YouTube

Report September 2026

Submitted

Executive summary


Google’s mission is to organise the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful. To deliver on this mission, and as technology evolves, helping users find useful, relevant and high-quality information across our services is of utmost importance. 

Since Google was founded, Google’s product, policy, and content enforcement decisions have been guided by the following three principles:

  1. We value openness and accessibility: We lean towards keeping content accessible by providing access to an open and diverse information ecosystem.
  2. We respect user choice: If users search for content that is not illegal or prohibited by our policies, they should be able to find it.
  3. We build for everyone: Our services are used around the world by users from different cultures, languages, and backgrounds, and at different stages in their lives. We take the diversity of our users into account in policy development and policy enforcement decisions.

With these principles in mind, Google has long invested in ranking systems and has teams around the world working to connect people with high-quality content; in developing and enforcing rules that prohibit harmful behaviours and content on Google services; and in innovative ways to provide context to users when they might need it most. 

How companies like Google address information quality concerns has an impact on society and on the trust users place in our services. We are cognisant that these are complex issues, affecting all of society, which no single actor is in a position to fully tackle on their own. That is why we have welcomed the multi-stakeholder approach put forward by the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation. 

Alongside our participation in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation, we continue to work closely with regulators to ensure that our services appropriately comply with the EU Digital Services Act (EU DSA), in full respect of EU fundamental rights such as freedom of expression.

The work of supporting a healthy information ecosystem is never finished and we remain committed to it. This is in our interest and the interest of our users.

This report includes metrics and narrative detail for Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising users in the European Union (EU), and covers the period from 1 January 2026 to 30 June 2026.

Updates to highlight in this report include (but are not limited to): 
  • 2026 Elections across EU Member States: During the reporting period, voters cast their ballots in Slovenia, Hungary, Denmark, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta. Google supported these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse, and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training. In addition, Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that helped people navigate political content that was AI-generated, content labels on YouTube, and digital watermarking tools. 
  • Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and provenance transparency: In H1 2026, we announced new and expanded AI provenance tools to help increase content transparency, including Content Credentials verification across products. Content Credentials (C2PA) verification shows users whether the origin of content was AI or a camera, and if it’s been edited with generative AI tools. To give more access to this information, we have begun to expand both Content Credentials and SynthID verification beyond Gemini by integrating into our Search and Chrome products. For example, Google Lens has integrated SynthID verification. 
  • When we launched SynthID in 2023— a state-of-the-art tool that embeds imperceptible watermarks and enables the identification of AI-generated content — our aim was to provide a suite of novel technical solutions to help minimise misinformation and misattribution.
    • SynthID not only preserves the content’s quality, it acts as a robust watermark that remains detectable even when the content is shared or undergoes a range of transformations. While originally focused on AI-generated imagery only, we have since expanded SynthID to include AI-generated text, audio and video content, including content generated by our Gemini, Imagen, Lyria and Veo models. Since launch, over 100 billion images and videos and 60,000 years of audio assets have been watermarked with SynthID.
    • SynthID Detector, a verification portal to identify AI-generated content made with Google AI, was introduced in May 2025. The portal, which is accessible to early testers, provides detection capabilities across different modalities in one place, and provides essential transparency in the rapidly evolving landscape of generative media. Its eventual goal is to provide cross-verification capabilities within our ecosystem of SynthID partners. In November 2025, detection capabilities for Google AI-generated content were integrated natively into the Gemini app, allowing millions of people to quickly verify content provenance. In May 2026, we expanded this verification capability to Search features like Google Lens and announced that the integration was coming soon to Chrome.
    • How SynthID Detector & verification works: When a user uploads an image, audio track, or video via Google's AI tools or SynthID-integrated partner tools (see next bullet), our verification systems will scan the media for a SynthID watermark. If a watermark is detected, we will highlight specific portions of the content most likely to be watermarked. For audio, we pinpoint specific segments where a SynthID watermark is detected, and for images, we indicate areas where a watermark is most likely.
  • In addition to our continued work and investment in new tools, we are also committed to working with the greater ecosystem and across the industry to help others benefit from and improve on the advances we are making. As such, we have open-sourced SynthID text watermarking through our updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit and several of our industry partners, including Nvidia, OpenAI and ElevenLabs, have integrated SynthID into their tools to embed watermarks in their own AI-generated content.
  • Underpinning our advancements in AI, as a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), we collaborated with Adobe, Microsoft, OpenAI, Meta, startups, and many others to build and implement the newest version of the coalition’s technical standard, Content Credentials (v2.4, launched in April 2026). This version expands native support for additional digital media container types, updates assertion structures for improved lineage tracking, and adds security guidance for handling sensitive metadata.

