Code of Practice on Disinformation – Report by Google Ireland Limited ('Google') for the period of 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024

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Executive summary

Google's mission is to organise the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful. To deliver on this mission, elevating high-quality information and enhancing information quality across our services is of utmost importance. Since Google was founded, Google's product, policy, and content enforcement decisions have been guided by the following three principles:

1. **Value openness and accessibility:** Aim to provide access to an open and diverse information ecosystem, while maintaining a responsible approach to supporting information quality;

2. **Respect user choice:** Based on users' intent, provide access to content that is not illegal or prohibited by Google's policies, but set a high bar for information quality where users have not clearly expressed what they are looking for;

3. **Build for everyone:** Take into account the diversity of users (cultures, languages, backgrounds) and seek to address their needs appropriately.

With these principles in mind, Google has teams around the world working to combat harmful misinformation. Google has long invested in ranking systems that seek to connect people with high-quality content; in developing and enforcing rules that prohibit harmful behaviours and contents on Google services; and in innovative ways to provide context to users when they might need it most. We realise that fundamental rights are interdependent and are sometimes in tension with each other. When efforts to protect or advance one right may result in limiting another right, we identify and implement mitigation measures to address potential adverse impacts such as, protecting freedom of expression via appeals mechanisms or raising high-quality content to address lower-quality content that may appear on the platform. We comply with applicable laws by removing illegal content. We also remove content that violates our policies, and regularly evolve these policies in consultation with experts. Our work is not done, and we expect to continue improving upon these efforts in the future.

However, we are cognisant that these are complex issues, affecting all of society, which no single actor is in a position to fully tackle on their own. That is why we have welcomed the multi-stakeholder approach put forward by the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.

As the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation is being brought under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) framework, Google has revised its subscription to focus on reasonable, proportionate and effective measures to mitigate systemic risks related to disinformation that are tailored to our services. Accordingly, Google has exited certain commitments that are not relevant, practicable or appropriate for its services, including all commitments under the Political Advertising and Fact-Checking chapters.

Alongside our participation in the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, we will continue to work closely with regulators to ensure that our services appropriately comply with the DSA, in full respect of EU fundamental rights such as freedom of expression. The work of supporting a healthy information ecosystem is never finished and we remain committed to it. This is in our interest and the interest of our users.

This report includes metrics and narrative detail for Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising users in the European Union (EU), and covers the period from 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024.

Updates to highlight in this report include (but are not limited to):

- **2024 EU Elections:** In 2024, a number of elections took place around the world. In H2 2024, voters cast their ballots in the Romanian presidential election and in the second round of the French legislative election. Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. In addition, Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate political content that was AI-generated, including ad disclosures, content labels on YouTube, and digital watermarking tools.

- **Supporting Researchers in Technology Related to Trust & Safety:** Google has continued to demonstrate its commitment to empowering the research community by hosting workshops with researchers and providing grants to support research efforts related to Trust & Safety areas of interest. These Trust & Safety workshops aim to build relationships among scholars working in different fields, to share projects and insights across the broader Trust & Safety ecosystem. We are also committed to assisting researchers with financial support to continue their research. Google provides unrestricted grants to support research efforts across areas of interest related to Trust & Safety in technology through the Trust & Safety Research Awards. This program, in partnership with University Relations, is one of Google's largest opportunities to partner with external researchers on priority Trust & Safety topics. Similarly, we announced the first-ever winners of the Google Academic Research Awards (GARA) program in October 2024. In this first funding cycle, the program will support 95 projects led by 143 researchers globally, and their work aligns with Google's commitment to responsible innovation.

- **Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI):** In H1 2024, we announced new AI safeguards to help protect against misuse. We introduced SynthID, a technology that adds imperceptible watermarks to AI-generated images and audio so they are easier to identify; this year, we are expanding SynthID's capabilities to watermarking AI-generated text, audio, visual and video. YouTube also introduced a new tool in Creator Studio requiring creators to disclose to viewers when realistic content is made with altered or synthetic media, including generative AI. In addition to these new tools, we are also committed to working with the greater ecosystem to help others benefit from and improve on the advances we are making. As such, we will open-source SynthID text watermarking through our updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit. Underpinning our advancements in AI, as a member of the Standard and Coalition for Content Provenance and

Authenticity (C2PA), we collaborate with Adobe, Microsoft, startups and many others to build and implement the newest version (2.1) of the coalition's technical standard, Content Credentials. This version is more secure against a wider range of tampering attacks due to stricter technical requirements for validating the history of the content's provenance.

