Report March 2026

Submitted

Your organisation description

Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.3 Measure 1.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We are in the process of expanding advertiser delivery reports to more Facebook ad placements.
We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.

Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

Facebook

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details].

These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.

Measure 1.5

Relevant Signatories involved in the reporting of monetisation activities inclusive of media platforms, ad networks, and ad verification companies will take the necessary steps to give industry-recognised relevant independent third-party auditors commercially appropriate and fair access to their services and data in order to: - First, confirm the accuracy of first party reporting relative to monetisation and Disinformation, seeking alignment with regular audits performed under the DSA. - Second, accreditation services should assess the effectiveness of media platforms' policy enforcement, including Disinformation policies.

Facebook

QRE 1.5.1

Signatories that produce first party reporting will report on the access provided to independent third-party auditors as outlined in Measure 1.5 and will link to public reports and results from such auditors, such as MRC Content Level Brand Safety Accreditation, TAG Brand Safety certifications, or other similarly recognised industry accepted certifications.

The Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG) audits Meta as part of its Certified Against Fraud and Brand Safety Certified accreditations. This audit supports the documentation of Meta’s Content Monetization Policy and Advertising Standards Policy which both prohibit the monetization and advertisement of misinformation.

QRE 1.5.2

Signatories that conduct independent accreditation via audits will disclose areas of their accreditation that have been updated to reflect needs in Measure 1.5.

While Meta is not seeking further first-party Media Rating Council (MRC) accreditation, we remain committed to supporting the auditing efforts of our third party partners.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.2 Measure 2.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

Facebook

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of service, our Community Standards and our Advertising Standards.

Meta’s Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Misinformation Community Standard or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers.

See more here.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Country	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Austria	Over 7,000	Over 350,000
Belgium	Over 15,000	Over 200,000
Bulgaria	Over 4,600	Over 1,500,000
Croatia	Over 2,300	Over 580,000
Cyprus	Over 4,800	Over 250,000
Czech Republic	Over 10,000	Over 96,000
Denmark	Over 4,800	Over 180,000
Estonia	Over 2,700	Over 700
Finland	Over 3,200	Over 660,000
France	Over 17,000	Over 460,000
Germany	Over 23,000	Over 21,000
Greece	Over 5,000	Over 100,000
Hungary	Over 30,000	Over 220,000
Ireland	Over 3,900	Over 1,100,000
Italy	Over 25,000	Over 210,000
Latvia	Over 2,200	Over 480,000
Lithuania	Over 3,200	Over 340,000
Luxembourg	Over 680	Over 89,000
Malta	Over 870	Over 100,000
Netherlands	Over 7,500	Over 640,000
Poland	Over 15,000	Over 350,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 46,000
Romania	Over 28,000	Over 150,000
Slovakia	Over 7,600	Over 230,000
Slovenia	Over 980	Over 440,000
Spain	Over 9,900	Over 730,000
Sweden	Over 8,700	Over 1,000,000
Iceland	Over 4,800	Over 350,000
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Over 44,000
Norway	Over 3,200	Over 96,000
Total	Over 250,000	Over 11,000,000

Measure 2.2

Relevant Signatories will develop tools, methods, or partnerships, which may include reference to independent information sources both public and proprietary (for instance partnerships with fact-checking or source rating organisations, or services providing indicators of trustworthiness, or proprietary methods developed internally) to identify content and sources as distributing harmful Disinformation, to identify and take action on ads and promoted content that violate advertising policies regarding Disinformation mentioned in Measure 2.1.

Facebook

QRE 2.2.1

Signatories will describe the tools, methods, or partnerships they use to identify content and sources that contravene policies mentioned in Measure 2.1 - while being mindful of not disclosing information that'd make it easier for malicious actors to circumvent these tools, methods, or partnerships. Signatories will specify the independent information sources involved in these tools, methods, or partnerships.

Meta’s Advertising Standards, prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Misinformation Community Standard or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta technologies. See our Advertising Standards for more information.

To identify ads and promoted content that may contravene policies and assess whether or not they are in fact violating before taking enforcement action, Meta uses the following tools, methods, and partnerships:

- Automated tools and human review: Meta proactively reviews all advertisements before publication, implementing an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. This process uses automated detection systems combined with human review to identify policy-violating ads. The review covers ad components (images, video, text, targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations.

- Fact-checker review: In the EU, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations (3PFCs) certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). 3PFCs assess the accuracy of content and rate it as False, Partly False, Altered, or Missing Context. Any ad containing content rated as such by these fact-checkers is prohibited and advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may face restrictions on their ability to advertise, including reduced reach or loss of monetisation.

- Influence Operations Research Archive: Meta shares information with qualified external researchers to enable research on influence operations. Data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy is made available through the IO Research Archive, housed in the Meta Content Library.

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

Facebook

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

Meta's ad review system is designed to ensure that ads on Facebook and
Instagram comply with our Advertising Standards, Community Standards, and other Meta policies. The system operates through the following procedures:

- Proactive and Reactive Review: All advertisements are proactively reviewed before publication, with an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. During this process, automated tools evaluate the ad's content — including images, text, titles, and landing pages — against our policies. We also monitor and investigate advertiser behaviour, reviewing Business Accounts and their assets (ad
accounts, Pages, and user accounts) for policy violations. Once an ad is live, it continues to be monitored and may be rejected for policy violations at any point.

- Fact-checker review: Any ad containing content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by independent third-party fact-checkers is prohibited. Where fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, Meta uses technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook and Instagram. If ads are found to be identical or near-identical to content that fact-checkers have rated, they are rejected.

SLI 2.3.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the ads removed or prohibited from their services using procedures outlined in Measure 2.3. In the event of ads successfully removed, parties should report on the reach of violatory content and advertising.

1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Country	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Austria	Over 7,000	Over 350,000
Belgium	Over 15,000	Over 200,000
Bulgaria	Over 4,600	Over 1,500,000
Croatia	Over 2,300	Over 580,000
Cyprus	Over 4,800	Over 250,000
Czech Republic	Over 10,000	Over 96,000
Denmark	Over 4,800	Over 180,000
Estonia	Over 2,700	Over 700
Finland	Over 3,200	Over 660,000
France	Over 17,000	Over 460,000
Germany	Over 23,000	Over 21,000
Greece	Over 5,000	Over 100,000
Hungary	Over 30,000	Over 220,000
Ireland	Over 3,900	Over 1,100,000
Italy	Over 25,000	Over 210,000
Latvia	Over 2,200	Over 480,000
Lithuania	Over 3,200	Over 340,000
Luxembourg	Over 680	Over 89,000
Malta	Over 870	Over 100,000
Netherlands	Over 7,500	Over 640,000
Poland	Over 15,000	Over 350,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 46,000
Romania	Over 28,000	Over 150,000
Slovakia	Over 7,600	Over 230,000
Slovenia	Over 980	Over 440,000
Spain	Over 9,900	Over 730,000
Sweden	Over 8,700	Over 1,000,000
Iceland	Over 4,800	Over 350,000
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Over 44,000
Norway	Over 3,200	Over 96,000
Total	Over 250,000	Over 11,000,000

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 3.1 Measure 3.2 Measure 3.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 3.1

Relevant Signatories will cooperate with platforms, advertising supply chain players, source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checking organisations, advertisers and any other actors active in the online monetisation value chain, to facilitate the integration and flow of information, in particular information relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation, in full respect of all relevant data protection rules and confidentiality agreements.

Facebook

QRE 3.1.1

Signatories will outline how they work with others across industry and civil society to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation.

Meta actively cooperates with partners to facilitate the integration and fl ow of information relevant to tackling harmful disinformation, via modes such as:

Cooperation across industry and civil society: Meta works collaboratively across the broader information and monetization ecosystem to enable signal-sharing and partnerships that help identify and disrupt sources of harmful misinformation and disinformation.

3PFC/EFCSN: In the EU, Meta integrates independent assessments of content quality through its cooperation with third party fact‑checkers (3PFC) certified under the European Fact‑Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to address misinformation on Facebook and Instagram. Fact-checkers will review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.

Trusted Partners: In effort to remove misinformation or unverifiable rumours that contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm or violence, Meta works with Trusted Partners with experience in social media monitoring, an interest in learning about our Content Policies, and a commitment to keeping online communities safe.

Global security research community support: Meta shares threat indicators related to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) networks in our dedicated GitHub repository.

EC: Meta collaborates with representatives of the European Commission (EC) as requested, to share disinformation threats. For example, we recently met with a working group, called the ‘European Council’s Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats’, which recommends actions in response to shared disinformation threats, to discuss our work against CIB networks.

Measure 3.2

Relevant Signatories will exchange among themselves information on Disinformation trends and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), via the Code Task-force, GARM, IAB Europe, or other relevant fora. This will include sharing insights on new techniques or threats observed by Relevant Signatories, discussing case studies, and other means of improving capabilities and steps to help remove Disinformation across the advertising supply chain - potentially including real-time technical capabilities.

Facebook

QRE 3.2.1

Signatories will report on their discussions within fora mentioned in Measure 3.2, being mindful of not disclosing information that is confidential and/or that may be used by malicious actors to circumvent the defences set by Signatories and others across the advertising supply chain. This could include, for instance, information about the fora Signatories engaged in; about the kinds of information they shared; and about the learnings they derived from these exchanges.

Meta shares information on disinformation trends and TTPs with other CoCD Signatories and relevant fora via the CoCD Task-force.

IO/CIB Bilateral Information Sharing with Industry Peers: Meta exchanges relevant information about influence operations, including foreign interference, with selected industry peers through established partnerships. Meta ensures that threat intelligence and technical indicators are shared through secure channels and legal agreements with the partners.

Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive is a secure repository established and operated by Meta’s Security Policy and Data Sharing Insights and Platform team. Its goal is to provide qualified external researchers with access to previously public content and data from networks that have been disrupted under Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy.

CIB refers to networks managed by adversarial threat actors who engage in sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior, where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. Meta has publicly reported on adversarial threats since 2017.

Ongoing Evaluation: Meta is evaluating further partnership opportunities and will provide updates as new collaborations are formalized.

Measure 3.3

Relevant Signatories will integrate the work of or collaborate with relevant third-party organisations, such as independent source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or open-source investigators, in order to reduce monetisation of Disinformation and avoid the dissemination of advertising containing Disinformation.

Facebook

QRE 3.3.1

Signatories will report on the collaborations and integrations relevant to their work with organisations mentioned.

Meta is working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.

