Report September 2026

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Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.2 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports.

As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we’ve introduced several improvements. In the first half of 2026, we’ve also added data from public Facebook channels and Facebook channel messages.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

Meta provides public access to public data that can support research through several tools and processes:

Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualified researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment.
Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API, publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies.
Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports.

Safeguards to address risks of abuse:

The Meta Content Library and API implement multiple, layered safeguards, such as controlled access, prohibition of misuse, privacy protection and ongoing oversight.

The Ad Library is a public transparency tool. The Ad Library API implements safeguards including verified access, policy-based restrictions, and technical abuse prevention.

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 26.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

Meta Content Library and API: Meta publishes comprehensive documentation about the data available through the Meta Content Library and API on Meta's Developer Documentation portal, which is reachable from the Meta Transparency Centre. This documentation includes definitions of available data points, the scope of the data (including eligibility criteria for content inclusion), technical protocols for accessing the data (including API documentation), and a changelog documenting product and data changes per release.

Ad Library and API: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. Meta publishes information about ways-of-access and the data points available in the Ad Library and Ad Library API on Meta’s Transparency Centre, the Ad Library Overview and FAQ page and the Ad Library API page.

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

As of 30 June 2026, over 1,900 researchers globally and over 630 researchers in the EEA had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.

Country
	0

Measure 26.2

Relevant Signatories will provide real-time or near real-time, machine-readable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data on their service for research purposes, such as accounts belonging to public figures such as elected official, news outlets and government accounts subject to an application process which is not overly cumbersome.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide real-time or near real-time access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data for research purposes as described in Measure 26.2.

Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API.

Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:

Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.
Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.
Producer lists: customisable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.

Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform:

Endpoints and data fields: The Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields. This includes Facebook Pages, posts, groups, events, and a subset of profiles.
Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query.
Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API.

For more details, see here.

QRE 26.2.2

Relevant Signatories will describe the scope of manifestly-made public data as applicable to their services.

Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:

Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of profiles.
Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements
The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen

For more details, see here.

QRE 26.2.3

Relevant Signatories will describe the application process in place to in order to gain the access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data described in Measure 26.2.

Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Centre (CASD, Le Centre d’Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to independently review research proposals to access Meta Content Library, Meta’s comprehensive archive of public content on Facebook and Instagram. CASD continues to serve as the independent body reviewing researcher access requests.

Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.

In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform).

For more details on the application process see here.

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website, which also include a dedicated help centre.

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including streamlining application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta’s impact on the world.

The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for academic researchers, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners.

Current models to support independent external research:

Onboarding Support
Training and Education for researcher products and datasets
Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials

Through these engagement activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs and help researchers identify the appropriate tools and contact points within Meta's research ecosystem.

Relevant details about research tools are available on our Transparency Centre.

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

Meta provides data sets and tools for researchers and publicly discloses all data types currently available in the Meta Content Library and API. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged on Research tools and datasets.

The main data available to researchers are:

Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram.
Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta’s CIB policy

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

Meta engaged with EDMO stakeholders with expertise in data access to explore potential partnership opportunities aimed at strengthening EU research data infrastructure.

This engagement included a joint workshop held by Meta with GESIS to learn more about GESIS’s RIDLOP project which aims to build a robust infrastructure for researchers to access data from online platforms. The session surfaced several potential avenues of collaboration between Meta and GESIS towards facilitating responsible and secure data access for European researchers

No reports of adversarial actions against researchers conducting good-faith disinformation research were identified during these engagements.

Measure 28.4

As part of the cooperation framework between the Signatories and the European research community, relevant Signatories will, with the assistance of the EDMO, make funds available for research on Disinformation, for researchers to independently manage and to define scientific priorities and transparent allocation procedures based on scientific merit.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 28.4.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the resources made available for the purposes of Measure 28.4 and procedures put in place to ensure the resources are independently managed.

Up until September 2025, Meta coordinated with other platforms through EDMO working groups with the goal of establishing an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) intended to serve as an intermediary between researchers, platforms, search engines, and Digital Service Coordinators in order to facilitate data sharing and mitigate disputes among other things. Meta set aside $100,000 to support this effort.

Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative - a decision made in September 2025 for reasons outside Meta’s control - Meta began collaboration with GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Meta has collaborated with GESIS to support their funding application for RIDLOP, which is intended to serve as an industry-wide initiative enabling structured data sharing between platforms and the European research community.

Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No, we have not introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta’s public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 30.1

Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on and explain the nature of their agreements with fact-checking organisations; their expected results; relevant quantitative information (for instance: contents fact-checked, increased coverage, changes in integration of fact-checking as depends on the agreements and to be further discussed within the Task-force); and such as relevant common standards and conditions for these agreements.

Meta’s agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognised industry standards.

Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta’s agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.

Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta’s agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.

Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed.

Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.

Further details and evidence of Meta’s partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at the Meta Transparency Centre: Meta’s Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.

QRE 30.1.3

Relevant Signatories will report on resources allocated where relevant in each of their services to achieve fact-checking coverage in each Member State and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat Disinformation online at the Member State level.

Meta allocates resources to achieve fact-checking coverage and to support fact-checking organisations’ work to combat disinformation. For example:

Financial Resources: Meta has established an agreement framework that provides fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.

Tools and Technology: Meta provides fact-checking partners with access to the Meta Content Library, which grants comprehensive access to public content across Facebook and Instagram to support their investigative capabilities. Partners also have access to Meta’s fact-checking tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.

Training and Capacity Building: Meta provides partners with comprehensive training materials and training sessions on any significant policy or product updates.

Dedicated Relationship Management: Meta supports cooperation through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support that helps improve the fact-checking programme.

Measure 30.2

Relevant Signatories will provide fair financial contributions to the independent European fact-checking organisations for their work to combat Disinformation on their services. Those financial contributions could be in the form of individual agreements, of agreements with multiple fact-checkers or with an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations that has the mandate to conclude said agreements.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 30.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken and general criteria used to ensure the fair financial contributions to the fact-checkers for the work done, on criteria used in those agreements to guarantee high ethical and professional standards, independence of the fact-checking organisations, as well as conditions of transparency, openness, consistency and non-discrimination.