Google has been working on AI for more than a dozen years to solve society's biggest challenges and power Google services people use every day. The progress in large-scale AI models (including generative AI) has sparked additional discussion about the social impacts of AI and raised concerns on topics such as misinformation. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and published AI Principles in 2018 to guide our work. Google's robust internal governance focuses on responsibility throughout the AI development lifecycle, covering model development, application deployment, and post-launch monitoring. While we recently updated our Principles to adapt to shifts in technology, the global conversation, and the AI ecosystem, our deep commitment to responsible AI development remains unchanged. Through our philanthropic arm Google.org we have supported organisations that are using AI to tackle important societal issues. Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content, outlining its approach to maintaining a high standard of information quality and the overall helpfulness of content on Search. To help enhance information quality across its services, Google has also announced that it will soon be integrating new innovations in watermarking, metadata, and other techniques into its latest generative models. Google has also joined other leading AI companies to jointly commit to advancing responsible practices in the development of artificial intelligence which will support efforts by the G7, the OECD, and national governments. Going forward we will continue to report and expand upon Google developed AI tools and are committed to advance bold and responsible AI, to maximise AI's benefits and minimise its risks.

Lastly, the contents of this report should be read with the following context in mind:

- This report discusses the key approaches across the following Google services when it comes to addressing disinformation: Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising.
- For chapters of the Code that involve the same actions across all three services (e.g. participation in the Permanent Task-force or in development of the Transparency Centre), we respond as 'Google, on behalf of related services'.
- This report follows the structure and template laid out by the Code's Permanent Task-force, organised around Commitments and Chapters of the Code.
- Unless otherwise specified, metrics provided cover activities and actions during the period from 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024.
- The data provided in this report is subject to a range of factors, including product changes and user settings, and so is expected to fluctuate over the time of the reporting period. As Google continues to evolve its approach, in part to better address user and regulatory needs, the data reported here could vary substantially over time.
- We are continuously working to improve the safety and reliability of our services. We are not always in a position to pre-announce specific launch dates, details or timelines for upcoming improvements, and therefore may reply 'no' when asked whether we can disclose future plans for Code implementation measures in the coming reporting period. This 'no' should be understood against the background

context that we are constantly working to improve safety and reliability and may in fact launch relevant changes without the ability to pre-announce.
- This report is filed concurrently with two 'crisis reports' about our response to the Israel-Gaza conflict and to the war in Ukraine. Additionally, an annex on Google's response toward the recent elections in Romania and France is included in this report. As such, while there will be references to our actions throughout this report, information specific to these events should be sought in dedicated reports.

Google will continue to publish subsequent versions of this report biannually, focusing on the 6 months review period relevant to each filing, as requested under the Code.

Google looks forward to continuing to work together with other stakeholders in the EU to address challenges related to disinformation.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Google Advertising[1]	Google Search	YouTube	Google, on behalf of related services
		II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
1	Measure 1.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.5	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	☑	☐	☐	☐
2	Measure 2.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 2.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	☑	☐	☐	☐
3	Measure 3.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 3.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 3.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
		III. Political advertising			
4	Measure 4.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 4.2	*Not subscribed*			
5	Measure 5.1	*Not subscribed*			
6	Measure 6.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.3	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.4	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.5	*Not subscribed*			

[1] *Note: Google Advertising refers to both Google Ads and Google AdSense where appropriate. Within the body of the report, 'Google Advertising' is used to refer to both services, whereas the individual service will be named if only applicable to Google Ads or Google AdSense.*

7	Measure 7.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 7.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 7.3	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 7.4	*Not subscribed*			
8	Measure 8.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 8.2	*Not subscribed*			
9	Measure 9.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 9.2	*Not subscribed*			
10	Measure 10.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 10.2	*Not subscribed*			
11	Measure 11.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 11.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 11.3	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 11.4	*Not subscribed*			
12	Measure 12.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 12.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 12.3	*Not subscribed*			
13	Measure 13.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 13.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 13.3	*Not subscribed*			
IV. Integrity of services					
14	Measure 14.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 14.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 14.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
15	Measure 15.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 15.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
16	Measure 16.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 16.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
V. Empowering users					
17	Measure 17.1	☐	☑	☑	☐

	Measure				
	Measure 17.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 17.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
18	Measure 18.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 18.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 18.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 19.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
20	Measure 20.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 20.2	Not subscribed			
21	Measure 21.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 21.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 21.3	Not subscribed			
22	Measure 22.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.4	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.5	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.6	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.7	☐	☑	☑	☐
23	Measure 23.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 23.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☐	☐	☑	☐
25	Measure 25.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 25.2	Not subscribed			
VI. Empowering the research community					
26	Measure 26.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 26.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 26.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
27	Measure 27.1	Not subscribed			

