Report March 2026
Submitted
Executive summary
Democracy Reporting International's (DRI) Digital Democracy Programme Unit monitors threats to information integrity during political events and electoral periods across Europe and beyond. Our Digital Democracy team conducts social media monitoring, audits AI-powered chatbots for their impact on political online discourse and formulates policy recommendations for various stakeholders in the technology and society ecosystem, including lawmakers, tech platforms, and civil society organizations. During 2025 we continue our active work as signatories of the Code, among others, co-chairing the Taskforce on Elections.
Exposed widespread inauthentic behaviour on TikTok: DRI continued its research into murky accounts during the reporting period, with a focus on elections in Germany, Poland, and Romania. In 2025, using authenticity indicators and account-level metrics, we identified and reported 482 inauthentic accounts through the Rapid Response System, documenting how these accounts impersonate political actors, amplify partisan messaging, and distort perceptions of political support. Our findings show that murky accounts remain a persistent problem on platforms, particularly during elections, and reinforce the need for stronger detection and enforcement against inauthentic behaviour.
Advocated for data access for civil society researchers: DRI continued its work on platform transparency and accountability by examining the nature and limits of researcher access to platform data under Article 40 of the DSA. During the reporting period, we undertook litigation action against X, published analyses and opinion pieces on barriers to meaningful access, engaged with more than 88 stakeholders through meetings and webinars to raise awareness, shared practical lessons from using platform tools and pursuing legal remedies. This work aimed to clarify how existing access mechanisms function in practice and to support stronger, more consistent implementation of researcher data access.
Generated evidence about social media’s impact on elections and political discourse: DRI carried out social media monitoring across the Austrian, German, Polish, and Sri Lankan elections, identifying toxic narratives, disinformation risks, and harmful online speech affecting both historically marginalised groups and electoral integrity. Using methods such as keyword-based monitoring, sentiment analysis, and computational analysis of online content, we tracked how divisive narratives, discriminatory rhetoric, and polarising campaign strategies spread across platforms during these electoral periods.
Raised awareness about AI-related election risks and advocated for the transparency of AI-generated content: DRI audited the most popular chatbots during the German federal elections and identified both inaccurate electoral information and unlabelled generative AI content in political communication. DRI also engaged in policy discussions under the EU Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-Generated Content and provided input to the European Commission on transparency, labelling, and accountability standards for generative AI.
Increased engagement and knowledge exchange on platform transparency and accountability: Our work during the reporting period remained closely tied to the Code of Conduct framework through DRI’s co-chairing role in the Elections Working Group and our use of the Rapid Response System. We also convened more than six roundtables, webinars, and conferences with researchers, regulators, civil society groups, and other stakeholders on election integrity, platform accountability, and data access.