Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.1 Measure 1.2 Measure 1.3 Measure 1.4 Measure 1.5 Measure 1.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 1.1

Relevant Signatories involved in the selling of advertising, inclusive of media platforms, publishers and ad tech companies, will deploy, disclose, and enforce policies with the aims of: - first avoiding the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation to protect the integrity of advertising supported businesses - second taking meaningful enforcement and remediation steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or on sources that repeatedly violate these policies; and - third adopting measures to enable the verification of the landing / destination pages of ads and origin of ad placement.

QRE 1.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 1.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

Measure 1.2

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will tighten eligibility requirements and content review processes for content monetisation and ad revenue share programmes on their services as necessary to effectively scrutinise parties and bar participation by actors who systematically post content or engage in behaviours which violate policies mentioned in Measure 1.1 that tackle Disinformation.

QRE 1.2.1

Signatories will outline their processes for reviewing, assessing, and augmenting their monetisation policies in order to scrutinise and bar participation by actors that systematically provide harmful Disinformation.

Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

• TikTok Inventory Filter: This is our proprietary system, which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter which is now available in 29 countries in the EEA and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the main system through which advertisers purchase ads. We have expanded the functionality of this Inventory Filter in various EEA countries. More details can be found here. The Inventory Filter is informed by industry standards and policies, which include topics that may be susceptible to disinformation. Additionally, this enabled advertisers to:
  • Selectively exclude unwanted or misaligned videos that do not align with their brand safety requirements from appearing next to their ads through TikTok's Video Exclusion List solution.
  • Exclude specific profile pages from serving their Profile Feed ads through TikTok's Profile Feed Exclusion List.
• TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”): Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.

• Zefr: Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform (now available in 29 countries in the EEA). Zefr aligns with industry standards.
• IAS: Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability, and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform (post campaign is available in 28 countries in the EEA). As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with industry standards. 

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

• TikTok Inventory Filter: This is our proprietary system, which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter which is now available in 29 jurisdictions in the EEA and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the main system through which advertisers purchase ads. We have expanded the functionality of this Inventory Filter in various EEA countries. More details can be found here. The Inventory Filter is informed by Industry Standards and policies, which include topics that may be susceptible to disinformation. Additionally, this enabled advertisers to:
  • Selectively exclude unwanted or misaligned videos that do not align with their brand safety requirements from appearing next to their ads through TikTok's Video Exclusion List solution.
  • Exclude specific profile pages from serving their Profile Feed ads through TikTok's Profile Feed Exclusion List.
• TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”): Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.

• Zefr: Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform (now available in 29 countries in the EEA). Zefr aligns with the Industry Standards.
• IAS: Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability, and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform (post campaign is available in 28 countries in the EEA). As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with the Industry Standards. 
• DoubleVerify: We are partnering with DoubleVerify to provide advertisers with media quality measurement for ads. DoubleVerify is working actively with us to expand its suite of brand suitability and media quality solutions on the platform. DoubleVerify is available in 27 EU countries.

Measure 1.4

Relevant Signatories responsible for the buying of advertising, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies, will place advertising through ad sellers that have taken effective, and transparent steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or in places that repeatedly publish Disinformation.

QRE 1.4.1

Relevant Signatories that are responsible for the buying of advertising will describe their processes and procedures to ensure they place advertising through ad sellers that take the steps described in Measure 1.4.

Measure 1.5

Relevant Signatories involved in the reporting of monetisation activities inclusive of media platforms, ad networks, and ad verification companies will take the necessary steps to give industry-recognised relevant independent third-party auditors commercially appropriate and fair access to their services and data in order to: - First, confirm the accuracy of first party reporting relative to monetisation and Disinformation, seeking alignment with regular audits performed under the DSA. - Second, accreditation services should assess the effectiveness of media platforms' policy enforcement, including Disinformation policies.

QRE 1.5.1

Signatories that produce first party reporting will report on the access provided to independent third-party auditors as outlined in Measure 1.5 and will link to public reports and results from such auditors, such as MRC Content Level Brand Safety Accreditation, TAG Brand Safety certifications, or other similarly recognised industry accepted certifications.

QRE 1.5.2

Signatories that conduct independent accreditation via audits will disclose areas of their accreditation that have been updated to reflect needs in Measure 1.5.

Measure 1.6

Relevant Signatories will advance the development, improve the availability, and take practical steps to advance the use of brand safety tools and partnerships, with the following goals: - To the degree commercially viable, relevant Signatories will provide options to integrate information and analysis from source-raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g., on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by ad buyers, namely advertisers and their agencies. - Advertisers, agencies, ad tech companies, and media platforms and publishers will take effective and reasonable steps to integrate the use of brand safety tools throughout the media planning, buying and reporting process, to avoid the placement of their advertising next to Disinformation content and/or in places or sources that repeatedly publish Disinformation. - Brand safety tool providers and rating services who categorise content and domains will provide reasonable transparency about the processes they use, insofar that they do not release commercially sensitive information or divulge trade secrets, and that they establish a mechanism for customer feedback and appeal.

QRE 1.6.1

Signatories that place ads will report on the options they provide for integration of information, indicators and analysis from source raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g. on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by buyers.

QRE 1.6.2

Signatories that purchase ads will outline the steps they have taken to integrate the use of brand safety tools in their advertising and media operations, disclosing what percentage of their media investment is protected by such services.

QRE 1.6.3

Signatories that provide brand safety tools will outline how they are ensuring transparency and appealability about their processes and outcomes.

QRE 1.6.4

Relevant Signatories that rate sources to determine if they persistently publish Disinformation shall provide reasonable information on the criteria under which websites are rated, make public the assessment of the relevant criteria relating to Disinformation, operate in an apolitical manner and give publishers the right to reply before ratings are published.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.2 Measure 2.3 Measure 2.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Health Misinformation
• Environment/Climate Misinformation
• Public Safety & Trust Misinformation
• Election Misinformation
• Other Misinformation
  
  

• Medical Misinformation
• Dangerous Misinformation
• Synthetic and Manipulated Media
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Climate Misinformation

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

Country	Number of ads removals under the granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	133
Belgium	101
Bulgaria	16
Croatia	9
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	22
Denmark	90
Estonia	10
Finland	22
France	138
Germany	656
Greece	17
Hungary	49
Ireland	176
Italy	102
Latvia	21
Lithuania	8
Luxembourg	1
Malta	-
Netherlands	46
Poland	77
Portugal	37
Romania	19
Slovakia	11
Slovenia	12
Spain	73
Sweden	195
Iceland	0
Liechtenstein	-
Norway	165
Total EU	2,044
Total EEA	2,209

Measure 2.2

Relevant Signatories will develop tools, methods, or partnerships, which may include reference to independent information sources both public and proprietary (for instance partnerships with fact-checking or source rating organisations, or services providing indicators of trustworthiness, or proprietary methods developed internally) to identify content and sources as distributing harmful Disinformation, to identify and take action on ads and promoted content that violate advertising policies regarding Disinformation mentioned in Measure 2.1.

• Health Misinformation
• Environment/Climate Misinformation
• Public Safety & Trust Misinformation 
• Election Misinformation
• Other Misinformation
  
  

• By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the advertisement and selecting the “Report” option.
• By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the advertisement and then selecting the “Report” option.

QRE 2.2.1

Signatories will describe the tools, methods, or partnerships they use to identify content and sources that contravene policies mentioned in Measure 2.1 - while being mindful of not disclosing information that'd make it easier for malicious actors to circumvent these tools, methods, or partnerships. Signatories will specify the independent information sources involved in these tools, methods, or partnerships.

• 
  Dangerous Misinformation
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Medical Misinformation
• Synthetic and Manipulated Media
• Climate Misinformation
  
  

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

• Health Misinformation
• Environment/Climate Misinformation
• Public Safety & Trust Misinformation
• Election Misinformation
• Other Misinformation
  
  

• By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the advertisement and selecting the “Report” option.
• By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the advertisement and then selecting the “Report” option.
  