Meta’s agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognised industry standards.

Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta’s agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.

Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta’s agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.

Further details and evidence of Meta’s partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at the Meta Transparency Centre: Meta’s Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.

QRE 30.2.2

Relevant Signatories will engage in, and report on, regular reviews with their fact-checking partner organisations to review the nature and effectiveness of the Signatory's fact-checking programme.

Meta has dedicated Partner Managers who engage with fact-checking partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support to improve the fact-checking programme. As part of this work, Partner Managers collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools.

Meta also provides fact-checking partners with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.

Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme’s design and deployment. Meta also provides fact-checking partners the ability to report any issues they’re encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta.

QRE 30.2.3

European fact-checking organisations will, directly (as Signatories to the Code) or indirectly (e.g. via polling by EDMO or an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations) report on the fairness of the individual compensations provided to them via these agreements.

This QRE is not relevant to Meta as it applies to fact-checking organisations.

Measure 30.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to cross-border cooperation between fact-checkers.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 30.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to facilitate their cross-border collaboration with and between fact-checkers, including examples of fact-checks, languages, or Member States where such cooperation was facilitated.

As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.

Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the programme, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).

Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.

Also, given the cross-border nature of content flows, Meta’s fact-checking systems allow multiple partners - including from different countries - to rate the same content. Users, regardless of location within the region, are then able to see the articles of multiple fact-checking partners.

Measure 30.4

To develop the Measures above, relevant Signatories will consult EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 30.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report, ex ante on plans to involve, and ex post on actions taken to involve, EDMO and the elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, including on the development of the framework of cooperation described in Measures 30.3 and 30.4.

The CoCD’s Taskforce is composed of the Code's Signatories, including Meta, together with representatives of ERGA and EDMO. It is chaired by the European Commission and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and it may invite relevant experts as observers, with decisions taken by consensus. The Taskforce meets in organised meetings and through dedicated working groups (subgroups) on specific workstreams.

Meta is an active participant in the Taskforce, attending EC-organised meetings and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. Through this participation, Meta engages directly with the European Commission, ERGA, EDMO and fellow Signatories.

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 31.1 and 31.2 Measure 31.3 Measure 31.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 31.1 and 31.2

31.1: Relevant Signatories that showcase User Generated Content (UGC) will integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use independent fact-checkers’ work in their platforms’ services, processes, and contents across all Member States and across formats relevant to the service. Relevant Signatories will collaborate with fact-checkers to that end, starting by conducting and documenting research and testing. 31.2: Relevant Signatories that integrate fact-checks in their products or processes will ensure they employ swift and efficient mechanisms such as labelling, information panels or policy enforcement to help increase the impact of fact-checks on audiences.

Facebook and Instagram

SLI 31.1.1

Member State level reporting on use of fact-checks by service and the swift and efficient mechanisms in place to increase their impact, which may include (as depends on the service): number of fact-check articles published; reach of fact-check articles; number of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers.

When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure fewer people see it, and (3) penalise repeat offenders. Meta's technology is designed to detect content that is the same or nearly identical to content rated by fact-checkers, applying notices and reduced distribution automatically. This integration operates across all content formats relevant to the service, including public posts, ads, articles, photos, videos, Reels, and text-only posts on both Facebook and Instagram.

When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. Content rated Satire or True won’t be labelled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Facebook. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well.

Ensuring fewer people see misinformation. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent. Meta does not suggest content to users once it is rated by a fact-checker, which significantly reduces the number of people who see it.

Repeat offenders. Facebook pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetise and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news Page.

Detection. Meta's systems support fact-checkers’ work through a signals-based detection approach, which uses various inputs - including user flags reporting “false information” - to identify and enqueue content for fact-checker review. Fact-checkers ultimately decide what to review and rate. Once content is rated, Meta applies automated enforcement actions (labelling, reduced distribution, ad rejection) and extends these actions to near-identical content detected through matching technology.

In terms of AI-generated content, fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking programme policies. They often rely on AI experts and visual techniques to aid in the detection of this content.

Filtered to content created on Facebook in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:

1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:

2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:*

These two metrics together show both the scale and impact of fact-checking.

*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta’s 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EEA Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EEA (119,000). This is expected.

**Owing to a number of technical issues, data was not captured for 53 days during this reporting period, primarily from 21 January to 6 March 2026. As a result, the affected metrics should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true volumes.

Country	Facebook: Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers	Facebook: Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook	Instagram: Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers	Instagram: Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram
Austria	319,316	26,388	22,762	4,858
Belgium	483,671	31,844	25,473	5,213
Bulgaria	380,233	18,434	9,350	2,754
Croatia	228,450	18,198	8,737	2,799
Cyprus	103,585	14,211	11,011	2,803
Czech Republic	344,103	19,466	13,270	3,611
Denmark	243,127	19,306	13,298	3,407
Estonia	51,001	8,049	3,408	1,395
Finland	115,933	15,497	11,332	3,227
France	2,052,817	48,812	62,427	8,541
Germany	1,768,156	56,827	95,585	11,682
Greece	490,180	25,326	18,316	4,378
Hungary	207,426	17,368	9,363	2,735
Iceland	24,582	6,172	2,259	983
Ireland	283,788	25,055	17,697	4,474
Italy	1,914,646	51,765	71,244	9,739
Latvia	94,304	9,496	3,925	1,629
Liechtenstein	1,923	1,160	329	215
Lithuania	129,645	13,092	4,966	1,829
Luxembourg	47,660	10,839	4,265	1,677
Malta	45,725	9,818	3,890	1,506
Netherlands	522,005	33,500	34,844	6,296
Norway	190,101	20,734	12,859	3,466
Poland	923,593	30,380	22,764	5,180
Portugal	555,898	30,367	34,253	6,466
Romania	520,618	24,604	14,839	3,663
Slovakia	208,303	15,087	8,288	2,655
Slovenia	113,746	12,802	5,280	1,879
Spain	1,720,888	48,096	85,359	10,239
Sweden	334,630	27,202	24,163	5,059
Totals	14420053	689895	655,556	124,358

SLI 31.1.2

An estimation, through meaningful metrics, of the impact of actions taken such as, for instance, the number of pieces of content labelled on the basis of fact-check articles, or the impact of said measures on user interactions with information fact-checked as false or misleading.

