Report March 2026

Submitted

Demagog is the first Polish fact-checking organization, established in 2014. Our mission is to combat disinformation and improve the quality of public debate by providing access to unbiased and credible information. For more than 10 years we’ve been fact-checking political claims, keeping track of the promises and debunking harmful disinformation. We strive to build a strong misinformation-resilient civil society that keeps politicians accountable for what they say and promise. We believe that we can achieve this goal by empowering citizens with critical fact-checking and media literacy skills. That’s why we share our expertise with others in our educational project called Fact-checking Academy. We are signatories to the 2022 European Code of Practice on Disinformation and the Polish Code of Good Practices in Combating Disinformation. We are members of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) and the Central European Digital Media Observatory Hub (CEDMO). We are partners to Meta's Third Party Fact-checking Program and TikTok's Fact-checking Program.

Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 33.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 33.1

Relevant Signatories will comply with the requirements of instruments such as being verified signatories of the International Fact-checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles or the future Code of Professional Integrity for Independent European fact-checking organisations.

Demagog Association commits to operate under strict ethical and transparency rules and to comply with relevant codes setting the qualitative standards for the fact-checking community based on principles of transparency, non- partisanship and fairness.

QRE 33.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the status of their membership to instruments such as those mentioned in Measure 33.1 and the actions taken as a result of that to ensure strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

Demagog Association maintains its commitment to adhere to highest qualitative standards for the fact-checking community. Since 2019 we are a verified member of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). The renewal process will take place later this year (2026). As of March 2026, in the IFCN there are 163 verified active signatories and 22 organizations under renewal process. Since 2023, we are certified members of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network. We have been verified as compliant with its Code with last renewal in May 2025. As of March 2026, there are 62 verified members of the EFCSN.

The European Code of Standards for Independent Fact-Checking Organisations is a set of criteria designed to ensure that organisations fact-checking mis- and disinformation adhere to the highest standards of methodology, ethics and transparency in order to best serve the public interest. Membership in the EFCSN signifies an organisation’s rigorous commitment to provide accurate information ethically and transparently, without bias or prejudice. Members focus on matters in the public interest and have a proven track record of excellence, integrity and accountability.

Last year Demagog Association actively participated in EFCSN’s working group on adapting the Code to new challenges.

SLI 33.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the number of European fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified or are members of the future Code of Professional Integrity.

Nr of fact-checkers IFCN-certified:

163 signatories

22 organizations under renewal

Nr of fact-checkers EFCSN-certified:

62 verified members

Country	Nr of fact-checkers IFCN-certified	Nr of members of CPI
Austria	0	0
Belgium	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	0	0
Estonia	0	0
Finland	0	0
France	0	0
Germany	0	0
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	0	0
Italy	0	0
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	0	0
Poland	0	0
Portugal	0	0
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	0	0
Sweden	0	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	0	0

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Demagog Association reaffirms its commitment to ensure the proper implementation of the Code.

QRE 38.1.1

In the first half of the year, Demagog Association delegated its Director of International Affairs, Pawel Terpilowski, to be a representative of the organization in the work of the Permanent Task-force as well as the coordinator of all activities undertaken by the organization to ensure the proper implementation of our commitments in the Code of Practice, including its involvement in the Rapid Response System. He was later replaced by Patryk Zakrzewski, the Vice President of the Board. Demagog Association allocates necessary financial and human resources to ensure compliance with the Code.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 40.2

Other Signatories will report yearly on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures taken under the present Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs, at service and Member State level.

Demagog Association reaffirms its commitment to provide relevant yearly reporting on the implementation of its commitments and measures in the Code of Practice as well as adequate feedback on improving the monitoring and reporting framework of the Code.

Measure 40.3

Measure 40.4

Measure 40.5

Measure 40.6

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

During the reporting period, an election campaign took place in Poland ahead of the presidential elections in May and June. Officially, the campaign began on January 15, but in fact, competition between candidates had already been underway since the final weeks of 2024. The post-election period also required special attention due to ongoing discussions about the legality of Karol Nawrocki’s election to the office of President.

