TikTok

Report March 2025

Submitted
TikTok's mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. In a global community such as ours with millions of users it is natural for people to have different opinions, so we seek to operate on a shared set of facts and reality when it comes to topics that impact people’s safety. Ensuring a safe and authentic environment for our community is critical to achieving our goals - this includes making sure our users have a trustworthy experience on TikTok. As part of creating a trustworthy environment, transparency is essential to enable online communities and wider society to assess TikTok's approach to its regulatory obligations. TikTok is committed to providing insights into the actions we are taking as a signatory to the Code of Practice on Disinformation (the Code). 

Our full executive summary is available as part of our report, which can be downloaded by following the link below.

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Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Actively engaged with the Crisis Response working group, sharing insights and learnings about relevant areas including CIOs. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. 
Measure 16.1
Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.
QRE 16.1.1
Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.
Central to our strategy for identifying and removing CIO on our platforms is working with our stakeholders including from civil society to user reports. This approach facilitates us - and others - disrupting the network’s operations in their early stages. In addition to continuously enhancing our in-house capabilities, we proactively engage in comprehensive reviews of our peers' publicly disclosed findings and swiftly implement necessary actions in alignment with our policies.

To provide more regular and detailed updates about the CIO we disrupt, we have introduced a new dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok’s transparency centre. In this report, we have also added new information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts. The insights and metrics in this report aim to inform industry peers and the research community. 

We share relevant insights and metrics within our quarterly transparency reports, which aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We also review relevant insights and metrics from other industry peers to cross-compare for any similar behaviour on TikTok.

We continue to engage in the sub groups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission. 

As we have detailed in other chapters to this report, we have robust monetisation integrity policies in place and have established joint operating procedures between specialist CIO investigations teams and monetisation integrity teams to work on joint investigations of CIOs involving monetised products.