Report September 2026

Submitted

Bing Search is one of the world’s leading online search engines with the primary objective of connecting users to the most relevant search results from the web

Integrity of Services

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We will continue to work to include data on potential foreign influence operations from teams across Microsoft to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing and Bing generative AI features. We also look forward to continuing to work under this commitment with the other signatories to further cross platform information sharing.

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

Although sharing of disinformation does not occur on the Bing platform (i.e., through the use of user accounts and networks), Bing supports cross-platform information sharing protocols established under this Measure. As a search engine, Bing may however have limited information to share with other platforms about cross-platform influence and foreign interference and therefore subscribes with the understanding that it principally participates as a recipient of information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Bing is an online search engine, the primary purpose of which is to provide a searchable index of webpages available on the internet to help users find the content they are looking for. Bing does not host the content or control the operation, content, or design of indexed websites. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms.

Bing does not allow users to post and share content or otherwise enable content to go “viral” through user-to-user exchanges of information on Bing. Although as a search engine Bing does not have any control over third party websites appearing in search results, Bing’s ranking algorithms, spam policies, and other safeguards described below can also address and mitigate the risks arising from malicious websites that use other TTPs attempting to manipulate our search engine rankings.

Bing’s primary mechanism for combatting manipulative behaviors in search results is via its ranking algorithms and systems designed to identify and combat attempts to abuse search engine optimization techniques (i.e., spam). Bing describes the main parameters of its ranking systems in depth in How Bing Delivers Search Results. Abusive techniques and examples of prohibited Search Engine Optimization (SEO) activities are described in the Bing Webmaster Guidelines. These pages provide a deeper, more detailed understanding of how Bing algorithms work that cannot be fully detailed here given the space limitations of this report and complexity of how search engines rank websites.

As described in these documents, Bing’s ranking algorithms are designed to identify and prioritize high quality, highly authoritative content available online that is relevant to the user’s query and to prevent abusive SEO techniques (spam).

One of the key ranking techniques Bing uses to prevent low quality or misinformative websites from returning high in search results is through the “quality and credibility” score. Determining the quality and credibility (QC) of a website includes evaluating the clarity of purpose of the site, its usability, and presentation. QC also consists of an evaluation of the page’s “authority”, which includes factors such as:

Reputation: What types of other websites link to the site? A well-known news site is considered to have a higher reputation than a brand-new blog.
Level of discourse: Is the purpose of the content solely to cause harm to individuals or groups of people? For example, a site that promotes violence or resorts to name-calling or bullying will be considered to have a low level of discourse, and therefore lower authority, than a balanced news article.
Level of distortion: How well does the site differentiate fact from opinion? A site that is clearly labeled as satire or parody will have more authority than one that tries to obscure its intent.
Origination and transparency of the ownership: Is the site reporting first-hand information, or does it summarize or republish content from others? If the site doesn’t publish original content, do they attribute the source? A first-hand account published on a personal blog could have more authority than unsourced content.

In addition to its ranking algorithms, Bing’s general abuse/spam policies prohibit certain practices intended to manipulate or deceive the Bing algorithms. These policies include prohibitions intended to address the TTPs employed by malicious actors in the spread of disinformation. Pursuant to the Webmaster Guidelines, Bing may take action on websites employing spam tactics (such as social media schemes, keyword stuffing, malicious behavior, cloaking, link schemes, or misleading structured data markups) or that otherwise violate the Webmaster Guidelines, including by applying ranking penalties (such as demoting a website) or delisting a website from the index.

