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Report March 2026

Submitted
Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
No
If yes, list these implementation measures here
There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
N/A
Measure 16.1
Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.
Instagram
QRE 16.1.1
Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.
Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action to stop emerging threats [Meta Newsroom].

Meta publishes Adversarial Threat Reports (ATRs) to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. As of 2025, researchers have produced over 100 independent reports using this archive (ATR, p. 10). In support of the global security research community, Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms. 

Collaboration and Disruption 
  •  Meta works closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. Many of our coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) takedowns are the result of information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement. 
  •  For example, in the December 2025 Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), Meta details how information sharing led to the early detection and removal of covert influence operations before they could build authentic audiences (see ATR, p. 3-5). 

Examples of Case Studies 
Poland:
In H2 2025, Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in and targeting Poland, actioning 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, and 23 Groups. About 49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and about 1,100 accounts followed one or more of these Groups. The network relied on organic amplification, not paid ads. The investigation found direct links to an individual in Poland, indicating a domestic operation seeking to influence local political conversations. Reference: ATR, p. 6-7. 
 
Belarus: 
Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in Belarus and targeting Polish audiences, with links to Belarus and Russia. 4 Facebook accounts and 12 Pages were removed; about 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages. Network operators spent about $1,800 in ads to amplify content. Reference: ATR, p. 7 

SLI 16.1.1
Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).
This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.