Report September 2026
TikTok allows users to create, share and watch short-form videos and live content, primarily for entertainment purposes
Advertising
Commitment 1
Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 1.1 Measure 1.2 Measure 1.3 Measure 1.4 Measure 1.5 Measure 1.6
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 1.1
Relevant Signatories involved in the selling of advertising, inclusive of media platforms, publishers and ad tech companies, will deploy, disclose, and enforce policies with the aims of: - first avoiding the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation to protect the integrity of advertising supported businesses - second taking meaningful enforcement and remediation steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or on sources that repeatedly violate these policies; and - third adopting measures to enable the verification of the landing / destination pages of ads and origin of ad placement.
Measure 1.2
Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will tighten eligibility requirements and content review processes for content monetisation and ad revenue share programmes on their services as necessary to effectively scrutinise parties and bar participation by actors who systematically post content or engage in behaviours which violate policies mentioned in Measure 1.1 that tackle Disinformation.
TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 Subscription Document.
Measure 1.3
Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.
QRE 1.3.1
Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.
Controls: We offer pre-campaign solutions to advertisers so they can put additional safeguards in place before their campaign goes live to mitigate the risk of their advertising being displayed adjacent to certain types of user-generated content. These measures are in addition to the Community Guidelines, which provide overarching rules around the types of content that can appear on TikTok and are eligible for the For You feed:
- TikTok Inventory Filter: This is our proprietary system, which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter, which is available in various EEA markets designated as fully or de minimis monetised on the TikTok app, and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the main system through which advertisers purchase ads. More details can be found here. The Inventory Filter is informed by industry standards and policies, which include topics that may be susceptible to disinformation. Additionally, this enables advertisers to:
- Selectively exclude unwanted or videos that do not align with their brand safety requirements from appearing next to their ads through TikTok's Video Exclusion List solution.
- Exclude specific profile pages from serving their Profile Feed ads through TikTok's Profile Feed Exclusion List.
- TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”): Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.
Transparency: We have partnered with third parties to offer post-campaign solutions that enable advertisers to assess the suitability of user content that ran immediately adjacent to their ad in the For You feed against their chosen brand suitability parameters:
- Zefr: Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform. Zefr aligns with industry standards.
- IAS: Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability, and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform. As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with industry standards.
- DoubleVerify: We are partnering with DoubleVerify to provide advertisers with media quality measurement for ads. DoubleVerify is working actively with us to expand its suite of brand suitability and media quality solutions on the platform.
Measure 1.4
Relevant Signatories responsible for the buying of advertising, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies, will place advertising through ad sellers that have taken effective, and transparent steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or in places that repeatedly publish Disinformation.
Measure 1.5
Relevant Signatories involved in the reporting of monetisation activities inclusive of media platforms, ad networks, and ad verification companies will take the necessary steps to give industry-recognised relevant independent third-party auditors commercially appropriate and fair access to their services and data in order to: - First, confirm the accuracy of first party reporting relative to monetisation and Disinformation, seeking alignment with regular audits performed under the DSA. - Second, accreditation services should assess the effectiveness of media platforms' policy enforcement, including Disinformation policies.
Measure 1.6
Relevant Signatories will advance the development, improve the availability, and take practical steps to advance the use of brand safety tools and partnerships, with the following goals: - To the degree commercially viable, relevant Signatories will provide options to integrate information and analysis from source-raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g., on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by ad buyers, namely advertisers and their agencies. - Advertisers, agencies, ad tech companies, and media platforms and publishers will take effective and reasonable steps to integrate the use of brand safety tools throughout the media planning, buying and reporting process, to avoid the placement of their advertising next to Disinformation content and/or in places or sources that repeatedly publish Disinformation. - Brand safety tool providers and rating services who categorise content and domains will provide reasonable transparency about the processes they use, insofar that they do not release commercially sensitive information or divulge trade secrets, and that they establish a mechanism for customer feedback and appeal.
Commitment 2
Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 2.1 Measure 2.2 Measure 2.3 Measure 2.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 2.1
Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.
QRE 2.1.1
Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.
- Health Misinformation
- Environment/Climate Misinformation
- Public Safety & Trust Misinformation
- Election Misinformation
- Other Misinformation
The policies provide clearer categorisation of misinformation types and build on the principles and enforcement experience of the policies previously set out in the H1 2025 report, enabling more consistent and targeted enforcement in line with evolving risks.
Our automated detection supports the enforcement of our new misinformation advertising policies, and we continue to develop our models to optimise operationalisation of the misinformation advertising policies.
We provide users with a simple and intuitive way to report advertisements in-app for breach of our misinformation advertising policies in the EEA.
Our advertiser account policies expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours, including prohibiting advertisers from circumventing, evading, or interfering with our advertising systems and processes.
SLI 2.1.1
Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.
We are pleased to be able to report on the ads removed for breach of our granular misinformation advertising policies. We have provided the political advertising enforcement metrics in the Elections Chapter of this Report.
Note that numbers have only been provided for monetised markets and are based on where the ads were displayed.
| Country | Number of ads removals under the granular misinformation ad policies |
|---|---|
| Austria | 19 |
| Belgium | 20 |
| Bulgaria | 1 |
| Croatia | 2 |
| Cyprus | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 7 |
| Denmark | 3 |
| Estonia | 0 |
| Finland | 1 |
| France | 37 |
| Germany | 12 |
| Greece | 0 |
| Hungary | 4 |
| Ireland | 0 |
| Italy | 19 |
| Latvia | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 |
| Malta | 0 |
| Netherlands | 8 |
| Poland | 3 |
| Portugal | 1 |
| Romania | 4 |
| Slovakia | 0 |
| Slovenia | 0 |
| Spain | 8 |
| Sweden | 2 |
| Iceland | 0 |
| Liechtenstein | 0 |
| Norway | 0 |
Measure 2.2
Relevant Signatories will develop tools, methods, or partnerships, which may include reference to independent information sources both public and proprietary (for instance partnerships with fact-checking or source rating organisations, or services providing indicators of trustworthiness, or proprietary methods developed internally) to identify content and sources as distributing harmful Disinformation, to identify and take action on ads and promoted content that violate advertising policies regarding Disinformation mentioned in Measure 2.1.
QRE 2.2.1
Signatories will describe the tools, methods, or partnerships they use to identify content and sources that contravene policies mentioned in Measure 2.1 - while being mindful of not disclosing information that'd make it easier for malicious actors to circumvent these tools, methods, or partnerships. Signatories will specify the independent information sources involved in these tools, methods, or partnerships.
Our granular misinformation advertising policies currently cover:
- Health Misinformation
- Environment/Climate Misinformation
- Public Safety & Trust Misinformation
- Election Misinformation
- Other Misinformation
We provide users with a simple and intuitive way to report advertisements in-app for breach of our Advertising Policies including for misinformation in the EEA.
- By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking and holding for 3 seconds) on the advertisement and selecting the “Report” option.
- By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the advertisement and then selecting the “Report” option.
Measure 2.3
Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.
QRE 2.3.1
Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.
Our granular misinformation advertising policies launched currently cover:
- Health Misinformation
- Environment/Climate Misinformation
- Public Safety & Trust Misinformation
- Election Misinformation
- Other Misinformation
- By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking and holding for 3 seconds) on the advertisement and selecting the “Report” option.
- By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the advertisement and then selecting the “Report” option.
Measure 2.4
Relevant Signatories will provide relevant information to advertisers about which advertising policies have been violated when they reject or remove ads violating policies described in Measure 2.1 above or disable advertising accounts in application of these policies and clarify their procedures for appeal.
QRE 2.4.1
Signatories will describe how they provide information to advertisers about advertising policies they have violated and how advertisers can appeal these policies.
Commitment 3
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 3.1 Measure 3.2 Measure 3.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
- Optimising our collaboration framework with third-party fact-checking organisation in relation to advertising (i.e. Science Feedback); and
- Continuing to enhance detection within the advertising ecosystem through signal-sharing to improve our internal databases.
Measure 3.1
Relevant Signatories will cooperate with platforms, advertising supply chain players, source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checking organisations, advertisers and any other actors active in the online monetisation value chain, to facilitate the integration and flow of information, in particular information relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation, in full respect of all relevant data protection rules and confidentiality agreements.
QRE 3.1.1
Signatories will outline how they work with others across industry and civil society to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation.
Measure 3.2
Relevant Signatories will exchange among themselves information on Disinformation trends and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), via the Code Task-force, GARM, IAB Europe, or other relevant fora. This will include sharing insights on new techniques or threats observed by Relevant Signatories, discussing case studies, and other means of improving capabilities and steps to help remove Disinformation across the advertising supply chain - potentially including real-time technical capabilities.
QRE 3.2.1
Signatories will report on their discussions within fora mentioned in Measure 3.2, being mindful of not disclosing information that is confidential and/or that may be used by malicious actors to circumvent the defences set by Signatories and others across the advertising supply chain. This could include, for instance, information about the fora Signatories engaged in; about the kinds of information they shared; and about the learnings they derived from these exchanges.
We continue to share relevant insights and metrics within our quarterly transparency reports, which aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We remain supportive of close industry collaboration to ensure alignment and clarity in reporting against the Code’s requirements.
Measure 3.3
Relevant Signatories will integrate the work of or collaborate with relevant third-party organisations, such as independent source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or open-source investigators, in order to reduce monetisation of Disinformation and avoid the dissemination of advertising containing Disinformation.
QRE 3.3.1
Signatories will report on the collaborations and integrations relevant to their work with organisations mentioned.
Political Advertising
Commitment 4
Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 4.1
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 4.1
Relevant Signatories commit to define "political and issue advertising" in this section in line with the definition of "political advertising" set out in the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.
QRE 4.1.1
Relevant Signatories will declare the relevant scope of their commitment at the time of reporting and publish their relevant policies, demonstrating alignment with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.
QRE 4.1.2
After the first year of the Code's operation, Relevant Signatories will state whether they assess that further work with the Task-force is necessary and the mechanism for doing so, in line with Measure 4.2.
Commitment 5
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 5.1
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 6
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 6.1 Measure 6.2 Measure 6.3 Measure 6.4 Measure 6.5
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 7
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 7.1 Measure 7.2 Measure 7.3 Measure 7.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 8
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 8.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 9
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 9.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 10
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 10.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 13
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 13.1 Measure 13.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Integrity of Services
Commitment 14
In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
- Our 2025 Community Guidelines update went live on September 13, 2025, ensuring that they remain aligned with our internal policies and were in force during the reporting period.
- Our Harmful Misinformation policies are referenced under the hack and leak section. They have all been refined in H2 2025, and they continue to drive our work in combating harmful misinformation.
- We have enhanced our ability to detect covert influence operations, as detailed in our dedicated Covert Influence Operations Transparency Report available in our Trust & Safety Centre.
- We updated and refined our policies around Covert Influence Operations in order to stay agile to changing behaviours and tactics on the platform and to ensure more granular detail is enshrined in our policy rationales.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
N/A
Measure 14.1
Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.
QRE 14.1.1
Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.
TTPs which pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and the ways to make these assets seem credible:
Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies expressly prohibit account behaviours that may spam or mislead our community. These include:
- Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
- Bulk distribution of a high volume of spam; and
- Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes
We also do not allow impersonation, including:
- Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
- Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform
Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) and use of fake followers or subscribers
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies do not allow the trade or marketing of services that attempt to artificially increase engagement or deceive TikTok’s recommendation system. We do not allow our users to:
- facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
- provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
TikTok does not have pages, fora, or domains. TikTok has invite-only private group chats. Therefore, this TTP is not materially relevant and - in any case - is generally addressed through broader integrity measures such as our Integrity and Authenticity policies.
Account hijacking or Impersonation
As described above, our Integrity and Authenticity policies prohibit impersonation, which refers to accounts that pose as another real person or entity or present as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform. Our users are not allowed to use someone else's name, biographical details, or profile picture in a misleading manner.
In order to protect freedom of expression, we do allow accounts that are clearly parody, commentary, or fan-based, such as where the account name indicates that it is a fan, commentary, or parody account and not affiliated with the subject of the account. We continue to develop our policies to ensure that impersonation of entities (such as businesses or educational institutions, for example) is prohibited and that accounts which impersonate people or entities who are not on the platform are also prohibited.
Our Privacy and Security policies under our Community Guidelines address account hijacking. We expressly prohibit users from providing access to their account credentials to others or enabling others to conduct activities against our Community Guidelines. We do not allow access to any part of TikTok through unauthorised methods; attempts to obtain sensitive, confidential, commercial, or personal information; or any abuse of the security, integrity, or reliability of our platform. We also provide practical guidance to users if they have concerns that their account may have been hacked.
Our TikTok Shop Content Policy also prohibits impersonating other individuals or organisations to deceive or mislead users or make false representations. In addition, under TikTok Shop's Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) policy, creators must not use AI-generated content to impersonate celebrities, medical professionals, political figures, public figures or official authorities for product promotion.
TTPs which pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views:
Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. location spoofing or obfuscation), inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers), use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, and coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.
We address covert influence operations (CIOs) through our Covert Influence Operations (CIO) policy, which prohibits attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose.
We focus on behavioural signals and linkages between accounts and techniques to determine if actors are engaging in a coordinated effort to mislead our systems or community. We take continuous action against these attempts, including banning accounts found to be linked to previously disrupted networks. Our approach is supported by ongoing research into complex deceptive behaviours and iterative updates to our product and policy solutions to address emerging disinformation risks. We also publish regular transparency reports detailing the CIO networks we detect and remove, which are available in our Trust & Safety Centre here. For advertising-related CIO measures, please refer to Chapter 2.
