Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.3 Measure 1.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

• We are in the process of expanding advertiser delivery reports to more Instagram ad placements.
• We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality. 
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Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

Measure 1.5

Relevant Signatories involved in the reporting of monetisation activities inclusive of media platforms, ad networks, and ad verification companies will take the necessary steps to give industry-recognised relevant independent third-party auditors commercially appropriate and fair access to their services and data in order to: - First, confirm the accuracy of first party reporting relative to monetisation and Disinformation, seeking alignment with regular audits performed under the DSA. - Second, accreditation services should assess the effectiveness of media platforms' policy enforcement, including Disinformation policies.

QRE 1.5.1

Signatories that produce first party reporting will report on the access provided to independent third-party auditors as outlined in Measure 1.5 and will link to public reports and results from such auditors, such as MRC Content Level Brand Safety Accreditation, TAG Brand Safety certifications, or other similarly recognised industry accepted certifications.

QRE 1.5.2

Signatories that conduct independent accreditation via audits will disclose areas of their accreditation that have been updated to reflect needs in Measure 1.5.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.2 Measure 2.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

Country	Number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.
Austria	517	42,924
Belgium	958	72,391
Bulgaria	1,427	85,695
Croatia	413	35,377
Cyprus	4,791	220,785
Czech Republic	1,555	304,288
Denmark	866	60,849
Estonia	1,897	226,220
Finland	294	40,752
France	7,276	546,367
Germany	5,009	511,212
Greece	764	59,354
Hungary	2,721	100,005
Iceland	4,248	644,011
Ireland	283	41,744
Italy	7,247	665,960
Latvia	737	39,021
Liechtenstein	2	2,723
Lithuania	1,211	68,739
Luxembourg	163	5,070
Malta	514	22,303
Netherlands	2,755	252,413
Norway	3,403	227,174
Poland	4,808	377,952
Portugal	3,191	157,484
Romania	2,066	139,260
Slovakia	526	54,304
Slovenia	602	18,811
Spain	5,136	343,020
Sweden	1,845	88,794
Total	67,225	5,455,002

Measure 2.2

Relevant Signatories will develop tools, methods, or partnerships, which may include reference to independent information sources both public and proprietary (for instance partnerships with fact-checking or source rating organisations, or services providing indicators of trustworthiness, or proprietary methods developed internally) to identify content and sources as distributing harmful Disinformation, to identify and take action on ads and promoted content that violate advertising policies regarding Disinformation mentioned in Measure 2.1.

QRE 2.2.1

Signatories will describe the tools, methods, or partnerships they use to identify content and sources that contravene policies mentioned in Measure 2.1 - while being mindful of not disclosing information that'd make it easier for malicious actors to circumvent these tools, methods, or partnerships. Signatories will specify the independent information sources involved in these tools, methods, or partnerships.

• Automated tools and human review: Meta proactively reviews all advertisements before publication, implementing an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. This process uses automated detection systems combined with human review to identify policy-violating ads. The review covers ad components (images, video, text and targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations. 
• Fact-checker review: In the EU, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations (3PFCs) certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). 3PFCs assess the accuracy of content and rate it as False, Partly False, Altered, or Missing Context. Any ad containing content rated as such by these fact-checkers is prohibited and advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may face restrictions on their ability to advertise, including reduced reach or loss of monetisation.
• Influence Operations Research Archive: Meta shares information with qualified external researchers to enable research on influence operations. Data from networks disrupted under Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy is made available through the IO Research Archive, housed in the Meta Content Library.

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

• Proactive and Reactive Review: All advertisements are proactively reviewed before publication, with an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. During this process, automated tools evaluate the ad’s content, including images, text, titles, and landing pages, against our policies. We also monitor and investigate advertiser behaviour, reviewing Business Accounts and their assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts) for policy violations. Once an ad is live, it continues to be monitored and may be rejected for policy violations at any point.
• Fact-checker review: Any ad containing content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by independent third-party fact-checkers is prohibited. Where fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, Meta uses technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook and Instagram. If ads are found to be identical or near-identical to content that fact-checkers have rated, they are rejected. 

SLI 2.3.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the ads removed or prohibited from their services using procedures outlined in Measure 2.3. In the event of ads successfully removed, parties should report on the reach of violatory content and advertising.

1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.
2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.

Country	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.
Austria	517	42,924
Belgium	958	72,391
Bulgaria	1,427	85,695
Croatia	413	35,377
Cyprus	4,791	220,785
Czech Republic	1,555	304,288
Denmark	866	60,849
Estonia	1,897	226,220
Finland	294	40,752
France	7,276	546,367
Germany	5,009	511,212
Greece	764	59,354
Hungary	2,721	100,005
Iceland	4,248	644,011
Ireland	283	41,744
Italy	7,247	665,960
Latvia	737	39,021
Liechtenstein	2	2,723
Lithuania	1,211	68,739
Luxembourg	163	5,070
Malta	514	22,303
Netherlands	2,755	252,413
Norway	3,403	227,174
Poland	4,808	377,952
Portugal	3,191	157,484
Romania	2,066	139,260
Slovakia	526	54,304
Slovenia	602	18,811
Spain	5,136	343,020
Sweden	1,845	88,794
Total	67,225	5,455,002

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 3.1 Measure 3.2 Measure 3.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 3.1

Relevant Signatories will cooperate with platforms, advertising supply chain players, source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checking organisations, advertisers and any other actors active in the online monetisation value chain, to facilitate the integration and flow of information, in particular information relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation, in full respect of all relevant data protection rules and confidentiality agreements.

