TikTok

Report September 2026

Submitted
TikTok’s mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. With more than 200 million people across Europe coming to TikTok every month, including 189 million in the EU, it’s natural for people to hold different opinions. That’s why we focus on a shared set of facts when it comes to issues that affect people’s safety. A safe, authentic, and trustworthy experience is essential to achieving our goals. Transparency plays a key role in building that trust, allowing online communities and society to assess how TikTok meets its regulatory obligations. As a signatory to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation (the Code), TikTok is committed to sharing clear insights into the actions we take.

TikTok takes disinformation extremely seriously. We are committed to preventing its spread, promoting authoritative information, and supporting media literacy initiatives that strengthen community resilience.

Our 2026 H1 report under the Code can be found below. 

Download PDF

Commitment 14
In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here
  • Our 2025 Community Guidelines update went live on September 13, 2025, ensuring that they remain aligned with our internal policies and were in force during the reporting period.
    • Our Harmful Misinformation policies are referenced under the hack and leak section. They have all been refined in H2 2025, and they continue to drive our work in combating harmful misinformation.
  • We have enhanced our ability to detect covert influence operations, as detailed in our dedicated Covert Influence Operations Transparency Report available in our Trust & Safety Centre
  • We updated and refined our policies around Covert Influence Operations in order to stay agile to changing behaviours and tactics on the platform and to ensure more granular detail is enshrined in our policy rationales. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A
Measure 14.1
Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.
QRE 14.1.1
Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies in our Community Guidelines expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours and relate to the TTPs as follows:
TTPs which pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and the ways to make these assets seem credible:
Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies expressly prohibit account behaviours that may spam or mislead our community. These include:
- Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
- Bulk distribution of a high volume of spam; and
- Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes
We also do not allow impersonation, including:
- Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
- Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform
Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) and use of fake followers or subscribers
Our Integrity and Authenticity policies do not allow the trade or marketing of services that attempt to artificially increase engagement or deceive TikTok’s recommendation system. We do not allow our users to:
- facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
- provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
TikTok does not have pages, fora, or domains. TikTok has invite-only private group chats. Therefore, this TTP is not materially relevant and - in any case - is generally addressed through broader integrity measures such as our Integrity and Authenticity policies.
Account hijacking or Impersonation
As described above, our Integrity and Authenticity policies prohibit impersonation, which refers to accounts that pose as another real person or entity or present as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform. Our users are not allowed to use someone else's name, biographical details, or profile picture in a misleading manner.
In order to protect freedom of expression, we do allow accounts that are clearly parody, commentary, or fan-based, such as where the account name indicates that it is a fan, commentary, or parody account and not affiliated with the subject of the account. We continue to develop our policies to ensure that impersonation of entities (such as businesses or educational institutions, for example) is prohibited and that accounts which impersonate people or entities who are not on the platform are also prohibited.
Our Privacy and Security policies under our Community Guidelines address account hijacking. We expressly prohibit users from providing access to their account credentials to others or enabling others to conduct activities against our Community Guidelines. We do not allow access to any part of TikTok through unauthorised methods; attempts to obtain sensitive, confidential, commercial, or personal information; or any abuse of the security, integrity, or reliability of our platform. We also provide practical guidance to users if they have concerns that their account may have been hacked.
Our TikTok Shop Content Policy also prohibits impersonating other individuals or organisations to deceive or mislead users or make false representations. In addition, under TikTok Shop's Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) policy, creators must not use AI-generated content to impersonate celebrities, medical professionals, political figures, public figures or official authorities for product promotion.
TTPs which pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views:
Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. location spoofing or obfuscation), inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers), use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, and coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.
We address covert influence operations (CIOs) through our Covert Influence Operations (CIO) policy, which prohibits attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose.
We focus on behavioural signals and linkages between accounts and techniques to determine if actors are engaging in a coordinated effort to mislead our systems or community. We take continuous action against these attempts, including banning accounts found to be linked to previously disrupted networks. Our approach is supported by ongoing research into complex deceptive behaviours and iterative updates to our product and policy solutions to address emerging disinformation risks. We also publish regular transparency reports detailing the CIO networks we detect and remove, which are available in our Trust & Safety Centre here. For advertising-related CIO measures, please refer to Chapter 2.
TikTok Shop's Creator Fraud, Abuse and Misconduct Policy prohibits:
- Fake interactions, being activities that involve directly manipulating platform metrics or algorithms to artificially boost performance.
- Traffic manipulation, which involves generating traffic, exposure, or engagement through improper, deceptive, or non-genuine means.
- Inauthentic engagement behaviours, which involve deceptive or manipulative tactics intended to influence buyer behavior or artificially drive engagement.
