Microsoft Bing

Report September 2025

Submitted
Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (MIOL)– the provider of Bing’s services in the European Union (EU) – welcomes the opportunity to file this report on our compliance with the commitments and measures of the strengthened 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation that we subscribed to in our Subscription Document dated 15 January 2025. This report covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2025 (the “Reporting Period”).    

Bing Search is an online search engine with the primary objective of connecting users to the most relevant search results from the web. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Therefore, addressing misinformation or disinformation in organic search results often requires a different approach than may be appropriate for other types of online services, as over-moderation of content in search could have a significant negative impact on the right to access information, freedom of expression, and media plurality. 

Bing carefully balances these competing fundamental rights and interests as it works to ensure that its algorithms return the most high-quality content available that is relevant to the user’s queries, working to avoid causing harm to users without unduly limiting their ability to access answers to the questions they seek. In some cases, different features may require different interventions based on functionality and user expectations. 

While Bing’s remediation efforts may on occasion involve removal of content from search results (where legal or policy considerations warrant removal), in many cases, Bing has found that actions such as targeted ranking interventions, or additional digital literacy features such as Answers pointing to high authority sources, or content provenance indicators, are more effective. Bing regularly reviews the efficacy of its measures to identify additional areas for improvement and works with internal and external subject matter experts in key policy areas to identify new threat vectors or improved mechanisms to help prevent users from being unexpectedly exposed to harmful content in search results that they did not expressly seek to find. 

Bing offers numerous generative AI experiences for users. For example, users may see generative search results on the main search engine results page for informational and complex queries. Generative search results are contained and indicated with an icon with the sentence “This summary was generated by AI from multiple online sources. Find the source links used for this summary under "Based on sources".” Users continue to see traditional search results immediately below any generative results. 

Bing also offers a fully generative search experience, previously known as Bing Generative Search and rebranded in April 2025 to Copilot Search. Copilot Search combines the foundation of Bing’s search results with the power of large and small language models (LLMs and SLMs). It understands the search query, reviews millions of sources of information, dynamically matches content, and generates search results in a new AI-generated layout to fulfil the intent of the user’s query more effectively. 

Bing also offers Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator. These experiences, powered by the very latest DALL∙E models from our partners at OpenAI, allow a user to create images and videos simply by using their own words to describe the picture they want to see. 

Bing follows the “Trustworthy Search Principles” (found at How Bing delivers search results - Microsoft Support) to guide the product design, experience, algorithms, and mitigation measures that Bing adopts to ensure users’ expectations are met while addressing potential risks or harms arising from use of the service, including across Bing’s GenAI experiences. 

As confirmed by Bing’s Year Two and Three Digital Service Act (DSA) Systemic Risk Assessments, the residual risks most relevant to misinformation and disinformation (i.e. those relating to Civic Discourse and Electoral Process, Public Health and Public Security) are categorised as “Low”. Of note, during the Reporting Period, Bing participated in the Rapid Response Systems activated for the elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland, and received no notifications during this period. 

Bing supports the objectives of the European Code of Practice on Disinformation (the “Code”) and we are committed to actively working with Signatories and the European Commission in the context of this Code to defend against disinformation on the Bing service.

Unless stated otherwise, data provided under this report covers a reporting period of 1 Jan 2025 to 31 June 2025 (“Reporting Period”).

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Crisis 2025
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].
Threats observed or anticipated
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Bing Search has observed instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to the Russia<>Ukraine conflict. Themes included narratives involving Ukrainian immigrants in different countries, specific countries’ support to Ukraine (often in the context of local elections), allegations surrounding Ukrainian politicians, military operations such as third parties' potential involvement in the war, etc.

Israel – Hamas conflict

Bing Search has observed instances of data void manipulation to show low-authority content to unsuspecting users related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. This type of search algorithm manipulation could potentially be used as a tactic to spread disinformation. Other themes observed have included foreign influence operations speculating on the evolution of conflict and military operations in the area, often referring to manipulated videos and images circulating online and narratives on the broader Middle East conflicts. 
Mitigations in place
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Microsoft has been actively involved in identifying and helping counter Russia’s cyber and influence operations aimed against Ukraine. In addition to supporting nonprofits, journalists, and academics within Ukraine, Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) team closely tracks cyber-enabled influence operations. MTAC’s work includes analysing the ways these methods are leveraged to target audiences in Central and Eastern Europe. 

Bing Search has implemented the following measures: (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features , along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report. 

Israel – Hamas conflict

As part of its regular practices, Bing search employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

Policies and Terms and Conditions
Outline any changes to your policies
Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Bing has not implemented additional policies specific to this crisis since its last report.

Israel – Hamas conflict 
Bing Search has not introduced specific policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks related to this crisis. 
Rationale - 51.1.3
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Prior to this reporting period, Bing had already established measures to address this crisis. Although Bing continues to refine its approach to addressing this crisis and continues to evolve mitigation measures, it has not introduced specific policy changes this reporting period.