Meta collaborates with third parties creating a bidirectional flow of information and actions that help tackle purveyors of harmful disinformation. These collaborations support earlier detection, faster mitigation, and helps prevent the dissemination of advertising containing misinformation or disinformation. In line with Meta’s Advertising Standards, ads must not contain content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by third-party fact-checkers or otherwise violate Meta’s Community Standards. When such content is identified and flagged, Meta rejects these ads, thereby reducing the monetization of disinformation.

Additionally, Meta shares information with qualified external researchers which enables them to conduct research on influence operations. The information is shared through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy. The IO Research Archive is housed in the Meta Content Library (MCL).

Political Advertising

Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 6.1 Measure 6.2 Measure 6.3 Measure 6.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 6.1

Relevant Signatories will develop a set of common best practices and examples for marks and labels on political or issue ads and integrate those learnings as relevant to their services.

Facebook

QRE 6.1.1

Relevant Signatories will publicise the best practices and examples developed as part of Measure 2.2.1 and describe how they relate to their relevant services.

Measure 6.2

Relevant Signatories will ensure that relevant information, such as the identity of the sponsor, is included in the label attached to the ad or is otherwise easily accessible to the user from the label.

Facebook

QRE 6.2.1

Relevant Signatories will publish examples of how sponsor identities and other relevant information are attached to ads or otherwise made easily accessible to users from the label.

QRE 6.2.2

Relevant Signatories will publish their labelling designs.

Examples of political ad labeling may be found in the Ad Library. The Ad Library is Meta’s most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.

SLI 6.2.1

Relevant Signatories will publish meaningful metrics, at Member State level, on the volume of ads labelled according to Measure 6.2, such as the number of ads accepted and labelled, amounts spent by labelled advertisers, or other metrics to be determined in discussion within the Task-force with the aim to assess the efficiency of this labelling.

Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying “paid for by” disclaimers from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.
Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.

Country	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined
Austria	Over 15,000
Belgium	Over 66,000
Bulgaria	Over 2,200
Croatia	Over 10,000
Cyprus	Over 2,000
Czech Republic	Over 24,000
Denmark	Over 22,000
Estonia	Over 5,600
Finland	Over 5,800
France	Over 17,000
Germany	Over 47,000
Greece	Over 13,000
Hungary	Over 47,000
Ireland	Over 6,700
Italy	Over 42,000
Latvia	Over 3,000
Lithuania	Over 3,200
Luxembourg	Over 460
Malta	Over 1,300
Netherlands	Over 350,000
Poland	Over 21,000
Portugal	Over 14,000
Romania	Over 10,000
Slovakia	Over 19,000
Slovenia	Over 1,600
Spain	Over 13,000
Sweden	Over 17,000
Iceland	Over 870
Liechtenstein	Less than 100
Norway	Over 20,000
Total	Over 810,000

Measure 6.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and participate in research to improve users's identification and comprehension of labels, discuss the findings of said research with the Task-force, and will endeavour to integrate the results of such research into their services where relevant.

Facebook

QRE 6.3.1

Relevant Signatories will publish relevant research into understanding how users identify and comprehend labels on political or issue ads and report on the steps they have taken to ensure that users are consistently able to do so and to improve the labels' potential to attract users' awareness.

Measure 6.4

Relevant Signatories will ensure that once a political or issue ad is labelled as such on their platform, the label remains in place when users share that same ad on the same platform, so that they continue to be clearly identified as paid-for political or issue content.

Facebook

QRE 6.4.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the steps they put in place to ensure that labels remain in place when users share ads.

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 7.1 Measure 7.2 Measure 7.3 Measure 7.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 7.1

Relevant Signatories will make sure the sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors purchasing political or issue ads have provided the relevant information regarding their identity to verify (and re-verify where appropriate) said identity or the sponsors they are acting on behalf of before allowing placement of such ads.

Facebook

QRE 7.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to collect and verify the information outlined in Measure 7.1.1, including information on the timeliness and proportionality of said tools and processes.

SLI 7.1.1

Relevant Signatories will publish meaningful metrics on the volume of ads rejected for failure to fulfil the relevant verification processes, comparable to metrics for SLI 6.2.1, where relevant per service and at Member State level.

Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.

Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.

Country	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.
Austria	Over 290,000
Belgium	Over 260,000
Bulgaria	Over 63,000
Croatia	Over 79,000
Cyprus	Over 44,000
Czech Republic	Over 220,000
Denmark	Over 230,000
Estonia	Over 42,000
Finland	Over 160,000
France	Over 260,000
Germany	Over 770,000
Greece	Over 190,000
Hungary	Over 480,000
Ireland	Over 68,000
Italy	Over 800,000
Latvia	Over 32,000
Lithuania	Over 47,000
Luxembourg	Over 15,000
Malta	Over 25,000
Netherlands	Over 270,000
Poland	Over 340,000
Portugal	Over 72,000
Romania	Over 370,000
Slovakia	Over 180,000
Slovenia	Over 33,000
Spain	Over 260,000
Sweden	Over 330,000
Iceland	Over 1,800
Liechtenstein	Over 330
Norway	Over 12,000
Total	Over 6,000,000

Measure 7.2

Relevant Signatories will complete verifications processes described in Commitment 7 in a timely and proportionate manner.

Facebook

QRE 7.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the actions taken against actors demonstrably evading the said tools and processes, including any relevant policy updates.

As mentioned in our Advertising standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions.

As announced in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU’s Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

QRE 7.2.2

Relevant Signatories will provide information on the timeliness and proportionality of the verification process.

Details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our Business Help Centre.

An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page using a valid disclaimer to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.

Measure 7.3

Relevant Signatories will take appropriate action, such as suspensions or other account-level penalties, against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements via on-platform tactics. Relevant Signatories will develop - or provide via existing tools - functionalities that allow users to flag ads that are not labelled as political.

Facebook

QRE 7.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to request a declaration on whether the advertising service requested constitutes political or issue advertising.

All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our Advertising Standards. In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a “Paid for by” disclaimer, we disapprove it.

The Community Standards prohibit ads that promote voter interference.

We require advertisers to know how we define social issues and review text examples. Ads where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.

All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook, which relies primarily on automated review (artificial intelligence) to check ads against our Advertising Policies. Ad review can take up to 72 hours to determine if an ad falls under our ads about social issues, elections or politics policy or if the ad is primarily focused on selling a product or promoting a service.

Advertisers can request another review if they believe the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service and doesn't require a disclaimer. Upon review, if we determine the ads aren't in scope of our social issues, elections, or politics policy, then the ad will be permitted to run without a disclaimer. However, if ads are determined to fall under this policy, advertisers won't be able to run these ads unless they include a disclaimer on them.

In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a “Paid for by” disclaimer, we disapprove it.

Facebook’s Community Standards prohibit ads that promote voter interference:

- Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences

- Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials’ activity using militaristic language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power.

QRE 7.3.2

Relevant Signatories will report on policies in place against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements on-platform.

Our Advertising Standards make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.

Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.

Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads without being authorized will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers’ ability to advertise.

Measure 7.4

Relevant Signatories commit to request that sponsors, and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors, declare whether the advertising service they request constitutes political or issue advertising.

Facebook

QRE 7.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report on research and publish data on the effectiveness of measures they take to verify the identity of political or issue ad sponsors.

Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.

Commitment 8

Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 8.1 Measure 8.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 8.1

Relevant Signatories will agree on the common minimum transparency obligations, seeking alignment with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, such as identification of the sponsor, display period, ad spend, and aggregate information on recipients of the ad.

Facebook

Measure 8.2

Relevant Signatories will provide a direct link from the ad to the ad repository.

Facebook

QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Commitment 9

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 9.1 Measure 9.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 9.1

Relevant Signatories will, seeking alignment with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, provide a simple means for users to access information about why they are seeing a particular political or issue ad.

Facebook

Measure 9.2

Relevant Signatories will explain in simple, plain language, the rationale and the tools used by the sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors (for instance: demographic, geographic, contextual, interest or behaviourally-based) to determine that a political or issue ad is displayed specifically to the user.

Facebook

QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)

Meta’s Why am I seeing this ad?” feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.

Further:

- To better match people’s evolving expectations of how advertisers may reach them on our platform, we removed Detailed Targeting options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation.

- Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the “Paid for by” political disclaimer on them. We also allow Facebook users to see how we decide which ads to show and how users can adjust their preferences to determine the ads users are shown.

- Our FAQs section in the Ad Library also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.

Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 10.1 Measure 10.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 10.1

Relevant Signatories will set up and maintain dedicated searchable ad repositories containing accurate records (in as close to real time as possible, in particular during election periods) of all political and issue ads served, including the ads themselves. This should be accompanied by relevant information for each ad such as the identification of the sponsor; the dates the ad ran for; the total amount spent on the ad; the number of impressions delivered; the audience criteria used to determine recipients; the demographics and number of recipients who saw the ad; and the geographical areas the ad was seen in.

Facebook

Measure 10.2

The information in such ad repositories will be publicly available for at least 5 years.

Facebook

QRE 10.2.1 (for Measures 10.1 and 10.2)

Relevant Signatories will detail the availability, features, and updating cadence of their repositories to comply with Measures 10.1 and 10.2. Relevant Signatories will also provide quantitative information on the usage of the repositories, such as monthly usage.

As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We currently store these ads in the library for 7 years.

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 11.1 Measure 11.2 Measure 11.3 Measure 11.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Meta's Ad Library application programming interface (“API”) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 11.1

Relevant Signatories' APIs or other interfaces will provide a set of minimum functionalities and search criteria that enable users and researchers to perform customised searches for data in as close to real time as possible (in particular during elections) in standard formats, including for instance searches per advertiser or candidate, per geographic area or country, per language, per keyword, per election, or per other targeting criteria, to allow for research and monitoring.

Facebook

QRE 11.1.1 (for Measures 11.1-11.4)

Details extracted from JSON files.

The Ad Library API provides access data about ads about social
issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include:

- Ad creatives
- Ad performance data including total amount spent (range)
- Total impressions an ad received (range)
- Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%)
- Dates the ad ran

The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete these steps to access the API.

Anyone can explore the ad library, with or without a Facebook account. However, reporting ads and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.

Measure 11.2

The data Relevant Signatories make available via such APIs and other interfaces will be equivalent to or more detailed than that data made available through their ad repositories.

Facebook

Measure 11.3

Relevant Signatories will ensure wide access to and availability of APIs and other interfaces.