  

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

• Dangerous Misinformation
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Medical Misinformation
• Synthetic and Manipulated Media
• Climate Misinformation

SLI 2.3.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the ads removed or prohibited from their services using procedures outlined in Measure 2.3. In the event of ads successfully removed, parties should report on the reach of violatory content and advertising.

Country	Number of ads removals under the granular misinformation ad policies	Number of impressions for ads removed under the granular misinformation ad policiesÊ
Austria	133	14,139
Belgium	101	35,702
Bulgaria	16	1,245
Croatia	9	2,019
Cyprus	3	1,542
Czech Republic	22	16,572
Denmark	90	12,306
Estonia	10	620
Finland	22	11,521
France	138	36,867
Germany	656	402,684
Greece	17	32,304
Hungary	49	189,097
Ireland	176	44,960
Italy	102	65,589
Latvia	21	128,011
Lithuania	8	866
Luxembourg	1	4,632
Malta	-	-
Netherlands	46	1,282
Poland	77	57,588
Portugal	37	40,976
Romania	19	2,599
Slovakia	11	588
Slovenia	12	872
Spain	73	7,958
Sweden	195	20,877
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	-	-
Norway	165	23,045
Total EU	2,044	1,133,416
Total EEA	2,209	1,156,461

Measure 2.4

Relevant Signatories will provide relevant information to advertisers about which advertising policies have been violated when they reject or remove ads violating policies described in Measure 2.1 above or disable advertising accounts in application of these policies and clarify their procedures for appeal.

QRE 2.4.1

Signatories will describe how they provide information to advertisers about advertising policies they have violated and how advertisers can appeal these policies.

SLI 2.4.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the number of appeals per their standard procedures they received from advertisers on the application of their policies and on the proportion of these appeals that led to a change of the initial policy decision.

Country	Number of appeals for ads removed under the granular misinformation ad policies	Number of overturns of appeals under the granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	0	0
Belgium	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	0	0
Estonia	0	0
Finland	0	0
France	0	0
Germany	0	0
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	0	0
Italy	0	0
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	0	0
Poland	0	0
Portugal	0	0
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	0	0
Sweden	0	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	0	0

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 3.1 Measure 3.2 Measure 3.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• We have established and strengthened our partnership with third-party fact-checkers to detect harmful misinformation on our platform.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

• The optimisation of our collaboration framework with third-party fact-checking organisation in relation to advertising (e.g.Science Feedback); and
• Continuing enhancing detection within the advertising ecosystem through signal-sharing to improve our internal databases. 

Measure 3.1

Relevant Signatories will cooperate with platforms, advertising supply chain players, source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checking organisations, advertisers and any other actors active in the online monetisation value chain, to facilitate the integration and flow of information, in particular information relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation, in full respect of all relevant data protection rules and confidentiality agreements.

QRE 3.1.1

Signatories will outline how they work with others across industry and civil society to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation.

Measure 3.2

Relevant Signatories will exchange among themselves information on Disinformation trends and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), via the Code Task-force, GARM, IAB Europe, or other relevant fora. This will include sharing insights on new techniques or threats observed by Relevant Signatories, discussing case studies, and other means of improving capabilities and steps to help remove Disinformation across the advertising supply chain - potentially including real-time technical capabilities.

QRE 3.2.1

Signatories will report on their discussions within fora mentioned in Measure 3.2, being mindful of not disclosing information that is confidential and/or that may be used by malicious actors to circumvent the defences set by Signatories and others across the advertising supply chain. This could include, for instance, information about the fora Signatories engaged in; about the kinds of information they shared; and about the learnings they derived from these exchanges.

Measure 3.3

Relevant Signatories will integrate the work of or collaborate with relevant third-party organisations, such as independent source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or open-source investigators, in order to reduce monetisation of Disinformation and avoid the dissemination of advertising containing Disinformation.

QRE 3.3.1

Signatories will report on the collaborations and integrations relevant to their work with organisations mentioned.

Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 4.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 4.1

Relevant Signatories commit to define "political and issue advertising" in this section in line with the definition of "political advertising" set out in the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.

Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Our 2025 Community Guidelines update was launched on August 14, 2025 and went live on September 13, 2025 (due to the 30-day notice period for users). This update ensured that the Community Guidelines remain aligned with our internal policies.
  • Our Harmful Misinformation policies are referenced under the hack and leak section. They have all been refined in H2 2025, and they continue to drive our work in combating harmful misinformation, such as conspiracy theories, claims relating to unfolding events, and other forms of dangerous misinformation.
• We continue enforcing our AIGC policy against TikTok Shop content.
• We launched the Evasive Techniques policy, which combats methods designed to evade moderation systems. Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections” which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections. 
• We have continued to enhance our ability to detect covert influence operations. To provide more regular and detailed updates about the covert influence operations we disrupt, we have a dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok’s Transparency Centre. In this report, we include information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts.
  
  

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 14.1

Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.

• Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
• Bulk distribution of a high volume of spam; and
• Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes

• Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
• Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform

• facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
• provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Our hack and leak policy, which aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities, and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures.
• Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation.
• Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure.
• In H2 2025, we deployed a defined suite of misinformation policies. As stated in our Community Guidelines, our policies do not allow misinformation that could cause significant harm to individuals or society, no matter the intent of the person posting it. This includes hoaxes, misleading AIGC, harmful conspiracy theories, and other false information related to public safety, crises, or major civic events—when such content may lead to violence or cause public panic. In addition, content is ineligible for the FYF if it contains misinformation that may cause moderate harm to individuals or society. To be cautious, unverified information about crises, major civic events, or content temporarily under review by fact-checkers is also ineligible for the FYF.
• Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or incites panic, including falsely presenting past crisis events as recent or claiming that critical resources are unavailable during emergencies
• Health misinformation that could cause significant harm, such as promoting unproven treatments that may be fatal, discouraging professional care for life-threatening conditions (e.g., vaccine effectiveness), or spreading false information about how such conditions are transmitted.
• Misinformation that denies the existence of climate change, misrepresents its causes, or contradicts its established environmental impact
• Conspiracy theories or hoaxes that could cause significant harm, such as those that make a violent call to action or have links to previous violence.
  
  

• The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualisation, bullying or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals.
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely show:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation.
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

• prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
• remove registered accounts based on certain signals (i.e., uncommon behaviour on the platform).

• They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or work together to spread the same narrative.
• They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location or use fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
• They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision-making, beliefs, and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.

QRE 14.1.1

Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.

• Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
• Bulk distribution of a high volume of spam; and
• Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes

• Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
• Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform

• facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
• provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Our hack and leak policy, which aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities, and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures.
• Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation.
• Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure.
• Our harmful misinformation policies combat conspiracy theories related to unfolding events and dangerous misinformation.
• Our Trade of Regulated Goods and Services policy prohibits the trading of hacked goods.

• The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
• The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware that it was used without their permission.
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely show:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation.
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

QRE 14.1.2

Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.

• prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
• remove registered accounts based on certain signals (i.e., uncommon behaviour on the platform).

• They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or work together to spread the same narrative.
• They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location or use fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
• They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision-making, beliefs, and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.

Measure 14.2

Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.

QRE 14.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.

SLI 14.2.4

Estimation, at the Member State level, of TTPs related content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement with such content as a percentage of the total content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement on relevant signatories' service.

Country	Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "AI-generated"
Austria	292,401
Belgium	461,238
Bulgaria	832,573
Croatia	94,124
Cyprus	100,228
Czech Republic	455,194
Denmark	114,169
Estonia	63,904
Finland	178,869
France	2,665,168
Germany	3,887,735
Greece	445,046
Hungary	647,102
Ireland	131,936
Italy	2,778,340
Latvia	150,166
Lithuania	169,243
Luxembourg	26,034
Malta	26,024
Netherlands	884,486
Poland	1,455,778
Portugal	697,724
Romania	1,826,466
Slovakia	281,735
Slovenia	35,187
Spain	3,289,279
Sweden	336,203
Iceland	11,757
Liechtenstein	530
Norway	154,897
Total EU	22,326,352
Total EEA	22,493,536

Measure 14.3

Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.