During this period, we identified several particularly widespread false narratives. Some of them concerned Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland. The social media accounts and politicians we monitored closely claimed that the current government wanted to drag Poland into a war with Russia. In this way, they portrayed actions in support of Ukraine as dangerous to Poland’s security. They repeatedly overinterpreted statements and documents to present them as alleged evidence of sending Polish troops to Ukraine. They also argued that Ukrainians in Poland are a burden on the state budget and a threat to internal security. Contrary to the facts, they claimed that tax contributions from Ukrainian citizens are lower than public spending on them. They attempted to focus attention on extreme cases of Ukrainian crime in Poland without considering the broader statistical picture. Often referring to the Volhynia massacre, and sometimes questioning recent reports about perpetrators’ cooperation with Russian services, they claimed that Ukrainians were committing arson in Poland out of hatred toward Poles. We observed cases of impersonation on social media, where individuals posed as pro-Ukrainian activists and organizations. There were also cases of sending compromising letters to local governments on their behalf.

The second frequently discussed topic was migration. It was claimed that the current government had agreed, under the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, to relocate thousands of refugees from Germany to Poland. A narrative was created suggesting that within just a few months, a very large number of migrants from Africa and the Middle East had already arrived in Poland. As evidence many sources used cases of migrants being turned back at the Polish-German border, recordings of Muslim gatherings during religious holidays, as well as videos and photos taken out of context and often originating from outside Poland. It was argued that immigrants pose a threat to internal security and that Germany is attempting to use Poland as a place to transfer large numbers of the most dangerous foreigners.

The third popular topic was climate change. The European Green Deal was portrayed as a set of absurd solutions that would drive Polish citizens into poverty. Claims were made about enormous costs of the energy transition, often involving manipulation of data. At the same time, contrary to the facts, coal-based energy was presented as a good solution that could provide Poland with cheap energy for hundreds or even thousands of years. Concerns about the effects of continued greenhouse gas emissions were countered with pseudoscientific theories denying global warming.

Additionally, on the days of the first and second rounds of the election, some politicians and social media accounts opposed to the government claimed that attempts at electoral fraud were underway. One civil society organization created a special application allegedly intended to detect individuals attempting to vote multiple times in different polling stations. Due to numerous mistakes in this solution, it led to many false positives. After the election, in turn, pro-government politicians and accounts, as well as some experts, used statistical manipulation to argue that electoral fraud had occurred in many polling stations in favor of the opposition candidate. This resulted in the highest number of election protests in years and a political dispute over the validity of the presidential election. Before the election, we ourselves highlighted a security loophole involving easily bypassed safeguards in the mObywatel application. It led to legal changes and the introduction of a new method for verifying electronic identity documents during voting.

It is worth noting that this was the first election campaign with such extensive and frequent use of artificial intelligence. It was primarily used to create materials supporting various candidates, especially to generate images of young people declaring their intention to vote for them.

Mitigations in place

As part of preparations for the election campaign:

We initiated cooperation with media outlets (Onet, Fakt, Imponderabilia), a media monitoring company (IMM), a PR company (PRoto), and creators of political preference tests (MyPolitics). We carried out the “Elections Without Fraud” campaign promoting fair public debate and informed electoral decision-making. Together, we monitored candidates’ media activity, describing it in weekly reports. We publicized cases of falsehoods and manipulation and highlighted shortcomings in the systemic fight against disinformation.

We developed a methodology for observing and analyzing FIMI, then launched monitoring and published weekly analytical reports. Thus we highlighted trends, sources of disinformation, and manipulation techniques.

We designed and implemented the “Facts in Real Time” („Fakty na bieżąco”) format. These are short texts providing a rapid response to information chaos and serving as a form of prebunking emerging disinformation narratives.

We improved the process of live fact-checking of political debates and carried out such during the main debates before the first and second rounds of the election. In particular our activity during the debate before the second round attracted significant attention and contributed to popularizing the idea of fact-checking in Poland.

Significant attention was also drawn to our report on the foreign financing of social media advertisements supporting the ruling coalition’s candidate and criticizing the opposition. This potentially illegal campaign financing attracted the interest of the National Electoral Commission and foreign observers.

Apart from the editorial work, the organisation was also involved in the Rapid Response System activities, providing inputs in regard to content that might would have affected the election integrity.