Facebook

Measure 11.4

Relevant Signatories will engage with researchers and update the functionalities of the APIs and other interfaces to meet researchers' reasonable needs where applicable.

Facebook

QRE 11.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report about their engagement with researchers, including to understand their experience with the functionalities of APIs, and the resulting improvements of the functionalities as the result of this engagement and of a discussion within the Task-force.

Meta engages with researchers to understand their experience with the functionalities of its ads transparency and research tools — including the Ad Library API and related datasets — through several channels:

Research Partnerships Team: Meta maintains a dedicated team that serves as the primary point of contact for qualified academic researchers, supporting partner onboarding, data access setup, and product training. The team provides Office Hours for live technical support and promotes product updates through newsletters and educational materials. Through these activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs.

Stakeholder Engagement: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research. On June 26, 2025, Meta hosted a data dialogue in Berlin to gather feedback on Meta's research tools and discuss barriers encountered. Meta further engaged with researchers during the DSA Access Days conference in September 2025, where researcher experiences with platform access were discussed. No reports of adversarial actions against researchers were identified during these engagements.

Expanded Data Access: As of December 2025, targeting information for over 49 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads has been made available globally to academic researchers — an expansion informed by researcher demand for more comprehensive geographic coverage.

Task-force Collaboration: Dependent on the Task-force priorities during each period, Meta works with the Task-force on essential tasks including considering research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments.

Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 13.1 Measure 13.2 Measure 13.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 13.1

Relevant Signatories agree to work individually and together through the Task-force to identify novel and evolving disinformation risks in the uses of political or issue advertising and discuss options for addressing those risks.

Facebook

QRE 13.1.1 (for Measures 13.1-13.3)

Through the Task-force, the Relevant Signatories will convene, at least annually, an appropriately resourced discussion around novel risks in political advertising to develop coordinated policy.

As announced in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU’s Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Task-force, participating in weekly Task-force plenary sessions and working groups where applicable SIEP-related topics are discussed as applicable.

Measure 13.2

Facebook

Measure 13.3

Facebook

Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. Our approach to Inauthentic Behavior, and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behavior- and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech).

Fake accounts: In order to maintain a safe environment, we restrict or remove fake accounts that violate our Terms of Service. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We prioritize enforcement against fake accounts that seek to cause harm. Many of these accounts are used in spam campaigns and are financially motivated. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 692M accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q3 2025 and 1.1B fake accounts in Q4 2025 on Facebook globally.

Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to investigate and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that attempt to deceive Meta or our community or to evade enforcement under the Community Standards. In 2025. We updated our inauthentic behavior policy to simplify and refi ne our policy language and to help uninvolved authentic communities, Pages and Groups that are targeted, managed, or co-opted by CIB operations to remain on our services. . We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.

In July 2024, we stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.

We also continue to update our inauthentic behavior policy to improve our ability to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms - whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.

Cybersecurity:

We know that bad actors often target people’s accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures.

We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people’s accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. As a result, we’ve helped eight times more people a day on average get back into their Facebook account than last year when they didn’t have access to their listed contact points. We’re also running global in-app prompts across Facebook reminding people to confirm their contact points.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 14.1

Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.

Facebook

QRE 14.1.1

Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.

Depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:

Inauthentic Behaviour - Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts.

CIB Policy - Our policy on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as “particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior where inauthentic accounts are central to the operation,” the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.

CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on fake accounts. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behavior policies, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.

We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviors, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviors. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defenses.

CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments); (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers; (4) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, and domains; (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (6) account hijacking or impersonation; and (7) inauthentic coordination.

We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on Account Integrity and Authentic Identity. However, no enforcement framework can guarantee complete elimination of inauthentic behaviour in real time, precisely because adversarial actors are incentivised to find and exploit gaps in any system. This necessitates continuous investment in both proactive and reactive enforcement capabilities.

Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or engage in unauthorised access by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.

Spam - We work hard to limit the spread of spam because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic Pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices.

Branded Content Policies - Branded content may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages.

Privacy - We remove content that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.

QRE 14.1.2

Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.

Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.

In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways:

- Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created enmasse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can’t access our systems and thus can’t create accounts.

- Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behavior through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we’ve removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm.

- Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defenses and still make it onto the platform. Often, this is because they don’t readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behavior or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are.

Pages and Groups that violate our CIB policy are removed. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behavior-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.

We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block the network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts, Pages and Groups connected to networks we took down in the past.

For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see Meta’s threat disruptions.

Measure 14.2

Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.

Facebook

QRE 14.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.

We report on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:

- Fake Accounts Policy: In Q3 2025, we took action against 692M fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide daily active people (DAP) on Facebook during Q3 2025. In Q4 2025, we took action against 1.1B fake accounts, representing approximately 5% of worldwide DAP during Q4 2025. These enforcement actions address TTPs related to the creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets, and the use of fake/inauthentic reactions, followers, and subscribers.

- Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) Policy: In the second half of 2025, we disrupted the following CIB networks targeting EEA Member States:
- Poland-based network targeting Poland: We removed 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups, and 1 Instagram account. This domestic operation used fake accounts with crafted political identities and organic amplification to infiltrate civic groups across the political spectrum — corresponding to TTPs including creation of inauthentic accounts and inauthentic coordination of content amplification.

- Belarus/Russia-based network targeting Poland: We removed 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages, and 21 Instagram accounts. This foreign influence campaign employed impersonation of a Polish political party, targeted advertising under false identities, and amplification of hack-and-leak campaign materials — corresponding to TTPs including account impersonation, deliberately targeting recipients, and use of hack-and-leak operations.

- Iran-based network ("Endless Mayfly") targeting France (among others): In our Adversarial Threat Report, we published an updated attribution of a persistent Iranian influence operation targeting France, the US, Israel, and the UK. TTPs employed include creation of inauthentic domains, impersonation of journalists, and coordinated cross-platform content amplification using proxy infrastructure.

Full details, including threat indicators for each network, are published on Meta's dedicated GitHub repository.

SLI 14.2.1

Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken at the Member State level under policies addressing each of the TTPs as well as information on the type of content.

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:

Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)

Use of fake followers or subscribers

Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification

Account hijacking or impersonation

Methodology of data measurement: coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content — no matter who’s behind them, what they post or whether they’re foreign or domestic. We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.

Poland:

- Number of instances of identified TTPs: 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups

- Number of actions taken by type: Removal of 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups

Belarus:

- Number of instances of identified TTPs: 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages

- Number of actions taken by type: Removal of 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs:

Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Use of fake followers or subscribers
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Methodology of data measurement: Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information here.

Global Q3:

- Number of instances of identified TTPs: 692M accounts

- Number of actions taken by type: Removal of 692M accounts

Global Q4:

- Number of instances of identified TTPs: 1.1B accounts

- Number of actions taken by type: Removal of 1.1B accounts

Country	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type
Poland	55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups	Removal of 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups
Belarus	4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages	Removal of 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages
Global Q3	692M accounts	Removal of 692M accounts
Global Q4	1.1B accounts	Removal of 1.1B accounts

SLI 14.2.2

Views/impressions of and interaction/engagement at the Member State level (e.g. likes, shares, comments), related to each identified TTP, before and after action was taken.

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:

Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)

Use of fake followers or subscribers

Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification

Account hijacking or impersonation

Poland:

- Views/Impressions before action:

- Interaction/Engagement before action: About 49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 1,100 accounts followed one or more of these Groups.

- Views/impressions after action: 0 (deleted)

- Interaction/Engagement after action: 0 (deleted)

Belarus:

- Views/Impressions before action:

- Interaction/Engagement before action: About 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages

- Views/impressions after action: 0 (deleted)

- Interaction/Engagement after action: 0 (deleted)

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs:

Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Use of fake followers or subscribers
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Global Q3:

- Views/Impressions before action:

- Interaction/Engagement before action:

- Views/impressions after action: 0 (deleted)

- Interaction/Engagement after action: 0 (deleted)

Global Q4:

- Views/Impressions before action:

- Interaction/Engagement before action:

- Views/impressions after action: 0 (deleted)

- Interaction/Engagement after action: 0 (deleted)

Country	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action
Poland	About 49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 1,100 accounts followed one or more of these Groups.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)
Belarus	About 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)
Global Q3		0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)
Global Q4		0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)

SLI 14.2.3

Metrics to estimate the penetration and impact that e.g. Fake/Inauthentic accounts have on genuine users and report at the Member State level (including trends on audiences targeted; narratives used etc.).

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:

Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)

Use of fake followers or subscribers

Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification

Account hijacking or impersonation

Methodology of data measurement: coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content — no matter who’s behind them, what they post or whether they’re foreign or domestic. We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.

Poland:

- Penetration and impact on genuine users :

- Trends on targeted audiences : We observed that network operators consistently amplified narratives critical of Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski and the current Polish government while promoting content favorable to the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) Party. The network employed sophisticated persona development tactics, creating fake accounts with carefully crafted political identities spanning the ideological spectrum, including both left-wing and right-wing personas as well as accounts focused on historical interests.

- Trends on narratives used :

Belarus:

- Penetration and impact on genuine users :

- Trends on targeted audiences : We observed that network operators strategically disseminated messaging focused on Poland's immigration policies and the country's relationships with the European Union and Ukraine.

- Trends on narratives used :

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs:

Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Use of fake followers or subscribers
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Global Q3:

- Penetration and impact on genuine users :

- Trends on targeted audiences :

- Trends on narratives used :

Global Q4:

- Penetration and impact on genuine users :

- Trends on targeted audiences :

- Trends on narratives used :

Country	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used
Poland		We observed that network operators consistently amplifi ed narratives critical of Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski and the current Polish government while promoting content favorable to the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) Party. The network employed sophisticated persona development tactics, creating fake accounts with carefully crafted political identities spanning the ideological spectrum, including both left-wing and right-wing personas as well as accounts focused on historical interests.
Belarus		We observed that network operators strategically disseminated messaging focused on Poland's immigration policies and the country's relationships with the European Union and Ukraine.
Global Q3
Global Q4

SLI 14.2.4

Estimation, at the Member State level, of TTPs related content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement with such content as a percentage of the total content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement on relevant signatories' service.

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:

Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)

Use of fake followers or subscribers

Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification

Account hijacking or impersonation

Methodology of data measurement: coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content — no matter who’s behind them, what they post or whether they’re foreign or domestic. We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.