TikTok Shop's Creator Fraud, Abuse and Misconduct Policy prohibits:
- Fake interactions, being activities that involve directly manipulating platform metrics or algorithms to artificially boost performance.
- Traffic manipulation, which involves generating traffic, exposure, or engagement through improper, deceptive, or non-genuine means.
- Inauthentic engagement behaviours, which involve deceptive or manipulative tactics intended to influence buyer behavior or artificially drive engagement.
TikTok Shop's Content Policy also prohibits certain forms of artificial amplification and coordinated distribution of e-commerce content. This includes creating multiple accounts to distribute the same e-commerce content, coordinated mass posting across multiple accounts, and the use of malicious software or modified code to artificially increase views, likes, followers, shares or comments.
Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
We have a number of policies that address hack-and-leak related threats, including:
- Our hack and leak policy aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities, and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures.
- Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation.
- Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure.
- Our misinformation policies prohibit:
- Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or incites panic, including falsely presenting past crisis events as recent or claiming that critical resources are unavailable during emergencies.
- Health misinformation that could cause significant harm, such as promoting unproven treatments that may be fatal, discouraging professional care for life-threatening conditions (e.g., vaccine effectiveness), or spreading false information about how such conditions are transmitted.
- Misinformation that denies the existence of climate change, misrepresents its causes, or contradicts its established environmental impact.
- Conspiracy theories or hoaxes that could cause significant harm, such as those that make a violent call to action or have links to previous violence.
Deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
Our ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy outlines our existing prohibitions on AIGC.
In accordance with our policy, we prohibit AIGC which features:
- Using the likeness of private figures without consent
- Sexualized, fetishized, or victimizing depictions
- AI-created likenesses made to bully or harass
- Accounts focused on AI images of youth in clothing suited for adults, or sexualized poses or facial expressions
- AIGC or significantly edited content that misleads about a matter of public importance, such as:
- Content made to look like it comes from a real news source
- A crisis event, like a natural disaster or conflict
- A public figure being degraded, harassed, or linked to criminal behavior
- A public figure taking political stances, supporting products, or commenting on public issues they haven't actually addressed
- A political endorsement or condemnation that never happened
- Any content that breaks our Community Guidelines, including those on impersonation, misinformation, and hate speech, even if it's AI-generated
TikTok Shop's AIGC policy also prohibits the use of AI-generated content that impersonates celebrities, medical professionals, political figures, public figures or official authorities for product promotion, including AI-generated deepfakes and other manipulated media.
Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
Under our Terms of Service and Commercial Disclosure and Paid Marketing section of our Community Guidelines, users posting about a brand or product in return for any payment or other incentive must disclose their content by enabling the Commercial Disclosure Toggle, which we make available for users. To support enforcement, we provide a reporting functionality for suspected undisclosed branded content, which triggers user prompts and encourages corrective action.
For TikTok Shop, creator commissions are paid through TikTok itself, meaning TikTok is aware whenever content contains a shoppable product link and the creator is remunerated. As a result, such content does not rely on user self-disclosure: the Commercial Disclosure Toggle is automatically enabled when a product link is added.
Our Political Advertising policy prohibits political advertising, including political branded content.
With regard to Advertising Policies, please refer to Chapter 2 concerning Misinformation Advertising Policies.
In addition, our CIO policy also applies to non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers where it is found that those messages or promotions formed part of a covert influence campaign.
QRE 14.1.2
Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.
We have created and used detection models and rule engines that:
- Prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
- Remove registered accounts based on certain signals (i.e., uncommon behaviour on the platform).
We also manually monitor user reports of inauthentic accounts in order to detect larger clusters or similar inauthentic behaviours.
Given the complex nature of the TTPs, human moderation is critical to success in assessing and addressing identified violations. We provide our moderation teams with detailed guidance on how to apply the Integrity and Authenticity policies in our Community Guidelines, allowing them to route new or evolving content to our fact-checking partners for assessment.
In addition, where content reaches certain popularity levels in terms of the number of video views, it will be flagged for further review given the increase in potential harm if the content is found to be in breach of our Community Guidelines, including our Integrity and Authenticity policies.
Furthermore, during this reporting period, we improved automated detection and enforcement of our ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy, effectively increasing the number of videos removed for policy violations. This also decreased the number of views per video over the reporting period, demonstrating an effective control strategy as the scope of enforcement increased.
We've built international trust and safety teams with specialised expertise across threat intelligence, security, law enforcement, and data science to work on influence operations. These teams are trained to continuously pursue and analyse on-platform technical signals as well as leads from external sources to detect and investigate potential CIOs. They also collaborate with external intelligence vendors to support specific investigations on a case-by-case basis.
Accounts that engage in influence operations often avoid posting content that would be violative of platforms' guidelines by itself. That's why we focus on accounts' behaviour and technical linkages, specifically looking for evidence that:
- They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or work together to spread the same narrative.
- They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location or use fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
- They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision-making, beliefs, and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.
These criteria are aligned with industry standards and guidance from the experts we regularly consult with. They're particularly important to help us distinguish malicious, inauthentic coordination from authentic interactions that are part of healthy and open communities.
Measure 14.2
Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.
QRE 14.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.
In further details:
- Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- If we determine someone has engaged in any deceptive account behaviours, we will ban the account, and may ban any new accounts that are created. We also issue warnings to users of suspected impersonation accounts and do not recommend those accounts on our For You Feed.
- Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) and use of fake followers or subscribers
- If we become aware of accounts or content with inauthentically inflated metrics, we will remove the associated fake followers or likes. Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase engagement metrics, such as “like-for-like” promises and false incentives for engaging with content (to increase gifts, followers, likes, views, or other engagement metrics) is ineligible for our For You feed.
- Account hijacking or Impersonation
- If we determine someone has engaged in any account hijacking or impersonation, we will ban the account, and may ban any new accounts that are created. We also issue warnings to users of suspected impersonation accounts and do not recommend those accounts on our For You Feed.
- Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. location spoofing or obfuscation), inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers), use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, and coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.
- Targeting vulnerable recipients via deceptive practices in order to manipulate the information environment is covered by our policy on CIO. We use in-depth analysis to assess for technical signals such as location obfuscation and inauthentic coordination in these investigations. Where our teams have the necessary high degree of confidence that an account is engaged in CIO or is connected to networks we took down in the past as part of a CIO, it is removed from our Platform.
- Engaging in a “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- If we determine with high confidence that someone has posted private, sensitive, or confidential information that was obtained without consent, we will remove the content from the platform. We will further ban accounts that posted the material if it is part of a wider covert influence operation. However, we allow limited discussion or distribution of such materials if there's a clear public interest and the content follows journalistic best practices.
- Deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- We remove content that was generated or significantly edited by AI or AI-assisted tools to falsely or misleadingly depict authoritative information, critical events, elections, and public figures. If we determine that the account has repeatedly posted such content, we will ban the account as well.
- If we determine that e-commerce content does not comply with TikTok Shop's Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) policy, we take enforcement action, including the removal of product anchors from content and other account-level measures depending on the nature and severity of the violation.
- Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- For undisclosed branded content, we remind the user who posted the suspected undisclosed branded content of our requirements and prompt them to turn the Commercial Disclosure Toggle on if required.
- Where TikTok suspects content is political branded content and TikTok has high confidence that an individual was paid to post political content, TikTok removes the content. Where TikTok has only medium confidence, the content is restricted from appearing in the For You Feed.
- For TikTok Shop, creator commissions are paid through TikTok itself, meaning TikTok is aware whenever content contains a shoppable product link and the creator is remunerated. As a result, such content does not rely on user self-disclosure: the Commercial Disclosure Toggle is automatically enabled when a product link is added.
The implementation of our policies is also ensured through enforcement measures applied in all EEA countries.
Similarly, where our teams have a high degree of confidence that specific content violates one of our TTPs-related policies (See QRE 14.1.1), such content is removed from TikTok.
TTP OR ACTION1
TTP No. 1: Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Methodology of data measurement
We have based the number on: (i) fake accounts removed; and (ii) followers of the fake accounts (identified at the time of removal of the fake account), in the country the fake account was last active in.
For SLI 14.2.4, we provide a ratio of the monthly average of fake accounts removed over monthly active users in the EU, based on the latest publication of monthly active users by TikTok under the DSA, in order to better reflect TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service.
TTP OR ACTION 2
TTP no. 2: Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
Methodology of data measurement:
We based the number of fake likes that we removed on the country of registration of the user. We also based the number of fake likes prevented on the country of registration of the user.
H1 2026 figures for this metric reflect certain data limitations experienced earlier in the reporting period, impacting data quality and completeness. As such, the totals presented may not fully capture the overall scope of activity under this TTP.
TTP OR ACTION 3
TTP No. 3: Use of fake followers or subscribers
Methodology of data measurement:
We based the number of fake followers that we removed on the country of registration of the user. We also based the number of fake followers prevented on the country of registration of the user.
H1 2026 figures for this metric reflect certain data limitations experienced earlier in the reporting period, impacting data quality and completeness. As such, the totals presented may not fully capture the overall scope of activity under this TTP.
TTP OR ACTION 4
TTP No. 4: Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
TikTok does not have pages, fora, or domains. TikTok has invite-only private group chats. Therefore, this TTP is not materially relevant and - in any case - is generally addressed through broader integrity measures such as our Integrity and Authenticity policies.
TTP OR ACTION 5
TTP No. 5: Account hijacking or impersonation
Methodology of data measurement:
The number of accounts removed under our impersonation policy is based on the approximate location of the users. We have updated our methodology to report the ratio of monthly average impersonation accounts banned over monthly active users, based on the latest publication of monthly active users, in order to better reflect TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service.
TTP OR ACTION 6
TTP No. 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
Methodology of data measurement:
The number of new CIO network discoveries found to be targeting European audiences relates to our public disclosures for the period January 1 to June 30 2026. We have categorised disrupted CIO networks by the country we assess that the network targeted. We have included any network which we assess to have targeted one or more European markets, or have operated from an EU market. We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our transparency reports here.
CIO networks identified and removed are detailed below, including the assessed geographic location of network operation and the assessed target audience of the network, which we assess via technical and behavioural evidence from proprietary and open sources. The number of followers of CIO networks has been based on the number of accounts that followed any account within a network as of the date of that network’s removal.
January 1- June 30 2026
Hungary - 107 Accounts; 37,070 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Hungary and targeted a Hungarian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the Tisza political party. The network was found to post AI-generated content to reinforce its messaging.
Ukraine - 45 Accounts; 47,114 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted European audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to undermine certain European political figures such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as news accounts.
Hungary - 91 Accounts; 246 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Hungary and targeted a Hungarian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the Tisza political party. The network was found to create fictitious personas using stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures.
Hungary - 62 Accounts; 1,452 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Hungary and targeted a Hungarian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the Fidesz political party. The network was found to create fictitious personas using profile pictures which we assess to be AI-generated.
Bulgaria - 34 Accounts; 66,763 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Bulgaria and targeted a Bulgarian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in support of the DPS-NN political party, within the context of the April 2026 Bulgarian parliamentary elections. The network was found to coordinate across multiple online platforms.
Malta - 9 Accounts; 433 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Malta and targeted a Maltese audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives favorable to the Labor Party within the context of the 2026 Maltese general elections. The network was found to create accounts that it presented as news accounts.
China - 41 Accounts; 195,566 Followers. We assess that this network operated from China and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially undermine public perception of US foreign policy decisions. The network was found to create fictitious personas that catered to each market using English and Chinese language videos.
Germany - 51 Accounts; 46,388 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives supporting the Alternative for Germany (AfD) political party. The network was found to create duplicative profiles in order to artificially amplify its narratives.
France - 47 Accounts; 7,281 Followers. We assess that this network operated from France and targeted audiences in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify anti-Azerbaijan narratives. The network was found to post in multiple languages, including Russian, Armenian and Georgian.
Pakistan - 26 Accounts; 31,880 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Pakistan and targeted the Pakistani and Indian diasporas globally. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives favorable to Pakistan, while criticizing India and the United Kingdom. We assess that the network used hashtags not commonly used within Pakistan in order to target a more global audience.
Kazakhstan - 6 Accounts; 492,739 Followers. We assess that this network operated from Kazakhstan and targeted a global English-speaking audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives critical of U.S. foreign policy. The network was found to repurpose accounts with existing high engagement in order to post content in support of its strategic aims.
TTP OR ACTION 7
TTP No. 7: Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
We have based the following numbers on the country in which the video was posted: videos removed because of violations of the Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy. The number of views of videos removed because of violation of each of these policies is based on the approximate location of the user.
TTP OR ACTION 8
TTP No. 8: Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6. We have also provided data on violations of our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy under TTP No. 7. Our hack and leak policy was launched in H1 2024, but we do not have meaningful metrics under this policy to report for H1 2026.
TTP OR ACTION 9
TTP No. 9: Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
In H2 2025, we launched the Evasive Techniques policy, which combats methods designed to evade moderation systems.
We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.
TTP OR ACTION 10
TTP No. 10: Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.
TTP OR ACTION 11
TTP No. 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
Methodology of data measurement:
We are unable to provide this metric due to insufficient data available for the reporting period.
TTP OR ACTION 12
TTP No. 12: Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts
We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.