1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.

2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.

*Owing to a number of technical issues, data was not captured for 53 days during this reporting period, primarily from 21 January to 6 March 2026. As a result, the affected metrics should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true volumes.

Country	Facebook: Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers	Facebook: % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook	Instagram: Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers	Instagram: % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram
Austria	319,316	49.64%	22,762	62.13%
Belgium	483,671	48.55%	25,473	61.67%
Bulgaria	380,233	55.22%	9,350	64.36%
Croatia	228,450	51.75%	8,737	59.15%
Cyprus	103,585	57.47%	11,011	61.02%
Czech Republic	344,103	38.17%	13,270	55.71%
Denmark	243,127	50.26%	13,298	60.53%
Estonia	51,001	42.36%	3,408	57.76%
Finland	115,933	49.94%	11,332	61.81%
France	2,052,817	54.37%	62,427	61.47%
Germany	1,768,156	47.66%	95,585	62.85%
Greece	490,180	55.44%	18,316	68.09%
Hungary	207,426	54.75%	9,363	58.62%
Iceland	24,582	52.94%	2,259	85.11%
Ireland	283,788	48.42%	17,697	63.33%
Italy	1,914,646	56.50%	71,244	62.48%
Latvia	94,304	43.87%	3,925	60.25%
Liechtenstein	1,923	100.00%	329	75.00%
Lithuania	129,645	47.34%	4,966	57.58%
Luxembourg	47,660	54.14%	4,265	60.24%
Malta	45,725	61.20%	3,890	65.19%
Netherlands	522,005	44.34%	34,844	61.27%
Norway	190,101	50.42%	12,859	56.94%
Poland	923,593	47.05%	22,764	60.27%
Portugal	555,898	58.36%	34,253	63.39%
Romania	520,618	26.14%	14,839	60.92%
Slovakia	208,303	40.90%	8,288	61.42%
Slovenia	113,746	38.73%	5,280	59.85%
Spain	1,720,888	59.89%	85,359	64.33%
Sweden	334,630	52.28%	24,163	59.24%
Total	14,420,053		655,556

SLI 31.1.3

Signatories recognise the importance of providing context to SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2 in ways that empower researchers, fact-checkers, the Commission, ERGA, and the public to understand and assess the impact of the actions taken to comply with Commitment 31. To that end, relevant Signatories commit to include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise these SLIs. Relevant Signatories will present and discuss within the Permanent Task-force the type of baseline quantitative information they consider using for contextualisation ahead of their baseline reports.

Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.

There have been no significant updates in methodology since the last submitted report.

For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report.

Country	Facebook (1 January - 30 June 2026)	Instagram (1 January - 30 June 2026)
Average monthly active users in the EU	264 million	297 million

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 32.1 and 32.2 Measure 32.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No, we did not introduce new measures during the implementation period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 32.1 and 32.2

32.1: Relevant Signatories will provide fact-checkers with information to help them quantify the impact of fact-checked content over time, such as (depending on the service) actions taken on the basis of that content, impressions, clicks or interactions. 32.2: Relevant Signatories will provide fact-checkers with information to help them quantify the impact of fact-checked content over time, such as (depending on the service) actions taken on the basis of that content, impressions, clicks, or interactions.

Facebook and Instagram

SLI 32.1.1 (for Measures 32.1 and 32.2)

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the use of the interfaces and other tools put in place to provide fact-checkers with the information referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 (such as monthly users for instance).

All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking programme. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.

Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting “false information”. Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review and rate themselves. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent.

During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find. For example, we’ve used this feature to group content about global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.

See list in SLI 30.1.1 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.

Country
	0

Measure 32.3

Relevant Signatories will regularly exchange information between themselves and the fact-checking community, to strengthen their cooperation.

Facebook and Instagram

QRE 32.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the channels of communications and the exchanges conducted to strengthen their cooperation - including success of and satisfaction with the information, interface, and other tools referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 - and any conclusions drawn from such exchanges.

As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking programme together. Meta’s cooperation with fact-checking partners is conducted through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners to communicate product and policy changes and manage day-to-day support.

Meta is an active participant in the CoCD Permanent Taskforce, attending EC-organised meetings and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. During this period, fact-checking has not been a dedicated working group focus within the Taskforce; however, Meta maintains its direct cooperation with fact-checking partners through the channels described above.

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 34.1

Signatories establish and maintain the common Transparency Centre website, which will be operational and available to the public within 6 months from the signature of this Code.

Meta supported the establishment and maintenance of the Transparency Centre website, making it operational and available to the public as of 2023, within 6 months from the signature of the Code. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 34.2

Signatories provide appropriate funding, for setting up and operating the Transparency Centre website, including its maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. Funding contribution should be commensurate with the nature of the Signatories' activity and shall be sufficient for the website's operations and maintenance and proportional to each Signatories' risk profile and economic capacity.

Meta equally co-funds the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website alongside other signatories, providing funding sufficient for the website’s maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. The website is managed by VOST Europe in the role of developer. Meta’s funding contribution is commensurate with its activity as a signatory to the Code and proportional to its risk profile and economic capacity.

Measure 34.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to the Transparency Centre's information to the extent that the Code is applicable to their services.

Meta continuously contributes to the Transparency Centre’s information through the bi-annual submission of its Transparency Reports. These reports are uploaded to the Transparency Centre and made available to the public. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 34.4

Signatories will agree on the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre within the Task-force, to be recorded and reviewed within the Task-Force on an annual basis.

Meta participates in EC CoCD Taskforce discussions regarding the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre. The financing arrangement is agreed upon within the Taskforce and reviewed on an annual basis in accordance with the Code’s requirements. Meta engages in these periodic reviews to ensure the arrangement remains appropriate and sufficient for the TC’s continued operation.

Measure 34.5

The Task-force will regularly discuss the Transparency Centre and assess whether adjustments or actions are necessary. Signatories commit to implement the actions and adjustments decided within the Task-force within a reasonable timeline.

Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Taskforce, which regularly discusses the Transparency Centre and assesses whether adjustments or actions are necessary. During the reporting period, Meta participated in organised Taskforce-related meetings and working groups where applicable TC topics were discussed as applicable. Meta remains committed to implementing any actions or adjustments decided within the Taskforce within a reasonable timeline, consistent with the Code’s requirements.

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 35.1

Signatories will list in the Transparency Centre, per each Commitment and Measure that they subscribe to, the terms of service and policies that their service applies to implement these Commitments and Measures.

Meta publishes its Transparency Reports on a bi-annual basis in the EC’s Transparency Centre. The Transparency Reports list all the relevant information, including the terms of service and policies applicable to Facebook and Instagram, per commitment and measure. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 35.2

Signatories provide information on the implementation and enforcement of their policies per service, including geographical and language coverage.

Meta provides information on the implementation and enforcement of its policies, which is available in the published Transparency Reports. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 35.3

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre contains a repository of their reports assessing the implementation of the Code's commitments.

Meta’s Transparency Reports, which assess the implementation of the Code’s commitments, are maintained in the Transparency Centre repository. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 35.4

In crisis situations, Signatories use the Transparency Centre to publish information regarding the specific mitigation actions taken related to the crisis.

No formal crisis situation, as defined under Article 36 of the DSA or as declared by the European Commission, occurred during the current reporting period that would trigger the application of Measure 35.4.

Meta maintains documented Crisis Response Protocols and Assessments that would be activated in the event a crisis is declared. These protocols enable Meta to identify and assess whether external events impacting the functioning and use of its services are significantly contributing to a serious threat, and to publish information regarding specific mitigation actions taken on the Transparency Centre as required.

Measure 35.5

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology, is user-friendly, and that the relevant information is easily searchable (including per Commitment and Measure). Users of the Transparency Centre will be able to easily track changes in Signatories' policies and actions.

Meta and other signatories equally co-fund the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website, which is managed by VOST Europe in the role of a developer, ensuring the Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology and user friendliness. The layout designed by the developer allows for easy searchability, as well as straightforward tracking of changes.

Measure 35.6

The Transparency Centre will enable users to easily access and understand the Service Level Indicators and Qualitative Reporting Elements tied to each Commitment and Measure of the Code for each service, including Member State breakdowns, in a standardised and searchable way. The Transparency Centre should also enable users to easily access and understand Structural Indicators for each Signatory.

Meta’s bi-annual Transparency Reports, published on the Transparency Centre, list Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) tied to each commitment and measure for Facebook and Instagram, including Member State breakdowns in a standardised and searchable format.

In addition, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, produced in collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz, and the European Commission as part of the Rapid Response System (RRS). These Structural Indicators are accessible via the Transparency Centre, enabling users to understand compliance patterns across signatories. Meta continues to update Structural Indicator measurements aligned with its bi-annual reporting periods.

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 36.1 Measure 36.2 Measure 36.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 36.1

Signatories provide updates about relevant changes in policies and implementation actions in a timely manner, and in any event no later than 30 days after changes are announced or implemented.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

Measure 36.2

Signatories will regularly update Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators, in parallel with the regular reporting foreseen by the monitoring framework. After the first reporting period, Relevant Signatories are encouraged to also update the Transparency Centre more regularly.

Meta regularly updates Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators which are published by TrustLab on the EC’s Transparency Centre. Additionally, Meta participates in EC CoCD Taskforce discussions regarding the operation of the Transparency Centre, which includes maintenance and regular updating of the Transparency Centre website.

Measure 36.3

Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.

Meta is involved in discussions with the EC Taskforce regarding the Code and monitoring framework. Consequently, any relevant decisions of the Taskforce are updated in the Transparency Centre through the bi-annual cadence of the publishing of Meta’s Transparency Report.

QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.

QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code’s signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.

SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.

In the period between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026, our total report page was viewed 40,731 times, our signatory profile was visited 2,928 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 35,687 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 46,705 times. The report page was viewed an average of 5,819 times per month.

Country

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

We deployed the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework which was developed within the Taskforce and activated it ahead of EU nationwide elections. We onboarded relevant Civil Society Organisations to our direct escalation channels and ensured timely review of escalations coming through the RRS.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 37.1

Signatories will participate in the Task-force and contribute to its work. Signatories, in particular smaller or emerging services will contribute to the work of the Task-force proportionate to their resources, size and risk profile. Smaller or emerging services can also agree to pool their resources together and represent each other in the Task-force. The Task-force will meet in plenary sessions as necessary and at least every 6 months, and, where relevant, in subgroups dedicated to specific issues or workstreams.

Meta actively participates in and contributes to the work of the Taskforce, attending scheduled meetings and engaging in relevant subgroups dedicated to specific topics or workstreams.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Meta agrees to and, when relevant, works with the Taskforce on all essential tasks if and as required, including but not limited to developing and refining harmonised reporting templates, Service Level and Structural Indicators, and TTP benchmarks; contributing to the development and refinement of the Rapid Response System and coordinating rapid response efforts during elections or crises; reviewing research and evidence relevant to the Code’s commitments; providing guidance on fact-checking reporting obligations; assessing whether the Code’s commitments and measures require updates in light of evolving developments; and promoting the Code’s adoption among new signatories.

Measure 37.3

The Task-force will agree on and define its operating rules, including on the involvement of third-party experts, which will be laid down in a Vademecum drafted by the European Commission in collaboration with the Signatories and agreed on by consensus between the members of the Task-force.

Meta works with the EC and other signatories to define operating rules for the EC Taskforce, including third-party expert involvement.

Measure 37.4

Signatories agree to set up subgroups dedicated to the specific issues related to the implementation and revision of the Code with the participation of the relevant Signatories.

Meta participates in the following working groups, contributing specialised knowledge and operational support to the implementation and, if needed, the revision of the Code: Elections Working Group and Crisis Protocol Working Group. These working groups are updated as needed to address any specific issues. These are the working groups that are currently active. However, Meta has agreed to participate in all working groups that are relevant and pertinent to our services.

Measure 37.5

When needed, and in any event at least once per year the Task-force organises meetings with relevant stakeholder groups and experts to inform them about the operation of the Code and gather their views related to important developments in the field of Disinformation.

