Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action t
o stop emerging threats.
We publish
Adversarial Threat Reports to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. In support of the global security research community, we also share threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated
GitHub repository. This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.
Collaboration and Disruption
- We work closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. While Meta is able to proactively detect and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks from our platforms, our efforts are enhanced by information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement.
- In the August 2026 Adversarial Threat Report, we detail how collaboration with industry peers, government agencies, and law enforcement enhances Meta’s ability to detect, investigate, and disrupt CIB networks. This includes investigating leads shared by other technology companies. For example, a covert influence network Meta identified after reviewing information shared by its peers at OpenAI, taking any appropriate action consistent with Meta’s policies, and publishing threat indicators through Meta’s dedicated GitHub repository to enable cross-platform action (see Adversarial Threat Report p. 39–40). More broadly, Meta applies the same “whole-of-society” model to adjacent threats: its third and largest Joint Disruption Week, convened with the US Department of Justice, the FBI, the Royal Thai Police, and cross-industry partners, removed more than 1.4 million assets and contributed to 63 arrests.
Examples of Case Studies:
- Russia-linked covert influence operations (Doppelganger / ANO “Dialog”): We disrupted multiple operations under the Doppelganger umbrella, which maintained a cross-platform presence, operating on our platforms as well as on TikTok and YouTube. We published the associated threat indicators to our GitHub repository so industry partners and the broader security research community could detect the same activity across platforms.
- Israel-origin CIB network: targeted audiences in France, the United Kingdom, Australia and others through an influence-for-hire operation with a cross-platform presence on TikTok, X, and its own websites; we removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found it through our own investigation into suspected CIB in the region, an example of behaviour-based enforcement.
- Russia-origin "International Burke Institute” network: targeted Western audiences, with France as a primary focus, through a fabricated think tank with a cross-platform presence on Telegram, TikTok, YouTube and X; we removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found this network after reviewing information shared with us by our peers at OpenAI, an example of cross-industry cooperation.