	Measure 27.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.4	Not subscribed			
28	Measure 28.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.4	☐	☑	☑	☐
29	Measure 29.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 29.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 29.3	Not subscribed			
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
30	Measure 30.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 30.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 30.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 30.4	Not subscribed			
31	Measure 31.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.4	Not subscribed			
32	Measure 32.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 32.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 32.3	Not subscribed			
33	Measure 33.1	Not subscribed			
VIII. Transparency centre					
34	Measure 34.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.5	☐	☐	☐	☑

35	Measure 35.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
36	Measure 36.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 36.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 36.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
IX. Permanent Task-Force					
37	Measure 37.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
39	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
40	Measure 40.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
41	Measure 41.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 41.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 41.3	☐	☐	☐	☑

42	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
43	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
44	-	☐	☐	☐	☑

Guidelines for filling out the report for VLOPSEs

The reporting period to be covered in the reports is six months (1 July to 31 December 2024) for Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPSEs). Signatories shall submit reports outlining policy updates and actions taken to implement the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code. All data and policy updates should be reported for six months period from the submission of last reports.

Reporting per Service

When filling in a report for several services, use colour codes to clearly distinguish between services. At the beginning of the report, clarify what colour is used for which service.

Reporting in text form

Reporting in the form of written text is required for several parts of the report. Most of them are accompanied by a target character limit. Please stick to the target character limit as much as possible. We encourage you to use bullet points and short sentences. When providing information to the QRE, please make sure that your answer covers all the elements of the associated commitment and measure. Links should only be used to provide examples or to illustrate the point. They should not be used to replace explanations or to provide data in the forms. All relevant explanations and data must be included in the report directly, in written form.

Reporting SLIs and data

Reporting on SLIs requires quantitative information to be reported on in this harmonised reporting template.

- SLIs should generally be reported on per Member State. Where required by the Code, reporting needs to be done both per Member State and per language, e.g. SLI 30.1.1.
- If no data is available on Member State level, SLIs might, instead, be exceptionally reported on per language. (NB that Signatories agreed to revisit this issue after the first reporting, to ensure harmonised and meaningful reporting.)
- Please report data in the format provided by the harmonised reporting template, not through external links. Please use the Member State/language template provided in the harmonised reporting template. Where the table asks for 'Other relevant metrics', please name the metric that you would like to report on in addition to the ones already provided. You may include more than the number of additional fields provided where necessary; in that case, please adjust the table as needed.
- Please contextualise all data as much as possible, i.e. include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise the SLIs (e.g. number of pieces of content labelled out of what volume of content).
- If there are no relevant metrics to report on, please leave the respective columns blank.

Reporting on TTPs

If subscribed to Commitment 14, Integrity of Services, we ask you to report on each identified TTP individually. The number of identified TTPs may vary per service. Where more than one TTP are reported under the same action, clarify the reasoning in the methodology. Where input is not provided, keep the placeholder for the relevant TTP and explain reasons and planned remedial action. Additionally, as with all other SLIs, data should be provided per Member State for each individual TTP.

Missing Data and insights on methodology

In case that at the time of reporting there is no data available yet, the data is insufficient, or the methodology is lacking, please outline in the dedicated field (i.e. in the field about further implementation measures planned) how this will be addressed over the upcoming six months, being as specific as possible.

Signatories are encouraged to provide insights about the data/numbers they provide by inserting possible explanations in the boxes of the template "*Methodology of data measurement & insights on data provided*". This should aim to explain the why of what is being reported, for instance - *Are there trends or curiosities that could require or use contextual explanation? What may be driving the change or the difference in the number?* Please also indicate inconsistencies or gaps regarding methodology in the dedicated box.

Attachments

We ask you not to enclose any additional attachments to the harmonised reporting template.

Crisis and elections reporting template

Relevant signatories are asked to provide proportionate and appropriate information and data during a period of crisis and during an election. Reporting is a part of a special chapter at the end of the harmonised reporting template and should follow the guidelines:

- The reporting of signatories' actions should be as specific to the particular crisis or election reported on as possible. To this extent, the rows on "Specific Action[s]" should be filled in with actions that are either put in place specifically for a particular event (for example a media literacy campaign on disinformation related to the Ukraine war, an information panel for the European elections), or to explain in more detail how an action that forms part of the service's general approach to implementing the Code is implemented in the specific context of the crisis or election reported on (for example, what types of narratives in a particular election/crisis would fall into scope of a particular policy of the service, what forms of advertising are ineligible).
- The harmonised reporting template should be filled in by adding additional rows for each item reported on. This means that rather than combined/bulk reporting such as "Depending on severity of violation, we demote or remove content based on policies X, Y, Z", there should be individual rows stating for example "Under Policy X, content is demoted or removed based on severity", "Under Policy Y, content [...]" etc.
- The rows should be colour-coded to indicate which service is being reported on, using the same colour code as for the overall harmonised reporting template.
- Reporting should be brief and to the point, with a suggested character limit entry of 2000 characters.