QRE 3.1.1

Signatories will outline how they work with others across industry and civil society to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation.

Measure 3.2

Relevant Signatories will exchange among themselves information on Disinformation trends and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), via the Code Task-force, GARM, IAB Europe, or other relevant fora. This will include sharing insights on new techniques or threats observed by Relevant Signatories, discussing case studies, and other means of improving capabilities and steps to help remove Disinformation across the advertising supply chain - potentially including real-time technical capabilities.

QRE 3.2.1

Signatories will report on their discussions within fora mentioned in Measure 3.2, being mindful of not disclosing information that is confidential and/or that may be used by malicious actors to circumvent the defences set by Signatories and others across the advertising supply chain. This could include, for instance, information about the fora Signatories engaged in; about the kinds of information they shared; and about the learnings they derived from these exchanges.

Measure 3.3

Relevant Signatories will integrate the work of or collaborate with relevant third-party organisations, such as independent source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or open-source investigators, in order to reduce monetisation of Disinformation and avoid the dissemination of advertising containing Disinformation.

QRE 3.3.1

Signatories will report on the collaborations and integrations relevant to their work with organisations mentioned.

Political Advertising

Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 6.1 Measure 6.2 Measure 6.3 Measure 6.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 6.1

Relevant Signatories will develop a set of common best practices and examples for marks and labels on political or issue ads and integrate those learnings as relevant to their services.

QRE 6.1.1

Relevant Signatories will publicise the best practices and examples developed as part of Measure 2.2.1 and describe how they relate to their relevant services.

Measure 6.2

Relevant Signatories will ensure that relevant information, such as the identity of the sponsor, is included in the label attached to the ad or is otherwise easily accessible to the user from the label.

QRE 6.2.1

Relevant Signatories will publish examples of how sponsor identities and other relevant information are attached to ads or otherwise made easily accessible to users from the label.

QRE 6.2.2

Relevant Signatories will publish their labelling designs.

SLI 6.2.1

Relevant Signatories will publish meaningful metrics, at Member State level, on the volume of ads labelled according to Measure 6.2, such as the number of ads accepted and labelled, amounts spent by labelled advertisers, or other metrics to be determined in discussion within the Task-force with the aim to assess the efficiency of this labelling.

Country	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined
Iceland	4,880
Liechtenstein	0
Norway	5,704
Total	10,584

Measure 6.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and participate in research to improve users's identification and comprehension of labels, discuss the findings of said research with the Task-force, and will endeavour to integrate the results of such research into their services where relevant.

QRE 6.3.1

Relevant Signatories will publish relevant research into understanding how users identify and comprehend labels on political or issue ads and report on the steps they have taken to ensure that users are consistently able to do so and to improve the labels' potential to attract users' awareness.

Measure 6.4

Relevant Signatories will ensure that once a political or issue ad is labelled as such on their platform, the label remains in place when users share that same ad on the same platform, so that they continue to be clearly identified as paid-for political or issue content.

QRE 6.4.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the steps they put in place to ensure that labels remain in place when users share ads.

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 7.1 Measure 7.2 Measure 7.3 Measure 7.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 7.1

Relevant Signatories will make sure the sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors purchasing political or issue ads have provided the relevant information regarding their identity to verify (and re-verify where appropriate) said identity or the sponsors they are acting on behalf of before allowing placement of such ads.

QRE 7.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to collect and verify the information outlined in Measure 7.1.1, including information on the timeliness and proportionality of said tools and processes.

SLI 7.1.1

Relevant Signatories will publish meaningful metrics on the volume of ads rejected for failure to fulfil the relevant verification processes, comparable to metrics for SLI 6.2.1, where relevant per service and at Member State level.

• Removed in the EU and associated territories as SIEP ads are no longer permitted (since 6 October 2025). 
• *In Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, SIEP ads that ran without the required “paid for by” disclaimer and were later removed. 

Country	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in EEA Member States.
Austria	8,839
Belgium	11,724
Bulgaria	5,377
Croatia	2,816
Cyprus	8,382
Czech Republic	13,088
Denmark	11,170
Estonia	2,795
Finland	9,943
France	42,901
Germany	51,851
Greece	9,047
Hungary	26,433
Iceland	5,495
Ireland	3,657
Italy	60,215
Latvia	3,500
Lithuania	3,762
Liechtenstein	45
Lithuania	3,762
Luxembourg	1,259
Malta	2,711
Netherlands	26,439
Norway	9,759
Poland	27,144
Portugal	9,845
Romania	12,005
Slovakia	8,785
Slovenia	2,825
Spain	31,197
Sweden	14,434
Total	427,443

Measure 7.2

Relevant Signatories will complete verifications processes described in Commitment 7 in a timely and proportionate manner.

QRE 7.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the actions taken against actors demonstrably evading the said tools and processes, including any relevant policy updates.

QRE 7.2.2

Relevant Signatories will provide information on the timeliness and proportionality of the verification process.

Measure 7.3

Relevant Signatories will take appropriate action, such as suspensions or other account-level penalties, against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements via on-platform tactics. Relevant Signatories will develop - or provide via existing tools - functionalities that allow users to flag ads that are not labelled as political.

QRE 7.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to request a declaration on whether the advertising service requested constitutes political or issue advertising.

• Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences. 
• Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials’ activity using militaristic language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power.
  
  

QRE 7.3.2

Relevant Signatories will report on policies in place against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements on-platform.