Bing partners with numerous organizations, including independent third-party organizations and teams across Microsoft, to provide information on potential information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing and Bing generative AI features. For example,

Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, such as trusted fact checkers, news publishers, and research organizations, that provide fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and early indicators of information operations, such as narratives or hashtags, to inform early detection and defensive search strategies. These organizations provide information for EEA member states. Bing also monitors ClaimReview open protocol based web fact checks to inform threat intelligence and through that search interventions
Bing partners with Microsoft’s internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), to collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams collaborate with external organisations and companies to support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats. Through Microsoft’s Elections and Societal Resilience team, the Rapid Response System framework and a dedicated reporting site on deceptive AI content for election candidates, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA Member States, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

Given the multipronged approach Microsoft and Bing take to monitoring and actioning influence operations and sources of misinformation and disinformation and the multiple internal and external sources relied upon, it is challenging to provide precise reporting on whether an incidence of single information sharing results in a corresponding defensive search intervention or other action.

Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

Unlike social media services, for which this Commitment appears primarily oriented, search engines do not typically cause or facilitate the viral propagation of disinformation, as they do not allow users to post or share content directly on the service. Please see How Bing delivers search results and Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines for an overview of how Bing Search designs its algorithms to deliver high authority and highly relevant content while minimizing the negative impact of spam and less credible information sources. Bing Search’s ranking algorithms and related policies are intended to address deceptive tactics intended to manipulate the algorithms and are discussed in more detail at QREs 16.1.1.

In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA, high in relevant search results.

Bing’s suggestions features offer possible search queries to users to facilitate a more efficient search experience. While search suggestions are not directly tied to virality of content, Bing Search also undertakes measures to help ensure it does not inadvertently lead users to misleading or other harmful content through suggestions. Specifically, Bing Search uses a combination of proactive and reactive algorithmic and manual interventions to prevent the display of search suggestions that could lead to low authority content. Users can also adjust and/or deactivate ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions.

Bing Search also provides a tool for users to provide feedback on suggestions they encounter. The feedback tool is shown below.

[see pdf report page 19 for screenshot]

Clicking “Feedback on these suggestions” allows users to provide specific feedback on individual suggestions on the below bases:

[see pdf report page 19 for screenshot]

In Bing’s generative AI experiences, there is generally no risk of viral spread of generated content through Bing because Bing does not allow users to directly post or otherwise share content on the platform. However, Bing has taken steps to prevent the service from being used to create misinformation that might be shared on other platforms through a multipronged approach to mitigations that helps prevent users from creating misinformative content.

This system includes terms of use and a code of conduct, classifiers, filters, metaprompting, and robust reporting mechanisms designed to mitigate the risk of potential misuse of the platform. The terms governing usage Bing Image Creator and Bing Image Creator, for example, prohibit users from using the service to generate fraudulent or misleading information, including the creation of disinformation. Bing’s ranking and relevance systems for search, which are an essential component to answering user questions in Copilot Search, work to ensure that high authority content is returned first in search results. Where Copilot Search systems flag that a user’s prompt or generated output may result in low authority or misleading information, the system will take steps to mitigate that possible harm through solutions, such as not returning generated content to the user, diverting the user to a different topic, or redirecting the user to traditional search. Users who encounter problematic content can report concerns at Microsoft-Report a Concern.

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

Bing does not have data relevant to this SLI. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing does not have a news feed for users of user content, allow users to post and share content within Bing, or otherwise enable content to go “viral” on Bing.

Country	Total no of violations	Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 2: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 3: indicating the impact of the action taken
Austria	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

Bing’s search engine ranking algorithms are not a traditional “recommender system” in that Bing only provides content to users as a result of their express request, rather than pushing content to users who were not expressly seeking it. That said, the main parameters of Bing’s ranking algorithms are published in the “How Bing Ranks Search Results” section of How Bing Delivers Search Results, which is available to Bing users in the EU. Bing also provides information on how it ranks and returns search suggestions in the Enhanced Search Experiences section of How Bing Delivers Search Results. Ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, can be adjusted and/or deactivated through user search settings. Bing’s ranking algorithms apply equally to traditional search results and generative AI features that extend to Bing.

Please also see 22.2.1.

Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 20.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft has continued to improve content provenance measures on its AI image and video generation features, including Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft expects to continue its important work in content provenance tools and ways to help counter harmful AI-generated content. Microsoft is helping to build public trust in digital content through its leadership in the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). A multistakeholder initiative, we are partnering with civil society organizations and industry partners in developing technical standards to certify the origin and integrity of media. These standards are integrated into Microsoft’s AI-generated image services and are helping partners verify if image content was created using AI. In addition, Microsoft has available through Microsoft Foundary a tool available to check if Microsoft AI products were used to create AI images.

Bing will also be implementing machine-readable watermarking and provenance measures for AI-generated content to meet EU AI Act Article 50 requirements

Measure 20.2

Relevant Signatories will take steps to join/support global initiatives and standards bodies (for instance, C2PA) focused on the development of provenance tools.

QRE 20.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of global initiatives and standards bodies focused on the development of provenance tools (for instance, C2PA) that signatories have joined, or the support given to relevant organisations, providing links to organisation websites where possible.

Microsoft is helping to build public trust in digital content through its leadership in the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). A multistakeholder initiative, we are partnering with civil society organizations and industry partners in developing technical standards to certify the origin and integrity of media. These standards are being integrated into Microsoft’s AI-generated image services and are helping partners verify if image content was created using AI.

Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 22.2 Measure 22.3 Measure 22.7

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft works with a range of external partners to provide training, resources, and AI-driven solutions for local newsrooms. Through collaborations with the CUNY Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism, the Poynter Institute, UNESCO, and the Thomson Reuters Foundation, Microsoft has helped train journalists and newsroom leaders around the world on responsible AI adoption, including the development of AI policies and ethical AI practices. In 2026, CUNY's tuition-free AI Journalism Lab completed two cohorts spanning more than a dozen countries and produced 45 projects, ranging from newsroom AI adoption plans to product prototypes.

Beyond training, Microsoft partners with The Lenfest Institute to support U.S. metro newspapers in hiring engineers who develop AI solutions for local newsrooms. The program has grown into an 11-organization cohort, making it the largest AI engineering fellowship and collaborative in American journalism. The fellows' work focuses on strengthening the business sustainability of local news organizations, and all projects are released as open-source tools that can be adopted by newsrooms globally. Insights and best practices from the program have been shared through case studies, code repositories, podcasts, panels, and in-person convenings.

Building on Microsoft's AI literacy work with the Poynter Institute in 2025, Microsoft is now supporting UNESCO and Poynter in the co-design of a global initiative focused on strengthening connections between newsrooms and content creators. As part of this effort, UNESCO's handbook for creators' associations is expected to be presented in draft form during Global Media and Information Literacy Week in Nairobi in October 2026. Poynter will develop a toolkit for public consumption focused on best practices between newsrooms and creator pairings.

Microsoft has also partnered with the Thomson Reuters Foundation to advance AI solutions and AI policies with five newsrooms in Kenya. This is on the heels of a successful cohort of four newsrooms in South Africa where they developed tools to reduce editing time, increase content output and audience reach, and drive measurable business growth.

In June 2026, Microsoft launched a newly revised AI Classroom Toolkit, a resource to help teachers navigate student safety and responsible AI use. The revised content was initially launched in Indonesia and Brazil, with plans to expand in the remainder of 2026. Looking ahead, Microsoft is developing two new modules and an interactive quiz to support the AI and information literacy learning objectives in the current toolkit

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

In September 2026, on National Voter Registration Day in the United States, Microsoft will launch the next phase of our voter education initiative, Check. Recheck. Vote. This year, the campaign will equip voters with practical AI literacy skills for the 2026 US election season. The updated campaign gives voters three straightforward steps: Check the sources and citations behind an AI-generated answer. Recheck the important details by visiting the original sources and comparing what other credible sources say. Vote based on current information from your state or local election website, including official guidance on registration, voting options, deadlines, and polling locations. Following rollout in the US for the 2026 midterms, Microsoft plans to localize content ahead of other select elections in 2027.