Google has been working on AI for over a decade to solve society’s biggest challenges and also power the Google services people use every day. The progress in large-scale AI models (including generative AI) has sparked additional discussion about the social impacts of AI and raised concerns on topics such as disinformation. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and first published AI Principles in 2018 to guide our work. Google’s robust internal governance focuses on responsibility throughout the AI development lifecycle, covering model development, application deployment, and post-launch monitoring. We publish an annual Responsible AI Progress Report with the latest published in February 2026. Through our philanthropic arm, Google.org, we have supported organisations that are using AI to tackle important societal issues. Google Search has published guidance for developers on AI-generated content, outlining its approach to maintaining a high standard of information quality and the overall helpfulness of content on Search. 

To help enhance information quality across its services, Google continuously works to integrate new innovations in watermarking, metadata, and other techniques into its latest generative models. Google has also joined other leading AI companies to jointly commit to advancing responsible practices in the development of artificial intelligence, which will support efforts by the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and national governments. Going forward, we will continue to report and expand upon Google-developed AI tools and are committed to advancing bold and responsible AI to maximise AI’s benefits and minimise its risks.

Lastly, the contents of this report should be read with the following context in mind: 
  • This report discusses the key approaches across the following Google services when it comes to addressing disinformation: Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising. 
  • For chapters of the Code that involve the same actions across all three services (e.g. participation in the Permanent Task-force or in development of the Transparency Centre), we respond as 'Google, on behalf of related services'.
  • This report follows the structure and template laid out by the Code’s Permanent Task-force, organised around Commitments and Chapters of the Code.
  • Unless otherwise specified, metrics provided cover activities and actions during the period from 1 January 2026 to 30 June 2026.
  • The data provided in this report is subject to a range of factors, including product changes and user settings, and so is expected to fluctuate over the time of the reporting period. As Google continues to evolve its approach, in part to better address user and regulatory needs, the data reported here could vary substantially over time. 
  • We are continuously working to improve the safety and reliability of our services. We are not always in a position to pre-announce specific launch dates, details or timelines for upcoming improvements, and therefore may reply 'no' when asked whether we can disclose future plans for Code implementation measures in the coming reporting period. This 'no' should be understood in the context that we are constantly working to improve safety and reliability and may in fact launch relevant changes without the ability to pre-announce. 
  • This report is filed concurrently with two ‘crisis reports’ about our response to the Israel-Gaza conflict and to the war in Ukraine. Additionally, an annex on Google’s response to the recent elections in Slovenia, Hungary, Denmark, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta is included in this report.
  • The term ‘disinformation’ in this report refers to the definition included in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

Google looks forward to continuing to work together with other stakeholders in the EU to address challenges related to disinformation.

Download PDF

Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here
  • Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) published its Quarterly Influence Operations Bulletins for Q1 2026 and Q2 2026, which provide updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
N/A
Measure 16.1
Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.
QRE 16.1.1
Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.
Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States. 

One of GTIG’s missions is to understand and disrupt coordinated information operations threat actors. Their work enables Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by rigorous analysis. Their investigations do not focus on making judgements about the content on Google platforms, but rather they examine technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural patterns to make an assessment that activity is coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

GTIG publishes the quarterly bulletins here (formerly known as the TAG Bulletin and, starting in Q1 2026, the Influence Operations Bulletin). These provide updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms, as well as additional periodic blog posts. GTIG also engages with other platform Signatories to receive and, when permitted by law and strictly necessary for security purposes, share information related to threat actor activity – in compliance with applicable laws. To learn more, refer to SLI 16.1.1.

See Google’s disclosure policies about handling security vulnerabilities for developers and security professionals.
SLI 16.1.1
Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).
See response to QRE 16.1.1

YouTube
The publicly available bulletins that were published for the reporting period show:
  • The number of actions taken on YouTube channels involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. 
  • The languages of the uploaded content that were part of campaigns.
  • Brief descriptions of the campaigns.
  • Instances when industry partners supported YouTube’s actions by providing leads.

Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or were based in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in an EEA Member State language does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State. 

The Influence Operations Bulletins and periodic blog posts are Google’s, including YouTube’s, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues.


The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to provide a means for cooperation and communication between them for a period of time ahead, during and after the election period.

The RRS allows non-platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to report time-sensitive content or accounts that they deem may present serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process, and enables discussion with the platform Signatories in light of their respective policies.

The disclosures below also include reporting through the RRS of allegedly illegal content. Although the Article 16 Digital Services Act (DSA) mechanism should be used by non-platform Signatories to report allegedly illegal content, Google reviews such notifications, too, as part of the RRS, provided the non-platform Signatory has already used the Article 16 DSA mechanism to submit them and shares the appropriate notification reference with Google through the RRS.

Note: Portugal’s RRS metrics for the January 2026 elections were included in the H2 2025 report and are not reproduced below.

Please note that the reported figures exclude reports relating to Ads.

Search 
  • Slovenia - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Hungary - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Denmark - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Bulgaria - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Cyprus - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Malta - No notifications were received through RRS.

YouTube
  • Slovenia - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Hungary - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Denmark - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Bulgaria - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Cyprus - No notifications were received through RRS.
  • Malta - No notifications were received through RRS.