Meta participates in annual and ad hoc EC Taskforce meetings with stakeholders and experts, providing updates via bi-annual Transparency Reports and discussing research outcomes.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Meta maintains its subscription document and actively participates in the EC CoCD Taskforce, through which any changes to commitments or measures are identified and discussed. Meta’s subscription document remains unchanged from the prior reporting period.

Meta's participation in Taskforce working groups during this period was as follows:

Elections Working Group: The most active working group during the reporting period; focused on novel threats including AI-generated content and rapid response mechanisms.
Crisis Protocol Working Group: Focused on the Rapid Response System for crisis situations. The EC is developing a Code-specific crisis protocol; industry signatories are engaging on alignment with existing DSA obligations.

Meta remains an active participant in the Taskforce-related meetings and responds to meeting invitations as they are scheduled by the EC. Meta’s engagement is aligned with the current Taskforce priorities of election integrity and associated disinformation challenges and agrees to its participation in all the working groups that are relevant and pertinent to our services.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Maintained and enhanced dedicated cross-functional team structure to support CoCD implementation, including Meta’s Public Policy & Global Affairs team), Regional Regulatory Readiness team, and Global Response Operations team.
Continued investment in teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development, all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation.
Active and ongoing participation in EC CoCD Taskforce-related meetings and working groups, with current engagement focused on the Elections and the Rapid Response System (RRS) and Plenary meetings when convened by the EC to ensure alignment with Code requirements and adaptation of internal processes as needed.
Maintained the Regulatory Information Response (RIR) process to proactively manage compliance deliverables and audit readiness across all signed-up commitments, including bi-annual Transparency Report production and submission within required deadlines.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We will continue to participate in the Rapid Response System for elections in EU Member States during the next reporting period, and continue to engage in the Taskforce's Crisis Protocol Working Group on the development of a Code specific crisis and incident response mechanism.

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

QRE 38.1.1

Meta dedicated adequate financial and human resources and maintained appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of its commitments under the Code, including but not limited to the following:

Dedicated Teams Supporting CoCD Implementation:

Public Policy & Global Affairs Team: Alongside the Content Policy team responsible for maintaining Meta’s Misinformation Policy, and EMEA Integrity Legal, it serves as the primary liaison with the European Commission CoCD Taskforce. This team regularly participates in EC Taskforce meetings and working groups, ensuring Meta’s internal processes remain aligned with Code requirements.
Regional Regulatory Readiness (RRR) Team: This team maintains a regulatory information response process to proactively produce regulatory reports, including the CoCD bi-annual Transparency Report submissions. The team also coordinates the effective implementation of the Rapid Alert System ahead of each EU national election, which operates under the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework, supporting Meta’s commitment to timely action on disinformation threats. The team is also responsible for coordinating the internal elections preparation work and ensures we have robust systems to respond to election specific risks, including misinformation and disinformation. RRR operates under a regional model, with dedicated Programme Managers organised regionally to deepen jurisdictional context and in-region expertise.
Meta also maintains specialised teams who manage the relationship with third-party fact-checkers and the overall fact-checking programme in the EEA.

Cross-Functional Resource Allocation:

Meta maintains teams with expertise across content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development, all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation in support of the Code.
We have expert investigation teams to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats.
These teams are distributed globally and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners, including content reviewers located in the EU with specialist expertise in EU languages.

Internal Processes:

A dedicated cross-functional team manages the day-to-day processes relating to the CoCD, including regulatory reporting, EC engagement, and coordination of compliance deliverables across all signed-up commitments.
Meta's DSA Head of Compliance communicates and shares relevant information with the EC in relation to Meta Platforms Ireland Limited’s compliance with the DSA, which now includes the CoCD, engaging with the EC periodically and taking any necessary actions arising from those engagements.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

This commitment was fulfilled in January 2023 when Meta provided its baseline report.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

For this report, Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

For this report, Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp will continue to provide relevant QREs and SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

Commitment 43

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in the next 6 months.

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp continue to engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

Meta's Approach to Elections
Meta is committed to providing reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages on our platforms. Our policies and safeguards for elections have been developed over many years and informed by our experiences of working on numerous elections around the world. Those experiences have resulted in the development of a robust election programme, which uses mature policies, processes, and tools to both protect speech on our platform and safeguard the integrity of the elections. We continuously improve these measures to ensure they remain appropriate and responsive to emerging risks, and we have reinforced these efforts in light of the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act, the Election Guidelines, and our commitments under this Code.

Community Standards and Guidelines Relevant to Elections

Our Community Standards set out strict rules for content that can and cannot be posted on Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger. These policies cover voter interference, voter fraud, electoral violence, and misinformation, among other categories, such as, hateful conduct, coordinating harm and promoting crime, bullying and harassment. Our policies have been refined over many years, by partnering with academics, civil society, and third-party fact-checkers to find the appropriate balance between protecting people and protecting freedom of expression and information. These policies are regularly reviewed, and they are made available to the public through our Transparency Centre.

Our comprehensive approach to elections continued for European elections held between 1 January 2026 and 30 June 2026. The election responses covered in this report include:

Portugal (Presidential) election, Round 1: 18 January 2026; Round 2: 8 February 2026
Slovenia (Parliamentary) election, 22 March 2026
Denmark (Parliamentary) election, 24 March 2026
Hungary (Parliamentary) election, 12 April 2026
Bulgaria (Parliamentary) election, 19 April 2026
Cyprus (Parliamentary) election, 24 May 2026
Malta (General) election, 30 May 2026
Our Election Risk Management Processes

We have a dedicated team responsible for driving Meta’s cross-company election integrity efforts, leveraging experts from a full range of business functions to foster a holistic approach to tackling election-related risks. Those functions include colleagues in Meta’s intelligence, data science, product and engineering, research, operations, content and public policy, and legal teams.

Over the years, Meta has developed a comprehensive approach to mitigate relevant user risks and respect the integrity of elections during an election period. This approach has been iterated and has matured over the course of hundreds of elections over the past years. We have processes, tools and policies in place all year round to address harmful or illegal content while protecting legitimate speech on our platforms, which have been further reinforced in light of the regulatory framework under the DSA including the Communication from the Commission (C/2024/3014) on Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes (the “Election Guidelines”).

