Google

Report March 2026

Submitted

Your organisation description

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

In line with Code commitments and alongside other Signatories, Google helped maintain the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Transparency Centre, located at https://disinfocode.eu during the reporting period.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

In line with Code commitments, and alongside other Signatories, Google populated the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Transparency Centre with related relevant information during the reporting period.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 36.1 Measure 36.2 Measure 36.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

In line with Code commitments, Google uploaded its H1 2025 PDF report to the newly launched Transparency Centre in September 2025, and completed the final upload in October 2025 after site maintenance.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

In line with Code commitments, Google plans to upload reports and pertinent updates to the Transparency Centre located at https://disinfocode.eu.

Measure 36.3

Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.

QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

N/A

QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

N/A

SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.

During the period from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,676 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 11,362 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Google has continued to meaningfully engage in Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to participation in meetings, and providing feedback.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google has several teams across the company, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments made under this Code. This is core to Google’s mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful content. To enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google relies both on specially-trained experts and machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

In line with Code commitments in H2 2025 (1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025), Google provided its seventh report to the European Commission.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

In line with Code commitments in H2 2025 (1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025), Google provided its seventh report which included reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) to the European Commission.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 41.1 Measure 41.2 Measure 41.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

  • Google has been a participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators.
  • Google supported the publication of Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through its collaboration with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), Avaaz and the European Commission.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Google will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

As requested by the European Commission, Google provides an Annex on Elections to this report. During the reporting period, Google activated temporary Rapid Response Systems (RRSs) for elections in Czech Republic, Ireland, Moldova and the Netherlands at the EC’s request and also participated in discussions on the establishment of a permanent Elections RRS by the Task-force. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 43

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

N/A - It was agreed with the European Commission that this commitment is duplicative of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) requirements, and should therefore be deleted from the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation text. Google is taking steps to be subject to an audit under the DSA, for relevant services.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Overview
In elections and other democratic processes, people want access to high-quality information and a broad range of perspectives. High-quality information helps people make informed decisions when voting and counteracts abuse by bad actors. Consistent with its broader approach to elections around the world, during the various elections across the EU in the reporting period, Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training – with a strong focus on helping people navigate AI-generated content. 

Mitigations in place

Across Google, various teams support democratic processes by connecting people to election information like practical tips on how to register to vote or providing high-quality information about candidates. In 2025, a number of key elections took place around the world and across the EU in particular. During the reporting period, voters cast their votes in Moldova, Czech Republic, Portugal, Ireland and the Netherlands. Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. Across its efforts, Google also has an increased focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and the part it can play in the disinformation landscape — while also leveraging AI models to augment Google’s abuse-fighting efforts.
 
Safeguarding Google platforms and disrupting the spread of disinformation
To better secure its products and prevent abuse, Google continues to enhance its enforcement systems and to invest in Trust & Safety operations — including at its Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) for Content Responsibility in Dublin, dedicated to online safety in Europe and around the world. Google also continues to partner with the wider ecosystem to combat disinformation. 
  • Enforcing Google policies and using AI models to fight abuse at scale: Google has long-standing policies that inform how it approaches areas like manipulated media, hate and harassment, and incitement to violence — along with policies around demonstrably false claims that could undermine democratic processes, for example in YouTube’s Community Guidelines. To help enforce Google policies, Google’s AI models are enhancing its abuse-fighting efforts. With recent advances in Google’s Large Language Models (LLMs), Google is building faster and more adaptable enforcement systems that enable us to remain nimble and take action even more quickly when new threats emerge.
  • Working with the wider ecosystem: Since Google’s inaugural commitment of €25 million to help launch the European Media & Information Fund, an effort designed to strengthen media literacy and information quality across Europe, 121 projects have been funded across 28 countries so far.

Helping people navigate AI-generated content
Like any emerging technology, AI presents new opportunities as well as challenges. For example, generative AI makes it easier than ever to create new content, but it can also raise questions about trustworthiness of information. Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate content that was AI-generated. Overall, harmful altered or synthetic political content did not appear to be widespread on Google’s platforms. Measures that helped mitigate that risk include: 
  • Ads disclosures: Google expanded its Political Content Policies in November 2023 to require advertisers to disclose when their election ads include synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. Google’s ads policies already prohibit the use of manipulated media to mislead people, like deep fakes or doctored content. In September 2025, Google updated the Political Content Policies restricting political advertising in the European Union.
  • Content labels on YouTube: YouTube’s Misinformation Policies prohibit technically manipulated content that misleads users and could pose a serious risk of egregious harm — and YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created realistic altered or synthetic content, and will display a label that indicates for people when the content they are watching is synthetic. For sensitive content, including election related content, that contains realistic altered or synthetic material, the label appears on the video itself and in the video description.
  • Provide users with additional context: 'About This Image' in Search helps people assess the credibility and context of images found online. We continue looking at ways to integrate integrity signals more directly throughout the Search experience, with a view to enhancing user experience and providing users with the context needed to make informed decisions about the information they see online. For example, we are looking at embedding image provenance into Google Search features in order to enable users to check image provenance more seamlessly.
  • Industry collaboration: Google is a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) and standard, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content. 

