Report September 2026
Submitted
Democracy Reporting International's (DRI) Digital Democracy Programme Unit focuses on identifying trends in online discourse and potential threats to the integrity of information during political events and electoral periods across Europe and beyond. Our Digital Democracy team monitors and audits key elements of the online information space (social media platforms, consumer AI products) and formulates policy recommendations for various stakeholders in the technology and society ecosystem, including lawmakers, tech platforms, and civil society organisations.
During the reporting period, DRI identified multiple threats to electoral integrity, centred on Hungary's 2026 parliamentary elections. These included unlabelled AI-generated political content and weak platform governance of it, cross-border coordinated inauthentic behaviour on X, and coordinated inauthentic news networks operating on Telegram outside the DSA's systemic risk obligations. Barriers to platform data access persisted throughout. These threats risked misleading voters, amplifying manipulation, and letting coordinated campaigns evade regulatory oversight. In response, DRI combined research, stakeholder engagement, advocacy, legal action, and public awareness to strengthen compliance with EU digital regulations and safeguard civic discourse.
Key Findings and Actions during the Reporting Period:
- AI-Generated Content and Platform Governance: DRI assessed how Meta, TikTok, and YouTube govern AI-generated content in political contexts across five dimensions. None of the three mandate political accounts to label such content. During Hungary's elections, we identified 2,043 posts from 22 accounts focused on Hungarian politics. Nearly three quarters contained AI-generated content, and 37.5 per cent of that content was left unlabelled. We reported 199 unlabelled posts to TikTok for non-compliance. We also provided comments to Meta’s oversight board on the use of generative AI during the Hungarian elections.
- Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour on X: A Berlin Court of Appeal ruling in February 2026 secured DRI's API access to X, which made pattern detection at scale possible. We first identified 46 cryptocurrency-themed accounts that pivoted to Hungarian political content, one amplified post tracing to the Russian Storm-1516 campaign. We also uncovered a larger network of 337 coordinated accounts based in Serbia, amplifying pro-Orbán content and disinformation about the opposition.
- Inauthentic Networks on Telegram: Using a replicable cross-platform dissemination methodology that we developed, we uncovered a coordinated network of 19 inauthentic news channels during Hungary's elections, operating across many languages with clear signatures of automation and shared branding.
- Stakeholder Engagement and Awareness: DRI convened more than 35 researchers, regulators, and fact-checking experts to sharpen detection and attribution methods and surface the regulatory gaps around Telegram and other non-VLOP platforms. We carried this further in an op-ed making the case for stronger Telegram accountability under the DSA.
- Data Access: DRI raised awareness about barriers to platform data access under the DSA. Through an EU DisinfoLab webinar on our litigation against X under Article 40(12). We shared practical lessons for researchers and civil society actors considering similar action.