QRE 14.3.1

Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• We provided extensive training for moderators and risk containment agents to help them better detect and remove deceptive AIGC more quickly. We also conducted a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of our AI policies and provided guidance to reduce systemic error. 
• We published our Responsible AI Principles. 
• Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections’ which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections.
• We continue to participate in relevant working groups, such as the Generative AI working group, which commenced in September 2023.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

• AIGC that shows the likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualisation, bullying or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals. 
• AIGC that shows the likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

• AIGC that shows the likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualisation, bullying or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals. 
• AIGC that shows the likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

• We have in place internal guidelines on Algorithmic Fairness that are developed with adherence to our commitment to human rights as outlined here: https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/en/upholding-human-rights
• We have continued to scale our algorithmic fairness compliance review process for new or updated AI systems that meet certain risk-based thresholds.

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

• We have in place internal guidelines and training to help ensure that the training and deployment of our AI systems comply with applicable data protection laws, as well as principles of fairness.
• We have instituted a compliance review process for new AI systems that meet certain thresholds, and are working to prioritise review of previously developed algorithms.

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Measure 16.2

Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.

QRE 16.2.1

As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.

Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• We ran 8 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • 7 in the EU 
    • Czechia (Parliamentary election): Demagog.cz
    • Portugal (local election): Poligrafo
    • Estonia (local election): Lead Stories
    • Ireland (presidential election): The Journal
    • Netherlands (parliamentary election)
    • Denmark (local and municipal election): Sikker Digital
    • Portugal (presidential election): Polígrafo
  • 1 in Norway (parliamentary election)
• Following wildfires in Portugal and Spain, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content during natural disasters. The guide links to TikTok's tragic event support guide and authoritative third party resources (PT)(ES) of information about aid and relief support. The intervention is available in all in-app languages.
• Following protests in France, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content when events are unfolding rapidly. The guide links to TikTok's Community Guidelines and Well-being Guide. 
• Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Holocaust Education, and the War in Ukraine.
• Continued to support mental well-being awareness and literacy and to combat misinformation with reliable content through the WHO's Fides network, a diverse community of trusted healthcare professionals and content creators in a number of countries, including France.
• We launched a $2 Million AI Literacy fund in partnership with more than 20 civil society organisations across 12 markets worldwide. The ad credit fund is designed to support the creation of educational content that will appear in For You feeds. This initiative launched alongside several new company updates to spot, shape and understand AI-generated content.
• Brought greater transparency about our systems and our integrity and authenticity efforts to our community by sharing regular insights and updates.  In H2 2025, we launched a new:
  • Transparency Center Global Elections Hub , including dedicated coverage of elections across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Hub outlines our policies, product features, and moderation practices that help protect platform integrity during elections. Throughout this reporting period, we regularly updated the Hub with information on our safety efforts in markets with active elections, including Croatia, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland and Ireland. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 17.1

Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.

QRE 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.

Measure 17.2

Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.

QRE 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.

• Czechia Parliamentary Elections 2025: From 4 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Czech parliamentary election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation. 
• Portugal Local Elections 2025: From 16 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Portugal local elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Polígrafo. 
• Estonia Local Elections 2025: From 24 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Estonia local election. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to our Estonian fact-checking partner, Lead Stories for digital literacy resources. 
• Ireland Presidential Election 2025: From 24 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Irish presidential elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation The Journal.
• Netherlands Parliamentary Election 2025: From 29 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Dutch parliamentary elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.
• Danish Local and Municipal Elections 2025: From 24 Oct 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Danish local and municipal elections. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to Sikker Digital for digital literacy resources.
• Portugal Presidential Election 2026: From 9 Dec 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2026 Portugal presidential election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Polígrafo.
• Norway Parliamentary Elections 2025: From 8 Aug 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Norwegian parliamentary election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.

• 
  Partnered with Lead Stories: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
• Partnered with fakenews.pl: Poland.
• Partnered with Correctiv: Germany, Austria.
  
  

SLI 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories report on number of media literacy and awareness raising activities organised and or participated in and will share quantitative information pertinent to show the effects of the campaigns they build or support at the Member State level.

Country	Total number of impressions of the H5 Page (Views generated between July 1 and December 31, 2025)	Number of impressions of the search intervention	Number of clicks on the search intervention	Click through rate of the search intervention
France (in partnership with AFP)	48,144	26,260,992	71,577	0.27%
Portugal (in partnership with Poligrafo)	10,369	5,426,533	22,811	0.42%
Denmark (in partnership with Logically Facts)	4,098	202,542	881	0.43%
The Netherlands (in partnership with Nieuwscheckers)	34,937	2,739,245	41,868	1.53%
Ireland (in partnership with The journal.ie)	905	359,461	1,883	0.52%
Finland (in partnership with Logically Facts)	1,543	186,559	2,994	1.60%
Sweden (in partnership with Logically Facts)	2,342	413,554	4,115	1.00%
Spain (in partnership with Maldita)	21,922	17,986,294	42,554	0.24%
Italy (in partnership with Facta)	1,433	439,721	2,290	0.52%
Austria (in partnership with Correctiv, joint campaign with Germany)	4,607	1,535,546	7,965	0.52%
Germany (in partnership with Correctiv, joint campaign with Austria)	7,790	536,473	2,533	0.47%
Poland	10,369	9,183,221	54,480	0.59%
Bulgaria	1,137	297,690	1,905	0.64%
Croatia	1,256	397,876	2,240	0.56%
Czechia	2,270	962,911	3,190	0.33%
Slovenia	535	129,253	801	0.62%

Measure 17.3

For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.

QRE 17.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.

• 
  Portugal (local election): Polígrafo
• Estonia (local election): Lead Stories
• Ireland (presidential election): The Journal
• Denmark (local and municipal elections): Sikker Digital
• Portugal (presidential election): Polígrafo
• Czechia (parliamentary election): Demagog.cz
  
  

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.1 Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Continued to improve the accuracy of, and overall coverage provided by, our machine learning detection models. 
• Began testing large language models (LLMs) to further support proactive moderation at scale. Because LLMs can comprehend human language and perform highly specific, complex tasks, we are better able to moderate nuanced areas like misinformation by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.
• TikTok teams and personnel also regularly participate in research-focused events. In October 2025, TikTok co-sponsored the EU DisinfoLab conference in Slovenia. Several TikTok staff attended, and we co-led a session with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue on how platforms and conflict mediators can work together to reduce the risks of violence during conflicts.
• Continued to participate in, and co-chair, the working group on Elections.
• TikTok gathered its global Safety Advisory Councils in Singapore in October 2025 to consult them on a variety of topics including our approach to media literacy.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 18.1

Relevant Signatories will take measures to mitigate risks of their services fuelling the viral spread of harmful Disinformation, such as: recommender systems designed to improve the prominence of authoritative information and reduce the prominence of Disinformation based on clear and transparent methods and approaches for defining the criteria for authoritative information; other systemic approaches in the design of their products, policies, or processes, such as pre-testing.

QRE 18.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the risk mitigation systems, tools, procedures, or features deployed under Measure 18.1 and report on their deployment in each EU Member State.

QRE 18.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish the main parameters of their recommender systems, both in their report and, once it is operational, on the Transparency Centre.

QRE 18.1.3

Relevant Signatories will outline how they design their products, policies, or processes, to reduce the impressions and engagement with Disinformation whether through recommender systems or through other systemic approaches, and/or to increase the visibility of authoritative information.

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

• Misinformation 
  • Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or may induce panic about a crisis event or emergency, including using historical footage of a previous attack as if it were current, or incorrectly claiming a basic necessity (such as food or water) is no longer available in a particular location.Health misinformation, such as misleading statements about vaccines, inaccurate medical advice that discourages people from getting appropriate medical care for a life-threatening disease, or other misinformation which may cause negative health effects on an individual's life.
  • Climate change misinformation that undermines well-established scientific consensus, such as denying the existence of climate change or the factors that contribute to it.
  • Conspiracy theories that name and attack individual people.
  • Conspiracy theories that are violent or hateful, such as making a violent call to action, having links to previous violence, denying well-documented violent events, or causing prejudice towards a group with a protected attribute.
• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Election misinformation, including:
    • How, when, and where to vote or register to vote;
    • Eligibility requirements of voters to participate in an election, and the qualifications for candidates to run for office;
    • Laws, processes, and procedures that govern the organisation and implementation of elections and other civic processes, such as referendums, ballot propositions, or censuses;
    • Final results or outcome of an election.
• Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)
  • The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
  • The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
  • Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
    • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation;
    • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour;
  • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
  • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.
• Fake Engagement
  • Facilitating the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes.
  • Providing instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Misinformation 
  • Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society".
  • Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness.
  • Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest.
  • Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study.
  • Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event.
  • Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review.
• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied.
  • Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill.
• Fake Engagement
  • Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content.