Informing voters surfacing high-quality information
In the build-up to elections, people need useful, relevant and timely information to help them navigate the electoral process. Here are some of the ways Google makes it easy for people to find what they need, and which were deployed during elections that took place across the EU in 2025: 
  • High-quality Information on YouTube: For news and information related to elections, YouTube’s systems prominently surface high-quality content, on the YouTube homepage, in search results and the ‘Up Next’ panel. YouTube also displays information panels at the top of search results and below videos to provide additional context. For example, YouTube may surface various election information panels above search results or on videos related to election candidates, parties or voting.
  • Ongoing transparency on Election Ads: Starting September 2025, Google restricted political advertising in the European Union under new regulations. Since mid-August 2025, advertisers have been asked to declare if they intend to run political advertising. EU Election Ads previously shown in the Political Ads Transparency Report will remain publicly accessible in the Ads Transparency Centre, subject to retention policies.

Equipping campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training
As elections come with increased cybersecurity risks, Google works hard to help high-risk users, such as campaigns and election officials, civil society and news sources, improve their security in light of existing and emerging threats, and to educate them on how to use Google’s products and services. 
  • Security tools for campaign and election teams: Google offers free services like its Advanced Protection Program — Google’s strongest set of cyber protections — and Project Shield, which provides unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Google also partners with Possible, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Deutschland sicher im Netz (DSIN) to scale account security training and to provide security tools including Titan Security Keys, which defend against phishing attacks and prevent bad actors from accessing users’ Google Accounts.
  • Tackling coordinated influence operations: Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) helps identify, monitor and tackle emerging threats, ranging from coordinated influence operations to cyber espionage campaigns against high-risk entities. Google reports on actions taken in its quarterly bulletin, and meets regularly with government officials and others in the industry to share threat information and suspected election interference. Mandiant also helps organisations build holistic election security programs and harden their defences with comprehensive solutions, services and tools, including proactive exposure management, proactive intelligence threat hunts, cyber crisis communication services and threat intelligence tracking of information operations. A recent publication from the team gives an overview of the global election cybersecurity landscape, designed to help election organisations tackle a range of potential threats.

Google is committed to working with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union — building on its commitments made in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation. 

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

N/A

Rationale - 50.1.3

N/A

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.1

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world.

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.4

Google helped develop the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) to streamline the exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms. 

Description of intervention - 50.4.5

The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to ensure rapid and effective cooperation and communication between them ahead and during the election period.

The RRS allows non-platform Signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies. The RRS also provides an opportunity for platform Signatories to provide feedback - such as on broader trends - to the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force Working Group with Member State authorities, independent experts and civil society organisations.

Indication of impact - 50.4.6

See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.7

In an effort to equip election campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training, Google’s Project Shield provides free and unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks - a method of censorship and intimidation. 

Description of intervention - 50.4.8

Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks. 

Indication of impact - 50.4.9

N/A

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.1

Leading up to and during key elections in the EU, Google Search deployed election features to help users prepare for elections and access high-quality election information.

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

In advance of the 2025 elections in the EU, Google launched features to help users prepare for the elections and access high-quality election information. In Ireland, the Czech Republic and Netherlands, for example, we launched Search Homepage Promotions to help users easily find and access election commission websites.

Indication of impact - 50.5.3

No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.4

Google partnered with ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank, to empower young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. 

Description of intervention - 50.5.5

With the voting age lowered to 16+ in some European countries, more young people can participate in the democratic process. To support them, Google.org has awarded a $1 million grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank looking for innovative solutions to fight election disinformation and reduce barriers to voting using tech. The grant funded youth-led hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to focus on information quality and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018.

ThinkYoung launched a call for applications for a chance to test and develop solutions alongside its partners and experts. This initiative has paid out €300,000 in cash and prizes to the winning teams.

Indication of impact - 50.5.6

In October 2025, with Google’s support, the grand winner was awarded €200,000 at The Grand Final in Brussels, and another two winners were each awarded €30,000.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.7

N/A

Description of intervention - 50.5.8

N/A

Indication of impact - 50.5.9

N/A

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.6.1

As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact. 