Measure 7.4

Relevant Signatories commit to request that sponsors, and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors, declare whether the advertising service they request constitutes political or issue advertising.

QRE 7.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report on research and publish data on the effectiveness of measures they take to verify the identity of political or issue ad sponsors.

Commitment 8

Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 8.1 Measure 8.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 8.1

Relevant Signatories will agree on the common minimum transparency obligations, seeking alignment with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, such as identification of the sponsor, display period, ad spend, and aggregate information on recipients of the ad.

Measure 8.2

Relevant Signatories will provide a direct link from the ad to the ad repository.

QRE 8.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard.

QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)

Commitment 9

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 9.1 Measure 9.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 9.1

Relevant Signatories will, seeking alignment with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, provide a simple means for users to access information about why they are seeing a particular political or issue ad.

Measure 9.2

Relevant Signatories will explain in simple, plain language, the rationale and the tools used by the sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors (for instance: demographic, geographic, contextual, interest or behaviourally-based) to determine that a political or issue ad is displayed specifically to the user.

QRE 9.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and features in place to provide users with the information outlined in Measures 9.1 and 9.2, including relevant examples for each targeting method offered by the service.

QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)

Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 10.1 Measure 10.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 10.1

Relevant Signatories will set up and maintain dedicated searchable ad repositories containing accurate records (in as close to real time as possible, in particular during election periods) of all political and issue ads served, including the ads themselves. This should be accompanied by relevant information for each ad such as the identification of the sponsor; the dates the ad ran for; the total amount spent on the ad; the number of impressions delivered; the audience criteria used to determine recipients; the demographics and number of recipients who saw the ad; and the geographical areas the ad was seen in.

Measure 10.2

The information in such ad repositories will be publicly available for at least 5 years.

QRE 10.2.1 (for Measures 10.1 and 10.2)

Relevant Signatories will detail the availability, features, and updating cadence of their repositories to comply with Measures 10.1 and 10.2. Relevant Signatories will also provide quantitative information on the usage of the repositories, such as monthly usage.

• Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years (including from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU) 
• Ads that have run anywhere in the EU in the past year

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 11.1 Measure 11.2 Measure 11.3 Measure 11.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 11.1

Relevant Signatories' APIs or other interfaces will provide a set of minimum functionalities and search criteria that enable users and researchers to perform customised searches for data in as close to real time as possible (in particular during elections) in standard formats, including for instance searches per advertiser or candidate, per geographic area or country, per language, per keyword, per election, or per other targeting criteria, to allow for research and monitoring.

QRE 11.1.1 (for Measures 11.1-11.4)

Details extracted from JSON files.

• Ad creatives
• Ad performance data including total amount spent (range)
• Total impressions an ad received (range)
• Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%)
• The dates the ad started and stopped delivering

Measure 11.2

The data Relevant Signatories make available via such APIs and other interfaces will be equivalent to or more detailed than that data made available through their ad repositories.

Measure 11.3

Relevant Signatories will ensure wide access to and availability of APIs and other interfaces.

Measure 11.4

Relevant Signatories will engage with researchers and update the functionalities of the APIs and other interfaces to meet researchers' reasonable needs where applicable.

QRE 11.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report about their engagement with researchers, including to understand their experience with the functionalities of APIs, and the resulting improvements of the functionalities as the result of this engagement and of a discussion within the Task-force.

Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 13.1 Measure 13.2 Measure 13.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 13.1

Relevant Signatories agree to work individually and together through the Task-force to identify novel and evolving disinformation risks in the uses of political or issue advertising and discuss options for addressing those risks.

QRE 13.1.1 (for Measures 13.1-13.3)

Through the Task-force, the Relevant Signatories will convene, at least annually, an appropriately resourced discussion around novel risks in political advertising to develop coordinated policy.

Measure 13.2

Measure 13.3

Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 14.1

Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.

QRE 14.1.1

Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.

QRE 14.1.2

Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.

• Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can’t access our systems and thus can’t create accounts. 
• Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behaviour through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we’ve removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm.
• Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defences and still make it onto the platform. Often, this is because they don’t readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behaviour or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are.
  
  

Measure 14.2

Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.

QRE 14.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.

• Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) Policy: During the reporting period, we disrupted the following CIB networks targeting EEA Member States:
  • Russia-origin operation (Doppelganger): targeted Germany and France, with an offshoot targeting Hungary ahead of its election; violating assets removed via a combination of specialised manual investigations and by automated defences.
  • Russia-linked ANO “Dialog” network: targeted the Armenian diaspora in Germany and France (alongside Armenia and the US). We removed 25 Facebook accounts, 13 Pages, and 13 Instagram accounts. 
  • France- and Spain-origin network: targeted France (among several West/Central African countries). We removed 8 Facebook accounts, 24 Pages, and 6 Instagram accounts.
  • Israel-origin influence-for-hire network: targeted France (among the UK, Australia and others), including narratives around France’s 2026 municipal elections. We removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts.
  • Russia-origin “International Burke Institute” network: targeted Western audiences with France as a primary focus; we removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts.
  • Russia-origin network (Hungary): targeted Hungary ahead of its election; we removed 6 Facebook accounts and 4 Pages.
  • Ukraine- and Bulgaria-origin network: targeted Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Latvia (among others). We removed 72 Facebook accounts and 16 Instagram accounts.

SLI 14.2.1

Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken at the Member State level under policies addressing each of the TTPs as well as information on the type of content.

• Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, upvotes, comments)
• Use of fake followers or subscribers
• Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
• Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification

Country	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type
Austria	429,282	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Belgium	605,439	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Bulgaria	294,728	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Croatia	164,478	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Cyprus	483,842	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Czech Republic	376,984	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Denmark	294,627	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Estonia	169,335	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Finland	426,402	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
France	4,013,659	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Germany	3,376,747	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Greece	344,480	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Hungary	250,414	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Iceland	104,046	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Ireland	448,291	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Italy	1,552,406	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Latvia	206,392	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Liechtenstein	34,551	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Lithuania	244,139	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Luxembourg	153,394	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Malta	86,872	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Netherlands	1,936,220	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Norway	287,080	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Poland	1,090,424	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Portugal	604,758	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Romania	552,476	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Slovakia	171,563	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Slovenia	193,625	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Spain	1,538,486	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
Sweden	535,016	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform
EEA Total	20,970,156
Global Total	255,839,859

SLI 14.2.3

Metrics to estimate the penetration and impact that e.g. Fake/Inauthentic accounts have on genuine users and report at the Member State level (including trends on audiences targeted; narratives used etc.).

Country	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used
	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.

SLI 14.2.4

Estimation, at the Member State level, of TTPs related content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement with such content as a percentage of the total content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement on relevant signatories' service.

Country	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/ impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)
	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.

Measure 14.3

Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.

QRE 14.3.1

Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

• Meta works closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. While Meta is able to proactively detect and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks from our platforms, our efforts are enhanced by information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement.
• In the August 2026 Adversarial Threat Report, we detail how collaboration with industry peers, government agencies, and law enforcement enhances Meta’s ability to detect, investigate, and disrupt CIB networks. This includes investigating leads shared by other technology companies. For example, a covert influence network Meta identified after reviewing information shared by its peers at OpenAI, taking any appropriate action consistent with Meta’s policies, and publishing threat indicators through Meta’s dedicated GitHub repository to enable cross-platform action (see Adversarial Threat Report, p. 39–40). More broadly, Meta applies the same “whole-of-society” model to adjacent threats: its third and largest Joint Disruption Week, convened with the US Department of Justice, the FBI, the Royal Thai Police, and cross-industry partners, removed more than 1.4 million assets and contributed to 63 arrests. 

• Russia-linked covert influence operations (Doppelganger / ANO “Dialog”): We disrupted multiple operations under the Doppelganger umbrella, which maintained a cross-platform presence, operating on our platforms as well as on TikTok and YouTube. We published the associated threat indicators to our GitHub repository so industry partners and the broader security research community could detect the same activity across platforms.
• Israel-origin CIB network: targeted audiences in France, the United Kingdom, Australia and others through an influence-for-hire operation with a cross-platform presence on TikTok, X, and its own websites; we removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found it through our own investigation into suspected CIB in the region, an example of behaviour-based enforcement.
• Russia-origin "International Burke Institute” network: targeted Western audiences, with France as a primary focus, through a fabricated think tank with a cross-platform presence on Telegram, TikTok, YouTube and X; we removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found this network after reviewing information shared with us by our peers at OpenAI, an example of cross-industry cooperation.

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

Measure 16.2

Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.

QRE 16.2.1

As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.

• We regularly publish Adversarial Threat Reports to share notable trends, case studies, and investigations on evolving security threats, including the migration of disinformation actors across platforms.
• To effectively counter these cross-platform threats, we actively collaborate with other technology companies by sharing investigative leads when appropriate. We mutually share information with industry peers to help both Meta and our peers independently investigate and remove violating activity from our respective platforms.
• We provide qualified researchers with access to the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which contains public information on disrupted networks, supporting independent analysis of migration tactics and cross-platform activity.
• We also share information with law enforcement where appropriate.

Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Meta published its second Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2026. The plan establishes Meta’s multifaceted strategy for media literacy in the EU, outlining how products, features, and initiatives help users on Facebook and Instagram critically assess the credibility and context of online content. It also provides details on specific media literacy initiatives run by Meta, including its work on digital citizenship, its media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital, and its election literacy programmes.
• In the first half of 2026, Meta continued to expand its “AI info” labelling system across additional content formats and surfaces, helping users identify AI-generated content. This includes detecting industry-standard C2PA and IPTC metadata from tools by Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney, and Shutterstock, and the open-sourcing of Content Seal, Meta’s watermarking framework for images, video, audio, and text.
• Meta continued providing a series of media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital. These research-informed lessons are free worldwide and are designed for teachers at secondary level. Topics range from assessing the quality of the information online to more technical skills like reverse image search.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 17.1

Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.

QRE 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.

• To help people avoid coming across content that they’d rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile.

• When content has been rated by fact-checkers as False, Altered, Partly False, or Missing Context, we add a notice to it so that people can read additional context.
• Meta also notifies users before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. 
• Meta uses its technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well. 

Measure 17.2

Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.

QRE 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.

Measure 17.3

For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.

QRE 17.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

• Community Standards - Misinformation
• Content Distribution Guidelines (‘Fact-checked misinformation’) - Misinformation

Measure 18.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.