Also in September 2026, Microsoft and Minecraft will release Village Square, a new Minecraft Education civic learning experience that helps students explore how communities make decisions and solve shared challenges. The game brings concepts such as dialogue, participation, and collective decision-making to life through immersive gameplay. Village Square gives educators and families an engaging, nonpartisan way to help young people practice listening to different perspectives, weighing trade-offs and working together to build stronger communities. This game represents the next installment in Microsoft and Minecraft’s initiative to create educational materials for users related to AI and AI literacy, following the release of Reed Smart in 2025.

Measure 22.2

Relevant Signatories will give users the option of having signals relating to the trustworthiness of media sources into the recommender systems or feed such signals into their recommender systems.

QRE 22.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on whether and, if relevant, how they feed signals related to the trustworthiness of media sources into their recommender systems, and outline the rationale for their approach.

Bing utilizes a variety of signals – including trustworthiness indicators from trusted fact checkers and research organizations – as one of several means to help determine the authority score of a given website and rank it accordingly in search results.

Microsoft also maintains additional partnerships with fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA to strengthen the company’s capacity and understanding of global threats to disinformation and inform interventions in Bing to protect users against related risks. These partnerships are part of a broader effort to empower Microsoft users to better understand the information they consume across our platforms and products.

The above mechanisms and the Bing algorithm’s emphasis on promoting high authority content are applied equally to core search as well as Bing generative AI features to help ensure that users are protected from misleading information across Bing surfaces. Ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, can be adjusted and/or deactivated through user search setting.

Measure 22.3

Relevant Signatories will make details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

QRE 22.3.1

The above-mentioned policies and measures are available to EU users in EU languages through the Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines and How Bing delivers search results

Measure 22.7

Relevant Signatories will design and apply products and features (e.g. information panels, banners, pop-ups, maps and prompts, trustworthiness indicators) that lead users to authoritative sources on topics of particular public and societal interest or in crisis situations.

QRE 22.7.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the products and features they deploy across their services and will specify whether those are available across Member States.

In addition to broader measures described in this report, Bing has taken special care to counter low authority information and misinformation in relation to elections, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and EU Member State elections as detailed below and further in the Crisis and Elections Reporting appendices.

Microsoft is an active participant in the Task-force’s Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group. In addition, Microsoft works with election authorities responsible for running elections to promote trusted information regarding elections and monitors for foreign information operations targeting elections.

Additional detail is provided in the Crisis Reporting appendix.

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Bing has closely monitored low authority information trend and works to promote authoritative content related to the conflict.

Bing has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (see SLI 22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing and integrated into Copilot Search
Bing works with Microsoft’s Elections and Societal Resilience Team and Threat Assessment Center (MTAC) to ensure access to signals regarding Russian cyber and information operations targeting Ukraine to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and generative AI search tools.
Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, including trusted fact checkers, news publishers, research organizations and nonprofit organizations, to provide information related to information operations, such as actors, domains, narratives, and emerging data voids manipulated, to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and Bing’s generative AI experiences.
Bing also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content.
These measures have helped ensure that Bing is generally promoting authoritative news sources, timelines, and other factual information at the top of algorithmic search results and in Copilot Search.

Additional information concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict is contained in the Crisis Reporting Appendices

SLI 22.7.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the reach and/or user interactions with the products or features, at the Member State level, via the metrics of impressions and interactions (clicks, click-through rates (as relevant to the tools and services in question) and shares (as relevant to the tools and services in question).

Bing has revised the SLI action descriptions below for accuracy with respect to the metrics provided pursuant to this Section. Please see below key metrics.

Although defensive search actions are taken at a global level (and therefore applied in every Member State), Bing has endeavoured to provide the additional following data for this SLI:

“Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)” refers to the total number of queries entered by users that were addressed with defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis during the Reporting Period.
“Impressions (RU/UA)” reflects the number of user impressions for queries searched by users where defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis were applied during the Reporting Period.