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

Country	Number of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policyÊ	Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy	Number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the Misinformation policy.	Number of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)	Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)
Austria	2,612	1,946,472	2,871	511	219,339	1564	2,121,335
Belgium	4,150	8,424,034	3,069	864	292,729	2899	33,524,248
Bulgaria	4,828	3,601,953	9,427	402	58,515	2181	1,380,041
Croatia	638	984,109	793	63	49	1190	857,576
Cyprus	701	825,228	1,060	85	9	1214	877,703
Czech Republic	2,855	846,267	5,263	338	50,350	1551	166,156
Denmark	2,484	1,938,348	2,085	512	20,319	1920	2,522,414
Estonia	527	9,792	865	45	60,189	1571	202,878
Finland	1,357	8,695,926	1,752	268	162,976	921	417,085
France	37,466	94,473,247	60,520	3,650	6,727,613	28565	145,692,240
Germany	42,642	179,399,985	47,221	5,287	926,431	50378	113,670,298
Greece	4,602	1,556,421	8,200	960	48,866	2284	929,995
Hungary	1,490	1,328,847	2,489	876	13,680	990	2,318,366
Ireland	2,613	885,690	3,489	413	8,482	1722	1,125,060
Italy	18,667	40,083,897	36,707	2,726	723,486	15434	93,101,464
Latvia	705	448,180	1,107	301	318	1519	2,530
Lithuania	1,086	59,207	1,257	61	1,190	1727	8,952,387
Luxembourg	349	14,382	305	48	10	1620	164,719
Malta	159	876,245	283	26	0	382	2,127
Netherlands	14,335	15,235,784	13,311	907	2,340,996	7974	28,839,022
Poland	14,770	22,162,809	15,480	1,038	399,418	7227	14,249,635
Portugal	3,141	2,107,021	2,561	270	38,447	1659	6,862,825
Romania	28,743	45,185,198	32,030	4,622	5,017,440	10458	6,624,761
Slovakia	1,122	858,265	1,861	64	639	1589	346,191
Slovenia	370	26,882	589	34	7	844	3,070,784
Spain	21,592	25,310,043	38,779	1,483	162,917	16129	40,748,793
Sweden	4,159	2,192,170	4,633	761	455	5168	4,607,858
Iceland	123	6,208	188	19	0	175	414
Liechtenstein	143	24,362	76	4	0	484	0
Norway	1,662	2,467,190	1,681	290	1,582	1282	2,920,599
Total EU	218,163	459,476,402	298,007	26,615	17,274,870	170,680	513,378,491
Total EEA	220,091	461,974,162	299,952	26,928	17,276,452	172,621	516,299,504

Measure 18.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.

QRE 18.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe research efforts, both in-house and in partnership with third-party organisations, on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and relevant safe design practices, as well as actions or changes as a result of this research. Relevant Signatories will include where possible information on financial investments in said research. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• At TikTok, we strive to bring transparency to how we protect our platform.  We continue to increase the reports we voluntarily publish, the depth of data we disclose, and the frequency with which we publish.
• We also worked to make it easier for people to independently study our data and platform. For example through: 
  • Our Research Tools, which empower over 900 research teams to independently study our platform.
  • Adding additional functionality to the Research API, including a compliance API (launched in June 2025) that improves the data refresh process for researchers, helping to ensure that efforts to comply with our Terms of Service (ToS) do not impede researchers' ability to efficiently access data from TikTok's Research API.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

• User interactions (e.g. content users like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that users follow back); 
• Content information (e.g. sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country the content was published); and 
• User information  (e.g. device settings, language preferences, location, time zone and day, and device types). 
  
  

• Users can click on any video and select “not interested” to indicate that they do not want to see similar content.
• Users are able to automatically filter out specific words or hashtags from the content recommended to them (see here). 
• Users are able to refresh their For You feed if they no longer feel like recommendations are relevant to them or are too similar. When the For You feed is refreshed, users view a number of new videos which include popular videos (e.g., they have a high view count or a high like rate). Their interaction with these new videos will inform future recommendations.
• Users can also personalise their "For You" page through our new Manage Topics feature (June 2025). This allows users to adjust the frequency of content they see related to particular topics. The settings don't eliminate topics entirely but can influence how often they're recommended as peoples' interests evolve over time. It adds to the many ways people shape their feed every day - including liking or sharing videos, searching for topics, or simply watching videos for longer.
• As part of our obligations under the DSA (Article 38), we introduced non-personalized feeds on our platform, which provide our European users with an alternative to personalised recommender systems. They are able to turn off personalisation so that feeds show non-personalised content. The For You feed will instead show popular videos in their region and internationally. See here.
  
  

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

Country	Number of users that filtered hashtags or words	Number of users that clicked on "not interested"	Number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh	Number of Videos tagged with AIGC label
Austria	81,940	1,054,601	56,468	494,206
Belgium	123,591	1,636,355	90,963	678,792
Bulgaria	59,087	1,077,505	45,808	1,044,321
Croatia	30,698	564,614	25,259	131,396
Cyprus	17,932	224,295	15,464	181,397
Czech Republic	63,982	849,428	41,602	538,710
Denmark	49,192	637,478	31,304	191,270
Estonia	18,895	182,527	13,036	83,768
Finland	67,907	680,821	49,088	275,526
France	680,454	9,545,884	490,210	4,724,226
Germany	813,569	9,455,189	584,609	6,351,939
Greece	89,043	1,629,313	81,664	715,077
Hungary	63,484	1,179,383	35,106	776,347
Ireland	83,988	1,014,346	60,748	181,131
Italy	429,072	7,991,598	277,864	3,843,482
Latvia	28,449	361,290	22,190	198,043
Lithuania	34,507	402,385	26,669	220,796
Luxembourg	7,038	97,071	5,142	48,734
Malta	6,444	98,531	7,840	41,910
Netherlands	267,432	2,926,699	204,997	1,387,922
Poland	285,891	4,192,550	179,424	1,772,881
Portugal	96,468	1,293,884	64,318	903,172
Romania	155,037	3,379,837	196,717	2,213,505
Slovakia	28,269	399,464	14,507	311,951
Slovenia	14,149	204,523	11,366	52,786
Spain	502,835	8,571,737	433,076	4,547,581
Sweden	118,791	1,562,220	105,302	560,744
Iceland	6,537	65,577	3,173	17,098
Liechtenstein	229	3,947	364	1,164
Norway	74,159	820,642	47,990	246,312
Total EU	4,218,144	61,213,528	3,170,741	32,471,613
Total EEA	4,299,069	62,103,694	3,222,268	32,736,187

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 21.1 Measure 21.2 Measure 21.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• We ran 8 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • 7 in the EU
    • Czechia (parliamentary election) with Demagog.cz
    • Portugal (local election) with Polígrafo
    • Estonia (local election) with Lead Stories
    • Ireland (presidential election) with The Journal
    • Netherlands (parliamentary election) N/A
    • Denmark (local and municipal election) with Sikker Digital
    • Portugal (presidential election) with Polígrafo
  • 1 in Norway (parliamentary election) N/A
• Following wildfires in Portugal and Spain, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content during natural disasters. The guide links to TikTok's tragic event support guide and authoritative third party resources (PT)(ES) of information about aid and relief support. The intervention is available in all in-app languages.
• Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around the elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Holocaust Education, and the War in Ukraine.
• We partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers via a banner that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility.
• We launched a $2 Million AI Literacy fund in partnership with more than 20 civil society organisations across 12 markets worldwide. The ad credit fund is designed to support the creation of educational content that will appear in For You feeds. This initiative launched alongside several new company updates to spot, shape and understand AI-generated content.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 21.1

Relevant Signatories will further develop and apply policies, features, or programs across Member States and EU languages to help users benefit from the context and insights provided by independent fact-checkers or authoritative sources, for instance by means of labels, such as labels indicating fact-checker ratings, notices to users who try to share or previously shared the rated content, information panels, or by acting upon content notified by fact-checkers that violate their policies.