Poland:

- TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service :

- Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) :

- Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service) :

Belarus:

- TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service :

- Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) :

- Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service):

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs:

Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Use of fake followers or subscribers
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

Global Q3:

- TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service :

- Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) :

- Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service) :

Global Q4:

- TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service :

- Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) :

- Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service) :

Country	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Poland
Belarus
Global Q3
Global Q4

Measure 14.3

Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.

Facebook

QRE 14.3.1

Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.

The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs did so during Q4 2022.

Ongoing TTP Identification and Public Disclosure: Independent of the collective Task-force process, Meta continuously identifies, analyses, and publicly discloses emerging TTPs through its Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), published on a regular basis. The ATR details the disruption of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, including narrative deep-dives on specific TTPs employed by threat actors. For every CIB network taken down, Meta publishes threat indicators (including domains, behavioural signatures, and associated TTPs) through its dedicated GitHub repository, enabling external research communities to investigate and build upon these findings.

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

Facebook

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

We acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely to cause significant harm. Meta’s Community Standards and enforcement actions are designed to counter prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content. Our approach includes proactive detection and labeling of AI-generated content, warning users through visible labels, and removing or restricting content that violates our policies. These measures are regularly reviewed and updated to ensure continued compliance with evolving regulatory requirements and best practices.

Labeling content that has been created using generative AI creative features is one part of Meta's efforts to provide transparency about the use of AI in content creation, particularly in advertisements and organic content across Facebook and Instagram. The rollout of AI labeling began in 2024, with updates and expansions planned as new generative AI features are introduced, and as technology continues to evolve.

Meta has processes/technology in place to help automatic detection of AI-generated content. Once content is generated via Meta AI and it is uploaded or shared across the relevant, in-scope posting surfaces, that Meta AI generated content is labelled. Upon successful attribution, for fully Meta AI-generated content, the label appears directly on the content and is visible to all users.

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

Facebook

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

Meta applies established governance frameworks and oversight—including regular cross-functional reviews and alignment with industry standards such as C2PA and IPTC metadata protocols—to ensure that algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content are trustworthy, respect end-user rights, and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices.

Detection and moderation systems are periodically assessed for effectiveness, fairness, and compliance with applicable laws. AI-generated content is labeled to inform users, not restrict access, and labeling is based on objective signals (e.g., metadata, self-disclosure) rather than subjective or manipulative criteria. Meta is committed to transparency and will continue to update disclosures as practices and regulatory expectations evolve. For more information, see Meta’s Responsible AI Principles and the Meta Transparency Center.

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation.

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

Facebook

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action to stop emerging threats [Meta Newsroom].

Meta publishes Adversarial Threat Reports (ATRs) to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. As of 2025, researchers have produced over 100 independent reports using this archive (ATR, p. 10). In support of the global security research community, Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.

Collaboration and Disruption
- Meta works closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. Many of our coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) takedowns are the result of information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement.
- For example, in the December 2025 Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), Meta details how information sharing led to the early detection and removal of covert influence operations before they could build authentic audiences (see ATR, p. 3-5).

Examples of Case Studies
Poland:
In H2 2025, Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in and targeting Poland, actioning 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, and 23 Groups. About 49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and about 1,100 accounts followed one or more of these Groups. The network relied on organic amplification, not paid ads. The investigation found direct links to an individual in Poland, indicating a domestic operation seeking to influence local political conversations.
Reference: ATR, p. 6-7

Belarus:
Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in Belarus and targeting Polish audiences, with links to Belarus and Russia. 4 Facebook accounts and 12 Pages were removed; about 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages. Network operators spent about $1,800 in ads to amplify content.
Reference: ATR, p. 7

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.

Measure 16.2

Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.

Facebook

QRE 16.2.1

As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.

Meta is committed to sharing qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed by disinformation actors, as observed by our moderation teams and external partners.

For example:
- Meta regularly publishes Adversarial Threat Reports (see Dec 2025 ATR, p. 8-11) to share notable trends, case studies, and investigations on evolving security threats, including the migration of disinformation actors across platforms.

- Meta collaborates with partners such as Microsoft (Global Signal Exchange), Google, and the Global Anti-Scam Alliance (GASA) to exchange early signals of account compromise and scam infrastructure, enabling earlier detection and removal of fraudulent accounts and infrastructure. In 2025, we worked with the Global Signal Exchange to identify and remove about 29,000 scam accounts in Australian Facebook groups and 1,850 scam enablers (websites, job ads) (ATR, p. 9-10).

- Meta provides qualified researchers with access to the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which contains public information on disrupted networks, supporting independent analysis of migration tactics and cross-platform activity. Over 100 independent reports have been produced by researchers using the IO Research Archive, analyzing migration tactics and the evolution of disinformation networks (ATR, p. 10).

Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.

Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

The key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union.

Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram.
In 2025, Meta launched a campaign that ran in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of new tools available on Instagram to protect Youth well-being. These tools included private accounts, additional messaging and sensitive content restrictions, time limit reminders and sleep mode.
As part of our global anti-scam awareness campaign to protect people online, we share relevant product tools across Facebook. Additionally, we released new research on romance scams occurring across the internet, along with updates on our enforcement actions targeting scammers who impersonate military personnel and other individuals.
In 2025, Meta rolled out a youth-focused campaign across eight EU countries—France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Ireland, and Greece—running from late September through late November, to highlight support for parental approval for teens accessing online services.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 17.1

Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.

Facebook

QRE 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.

Meta has developed a series of tools over the years to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.

A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:

Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook:
- People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as:

Violent or graphic imagery.
Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness.
Some forms of nudity.
Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts.

Fact-checking notices:
- When content has been rated by fact-checkers as False, Altered, Partly False, or Missing Context, we add a notice to it so that people can read additional context.
- Meta also notifi es users before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past.
- Meta uses its technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact checkers, and add notices to that content as well.

Links:
Warning screens on sensitive content: https://transparency.meta.com/enforcement/taking-action/context-on-sensitive-misleading-content/

Fact-checking notices: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works/

SLI 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report, at the Member State level, on metrics pertinent to assessing the effects of the tools described in the qualitative reporting element for Measure 17.1, which will include: the total count of impressions of the tool; and information on the interactions/engagement with the tool.

Content on Facebook treated with a warning screen for sensitive content between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025

Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025

% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Country	Content on Facebook treated with a warning screen for sensitive content between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Austria	13,368	Over 490,000	51.00%
Belgium	28,509	Over 730,000	50.60%
Bulgaria	11,439	Over 570,000	56.70%
Croatia	6,641	Over 370,000	56.10%
Cyprus	4,734	Over 150,000	61.10%
Czech Republic	19,447	Over 460,000	38.20%
Denmark	14,273	Over 370,000	52.70%
Estonia	1,578	Over 76,000	44.40%
Finland	8,015	Over 170,000	43.90%
France	108,617	Over 3,200,000	57.80%
Germany	120,394	Over 2,700,000	49.50%
Greece	25,395	Over 760,000	58.00%
Hungary	29,595	Over 320,000	53.30%
Ireland	12,559	Over 37,000	51.20%
Italy	123,761	Over 2,900,000	55.20%
Latvia	1,832	Over 2,900	43.30%
Lithuania	3,353	Over 190,000	49.10%
Luxembourg	1,674	Over 75,000	50.00%
Malta	1,454	Over 68,000	61.10%
Netherlands	36,834	Over 780,000	44.20%
Poland	38,439	Over 1,400,000	49.00%
Portugal	45,433	Over 920,000	62.40%
Romania	26,379	Over 820,000	28.70%
Slovakia	7,029	Over 280,000	38.80%
Slovenia	3,358	Over 180,000	47.90%
Spain	84,328	Over 2,500,000	60.30%
Sweden	29,365	Over 530,000	53.20%
Iceland	1,249	Over 450,000	55.90%
Liechtenstein	39	Over 130,000	100.00%
Norway	13,055	Over 295,000	45.00%
Total	822,146	Over 17,000,000

Measure 17.2

Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.

Facebook

QRE 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.

Meta invests in user education programs and resources to improve media literacy and critical thinking skills. Below are examples of Media Literacy activities Meta has undertaken in the European Union in 2025:

National Elections:
We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app ‘Election Day Information’. These are notices at the top of feed on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. For more information, please refer to the Elections chapter.

Media Literacy Annual Plan:
This plan establishes Meta's strategic framework for media literacy, outlining how its products, features, and initiatives help users build the skills to critically assess the credibility and context of content they encounter online.
Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025 in compliance with the Irish Online Safety Code, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features it makes available to Facebook and Instagram users. See the publicly available report here.

Meta Safety Center:
The Safety Center provides a variety of resources for educators, parents, and community leaders to promote digital literacy, which are updated as needed to reflect new developments and initiatives.
The Digital Literacy section of the Safety Center features resources designed to help people develop practical skills for navigating the digital world safely.

Global awareness campaigns: These campaigns equip users with the knowledge to help identify misleading or manipulative content, which is a core component of media literacy. For example during Cybersecurity Awareness Month (October 2025), Meta published guidance on helping older adults avoid online scams and shared updates on its global anti-scam efforts. See the campaign blog post here.

Links:
Media Literacy Annual Plan: https://transparency.meta.com/reports/regulatory-transparency-reports/#:~:text=Online%20Safety%20Code,Facebook%20and%20Instagram

Meta Safety Center - Digital Literacy section: https://www.meta.com/en-gb/safety/topics/digital-literacy/?srsltid=AfmBOooOIpprlLtqxUPGf-fJmiJzXkD1T2qiNbkJK3-EEnd8jd22hr7p

Campaign blog for the Cybersecurity Awareness Month: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/10/cybersecurity-awareness-month-helping-older-adults-avoid-online-scams/

SLI 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories report on number of media literacy and awareness raising activities organised and or participated in and will share quantitative information pertinent to show the effects of the campaigns they build or support at the Member State level.

Number of distinct sessions on the transparency reporting page hosting the Media Literacy Annual Plan between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025

Number of distinct sessions on pages within the Meta Safety Center between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025

Country	Number of distinct sessions on the transparency reporting page hosting the Media Literacy Annual Plan between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Number of distinct sessions on pages within the Meta Safety Center between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025
Austria	143	3,548
Belgium	279	4,664
Bulgaria	155	1,616
Croatia	21	1,130
Cyprus	39	885
Czech Republic	503	2,991
Denmark	83	1,602
Estonia	12	333
Finland	63	1,842
France	841	36,838
Germany	976	33,419
Greece	273	2,971
Hungary	363	2,108
Ireland	277	2,897
Italy	471	21,431
Latvia	14	535
Lithuania	46	653
Luxembourg	15	301
Malta	12	226
Netherlands	522	7,331
Poland	288	8,621
Portugal	173	7,316
Romania	360	4,010
Slovakia	141	1,109
Slovenia	20	401
Spain	403	18,669
Sweden	123	3,943
Iceland	4	182
Liechtenstein	0	23
Norway	76	2,481
Total	6,696	174,076

Measure 17.3

For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.

