French Elections
(I) Moderation capabilities
We have thousands of trust and safety professionals dedicated to keeping our platform safe. As they usually do, our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently
enforcing our rules to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. In advance of the election we had proactive data monitoring, trend detection and regular monitoring of enriched keywords and accounts.
(II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration
On 17 June, ahead of the French Elections, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC) bringing together employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams were able to provide consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, and during, the French Election.
(III) Countering misinformation
Our misinformation moderators receive enhanced training and tools to detect and remove misinformation and other violative content. We also have teams on the ground who partner with experts to ensure local context and nuance is reflected in our approach.
In the weeks leading up to and including the snap election, we removed over 1,200 videos for violating our civic and election integrity policies, and over 9,000 videos for violating our misinformation policies. We removed over 99% of violative misinformation content before it was reported to us.
(IV) Fact-checking
Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify.
TikTok collaborates with
14 fact-checking organizations across Europe to evaluate the accuracy of content in most European languages, including French.
Agence France-Presse (AFP), serves as the fact-checking partner for France, which provided coverage for the platform.
(V) Deterring covert influence operations
We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encourage them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our
website.
(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content
Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an
AI-generated content label to help people do this. TikTok has a ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.
(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPPAs)
Many political leaders, ministers, and political parties have a presence on TikTok.These politicians and parties play an important role on our platform - we believe that verified accounts belonging to politicians and institutions provide the electorate with another route to access their representatives, and additional trusted voices in the shared fight against misinformation.
We strongly recommend GPPPAs have their accounts
verified by TikTok. Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they’re seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.
Before the French Election we met with French political parties Heads of Communication to (i) provide an overview of TikTok's policies for political accounts, (ii) outline TikTok's approach to election integrity and to data security, (iii) encourage account verification and (iv) enable direct contact to respond to their specific requests.
Directing people to trusted sources
(I) Investing in media literacy
We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. TikTok has partnered with AFP in France to help the community safely navigate the platform and protect themselves against potential misinformation during the elections. AFP developed a series of educational videos explaining how users could identify and avoid misinformation, use TikTok’s safety features, and critically evaluate content related to the electoral process. The French community could find the video series with practical advice and useful information about the electoral process in the relevant Election Center.
External engagement at the national and EU levels
(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COPD Signatories
The COPD Rapid Response System (RRS) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 2 RRS reports through the RRS before the French Election, which were rapidly addressed. Actions included banning of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.
(II) Engagement with local experts
To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the French Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with AFP who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams
(III) Engagement with national authorities and stakeholders
In order to prepare for the French Election, our Government Relations represented TikTok at an official meeting organised by the EU Commission with ARCOM ahead of the elections alongside representatives from other online platforms.
We also liaised with the French Government’s Information Service (SIG) to include relevant official resources in TikTok's in-app election guide.
As previously referenced, we also met with French political parties’ Heads of Communication to (i) provide an overview of TikTok's policies for political accounts, (ii) outline TikTok's approach to election integrity and to data security, (iii) encourage account verification and (iv) enable direct contact to respond to their specific requests.
Romanian Presidential Election
Enforcing our policies
(I) Moderation capabilities
Our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently
enforcing our rules to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. We continue to prioritize and enhance TikTok's automated moderation technology as such technology enables faster and consistent removal of content that violates our rules. We invest in technologies that improve content understanding and predict potential risks so that we can take action on violative content before it's viewed.
We have thousands of trust and safety professionals dedicated to keeping our platform safe. We have 99 Romanian-speaking moderators, which is the largest such team among digital platforms in the country, both in absolute terms and relative to the number of users. We increased resources on our Romanian elections task force by adding more than 120 subject matter experts across multiple teams including Deceptive Behaviour (which includes Covert Influence Operations analysts), Security and Ads Integrity.
(II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration
On 23 October 2024, in advance of the official campaign period for the Romanian Presidential Election, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC), including employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams were able to provide consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, and during, the Romanian Presidential Election.
(III) Countering misinformation
Our misinformation moderators receive enhanced training and tools to detect and remove misinformation and other violative content. We also have teams on the ground who partner with experts to ensure local context and nuance is reflected in our approach. We also integrated the most recent insights from our expert partners into our policies and guidelines on misinformation and impersonation. We removed more than 5,500 pieces of election-related content in Romania for violating our policies on misinformation, harassment, and hate speech between the end of October and 17 December 2024.