Country	Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)	Impressions (RU/UA)
Austria	1829	26218
Belgium	2303	38282
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	1071	6177
Estonia	0	0
Finland	685	6102
France	4730	126683
Germany	8777	253990
Greece	0	0
Hungary	1	1
Ireland	3354	21365
Italy	2892	76279
Latvia	1	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	1	0
Netherlands	3740	21083
Poland	2455	21293
Portugal	1192	5421
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	2935	19890
Sweden	3043	14931
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	2484	12219
Total EU	39009	637717
Total EEA	41493	649936
Total Global	1139748	4877963

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Bing is dedicated to supporting the research community and welcomes feedback from this vital community and the Commission on the types of data that would be most useful for safety research.

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

Bing and Microsoft are dedicated to supporting the research community and regularly provide information and data to the research community in a variety of ways.

Consistent with the EU’s CoCD and the Digital Services Act (DSA) regulation, researchers may request data from Bing. Bing uses the same intake process for both CoCD and DSA research requests. Researchers may easily request access for publicly accessible Bing data through Bing’s Qualified Researcher Program (aligned with DSA Article 40(12)) and resources for researchers seeking access to datasets (aligned with DSA Article 40(4)). However, because these datasets are already available open-source (see below), some researchers may elect to obtain datasets via the below means to avoid the burden of an application and credentialing process.

Bing also offers use of Bing APIs to the public, referred to as “Grounding with Bing”. These APIs are offered for less than 15 Euros for up to 1,000 transactions per month, which may be leveraged by the research community.

Researchers who are registered webmasters may utilize Bing’s Keyword research and Backlinks Webmaster Tools to provide insights into search usage and keywords. Bing is working on ways to provide deeper research access to the tool across the research community and looks forward to providing more information as it is available.

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/tools/?https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ai/responsible-ai?msockid=0087f13f86f4659007e6e70d87cb6487#ToolsLastly, given the open nature of the Bing index and public nature of search results, researchers can utilize Bing, Copilot Search, Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator to run specific queries and analyze results (unlike social media which may require private accounts or connections between users to access certain materials).

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 26.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

In the reporting period, Bing attended DSA roundtable on Data Access for Vetted Researchers under Article 40(4) DSA.

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

Bing has a tracking tool for all the data requests by researchers in alignment with DSA, Article 40(12) and Article 40(4). The tool includes the information on the researcher, received and response dates, link to information related to the application, provided answer and rational amongst other information

Country	Nr of users of public access	Other quantitative information on public access
Austria	0	0
Belgium	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	0	0
Estonia	0	0
Finland	0	0
France	0	0
Germany	0	0
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	0	0
Italy	0	0
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	0	0
Poland	0	0
Portugal	0	0
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	0	0
Sweden	0	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	0	0

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

For Bing’s Keyword Research tool, users can report issues by creating a support request ticket at Webmaster Support - Bing Webmaster Tools.
For Bing API access, users can report issues at https://aka.ms/bingapisupport.

For Bing’s EU qualified researcher program, users can find information to report issues at Bing Qualified Researcher Program - Microsoft Support

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Bing and Microsoft have ongoing research projects and internal research on misinformation risks in image generation services, generative AI in elections, and other important topics.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Ongoing review of researcher feedback and requests may result in additional measures and resources.

In addition, Microsoft Research regularly explores potential partnerships with third party research institutions and discusses potential misinformation and disinformation related research that may leverage Bing data with research institutions. Microsoft’s internal research divisions also regularly initiate and support research relevant to misinformation and disinformation and further research may be released in the next reporting period.

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

See QRE 26.1.1.

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

We look forward to partnering with other relevant signatories on this project and will provide further reporting as the annual consultation is established.

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing has actively contributed in the context of the Transparency Center subgroup, providing feedback on the functioning and usability of the Transparency Center website.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing is committed to the proper functioning of the Transparency Center website and will therefore continue its engagement in the Transparency Center subgroup in order to assess the necessity of technical adjustments and new actions to improve the website.