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Uploading data to the Transparency Centre

The reports should be submitted to the Commission in the form of the pdf via e-mail to the address CNECT COP TASK FORCE CNECT-COP-TASK-FORCE@ec.europa.eu within the agreed deadline. Signatories will upload all data from the harmonised reporting template to the Transparency Centre, allowing easy data access and filtering within the agreed deadline. It is the responsibility of the Signatories to ensure that the uploading takes place and is executed on time. Signatories are also responsible to ensure that the Transparency Centre is operational

and functional by the time of the reports' submission, that the data from the reports are uploaded and made accessible in the Transparency Centre within the above deadline, and that users are able to read, search, filter and download data as needed in a user-friendly way and format.

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 - 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 1.1	*Not subscribed*

QRE 1.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid[2] or impression[3]) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 1.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 1.2.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 1.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 1.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.3.1	Google sets a high bar for information quality on services that involve advertising and content monetisation. Given that many bad actors may seek to make money by spreading harmful content, raising the bar for monetisation can also

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[2] Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.
[3] Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

| | diminish their incentives to misuse Google services. For example, Google prohibits deceptive behaviour on Google advertising products.

Google Ads also provides advertisers with additional controls and helps them exclude types of content that, while in compliance with AdSense policies, may not fit their brand or business. These controls let advertisers apply content filters or exclude certain types of content or terms from their video, display, and search ad campaigns. Advertisers can exclude content such as politics, news, sports, beauty, fashion and many other categories. These categories are listed in the Google Ads Help Centre. |
|---|---|
| Measure 1.4 | *Not subscribed* |
| QRE 1.4.1 | *Not subscribed* |
| Measure 1.5 | **Google Advertising** |
| QRE 1.5.1 | Google partakes in audits including those conducted by independent accreditation organisations such as the Media Rating Council (MRC) and maintains this accreditation via participation in annual audit cycles conducted by the MRC.

The current MRC accreditation certifies that:

- Google's Google Ads display and Search Clicks measurement methodology and AdSense ad serving technologies adhere to the industry standards for click measurement.
- Google Ads video impression and video viewability measurement as reported in the Video Viewability Report adheres to the industry standards for video impression and viewability measurement.
- The processes supporting these technologies are accurate. This applies to Google's measurement technology which is used across all device types: desktop, mobile, and tablet, in both browser and mobile apps environments.

For more information about what this accreditation means, please see this help page. |
QRE 1.5.2	See response to QRE 1.5.1.
Measure 1.6	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.6.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

| | Google Ads also provides its advertising partners with features that enable them to maintain control over where their ads appear, the format in which their ads run, and their intended audience.

Since April 2021, advertisers have the [ability](#) to use [dynamic exclusion lists](#) that can be updated seamlessly and continuously over time. These lists can be created by advertisers themselves or by a third party they trust, such as brand safety organisations and industry groups. Once advertisers upload a dynamic exclusion list to their Google Ads account, they can schedule automatic updates as new web pages or domains are added, ensuring that their exclusion lists remain effective and up-to-date. |
|---|---|
| **QRE 1.6.2** | Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads). |
| **QRE 1.6.3** | Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that provide brand safety tools). |
| **QRE 1.6.4** | Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that rate sources). |
| **SLI 1.6.1** | Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads). |
| **Data** | |

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
Commitment 2 Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.					
	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• In July 2024, Google updated the Disclosure requirements for synthetic content under the Political Content Policy, requiring advertisers to disclose election ads that contain synthetic or digitally altered content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events by selecting the checkbox in the 'Altered or synthetic content' section in their campaign settings. Google will then generate an in-ad disclosure based on that checkbox, for certain types of formats. • After joining the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content, in February 2024, Google recently announced that it had begun integrating C2PA metadata into their ads systems. Google aims to use CP2A signals to inform how it enforces key policies.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 2.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 2.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 2.2	Google Advertising
QRE 2.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All newly created ads and ads that are edited by users are reviewed for policy violations. The review of new ads is performed by either, or a combination of: ● Automated mechanisms; and ● Manual reviews performed by human reviewers. For more information on how the ad review process works, please see the 'About the ad review process' page.