QRE 18.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe research efforts, both in-house and in partnership with third-party organisations, on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and relevant safe design practices, as well as actions or changes as a result of this research. Relevant Signatories will include where possible information on financial investments in said research. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

• Sensitive Content Control — users adjust how much sensitive content they see across Feed, Explore, Search, Reels, and Accounts You Might Follow. The “More” option is unavailable for users under 18. 
• "Not Interested" — removes a post immediately and reduces similar suggestions across Reels, Search, and other recommendation surfaces.
• Snooze Recommendations — pauses suggested posts in Feed for 30 days.
• Hidden Words — hides content with specified words, phrases, emojis, or hashtags from recommendations in captions and hashtags.
• Mute — stops seeing an account’s content without unfollowing.
• Your Algo — users can request to see more or less of their interests in their suggested content on Reels, Feed and Explore.
• Feed controls:
  • Following & Favourites Feeds — users add up to 50 accounts to Favourites; posts appear higher and can be viewed in a dedicated feed with no suggested posts.

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

Country
	0

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 21.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 21.3

Where Relevant Signatories employ labelling and warning systems, they will design these in accordance with up-to-date scientific evidence and with analysis of their users' needs on how to maximise the impact and usefulness of such interventions, for instance such that they are likely to be viewed and positively received.

QRE 21.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their procedures for developing and deploying labelling or warning systems and how they take scientific evidence and their users' needs into account to maximise usefulness.

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 23.1

Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.

QRE 23.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.

• Click *** Options next to the post that you’d like to mark as false.
• Click Report.
• Click Scam, fraud or spam.
• Click Fraud or scam, then click “Submit Report”
• Click Done
  
  

Measure 23.2

Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).

QRE 23.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 24.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 24.1

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with information on why particular content or accounts have been labelled, demoted, or otherwise enforced on, on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section, as well as the basis for such enforcement action, and the possibility for them to appeal through a transparent mechanism.

QRE 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems across Member States and languages and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.2 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

• Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualified researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment.
• Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API, publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies.
• Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports.

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 26.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

Country

Measure 26.2

Relevant Signatories will provide real-time or near real-time, machine-readable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data on their service for research purposes, such as accounts belonging to public figures such as elected official, news outlets and government accounts subject to an application process which is not overly cumbersome.

QRE 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide real-time or near real-time access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data for research purposes as described in Measure 26.2.

• Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.
• Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.
• Producer lists: customisable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.

• Endpoints and data fields: The Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields. This includes Instagram posts from Instagram business and creator accounts, and a subset of personal Instagram accounts.
• Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query.
• Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API.

QRE 26.2.2

Relevant Signatories will describe the scope of manifestly-made public data as applicable to their services.

• Posts shared by and information about Instagram business and creator accounts, and a subset of personal accounts.
• Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements
• The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen

QRE 26.2.3

Relevant Signatories will describe the application process in place to in order to gain the access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data described in Measure 26.2.

SLI 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2, such as: Number of monthly users (or users over a sample representative timeframe), Number of applications received, rejected, and accepted (over a reporting period or a sample representative timeframe), Average response time (over a reporting period or a sample representative timeframe).

Country	Applications Received	Applications Approved	Under Review	Withdrawn	Rejected	(EU) Median Response Time (Days): Submission to CASD Approval	(EU) Median Response Time (Days): CASD Approval to Access
01 January 2026 - 30 June 2026	762	399	299	35	29	31.3	1.4

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

• Onboarding Support
• Training and Education for researcher products and datasets
• Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

• Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram.
• Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta’s CIB policy.

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

Measure 28.4

As part of the cooperation framework between the Signatories and the European research community, relevant Signatories will, with the assistance of the EDMO, make funds available for research on Disinformation, for researchers to independently manage and to define scientific priorities and transparent allocation procedures based on scientific merit.

QRE 28.4.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the resources made available for the purposes of Measure 28.4 and procedures put in place to ensure the resources are independently managed.

Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 30.1

Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.

QRE 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on and explain the nature of their agreements with fact-checking organisations; their expected results; relevant quantitative information (for instance: contents fact-checked, increased coverage, changes in integration of fact-checking as depends on the agreements and to be further discussed within the Task-force); and such as relevant common standards and conditions for these agreements.

QRE 30.1.2

Relevant Signatories will list the fact-checking organisations they have agreements with (unless a fact-checking organisation opposes such disclosure on the basis of a reasonable fear of retribution or violence).

QRE 30.1.3

Relevant Signatories will report on resources allocated where relevant in each of their services to achieve fact-checking coverage in each Member State and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat Disinformation online at the Member State level.

SLI 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations, including the total number of agreements with fact-checking organisations, per language and, where relevant, per service.

Country
Austria	AFP; dpa-Faktencheck
Belgium	AFP; dpa-Faktencheck; Knack
Bulgaria	AFP; FactCheck.bg
Croatia	Faktograf.hr; AFP
Cyprus	AFP
Czech Republic	AFP; Demagog.cz
Denmark	TjekDet
Estonia	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M
Finland	AFP
France	20 Minutes; AFP; Les Observateurs de France 24; Les Surligneurs
Germany	AFP; Correctiv; dpa-Faktencheck
Greece	AFP; Ellinika Hoaxes
Hungary	AFP
Ireland	TheJournal.ie
Italy	Open; Pagella Politica
Latvia	Delfi; Re:Baltica
Lithuania	Delfi; Patikrinta 15min
Luxembourg	dpa-Faktencheck; AFP
Netherlands	AFP; dpa-Faktencheck
Poland	AFP; Demagog
Portugal	Poligrafo; Observador
Romania	AFP; Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro
Slovakia	AFP; Demagog.cz; Demagog.sk
Slovenia	Oštro
Spain	AFP; EFE Verifica; Maldito Bulo; Newtral
Sweden	Kallkritikbyran AFP

Measure 30.2

Relevant Signatories will provide fair financial contributions to the independent European fact-checking organisations for their work to combat Disinformation on their services. Those financial contributions could be in the form of individual agreements, of agreements with multiple fact-checkers or with an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations that has the mandate to conclude said agreements.