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing will upload this September 2026 Report, for the Reporting Period 1 January until 30 June 2026, to the Transparency Centre website in a timely manner. This will include clear and simple information on the new or existing policies and actions that each service has implemented based on our Subscription document.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

In the context of the work of the Transparency Center subgroup, Microsoft Bing will assess the necessity of technical adjustments where necessary, aiming to ensure the information on the website pertaining to Bing remains easily accessible and complete for users.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing has actively engaged in and contributed to the work of the Task-force and the relevant Subgroups and Working Groups that took place during the reporting period.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing is committed to continuing its active engagement in and contribution to the Task-force and relevant Subgroups and Working Groups in the upcoming six-month period.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Microsoft Bing has actively engaged in and contributed to all the Task-force Plenary meetings as well as to the meetings of all Subgroups and Working Groups relevant to its subscription that were active in the current reporting period. As part of each Subgroup and Working Group relevant to its subscription that has taken place during the reporting period, Microsoft Bing has actively contributed to the development of the deliverables that were collectively agreed.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

A dedicated team across Microsoft and led by Bing continues to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Conduct across all applicable geographical areas. The team consists of representatives from Bing’s T&S function, known as the Responsible AI and Defense (RAID) team, relevant product attorneys, as well as members from the European Government Affairs team and Elections and Societal Resilience Team.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Bing will continue its efforts to ensure continued progress towards compliance of relevant measures.

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Bing has a dedicated team to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Conduct across all applicable geographical areas. The team consists of representatives from Bing’s T&S function, known as the Responsible AI and Defense (RAID) team, relevant product attorneys, as well as members from the European Government Affairs team and Elections and Societal Resilience Team. In addition, we implemented an internal tracking process that captured all relevant commitments, responsible entity and persons responsible for compliance with the Code of Conduct.

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

This Report sets out in detail the measures that Bing has taken in view of the regular reporting that it has subscribed to under the Code of Conduct.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Bing has worked over the past months to ensure it is in a position for the delivery of the September 2026 Report and looks forward continuing this trend going forward.

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing has been an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force’s Elections Working Group, working with signatories to finalize the Elections Rapid Response System, which has subsequently been implemented in our internal workflows.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing will continue its cooperation with other Signatories in the context of the Task-force’s Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group.

Commitment 43

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing will provide its September 2026 Report in accordance with the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies as jointly developed by Signatories in the Monitoring and Reporting Subgroup under the Code’s Task-force.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing stands ready to continue its engagement in the respective Task-force Subgroups to update where necessary the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies in view of its experience with reporting.

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

European national elections
Bing anticipated instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to elections. As part of its regular information integrity operations, Bing detected no noteworthy election-specific information manipulation themes related to the:

Portuguese presidential election.
Slovenian parliamentary election.
Danish general election
Bulgarian parliamentary election
Hungarian parliamentary election
Cypriot parliamentary election
Maltese general election

Mitigations in place

Bing takes a multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity and regularly updates its processes, policies, and practices to adapt to evolving risks, trends, and technological innovations. The approach may include: (1) defensive search interventions; (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources; (3) removal of auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content; (4) partnerships with independent organizations for threat intelligence on information manipulation, civic integrity and nation state affiliated actors to inform potential algorithmic interventions and contribute to broader research community; (5) special information panels and answers to direct users to high authority sources concerning elections and voting; (6) internal working groups dedicated to addressing company-wide election initiatives; (7) establishing special election-focused product feature teams; (8) conducting internal research on content provenance and elections; (9) evaluating and undertaking red-team testing for generative AI features with respect to elections; (10) ensuring Responsible AI reviews for all AI features; (11) undertaking comprehensive risk assessments related to elections and electoral processes; (12) developing and continuing to improve targeted monitoring both for web search and Bing generative AI features; (13) restricting generative AI responses for certain types of election-related content; (14) leveraging blocklists and classifiers in generative AI experiences to restrict generation of images or certain types of content concerning politicians and certain election-related topics (15) integrating information on political parties, candidates, and elections from local election authorities (including in the EU) or high authority third party sources to inform defensive interventions and election-related product mitigations; and (16) regularly evaluating whether additional measures, metrics, or mitigations should be implemented. These measures are integrated into Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