Facebook

QRE 17.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.

Meta cooperates with media literacy experts to improve media literacy and critical thinking across its platforms, engaging through direct partnerships, institutional frameworks, and research infrastructure collaboration.

Fact-Checking and Media Literacy Expertise: Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the program, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.

EDMO and the Research Community: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting research on Meta's platforms. Meta also started collaboration with GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their research proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data.

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

Facebook

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

Our policies and approach to tackle harmful false or misleading information, which Meta interprets as misinformation, are published in our Transparency Centre:

Meta Community Standards - Misinformation
Content Distribution Guidelines (‘Fact-checked misinformation’) - Misinformation

These include specific actions taken against actors that repeatedly share misinformation. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.

Our penalty system to restrict accounts that violate our Community Standards on the platform can be found here. For most violations, the user’s first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.

These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, these restrictions only apply to Facebook accounts).

If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.

For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.

Country	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Austria	Over 41,000	Over 82,000
Belgium	Over 60,000	Over 110,000
Bulgaria	Over 170,000	Over 440,000
Croatia	Over 36,000	Over 120,000
Cyprus	Over 11,000	Over 28,000
Czech Republic	Over 100,000	Over 230,000
Denmark	Over 20,000	Over 40,000
Estonia	Over 7,000	Over 24,000
Finland	Over 8,900	Over 17,000
France	Over 420,000	Over 1,000,000
Germany	Over 320,000	Over 700,000
Greece	Over 160,000	Over 350,000
Hungary	Over 26,000	Over 61,000
Ireland	Over 26,000	Over 61,000
Italy	Over 680,000	Over 1,000,000
Latvia	Over 24,000	Over 58,000
Lithuania	Over 22,000	Over 61,000
Luxembourg	Over 4,600	Over 8,700
Malta	Over 3,300	Over 5,500
Netherlands	Over 59,000	Over 97,000
Poland	Over 260,000	Over 600,000
Portugal	Over 75,000	Over 210,000
Romania	Over 380,000	Over 610,000
Slovakia	Over 83,000	Over 160,000
Slovenia	Over 13,000	Over 32,000
Spain	Over 380,000	Over 840,000
Sweden	Over 37,000	Over 78,000
Iceland	Over 1,500	Over 3,100
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Over 170
Norway	Over 18,000	Over 26,000
Total	Over 3,400,000	Over 7,200,000

Measure 18.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.

Facebook

QRE 18.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe research efforts, both in-house and in partnership with third-party organisations, on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and relevant safe design practices, as well as actions or changes as a result of this research. Relevant Signatories will include where possible information on financial investments in said research. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.

Meta supports a number of initiatives to empower the independent research community, including the Influence Operations Research Archive.

Meta's cross-functional teams also conduct regular in-house research and analysis of adversarial threats and Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks. The identification and disruption of CIB networks, which underpin the Influence Operations Research Archive, are the product of internal investigations conducted by highly specialized experts. This in-house research helps mitigate disinformation risk by informing improvements to Meta's detection systems and enforcement policies. Some of these findings are shared publicly via Meta's Adversarial Threat Reports on the Transparency Center.

Meta's approach to translating research into platform actions is holistic with findings integrated into Meta's broader integrity and product development ecosystem, informing ongoing improvements to policies, systems, and features across Facebook and Instagram. For example, insights from CIB network disruptions continuously refine Meta's CIB detection and enforcement capabilities.

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

Facebook

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

Meta publishes AI System Cards on the Transparency Center (https://transparency.meta.com/features/explaining-ranking/), providing an in-depth view into how AI systems in Meta's products work — including prediction models, input signals, and how they evolve over time. System Cards are written for both expert and non-expert audiences.

Meta provides users with the following tools to understand and control their Facebook experience:

Transparency tools:
- "Why Am I Seeing This Ad?" — shows how demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to ads shown in Feed

Feed control tools:
- Show More / Show Less — users give feedback on post types they want to see more or less of, temporarily adjusting ranking scores
- Favourites Feed — users select up to 30 friends/Pages whose posts appear higher in Feed and in a dedicated Favourites feed
- Most Recent Feed — content sorted in chronological order
- Feed Filter Bar — users alternate between Top Posts, Most Recent, or Favourites feeds
- Feed Preferences (https://www.facebook.com/help/964154640320617) — suite of tools to manage Feed: unfollow, snooze accounts, or prioritise Favourites

Content controls:
- Comment permissions — users decide who can comment on public posts
- Profanity and keyword filters

Meta continuously analyses integrity risks on its platforms and adjusts transparency and recommender tools as part of an ongoing improvement process.

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

Facebook

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 21.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 21.3

Where Relevant Signatories employ labelling and warning systems, they will design these in accordance with up-to-date scientific evidence and with analysis of their users' needs on how to maximise the impact and usefulness of such interventions, for instance such that they are likely to be viewed and positively received.

Facebook

QRE 21.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their procedures for developing and deploying labelling or warning systems and how they take scientific evidence and their users' needs into account to maximise usefulness.

Development and Stakeholder Engagement
Meta's fact-checking programme's rating types and labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts, and may be refined through ongoing engagement with these stakeholders. Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations, certified through the IFCN or EFCSN, who review and rate content based on their independent research and reporting. Meta provides guidance to partners through dedicated Partner Managers who regularly communicate product and policy changes and share related training resources. Partners may communicate feedback or raise questions about the program to Meta’s Partner Managers.

Evidence-Based Monitoring and Improvement
Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also gives Partners the ability to report any issues they’re encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta’s teams.

User Needs and Effectiveness
By engaging with fact-checkers, content moderation experts, and independent organizations, Meta ensures its labelling and warning systems are responsive to evolving user needs and informed by evidence on label effectiveness.

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 23.1

Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.

Facebook

QRE 23.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.

We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Standards when we’re made aware, including fake accounts and accounts engaged in inauthentic behavior and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm.

We use a combination of automated and human review for enforcement actions taken on the platform and invest in technology and people resources to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behavior.

As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.

Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on the Help Center:

- Click *** Options next to the post that you'd like to mark as false.
- Click Report post.
- Click Scam, fraud or false information.
- Click Sharing false information, then select the kind of false information.
- Click Done.

Measure 23.2

Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).

Facebook

QRE 23.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.

Meta’s processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.

Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high.

Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.

Protection against misuse: We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.

Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won’t see who reported them.

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 24.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 24.1

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with information on why particular content or accounts have been labelled, demoted, or otherwise enforced on, on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section, as well as the basis for such enforcement action, and the possibility for them to appeal through a transparent mechanism.

Facebook

QRE 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems across Member States and languages and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.

When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.

Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.

SLI 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories provide information on the number and nature of enforcement actions for policies described in response to Measure 18.2, the numbers of such actions that were subsequently appealed, the results of these appeals, information, and to the extent possible metrics, providing insight into the duration or effectiveness of processing of appeals process, and publish this information on the Transparency Centre.

Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were later appealed.

Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were restored after appeal.

Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Country	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were later appealed.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were restored after appeal	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025
Austria	Over 41,000	Less than 100	49	0.03
Belgium	Over 60,000	Less than 100	52	0.06
Bulgaria	Over 170,000	Less than 100	50	0.06
Croatia	Over 36,000	Less than 100	16	0.12
Cyprus	Over 11,000	Less than 100	6	0.2
Czech Republic	Over 100,000	Less than 100	35	0.1
Denmark	Over 20,000	Less than 100	47	0.07
Estonia	Over 7,000	Less than 100	9	0.15
Finland	Over 8,900	Less than 100	19	1.68
France	Over 420,000	Over 330	248	0.03
Germany	Over 320,000	Over 710	500	0.06
Greece	Over 160,000	Less than 100	38	0.07
Hungary	Over 26,000	Less than 100	38	0.02
Ireland	Over 26,000	Less than 100	38	0.02
Italy	Over 680,000	Over 370	257	0.07
Latvia	Over 24,000	Less than 100	4	0.01
Lithuania	Over 22,000	Less than 100	6	0.01
Luxembourg	Over 4,600	Less than 100	3	0.19
Malta	Over 3,300	Less than 100	6	0.01
Netherlands	Over 59,000	Over 220	134	0.11
Poland	Over 260,000	Over 180	121	0.08
Portugal	Over 75,000	Less than 100	39	0.1
Romania	Over 380,000	Less than 100	68	0.06
Slovakia	Over 83,000	Less than 100	14	0.02
Slovenia	Over 13,000	Less than 100	1	26.08
Spain	Over 380,000	Over 180	136	0.06
Sweden	Over 37,000	Over 170	130	0.13
Iceland	Over 1,500	Less than 100	0	0
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	0
Norway	Over 18,000	Less than 100	17	0.15
Total	Over 3,400,000	Over 3,000	2,081

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.2 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools to provide access to near real-time public content on Facebook. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API.

Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram.

Individuals, including journalists, affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This was a first-of-its-kind partnership that enabled researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR’s Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.

Furthermore, in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Center (CASD, Le Centre d’Accès Sécurisé aux Données), an organization renowned for facilitating responsible data access for researchers worldwide. As part of our collaboration, CASD independently reviews research proposals to access Meta Content Library. We also launched a new Meta-hosted application portal, Research Tools Manager, to enhance the onboarding and support experience for both new applicants and existing researchers.

In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform).

Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications as of December 2025, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.

Additionally, we made updates to the Meta Research Tools Terms and Conditions.

Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Facebook via its Transparency Centre. We’ve shared our 2025 reports there:

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

Facebook

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

Meta provides public access to public data that can support research through several tools and processes:

- Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualifi ed researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment.

- Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API — publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies.
- Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports (https://transparency.fb.com/data/).

Safeguards to address risks of abuse:
The Meta Content Library and API implement multiple, layered safeguards, such as controlled access, prohibition of misuse, privacy protection and ongoing oversight.

The Ad Library is a public transparency tool. The Ad Library API implements safeguards including verified access, policy-based restrictions, and technical abuse prevention.

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 26.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

Meta Content Library and API: Meta publishes comprehensive documentation about the data available through the Meta Content Library and API on Meta's Developer Documentation portal, which is reachable from the Meta Transparency Centre. This documentation includes definitions of available data points, the scope of the data (including eligibility criteria for content inclusion), technical protocols for accessing the data (including API documentation), and a changelog documenting product and data changes per release.

