As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to
stop emerging threats by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.
In
December 2025, we shared our Adversarial Threat Report with information on threat research into new covert influence operations that we took down. We detected and removed these campaigns before they were able to build authentic audiences on our apps.
Poland
We disrupted a coordinated inauthentic behavior network originating in and targeting Poland. We actioned 1 Instagram account for violating our policy against Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior. About 2,900 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts. The network did not engage in paid advertising, instead relying on organic content amplification strategies to reach target audiences.
Our investigation found direct links to an individual based in Poland, indicating a domestic operation seeking to influence local political conversations. We found this network following an internal investigation that identified sophisticated deceptive tactics designed to manipulate
domestic political discourse.
Belarus
We disrupted a coordinated inauthentic behavior network originating in Belarus and targeting Polish audiences. Our internal investigation revealed links to Belarus and Russia, indicating a coordinated foreign influence campaign. We removed 21 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior. About 3,300 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts. Network operators had around $1800 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram, paid for mostly in Polish zlotys and US Dollars, to amplify their content and expand their reach with targeted audiences