QRE 30.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken and general criteria used to ensure the fair financial contributions to the fact-checkers for the work done, on criteria used in those agreements to guarantee high ethical and professional standards, independence of the fact-checking organisations, as well as conditions of transparency, openness, consistency and non-discrimination.

QRE 30.2.2

Relevant Signatories will engage in, and report on, regular reviews with their fact-checking partner organisations to review the nature and effectiveness of the Signatory's fact-checking programme.

QRE 30.2.3

European fact-checking organisations will, directly (as Signatories to the Code) or indirectly (e.g. via polling by EDMO or an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations) report on the fairness of the individual compensations provided to them via these agreements.

Measure 30.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to cross-border cooperation between fact-checkers.

QRE 30.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to facilitate their cross-border collaboration with and between fact-checkers, including examples of fact-checks, languages, or Member States where such cooperation was facilitated.

Measure 30.4

To develop the Measures above, relevant Signatories will consult EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

QRE 30.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report, ex ante on plans to involve, and ex post on actions taken to involve, EDMO and the elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, including on the development of the framework of cooperation described in Measures 30.3 and 30.4.

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 31.1 and 31.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 31.1 and 31.2

31.1: Relevant Signatories that showcase User Generated Content (UGC) will integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use independent fact-checkers’ work in their platforms’ services, processes, and contents across all Member States and across formats relevant to the service. Relevant Signatories will collaborate with fact-checkers to that end, starting by conducting and documenting research and testing. 31.2: Relevant Signatories that integrate fact-checks in their products or processes will ensure they employ swift and efficient mechanisms such as labelling, information panels or policy enforcement to help increase the impact of fact-checks on audiences.

QRE 31.1.1 (for Measures 31.1 and 31.2)

Relevant Signatories will report on their specific activities and initiatives related to Measures 31.1 and 31.2, including the full results and methodology applied in testing solutions to that end.

SLI 31.1.1

Member State level reporting on use of fact-checks by service and the swift and efficient mechanisms in place to increase their impact, which may include (as depends on the service): number of fact-check articles published; reach of fact-check articles; number of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers.

Country	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:	Number of Articles written by third-party fact-checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:
Austria	22,762	4,858
Belgium	25,473	5,213
Bulgaria	9,350	2,754
Croatia	8,737	2,799
Cyprus	11,011	2,803
Czech Republic	13,270	3,611
Denmark	13,298	3,407
Estonia	3,408	1,395
Finland	11,332	3,227
France	62,427	8,541
Germany	95,585	11,682
Greece	18,316	4,378
Hungary	9,363	2,735
Ireland	17,697	4,474
Italy	71,244	9,739
Latvia	3,925	1,629
Lithuania	4,966	1,829
Luxembourg	4,265	1,677
Malta	3,890	1,506
Netherlands	34,844	6,296
Poland	22,764	5,180
Portugal	34,253	6,466
Romania	14,839	3,663
Slovakia	8,288	2,655
Slovenia	5,280	1,879
Spain	85,359	10,239
Sweden	24,163	5,059
Iceland	2,259	983
Liechtenstein	329	215
Norway	12,859	3,466
Total	655,556	124,358

SLI 31.1.2

An estimation, through meaningful metrics, of the impact of actions taken such as, for instance, the number of pieces of content labelled on the basis of fact-check articles, or the impact of said measures on user interactions with information fact-checked as false or misleading.

Country	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.
Austria	22,762	62.13%
Belgium	25,473	61.67%
Bulgaria	9,350	64.36%
Croatia	8,737	59.15%
Cyprus	11,011	61.02%
Czech Republic	13,270	55.71%
Denmark	13,298	60.53%
Estonia	3,408	57.76%
Finland	11,332	61.81%
France	62,427	61.47%
Germany	95,585	62.85%
Greece	18,316	68.09%
Hungary	9,363	58.62%
Ireland	2,259	85.11%
Italy	71,244	62.48%
Latvia	3,925	60.25%
Lithuania	4,966	57.58%
Luxembourg	4,265	60.24%
Malta	3,890	65.19%
Netherlands	34,844	61.27%
Poland	22,764	60.27%
Portugal	34,253	63.39%
Romania	14,839	60.92%
Slovakia	8,288	61.42%
Slovenia	5,280	59.85%
Spain	85,359	64.33%
Sweden	24,163	59.24%
Iceland	2,259	85.11%
Liechtenstein	329	75.00%
Norway	12,859	56.94%
Total	655,556

SLI 31.1.3

Signatories recognise the importance of providing context to SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2 in ways that empower researchers, fact-checkers, the Commission, ERGA, and the public to understand and assess the impact of the actions taken to comply with Commitment 31. To that end, relevant Signatories commit to include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise these SLIs. Relevant Signatories will present and discuss within the Permanent Task-force the type of baseline quantitative information they consider using for contextualisation ahead of their baseline reports.

Country

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 32.1 and 32.2 Measure 32.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 32.1 and 32.2

32.1: Relevant Signatories will provide fact-checkers with information to help them quantify the impact of fact-checked content over time, such as (depending on the service) actions taken on the basis of that content, impressions, clicks or interactions. 32.2: Relevant Signatories will provide fact-checkers with information to help them quantify the impact of fact-checked content over time, such as (depending on the service) actions taken on the basis of that content, impressions, clicks, or interactions.

