Transparency Center

Report March 2025

Submitted

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Throughout the reporting period Microsoft continued to publish threat intelligence related to foreign cyber enabled interference in elections around the world. This intelligence was shared publicly so election authorities around the world, including in Romania and Croatia could benefit from the insights into foreign adversary activity.

Bing participated in the Elections Working Group and established additional intake channels to facilitate cross-platform information sharing in relation to the French, Romanian and Croatian Elections.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We look forward to continuing to work on this commitment with the other signatories as we develop further cross platform information sharing.

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Bing Search, through Microsoft, is an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force’s Crisis Response subgroup, in which it proactively provides analysis and data related to influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerges on its service.

Microsoft’s internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft Research (MSR), and AI For Good, collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams work with external organisations and companies to share and ingest data that help support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats.

Microsoft also works to identify and track nation-state information operations targeting democracies across the world and works with trusted third-party partners for early indicators of narratives, hashtags, or information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing. Through Microsoft’s Democracy Forward team and MTAC, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA member states, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections.

See also QRE 14.1.2.

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

See SLI 14.1.2 for defensive search interventions data, which is based in part on information and threat intelligence gathered through information sharing with third parties, as well as the internal Microsoft and Bing resources noted in QREs 16.1.1 and 14.1.2. Given the multipronged approach Microsoft and Bing take to monitoring and actioning influence operations and sources of misinformation and disinformation and the multiple internal and external sources relied upon, it is challenging to provide precise reporting on whether an incidence of single information sharing results in a corresponding defensive search intervention or other action.