SLI 14.2.1
Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken at the Member State level under policies addressing each of the TTPs as well as information on the type of content.
| Country | Number of fake accounts removed | Number of followers of fake accounts identified at the time of removal | Ratio of monthly average of Fake accounts over monthly active users | Number of fake likes removed | Number of fake likes prevented | Number of fake followers removed | Number of fake follows prevented | Number of account banned under impersonation policy | Impersonation accounts over monthly active users | Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Number of views of videos removed because of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "Creator labeled as AI-generated" | Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "AI-generated" |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 970509 | 121661 | 17057524 | 8663536 | 11390859 | 3749861 | 850 | 11719 | 3734469 | 242193 | 1352933 | ||
| Belgium | 1182975 | 175652 | 33605557 | 15915836 | 22137682 | 6413789 | 1441 | 10754 | 3425892 | 270806 | 2128005 | ||
| Bulgaria | 689877 | 65405 | 8793507 | 17878056 | 3813327 | 6509936 | 827 | 42241 | 1708891 | 111688 | 3068025 | ||
| Croatia | 694966 | 47332 | 6315458 | 4672220 | 3128259 | 1394627 | 316 | 16366 | 722675 | 41838 | 448236 | ||
| Cyprus | 356703 | 45024 | 21419126 | 1947853 | 3746433 | 643893 | 211 | 4826 | 912258 | 105076 | 395260 | ||
| Czech Republic | 647844 | 125046 | 6906117 | 7512112 | 8180464 | 2416099 | 754 | 7177 | 10261960 | 92420 | 1463723 | ||
| Denmark | 1009026 | 65251 | 7251754 | 4643146 | 5817279 | 3017345 | 628 | 15176 | 8686782 | 101929 | 664029 | ||
| Estonia | 761476 | 41967 | 2478309 | 2201824 | 1470272 | 967121 | 178 | 4085 | 2056073 | 31497 | 223889 | ||
| Finland | 1251547 | 199189 | 15179538 | 5786710 | 4549158 | 1951041 | 692 | 5372 | 4735509 | 120414 | 645357 | ||
| France | 4754983 | 2723599 | 203055875 | 125365075 | 169273428 | 98736923 | 10362 | 63056 | 94228457 | 2897475 | 13544507 | ||
| Germany | 6651150 | 3087831 | 222641814 | 276744482 | 236112589 | 108719977 | 10732 | 99159 | 128170986 | 3698070 | 15869550 | ||
| Greece | 1269946 | 207504 | 13148363 | 10549929 | 7150537 | 7479380 | 807 | 5441 | 867743 | 301057 | 2293565 | ||
| Hungary | 239605 | 63867 | 7627999 | 8971004 | 5744976 | 4567699 | 629 | 14592 | 3097025 | 225171 | 2683504 | ||
| Ireland | 443832 | 99793 | 25037665 | 7587545 | 7076834 | 18470877 | 1088 | 6948 | 1363165 | 71710 | 575280 | ||
| Italy | 1352923 | 571400 | 84279565 | 69958143 | 53195455 | 87949421 | 5227 | 37133 | 13472997 | 1833428 | 12282164 | ||
| Latvia | 201734 | 40532 | 7957686 | 3215055 | 2274410 | 1437015 | 273 | 4805 | 5250952 | 63249 | 546291 | ||
| Lithuania | 163058 | 63406 | 4287887 | 4004511 | 5452681 | 1238838 | 378 | 4861 | 3304486 | 112851 | 1717055 | ||
| Luxembourg | 410838 | 57750 | 1348163 | 1821560 | 1682553 | 1133166 | 112 | 2078 | 23604 | 20863 | 130628 | ||
| Malta | 269526 | 14785 | 5716023 | 1107908 | 885786 | 215705 | 0 | 910 | 1778433 | 17863 | 124796 | ||
| Netherlands | 1311942 | 815914 | 103826313 | 44523502 | 40994677 | 25049518 | 4678 | 85596 | 33693554 | 640312 | 2910540 | ||
| Poland | 1956516 | 575722 | 28439166 | 43801134 | 22161275 | 16669449 | 5140 | 42850 | 30661634 | 455100 | 5781369 | ||
| Portugal | 350462 | 386145 | 11714277 | 13147308 | 6973708 | 9044549 | 1095 | 11637 | 2861651 | 248864 | 2708704 | ||
| Romania | 960855 | 180313 | 34964776 | 29599787 | 20094090 | 26393859 | 3046 | 27051 | 6105146 | 533887 | 9301075 | ||
| Slovakia | 465397 | 49613 | 2819307 | 5504841 | 1976213 | 1644686 | 471 | 4077 | 146257 | 38502 | 1095414 | ||
| Slovenia | 376600 | 66800 | 1587706 | 3738400 | 1367979 | 6146667 | 175 | 1570 | 273450 | 24673 | 208580 | ||
| Spain | 3413344 | 811709 | 72291234 | 59864715 | 52866819 | 34466332 | 5382 | 45863 | 35355202 | 1960427 | 12916276 | ||
| Sweden | 2063601 | 239303 | 27053458 | 51504755 | 15038610 | 6068181 | 1554 | 10924 | 26469283 | 291759 | 1386206 | ||
| Iceland | 49563 | 21062 | 691841 | 413196 | 527905 | 456623 | 68 | 568 | 339717 | 4817 | 39335 | ||
| Liechtenstein | 30540 | 4757 | 2201447 | 33424 | 61053 | 7324 | 0 | 63 | 0 | 436 | 2001 | ||
| Norway | 2311190 | 64496 | 18254336 | 4840856 | 6628315 | 2507450 | 901 | 27016 | 1668462 | 118845 | 612409 |
Measure 14.3
Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.
QRE 14.3.1
Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.
Commitment 15
Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 15.1
Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.
QRE 15.1.1
In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.
In line with our policy, users must proactively disclose when their content is AI-generated or manipulated but shows realistic scenes (i.e. fake people, places, or events that look like they are real). Our AI toggle allows users to self-disclose AI-generated content when posting. When this has been turned on, a tag “Creator labelled as AI-generated” is displayed to users. Alternatively, this can be done through the use of a sticker or caption, such as ‘synthetic’, ‘fake’, ‘not real’, or ‘altered’.
We also automatically label content made with TikTok effects if they use AI. TikTok may automatically apply the "AI-generated" label to content we identify as completely generated or significantly edited with AI. This may happen when a creator uses TikTok AI effects or uploads AI-generated content that has Content Credentials attached, a technology from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). Content Credentials attach metadata to content that we can use to recognize and label AIGC instantly. Once content is labeled as AI-generated with an auto-label, users are unable to remove the label from the post.
Under our AIGC policy, we do not allow:
- Using the likeness of private figures without consent
- Sexualized, fetishized, or victimizing depictions
- AI-created likenesses made to bully or harass
- Accounts focused on AI images of youth in clothing suited for adults, or sexualized poses or facial expressions
- AIGC or significantly edited content that misleads about a matter of public importance, such as:
- Content made to look like it comes from a real news source
- A crisis event, like a natural disaster or conflict
- A public figure being degraded, harassed, or linked to criminal behavior
- A public figure taking political stances, supporting products, or commenting on public issues they haven't actually addressed
- A political endorsement or condemnation that never happened
- Any content that breaks our Community Guidelines, including those on impersonation, misinformation, and hate speech, even if it's AI-generated
In H1 2026 we updated our Enforcement Guidance for the Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy to account for the latest AIGC trends on our platform.
TikTok Shop operates a separate dedicated AIGC policy applicable to e-commerce videos and livestreams. Under this policy, creators are required to disclose AI-generated content, including through TikTok's AI-generated content disclosure tools where applicable. Under the TikTok Shop AIGC policy, the following are prohibited:
- AI-generated content that impersonates or misrepresents celebrities, medical professionals, political figures, public figures, or official authorities for product promotion;
- AI-generated content that exaggerates, fabricates or misrepresents product functions, efficacy, attributes or performance;
- AI-generated content that uses fear-based health imagery or otherwise presents misleading health-related outcomes; and
- Certain forms of high-volume, repetitive AI-generated promotional content.
In addition, in relation to product listings, sellers are required to ensure that the product image depicts the actual product being offered for sale.
Measure 15.2
Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.
QRE 15.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.
- We have in place internal guidelines on Algorithmic Fairness that are developed with adherence to our commitment to human rights as outlined here: https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/en/upholding-human-rights
- We have continued to take a risk-based approach to monitoring our AI content moderation systems for fairness, and conducting technical fairness assessments where they meet certain risk-based thresholds.
Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 16.1
Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.
QRE 16.1.1
Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.
To provide more regular and detailed updates about the CIO we disrupt to others, we have a dedicated report on covert influence operations, available in TikTok’s Trust & Safety Centre. The insights and metrics in this report aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We also review relevant insights and metrics from other industry peers to cross-compare for any similar behaviour on TikTok.
We continue to engage in the subgroups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission, including:
- Cross-industry forums such as EU elections roundtables in markets including Denmark and Slovenia;
As we have detailed in other chapters to this report, we have robust advertising policies in place and have established joint operating procedures between specialist CIO investigations teams and Business Integrity teams to work on joint investigations of CIOs involving ads.
Measure 16.2
Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.
QRE 16.2.1
As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.
Empowering Users
Commitment 17
In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 17.1
Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.
QRE 17.1.1
Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.
We work with external experts to combat harmful misinformation. For example, we work with our global fact-checking partners, taking into account their feedback to continually identify new topics and consider which tools may be best suited for raising awareness around that topic.
We also deploy a combination of in-app user intervention tools on topical issues such as elections, Holocaust Education, and the War in Ukraine. These tools include:
- Video notice tags: An information bar at the bottom of a video which is automatically applied to a specific word or hashtag (or set of hashtags). The information bar is clickable and invites users to “Learn more about [the topic]”. Users will be directed to an in-app guide, or reliable third party resource, as appropriate.
- Search intervention: If users search for terms associated with a topic, they will be presented with a banner encouraging them to verify the facts and providing a link to a trusted source of information. Search interventions are not deployed for search terms that violate our Community Guidelines, which are actioned according to our policies.
TikTok Shop also provides educational resources for sellers and creators through TikTok Shop Academy and the Policy Centre. These resources provide information on platform policies, compliance requirements and responsible content practices relevant to TikTok Shop.
We have updated our methodology for this COCD report to include an additional Holocaust misinformation campaign in the data we provide below.
Measure 17.2
Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.
QRE 17.2.1
Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.
Below are examples of the campaigns we have most recently run in-app which have leveraged a number of the intervention tools outlined above.
(I) Promoting election integrity. As well as the election integrity pages on TikTok's Safety Center and Transparency Center, and the dedicated Global Elections Hub, we launched media literacy campaigns in advance of several elections in the EU and wider Europe.
- Portugal Presidential Election 2026: From 9 Dec 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2026 Portugal presidential election, which contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Polígrafo.
- Aragon (Spain) Regional Election: From 2 Feb 2026, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Aragon local election, which contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to the local election office website.
- German State Elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz 2026: From 9 Feb 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the German state elections taking place in March 2026, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation dpa.
- Castile and Leon (Spain) Regional Election: From 23 Feb 2026, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Castile and Leon local election, which contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to the local election office website.
- France Municipal Elections 2026: From 4 Feb 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the France municipal elections, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation, including videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Agence France-Presse (AFP).
- Netherlands Municipal Election: From 18 Feb 2026, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Netherlands’ municipal elections, which contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to the local election office website and to isdatechtzo.nl for digital literacy resources.
- Slovenia Parliamentary Election 2026: From 19 Feb 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Slovenia parliamentary election, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation.
- Denmark General Election 2026: From 11 March 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Denmark general election. The centre contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation.
- Hungary Parliamentary Election 2026: From 10 March 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Hungary parliamentary election, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation.
- Bulgaria Parliamentary Election 2026: From 19 April 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Bulgaria parliamentary election, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation.
- Andalusia (Spain) Regional Election: From 28 April 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Andalusia election, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation, including videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Newtral.
- Cyprus Parliamentary Election 2026: From 8 May 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Cyprus parliamentary election, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation.
- Malta General Election 2026: From 8 May 2026, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the Malta general election, which contained a section providing tips for spotting misinformation.
- New Caledonia (France) Election: From 17 June 2026, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the elections in New Caledonia, which contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to the local election office website.
(II) Media literacy (General). We continue our ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in the EU in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners, spanning 14 countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal).
(III) Media literacy (War in Ukraine). We continue to serve 17 localised media literacy campaigns specific to the war in Ukraine in: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechia, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Austria, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
- Partnered with Lead Stories: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
- Partnered with fakenews.pl: Poland.
- Partnered with Correctiv: Germany, Austria.
Through these campaigns, users searching for keywords relating to the war in Ukraine on TikTok are directed to tips prepared in partnership with local media literacy bodies and our trusted fact-checking partners, to help them identify misinformation and prevent its spread on the platform.
(IV) Israel-Hamas conflict. To help raise awareness and to protect our users, we have search interventions that are triggered when users search for neutral terms related to this topic (e.g. Israel, Palestine). These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also direct them to well-being resources.
- On 1 March 2026, we expanded our Rapidly Changing Events search guide to include keywords related to the conflict in Iran.
- The Rapidly Changing Events search intervention that related to the Israel/Hamas conflict, and subsequently expanded to include the Iran conflict, was ended on 11 June 2026.