QRE 32.1.1 (for Measures 32.1 and 32.2)

Relevant Signatories will provide details on the interfaces and other tools put in place to provide fact-checkers with the information referred to in Measure 31.1 and 31.2.

SLI 32.1.1 (for Measures 32.1 and 32.2)

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the use of the interfaces and other tools put in place to provide fact-checkers with the information referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 (such as monthly users for instance).

Country

Measure 32.3

Relevant Signatories will regularly exchange information between themselves and the fact-checking community, to strengthen their cooperation.

QRE 32.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the channels of communications and the exchanges conducted to strengthen their cooperation - including success of and satisfaction with the information, interface, and other tools referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 - and any conclusions drawn from such exchanges.

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 34.1

Signatories establish and maintain the common Transparency Centre website, which will be operational and available to the public within 6 months from the signature of this Code.

Measure 34.2

Signatories provide appropriate funding, for setting up and operating the Transparency Centre website, including its maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. Funding contribution should be commensurate with the nature of the Signatories' activity and shall be sufficient for the website's operations and maintenance and proportional to each Signatories' risk profile and economic capacity.

Measure 34.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to the Transparency Centre's information to the extent that the Code is applicable to their services.

Measure 34.4

Signatories will agree on the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre within the Task-force, to be recorded and reviewed within the Task-Force on an annual basis.

Measure 34.5

The Task-force will regularly discuss the Transparency Centre and assess whether adjustments or actions are necessary. Signatories commit to implement the actions and adjustments decided within the Task-force within a reasonable timeline.

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 35.1

Signatories will list in the Transparency Centre, per each Commitment and Measure that they subscribe to, the terms of service and policies that their service applies to implement these Commitments and Measures.

Measure 35.2

Signatories provide information on the implementation and enforcement of their policies per service, including geographical and language coverage.

Measure 35.3

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre contains a repository of their reports assessing the implementation of the Code's commitments.

Measure 35.4

In crisis situations, Signatories use the Transparency Centre to publish information regarding the specific mitigation actions taken related to the crisis.

Measure 35.5

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology, is user-friendly, and that the relevant information is easily searchable (including per Commitment and Measure). Users of the Transparency Centre will be able to easily track changes in Signatories' policies and actions.

Measure 35.6

The Transparency Centre will enable users to easily access and understand the Service Level Indicators and Qualitative Reporting Elements tied to each Commitment and Measure of the Code for each service, including Member State breakdowns, in a standardised and searchable way. The Transparency Centre should also enable users to easily access and understand Structural Indicators for each Signatory.

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 36.1 Measure 36.2 Measure 36.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 36.1

Signatories provide updates about relevant changes in policies and implementation actions in a timely manner, and in any event no later than 30 days after changes are announced or implemented.

Measure 36.2

Signatories will regularly update Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators, in parallel with the regular reporting foreseen by the monitoring framework. After the first reporting period, Relevant Signatories are encouraged to also update the Transparency Centre more regularly.

Measure 36.3

Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.

QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.

Country

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 37.1

Signatories will participate in the Task-force and contribute to its work. Signatories, in particular smaller or emerging services will contribute to the work of the Task-force proportionate to their resources, size and risk profile. Smaller or emerging services can also agree to pool their resources together and represent each other in the Task-force. The Task-force will meet in plenary sessions as necessary and at least every 6 months, and, where relevant, in subgroups dedicated to specific issues or workstreams.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Measure 37.3

The Task-force will agree on and define its operating rules, including on the involvement of third-party experts, which will be laid down in a Vademecum drafted by the European Commission in collaboration with the Signatories and agreed on by consensus between the members of the Task-force.

Measure 37.4

Signatories agree to set up subgroups dedicated to the specific issues related to the implementation and revision of the Code with the participation of the relevant Signatories.

Measure 37.5

When needed, and in any event at least once per year the Task-force organises meetings with relevant stakeholder groups and experts to inform them about the operation of the Code and gather their views related to important developments in the field of Disinformation.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

• Elections Working Group: The most active working group during the reporting period; focused on novel threats including AI-generated content and rapid response mechanisms. 
• Crisis Protocol Working Group: Focused on the Rapid Response System for crisis situations. The EC is developing a Code-specific crisis protocol; industry signatories are engaging on alignment with existing DSA obligations.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Maintained and enhanced dedicated cross-functional team structure to support CoCD implementation, including Meta’s Public Policy & Global Affairs team), Regional Regulatory Readiness team, and Global Response Operations team.
• Continued investment in teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development, all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation.
• Active and ongoing participation in EC CoCD Taskforce-related meetings and working groups, with current engagement focused on the Elections and the Rapid Response System (RRS) and Plenary meetings when convened by the EC to ensure alignment with Code requirements and adaptation of internal processes as needed.
• Maintained the Regulatory Information Response (RIR) process to proactively manage compliance deliverables and audit readiness across all signed-up commitments, including bi-annual Transparency Report production and submission within required deadlines. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

• Public Policy & Global Affairs Team: Alongside the Content Policy team responsible for maintaining Meta’s Misinformation Policy, and EMEA Integrity Legal, it serves as the primary liaison with the European Commission CoCD Taskforce. This team regularly participates in EC Taskforce meetings and working groups, ensuring Meta’s internal processes remain aligned with Code requirements.
• Regional Regulatory Readiness (RRR) Team: This team maintains a regulatory information response process to proactively produce regulatory reports, including the CoCD bi-annual Transparency Report submissions. The team also coordinates the effective implementation of the Rapid Alert System ahead of each EU national election, which operates under the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework, supporting Meta’s commitment to timely action on disinformation threats. The team is also responsible for coordinating the internal elections preparation work and ensures we have robust systems to respond to election specific risks, including misinformation and disinformation. RRR operates under a regional model, with dedicated Programme Managers organised regionally to deepen jurisdictional context and in-region expertise.
• Meta also maintains specialised teams who manage the relationship with third-party fact-checkers and the overall fact-checking programme in the EEA.