During the reporting period for this report, we continued to work closely with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures ahead of elections. This included collaboration with Member State Digital Service Coordinators (DSCs), national authorities, electoral bodies, as well as taking part in the EU Code of Practice ("CoP") Rapid Response System. As part of the rapid response system framework, we onboarded designated civil society organisations and fact-checkers to our direct escalation channels to report time sensitive content, accounts or trends that could threaten the integrity of the electoral process.

Overview of Cooperation with External Stakeholders and Election Integrity Efforts

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of our day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation and integrity efforts for Portugal, Slovenia, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Malta. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

We remain focused on providing users with reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages. That is why we continue to connect people with details about the election for their Member State through in-app notifications, where legally permitted. We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app ‘Voter Information Units (VIU)’ and ‘Election Day Reminders (EDR)’.

Portugal Presidential Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, spanning electoral authorities, government, and the European Commission (DG CNECT). ANACOM, the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC), was already onboarded to Meta’s escalation channels, and a refresher training session was held on the direct escalation channels. Meta also reached out to the National Election Commission (CNE) to offer onboarding.

Ahead of the election, Meta conducted outreach to political parties sharing key information on account security and best practices for organic content. We were also in regular contact with civil society organisations and partners, including Iberifier, the European Partnership for Democracy, and ISCTE.

The Rapid Response System was activated approximately 6 weeks prior to the election, with onboarding conducted from 22 December 2025.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (22 December 2025 to 13 February 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 2
Number of onboarded flaggers: 2
Number of reports received during the election period: 47

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:
Facebook

VIU Reach: 4.6 million
EDR Reach: 3.8 million

Instagram

VIU Reach: 4.9 million
EDR Reach: 3.9 million

Slovenia Parliamentary Election

Preparations for the Slovenian parliamentary election began well ahead of polling day, with early engagement across government, including the Minister of Digital Affairs. Meta took part in a roundtable hosted by the DSC, the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia, covering election preparedness.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period and onboarded the Adria Digital Media Observatory (ADMO) to its direct reporting channel. We also offered to onboard the National Election Commission (DVK) to our reporting channels.

Throughout the campaign, Meta stayed in regular contact with civil society organisations and partners, including ADMO and the European Diplomacy Exchange Forum. Political parties were engaged directly through workshops, ensuring candidates’ teams understood Meta's policies, reporting channels, and election integrity measures.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (23 February to 29 March 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
Number of onboarded flaggers: 3
Number of reports received during the election period: 1

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

VIU Reach: 876K
EDR Reach: 738K

Instagram

VIU Reach: 539K
EDR Reach: 448K

Denmark Parliamentary Election

External engagement and election preparation for Denmark’s Parliamentary Election began early, spanning the government ministries and DSC. Meta engaged with the Danish Government’s election Taskforce, including the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, in Copenhagen to discuss election tools, reporting mechanisms, and foreign interference concerns, with further calls held ahead of the vote. Meta also held a webinar for parties on election tools and reporting mechanisms.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period, with direct escalation channels in place for the Danish Agency for Digitisation (DSC), the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior, the Danish Medicines Agency, and Danish Gambling Authority, all previously onboarded. The Rapid Response System (RRS) has been activated, with EDMO Central as the coordinating body, which was duly onboarded. Throughout the campaign, Meta cooperated with its fact-checking partner TjekDet, which could receive content escalations directly for rating.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (18 March to 7 April 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
Number of reports received during the election period: 0

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

VIU Reach: 3 million
EDR Reach: 2.5 million

Instagram

VIU Reach: 1.9 million
EDR Reach: 1.5 million

Hungary Parliamentary Election

Preparations for the election began well ahead of the vote including early engagements with government and national election entities. Meta also engaged political parties through scaled training and education sessions starting in Budapest in July 2025, clarifying Meta’s policies, establishing communication channels, and providing access to ‘Meta Support Pro’ for priority technical issues.

Meta partnered with the National Election Office to connect users with authoritative voting information, and provided the National Media and Infocomm Authority (DSC) and the National Election Commission with training on key content policies and a dedicated session on the content escalation channel.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period and onboarded Political Capital, Lakmusz, and the CEE Digital Democracy Watch (CEEDDW) to its direct reporting channel for civic-violating and unlawful content. Meta cooperated with its fact-checking partner AFP and launched a Trending Event using relevant keywords to help AFP identify and debunk election-related misinformation, and stayed in close contact with AFP throughout the campaign to ensure they were supported.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (13 March to 21 April 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 3
Number of onboarded flaggers: 3
Number of reports received during the election period: 148

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

VIU Reach: 5.4 million
EDR Reach: 4.7 million

Instagram

VIU Reach: 1.7 million
EDR Reach: 1.3 million

Bulgaria Parliamentary Election

External engagement and preparations for the Bulgarian snap parliamentary election began early, spanning the electoral commission, government, and the European Commission. Meta held two meetings with the Bulgarian Minister of e-Governance and cross-government partners to discuss election-related topics, and directed them to existing escalation channels. The Communications Regulation Commission (CRC), Bulgaria’s DSC, was engaged to explain overall election efforts and respond to its requests for information.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period and onboarded the BROD/GATE hub to its direct reporting channel. The Central Election Commission was offered escalation channel onboarding but remained offboarded.

Throughout the campaign, Meta stayed in regular contact with civil society and research organisations, including the Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI), the GATE Institute and BROD hub.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (23 March to 26 April 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
Number of onboarded flaggers: 2
Number of reports received during the election period: 17

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

VIU Reach: 3.4 million
EDR Reach: 2.8 million

Instagram

VIU Reach: 1.3 million
EDR Reach: 1 million

Cyprus Parliamentary Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, with in-person engagement with the Central Election Service (CES). CES was temporarily re-onboarded to Meta’s escalation channels for blackout period reporting. The Cyprus Radio and Television Authority, as the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC), was onboarded to Meta’s direct reporting channel. Meta also engaged with the Minister of the Interior.