QRE 21.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies, features, or programs they deploy to meet this Measure and on their availability across Member States.

1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur
3. Demagog
4. Facta
5. Fact Check Georgia
6. Faktograf
7. Internews Kosova
8. Lead Stories
9. Newtral
10. Poligrafo
11. Reuters
12. Teyit

• Enforcement of misinformation policies. Our fact-checking partners play a critical role in helping us enforce our misinformation policies, which aim to promote a trustworthy and authentic experience for our users. We consider context and fact-checking to be key to consistently and accurately enforcing these policies, so, while we use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, we have our misinformation moderators assess, confirm, and take action on harmful misinformation. As part of this process, our moderators can access a repository of previously fact-checked claims and they are able to provide content to our expert fact checking partners for further evaluation. Where fact-checking partners advise that content is false, our moderators take measures to assess and remove it from our platform. Our response to QRE 31.1.1 provides further insight into the way in which fact-checking partners  are involved in this process.
• Unverified content labelling. As mentioned above, we partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners  determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers via a banner that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility. In these circumstances, the content creator is also notified that their video was flagged as unsubstantiated content and the video will become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed.

• In-app tools related to specific topics:
  • Election integrity. We have launched campaigns in advance of several major elections aimed at educating the public about the voting process which encourage users to fact-check information with our fact-checking partners. For example, the election integrity campaign we rolled out in advance of France legislative elections in June 2024 included a search intervention and in-app Election Centre. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with fact-checking organisation Agence France-Presse (AFP). In total, during the reporting period, we ran 14 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections. 
  • Climate Change. We launched a search intervention which redirects users seeking out climate change-related content to authoritative information. We worked with the UN to provide the authoritative information. 
  • Natural disasters: Launched a new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guide for the Reunion Cyclone Garance between 4 March and 4 April 2025 and continued our temporary search guide for the Mayotte Cyclone until 14 Feb 2025. These search guides link to TikTok's Safety Center tragic events support guide and authoritative third party information about aid and relief support. 
• User awareness of our fact-checking partnerships and labels. We have created pages on our Safety Center & Transparency Center to raise users’ awareness about our fact-checking program and labels and to support the work of our fact-checking partners. 

SLI 21.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report through meaningful metrics on actions taken under Measure 21.1, at the Member State level. At the minimum, the metrics will include: total impressions of fact-checks; ratio of impressions of fact-checks to original impressions of the fact-checked content–or if these are not pertinent to the implementation of fact-checking on their services, other equally pertinent metrics and an explanation of why those are more adequate.

Country	Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up)	Share of removals under misinformation policy	Share of proactive removals under misinformation policy	Share of video removals before any views under misinformation policy	Share of video removals within 24h by misinformation policy	Share of video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy	Share of proactive video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy	Share of video removals before any views under Civic and Election Integrity policy	Share of video removals within 24h under Civic and Election Integrity policy	% video removals under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy	% proactive video removals under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy	% video removals before any views under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy	% video removals within 24h under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy
Austria	30.37%	28.57%	98.77%	85.60%	91.54%	5.59%	99.02%	94.91%	97.06%	17.10%	97.51%	88.55%	86.96%
Belgium	29.07%	32.26%	98.29%	86.10%	90.80%	6.72%	99.65%	95.72%	70.14%	22.54%	98.03%	84.24%	82.03%
Bulgaria	35.32%	52.31%	99.52%	78.27%	92.65%	4.36%	99.00%	95.52%	91.04%	23.63%	99.08%	87.35%	88.77%
Croatia	25.89%	21.13%	97.81%	82.13%	92.16%	2.09%	100.00%	98.41%	100.00%	39.42%	98.40%	95.55%	96.05%
Cyprus	33.62%	25.18%	98.00%	85.02%	92.58%	3.05%	100.00%	96.47%	96.47%	43.61%	97.94%	92.50%	92.50%
Czech Republic	31.01%	41.67%	99.37%	80.18%	94.92%	4.93%	98.52%	92.60%	95.56%	22.64%	99.03%	92.07%	93.55%
Denmark	31.82%	18.65%	98.79%	84.02%	90.10%	3.84%	98.63%	89.06%	96.68%	14.42%	98.65%	93.59%	93.70%
Estonia	30.88%	7.88%	99.24%	85.01%	93.93%	0.67%	97.78%	82.22%	91.11%	23.48%	98.79%	97.90%	97.90%
Finland	29.58%	31.31%	97.20%	82.76%	91.75%	6.18%	97.39%	90.67%	92.91%	21.25%	97.39%	91.10%	93.05%
France	30.16%	31.65%	97.72%	80.63%	88.60%	3.08%	98.82%	94.33%	97.86%	24.13%	96.36%	91.40%	91.17%
Germany	29.86%	29.76%	96.93%	83.42%	90.34%	3.69%	98.85%	95.80%	98.20%	35.15%	97.74%	92.71%	92.71%
Greece	30.64%	35.82%	99.17%	81.49%	95.59%	7.47%	99.90%	95.52%	99.38%	17.78%	98.77%	84.15%	86.73%
Hungary	28.14%	15.44%	98.79%	92.35%	96.31%	9.07%	99.66%	95.55%	99.09%	10.26%	96.97%	92.12%	91.92%
Ireland	33.69%	28.97%	98.97%	89.48%	93.19%	4.58%	98.06%	94.67%	97.34%	19.09%	97.97%	91.29%	90.24%
Italy	32.14%	36.23%	92.03%	84.00%	91.51%	5.29%	76.27%	91.53%	96.92%	29.96%	82.05%	89.87%	89.16%
Latvia	36.08%	19.79%	99.29%	86.10%	95.32%	8.45%	100.00%	28.57%	16.61%	42.64%	98.88%	97.63%	97.43%
Lithuania	31.90%	25.86%	98.99%	59.21%	66.67%	1.45%	96.72%	98.36%	96.72%	41.12%	98.61%	96.41%	96.41%
Luxembourg	32.63%	2.81%	98.85%	86.82%	90.54%	0.39%	100.00%	95.83%	100.00%	13.06%	99.57%	98.46%	98.64%
Malta	28.83%	13.64%	95.60%	89.31%	91.19%	2.23%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	32.76%	97.91%	96.34%	95.81%
Netherlands	29.12%	42.73%	98.74%	81.47%	82.21%	2.70%	96.47%	82.25%	84.12%	23.77%	97.35%	88.90%	88.15%
Poland	30.73%	37.40%	98.31%	76.58%	91.66%	2.63%	99.33%	89.31%	94.03%	18.30%	97.45%	93.23%	94.52%
Portugal	29.97%	41.29%	99.49%	87.33%	92.26%	3.55%	99.63%	94.81%	97.41%	21.81%	98.61%	84.33%	85.11%
Romania	28.50%	52.46%	98.90%	78.00%	91.12%	8.44%	98.55%	79.64%	93.70%	19.09%	98.16%	89.30%	84.11%
Slovakia	28.39%	27.99%	98.93%	76.83%	94.74%	1.60%	100.00%	93.75%	96.88%	39.64%	99.50%	97.17%	97.99%
Slovenia	30.61%	7.33%	99.73%	88.92%	96.22%	0.67%	100.00%	94.12%	100.00%	16.71%	98.70%	96.21%	95.73%
Spain	36.23%	35.84%	99.07%	88.68%	92.00%	2.46%	99.39%	88.60%	93.73%	26.77%	99.32%	92.43%	91.18%
Sweden	29.51%	25.98%	98.92%	88.05%	94.45%	4.75%	99.61%	98.29%	99.21%	32.28%	99.28%	93.73%	93.77%
Iceland	33.50%	25.52%	98.37%	86.18%	86.99%	3.94%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	36.31%	100.00%	94.29%	93.71%
Liechtenstein	31.25%	4.15%	98.60%	93.71%	95.80%	0.12%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	14.06%	99.38%	100.00%	99.79%
Norway	29.55%	27.09%	98.26%	85.98%	92.66%	4.73%	100.00%	97.59%	100.00%	20.89%	98.21%	89.63%	90.41%
Total EU	31.26%	33.30%	97.70%	82.24%	90.35%	4.06%	96.56%	90.25%	94.34%	26.06%	96.42%	91.67%	91.18%
Total EEA	31.23%	33.09%	97.70%	82.28%	90.37%	4.05%	96.60%	90.33%	94.40%	25.95%	96.44%	91.68%	91.21%