SLI 17.2.1
Relevant Signatories report on number of media literacy and awareness raising activities organised and or participated in and will share quantitative information pertinent to show the effects of the campaigns they build or support at the Member State level.
| Country | Total number of impressions of the H5 Page (Views generated between January 1 and June 30, 2026. | Number of impressions of the search intervention | Number of clicks on the search intervention | Click through rate of the search intervention |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | 764 | 242468 | 1087 | 0.45% |
| Finland | 1109 | 186749 | 2051 | 1.1% |
| France | 62921 | 27832706 | 83877 | 0.3% |
| Germany | 18392 | 8592576 | 32445 | 0.38% |
| Ireland | 1064 | 296704 | 2003 | 0.68% |
| Italy | 1666 | 513261 | 2706 | 0.53% |
| Netherlands | 12572 | 3347885 | 19401 | 0.58% |
| Poland | 10384 | 13917257 | 100745 | 0.72% |
| Portugal | 9004 | 5389311 | 19453 | 0.36% |
| Romania | 8786 | 489946 | 2512 | 0.51% |
| Spain | 16222 | 12288223 | 31930 | 0.26% |
| Sweden | 1806 | 383190 | 3279 | 0.86% |
Measure 17.3
For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.
QRE 17.3.1
Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.
(I) Promoting election integrity.
We partner with various media organisations and fact-checkers to promote election integrity on TikTok. For more detail about the input our fact-checking partners provide please refer to QRE 30.1.3.
During this reporting period, we worked with European fact-checkers and media literacy organisations on 4 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns, in advance of elections, through our in-app Election Centers:
- Portugal (local election): Polígrafo
- Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany State Elections) - Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
- France (Municipal Elections) - Agence France-Presse (AFP)
- Andalusia (Spain Regional Election) - Newtral
(II) War in Ukraine.
We continue to run our media literacy campaigns about the war in Ukraine, developed in partnership with our media literacy partners Correctiv in Austria and Germany, Fakenews.pl in Poland and Lead Stories in Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania. This campaign is also active in Czechia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria.
Commitment 18
Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 18.1 Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 18.1
Relevant Signatories will take measures to mitigate risks of their services fuelling the viral spread of harmful Disinformation, such as: recommender systems designed to improve the prominence of authoritative information and reduce the prominence of Disinformation based on clear and transparent methods and approaches for defining the criteria for authoritative information; other systemic approaches in the design of their products, policies, or processes, such as pre-testing.
Measure 18.2
Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.
QRE 18.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.
Specifically, our policies do not allow:
- Misinformation
- Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or incites panic about a crisis event or emergency, including falsely presenting past crisis events as recent or claiming that critical resources are unavailable during emergencies
- Health misinformation that could cause significant harm, such as promoting unproven treatments that may be fatal, discouraging professional care for life-threatening conditions (e.g., vaccine effectiveness), or spreading false information about how such conditions are transmitted
- Misinformation that denies the existence of climate change, misrepresents its causes, or contradicts its established environmental impact
- Conspiracy theories or hoaxes that could cause significant harm, such as those that make a violent call to action or have links to previous violence
- Civic and Election Integrity
- Election misinformation, including:
- How, when, and where to vote or register to vote
- Voter eligibility or candidate qualifications
- Laws or procedures for elections, referendums, ballot initiatives, or censuses
- Election results
- Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)
- Using the likeness of private figures without consent
- Sexualized, fetishized, or victimizing depictions
- AI-created likenesses made to bully or harass
- Accounts focused on AI images of youth in clothing suited for adults, or sexualized poses or facial expressions
- AIGC or significantly edited content that misleads about a matter of public importance, such as:
- Content made to look like it comes from a real news source
- A crisis event, like a natural disaster or conflict
- A public figure being degraded, harassed, or linked to criminal behavior
- A public figure taking political stances, supporting products, or commenting on public issues they haven't actually addressed
- A political endorsement or condemnation that never happened
- Any content that breaks our Community Guidelines, including those on impersonation, misinformation, and hate speech, even if it's AI-generated
- Fake Engagement
- Facilitating the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes.
- Providing instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.
We have made clear to our users here that the following content is ineligible for the For You feed:
- Misinformation
- Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society".
- Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness.
- Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest.
- Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study.
- Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event.
- Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review.
- Civic and Election Integrity
- Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied.
- Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill.
- Fake Engagement
- Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content.
As outlined under Commitment 14, we also remove accounts that seek to mislead people or use TikTok to deceptively sway public opinion. These activities range from inauthentic or fake account creation, to more sophisticated efforts to undermine public trust.
TikTok Shop. We maintain policies to prohibit harmful false or misleading information on TikTok Shop. These include the TikTok Shop Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) policy and Misleading Functionality and Effect policies. These policies are described in more detail in Measure 14. Under these policies, creators and sellers must not use AI-generated or manipulated content, editing techniques, special effects or other representations that mislead users as to a product's functionality, attributes, effects, performance or expected results. TikTok Shop also prohibits certain misleading health-related claims, including claims that products can cure, treat, prevent or eliminate medical conditions or symptoms
We have policy experts within our Trust and Safety team dedicated to the topic of integrity and authenticity. They continually keep these policies under review and collaborate with external partners and experts to understand whether updates or new policies are required and ensure they are informed by a diversity of perspectives, expertise, and lived experiences.
Enforcing our policies. We remove content – including video, audio, livestream, images, comments, links, or other text – that violates our Integrity and Authenticity policies. Individuals are notified of our decisions and can appeal them if they believe no violation has occurred. We also make clear in our Community Guidelines that we will temporarily or permanently ban accounts and/or users that are involved in serious or repeated violations, including violations of our Integrity and Authenticity policies. For TikTok Shop content, enforcement measures may also include limiting recommendation or distribution of content through Feeds, Shop Tab, or Search, removing product anchors, and/or restricting creators' e-commerce permissions. As with our other policies, enforcement is applied proportionately, taking into account the severity and pattern of non-compliance.
We are pleased to include in this report the number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the relevant Integrity and Authenticity policies.
SLI 18.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).
We have based the following numbers on the country in which the video was posted: videos removed because of violations of our Misinformation, Civic and Election Integrity and Edited media and AIGC policies.
The number of views of videos removed because of violation of each of these policies is based on the approximate location of the user.
We also updated the methodology on the number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under our Misinformation policy.
For this report, we are also including TikTok Shop metrics under COCD for the first time. Under SLI 18.2.1, we are sharing the number of actions taken on TikTok Shop under the relevant AIGC and misinformation policies.
On 15 June 2026, we launched TikTok Shop in eight additional EU member states: Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Austria, Greece, Portugal and Hungary. The metrics in this report include data for the TikTok Shop market launches covering the period from launch to the end of the reporting period.
| Country | Number of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy | Number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the Misinformation policy. | Number of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) | Number of actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Number of actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Misleading Functionality and Effect policy policy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 11308 | 3218475 | 4077 | 188 | 421509 | 11719 | 3734469 | 0 | 2 |
| Belgium | 15105 | 3976317 | 7162 | 328 | 149648 | 10754 | 3425892 | 0 | 2 |
| Bulgaria | 42197 | 4714923 | 5870 | 229 | 656676 | 42241 | 1708891 | ||
| Croatia | 9243 | 1958426 | 1210 | 73 | 3802 | 16366 | 722675 | ||
| Cyprus | 3222 | 1172909 | 1752 | 83 | 207 | 4826 | 912258 | ||
| Czech Republic | 10470 | 2537518 | 4305 | 150 | 29797 | 7177 | 10261960 | 1 | 8 |
| Denmark | 15725 | 1389364 | 2593 | 157 | 1309 | 15176 | 8686782 | ||
| Estonia | 1963 | 175119 | 826 | 55 | 13465 | 4085 | 2056073 | ||
| Finland | 5307 | 16740320 | 2373 | 105 | 193 | 5372 | 4735509 | ||
| France | 100530 | 123033306 | 50124 | 1093 | 2595543 | 63056 | 94228457 | 9212 | 3458 |
| Germany | 113943 | 94571527 | 57421 | 2443 | 6223320 | 99159 | 128170986 | 14772 | 2331 |
| Greece | 8404 | 6095813 | 7711 | 210 | 3938 | 5441 | 867743 | ||
| Hungary | 16159 | 10995548 | 3802 | 194 | 1125008 | 14592 | 3097025 | ||
| Ireland | 9383 | 402371 | 4076 | 206 | 2636 | 6948 | 1363165 | 18 | 57 |
| Italy | 41780 | 14807032 | 53760 | 1154 | 755531 | 37133 | 13472997 | 5674 | 1374 |
| Latvia | 3648 | 1357460 | 1427 | 62 | 2802 | 4805 | 5250952 | ||
| Lithuania | 3146 | 7321042 | 1533 | 106 | 19690 | 4861 | 3304486 | ||
| Luxembourg | 897 | 372475 | 354 | 30 | 49 | 2078 | 23604 | ||
| Malta | 501 | 26668 | 458 | 22 | 24709 | 910 | 1778433 | ||
| Netherlands | 80988 | 11906044 | 42591 | 817 | 55117 | 85596 | 33693554 | 2 | 21 |
| Poland | 63967 | 31092484 | 23880 | 880 | 3333956 | 42850 | 30661634 | 3 | 37 |
| Portugal | 11667 | 1374918 | 5248 | 257 | 612567 | 11637 | 2861651 | 11 | 11 |
| Romania | 47144 | 10399917 | 25016 | 3243 | 48434 | 27051 | 6105146 | ||
| Slovakia | 4076 | 2402576 | 1894 | 74 | 6274 | 4077 | 146257 | ||
| Slovenia | 1273 | 2094126 | 561 | 38 | 248 | 1570 | 273450 | ||
| Spain | 56000 | 26353206 | 43237 | 920 | 52512 | 45863 | 35355202 | 9441 | 2435 |
| Sweden | 13090 | 3654101 | 4836 | 210 | 219528 | 10924 | 26469283 | ||
| Iceland | 345 | 128459 | 218 | 9 | 205 | 568 | 339717 | ||
| Liechtenstein | 5 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 63 | 0 | ||
| Norway | 17075 | 2120896 | 2801 | 172 | 160 | 27016 | 1668462 |
Measure 18.3
Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.
Commitment 19
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 19.1
Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.
QRE 19.1.1
Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.
We make clear to users in our Terms of Service (section 4) and our Help Center article (and in our and Safety Center guide) that each account holder’s For You feed is based on a personalised recommendation system. As well as removing harmful misinformation content that violates our Community Guidelines, we take steps to avoid recommending certain categories of content that may not be appropriate for a broad audience, including general conspiracy theories and unverified information related to an emergency or unfolding event. We may also make some of this content harder to find in search.
Main parameters. The system recommends content by ranking content based on a combination of factors, including:
- User interactions (e.g. content users like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that users follow back);
- Content information (e.g. sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country the content was published in); and
- User information (e.g. device settings, language preferences, location, time zone and day, and device type).
The main parameters help us make predictions on the content users are likely to be interested in. Different factors can play a larger or smaller role in what’s recommended, and the importance – or weighting – of a factor can change over time. For many users, the time spent watching a specific video is generally weighted more heavily than other factors. These predictions are also influenced by the interactions of other people on TikTok who appear to have similar interests.
Users can access the “Why this video” feature, which allows them to see on any particular video that appears in their For You feed factors that influenced why it appeared. The feature essentially explains to users how past interactions on the platform have impacted the video they have been recommended.
TikTok Shop. TikTok Shop uses the same core recommendation parameters described above, namely user interactions, content information and user information. These factors are used to personalise recommendations across TikTok Shop features, including Feeds, Shop Tab and Search. Further information regarding TikTok Shop’s recommendation systems is available in the TikTok Help Center page titled ‘How TikTok Shop recommends content’, which is linked from the TikTok Shop Terms of Use.
User preferences. We also empower our users to customise their experience to their preferences and comfort.
For example, in the For You feed:
- Users can click on any video and select “not interested” to indicate that they do not want to see similar content.
- Users are able to automatically filter out specific words or hashtags from the content recommended to them (see here).
- Users are able to refresh their For You feed if they no longer feel like recommendations are relevant to them or are too similar. When the For You feed is refreshed, users view a number of new videos which include popular videos, and their interaction with these new videos will inform future recommendations.
- Users can also personalise their "For You" page through our Manage Topics feature. This allows users to adjust the frequency of content they see related to particular topics. The settings don't eliminate topics entirely but can influence how often they're recommended as peoples' interests evolve over time.
- As part of our obligations under the DSA (Article 38), we introduced non-personalized feeds on our platform, which enables our EU users to turn off personalisation so that feeds show non-personalised content (including TikTok Shop content). The For You feed will instead show popular videos in their region and internationally. See here.
Measure 19.2
Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.
SLI 19.2.1
Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.
The number of users who have filtered hashtags or a keyword to set preferences for For You feed, the number of times users clicked “not interested” in relation to the For You feed, and the number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh are all based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.
The number for videos tagged with AIGC label includes both automatic and creator-generated labeling. AIGC labelling is a tool that helps inform users about the content that is recommended to them.
