Logically

Report March 2025

Submitted
Logically is a technology company that delivers powerful Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning solutions to tackle the toughest modern information challenges. We have developed a suite of products to help government, trust and safety teams, and enterprises gain comprehensive insights into the increasingly complex information landscape. We also operate one of the world’s largest fact-checking teams under our independent subsidiary, Logically Facts, which was created as a separate division in April 2023. 

Our team of award-winning data scientists, engineers, analysts, developers and investigators possess deep domain expertise in the dynamics of misleading content, deceptive behaviour and harmful online narratives. The team is united by the company’s mission to build advanced Artificial Intelligence to give organisations a decisive information advantage in combating threats online. Our OSINT team produces deep-dive investigations and reports on disinformation, including on foreign information manipulation and interference. Logically Facts publishes frequent indepth  fact checks, in addition to more detailed analyses of particular developments. 

Our Signatoryship to the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation allows us to contribute to the development and post-implementation monitoring of industry-drafted self-regulatory standards to fight threats to information integrity. We have opted into Commitments that are geared towards countering the tactics employed by online threat actors, boosting the impact of fact-checking operations and enhancing media literacy. This report will demonstrate how we adhere to those Commitments. 

Commitment 14: This Commitment asks Signatories to outline the policies they have against the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by actors of disinformation. Logically does not provide a user-to-user service where such TTPs could manifest and so we do not have explicit policies against them. However, while we do not conduct policing actions against malicious actors, we do publish fact-checks and OSINT investigations that spotlight any TTPs employed, thereby providing case studies that can feed evidence-based policies by platforms or governments. The investigations we highlight in this report exemplify our identification of TTPs e.g. increased use of messaging platforms to control narratives as well as the amplification of content from fringe websites by hostile state actors. 

Commitment 16: This Commitment asks Signatories to provide qualitative examples of cross-platform migration tactics employed by actors of disinformation to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny. Logically’s case studies demonstrate the way in which different kinds of disinformation actors migrated to different kinds of platforms depending on the kind of content they were looking to spread. For e.g., while Telegram and Rumble became new homes for far right extremists and Covid-19 conspiracy theories to begin disseminating content, climate misinformation began to be spread from blogging sites like Substack or Medium. 

Commitment 17: This Commitment asked Signatories to report on the media literacy activities they undertook throughout the reporting period. Logically Facts partnered with TikTok to provide media literacy training which was accessible in several European countries and the UK ahead of elections. It also conducted a number of other media literacy initiatives in Sweden and the UK.

Commitment 29: This Commitment sought for Signatories to detail their methodologies for tracking and analysing influence operations and disinformation campaigns. In response, Logically cited the investigative methodologies employed in specified case studies, and detailed our work on ethical standards and data governance. We intend to keep our research contributions updated in the Transparency Centre, including via annual reporting under the Code.

Commitment 30: This Commitment asked Signatories to report on actions to facilitate fact-checking organisations’ cross-border collaboration. As a company with a dedicated fact-checking subsidiary, we have cited our involvement in the development of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN), our active cooperation with other organisations on specific fact-checks and subject matters, and our internal structural planning to prioritise such collaborations. We also demonstrated this commitment by participating in important events for the fact-checking community in 2024. 

Commitments 31, 34, 35 and 36: These Commitments sought information on how Signatories are contributing to the development of a repository of fact-checking content, as well as the Transparency Centre. Logically intends to contribute to these as and when we are called upon by the Taskforce. 

Commitment 33: In response to this Commitment to uphold ethical and transparency rules, we have cited our accreditation by the International Fact-Checking Network and our application to the EFCSN. We have also outlined our strict ethics and transparency policies, including our lists of prohibited clients and use cases, as well as the ways that we ensure our independence and non-partisanship. 

Commitment 37: This Commitment asked about the Signatories’ engagement with the Taskforce. Logically has remained steadfast in its engagement with the Taskforce. We continue to be part of four Subgroups, namely on the Empowerment of Fact-Checkers, the Integrity of Services, Generative AI, and on Elections. 

Commitment 38: This Commitment called for Signatories to outline the internal teams dedicated to ensuring compliance with the Code. Logically has indicated the titles of the team members responsible for overseeing compliance, as well as the processes carried out. This included internal cross-functional consultations and reviews of internal documentation and policies. 