Ad Library and API: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. Meta publishes information about ways-of-access and the data points available in the Ad Library and Ad Library API on Meta’s Transparency Center, the Ad Library Overview and FAQ page and the Ad Library API page.
_____________________
Links:
- Developer Documentation portal: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/content-library-and-api
- Meta Transparency Centre: https://transparency.meta.com/researchtools/meta-content-library?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHhLD5E16yNDV4SvBa9FOW6WoNMd_-4rE1tBPwkfpimBUpxdmd6aMxu1KaU58_aem_KbIzSA4h05TBOVVwylvALw
- Ad Library Overview and FAQ page: https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=active&ad_type=all&country=NL&is_targeted_country=false&media_type=all&sort_data[mode]=total_impressions&sort_data[direction]=desc
- Ad Library API page: https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/api/?source=nav-header

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

As of 31 December 2025, over 1,200 researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway

Measure 26.2

Relevant Signatories will provide real-time or near real-time, machine-readable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data on their service for research purposes, such as accounts belonging to public figures such as elected official, news outlets and government accounts subject to an application process which is not overly cumbersome.

Facebook

QRE 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide real-time or near real-time access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data for research purposes as described in Measure 26.2.

Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API.

Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:

Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.
Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.
Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.

Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform:

Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Facebook Pages, posts, , groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts.
Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query.
Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API.

For more details - see here.

QRE 26.2.2

Relevant Signatories will describe the scope of manifestly-made public data as applicable to their services.

Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:

Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts.
Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements
The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen

For more details - see here.

QRE 26.2.3

Relevant Signatories will describe the application process in place to in order to gain the access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data described in Measure 26.2.

Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Center (CASD, Le Centre d’Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to review Meta Content Library applications. Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.

For more details on the application process - see here.

SLI 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2, such as: Number of monthly users (or users over a sample representative timeframe), Number of applications received, rejected, and accepted (over a reporting period or a sample representative timeframe), Average response time (over a reporting period or a sample representative timeframe).

Please refer to the tables below

Timeframe - July 2025 - December 2025

Country	Applications Received	Access Granted (Approved)	Under Review	Withdrawn	Rejected	Median Response Time (Days): Submission to SOMAR Approval	Median Response Time (Days): SOMAR Approval to Access
Global	375	289 of 375	76 of 375	10 of 375	37	31	9
European Union	91	71 of 91	18 of 91	2 of 91	3
Non-EU	284	218 of 284	58 of 284	8 of 284	34

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

Facebook

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website, which also include a dedicated help centre.

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports.

As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Facebook.

Throughout the second half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comments filtering, and new tools in the API such as snapshots and collections. In addition, data coverage has expanded to include public profiles with 100 followers or more. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in independent research.

We made changes to the Meta Research Tools Terms and Conditions which include granting researchers ownership of their research outputs (Section 2(q)), subject to compliance with the terms and applicable law.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including streamlining application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

Facebook

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta’s impact on the world.

The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for academic researchers, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners.

Current models to support independent external research:
- Onboarding Support
- Training and Education for researcher products and datasets
- Office Hour to receive live technical support
- Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials

Through these engagement activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs and help researchers identify the appropriate tools and contact points within Meta's research ecosystem.

Relevant details about research tools are available on our Transparency Centre.

Link: https://transparency.meta.com/researchtools/

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

Facebook

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

Meta provides data sets and tools for researchers and publicly discloses all data types currently available in the Meta Content Library and API. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged on Research tools and datasets.

The main data available to researchers are:

● Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram.
● Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta's CIB policy.
____________
Link: https://transparency.meta.com/en-gb/researchtools/

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

Facebook

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research on Meta's platforms. This engagement included two main events in Berlin.

● First, on June 26, 2025, Meta hosted a data dialogue where we invited several EDMO stakeholders to provide feedback on the MCL + API and discuss their experience conducting research, including any barriers or adversarial actions encountered.
● Second, Meta further engaged with researchers and EDMO stakeholders during the DSA Access Days conference (https://dsa40collaboratory.eu/data-access-days/) in September 2025, where researcher experiences with platform access and research conditions were discussed.

No reports of adversarial actions against researchers conducting good-faith disinformation research were identified during these engagements.

Measure 28.4

As part of the cooperation framework between the Signatories and the European research community, relevant Signatories will, with the assistance of the EDMO, make funds available for research on Disinformation, for researchers to independently manage and to define scientific priorities and transparent allocation procedures based on scientific merit.

Facebook

QRE 28.4.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the resources made available for the purposes of Measure 28.4 and procedures put in place to ensure the resources are independently managed.

The specific provisions under Measure 28.4.1 are still in the process of being developed.

Up until September 2025, Meta has coordinated with other platforms through EDMO working groups with the goal of establishing an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) intended to serve as an intermediary between researchers, platforms, search engines, and Digital Service Coordinators in order to facilitate data sharing and mitigate disputes among other things. Meta set aside $100,000 to support this effort.

Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative - a decision made in September 2025 for reasons outside Meta's control - Meta began collaboration with GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Meta has collaborated with GESIS to support their funding application for RIDLOP, which is intended to serve as an industry-wide initiative enabling structured data sharing between platforms and the European research community.

Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Meta continued providing all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset.

Throughout the second half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including new collaborative tools in the API such as snapshots and collections. In addition, data coverage has expanded to include public profiles with 100 followers or more. collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact checking.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta’s public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 30.1

Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.

Facebook

QRE 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on and explain the nature of their agreements with fact-checking organisations; their expected results; relevant quantitative information (for instance: contents fact-checked, increased coverage, changes in integration of fact-checking as depends on the agreements and to be further discussed within the Task-force); and such as relevant common standards and conditions for these agreements.

Meta’s agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognized industry standards.

Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta’s agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.

Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta’s agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.

Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed.

Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.

Further details and evidence of Meta’s partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at Meta’s Transparency Center: Meta’s Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.
_____________
Link: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works

QRE 30.1.2

Relevant Signatories will list the fact-checking organisations they have agreements with (unless a fact-checking organisation opposes such disclosure on the basis of a reasonable fear of retribution or violence).

Facebook

QRE 30.1.3

Relevant Signatories will report on resources allocated where relevant in each of their services to achieve fact-checking coverage in each Member State and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat Disinformation online at the Member State level.

Meta allocates resources to achieve fact-checking coverage and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat disinformation. For example:

Financial Resources: Meta has established an agreement framework that provides fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.

Tools and Technology: Meta provides fact-checking partners with access to the Meta Content Library, which grants comprehensive access to public content across Facebook and Instagram to support their investigative capabilities. Partners also have access to Meta's fact-checking tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.

Training and Capacity Building: Meta provides partners with comprehensive training materials and training sessions on any significant policy or product updates.

Dedicated Relationship Management: Meta supports cooperation through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support that helps improve the fact-checking programme.

SLI 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations, including the total number of agreements with fact-checking organisations, per language and, where relevant, per service.

Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.

Country	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.
Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack
Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg
Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP
Cyprus (Greek)	AFP
Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz
Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet
Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M
Finland (Finnish)	AFP
France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs
Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck
Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes
Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP
Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie
Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica
Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min
Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck
Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog
Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador
Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro
Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk
Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro
Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral
Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran AFP

Measure 30.2

Relevant Signatories will provide fair financial contributions to the independent European fact-checking organisations for their work to combat Disinformation on their services. Those financial contributions could be in the form of individual agreements, of agreements with multiple fact-checkers or with an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations that has the mandate to conclude said agreements.

Facebook

QRE 30.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken and general criteria used to ensure the fair financial contributions to the fact-checkers for the work done, on criteria used in those agreements to guarantee high ethical and professional standards, independence of the fact-checking organisations, as well as conditions of transparency, openness, consistency and non-discrimination.

QRE 30.2.2

Relevant Signatories will engage in, and report on, regular reviews with their fact-checking partner organisations to review the nature and effectiveness of the Signatory's fact-checking programme.

Meta has dedicated Partner Managers who engage with fact-checking partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support to improve the fact-checking programme. As part of this work, Partner Managers collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools.

Meta also provides fact-checking partners with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.
Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also provides fact-checking partners the ability to report any issues they’re encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta.

QRE 30.2.3

European fact-checking organisations will, directly (as Signatories to the Code) or indirectly (e.g. via polling by EDMO or an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations) report on the fairness of the individual compensations provided to them via these agreements.

QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations

Measure 30.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to cross-border cooperation between fact-checkers.

Facebook

QRE 30.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to facilitate their cross-border collaboration with and between fact-checkers, including examples of fact-checks, languages, or Member States where such cooperation was facilitated.

As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.

Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the program, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).

Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.

Also, given the cross-border nature of content flows, Meta’s fact-checking systems allow multiple partners - including from different countries - to rate the same content. Users, regardless of location within the region, are then able to see the articles of multiple fact-checking partners.

Measure 30.4

To develop the Measures above, relevant Signatories will consult EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

Facebook

QRE 30.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report, ex ante on plans to involve, and ex post on actions taken to involve, EDMO and the elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, including on the development of the framework of cooperation described in Measures 30.3 and 30.4.

The European Commission, ERGA and EDMO are standing members of the CoCD's Task-force, which is chaired by the European Commission. The Task-force meets in plenary sessions and through dedicated working groups (subgroups) on specific workstreams.

Meta is an active participant in the Task-force, attending EC-organized working group meetings across multiple workstreams. Through this participation, Meta collaborates directly with the European Commission, ERGA and EDMO.

Additionally, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab through its collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission within the Monitoring Working Group.

Meta stands ready to cooperate in accordance with this QRE.

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 31.1 and 31.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 31.1 and 31.2

31.1: Relevant Signatories that showcase User Generated Content (UGC) will integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use independent fact-checkers’ work in their platforms’ services, processes, and contents across all Member States and across formats relevant to the service. Relevant Signatories will collaborate with fact-checkers to that end, starting by conducting and documenting research and testing. 31.2: Relevant Signatories that integrate fact-checks in their products or processes will ensure they employ swift and efficient mechanisms such as labelling, information panels or policy enforcement to help increase the impact of fact-checks on audiences.

Facebook

QRE 31.1.1 (for Measures 31.1 and 31.2)

Relevant Signatories will report on their specific activities and initiatives related to Measures 31.1 and 31.2, including the full results and methodology applied in testing solutions to that end.