The following metrics reflect how users interact with tools that TikTok makes available for users to influence and customise recommendations.
| Country | Number of users that filtered hashtags or words | Number of users that clicked on "not interested" | Number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh | Number of Videos tagged with AIGC label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 79581 | 1423257 | 52640 | 1595126 |
| Belgium | 122761 | 1901101 | 83694 | 2398811 |
| Bulgaria | 64907 | 1282340 | 47197 | 3179713 |
| Croatia | 38331 | 547873 | 22887 | 490074 |
| Cyprus | 19877 | 292189 | 15614 | 500336 |
| Czech Republic | 66773 | 1279910 | 37427 | 1556143 |
| Denmark | 47932 | 830450 | 30642 | 765958 |
| Estonia | 20407 | 262317 | 12441 | 255386 |
| Finland | 73960 | 909321 | 51941 | 765771 |
| France | 724990 | 11462004 | 449590 | 16441982 |
| Germany | 860636 | 12080787 | 573382 | 19567620 |
| Greece | 107543 | 1685674 | 89778 | 2594622 |
| Hungary | 65667 | 1497804 | 42982 | 2908675 |
| Ireland | 86060 | 1241931 | 73537 | 646990 |
| Italy | 461075 | 8683480 | 301800 | 14115592 |
| Latvia | 27123 | 578124 | 23813 | 609540 |
| Lithuania | 34860 | 704421 | 28890 | 1829906 |
| Luxembourg | 7491 | 116236 | 4294 | 151491 |
| Malta | 8206 | 153729 | 6534 | 142659 |
| Netherlands | 262002 | 4963767 | 193401 | 3550852 |
| Poland | 308148 | 5010960 | 219510 | 6236469 |
| Portugal | 105726 | 1386953 | 63010 | 2957568 |
| Romania | 172035 | 3715213 | 192428 | 9834962 |
| Slovakia | 29416 | 452807 | 17069 | 1133916 |
| Slovenia | 14875 | 266430 | 12339 | 233253 |
| Spain | 551153 | 9994444 | 349474 | 14876703 |
| Sweden | 126193 | 1983104 | 91940 | 1677965 |
| Iceland | 6683 | 78376 | 3943 | 44152 |
| Liechtenstein | 184 | 8264 | 278 | 2437 |
| Norway | 68484 | 930172 | 44812 | 731254 |
Commitment 21
Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 21.1 Measure 21.2 Measure 21.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 21.1
Relevant Signatories will further develop and apply policies, features, or programs across Member States and EU languages to help users benefit from the context and insights provided by independent fact-checkers or authoritative sources, for instance by means of labels, such as labels indicating fact-checker ratings, notices to users who try to share or previously shared the rated content, information panels, or by acting upon content notified by fact-checkers that violate their policies.
SLI 21.1.1
Relevant Signatories will report through meaningful metrics on actions taken under Measure 21.1, at the Member State level. At the minimum, the metrics will include: total impressions of fact-checks; ratio of impressions of fact-checks to original impressions of the fact-checked content–or if these are not pertinent to the implementation of fact-checking on their services, other equally pertinent metrics and an explanation of why those are more adequate.
The share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up indicates the percentage of users who do not share a video after seeing the label pop up. This metric is based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.
| Country | Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up) | Share of removals under misinformation policy | Share of proactive removals under misinformation policy | Share of video removals before any views under misinformation policy | Share of video removals within 24h by misinformation policy | Share of video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy | Share of proactive video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy | Share of video removals before any views under Civic and Election Integrity policy | Share of video removals within 24h under Civic and Election Integrity policy | % video removals under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | % proactive video removals under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | % video removals before any views under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | % video removals within 24h under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 30.5% | 52.2% | 99.7% | 90.5% | 96.5% | 0.9% | 99.5% | 91% | 97.5% | 54.1% | 99.7% | 95.6% | 97.5% |
| Belgium | 31% | 61.5% | 99.6% | 91.4% | 96% | 1.3% | 98.8% | 90.5% | 93% | 43.8% | 98.5% | 90.5% | 93% |
| Bulgaria | 30% | 49.8% | 99.9% | 96.9% | 99.3% | 0.3% | 95.6% | 78.2% | 99.4% | 49.9% | 100% | 98.9% | 99.4% |
| Croatia | 28.2% | 36.2% | 99.7% | 94.4% | 98.7% | 0.3% | 100% | 84.9% | 99.4% | 64% | 99.9% | 98.5% | 99.4% |
| Cyprus | 31.5% | 39.9% | 99.6% | 94.4% | 97.8% | 1% | 100% | 95.2% | 98.2% | 59.8% | 99.6% | 96.6% | 98.2% |
| Czech Republic | 29.2% | 50.3% | 99.5% | 80% | 96.3% | 0.7% | 100% | 86.7% | 97.8% | 34.5% | 99.5% | 95.1% | 97.8% |
| Denmark | 31.2% | 54.1% | 99.9% | 92.7% | 95.5% | 0.5% | 100% | 94.3% | 98.1% | 52.2% | 99.9% | 97.1% | 98.1% |
| Estonia | 29.5% | 31.6% | 99.7% | 84.2% | 97.5% | 0.9% | 98.2% | 94.5% | 98.8% | 65.8% | 99.7% | 97.3% | 98.8% |
| Finland | 33% | 48.7% | 99.5% | 83.5% | 96.9% | 1% | 100% | 94.3% | 96.9% | 49.3% | 99.5% | 95.1% | 96.9% |
| France | 30.6% | 64.3% | 99.4% | 82.2% | 94.3% | 0.7% | 97.7% | 81.2% | 93.2% | 40.3% | 98.9% | 90.4% | 93.2% |
| Germany | 33.6% | 55.3% | 99.4% | 85.5% | 95.6% | 1.2% | 98.3% | 84.2% | 94.8% | 48.1% | 98.7% | 91.7% | 94.8% |
| Greece | 30.1% | 60.9% | 99.6% | 79% | 96.7% | 1.5% | 100% | 84.8% | 94% | 39.4% | 99.3% | 88.9% | 94% |
| Hungary | 28.1% | 53% | 99.7% | 95.6% | 98.6% | 0.6% | 88.7% | 73.2% | 98.6% | 47.9% | 99.4% | 98.1% | 98.6% |
| Ireland | 33% | 57.3% | 99.8% | 92% | 97.7% | 1.3% | 100% | 87.9% | 96.6% | 42.4% | 99.7% | 93.7% | 96.6% |
| Italy | 34% | 55% | 99.6% | 91.4% | 96.5% | 1.5% | 98.4% | 86.4% | 95% | 48.9% | 99.3% | 92.8% | 95% |
| Latvia | 32.6% | 42.7% | 99.8% | 87.9% | 98.7% | 0.7% | 100% | 91.9% | 98.3% | 56.3% | 99.6% | 96.6% | 98.3% |
| Lithuania | 30.2% | 38.4% | 99.1% | 86.2% | 96.9% | 1.3% | 100% | 97.2% | 97.3% | 59.4% | 99.2% | 94.5% | 97.3% |
| Luxembourg | 26.5% | 31.1% | 99.9% | 92% | 96.3% | 1% | 100% | 76.7% | 98.2% | 72% | 100% | 96% | 98.2% |
| Malta | 29.1% | 36% | 99.6% | 93.6% | 96.4% | 1.6% | 100% | 68.2% | 95.3% | 65.3% | 99.7% | 93% | 95.3% |
| Netherlands | 29.7% | 62.5% | 99.7% | 96.2% | 98.3% | 0.6% | 98.5% | 92.5% | 98.5% | 66.1% | 99.3% | 97.5% | 98.5% |
| Poland | 27.5% | 63.1% | 99.5% | 77.3% | 97.6% | 0.9% | 98.6% | 72.7% | 97.7% | 42.2% | 99.2% | 93.7% | 97.7% |
| Portugal | 27.1% | 54.1% | 99.8% | 93% | 98% | 1.2% | 98.4% | 88.3% | 96.8% | 53.9% | 99.5% | 95.3% | 96.8% |
| Romania | 29.9% | 63.3% | 99.7% | 70% | 96.5% | 4.4% | 99.9% | 74.6% | 96.1% | 36.3% | 99.5% | 92.8% | 96.1% |
| Slovakia | 28.2% | 53.5% | 99.6% | 76.7% | 96.9% | 1% | 100% | 86.5% | 98.4% | 53.5% | 99.8% | 94.6% | 98.4% |
| Slovenia | 27.5% | 44.6% | 98% | 73.8% | 91.2% | 1.3% | 100% | 84.2% | 96% | 55% | 99.6% | 92.7% | 96% |
| Spain | 30.6% | 57.8% | 99.7% | 92.8% | 97.5% | 0.9% | 98.5% | 76.1% | 94.4% | 47.3% | 99.6% | 92% | 94.4% |
| Sweden | 31.8% | 54.9% | 99.7% | 84.8% | 96.4% | 0.9% | 98.6% | 84.8% | 95.3% | 45.8% | 99.4% | 91.9% | 95.3% |
| Iceland | 25.9% | 37.1% | 99.7% | 91% | 95.7% | 1% | 100% | 77.8% | 97% | 61.1% | 98.2% | 94.4% | 97% |
| Liechtenstein | 38.5% | 7% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 100% | 88.7% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Norway | 29.7% | 38.6% | 99.9% | 96.4% | 98.9% | 0.4% | 100% | 93% | 99.2% | 61.1% | 99.9% | 98.7% | 99.2% |
SLI 21.1.2
When cooperating with independent fact-checkers to label content on their services, Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken at the Member State level and their impact, via metrics, of: number of articles published by independent fact-checkers; number of labels applied to content, such as on the basis of such articles; meaningful metrics on the impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 such as the impact of said measures on user interactions with, or user re-shares of, content fact-checked as false or misleading.
| Country | Number of videos tagged with the unverified content label | Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up) |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | 48 | 30.5% |
| Belgium | 99 | 31% |
| Bulgaria | 99 | 30% |
| Croatia | 15 | 28.2% |
| Cyprus | 6 | 31.5% |
| Czech Republic | 165 | 29.2% |
| Denmark | 195 | 31.2% |
| Estonia | 15 | 29.5% |
| Finland | 33 | 33% |
| France | 913 | 30.6% |
| Germany | 826 | 33.6% |
| Greece | 121 | 30.1% |
| Hungary | 18 | 28.1% |
| Ireland | 23 | 33% |
| Italy | 481 | 34% |
| Latvia | 23 | 32.6% |
| Lithuania | 13 | 30.2% |
| Luxembourg | 2 | 26.5% |
| Malta | 0 | 29.1% |
| Netherlands | 131 | 29.7% |
| Poland | 207 | 27.5% |
| Portugal | 44 | 27.1% |
| Romania | 211 | 29.9% |
| Slovakia | 78 | 28.2% |
| Slovenia | 14 | 27.5% |
| Spain | 309 | 30.6% |
| Sweden | 75 | 31.8% |
| Iceland | 0 | 25.9% |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | 38.5% |
| Norway | 53 | 29.7% |
Measure 21.2
Relevant Signatories will, in light of scientific evidence and the specificities of their services, and of user privacy preferences, undertake and/or support research and testing on warnings or updates targeted to users that have interacted with content that was later actioned upon for violation of policies mentioned in this section. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force in view of identifying relevant follow up actions.
QRE 21.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on the research or testing efforts that they supported and undertook as part of this commitment and on the findings of research or testing undertaken as part of this commitment. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.
Measure 21.3
Where Relevant Signatories employ labelling and warning systems, they will design these in accordance with up-to-date scientific evidence and with analysis of their users' needs on how to maximise the impact and usefulness of such interventions, for instance such that they are likely to be viewed and positively received.
Commitment 23
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 23.1
Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.
QRE 23.1.1
Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.
Users can access the reporting tool by:
- Pressing and holding (i.e. tapping for 3 seconds) the video content and selecting the “Report” option.
- Selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the video content and then selecting the “Report” option.
The user is then shown categories of reporting reasons from which to select (which align with the harms our Community Guidelines seek to address), including - Misinformation.
TikTok Shop. Users can also report TikTok Shop content where it breaches policies or applicable law, including for harmful, false and/or misleading information. For advertisements and commission-based content containing a TikTok Shop product anchor, users are able to select a specific "misinformation" reporting category.
In line with our DSA requirements, we also continued to provide a dedicated reporting channel, and appeals process for our community in the European Union to ‘Report Illegal Content,’ enabling users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law.
Measure 23.2
Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).
QRE 23.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.
To ensure the integrity of our reporting system, we deploy a combination of advanced moderation technologies and teams of human safety experts. Reported videos are initially reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which aims to identify content that violates our Community Guidelines. If a potential violation of our Community Guidelines is found, the automated review system will either pass it on to our moderation teams for further review or, if there is a high degree of confidence that the content violates our Community Guidelines, remove it automatically. Automated removal is only applied when violations are clear-cut, such as where the content contains nudity or pertains to youth safety.
To support the fair and consistent review of potentially violative content, where violations are less clear-cut, content will be passed to our human moderation teams for further review.
We have sought to make our Community Guidelines as clear and complete as possible and have put in place robust Quality Assurance processes (including steps such as review of moderation cases, flows, appeals and undertaking Root Cause Analyses).
Where content is reported under our DSA “Report Illegal Content” channel, TikTok will review the content against our Community Guidelines and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally. If it is not removed, our illegal content moderation team will further review the content to assess whether it is unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction - this assessment is undertaken by human moderators. If it is, access to that content will be restricted in that country.
Appeals system
We are transparent with users in relation to appeals. We set out the options that may be available both to the user who reported the content and the creator of the affected content, where they disagree with the decision we have taken.
The integrity of our appeals systems is reinforced by the involvement of our dedicated moderation processes that take context and nuance into consideration when deciding whether content violates our Community Guidelines or is illegal.
To ensure consistency within this process and its overall integrity, we have sought to make our policies as clear and complete as possible and have put in place robust Quality Assurance processes (including steps such as auditing appeals and undertaking Root Cause Analyses).
If users who have submitted an appeal are still not satisfied with our decision, they can share feedback with us via the webform on TikTok.com. We continuously take user feedback into consideration to identify areas of improvement, including within the appeals process.
Commitment 24
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 24.1
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 24.1
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with information on why particular content or accounts have been labelled, demoted, or otherwise enforced on, on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section, as well as the basis for such enforcement action, and the possibility for them to appeal through a transparent mechanism.
QRE 24.1.1
Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems across Member States and languages and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.
- Removal or otherwise restriction of access to their content;
- A ban of the account;
- Restriction of their access to a feature (such as LIVE or TikTok Shop); or
- Restriction of their ability to monetise.
Such notifications are provided in near real time after action has been taken (i.e. generally within several seconds or up to a few minutes).
