Demagog

Report March 2026

Submitted
Demagog is the first Polish fact-checking organization, established in 2016 (with informal activities since 2014). Our mission is to counter disinformation and improve the quality of public debate by providing access to unbiased and credible information. For more than 10 years we have been fact-checking political claims, keeping track of the electoral promises and debunking harmful disinformation. We strive to build a strong misinformation-resilient civil society that keeps politicians accountable for what they say and promise. We believe that we can achieve this goal by empowering citizens with critical fact-checking and media literacy skills. For this reason, we share our expertise with others through Fact-checking Academy and other media literacy programs.

To adhere to the highest standards of fact-checking and maximize our impact in countering disinformation, we are a signatory to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation as well as a member of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) and the Central European Digital Media Observatory Hub (CEDMO). To prevent false narratives from spreading and provide users with additional context, we contribute to Meta's Third Party Fact-checking Program and TikTok's Fact-Checking Program.

So far, we have fact-checked more than 6,400 political claims and additionally more than 3,600 pieces of content, creating a comprehensive database to be further used by scholars, policy makers, and educators. In 2025, we organized more than 200 educational events reaching an audience of nearly 8,000 people, including students, teachers, librarians, and local and state-level officials.
Elections 2025
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].
Threats observed or anticipated
During the reporting period, an election campaign took place in Poland ahead of the presidential elections in May and June. Officially, the campaign began on January 15, but in fact, competition between candidates had already been underway since the final weeks of 2024. The post-election period also required special attention due to ongoing discussions about the legality of Karol Nawrocki’s election to the office of President.

During this period, we identified several particularly widespread false narratives. Some of them concerned Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland. The social media accounts and politicians we monitored closely claimed that the current government wanted to drag Poland into a war with Russia. In this way, they portrayed actions in support of Ukraine as dangerous to Poland’s security. They repeatedly overinterpreted statements and documents to present them as alleged evidence of sending Polish troops to Ukraine. They also argued that Ukrainians in Poland are a burden on the state budget and a threat to internal security. Contrary to the facts, they claimed that tax contributions from Ukrainian citizens are lower than public spending on them. They attempted to focus attention on extreme cases of Ukrainian crime in Poland without considering the broader statistical picture. Often referring to the Volhynia massacre, and sometimes questioning recent reports about perpetrators’ cooperation with Russian services, they claimed that Ukrainians were committing arson in Poland out of hatred toward Poles. We observed cases of impersonation on social media, where individuals posed as pro-Ukrainian activists and organizations. There were also cases of sending compromising letters to local governments on their behalf.

The second frequently discussed topic was migration. It was claimed that the current government had agreed, under the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, to relocate thousands of refugees from Germany to Poland. A narrative was created suggesting that within just a few months, a very large number of migrants from Africa and the Middle East had already arrived in Poland. As evidence many sources used cases of migrants being turned back at the Polish-German border, recordings of Muslim gatherings during religious holidays, as well as videos and photos taken out of context and often originating from outside Poland. It was argued that immigrants pose a threat to internal security and that Germany is attempting to use Poland as a place to transfer large numbers of the most dangerous foreigners.

The third popular topic was climate change. The European Green Deal was portrayed as a set of absurd solutions that would drive Polish citizens into poverty. Claims were made about enormous costs of the energy transition, often involving manipulation of data. At the same time, contrary to the facts, coal-based energy was presented as a good solution that could provide Poland with cheap energy for hundreds or even thousands of years. Concerns about the effects of continued greenhouse gas emissions were countered with pseudoscientific theories denying global warming.

Additionally, on the days of the first and second rounds of the election, some politicians and social media accounts opposed to the government claimed that attempts at electoral fraud were underway. One civil society organization created a special application allegedly intended to detect individuals attempting to vote multiple times in different polling stations. Due to numerous mistakes in this solution, it led to many false positives. After the election, in turn, pro-government politicians and accounts, as well as some experts, used statistical manipulation to argue that electoral fraud had occurred in many polling stations in favor of the opposition candidate. This resulted in the highest number of election protests in years and a political dispute over the validity of the presidential election. Before the election, we ourselves highlighted a security loophole involving easily bypassed safeguards in the mObywatel application. It led to legal changes and the introduction of a new method for verifying electronic identity documents during voting.

It is worth noting that this was the first election campaign with such extensive and frequent use of artificial intelligence. It was primarily used to create materials supporting various candidates, especially to generate images of young people declaring their intention to vote for them.
Mitigations in place
As part of preparations for the election campaign:

We initiated cooperation with media outlets (Onet, Fakt, Imponderabilia), a media monitoring company (IMM), a PR company (PRoto), and creators of political preference tests (MyPolitics). We carried out the “Elections Without Fraud” campaign promoting fair public debate and informed electoral decision-making. Together, we monitored candidates’ media activity, describing it in weekly reports. We publicized cases of falsehoods and manipulation and highlighted shortcomings in the systemic fight against disinformation.

We developed a methodology for observing and analyzing FIMI, then launched monitoring and published weekly analytical reports. Thus we highlighted trends, sources of disinformation, and manipulation techniques.

We designed and implemented the “Facts in Real Time” („Fakty na bieżąco”) format. These are short texts providing a rapid response to information chaos and serving as a form of prebunking emerging disinformation narratives.

We improved the process of live fact-checking of political debates and carried out such during the main debates before the first and second rounds of the election. In particular our activity during the debate before the second round attracted significant attention and contributed to popularizing the idea of fact-checking in Poland.

Significant attention was also drawn to our report on the foreign financing of social media advertisements supporting the ruling coalition’s candidate and criticizing the opposition. This potentially illegal campaign financing attracted the interest of the National Electoral Commission and foreign observers.

Apart from the editorial work, the organisation was also involved in the Rapid Response System activities, providing inputs in regard to content that might would have affected the election integrity.