When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure fewer people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders. Specifically, Meta's technology is designed to detect content that is the same or nearly identical to content rated by fact-checkers, applying notices and reduced distribution automatically. This integration operates across all content formats relevant to the service, including public posts, ads, articles, photos, videos, Reels, and text-only posts on both Facebook and Instagram.

Labeling. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. Content rated Satire or True won't be labeled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Facebook. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past.
We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well.

Ensuring fewer people see misinformation. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly false, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent.

Repeat offenders. Pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetize and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news Page.

Detection. Meta's systems support fact-checkers' work through a signals-based detection approach, which uses various inputs - including user flags reporting "false information" - to identify and enqueue content for fact-checker review. Fact-checkers ultimately decide what to review and rate. Once content is rated, Meta applies automated enforcement actions (labeling, reduced distribution, ad rejection) and extends these actions to near-identical content detected through matching technology.

In terms of AI-generated content, fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts and visual techniques to aid in the detection of this content.

SLI 31.1.1

Member State level reporting on use of fact-checks by service and the swift and efficient mechanisms in place to increase their impact, which may include (as depends on the service): number of fact-check articles published; reach of fact-check articles; number of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers.

Filtered to content created on Facebook in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:

1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:.

2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:*

These two metrics together show both the scale and impact of fact-checking.

*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta’s 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EEA Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EEA (120,000). This is expected.

Country	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:	Nr of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers	Other
Austria	Over 490,000	Over 33,000	0	0
Belgium	Over 730,000	Over 40,000	0	0
Bulgaria	Over 570,000	Over 23,000	0	0
Croatia	Over 370,000	Over 23,000	0	0
Cyprus	Over 150,000	Over 18,000	0	0
Czech Republic	Over 460,000	Over 24,000	0	0
Denmark	Over 370,000	Over 25,000	0	0
Estonia	Over 76,000	Over 10,000	0	0
Finland	Over 170,000	Over 20,000	0	0
France	Over 3,200,000	Over 60,000	0	0
Germany	Over 2,700,000	Over 68,000	0	0
Greece	Over 760,000	Over 32,000	0	0
Hungary	Over 320,000	Over 22,000	0	0
Ireland	Over 450,000	Over 32,000	0	0
Italy	Over 2,900,000	Over 62,000	0	0
Latvia	Over 130,000	Over 12,000	0	0
Lithuania	Over 190,000	Over 16,000	0	0
Luxembourg	Over 75,000	Over 15,000	0	0
Malta	Over 68,000	Over 13,000	0	0
Netherlands	Over 780,000	Over 43,000	0	0
Poland	Over 1,400,000	Over 38,000	0	0
Portugal	Over 920,000	Over 38,000	0	0
Romania	Over 820,000	Over 30,000	0	0
Slovakia	Over 280,000	Over 19,000	0	0
Slovenia	Over 180,000	Over 16,000	0	0
Spain	Over 2,500,000	Over 58,000	0	0
Sweden	Over 530,000	Over 35,000	0	0
Iceland	Over 37,000	Over 8,400	0	0
Liechtenstein	Over 2,900	Over 1,600	0	0
Norway	Over 295,000	Over 27,000	0	0
Total EU	Over 17,000,000	Over 120,000

SLI 31.1.2

An estimation, through meaningful metrics, of the impact of actions taken such as, for instance, the number of pieces of content labelled on the basis of fact-check articles, or the impact of said measures on user interactions with information fact-checked as false or misleading.

1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

Country	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Other
Austria	Over 490,000	51.00%	0
Belgium	Over 730,000	50.60%	0
Bulgaria	Over 570,000	56.70%	0
Croatia	Over 370,000	56.10%	0
Cyprus	Over 150,000	61.10%	0
Czech Republic	Over 460,000	38.20%	0
Denmark	Over 370,000	52.70%	0
Estonia	Over 76,000	44.40%	0
Finland	Over 170,000	43.90%	0
France	Over 3,200,000	57.80%	0
Germany	Over 2,700,000	49.50%	0
Greece	Over 760,000	58.00%	0
Hungary	Over 320,000	53.30%	0
Ireland	Over 450,000	51.20%	0
Italy	Over 2,900,000	55.20%	0
Latvia	Over 130,000	43.30%	0
Lithuania	Over 190,000	49.10%	0
Luxembourg	Over 75,000	50.00%	0
Malta	Over 68,000	61.10%	0
Netherlands	Over 780,000	44.20%	0
Poland	Over 1,400,000	49.00%	0
Portugal	Over 920,000	62.40%	0
Romania	Over 820,000	28.70%	0
Slovakia	Over 280,000	38.80%	0
Slovenia	Over 180,000	47.90%	0
Spain	Over 2,500,000	60.30%	0
Sweden	Over 530,000	53.20%	0
Iceland	Over 37,000	55.90%	0
Liechtenstein	Over 2,900	100.00%	0
Norway	Over 295,000	45.00%	0
Total	Over 17,000,000

SLI 31.1.3

Signatories recognise the importance of providing context to SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2 in ways that empower researchers, fact-checkers, the Commission, ERGA, and the public to understand and assess the impact of the actions taken to comply with Commitment 31. To that end, relevant Signatories commit to include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise these SLIs. Relevant Signatories will present and discuss within the Permanent Task-force the type of baseline quantitative information they consider using for contextualisation ahead of their baseline reports.

Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Monthly Active Users: Over a 6-month period, ending 31 December 2025 (i.e., 1 July 2025 - 31 December 2025), there were a total of approximately 263 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report.

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 32.1 and 32.2 Measure 32.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting "false information" and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 32.1 and 32.2

32.1: Relevant Signatories will provide fact-checkers with information to help them quantify the impact of fact-checked content over time, such as (depending on the service) actions taken on the basis of that content, impressions, clicks or interactions. 32.2: Relevant Signatories will provide fact-checkers with information to help them quantify the impact of fact-checked content over time, such as (depending on the service) actions taken on the basis of that content, impressions, clicks, or interactions.

Facebook

QRE 32.1.1 (for Measures 32.1 and 32.2)

Relevant Signatories will provide details on the interfaces and other tools put in place to provide fact-checkers with the information referred to in Measure 31.1 and 31.2.

All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.
Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting "false information". Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review and rate themselves. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent.
During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find. For example, we've used this feature to group content about global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.

SLI 32.1.1 (for Measures 32.1 and 32.2)

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the use of the interfaces and other tools put in place to provide fact-checkers with the information referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 (such as monthly users for instance).

See list in QRE 30.1.2 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway

Measure 32.3

Relevant Signatories will regularly exchange information between themselves and the fact-checking community, to strengthen their cooperation.

Facebook

QRE 32.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the channels of communications and the exchanges conducted to strengthen their cooperation - including success of and satisfaction with the information, interface, and other tools referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 - and any conclusions drawn from such exchanges.

As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. Meta's cooperation with fact-checking partners is primarily conducted through bilateral channels, including dedicated Partner Managers who regularly engage with partners to communicate product and policy changes and manage day-to-day support.

Meta is an active participant in the CoCD Permanent Task-force, attending EC-organized plenary sessions and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. During this period, fact-checking has not been a dedicated working group focus within the Task-force; however, Meta continues to engage with the Task-force on other workstreams relevant to fact-checking, and maintains its direct cooperation with fact-checking partners through the channels described above.

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 34.1

Signatories establish and maintain the common Transparency Centre website, which will be operational and available to the public within 6 months from the signature of this Code.

Meta supported the establishment and maintenance of the Transparency Centre website, making it operational and available to the public as of 2023, within 6 months from the signature of the Code. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 34.2

Signatories provide appropriate funding, for setting up and operating the Transparency Centre website, including its maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. Funding contribution should be commensurate with the nature of the Signatories' activity and shall be sufficient for the website's operations and maintenance and proportional to each Signatories' risk profile and economic capacity.

Meta equally co-funds the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website alongside other signatories, providing funding sufficient for the website's maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. The website is managed by VOST Europe in the role of developer. Meta's funding contribution is commensurate with its activity as a signatory to the Code and proportional to its risk profile and economic capacity.

Measure 34.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to the Transparency Centre's information to the extent that the Code is applicable to their services.

Meta continuously contributes to the Transparency Centre’s information through the bi-annual submission of its Transparency Reports. These reports are uploaded to the Transparency Centre and made available to the public. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 34.4

Signatories will agree on the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre within the Task-force, to be recorded and reviewed within the Task-Force on an annual basis.

Meta participates in EC CoCD Task-force discussions regarding the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre. The financing arrangement is agreed upon within the Task-force and reviewed on an annual basis in accordance with the Code's requirements. Meta engages in these periodic reviews to ensure the arrangement remains appropriate and sufficient for the TC's continued operation.

Measure 34.5

The Task-force will regularly discuss the Transparency Centre and assess whether adjustments or actions are necessary. Signatories commit to implement the actions and adjustments decided within the Task-force within a reasonable timeline.

Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Task-force, which regularly discusses the Transparency Centre and assesses whether adjustments or actions are necessary. During the reporting period, Meta participated in weekly Task-force plenary sessions and working groups where applicable TC topics were discussed as applicable.

Meta remains committed to implementing any actions or adjustments decided within the Task-force within a reasonable timeline, consistent with the Code's requirements.

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 35.1

Signatories will list in the Transparency Centre, per each Commitment and Measure that they subscribe to, the terms of service and policies that their service applies to implement these Commitments and Measures.

Meta publishes its Transparency Reports on a bi-annual basis in the EC’s Transparency Centre. The Transparency Reports list all the relevant information, including the terms of service and policies applicable to Facebook and Instagram, per commitment and measure. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 35.2

Signatories provide information on the implementation and enforcement of their policies per service, including geographical and language coverage.

Meta provides information on the implementation and enforcement of its policies, which is available in the published Transparency Reports. See the Transparency Centre reports here.

Measure 35.3

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre contains a repository of their reports assessing the implementation of the Code's commitments.

Meta's Transparency Reports, which assess the implementation of the Code's commitments, are maintained in the Transparency Centre repository. See the Transparency Centre reports here

Measure 35.4

In crisis situations, Signatories use the Transparency Centre to publish information regarding the specific mitigation actions taken related to the crisis.

No formal crisis situation, as defined under Article 36 of the DSA or as declared by the European Commission, occurred during the current reporting period that would trigger the application of Measure 35.4.