SLI 21.1.2

When cooperating with independent fact-checkers to label content on their services, Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken at the Member State level and their impact, via metrics, of: number of articles published by independent fact-checkers; number of labels applied to content, such as on the basis of such articles; meaningful metrics on the impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 such as the impact of said measures on user interactions with, or user re-shares of, content fact-checked as false or misleading.

Country	Number of videos tagged with the unverified content label	Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up)
Austria	77	30.37%
Belgium	178	29.07%
Bulgaria	198	35.32%
Croatia	5	25.89%
Cyprus	17	33.62%
Czech Republic	314	31.01%
Denmark	298	31.82%
Estonia	34	30.88%
Finland	57	29.58%
France	2,397	30.16%
Germany	1,945	29.86%
Greece	264	30.64%
Hungary	33	28.14%
Ireland	39	33.69%
Italy	943	32.14%
Latvia	2	36.08%
Lithuania	12	31.90%
Luxembourg	6	32.63%
Malta	0	28.83%
Netherlands	325	29.12%
Poland	425	30.73%
Portugal	138	29.97%
Romania	597	28.50%
Slovakia	133	28.39%
Slovenia	6	30.61%
Spain	549	36.23%
Sweden	123	29.51%
Iceland	0	33.50%
Liechtenstein	0	31.25%
Norway	79	29.55%
Total EU	9,115	31.26%
Total EEA	9,194	31.23%

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• In line with our DSA requirements, we continued to provide a dedicated reporting channel and appeals process for users who disagree with the outcome, for our community in the European Union to ‘Report Illegal Content,’ enabling users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. For advertising-related user reporting flow, please refer to Chapter 2.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 23.1

Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.

QRE 23.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.

• By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the video content and selecting the “Report” option. 
• By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the video content and then selecting the “Report” option.

Measure 23.2

Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).

QRE 23.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 24.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 24.1

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with information on why particular content or accounts have been labelled, demoted, or otherwise enforced on, on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section, as well as the basis for such enforcement action, and the possibility for them to appeal through a transparent mechanism.

QRE 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems across Member States and languages and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.

• removal or otherwise restriction of access to their content;
• a ban of the account;
• restriction of their access to a feature (such as LIVE); or
• restriction of their ability to monetise. 

SLI 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories provide information on the number and nature of enforcement actions for policies described in response to Measure 18.2, the numbers of such actions that were subsequently appealed, the results of these appeals, information, and to the extent possible metrics, providing insight into the duration or effectiveness of processing of appeals process, and publish this information on the Transparency Centre.

Country	Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy	Number of overturns of appealsÊ for violation of misinformation policy	Appeal success rate of videos removedÊ for violation of misinformation policy	Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)	Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)	Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)
Austria	885	683	77.20%	152	128	84.20%	645	574	89.00%
Belgium	1,047	877	83.80%	171	145	84.80%	590	521	88.30%
Bulgaria	1,375	983	71.50%	71	60	84.50%	333	278	83.50%
Croatia	133	106	79.70%	13	12	92.30%	256	229	89.50%
Cyprus	155	122	78.70%	13	11	84.60%	246	213	86.60%
Czech Republic	1,119	936	83.60%	110	96	87.30%	479	418	87.30%
Denmark	546	441	80.80%	88	69	78.40%	567	540	95.20%
Estonia	181	137	75.70%	23	15	65.20%	362	308	85.10%
Finland	424	346	81.60%	61	47	77.00%	429	388	90.40%
France	7,543	6,307	83.60%	362	309	85.40%	3,308	2,905	87.80%
Germany	14,569	10,635	73.00%	1,475	1,191	80.70%	10,927	9,547	87.40%
Greece	1,206	1,022	84.70%	168	150	89.30%	461	395	85.70%
Hungary	362	285	78.70%	189	163	86.20%	242	205	84.70%
Ireland	856	716	83.60%	85	77	90.60%	416	388	93.30%
Italy	4,912	3,583	72.90%	367	309	84.20%	2,796	2,399	85.80%
Latvia	253	227	89.70%	23	21	91.30%	544	487	89.50%
Lithuania	275	201	73.10%	28	25	89.30%	470	411	87.40%
Luxembourg	60	50	83.30%	7	6	85.70%	86	81	94.20%
Malta	33	25	75.80%	6	6	100.00%	62	54	87.10%
Netherlands	4,467	3,223	72.20%	330	246	74.50%	4,138	3,671	88.70%
Poland	5,049	3,488	69.10%	284	238	83.80%	1,910	1,563	81.80%
Portugal	823	648	78.70%	76	58	76.30%	291	253	86.90%
Romania	8,645	4,885	56.50%	1,219	777	63.70%	2,528	2,208	87.30%
Slovakia	358	287	80.20%	19	15	78.90%	337	290	86.10%
Slovenia	125	104	83.20%	11	5	45.50%	168	148	88.10%
Spain	5,671	4,159	73.30%	374	328	87.70%	3,988	3,608	90.50%
Sweden	1,039	831	80.00%	163	130	79.80%	830	701	84.50%
Iceland	36	33	91.70%	7	6	85.70%	34	33	97.10%
Liechtenstein	4	2	50.00%	0	0	0.00%	3	3	100.00%
Norway	547	429	78.40%	105	87	82.90%	527	477	90.50%
Total EU	62,111	45,307	72.90%	5,888	4,637	78.80%	37,409	32,783	87.60%
Total EEA	62,698	45,771	73.00%	6,000	4,730	78.80%	37,973	33,296	87.70%

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.2 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Enabled researchers to efficiently identify popular, high‑engagement content through our Research Tools (Research API and VCE) by filtering videos by numbers of views and comments, supporting studies across topics including potential disinformation.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 26.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

Measure 26.2

Relevant Signatories will provide real-time or near real-time, machine-readable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data on their service for research purposes, such as accounts belonging to public figures such as elected official, news outlets and government accounts subject to an application process which is not overly cumbersome.

QRE 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide real-time or near real-time access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data for research purposes as described in Measure 26.2.

• Ad Library: This library features ads that we're paid to display to people, including those that aren't currently active or have been paused by the advertisers.
• Other commercial content: This library features content that we're not paid to display, including content that promotes a brand, product, or service.

QRE 26.2.2

Relevant Signatories will describe the scope of manifestly-made public data as applicable to their services.

• Ad Library: This library features ads that we're paid to display to people, including those that aren't currently active or have been paused by the advertisers.
• Other commercial content: This library features content that we're not paid to display, including content that promotes a brand, product, or service.

QRE 26.2.3

Relevant Signatories will describe the application process in place to in order to gain the access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data described in Measure 26.2.

SLI 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2, such as: Number of monthly users (or users over a sample representative timeframe), Number of applications received, rejected, and accepted (over a reporting period or a sample representative timeframe), Average response time (over a reporting period or a sample representative timeframe).

• 201 applications to access TikTok’s Research Tools (Research API and VCE) from researchers in the EU and EEA.
• 90 applications to access the TikTok Commercial Content API.
  