Where we have taken any of these decisions, an in-app inbox notification sets out the violation deemed to have taken place, along with an option for users to “disagree” and submit an appeal. Users can submit appeals within 180 days of being notified of the decision they want to appeal. Further information, including about how to appeal a decision and other redress possibilities is set out here.
All such appeals raised will be queued for review by our dedicated moderation process so as to ensure that context is adequately taken into account in reaching a determination.
As mentioned above, our users have the ability to share feedback with us to the extent that they don't agree with the result of their appeal. They can do so by using the in-app function which allows them to "report a problem". We are continuously taking user feedback into consideration in order to identify areas of improvement within the appeals process.
SLI 24.1.1
Relevant Signatories provide information on the number and nature of enforcement actions for policies described in response to Measure 18.2, the numbers of such actions that were subsequently appealed, the results of these appeals, information, and to the extent possible metrics, providing insight into the duration or effectiveness of processing of appeals process, and publish this information on the Transparency Centre.
| Country | Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of misinformation policy | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy | Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) | Number of appeals against actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Misleading Functionality and Effect policy policy | Number of successful appeals against actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Misleading Functionality and Effect policy policy | Appeal success rate following appeals against actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Misleading Functionality and Effect policy policy | Number of appeals against actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Number of successful appeals against actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Appeal success rate following appeals against actions taken on TikTok Shop for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 1178 | 916 | 77.8% | 20 | 17 | 85% | 971 | 859 | 88% | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| Belgium | 2478 | 2135 | 86.2% | 59 | 52 | 88% | 1411 | 1267 | 90% | 1 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| Bulgaria | 1099 | 887 | 80.7% | 18 | 12 | 67% | 496 | 434 | 88% | ||||||
| Croatia | 518 | 470 | 90.7% | 7 | 7 | 100% | 486 | 443 | 91% | ||||||
| Cyprus | 287 | 231 | 80.5% | 12 | 9 | 75% | 403 | 344 | 85% | ||||||
| Czech Republic | 1928 | 1726 | 89.5% | 26 | 20 | 77% | 737 | 645 | 88% | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| Denmark | 867 | 758 | 87.4% | 13 | 13 | 100% | 535 | 488 | 91% | ||||||
| Estonia | 481 | 426 | 88.6% | 14 | 11 | 79% | 724 | 625 | 86% | ||||||
| Finland | 962 | 854 | 88.8% | 20 | 14 | 70% | 701 | 623 | 89% | ||||||
| France | 16207 | 13511 | 83.4% | 141 | 119 | 84% | 7398 | 6594 | 89% | 1417 | 198 | 13.97% | 2813 | 295 | 10.49% |
| Germany | 22230 | 17306 | 77.8% | 543 | 460 | 85% | 16437 | 14112 | 86% | 1460 | 355 | 24.32% | 6406 | 1951 | 30.46% |
| Greece | 1636 | 1448 | 88.5% | 39 | 30 | 77% | 777 | 706 | 91% | ||||||
| Hungary | 709 | 637 | 89.8% | 20 | 17 | 85% | 428 | 378 | 88% | ||||||
| Ireland | 1597 | 1240 | 77.6% | 42 | 34 | 81% | 735 | 670 | 91% | 39 | 8 | 20.51% | 15 | 0 | 0% |
| Italy | 7364 | 6418 | 87.2% | 223 | 207 | 93% | 5151 | 4675 | 91% | 775 | 137 | 17.68% | 1859 | 198 | 10.65% |
| Latvia | 733 | 666 | 90.9% | 17 | 12 | 71% | 950 | 805 | 85% | ||||||
| Lithuania | 495 | 434 | 87.7% | 14 | 11 | 79% | 783 | 674 | 86% | ||||||
| Luxembourg | 76 | 61 | 80.3% | 1 | 1 | 100% | 119 | 116 | 97% | ||||||
| Malta | 90 | 76 | 84.4% | 3 | 3 | 100% | 132 | 116 | 88% | ||||||
| Netherlands | 7025 | 6060 | 86.3% | 154 | 137 | 89% | 5261 | 4773 | 91% | 10 | 2 | 20% | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| Poland | 9081 | 7740 | 85.2% | 154 | 140 | 91% | 4496 | 3710 | 83% | 14 | 3 | 21.43% | 2 | 1 | 50% |
| Portugal | 1699 | 1550 | 91.2% | 66 | 63 | 95% | 1038 | 961 | 93% | 8 | 0 | 0% | 6 | 0 | 0% |
| Romania | 8181 | 6699 | 81.9% | 833 | 707 | 85% | 4837 | 4456 | 92% | ||||||
| Slovakia | 739 | 660 | 89.3% | 17 | 13 | 76% | 584 | 516 | 88% | ||||||
| Slovenia | 392 | 361 | 92.1% | 7 | 5 | 71% | 288 | 257 | 89% | ||||||
| Spain | 9110 | 7101 | 77.9% | 144 | 130 | 90% | 7276 | 6639 | 91% | 1793 | 854 | 47.63% | 3922 | 581 | 14.81% |
| Sweden | 2695 | 2463 | 91.4% | 38 | 33 | 87% | 1518 | 1362 | 90% | ||||||
| Iceland | 66 | 56 | 84.8% | 2 | 1 | 50% | 91 | 79 | 87% | ||||||
| Liechtenstein | 3 | 2 | 66.7% | 0 | 0 | 0% | 5 | 5 | 100% | ||||||
| Norway | 906 | 750 | 82.8% | 23 | 18 | 78% | 534 | 452 | 85% |
Empowering Researchers
Commitment 26
Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 26.1 Measure 26.2 Measure 26.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 26.1
Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).
QRE 26.1.1
Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.
QRE 26.1.2
Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 26.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.
Measure 26.2
Relevant Signatories will provide real-time or near real-time, machine-readable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data on their service for research purposes, such as accounts belonging to public figures such as elected official, news outlets and government accounts subject to an application process which is not overly cumbersome.
QRE 26.2.1
Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide real-time or near real-time access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data for research purposes as described in Measure 26.2.
Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, number of comments, shares, likes, followers and following lists, and favourites that a video receives on our platform. More information is available here.
(II) Virtual Compute Environment (VCE)
Through our VCE, qualifying not-for-profit researchers and academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the EU, intending to study youth safety can query and analyse TikTok’s public data. To protect the security and privacy of our users the VCE is designed to ensure that TikTok data is processed within confined parameters. TikTok only reviews the results to ensure that there is no identifiable individual information extracted out of the platform. All aggregated results will be shared as a downloadable link to the approved primary researcher's email.
(III) Commercial Content API
Through our Commercial Content API, qualifying researchers and professionals, who can be located in any country, can request public data about searches on ads and other commercial contents including ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information.
(IV) Commercial Content Library
TikTok's Commercial Content Library (CCL) is a repository of ads and other commercial content posted on TikTok.
There are two main sub-libraries within the CCL:
- Ad Library: This library features ads that we're paid to display to people, including those that aren't currently active or have been paused by the advertisers.
- Other commercial content: This library features content that we're not paid to display, including content that promotes a brand, product, or service.
The CCL currently includes information on ads available to users in the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland, the U.K. and Turkey.
QRE 26.2.2
Relevant Signatories will describe the scope of manifestly-made public data as applicable to their services.
QRE 26.2.3
Relevant Signatories will describe the application process in place to in order to gain the access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data described in Measure 26.2.
Researchers who wish to utilise the Research API or VCE must submit an application form with information about their eligibility and research project.
The application criteria for our Research Tools (Research API and VCE) and Commercial Content API is research topic agnostic and clearly set out in our dedicated TikTok for Developers website.
Once an application has been approved for access to our Research Tools, we provide step-by-step instructions for researchers on how to access research data, how to comply with the security steps, and how to run queries on the data, through our Getting Started guides for Research API and VCE
Similarly with the Commercial Content API, we provide participants with detailed information on how to query ad data and fetch public advertiser data.
Measure 26.3
Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.
QRE 26.3.1
Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.
TikTok provides technical support via a support form on the TikTok for Developers site as well as over email. Any reported bugs or outages are evaluated by our technical teams.
We also launched a quarterly Research Tools Office Hours session. This is targeted at researchers who are already onboarded to the Research Tools and who reach out with technical support questions (by invitation). Our Office Hours session is in addition to our ongoing work to conduct demos and engage with researchers at conferences.
Commitment 27
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 27.1 Measure 27.2 Measure 27.3 Measure 27.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 28
COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 28.1
Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.
QRE 28.1.1
Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.
TikTok teams and personnel also regularly participate in research-focused events. During this reporting period, we conducted office hours and demos. The transferable nature of the skills provided are such that they could be broadly applied to disinformation research.
- We launched a quarterly series of Research Tools Office Hours for researchers who are onboarded to our Tools and require technical support. We hosted two sessions in February and June.
- We conducted the demos for the following researcher groups: Johns Hopkins University (January), University of Lusofona (March), University of Coimbra (April), York University (April), University of Pennsylvania (April), and invited researchers in Slovakia (June).
Measure 28.2
Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.
QRE 28.2.1
Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.
With the Research API, researchers can access:
- Public account data, such as user profiles, followers and following lists, liked videos, pinned videos and reposted videos.
- Public content data, such as comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares and likes that a video receives.
Through the VCE, qualifying not-for-profit researchers in the EU can access and analyse TikTok's public data, including public U18 data, in a secure environment that is subject to strict security controls.
TikTok makes information about ads and other commercial content available through its Commercial Content Library (CCL). The CCL is a publicly accessible, searchable repository that allows users to view information about paid advertisements and other commercial content on TikTok, including relevant advertiser and ad information, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad ran, main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), number of people who were served the ad, and more. Separately, the Commercial Content API provides programmatic access to public data available through the CCL, allowing users to query and analyse this information through an API.
Measure 28.3
Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.
QRE 28.3.1
Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.
Measure 28.4
As part of the cooperation framework between the Signatories and the European research community, relevant Signatories will, with the assistance of the EDMO, make funds available for research on Disinformation, for researchers to independently manage and to define scientific priorities and transparent allocation procedures based on scientific merit.
QRE 28.4.1
Relevant Signatories will disclose the resources made available for the purposes of Measure 28.4 and procedures put in place to ensure the resources are independently managed.
Empowering fact-checkers
Commitment 30
Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 30.1
Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.
QRE 30.1.1
Relevant Signatories will report on and explain the nature of their agreements with fact-checking organisations; their expected results; relevant quantitative information (for instance: contents fact-checked, increased coverage, changes in integration of fact-checking as depends on the agreements and to be further discussed within the Task-force); and such as relevant common standards and conditions for these agreements.
Our partners have teams of fact-checkers who review and verify reported content. Our Integrity and Authenticity moderators then use that independent feedback to take action and where appropriate, remove or make ineligible for recommendation false or misleading content or label unverified content.
Our agreements with our partners are standardised, meaning the agreements are based on our template master services agreements and consistent with common standards and conditions. We reviewed and updated our template standard agreements as part of our annual contract renewal process.
The terms of the agreements describe:
- The service the fact-checking partner will provide, namely, that their team of fact checkers review, assess and rate video content uploaded to their fact-checking queue, and will provide regular pro-active Insights Reports about general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generate particular misinformation or disinformation.
- The expected results e.g. the fact-checkers’ advice on whether the content may be or contain misinformation and rate it using our classification categories.
- Notifications of proactive flagging of potentially harmful misinformation from our partners.
- The languages in which they will provide fact-checking services.
- The ability to request temporary coverage regarding additional languages or support on ad hoc additional projects.
- All other key terms including the applicable term and fees and payment arrangements.
QRE 30.1.2
Relevant Signatories will list the fact-checking organisations they have agreements with (unless a fact-checking organisation opposes such disclosure on the basis of a reasonable fear of retribution or violence).
- Agence France-Presse (AFP)
- Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
- Demagog
- Facta
- Geofacts
- Faktograf
- Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
- Lead Stories
- Newtral
- Poligrafo
- Reuters
- Science Feedback - For advertising-related fact-checking partnerships, please refer to Chapter 2.
- Teyit
We put in place temporary agreements with these fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis.
During this period, we also engaged an existing fact-checking partner to provide temporary fact-checking coverage during the Malta general election in both Maltese and English.
Globally, we have 20 IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and we keep users updated here.
QRE 30.1.3
Relevant Signatories will report on resources allocated where relevant in each of their services to achieve fact-checking coverage in each Member State and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat Disinformation online at the Member State level.
We have fact-checking coverage in a number of other European languages or languages used in Europe which affect European users, including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.
In terms of global fact-checking initiatives, we currently cover more than 60 languages and 130 markets across the world, thereby improving the overall integrity of the service and benefiting European users.
In order to effectively scale the feedback provided by our fact-checkers globally, we have implemented the measures listed below.
- Insights reports. Our fact-checking partners provide regular reports identifying general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generated particular misinformation or disinformation.
- Proactive detection by our fact-checking partners. Our fact-checking partners are authorised to proactively identify content that may constitute harmful misinformation on our platform, which our moderators assess against our Community Guidelines, and suggest prominent misinformation that is circulating online that may benefit from verification.
- Moderation guidelines. Where relevant, we create guidelines and trending topic reminders for our moderators which are informed by previous fact checking assessments. This helps our teams leverage the insights from our fact-checking partners and supports swift and accurate decisions on flagged content regardless of the language in which the original claim was made.
Malta
No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis.
Iceland
No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis.
Measure 30.2
Relevant Signatories will provide fair financial contributions to the independent European fact-checking organisations for their work to combat Disinformation on their services. Those financial contributions could be in the form of individual agreements, of agreements with multiple fact-checkers or with an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations that has the mandate to conclude said agreements.