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the EU elections in 2025.

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts. 

Specific Action applied - 50.6.4

Google regularly undertakes stakeholder engagement to discuss Google’s election preparedness. 

Description of intervention - 50.6.5

Google’s consultations with civil society organisations, academics and other relevant subject matter experts serve to both inform and share its resources and technologies. Since its launch, the Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) Dublin has held hundreds of public and private engagements, to share Google’s experience of managing content risk and hear from experts across a wide range of topics related to election integrity. Google also offered training to political parties on how to efficiently use Google platforms ahead of elections and secured direct communication channels with all these parties and key candidates.

Indication of impact - 50.6.6

Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

Crisis 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

War in Ukraine

Overview
In response to the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has continued through 2025, Google remains committed to help by providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, and providing high-quality information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during this conflict:

  1. Continued online services manipulation and coordinated influence operations;
  2. Advertising and monetisation linked to state-backed Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
  3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.


Israel-Gaza conflict
Overview
Following the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google has actively worked to support humanitarian and relief efforts, ensure platforms and partnerships are responsive to the current crisis, and counter the threat of disinformation. Google identified a few areas of focus for addressing the ongoing crisis:

  • Humanitarian and relief efforts;
  • Platforms and partnerships to protect our services from coordinated influence operations, hate speech, and graphic and terrorist content.

Mitigations in place

War in Ukraine

The following sections summarise Google’s main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the war in Ukraine.

1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations
Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is helping Ukraine by monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors. 

2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation
During the reporting period, Google continued to pause the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia via Google demand and third-party bidding, ads on Google’s properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Google paused ads containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager in August 2024. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure
Google expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google’s free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the war in Ukraine broke out. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats. 

GTIG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the war, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. GTIG’s findings have shown that government-backed actors from Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, nonprofit organisations, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the war as a lure for malicious campaigns. 

Future measures
Google aims to continue the following approach when responding to future crisis situations: 
  • Elevate access to high-quality information across Google services;
  • Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
  • Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
  • Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.


Israel-Gaza conflict
Humanitarian and relief efforts
Google.org has provided more than $18 million to nonprofits providing relief to civilians affected in Israel and Gaza. This includes more than $11 million raised globally by Google employees with company match and $1 million in donated Search Ads to nonprofits so they can better connect with people in need and provide information to those looking to help. We also provided $6 million in Google.org grant funding, including $3 million provided to Natal, an apolitical nonprofit organisation focused on psychological treatment of victims of trauma. The remaining funds were provided to organisations focussed on humanitarian aid and relief in Gaza, including $1 million to Save the Children, $1 million to Palestinian Red Crescent, $1 million to International Medical Corps.

Specifically, Google’s humanitarian and relief efforts with these organisations include: 
  • Natal- Israel Trauma and Resiliency Centre: In the early days of the war, calls to Natal’s support hotline went from around 300 a day to 8,000 a day. With our funding, they were able to scale their support to patients by 450%, including multidisciplinary treatment and mental & psychosocial support to direct and indirect victims of trauma due to terror and war in Israel. 
  • [See two-year detailed report] After more than two years and thanks to Google’s support, International Medical Corps continues to deliver lifesaving health and humanitarian services across Gaza. In addition to the two field hospitals they have been operating in Dier al Balah and Al Zawaida, they announced that they opened a third field hospital in Gaza City in November 2025, significantly expanding access to critical care for civilians in the north. As of late Jan 2026, International Medical Corps has: 
    • Provided 533,119 outpatient consultations;
    • Performed more than 19,771 surgeries;
    • Supported 9,238 deliveries, including 1,930 caesarean sections;
    • Screened 154,473 children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women for malnutrition; and much more. 


Platforms and partnerships
As the conflict continues, Google is committed to tackling disinformation, hate speech, graphic content and terrorist content by continuing to find ways to provide support through its products. For example, Google has deployed language capabilities to support emergency efforts including emergency translations, and localising Google content to help users, businesses and nonprofit organisations. Google has also pledged to help its partners in these extraordinary circumstances. For example, when schools closed in October 2023, the Ministry of Education in Israel used Meet as their core teach-from-home platform and Google provided support. Google has been in touch with Gaza-based partners and participants in its Palestine Launchpad program, its digital skills and entrepreneurship program for Palestinians, to try to support those who have been significantly impacted by this crisis.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

War in Ukraine: N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

War in Ukraine: N/A

Rationale - 51.1.3

War in Ukraine: N/A

Policy - 51.1.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Rationale - 51.1.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

War in Ukraine: Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative — including compromise assessments, incident response services, shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

War in Ukraine: N/A

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

War in Ukraine: Announced a new Online Safety and Security Partnership with the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) to provide free security training and tools to high-risk users. Google’s new partnership with IFES combines Google’s account security tools, like the Advanced Protection Program (APP), and IFES’s history in supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections management bodies.