  

Country	Number of applications received for Research Tools	Number of applications accepted for Research Tools	Number of applications rejected for Research Tools	Number of applications received for TikTok Commercial Content APIÊ	Number of applications accepted for TikTok Commercial Content APIÊ	Number of applications rejected for TikTok Commercial Content API
Austria	8	6	2	0	0	0
Belgium	5	3	2	2	2	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	1	1	0
Czech Republic	2	1	0	2	2	0
Denmark	6	6	0	10	10	0
Estonia	0	0	0	1	1	0
Finland	3	3	0	1	1	0
France	25	10	11	17	17	0
Germany	50	34	10	16	16	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	3	3	0	0	0	0
Ireland	6	4	2	2	2	0
Italy	24	18	6	2	2	0
Latvia	1	0	1	2	2	0
Lithuania	1	1	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	1	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	11	10	1	7	7	0
Poland	5	4	1	9	9	0
Portugal	4	3	0	0	0	0
Romania	5	2	1	2	2	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	1	1	0
Slovenia	2	1	1	1	1	0
Spain	35	14	17	7	7	0
Sweden	10	7	2	4	4	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	2	1	0	3	3	0
Total EU	207	130	57	87	87	0
Total EEA	209	131	57	90	90	0

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

• Public account data, such as user profiles, followers and following lists, liked videos, pinned videos and reposted videos.
• Public content data, such as comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares and likes that a video receives. 

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 30.1

Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.

QRE 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on and explain the nature of their agreements with fact-checking organisations; their expected results; relevant quantitative information (for instance: contents fact-checked, increased coverage, changes in integration of fact-checking as depends on the agreements and to be further discussed within the Task-force); and such as relevant common standards and conditions for these agreements.

• The service the fact-checking partner will provide, namely, that their team of fact checkers review, assess and rate video content uploaded to their fact-checking queue, and will provide regular pro-active Insights Reports about general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generate particular misinformation or disinformation. 
• The expected results e.g., the fact-checkers advise on whether the content may be or contain misinformation and rate it using our classification categories. 
• An option to receive pro-actively flagging of potential harmful misinformation from our partners.
• The languages in which they will provide fact-checking services.
• The ability to request temporary coverage regarding additional languages or support on ad hoc additional projects.
• All other key terms including the applicable term and fees and payment arrangements.

QRE 30.1.2

Relevant Signatories will list the fact-checking organisations they have agreements with (unless a fact-checking organisation opposes such disclosure on the basis of a reasonable fear of retribution or violence).

1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
3. Demagog
4. Facta
5. Geofacts
6. Faktograf
7. Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
8. Lead Stories
9. Newtral
10. Poligrafo
11. Reuters
12. Science Feedback- For advertising-related fact-checking partnerships, please refer to Chapter 2. 
13. Teyit

1. Portugal Local Elections -Polígrafo
2. Estonia Local Elections - Lead Stories
3. Ireland Presidential Election - The Journal
4. Portugal Presidential Election - Polígrafo
5. Denmark (local and municipal elections): Sikker Digital
6. Czechia (parliamentary election elections): Demagog.cz

QRE 30.1.3

Relevant Signatories will report on resources allocated where relevant in each of their services to achieve fact-checking coverage in each Member State and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat Disinformation online at the Member State level.

• Insights reports. Our fact-checking partners provide regular reports identifying general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generated particular misinformation or disinformation.  
• Proactive detection by our fact-checking partners. Our fact-checking partners are authorised to proactively identify content that may constitute harmful misinformation on our platform, which our moderators assess against our Community Guidelines, and suggest prominent misinformation that is circulating online that may benefit from verification. 
• Fact-checking guidelines. Where relevant, we create guidelines and trending topic reminders for our moderators which are informed by previous fact checking assessments. This helps our teams leverage the insights from our fact-checking partners and supports swift and accurate decisions on flagged content regardless of the language in which the original claim was made.

• Vision-based: Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
• Audio-based: Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
• Text-based: Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our fact-checking partners, to inform our keyword lists.
• Similarity-based: "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
• Activity-based: Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
• LLMs: We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
• Content Credentials: We launched the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to automatically label AI-generated content that originated on other major platforms.
  
  

Measure 30.2

Relevant Signatories will provide fair financial contributions to the independent European fact-checking organisations for their work to combat Disinformation on their services. Those financial contributions could be in the form of individual agreements, of agreements with multiple fact-checkers or with an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations that has the mandate to conclude said agreements.

QRE 30.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken and general criteria used to ensure the fair financial contributions to the fact-checkers for the work done, on criteria used in those agreements to guarantee high ethical and professional standards, independence of the fact-checking organisations, as well as conditions of transparency, openness, consistency and non-discrimination.

QRE 30.2.2

Relevant Signatories will engage in, and report on, regular reviews with their fact-checking partner organisations to review the nature and effectiveness of the Signatory's fact-checking programme.

QRE 30.2.3

European fact-checking organisations will, directly (as Signatories to the Code) or indirectly (e.g. via polling by EDMO or an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations) report on the fairness of the individual compensations provided to them via these agreements.

Measure 30.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to cross-border cooperation between fact-checkers.

QRE 30.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to facilitate their cross-border collaboration with and between fact-checkers, including examples of fact-checks, languages, or Member States where such cooperation was facilitated.

Measure 30.4

To develop the Measures above, relevant Signatories will consult EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

QRE 30.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report, ex ante on plans to involve, and ex post on actions taken to involve, EDMO and the elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, including on the development of the framework of cooperation described in Measures 30.3 and 30.4.

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 31.1 and 31.2 Measure 31.3 Measure 31.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 31.1 and 31.2

31.1: Relevant Signatories that showcase User Generated Content (UGC) will integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use independent fact-checkers’ work in their platforms’ services, processes, and contents across all Member States and across formats relevant to the service. Relevant Signatories will collaborate with fact-checkers to that end, starting by conducting and documenting research and testing. 31.2: Relevant Signatories that integrate fact-checks in their products or processes will ensure they employ swift and efficient mechanisms such as labelling, information panels or policy enforcement to help increase the impact of fact-checks on audiences.

QRE 31.1.1 (for Measures 31.1 and 31.2)

Relevant Signatories will report on their specific activities and initiatives related to Measures 31.1 and 31.2, including the full results and methodology applied in testing solutions to that end.

SLI 31.1.1

Member State level reporting on use of fact-checks by service and the swift and efficient mechanisms in place to increase their impact, which may include (as depends on the service): number of fact-check articles published; reach of fact-check articles; number of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers.

Country	Number of fact checked videos (tasks)
Austria	52
Belgium	396
Bulgaria	1,221
Croatia	135
Cyprus	21
Czechia	367
Denmark	239
Estonia	326
Finland	58
France	3,659
Germany	1,203
Greece	97
Hungary	107
Ireland	53
Italy	743
Latvia	223
Lithuania	182
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Netherlands	1,603
Poland	806
Portugal	344
Romania	308
Slovakia	283
Slovenia	193
Spain	349
Sweden	102
Iceland	5
Liechtenstein	0
Norway	190
Total EU	13,072
Total EEA	13,267

SLI 31.1.2

An estimation, through meaningful metrics, of the impact of actions taken such as, for instance, the number of pieces of content labelled on the basis of fact-check articles, or the impact of said measures on user interactions with information fact-checked as false or misleading.

Country	Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment	Number of videos removed under Misinformation policyÊ
Austria	12	2,612
Belgium	11	4,150
Bulgaria	166	4,828
Croatia	40	638
Cyprus	1	701
Czech Republic	20	2,855
Denmark	12	2,484
Estonia	28	527
Finland	7	1,357
France	273	37,466
Germany	216	42,642
Greece	7	4,602
Hungary	4	1,490
Ireland	3	2,613
Italy	207	18,667
Latvia	0	705
Lithuania	7	1,086
Luxembourg	0	349
Malta	0	159
Netherlands	258	14,335
Poland	128	14,770
Portugal	48	3,141
Romania	65	28,743
Slovakia	18	1,122
Slovenia	5	370
Spain	50	21,592
Sweden	3	4,159
Iceland	1	123
Liechtenstein	0	143
Norway	10	1,662
Total EU	1,589	218,163
Total EEA	1,600	220,091

SLI 31.1.3

Signatories recognise the importance of providing context to SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2 in ways that empower researchers, fact-checkers, the Commission, ERGA, and the public to understand and assess the impact of the actions taken to comply with Commitment 31. To that end, relevant Signatories commit to include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise these SLIs. Relevant Signatories will present and discuss within the Permanent Task-force the type of baseline quantitative information they consider using for contextualisation ahead of their baseline reports.