QRE 30.2.1
Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken and general criteria used to ensure the fair financial contributions to the fact-checkers for the work done, on criteria used in those agreements to guarantee high ethical and professional standards, independence of the fact-checking organisations, as well as conditions of transparency, openness, consistency and non-discrimination.
Our partners are compensated in a fair, transparent way based on the work done by them using standardised rates. Our fact-checking partners then invoice us on a monthly basis based on work done.
All of our fact-checking partners are independent organisations, which are certified through the non-partisan IFCN. Our agreements with them explicitly state that the fact-checkers are non-exclusive, independent contractors of TikTok who retain editorial independence in relation to the fact-checking, and that the services shall be performed in a professional manner and in line with the highest standards in the industry. Our processes are also set up to ensure our fact-checking partners’ independence. Our partners access flagged content through a tool dedicated for their use and provide their assessment of the accuracy of the content by providing a rating. Fact-checkers will do so independently from us, and their review may include calling sources, consulting public data or authenticating videos and images.
To facilitate transparency and openness with our fact-checking partners, we regularly meet with them to gather feedback.
QRE 30.2.2
Relevant Signatories will engage in, and report on, regular reviews with their fact-checking partner organisations to review the nature and effectiveness of the Signatory's fact-checking programme.
QRE 30.2.3
European fact-checking organisations will, directly (as Signatories to the Code) or indirectly (e.g. via polling by EDMO or an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations) report on the fairness of the individual compensations provided to them via these agreements.
Measure 30.3
Relevant Signatories will contribute to cross-border cooperation between fact-checkers.
QRE 30.3.1
Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to facilitate their cross-border collaboration with and between fact-checkers, including examples of fact-checks, languages, or Member States where such cooperation was facilitated.
In June 2026, TikTok both sponsored and sent a delegation of attendees to the Global Fact conference in Vilnius, Lithuania.
Measure 30.4
To develop the Measures above, relevant Signatories will consult EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.
QRE 30.4.1
Relevant Signatories will report, ex ante on plans to involve, and ex post on actions taken to involve, EDMO and the elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, including on the development of the framework of cooperation described in Measures 30.3 and 30.4.
Commitment 31
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 31.1 and 31.2 Measure 31.3 Measure 31.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 31.1 and 31.2
31.1: Relevant Signatories that showcase User Generated Content (UGC) will integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use independent fact-checkers’ work in their platforms’ services, processes, and contents across all Member States and across formats relevant to the service. Relevant Signatories will collaborate with fact-checkers to that end, starting by conducting and documenting research and testing. 31.2: Relevant Signatories that integrate fact-checks in their products or processes will ensure they employ swift and efficient mechanisms such as labelling, information panels or policy enforcement to help increase the impact of fact-checks on audiences.
QRE 31.1.1 (for Measures 31.1 and 31.2)
Relevant Signatories will report on their specific activities and initiatives related to Measures 31.1 and 31.2, including the full results and methodology applied in testing solutions to that end.
Our Integrity and Authenticity moderators receive direct access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of content. We also use fact-checking feedback to provide additional context to users about certain content. As mentioned, when our fact checking partners conclude that the fact-check is inconclusive or content is not able to be confirmed, we inform viewers via a banner when we identify a video with unverified content in an effort to raise users' awareness about the credibility of the content and to reduce sharing. The video may also become ineligible for recommendation into anyone's For You feed to limit the spread of potentially misleading information.
SLI 31.1.1
Member State level reporting on use of fact-checks by service and the swift and efficient mechanisms in place to increase their impact, which may include (as depends on the service): number of fact-check articles published; reach of fact-check articles; number of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers.
| Country | Number of fact checked videos (tasks) |
|---|---|
| Austria | 40 |
| Belgium | 78 |
| Bulgaria | 140 |
| Croatia | 4 |
| Cyprus | 14 |
| Czech Republic | 101 |
| Denmark | 51 |
| Estonia | 100 |
| Finland | 34 |
| France | 1659 |
| Germany | 318 |
| Greece | 51 |
| Hungary | 12 |
| Ireland | 36 |
| Italy | 662 |
| Latvia | 5 |
| Lithuania | 3 |
| Luxembourg | 1 |
| Malta | 4 |
| Netherlands | 343 |
| Poland | 1926 |
| Portugal | 263 |
| Romania | 73 |
| Slovakia | 108 |
| Slovenia | 6 |
| Spain | 726 |
| Sweden | 30 |
| Iceland | 1 |
| Liechtenstein | 0 |
| Norway | 44 |
SLI 31.1.2
An estimation, through meaningful metrics, of the impact of actions taken such as, for instance, the number of pieces of content labelled on the basis of fact-check articles, or the impact of said measures on user interactions with information fact-checked as false or misleading.
| Country | Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment | Number of videos removed under Misinformation policy |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | 13 | 11308 |
| Belgium | 22 | 15105 |
| Bulgaria | 11 | 42197 |
| Croatia | 14 | 9243 |
| Cyprus | 3 | 3222 |
| Czech Republic | 6 | 10470 |
| Denmark | 3 | 15725 |
| Estonia | 6 | 1963 |
| Finland | 6 | 5307 |
| France | 251 | 100530 |
| Germany | 122 | 113943 |
| Greece | 2 | 8404 |
| Hungary | 2 | 16159 |
| Ireland | 7 | 9383 |
| Italy | 142 | 41780 |
| Latvia | 0 | 3648 |
| Lithuania | 1 | 3146 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 897 |
| Malta | 0 | 501 |
| Netherlands | 54 | 80988 |
| Poland | 392 | 63967 |
| Portugal | 21 | 11667 |
| Romania | 10 | 47144 |
| Slovakia | 18 | 4076 |
| Slovenia | 1 | 1273 |
| Spain | 97 | 56000 |
| Sweden | 0 | 13090 |
| Iceland | 1 | 345 |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | 5 |
| Norway | 4 | 17075 |
SLI 31.1.3
Signatories recognise the importance of providing context to SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2 in ways that empower researchers, fact-checkers, the Commission, ERGA, and the public to understand and assess the impact of the actions taken to comply with Commitment 31. To that end, relevant Signatories commit to include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise these SLIs. Relevant Signatories will present and discuss within the Permanent Task-force the type of baseline quantitative information they consider using for contextualisation ahead of their baseline reports.
| Country | Videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment as a percentage of total number of videos removed due to violation of harmful misinformation policy |
|---|---|
| Austria | 0.11% |
| Belgium | 0.15% |
| Bulgaria | 0.03% |
| Croatia | 0.15% |
| Cyprus | 0.09% |
| Czech Republic | 0.06% |
| Denmark | 0.02% |
| Estonia | 0.31% |
| Finland | 0.11% |
| France | 0.25% |
| Germany | 0.11% |
| Greece | 0.02% |
| Hungary | 0.01% |
| Ireland | 0.07% |
| Italy | 0.34% |
| Latvia | 0% |
| Lithuania | 0.03% |
| Luxembourg | 0% |
| Malta | 0% |
| Netherlands | 0.07% |
| Poland | 0.61% |
| Portugal | 0.18% |
| Romania | 0.02% |
| Slovakia | 0.44% |
| Slovenia | 0.08% |
| Spain | 0.17% |
| Sweden | 0% |
| Iceland | 0.29% |
| Liechtenstein | 0% |
| Norway | 0.02% |
Measure 31.3
Relevant Signatories (including but not necessarily limited to fact-checkers and platforms) will create, in collaboration with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, a repository of fact-checking content that will be governed by the representatives of fact-checkers. Relevant Signatories (i.e. platforms) commit to contribute to funding the establishment of the repository, together with other Signatories and/or other relevant interested entities. Funding will be reassessed on an annual basis within the Permanent Task-force after the establishment of the repository, which shall take no longer than 12 months.
Measure 31.4
Relevant Signatories will explore technological solutions to facilitate the efficient use of this common repository across platforms and languages. They will discuss these solutions with the Permanent Task-force in view of identifying relevant follow up actions.
Commitment 32
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 32.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 32.3
Relevant Signatories will regularly exchange information between themselves and the fact-checking community, to strengthen their cooperation.
QRE 32.3.1
Relevant Signatories will report on the channels of communications and the exchanges conducted to strengthen their cooperation - including success of and satisfaction with the information, interface, and other tools referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 - and any conclusions drawn from such exchanges.
Transparency Centre
Commitment 34
To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 35
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 36
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 36.1 Measure 36.2 Measure 36.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 36.3
Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)
With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)
Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.
SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)
Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.
Between January 1 and June 30 2026, our signatory profile was visited 2,585 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 9,422 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage was visited 46,705 times overall.
| Country | Our company would like to provide the following data: Nr of fact-checkers IFCN-certified |
|---|---|
| Austria | 0 |
| Belgium | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 |
| Croatia | 0 |
| Cyprus | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 0 |
| Denmark | 0 |
| Estonia | 0 |
| Finland | 0 |
| France | 0 |
| Germany | 0 |
| Greece | 0 |
| Hungary | 0 |
| Ireland | 0 |
| Italy | 0 |
| Latvia | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 |
| Malta | 0 |
| Netherlands | 0 |
| Poland | 0 |
| Portugal | 0 |
| Romania | 0 |
| Slovakia | 0 |
| Slovenia | 0 |
| Spain | 0 |
| Sweden | 0 |
| Iceland | 0 |
| Liechtenstein | 0 |
| Norway | 0 |
Permanent Task-Force
Commitment 37
Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 37.1
Signatories will participate in the Task-force and contribute to its work. Signatories, in particular smaller or emerging services will contribute to the work of the Task-force proportionate to their resources, size and risk profile. Smaller or emerging services can also agree to pool their resources together and represent each other in the Task-force. The Task-force will meet in plenary sessions as necessary and at least every 6 months, and, where relevant, in subgroups dedicated to specific issues or workstreams.
Measure 37.2
Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.
Measure 37.3
The Task-force will agree on and define its operating rules, including on the involvement of third-party experts, which will be laid down in a Vademecum drafted by the European Commission in collaboration with the Signatories and agreed on by consensus between the members of the Task-force.
Measure 37.4
Signatories agree to set up subgroups dedicated to the specific issues related to the implementation and revision of the Code with the participation of the relevant Signatories.
Measure 37.5
When needed, and in any event at least once per year the Task-force organises meetings with relevant stakeholder groups and experts to inform them about the operation of the Code and gather their views related to important developments in the field of Disinformation.
Measure 37.6
Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.
QRE 37.6.1
Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.
Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 38
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 38.1
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 38.1
Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.
QRE 38.1.1
Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.
Commitment 39
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 40
Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 40.1
Relevant Signatories that are Very Large Online Platforms, as defined in the DSA, will report every six-months on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs at service and Member State Level.
Measure 40.2
Other Signatories will report yearly on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures taken under the present Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs, at service and Member State level.
Measure 40.3
Measure 40.4
Measure 40.5
Measure 40.6
Commitment 41
Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 41.1 Measure 41.2 Measure 41.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 41.1
Within 1 month of signing the Code, Signatories will establish a Working Group to tackle this objective. This working group will be tasked with putting forward data points to be provided by Platform Signatories, and a methodology to measure Structural Indicators on the base of these data points, to be executed by non-Platform Signatories.
Measure 41.2
The Working Group will report on its progress to the Task-force on a trimestral basis. It will consult with expert stakeholders including but not limited to EDMO, ERGA, and researchers to inform its work and outputs.
Measure 41.3
Commitment 42
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 43
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Commitment 44
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Crisis and Elections Response
Elections 2025
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].
Threats observed or anticipated
We have comprehensive measures in place to anticipate and address the risks associated with electoral processes, including the risks associated with election misinformation, in the context of the following elections held during the reporting period:
In advance of the Elections, a core election Task-Force was formed, and consultations between cross-functional teams helped to identify and design response strategies.
Through the Elections, we monitored for and actioned inauthentic behaviour and removed content that violated our Community Guidelines.
Please see Identifying and removing CIO networks (Commitment 14, Measure 14.1) below for details on the covert influence operations we removed.
Mitigations in place
Please see Rolling out Media literacy campaigns (Commitment 17, Measure 17.2) below for details on each Election Centre.
Additionally, we published Newsroom posts relating to the elections below:
Portugal Presidential Election- Slovenia Parliamentary Election
- Denmark General Election
- Hungary Parliamentary Election
- Bulgaria Parliamentary Election
- Cyprus Parliamentary Election and Malta General Election
External engagement at the national and EU levels
- Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COCD Signatories
- The COCD Election Rapid Response System (“RRS”) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 33 RRS during the relevant period. Throughout the election period for each of the Elections, the team maintained consistent prioritisation of RRS requests and ensured timely, accurate support for cross-functional partners.
- The COCD Election Rapid Response System (“RRS”) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 33 RRS during the relevant period. Throughout the election period for each of the Elections, the team maintained consistent prioritisation of RRS requests and ensured timely, accurate support for cross-functional partners.
- Engagement with local experts
- To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Elections, we organised an Election Speaker Series with local fact-checking partners who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.
- Portugal: Speaker Series was held with Polígrafo on 13 January 2026.
- Slovenia: Speaker Series was held with LeadStories on 12 March 2026.
- Hungary: Speaker Series was held with LeadStories on 1 April 2026.
- To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Elections, we organised an Election Speaker Series with local fact-checking partners who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.
Policies and Terms and Conditions
Outline any changes to your policies
Policy - 50.1.1
Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2
Scrutiny of Ads Placements
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 50.2.1
Description of intervention - 50.2.2
Indication of impact - 50.2.3
By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and it is one way that we can reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.
Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the day of the Portugal Presidential Election, as well as the additional 3 weeks leading up to and including the day of the second round election (22 Dec, 2025, and 8 Feb, 2026): 1,666- Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Slovenia Parliamentary Election (23 Feb, 2026, and 22 Mar, 2026): 676
- Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Denmark General Election (23 Feb, 2026, and 29 Mar, 2026): 1,025
- Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Hungary Parliamentary Election (16 Mar, 2026, and 12 Apr, 2026): 2,666
- Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Bulgaria Parliamentary Election (23 Mar, 2026, and 19 Apr, 2026): 937
- Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Cyprus Parliamentary Election (27 Apr, 2026, and 24 May, 2026): 1,047
Number of ads removed for our political advertising policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Malta General Election (27 Apr, 2026, and 31 May, 2026): 0
Political Advertising
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Integrity of Services
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 50.4.1
Description of intervention - 50.4.2
- Hungary:
- In February 2026, we disrupted two networks targeting political discourse.
- The first network, which we assessed to be operating from Hungary and targeting a Hungarian audience, included 107 accounts with 37,070 followers.
- The second network, which we assessed to be operating from Ukraine and targeting a European audience, included 45 accounts with 47,114 followers.
- The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to undermine certain European political figures such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
- In March 2026, we disrupted 2 networks targeting political discourse.
- The first network, which we assessed to be operating from Hungary and targeting a Hungarian audience, included 91 accounts with 246 followers.
- The second network, which we assessed to be operating from Hungary and targeting a Hungarian audience, included 62 accounts with 1,452 followers.
- In February 2026, we disrupted two networks targeting political discourse.
- Bulgaria: In March 2026, we disrupted a network targeting political discourse. The network, which we assessed to be operating from Bulgaria and targeting a Bulgarian audience, included 34 accounts with 66,763 followers.
- Malta: In May 2026, we disrupted a network targeting political discourse. The network, which we assessed to be operating from Malta and targeting a Maltese audience, included 9 accounts with 433 followers.
Indication of impact - 50.4.3
Specific Action applied - 50.4.4
Description of intervention - 50.4.5
Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;- A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;
- Matters of public importance, including debates about significant and challenging policy issues;
- A public figure who is:
- Being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior;
- Taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
- Spreading misinformation about matters of public importance.
TikTok is a member of the Content Authenticity Initiative and the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, and was the first video sharing platform to put Content Credentials into practice. We have the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to instantly recognise and label AIGC. This helped us to expand auto-labelling to AIGC created on some other platforms.
Indication of impact - 50.4.6
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the day of the Portugal Presidential Election, as well as the additional 3 weeks leading up to and including the day of the second round election (22 Dec, 2025, and 8 Feb, 2026): 2,401
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Slovenia Parliamentary Election (23 Feb, 2026, and 22 Mar, 2026): 196
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Denmark General Election (23 Feb, 2026, and 29 Mar, 2026): 1,950
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Hungary Parliamentary Election (16 Mar, 2026, and 12 Apr, 2026): 621
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Bulgaria Parliamentary Election (23 Mar, 2026, and 19 Apr, 2026): 911
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Cyprus Parliamentary Election (27 Apr, 2026, and 24 May, 2026): 321
- Number of removals under this policy during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Malta General Election (27 Apr, 2026, and 31 May, 2026): 143
Empowering Users
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 50.5.1
Description of intervention - 50.5.2
3. 11 March 2026: Election Centre for the Denmark general election.
4. 10 March 2026: Election Centre for the Hungary parliamentary election.
5. 19 April 2026: Election Centre for the Bulgaria parliamentary election.
6. 8 May 2026:Election Centre for the Cyprus parliamentary election.
7. 8 May 2026: Election Centre for the Malta general election.
Indication of impact - 50.5.3
1. Slovenia Election Centre was visited 18,024 times.
Specific Action applied - 50.5.4
Description of intervention - 50.5.5
- Held a Speaker Series with our fact-checking partner, Polígrafo, on 13 January 2026.
- Met with six Danish ministries to raise awareness of our election integrity efforts.
- Handled one government escalation on election day regarding a Danish artist who was using TikTok as a means of offering valuable artworks in exchange for votes for a specific party. This was escalated and quickly removed to great satisfaction.
- Participated in a roundtable organized by Agency for Communication on Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (Slovenian DSC) on 3 March 2026. Attendees included representatives of the national authorities, online platforms, and the European Commission.
- Visited Bulgarian authorities in March 2026, including the security agency, the Digital Services Coordinator, the Ministry of Interior, and presented our election integrity efforts.
- Met with Law Enforcement to discuss our process and support during elections.
- Attended a roundtable organised by the Hungarian DSC National Media and Infocommunications Authority with VLOPs and national authorities on 5 March 2026.
- Held a Speaker Series with our fact-checking partner, LeadStories, on 1 April 2026.
Indication of impact - 50.5.6
Description of intervention - 50.5.8
Empowering the Research Community
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 50.6.1
- Providing access to our Research API (Commitment 26 and Measures 26.1 and 26.2)
Description of intervention - 50.6.2
Indication of impact - 50.6.3
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 50.7.1
Description of intervention - 50.7.2
- Lead Stories serves as the fact-checking partner for Slovenia and provided fact-checking coverage throughout the election period.
- Lead Stories serves as the fact-checking partner for Bulgaria and provided fact-checking coverage throughout the election period.
- Lead Stories serves as the fact-checking partner for Hungary and provided fact-checking coverage throughout the election period.
- Reuters serves as the fact-checking partner for Denmark and provided fact-checking coverage throughout the election period.
- Polígrafo serves as the fact-checking partner for Portugal and provided fact-checking coverage throughout the election period.
- Lead Stories provided temporary fact-checking coverage throughout the election period for Malta.
- AFP serves as the fact-checking partner for Cyprus and provided fact-checking coverage throughout the election period.
Indication of impact - 50.7.3
Crisis 2025
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].
Threats observed or anticipated
Since the start of the war of aggression by Russia on Ukraine in February 2022 (the “War in Ukraine”), we have observed false or unverified claims about specific attacks and events, the development or use of weapons, the involvement of particular countries, and military activities such as troop movements. We have also seen misleadingly repurposed footage, including clips from video games, AI-generated content, or unrelated past events presented as current. We have remained alert to the spread of harmful misinformation and covert influence operations (“CIO”).
TikTok continues to moderate violative content at scale, while respecting and protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of European users. We remain committed to supporting freedom of expression, upholding our commitment to human rights, and maintaining the safety and integrity of our platform during the Israel–Hamas conflict (referred to as the “Conflict” in this chapter).
Mitigations in place
(I) Upholding TikTok's Community Guidelines
Automated Review
Vision-based: Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.- Audio-based: Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
- Text-based: Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags,. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves.
- Similarity-based: "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
- Activity-based: Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
- LLMs: We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
- We work with external groups, for example Tech Against Terrorism in the context of violent extremist content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.
Scaling human expertise
TikTok takes a multi-faceted approach to tackling the spread of harmful misinformation, regardless of intent. This includes our Integrity and Authenticity policies, as well as our products, operational practices, and external partnerships with fact-checkers, media literacy organisations, and researchers.
We support our Integrity and Authenticity moderators with detailed misinformation policy guidance, enhanced training, and direct access to our IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners, who help assess the accuracy of content.
Since the beginning of the Conflict, we are:
Automated Review
- Vision-based: Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
- Audio-based: Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
- Text-based: Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our fact-checking partners, to inform our keyword lists.
- Similarity-based: "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
- Activity-based: Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
- LLMs: We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
- We work with external groups, for example Tech Against Terrorism in the context of violent extremist content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.
Scaling human expertise
Policies and Terms and Conditions
Outline any changes to your policies
Policy - 51.1.1
No relevant updates in the reporting period.
Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2
Rationale - 51.1.3
Political Advertising
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Integrity of Services
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 51.4.1
Description of intervention - 51.4.2
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies prohibit attempts to manipulate public opinion while misleading our systems or users about identity, origin, approximate location, popularity, or purpose. Dedicated teams monitor and investigate CIO networks and have removed networks targeting discourse related to the War in Ukraine in line with these policies.
Israel-Hamas Conflict
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies prohibit attempts to manipulate public opinion while misleading our systems or users about identity, origin, approximate location, popularity, or purpose. Dedicated teams monitor and investigate CIO networks and have removed networks targeting discourse related to Israel and Palestine in line with these policies.
Indication of impact - 51.4.3
Between January and June 2026, we took action to remove the following 4 networks (consisting of 170 accounts in total) that were found to be involved in coordinated attempts to influence public opinion about the War in Ukraine and mislead our community:
Description: We assessed that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian.
We publish CIO networks we identify and remove, including those relating to the War in Ukraine, in our dedicated CIO transparency report.
Israel-Hamas Conflict
Between January and June 2026, we took action to remove the following two networks (consisting of 32 accounts in total) that were found to be related to the Conflict:
- Network Origin: Iran
Network Origin: Iran
Specific Action applied - 51.4.4
(Commitments 14 and 15, Measures 14.1, 15.1 and 15.2).
Description of intervention - 51.4.5
Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy makes it clear that we do not want our users to be misled about crisis events. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by AI technology or machine-learning processes. It includes images of real people and may show highly realistic-looking scenes.
- Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organization, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;
- A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;
- Matters of public importance, including debates about significant and challenging policy issues;
- A public figure who is:
- Being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior;
- Taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
- Spreading misinformation about matters of public importance.
Indication of impact - 51.4.6
Our efforts support transparent and responsible content creation practices, both in the context of the War in Ukraine and more broadly on our platform.
Israel-Hamas Conflict
Our efforts support transparent and responsible content creation practices, which are relevant both in the context of the Conflict and more broadly on our platform.
Specific Action applied - 51.4.7
(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)
Description of intervention - 51.4.8
The vast majority of violative content is proactively removed before it is viewed or reported. In H1 2026, more than 99% of videos violating our Integrity and Authenticity policies were removed proactively worldwide.
Israel-Hamas Conflict
We take proactive measures to remove accounts or content that contain inaccurate, misleading, or false information which may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. In conflict environments, this includes content repurposed from previous conflicts, false or harmful claims about specific events, or material that incites panic. In some cases, we may also reduce the visibility of such content.
Indication of impact - 51.4.9
In the context of the crisis, we have proactively removed 9,825 videos in H1 containing harmful misinformation related to the War in Ukraine. We carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of content as well as working closely with our fact-checking partners and responding to emerging trends they identify.
- Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 9,967
- Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (only focusing on RU/UA) - 3,534
- Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 9,825
Israel-Hamas Conflict
We have Arabic and Hebrew speaking content moderation as we recognise the importance of language and cultural context in the misinformation moderation process.
In the context of the crisis, we have proactively removed 24,177 videos in H1 containing harmful misinformation related to the Conflict. We carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of content (e.g. hashtags/sensitive keyword lists) as well as working closely with our fact-checking partners and responding to emerging trends they identify.
- Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL-Hamas) - 24,411
- Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL-Hamas) - 22,185
- Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas): 24,177
Empowering Users
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 51.5.1
(Commitment 17, Measures 17.2 and 17.3)
Description of intervention - 51.5.2
We have localised media literacy campaigns related to the crisis to raise awareness amongst our users. We promoted the campaign through a combination of our in-app intervention tools to ensure that authoritative information is promoted to our users.
Indication of impact - 51.5.3
Working with our fact-checking partners, we have 17 localised media literacy campaigns addressing disinformation related to the War in Ukraine in Austria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
Relevant metrics for the media literacy campaigns (EEA total numbers, in countries where campaigns are active):
- Total Number of impressions of the search intervention - 26,592,133
- Total Number of clicks on the search intervention - 158,841
Israel-Hamas Conflict
These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also direct them to well-being resources.
Empowering the Research Community
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 51.6.1
Description of intervention - 51.6.2
Indication of impact - 51.6.3
- Number of Research API applications related to the War in Ukraine that have been approved from January - June 2026: 2
- Number of Research API applications related to the Israel-Hamas Conflict that have been approved from January - June 2026: 4
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.
Specific Action applied - 51.7.1
Description of intervention - 51.7.2
Indication of impact - 51.7.3
Specific Action applied - 51.7.4
Description of intervention - 51.7.5
We work with 13 fact-checking partners in Europe, providing coverage in 23 official EEA languages, including at least one official language of each EU Member States, and additional languages including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Albanian and Serbian.
Israel-Hamas Conflict
As part of our fact-checking program, TikTok works with 20 IFCN-accredited fact-checking organisations that support more than 60 languages, including Hebrew and Arabic, to help assess the accuracy of content in this rapidly-changing environment. In the context of the Conflict, our independent fact-checking partners are following our standard practice, whereby they do not moderate content directly on TikTok, but assess whether a claim is true, false, or unsubstantiated so that our moderators can take action based on our Community Guidelines. Fact-checker input is then incorporated into our broader content moderation efforts in a number of different ways, as further outlined in the ‘indication of impact’ section below.
Indication of impact - 51.7.6
- Number of fact-checked videos with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 665
- Number of videos removed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 78
- Number of videos not recommended in the For Your Feed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 147
Israel-Hamas Conflict
We see harmful misinformation as different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we have ensured that, in the context of the Conflict, our fact-checking programme covers Arabic and Hebrew.
- Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they’re seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform.
- Collaborating with our fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives has facilitated proactive responses against high-harm trends and has helped to ensure that our Integrity and Authenticity moderators have up-to-date guidance.
- Number of fact checked tasks related to IL/Hamas - 851
- Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 186
- Number of videos demoted (NR) as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 396