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

War in Ukraine: IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across the world, including: 
  • Security training: In collaboration with Google's Safety Engineering Centre, IFES will expand its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices and create content for specialised audiences. 
  • Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries: Google’s tools and resources for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES’s international networks, helping more people use things like Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google’s strongest form of account security for high-risk users, Google Titan Security Keys, Project Shield, a free tool to help protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more.
  • Industry thought leadership and case studies: IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES’s partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) to help IFES further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process.

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.7

War in Ukraine: Expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google’s free protection against DDoS attack, so that Ukrainian government websites, embassies worldwide and other governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves and continue to offer their crucial services.

Description of intervention - 51.4.8

War in Ukraine: Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.

Indication of impact - 51.4.9

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.10

War in Ukraine: Added websites and domains identified as threats to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.

Description of intervention - 51.4.11

War in Ukraine: Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine. Google sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.

Indication of impact - 51.4.12

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.13

War in Ukraine: Automatically increased Google account security protections (including more frequent authentication challenges) for people in Ukraine and the surrounding region.

Description of intervention - 51.4.14

War in Ukraine: Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection Program — which delivers Google’s highest level of security — is currently protecting the accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine.

Indication of impact - 51.4.15

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.16

War in Ukraine: Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the war in Ukraine. GTIG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.

Description of intervention - 51.4.17

War in Ukraine: Throughout 2025, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. 

For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.

Indication of impact - 51.4.18

War in Ukraine: Please refer to the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.19

Israel-Gaza conflict: Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. GTIG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.

Description of intervention - 51.4.20

Israel-Gaza conflict: Throughout 2025, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. For example, in November 2025, GTIG identified a campaign that was sharing content in English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian about various topics including the Israel-Gaza conflict.

For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.

Indication of impact - 51.4.21

Israel-Gaza conflict: Please refer to the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

War in Ukraine: Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

War in Ukraine: Access to high-quality information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google worked closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.

Indication of impact - 51.5.3

War in Ukraine: No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Indication of impact - 51.5.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

War in Ukraine: Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact. 

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

War in Ukraine: See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

War in Ukraine: See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.4

War in Ukraine: Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate the intensified cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine. LetsData is one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program. 

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

War in Ukraine: The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation. Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate this challenge. LetsData offers AI radar against disinformation. It provides real-time media and social media monitoring in more than 50 countries, empowering state agencies, businesses and civil societies to proactively navigate risks and seize opportunities in the face of disinformation.

Since launching, their AI-powered solution has experienced rapid growth, establishing operations in the U.S. while continuing to anchor their technology and product development in Europe.

Now, they are one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program. This group of startups, from nine countries across Europe and North America, will get access to Google’s tools, partners and practices to help them continue to scale — and ultimately make the world a safer place.

Indication of impact - 51.6.6

War in Ukraine: See Commitment 28 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.7

War in Ukraine: In June 2025, Google announced the final recipients of the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, a $10 million fund providing additional equity-free cash awards along with Google support, mentorship and product expertise to Ukrainian-founded tech companies.

Description of intervention - 51.6.8

War in Ukraine: In March 2022, Google launched the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, which began with an initial $5 million in 2022 and expanded with a new $10 million fund for 2024. This fund provides crucial equity-free cash awards and dedicated Google support to help founders sustain and grow their businesses, strengthen their community and lay a vital foundation for post-war economic recovery. 

In June 2025, Google announced the final 35 recipients of the program. These 35 ambitious companies are making incredible technological advancements in critical areas from medical research to AI. Each selected startup receives up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $350,000 in Google Cloud credits. Google’s goal is to provide them with unique expertise, connections and resources to adapt and expand despite the ongoing war. We’re confident these entrepreneurs and all the others supported by this fund will drive their country's economic recovery and lead the next generation of global tech leaders.

Indication of impact - 51.6.9

War in Ukraine: In November 2025, Google announced that the fund had successfully supported 156 startups in total since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Combined, these companies raised over $60 million in follow-on funding, grew their revenues by approximately 100%, and created over 500 new jobs.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.10

Israel-Gaza conflict: As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact. 

Description of intervention - 51.6.11

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza. 

Indication of impact - 51.6.12

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.