MEDDMO was onboarded as the Rapid Response System partner and proactively flagged content during the election period.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (27 April to 2 June 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
Number of reports received during the election period: 34

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

VIU Reach: 463K
EDR Reach: 385.5K

Instagram

VIU Reach: 455.7K
EDR Reach: 383.4K

Malta General Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts were put in place quickly following the snap election announcement. Meta engaged with the Malta Communications Authority (DSC) through a roundtable covering platform preparedness, content moderation coverage, risk identification, and election integrity safeguards. The Maltese Electoral Commission was contacted for onboarding to direct escalation channels and confirmed its official website for the election products.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period, with the MEDDMO hub onboarded as the RRS partner covering Malta. Meta held two RRS meetings with MEDDMO, and all cases were cleared during the election period.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (8 May to 7 June 2026):

Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
Number of reports received during the election period: 11

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

VIU Reach: 343.3K
EDR Reach: 295.9K

Instagram

VIU Reach: 175.8K
EDR Reach: 153.5K

Responsible Approach to Generative AI

Meta’s approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for the EU national elections.

Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling:

Our Community Standards and Advertising Standards apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by Meta’s third-party fact-checking partners, whose rating options allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is generated or edited by AI.

Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from certain organic content creation tools. For advertising content, Meta labels images and videos that were created or significantly edited using our 1P generative AI ad creative tools.

Meta has begun labelling a wider range of media content when we detect industry-standard AI indicators or when users disclose that they are uploading AI-generated or AI-edited content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context.

Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration:

Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the Partnership on AI, for example, and signed onto the tech accord designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2026 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media.

Crisis 2025

Threats observed or anticipated

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon conflict

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the war of aggression by Russia on Ukraine.

Israel - Hamas War
In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the Israel - Hamas War.

Mitigations in place

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict

We took a variety of actions with the objectives of:

Helping to keep people in the region safe: we continue to provide user controls including Hidden Words, Limits, Comment Controls, Show More/Show Less and Sensitive
Content Control to help people manage what they see and who can interact with them.
Enforcing our policies: We continue to enforce our community standards, not only on content shared from within the affected countries, but globally wherever the content may be shared
Reducing the spread of misinformation: we worked with our third-party fact-checking partners in the region and consulted outside experts.
Monitoring for adversarial networks: we continue to monitor for and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour targeting discourse about the conflict.

Our main strategies focus on user safety controls in the affected markets, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation, and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
We took a variety of actions with the objectives of:

Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: since the beginning of the full-scale invasions we have introduced several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted.
Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared.
Reducing the spread of misinformation: We took steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and consulted with outside experts.
Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetising and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites.
In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today (globally), Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others.
We added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included additional accounts or subdomains of Russian media outlets of various NTV programmes, Rodina magazine, TV Centre, Radio Mayak, Radio Rossii, Vladimir Solovyov (vrsoloviev), Moskva 24, MTRK Mir network channels, TASS, Channel One, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Vzglyad.ru.

Israel - Hamas War

Mitigations in place or planned - at time of reporting:

In the wake of the 07/10/2023 terrorist attacks in Israel and Israel’s response in Gaza, expert teams from across Meta took immediate crisis response measures, while protecting people’s ability to use our apps to shed light on important developments happening on the ground. As we did so, we were guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, the protection of the dignity of victims, and the right to non-discrimination - as well as balancing those with the right to freedom of expression. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to prioritise and mitigate the most salient human rights risks: in this case, that people may use Meta platforms to further inflame an already violent conflict. We also looked to international humanitarian law (IHL) as an important source of reference for assessing online conduct. We have provided a public overview of our efforts related to the war in our Newsroom, as well as in our 2023 Annual Human Rights report. We provided an update on our actions in our 2024 annual human rights report. The following are some examples of the specific steps we have taken:

Taking Action on Violating Content:

We quickly established a dedicated crisis response staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. We explain how we deploy our Crisis Policy Protocol and manage crises in an infographic in our 2024 annual human rights report.
We continue to enforce our policies around Dangerous Organisations and Individuals, Violent and Graphic Content, Hateful Conduct, Violence and Incitement, Bullying and Harassment, and Coordinating Harm.

Safety and Security:

We memorialise accounts when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

Reducing the Spread of Misinformation:

We’re working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta’s third-party fact-checking network includes Arabic- and Hebrew-language coverage for Israel and Palestine through AFP and Reuters. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we’ve made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
We’re also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers.
We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven’t originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

User Controls:

We continue to provide tools to help people control their experience on our apps and protect themselves from content they don’t want to see. These include but aren’t limited to:

Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don’t follow you, or who only recently followed you.
Comment controls: You can control who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post-by-post basis.
Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook.
Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed.
Sensitive Content Control: Instagram’s Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people’s safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta’s technologies, tools, and processes.
Crisis Policy Protocol: We assess the risks of imminent harm both on and off our platforms so we can respond with specific policy and product interventions during moments of heightened risk. Our response was guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, and the protection of the dignity of victims. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and international humanitarian law.

Policy - 51.1.4

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people’s safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta’s technologies, tools, and processes.

Policy - 51.1.7

Israel - Hamas War
For the duration of the ongoing crisis, Meta has taken various actions to mitigate the possible content risks emerging from the crisis. This includes, inter alia, under the Dangerous Organisations and Individuals Policy, removes imagery depicting the moment an identifiable individual is abducted, unless such imagery is shared in the context of condemnation or a call to release, in which case we allow with a Mark as Disturbing (MAD) interstitial; and remove Hamas-produced imagery for hostages in captivity in all contexts. Meta has some further discretion policies which may be applied when content is escalated to us, including allowing content asking for, donating, or gifting pharmaceutical drugs in Israel and Gaza.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Specific Action applied - 51.2.1

Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)

Description of intervention - 51.2.2

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
Our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.

For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetisation Policies, any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our Partner Monetisation Policies

In line with applicable sanctions and legal restrictions, advertising and monetisation products are not available in Iran.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.

We prohibited ads or monetisation from Russian state-controlled media. Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories.

