Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 33.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 33.1

Relevant Signatories will comply with the requirements of instruments such as being verified signatories of the International Fact-checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles or the future Code of Professional Integrity for Independent European fact-checking organisations.

QRE 33.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the status of their membership to instruments such as those mentioned in Measure 33.1 and the actions taken as a result of that to ensure strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

SLI 33.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the number of European fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified or are members of the future Code of Professional Integrity.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 37.1

Signatories will participate in the Task-force and contribute to its work. Signatories, in particular smaller or emerging services will contribute to the work of the Task-force proportionate to their resources, size and risk profile. Smaller or emerging services can also agree to pool their resources together and represent each other in the Task-force. The Task-force will meet in plenary sessions as necessary and at least every 6 months, and, where relevant, in subgroups dedicated to specific issues or workstreams.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Measure 37.5

When needed, and in any event at least once per year the Task-force organises meetings with relevant stakeholder groups and experts to inform them about the operation of the Code and gather their views related to important developments in the field of Disinformation.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 40.6

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Participation in discussions: contributed directly to Taskforce and roundtable discussions on the nature of the Ceuta situation, including whether it constituted a DSA-defined crisis, whether the Code of Conduct is the appropriate instrument to address it, and how to handle harmful content falling outside third-party fact-checking programmes.
• Reporting on field insights and experience: shared first-hand observations from its verification work on the ground, including its assessment that no clear evidence of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) was identified during the Ceuta events.
• Providing situational context: supplied platforms and institutional participants with up-to-date context on the disinformation dynamics observed around Ceuta, helping inform discussions on the operational demands of crisis-mode monitoring and reporting.
• Contributing to existing crisis-mitigation mechanisms: stressed the demonstrated impact of platforms' fact-checking programmes and highlighted the value of mechanisms already in place to mitigate crisis situations, while also underlining the need to safeguard fact-checkers' independence, noting that some parts of the fact-checking community view closer cooperation mechanisms with a degree of caution.
  
  

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 43

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

• Voting-procedure disinformation: recurring false claims about what constitutes a null vote (e.g., writing on ballots, using envelopes from other elections, submitting two ballots from different parties), designed to confuse voters or discourage participation.
• Postal and electoral fraud narratives: content questioning the integrity of postal voting and vote-counting systems, including recurring false claims that private companies contracted for data transmission (e.g., Indra) are involved in counting votes, and misleading framing of statistical fluctuations in postal-vote figures as evidence of manipulation.
• AI-generated and deepfake content: growing use of AI to fabricate statements or images attributed to candidates, flagged as an emerging risk requiring dedicated detection guidance for the public.
• Fabricated interference in the campaign or in voting itself: including staged or decontextualized footage falsely presented as evidence of coercion at polling stations or campaign sabotage (e.g., a viral video from a 2023 election falsely recirculated as showing coercion during the 2026 Andalucía campaign).
• In Andalucía specifically, Newtral verified additional false narratives targeting individual candidates and public figures, including a fabricated claim that a musician's public endorsement of a candidate triggered mass concert-ticket refunds, and disinformation around the removal of campaign posters. In Aragón, Newtral also addressed disinformation around postal-vote figures and unfounded claims of irregularities such as "secret voting booth" failures.
• Beyond viral disinformation, Newtral anticipated and addressed a parallel risk: misleading or false statements made directly by candidates during televised debates (RTVE, Canal Sur, regional broadcasters) and campaign events, which required systematic, real-time political fact-checking rather than reactive debunking of user-generated content.
  
  

Mitigations in place

• Pre-election anti-disinformation guides: ahead of each vote, Newtral published dedicated guides to help citizens identify and avoid falling for common types of election-related disinformation, tailored to the specific candidates, parties and local issues at stake in each region (e.g., the guide published ahead of the Aragón election and the guide published ahead of the Andalucía election).
• Early warning on potential campaign interference: Newtral flagged and reported on possible risks of interference or manipulation targeting the electoral campaigns, drawing attention to patterns observed in previous elections and emerging narratives specific to each region.
• Real-time monitoring during election day: Newtral tracked and verified information circulating during the electoral day itself in each of the three regions, responding promptly to claims and content requiring fact-checking as results were counted and reported.
• Practical training through the "Verificatón" hackathon (Andalucía): Newtral organised a fact-checking hackathon focused on the candidates' televised debate ahead of the Andalucía election, bringing together students from two Spanish universities to verify political discourse in a hands-on exercise alongside Newtral's own newsroom journalists. This initiative was carried out within the framework of IberCHECK, the cross-media fact-checking alliance led by Newtral with support from the European Commission, and reflects Newtral's broader commitment to building fact-checking capacity and training the next generation of verifiers to scrutinise political speech.
  
  

Crisis 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

• Decontextualized and falsely attributed violent content: systematic circulation of violent videos and images, often unrelated to the current events or originating from other locations and time periods, deliberately presented as depicting the situation in Ceuta in order to amplify fear and social tension.
• False or misleading claims about official entities: a recurring pattern of fabricated statements, decisions, or positions falsely attributed to official bodies, including the United Nations and the governments of Morocco, Ceuta and Spain, aimed at undermining trust in institutional responses and fuelling confusion around the management of the crisis.
  
  

Mitigations in place

• Geolocation analysis: Newtral geolocated viral videos to establish their true origin. This method disproved, for example, footage of car burnings and violent unrest falsely attributed to Ceuta and Melilla, which was in fact recorded during unrelated disturbances in Nador, Morocco, on the other side of the border.
• Temporal verification and reverse image/video search: Newtral traced the original publication dates of recirculated footage, identifying content falsely presented as current — including images from Libya dating back to 2023 that were misrepresented as a "mass wave of migrants" or an "invasion of Europe."
• Source verification with official bodies: Newtral contacted relevant authorities directly to confirm or deny disputed claims, including Interior Ministry sources and the Government Delegation in Ceuta (to confirm a fabricated official communiqué on migrant transfers was not authentic), the Guardia Civil, and humanitarian NGOs operating on the ground.
• Fact-checking of institutional misattribution: Newtral debunked false claims attributed to international and foreign institutions, such as unfounded assertions that the UN classifies Ceuta and Melilla as "colonies" pending transfer to Morocco, and unverified statements attributed to Moroccan security officials regarding a purported invasion threat.
• Multichannel detection and response: In addition to open-source social media monitoring, Newtral used its WhatsApp verification channel to identify and respond to disinformation queries submitted directly by the public.