Meta maintains documented Crisis Response Protocols and Assessments that would be activated in the event a crisis is declared. These protocols enable Meta to identify and assess whether external events impacting the functioning and use of its services are significantly contributing to a serious threat, and to publish information regarding specific mitigation actions taken on the Transparency Centre (https://disinfocode.eu) as required.

Measure 35.5

Signatories ensure that the Transparency Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology, is user-friendly, and that the relevant information is easily searchable (including per Commitment and Measure). Users of the Transparency Centre will be able to easily track changes in Signatories' policies and actions.

Meta and other signatories equally co-fund the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website, which is managed by VOST Europe in the role of a developer, ensuring the Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology and user friendliness. The layout designed by the developer allows for easy searchability, as well as straightforward tracking of changes.

Measure 35.6

The Transparency Centre will enable users to easily access and understand the Service Level Indicators and Qualitative Reporting Elements tied to each Commitment and Measure of the Code for each service, including Member State breakdowns, in a standardised and searchable way. The Transparency Centre should also enable users to easily access and understand Structural Indicators for each Signatory.

Meta's bi-annual Transparency Reports, published on the Transparency Centre (https://disinfocode.eu/reports?signatory=meta), list Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) tied to each commitment and measure for Facebook and Instagram, including Member State breakdowns in a standardised and searchable format.

In addition, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, produced in collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz, and the European Commission as part of the Rapid Response System (RRS). These Structural Indicators are accessible via the Transparency Centre, enabling users to understand compliance patterns across signatories. Meta continues to update Structural Indicator measurements aligned with its bi-annual reporting periods.

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 36.1 Measure 36.2 Measure 36.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will upload this report in a timely and complete manner.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will continue to upload this report in a timely and complete manner.

Measure 36.1

Signatories provide updates about relevant changes in policies and implementation actions in a timely manner, and in any event no later than 30 days after changes are announced or implemented.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

Measure 36.2

Signatories will regularly update Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators, in parallel with the regular reporting foreseen by the monitoring framework. After the first reporting period, Relevant Signatories are encouraged to also update the Transparency Centre more regularly.

Meta regularly updates Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators which are published by TrustLab on the EC’s Transparency Centre. Additionally, Meta participates in EC CoCD Task-force discussions regarding the operation of the Transparency Centre, which includes maintenance and regular updating of the Transparency Centre website.

Measure 36.3

Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.

Meta is involved in discussions with the EC Taskforce regarding the Code and monitoring framework. Consequently, any relevant decisions of the Task-force are updated in the Transparency Centre through the bi-annual cadence of the publishing of Meta’s Transparency Report.

QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.

QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code’s signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.

SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.

In the period between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,580 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 9,941 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 37.1

Signatories will participate in the Task-force and contribute to its work. Signatories, in particular smaller or emerging services will contribute to the work of the Task-force proportionate to their resources, size and risk profile. Smaller or emerging services can also agree to pool their resources together and represent each other in the Task-force. The Task-force will meet in plenary sessions as necessary and at least every 6 months, and, where relevant, in subgroups dedicated to specific issues or workstreams.

Meta actively participates in and contributes to the work of the Task-force, attending plenary sessions and engaging in relevant subgroups dedicated to specific topics or workstreams.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Meta agrees to and actively works with the Task-force on all essential tasks if and as required, including but not limited to developing and refining harmonised reporting templates, Service Level and Structural Indicators, and TTP benchmarks; coordinating rapid response efforts during elections or crises; reviewing research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments; providing guidance on fact-checking reporting obligations; assessing whether the Code's commitments and measures require updates in light of evolving developments; and promoting the Code's adoption among new signatories.

Measure 37.3

The Task-force will agree on and define its operating rules, including on the involvement of third-party experts, which will be laid down in a Vademecum drafted by the European Commission in collaboration with the Signatories and agreed on by consensus between the members of the Task-force.

Meta works with the EC and other signatories to define operating rules for the EC Task-force, including third-party expert involvement, and supports the drafting and consensus agreement of the Vademecum with the EC.

Measure 37.4

Signatories agree to set up subgroups dedicated to the specific issues related to the implementation and revision of the Code with the participation of the relevant Signatories.

Meta participates in the following working groups, contributing specialized knowledge and operational support to the implementation and revision of the Code: Elections Working Group, AI Working Group, Critics Protocol Working Group, Integrity of Services Working Group, and Ads Scrutiny Working Group. These working groups are updated if and as needed to address any specific issues.

Measure 37.5

When needed, and in any event at least once per year the Task-force organises meetings with relevant stakeholder groups and experts to inform them about the operation of the Code and gather their views related to important developments in the field of Disinformation.

Meta participates in annual and ad hoc EC Task-force meetings with stakeholders and experts, providing updates via bi-annual Transparency Reports and discussing research outcomes. Meta’s collaborative efforts include supporting independent research initiatives and engaging with EDMO, ERGA, and the EC.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Meta maintains its subscription document and actively participates in the EC CoCD Taskforce, through which any changes to commitments or measures are identified and discussed. Meta's subscription document remains unchanged from the prior reporting period.

During the reporting period, the European Commission proposed a revised working group structure for the Task-force, reflecting the evolving priorities of the Code's implementation. On 12 December 2025, the CoCD Taskforce Plenary with the European Commission (EC) mapped European Democracy Shield priorities into the existing CoCD Working Groups. This resulted in an expanded scope, and the original Taskforce Working Group was expanded into additional working groups. Meta's participation in Task-force working groups during this period was as follows:

- Elections Working Group — The most active WG during the reporting period; focused on novel threats including AI-generated content and rapid response mechanisms. Meta participated in meetings and contributed to the development of the Rapid Response System (RRS) Framework.

- AI Working Group — Focused on detection and labelling of AI-generated/manipulated content. The EC is pushing guidelines for Gen AI labelling; industry participants (including Meta) are engaging on the intersection with Art 50 AI Act Code of Practice work.

- Crisis Protocol Working Group — Focused on the Rapid Response System for crisis situations. The EC is developing a Code-specific crisis protocol; industry signatories are engaging on alignment with existing DSA obligations.

- Integrity of Services Working Group — Focused on voluntary user verification and recommender transparency. The platform coordinator position remains vacant; Meta continues to monitor developments.

- Ads Scrutiny Working Group — Focused on demonetisation of ads. This group has not been active during the reporting period, though the EC expects all platforms with relevant commitments to participate once convened.

Meta remains an active participant in the Task-force plenary sessions and responds to meeting invitations as they are scheduled by the EC. Meta's engagement is aligned with the current Task-force priorities of election integrity and AI-related disinformation challenges.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

- Maintained and enhanced dedicated cross-functional team structure to support CoCD implementation, including Meta's Public Policy & Global Affairs team), Regulatory Information Response team, and Global Response Operations team.

- Continued investment in teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development — all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation.

- Active and ongoing participation in EC COCD Task-force plenary sessions and working groups, with current engagement focused on the Elections/AI Working Group and the Rapid Response System (RRS) to ensure alignment with Code requirements and adaptation of internal processes as needed.

- Maintained the Regulatory Information Response (RIR) process to proactively manage compliance deliverables and audit readiness across all signed-up commitments, including bi-annual Transparency Report production and submission within required deadlines

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

QRE 38.1.1

Meta dedicated adequate financial and human resources and maintained appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of its commitments under the Code, including but not limited to the following:

Dedicated Teams Supporting CoCD Implementation:
- Public Policy & Global Affairs Team: Alongside the Content Policy team responsible for maintaining Meta’s Misinformation Policy, and EMEA Integrity Legal, it serves as the primary liaison with the European Commission (EC) COCD Task-force. This team regularly participates in EC Task-force meetings and working groups, ensuring Meta's internal processes remain aligned with Code requirements.

- Regulatory Information Response (RIR) Team: Maintains a regulatory information response process to proactively produce regulatory reports, including the COCD bi-annual Transparency Report submissions. Following a 2025 organisational redesign, RIR operates under a regional model for response execution, with dedicated Response Managers organised regionally to deepen jurisdictional context and in-region expertise.

- The Regulatory Risk Management & Insights team (aka Global Response): This team coordinates the effective implementation of the Rapid Alert System ahead of each EU national election, which operates under the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework, supporting Meta's commitment to timely action on disinformation threats. The team is also responsible for coordinating the internal elections preparation work and ensures we have robust systems to respond to election specific risks, including misinformation and disinformation.

- Meta also maintains specialized teams who manage the relationship with third party fact-checkers and the overall Fact checking program in Europe

Cross-Functional Resource Allocation:
- Meta maintains teams with expertise across content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development — all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation in support of the Code.
- We have expert investigation teams to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats.
- These teams are distributed globally and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners, including content moderators located in the EU with specialist expertise in EU languages.

Internal Processes:
- A dedicated cross-functional team manages the day-to-day processes relating to the CoCD, including regulatory reporting, EC engagement, and coordination of compliance deliverables across all signed-up commitments.

- Meta's DSA Head of Compliance (HoC) communicates and shares relevant information with the EC in relation to Meta Platforms Ireland Limited's compliance with the DSA, which now includes the CoCD, engaging with the EC periodically and taking any necessary actions arising from those engagements.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

This report was submitted within the required timeline.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

This report was submitted within the required timeline.

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

For this report, Facebook. Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide relevant QREs and SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

Measure 40.1

Relevant Signatories that are Very Large Online Platforms, as defined in the DSA, will report every six-months on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs at service and Member State Level.

Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger

Measure 40.2

Other Signatories will report yearly on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures taken under the present Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs, at service and Member State level.

Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger

Measure 40.3

Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger

Measure 40.4

Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger

Measure 40.5

Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger

Measure 40.6

Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 41.1 Measure 41.2 Measure 41.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

We continue to engage with the Taskforce Monitoring Working Group.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We continue to engage with the Taskforce monitoring working group.

Measure 41.1

Within 1 month of signing the Code, Signatories will establish a Working Group to tackle this objective. This working group will be tasked with putting forward data points to be provided by Platform Signatories, and a methodology to measure Structural Indicators on the base of these data points, to be executed by non-Platform Signatories.

Facebook, Instagram

Measure 41.2

The Working Group will report on its progress to the Task-force on a trimestral basis. It will consult with expert stakeholders including but not limited to EDMO, ERGA, and researchers to inform its work and outputs.

Facebook, Instagram

Measure 41.3

Facebook, Instagram

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

We continue to engage in the Taskforce’s election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We continue to engage in the Taskforce’s election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.

Commitment 43

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger continue to engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

Commitment 44

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, following conversion of the Code into a Code of Conduct under the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits under the DSA.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?