• Meta maintains teams with expertise across content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development, all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation in support of the Code.
• We have expert investigation teams to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats. 
• These teams are distributed globally and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners, including content reviewers located in the EU with specialist expertise in EU languages.

• A dedicated cross-functional team manages the day-to-day processes relating to the CoCD, including regulatory reporting, EC engagement, and coordination of compliance deliverables across all signed-up commitments.
• Meta's DSA Head of Compliance communicates and shares relevant information with the EC in relation to Meta Platforms Ireland Limited’s compliance with the DSA, which now includes the CoCD, engaging with the EC periodically and taking any necessary actions arising from those engagements.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 41.1 Measure 41.2 Measure 41.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 43

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

1. Community Standards and Guidelines Relevant to Elections 

1. Portugal (Presidential) election, Round 1: 18 January 2026; Round 2: 8 February 2026
2. Slovenia (Parliamentary) election, 22 March 2026
3. Denmark (Parliamentary) election, 24 March 2026 
4. Hungary (Parliamentary) election, 12 April 2026 
5. Bulgaria (Parliamentary) election, 19 April 2026
6. Cyprus (Parliamentary) election, 24 May 2026 
7. Malta (General) election, 30 May 2026 
   
   
8. Our Election Risk Management Processes
   
   

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 2 
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 2 
• Number of reports received during the election period: 47 
  
  

• VIU Reach: 4.9 million 
• EDR Reach: 3.9 million

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 3
• Number of reports received during the election period: 1
  
  

• VIU Reach: 539K 
• EDR Reach: 448K 

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
• Number of reports received during the election period: 0

• VIU Reach: 1.9 million
• EDR Reach: 1.5 million

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 3 
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 3
• Number of reports received during the election period: 148

• VIU Reach: 1.7 million 
• EDR Reach: 1.3 million 

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 2
• Number of reports received during the election period: 17

• VIU Reach: 1.3 million 
• EDR Reach: 1 million 

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 1 
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 1 
• Number of reports received during the election period: 34
  
  

• VIU Reach: 455.7K
• EDR Reach: 383.4K 

• Number of onboarded partners per market: 1 
• Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
• Number of reports received during the election period: 11 
  
  

• VIU Reach: 175.8K
• EDR Reach: 153.5K

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Crisis 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

• Helping to keep people in the region safe: we continue to provide user controls including Hidden Words, Limits, Comment Controls, Show More/Show Less and Sensitive
  Content Control to help people manage what they see and who can interact with them. 
• Enforcing our policies: We continue to enforce our community standards, not only on content shared from within the affected countries, but globally wherever the content may be shared 
• Reducing the spread of misinformation: we worked with our third-party fact-checking partners in the region and consulted outside experts. 
• Monitoring for adversarial networks: we continue to monitor for and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour targeting discourse about the conflict. 
  
  

• Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: since the beginning of the full-scale invasions we have introduced several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted.
• Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared.
• Reducing the spread of misinformation: We took steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and consulted with outside experts. 
• Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetising and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites.
• In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today (globally), Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others.
• We added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included additional accounts or subdomains of Russian media outlets of various NTV programmes, Rodina magazine, TV Centre, Radio Mayak, Radio Rossii, Vladimir Solovyov (vrsoloviev), Moskva 24, MTRK Mir network channels, TASS, Channel One, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Vzglyad.ru.

• We quickly established a dedicated crisis response staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. We explain how we deploy our Crisis Policy Protocol and manage crises in an infographic in our 2024 annual human rights report.
• We continue to enforce our policies around Dangerous Organisations and Individuals, Violent and Graphic Content, Hateful Conduct, Violence and Incitement, Bullying and Harassment, and Coordinating Harm. 

• We memorialise accounts when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

• We’re working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta’s third-party fact-checking network includes Arabic- and Hebrew-language coverage for Israel and Palestine through AFP and Reuters. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it. 
• We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we’ve made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
• We’re also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. 
• We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven’t originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

• Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
• Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don’t follow you, or who only recently followed you.
• Comment controls: You can control who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post-by-post basis. 
• Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. 
• Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed. 
• Sensitive Content Control: Instagram’s Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. 

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

Policy - 51.1.4

Policy - 51.1.7

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.2.1

Description of intervention - 51.2.2

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

Specific Action applied - 51.5.7

Description of intervention - 51.5.8

Specific Action applied - 51.5.10

Description of intervention - 51.5.11

Specific Action applied - 51.5.13

Description of intervention - 51.5.14

Specific Action applied - 51.5.16

Description of intervention - 51.5.17

Specific Action applied - 51.5.19

Description of intervention - 51.5.20

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

Specific Action applied - 51.6.4

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.7.1

Description of intervention - 51.7.2

Specific Action applied - 51.7.4

Description of intervention - 51.7.5

Specific Action applied - 51.7.7

Description of intervention - 51.7.8