(IV) Fact-checking
Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify. TikTok collaborates with
14 fact-checking organizations across Europe to evaluate the accuracy of content in most European languages, including Romanian.
LeadStories, which is a verified member of International Fact-Checking Network and the European Fact-Checking Standards Network, serves as the fact-checking partner for Romania, which provided coverage for the platform, including across weekends.
(V) Deterring covert influence operations
We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encourage them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our
website.
(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content
Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an
AI-generated content label to help people do this. TikTok has a ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.
(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPPAs)
We classify presidential candidate accounts as a Government, Politician, and Political Party Account (
GPPPA). We then apply designated policies to GPPPAs to ensure the right experience, given their important role in civic processes. This includes disabling monetisation features.
We strongly recommended that GPPPAs be
verified. Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they’re seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.
In advance of the elections TikTok’s GR team organized dedicated sessions with every political group in Romania to inform about our policies and to educate political actors about safety measures. TikTok also requested a list of candidates be provided by the Romanian authorities to ensure the GPPPA label could be correctly applied where relevant.
Directing people to trusted sources
(I) Investing in media literacy
We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. TikTok has partnered with the local NGO
Funky Citizens in Romania to help the community safely navigate the platform and protect themselves against potential misinformation during the election. Funky Citizens developed a series of educational videos explaining how users could identify and avoid misinformation, use TikTok’s safety features, and critically evaluate content related to the electoral process. The Romanian community could find the video series with practical advice and useful information about the electoral process on
Funky Citizens' official TikTok account and the in-app Election Center dedicated to Romania’s elections. These videos were viewed 47,855,301 times between November 2024 and December 2024.
External engagement at the national and EU levels
(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COPD Signatories
The COPD Rapid Response System (RRS) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 11 notifications through the RRS in relation to the Romanian Election which were addressed and actioned, enforcement included banning or geo-blocking of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.
(II) Engagement with local experts
To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Romanian Presidential Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with Funky Citizens who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.
(III) Engagement with national authorities pre-election
GR proactively organized an election-dedicated meeting on 22 October 2024 with ANCOM, the Permanent Electoral Authority and Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization to establish points of contact before the elections and to offer access to our reporting tools and propose joint cooperation in creating an election center. At this meeting TikTok requested a candidate list to ensure we could apply our GPPPA label where relevant.
On 14 November 2024, TikTok in cooperation with the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization, organized an onsite session on disrupting covert influence operations. The meeting was attended by Romanian experts from the Ministry, ANCOM, DNSC and the Police. TikTok representatives from explained TikTok's approach to those risk posed by CIO and shared their professional knowledge
(III) Engagement with national authorities and stakeholders and EU authorities post election
The first round of the Presidential election was held on 24 November 2024. In the immediate aftermath, there were concerns about the election results and suspicions of an inauthentic online campaign aimed at mobilising voters in favour of one candidate.
On 29 November 2024 TikTok participated in a European Commission Roundtable with the Romanian Digital Services Coordinator ANCOM, relevant state authorities and civil society organisations and other platforms to discuss the situation in respect of the Romanian elections and the measures platforms were taking to help protect election integrity.
On 3 December 2024, we publicly answered questions from lawmakers at the European Parliament Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection.
On 5 December 2024 the European Commission issued a 'retention order' to TikTok requiring TikTok to preserve data related to risks its service could potentially pose to electoral processes and civic discourse in the EU. The order followed information received by the Commission in the context of the Romanian elections.
On 6 December 2024 the Constitutional Court of Romania exercised its power under the Romanian Constitution and decided that the entire electoral process with regard to the election of the President of Romania was annulled.
On
17 December 2024, the European Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the DSA in the context of the Romanian presidential elections. The decision to open an investigation took into account information received from
declassified intelligence reports by the Romanian authorities, as well as third-party reports. TikTok are co-operating fully with the EC in relation to the investigation.
More generally, we have engaged with relevant authorities in Romania in relation to the situation with the Presidential Election and encouraged them to share any intelligence so that we could work together to ensure the integrity of the election. TikTok has also responded to content related requests from the authorities, including the EC, by answering their specific questions about accounts and sharing details of our investigations.
Romania has now set a date to rerun its presidential election. The new vote will
take place on May 4, with a runoff planned two weeks later, on May 18.