TikTok Shop's Content Policy also prohibits certain forms of artificial amplification and coordinated distribution of e-commerce content. This includes creating multiple accounts to distribute the same e-commerce content, coordinated mass posting across multiple accounts, and the use of malicious software or modified code to artificially increase views, likes, followers, shares or comments.
Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
We have a number of policies that address hack-and-leak related threats, including:
- Our hack and leak policy aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities, and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures.
- Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation.
- Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure.
- Our misinformation policies prohibit:
- Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or incites panic, including falsely presenting past crisis events as recent or claiming that critical resources are unavailable during emergencies.
- Health misinformation that could cause significant harm, such as promoting unproven treatments that may be fatal, discouraging professional care for life-threatening conditions (e.g., vaccine effectiveness), or spreading false information about how such conditions are transmitted.
- Misinformation that denies the existence of climate change, misrepresents its causes, or contradicts its established environmental impact.
- Conspiracy theories or hoaxes that could cause significant harm, such as those that make a violent call to action or have links to previous violence.
Deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
Our ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy outlines our existing prohibitions on AIGC.
In accordance with our policy, we prohibit AIGC which features:
- Using the likeness of private figures without consent
- Sexualized, fetishized, or victimizing depictions
- AI-created likenesses made to bully or harass
- Accounts focused on AI images of youth in clothing suited for adults, or sexualized poses or facial expressions
- AIGC or significantly edited content that misleads about a matter of public importance, such as:
- Content made to look like it comes from a real news source
- A crisis event, like a natural disaster or conflict
- A public figure being degraded, harassed, or linked to criminal behavior
- A public figure taking political stances, supporting products, or commenting on public issues they haven't actually addressed
- A political endorsement or condemnation that never happened
- Any content that breaks our Community Guidelines, including those on impersonation, misinformation, and hate speech, even if it's AI-generated
TikTok Shop's AIGC policy also prohibits the use of AI-generated content that impersonates celebrities, medical professionals, political figures, public figures or official authorities for product promotion, including AI-generated deepfakes and other manipulated media.
Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
Under our Terms of Service and Commercial Disclosure and Paid Marketing section of our Community Guidelines, users posting about a brand or product in return for any payment or other incentive must disclose their content by enabling the Commercial Disclosure Toggle, which we make available for users. To support enforcement, we provide a reporting functionality for suspected undisclosed branded content, which triggers user prompts and encourages corrective action.
For TikTok Shop, creator commissions are paid through TikTok itself, meaning TikTok is aware whenever content contains a shoppable product link and the creator is remunerated. As a result, such content does not rely on user self-disclosure: the Commercial Disclosure Toggle is automatically enabled when a product link is added.
Our Political Advertising policy prohibits political advertising, including political branded content.
With regard to Advertising Policies, please refer to Chapter 2 concerning Misinformation Advertising Policies.
In addition, our CIO policy also applies to non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers where it is found that those messages or promotions formed part of a covert influence campaign.
QRE 14.1.2
Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.
We proactively detect TTPs and related practices through a combination of automated systems, behavioural analytics and specialised investigative teams.
We have created and used detection models and rule engines that:
- Prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
- Remove registered accounts based on certain signals (i.e., uncommon behaviour on the platform).
We also manually monitor user reports of inauthentic accounts in order to detect larger clusters or similar inauthentic behaviours.
Given the complex nature of the TTPs, human moderation is critical to success in assessing and addressing identified violations. We provide our moderation teams with detailed guidance on how to apply the Integrity and Authenticity policies in our Community Guidelines, allowing them to route new or evolving content to our fact-checking partners for assessment.
In addition, where content reaches certain popularity levels in terms of the number of video views, it will be flagged for further review given the increase in potential harm if the content is found to be in breach of our Community Guidelines, including our Integrity and Authenticity policies.
Furthermore, during this reporting period, we improved automated detection and enforcement of our ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy, effectively increasing the number of videos removed for policy violations. This also decreased the number of views per video over the reporting period, demonstrating an effective control strategy as the scope of enforcement increased.
We've built international trust and safety teams with specialised expertise across threat intelligence, security, law enforcement, and data science to work on influence operations. These teams are trained to continuously pursue and analyse on-platform technical signals as well as leads from external sources to detect and investigate potential CIOs. They also collaborate with external intelligence vendors to support specific investigations on a case-by-case basis.
Accounts that engage in influence operations often avoid posting content that would be violative of platforms' guidelines by itself. That's why we focus on accounts' behaviour and technical linkages, specifically looking for evidence that:
- They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or work together to spread the same narrative.
- They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location or use fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
- They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision-making, beliefs, and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.
These criteria are aligned with industry standards and guidance from the experts we regularly consult with. They're particularly important to help us distinguish malicious, inauthentic coordination from authentic interactions that are part of healthy and open communities.