Country	Videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment as a percentage of total number of videos removed due to violation of harmful misinformation policy
Austria	0.50%
Belgium	0.30%
Bulgaria	3.40%
Croatia	6.30%
Cyprus	0.10%
Czech Republic	0.70%
Denmark	0.50%
Estonia	5.30%
Finland	0.50%
France	0.70%
Germany	0.50%
Greece	0.20%
Hungary	0.30%
Ireland	0.10%
Italy	1.10%
Latvia	0.00%
Lithuania	0.60%
Luxembourg	0.00%
Malta	0.00%
Netherlands	1.80%
Poland	0.90%
Portugal	1.50%
Romania	0.20%
Slovakia	1.60%
Slovenia	1.40%
Spain	0.20%
Sweden	0.10%
Iceland	0.80%
Liechtenstein	0.00%
Norway	0.60%
Total EU	0.70%
Total EEA	0.70%

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 32.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 32.3

Relevant Signatories will regularly exchange information between themselves and the fact-checking community, to strengthen their cooperation.

QRE 32.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the channels of communications and the exchanges conducted to strengthen their cooperation - including success of and satisfaction with the information, interface, and other tools referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 - and any conclusions drawn from such exchanges.

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 34.1

Signatories establish and maintain the common Transparency Centre website, which will be operational and available to the public within 6 months from the signature of this Code.

Measure 34.2

Signatories provide appropriate funding, for setting up and operating the Transparency Centre website, including its maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. Funding contribution should be commensurate with the nature of the Signatories' activity and shall be sufficient for the website's operations and maintenance and proportional to each Signatories' risk profile and economic capacity.

Measure 34.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to the Transparency Centre's information to the extent that the Code is applicable to their services.

Measure 34.4

Signatories will agree on the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre within the Task-force, to be recorded and reviewed within the Task-Force on an annual basis.

Measure 34.5

The Task-force will regularly discuss the Transparency Centre and assess whether adjustments or actions are necessary. Signatories commit to implement the actions and adjustments decided within the Task-force within a reasonable timeline.

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 35.1

Signatories will list in the Transparency Centre, per each Commitment and Measure that they subscribe to, the terms of service and policies that their service applies to implement these Commitments and Measures.

Measure 35.2

Signatories provide information on the implementation and enforcement of their policies per service, including geographical and language coverage.

Measure 35.3

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre contains a repository of their reports assessing the implementation of the Code's commitments.

Measure 35.4

In crisis situations, Signatories use the Transparency Centre to publish information regarding the specific mitigation actions taken related to the crisis.

Measure 35.5

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology, is user-friendly, and that the relevant information is easily searchable (including per Commitment and Measure). Users of the Transparency Centre will be able to easily track changes in Signatories' policies and actions.

Measure 35.6

The Transparency Centre will enable users to easily access and understand the Service Level Indicators and Qualitative Reporting Elements tied to each Commitment and Measure of the Code for each service, including Member State breakdowns, in a standardised and searchable way. The Transparency Centre should also enable users to easily access and understand Structural Indicators for each Signatory.

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 36.1 Measure 36.2 Measure 36.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 36.1

Signatories provide updates about relevant changes in policies and implementation actions in a timely manner, and in any event no later than 30 days after changes are announced or implemented.

Measure 36.2

Signatories will regularly update Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators, in parallel with the regular reporting foreseen by the monitoring framework. After the first reporting period, Relevant Signatories are encouraged to also update the Transparency Centre more regularly.

Measure 36.3

Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.

QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.

Platform	Metrics
TikTok	Between July 1 and December 31 2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,350 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 3,456 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 37.1

Signatories will participate in the Task-force and contribute to its work. Signatories, in particular smaller or emerging services will contribute to the work of the Task-force proportionate to their resources, size and risk profile. Smaller or emerging services can also agree to pool their resources together and represent each other in the Task-force. The Task-force will meet in plenary sessions as necessary and at least every 6 months, and, where relevant, in subgroups dedicated to specific issues or workstreams.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Measure 37.3

The Task-force will agree on and define its operating rules, including on the involvement of third-party experts, which will be laid down in a Vademecum drafted by the European Commission in collaboration with the Signatories and agreed on by consensus between the members of the Task-force.

Measure 37.4

Signatories agree to set up subgroups dedicated to the specific issues related to the implementation and revision of the Code with the participation of the relevant Signatories.

Measure 37.5

When needed, and in any event at least once per year the Task-force organises meetings with relevant stakeholder groups and experts to inform them about the operation of the Code and gather their views related to important developments in the field of Disinformation.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 40.1

Relevant Signatories that are Very Large Online Platforms, as defined in the DSA, will report every six-months on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs at service and Member State Level.

Measure 40.2

Other Signatories will report yearly on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures taken under the present Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs, at service and Member State level.

Measure 40.3

Measure 40.4

Measure 40.5

Measure 40.6

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 41.1 Measure 41.2 Measure 41.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.2.1

Description of intervention - 50.2.2

Indication of impact - 50.2.3

• Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Irish Presidential Election (22 Sep., 2025, and 26 Oct., 2025): 2,134
• Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Czech Election (1 Sep., 2025, and 5 Oct., 2025): 1,092
• Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Netherlands Election (29 Sep. 2025, and 2 Nov. 2025): 2,113

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.1

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

Specific Action applied - 50.4.4

Description of intervention - 50.4.5

• Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organization, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;
• A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;
• Matters of public importance, including debates about significant and challenging policy issues;
• A public figure who is:
  • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior
  • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)
  • spreading misinformation about matters of public importance

Indication of impact - 50.4.6

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.1

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

Indication of impact - 50.5.3

Specific Action applied - 50.5.4

Description of intervention - 50.5.5

Indication of impact - 50.5.6

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.6.1

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.7.1

Description of intervention - 50.7.2

Indication of impact - 50.7.3

Crisis 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

• Vision-based: Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
• Audio-based: Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
• Text-based: Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags,. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. 
• Similarity-based: "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
• Activity-based: Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
• LLMs: We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
• We work with external groups, for example Tech Against Terrorism in the context of violent extremist content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.
  
  

• 
  Vision-based: Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
• Audio-based: Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
• Text-based: Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our fact-checking partners, to inform our keyword lists.
• Similarity-based: "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
• Activity-based: Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts
• LLMs: We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
• We work with external groups, for example Tech Against Terrorism in the context of violent extremist content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.
  
  

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.3.1

Description of intervention - 51.3.2

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

1. Network Origin: Ukraine
   
   

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

• Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organization, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;
• A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;
• Matters of public importance, including debates about significant and challenging policy issues;
• A public figure who is:
  • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior
  • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)
  • spreading misinformation about matters of public importance

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

Specific Action applied - 51.4.7

Description of intervention - 51.4.8

Indication of impact - 51.4.9

• Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 1,352
• Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (only focusing on RU/UA) - 1,458
• Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 1,313

• Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL-Hamas) -  3,901
• Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL-Hamas) - 4,941
• Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) - 3,874

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

Indication of impact - 51.5.3

• Total Number of impressions of the search intervention - 23,191,195
• Total Number of clicks on the search intervention - 109,770
• Click through rate of the search intervention - 0.47%
  
  

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

Indication of impact - 51.5.6

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.7.1

Description of intervention - 51.7.2

Indication of impact - 51.7.3

Specific Action applied - 51.7.4

Description of intervention - 51.7.5

Indication of impact - 51.7.6

• Number of fact-checked videos with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 665
• Number of videos removed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 78
• Number of videos not recommended in the For Your Feed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 147

• Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they’re seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform.
• Collaborating with our fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives has facilitated proactive responses against high-harm trends and has helped to ensure that our Integrity and Authenticity moderators have up-to-date guidance.

• Number of fact checked tasks related to IL/Hamas - 879
• Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 101
• Number of videos demoted (NR) as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 199