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs ( Commitment 14)

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
We have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
We have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.
We published an update on Doppelganger, the most persistent Russian-origin covert influence operation we track and first exposed in 2022, in our 2026 Adversarial Threat Report. After years of sustained defensive pressure, the operation has shifted from a single high-volume campaign into a portfolio of smaller, tactically distinct efforts. Its “brute force” ad activity - minimal text over images, no audience-building, rapidly regenerating spoofed domains - continued to target France and Germany and expanded to Hungary ahead of that country’s election, while dropping Israel. Alongside it, we removed offshoot campaigns linked to the Social Design Agency (SDA) and to the state-linked ANO “Dialog”, targeting Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, the EU and the United States. Most Doppelganger ad attempts are detected and blocked automatically before anyone sees them. Throughout, we have continued to refine our automated detection based on the behaviours we observe and to engineer campaign-specific defences to help block these operators from returning to our platforms.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitments 14-16)

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
Throughout the conflict, we have mobilised our teams, technologies, and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.
We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, who are monitoring the situation, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies, and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.
We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the situation, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict

Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate. During this period we received and triaged escalations relating to the conflict and flagged emerging misinformation trends to our Misinformation Policy team.

Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour networks.

Warning labels: We add warning labels to content rated false by third-party fact-checkers, and we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven’t originated with the sender.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

State controlled media: We have taken further action to limit the impact of state controlled media, described above.

Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate. During this period we received and triaged escalations relating to the conflict and flagged emerging misinformation trends to our Misinformation Policy team.

Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
We continue to work through our AI for Good programme, which empowers humanitarian organisations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers to make more informed decisions on how to support refugees, including those displaced by this conflict to Lebanon.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine.

We continue to work through our AI for Good programme, which empowers humanitarian organisations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers to make more informed decisions on how to support refugees, including the people of Ukraine.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.7

Warning Screens on sensitive content, Sensitive Content Control and Facebook Reduce: (Commitment 17)

Description of intervention - 51.5.8

Israel - Hamas War
The 07/10/2023 attack by Hamas was designated as a Terrorist Attack under Meta’s Dangerous Organisation and Individuals Policy. Consistent with that designation, we removed all content showing identifiable victims at the moment of the attack. Following that, people began sharing this type of footage in order to raise awareness and condemn the attacks. Meta’s goal is to allow people to express themselves while still removing harmful content. In turn, we began allowing people to post this type of footage within that context only, with the addition of a warning screen to inform users that it may be disturbing. We also allowed this type of content in professional news reporting settings and in pledges and calls for the release of hostages. If the user’s intent in sharing the content is unclear, we err on the side of safety and remove it.
However, there are additional protections in place to ensure people have choices when it comes to this content.
Instagram’s Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. We try not to recommend sensitive content in these places by default, but people can also choose to see less, to further reduce the possibility of seeing this content from accounts they don’t follow.

We’re continually testing how we deliver personalised experiences and have recently conducted testing around civic content. As a result, we started treating civic content from people and Pages users follow on Facebook more like any other content in their feed, and we started ranking and showing users that content based on explicit signals (for example, liking a piece of content) and implicit signals (like viewing posts) that help us predict what’s meaningful to people. We also started recommending more political content based on these personalised signals and are expanding the options people have to control how much of this content they see.

These actions ensure that we balance the protection of voice with removing harmful content. In this context, it has allowed for important discussion and condemnation of violence, while also empowering people to make choices in reaction to the content they see on Facebook and Instagram.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.10

Hidden words Filter (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)

Description of intervention - 51.5.11

Israel - Hamas War
When turned on, Hidden Words filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments, so people never have to see them. People can customise this list to make sure the terms they find offensive are hidden.
Hidden Words help people choose offensive terms and phrases to hide, so they are protected from seeing them.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.13

Limits (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)

Description of intervention - 51.5.14

Israel - Hamas War
When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don’t follow you, or who only recently followed you.
This tool gives people choice about DM and requests they receive, which may be important when engaging online around sensitive topics.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.16

Comment Controls (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)

Description of intervention - 51.5.17

Israel - Hamas War
People can control who can comment on their posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post-by-post basis.
This tool gives people control over engagement with what they post on Facebook and Instagram.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.19

Show more Show less: (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)

Description of intervention - 51.5.20

Israel - Hamas War
Show More, Show Less gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. Selecting “Show more” will temporarily increase the amount of content that is like the post a user gave feedback on, while selecting “Show Less” means a user will temporarily see fewer posts like the one that feedback was given on.

This tool provides people with more direct control over what they see, which is important for protecting people’s well-being during high profile crisis events.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitments 17-25)

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
As we previously reported, Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and Content Library API tools to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date.
Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR’s Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.
Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements.

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
The AI for Good programme shares privacy-protected data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty, and climate change. In support of the Ukraine humanitarian response, the programme’s maps have been utilised to provide valuable assistance.
We make baseline population density maps (the high resolution settlement layer) of countries surrounding Ukraine publicly available. These are among the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e. no Facebook user data).
Our Social Connectedness Index has also been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission - Joint Research Centre unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to estimate the rate at which Ukrainian refugees might seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.4

Content Library and API tools (Commitment 26)

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

Israel - Hamas War
As we previously reported, Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and Content Library API tools to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. In the first half of 2026, we also added data from public Facebook channels and Facebook channel messages. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date.
Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research. Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Centre (CASD, Le Centre d’Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to independently review research proposals to access Meta Content Library, Meta’s comprehensive archive of public content on Facebook and Instagram. CASD continues to serve as the independent body reviewing researcher access requests. Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements. As of 30 June 2026, over 1,900 researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.7.1

Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection (Commitment 30)

Description of intervention - 51.7.2

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta’s third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in Persian, Arabic and Hebrew, through Factnameh, AFP, and Reuters. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we’ve made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the conflict, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.

Israel - Hamas War
Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta’s third-party fact-checking network includes Arabic- and Hebrew-language coverage for Israel and Palestine through AFP and Reuters. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we’ve made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.

Specific Action applied - 51.7.4

Content Warning Labels (Commitment 31)

Description of intervention - 51.7.5

U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict
Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven’t originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.
Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Israel - Hamas War
Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven’t originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.
Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Specific Action applied - 51.7.7

Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU (Commitments 30-33)

Description of intervention - 51.7.8

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
For misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we work with our network of independent third-party fact-checking partners.The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering fact-checkers chapter above.Our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the fact-checkers’ Empowerment chapter above.
In the European Union, we partner with 29 fact-checking organisations covering 26 countries and 24 different languages.