2024 was a monumental year in Logically’s growth. We have expanded the scope of our threat detection product, Logically Intelligence®. We developed a new tool, Logically Accelerate to assist fact checkers and journalists search and analyse short-form videos. We have carried out a number of media literacy initiatives and have increased our resources dedicated to this activity accordingly. As experts in our field, we can help government, trust and safety teams and enterprises to monitor and mitigate harmful information threats at speed and at scale and empower the public with accurate information to build societal resilience. We intend to continue expanding and refining these efforts in line with our Commitments under the Code in the next scheduled reporting round.



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Commitment 14
In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 14.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
No
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?



Measure 14.3
Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.
Logically Facts and Logically publish fact-checks and open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations, respectively, to counter threat actors’ manipulative tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). As we do not conduct any policing actions, we do not have formal policies in place to address these. However, our publications can educate audiences on such TTPs, and equip stakeholders with the case studies needed to feed evidence-based policies.

Logically became a member of the Subgroup on the Integrity of Services in September 2023, and has subsequently attended and contributed to several meetings in the regular review of the list of TTPs. 
QRE 14.3.1
Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.
Examples of identified TTPs


Narrative control through messaging platforms and subsequent migration


  • In February 2023, we identified a French-language, cross-platform network targeting Africa being run by individuals affiliated with the Russian Government and uncovered “fringe actors” associated with the operation. In February 2024, we conducted further investigations into the network and found a particular member’s attempts to establish independence campaigns within the United States, with the backing of the Russian Government and PMC Wagner.

  • In September 2024, we conducted further investigations into the network. Logically assessed that the identified member, Andre Dembele, made a public Telegram channel private, detailing unprecedented levels of encrypted communications with individuals working in Russia and West Africa, members of PMC Wagner, and individuals affiliated with a bank operating an office in UK.

  • (For more details on migration tactics including the use of Telegram, please see the response to QRE 16.2.1 below)

Amplification of fringe sites for strategic objectives by hostile state actors

  • During the course of the violence in the United Kingdom in July and August 2024 that followed the tragic knife attack in Southport, Logically and Logically Facts published a number of reports assessing the spread of disinformation regarding the identity of the attacker. We identified a bogus news website, “Channel 3NOW” which published the supposed name of the attacker as part of an article that was then later cited by Russian state media as a source and amplified. The website’s details - such as its registrant being located in Lithuania while being based out of Pakistan and its regular cycling through another bogus news branding - and the flow of information in and out of the website resembles Russian approaches around information laundering and narrative dissemination. While it cannot be proven that “Channel 3NOW” was part of a larger foreign interference effort, its use by Russian state media to increase the circulation of disinformation that increased inter-ethnic tensions in the UK meant it functioned in a way advantageous to hostile states.

Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers  

  • In March 2023, Logically carried out an investigation into the Russian “fact-checking” website “War on Fakes”. We were able to attribute the website to Timofey Vasiliev, a former Russian journalist who had not disclosed that he was a Russian state television presenter with widespread relationships to Russian influencers with over 1 million followers who promoted the page during its initial creation. 
  • To conduct attribution, we reviewed changes that were made on the “WHOIS” registry of public available information about a given domain. The details on the site’s registration could be connected to War on Fakes, Vasiliev, and his ties to the Russian government and propagandist community. We made this connection by reviewing the name, phone number and email address of the corresponding accounts. A review of Vasiliev’s career dating back to 2011 also revealed several roles where Vasiliev was a known affiliate of groups associated with Russian propaganda e.g. the Russian propaganda outlet Ridus. We found information on his resume in the archive of his personal website, as well as through career histories available on the websites of organisations that Vasiliev has worked for. 
  • Logically further identified two other initiatives that Vasiliev was actively engaged with at the time of our investigation - Klub5000 and SVO. The former sought to bring together monthly donors to vetted Russian military and civilian causes, and offered potential trips to the “Special Operation Zone”. The latter provided twice daily news updates of the biggest stories from the Russian government and the war in Ukraine. Given the lack of disclosure on the website about Vasiliev’s background, this can be considered a non-transparent promotion by an influencer. 

Internal processes to better identify TTPs

As we reported in our Baseline Report of January 2023, we are also developing an end-to-end automated Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) identification system as part of our disinformation detection and reporting service, Logically Intelligence®, to assist human experts. The development of this system is progressing, and has been deployed to support OSINT experts delivering on commercial projects. Further plans to improve the CIB system’s efficacy through active learning are in progress. 

We are also undertaking research on how to approach the detection of foreign information manipulation and interference via data science and machine learning. We aim to create a system that can be deployed alongside our expert teams. The deployment of this system would be governed by our ‘Human and Machine in the Loop Evaluation and Training’ (HAMLET) framework, which is intended to maximise machine-learning techniques by maintaining a human-in-the-loop capability.