In addition, we offer Microsoft AccountGuard, a security service designed to enhance protections for organizations involved in democratic processes and civil society. The program provides an extra layer of cyber threat monitoring and notification of nation-state actors targeting high-risk customers who enroll. AccountGuard is available in 40 countries, including 23 European Union Countries: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The service is also offered to candidates for the EU Parliament from any member nation.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Deepfakes and Elections

Policy - 50.1.1

Authoritative Information sources
Bing empowered voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites

As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on election-related information seeking queries

Deepfakes and Elections
Microsoft-Report Election Misrepresentation is a webpage created to empower political candidates, campaigns and election authorities to report alleged deepfakes of themselves to Microsoft. To date, we have not received an actionable report of deceptive AI targeting elections on Microsoft platforms.

Microsoft’s Office of Responsible AI has also established policies concerning election-related content and works with teams, including Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator on implementation.

Rationale - 50.1.3

See more at Meeting the moment: combating AI deepfakes in elections through new tech accord

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

N/A

Specific Action applied - 50.2.1

N/A

Description of intervention - 50.2.2

N/A

Indication of impact - 50.2.3

N/A

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

N/A

Specific Action applied - 50.3.1

N/A

Description of intervention - 50.3.2

N/A

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.1

As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on election-related information seeking queries.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

Bing identified information manipulation themes related to relevant elections, which have informed defensive search interventions and fanouts to related search terms.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.1

Partnerships with Election Authorities and Trusted Partners

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

Bing empowers voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites. Additionally, Bing receives data from independent third-party organizations, election authorities and other sources of trusted election information to ensure accurate election critical information is provided to voters. In addition, Bing works to provide user-facing information panels on election information for higher risk European elections.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

Microsoft is undertaking additional research on how users interact with content provenance tools and the use of content provenance tools for AI and elections and other research concerning AI and elections.

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

Such research helps to inform Bing safety mitigations.

Crisis 2025

Threats observed or anticipated

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Bing has observed instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to the Russia<>Ukraine conflict. Trends include the spread of antisemitic conspiracy narratives, increasing use of AI-generated content, including targeting Ukrainian and European political leaders, and attempts to influence LLM outputs by seeding pro-Kremlin narratives across online sources. In parallel, extremist and fringe communities are leveraged to amplify pro-Kremlin narratives among Western audiences.

Israel – Hamas conflict
Bing has observed instances of data void manipulation to show low-authority content to unsuspecting users related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. This type of search algorithm manipulation could potentially be used as a tactic to spread disinformation. Other themes observed have included foreign influence operations speculating on the humanitarian crisis and scale of civilian causalities related to conflict and military operations in the area, often referring to manipulated videos and images circulating online and narratives on broader Middle East conflicts.

Mitigations in place

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Microsoft has been actively involved in identifying and helping counter Russia’s cyber and influence operations aimed against Ukraine. In addition to supporting nonprofits, journalists, and academics within Ukraine, Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) team closely tracks cyber-enabled influence operations. MTAC’s work includes analysing the ways these methods are leveraged to target audiences in Central and Eastern Europe.

Bing has implemented the following measures: (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report

Israel – Hamas conflict
As part of its regular practices, Bing employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Bing has not introduced specific policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks related to this crisis.

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

As part of its regular practices, Bing employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

Bing has not introduced specific practices or policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks. However, Bing continues to monitor this crisis and may evolve its approach as needed. Nonetheless, articles from news and fact checking organizations may also appear as part of specialized Bing Answers.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

SeeQRE 26.1.1 for general research support. Bing has not made datasets available pertaining specifically to this crisis.