Measure 2.3	Google Advertising
QRE 2.3.1	See response to QRE 2.2.1.
SLI 2.3.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing relevant policies	Number of own-initiative actions taken on advertisements that affect the availability, visibility, and accessibility of information provided by recipients of Google Ads services, by EEA Member State billing country and policy in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024). These actions taken include enforcement against ads and ad assets that violate any of the policy topics in scope for reporting. Content moderation actions taken at Google's 'own initiative' are considered to be actions taken on content shown to or because the content violates Google Ads policies, or where the content is illegal but action is not taken in response to an Article 9 order or Article 16 notice, as defined by the Digital Services Act (DSA). These can encompass both proactive and reactive enforcement actions. Proactive enforcement takes place when Google employees, algorithms, or contractors flag potentially policy-violating content. Reactive enforcement takes place in response to external notifications, such as user policy flags or legal complaints. To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violates Google Ads policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks.

Ad or asset disapproval

Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is reviewed.

Account suspension

Google Ads Accounts may be suspended if Google finds violations of its policies or the Terms and Conditions.

For more information on what happens when an ad or account is violating Google Ads policies, please see the 'What happens if you violate our policies' page.

Policies in scope:
- Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content);
- Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

Number of actions taken, by Policy		
Number of actions taken, for Destination Requirements	Number of actions taken, for Inappropriate Content	Number of actions taken, for Misrepresentation
Level / **Ads & Ad Assets**	**Ads & Ad Assets**	**Ads & Ad Assets**
Member States		
Austria	7,422,101	60,174	66,717
Belgium	12,660,562	59,045	116,586
Bulgaria	6,971,115	88,399	155,851
Croatia	2,727,827	34,436	37,895
Cyprus	52,668,089	113,444	963,259
Czech Republic	22,154,687	309,514	219,848
Denmark	156,943,475	136,645	395,612

Estonia	2,021,982	16,377	108,880
Finland	2,956,655	43,135	60,524
France	196,126,998	540,361	2,367,010
Germany	131,475,890	955,572	2,443,336
Greece	2,720,410	30,688	135,403
Hungary	4,030,059	87,838	138,459
Ireland	40,613,267	1,040,422	25,643,951
Italy	55,368,074	328,135	2,220,113
Latvia	1,961,748	49,753	127,796
Lithuania	7,357,129	149,638	198,308
Luxembourg	1,904,111	48,285	639,716
Malta	2,342,282	3,807	153,093
Netherlands	75,660,484	540,200	1,733,070
Poland	19,165,056	714,955	2,112,907
Portugal	2,438,751	44,576	183,139
Romania	5,415,231	118,864	343,813
Slovakia	3,671,184	32,633	101,007
Slovenia	5,550,505	28,316	53,231
Spain	107,768,933	380,582	5,457,434
Sweden	19,021,742	343,419	248,193
Iceland	90,480	1,296	25,059
Liechtenstein	1,220,132	322	1,442
Norway	3,432,920	18,154	128,489

Total EU	949,118,347	6,299,213	46,425,151
Total EEA	953,861,879	6,318,985	46,580,141

Measure 2.4	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Notification** Ads that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved or (if appropriate) limited in where and when they can show. This will be shown in the 'Status' column as 'Disapproved' or 'Eligible (limited),' and the ad may not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed. By hovering the cursor over the status of the ad, there is additional information, including the policy violation impacting the ad. For more information on how to fix a disapproved ad, see the external Help Centre page. **Appeal process** Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the Disapproved Ads and Policy Questions form. For more information about the appeal process, check the Help Centre page. For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the submit an appeal process.

SLI 2.4.1	Number of content moderation complaints received from advertisers located in EEA Member States during H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State and by complaint outcome. Advertiser complaints were received via Google Ads standardised path for appealing policy decisions.
	
	Complaint outcomes include initial decision upheld and initial decision reversed. An 'initial decision' refers to the first enforcement of Google's terms of service or product policies. These decisions may be reversed in light of additional information provided by the appellant as part of an appeal or additional automatic, manual review of the content.
	
	Policies in scope:
	   • Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content);
	   • Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);

	• Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).		
	Number of complaints received, by EU Member State for relevant policies described above, and complaint outcome in H2 2024		
	Number of Ads Appeals	**Number of Successful Appeals**	**Number of Failed Appeals**
Level	Ads	Ads	Ads
Member States			
Austria	14,234	4,207	10,027
Belgium	18,261	10,279	7,982
Bulgaria	15,513	4,350	11,163
Croatia	5,071	2,472	2,599
Cyprus	113,836	39,665	74,171
Czech Republic	46,001	9,706	36,295
Denmark	48,601	32,199	16,402
Estonia	14,257	6,882	7,375
Finland	4,739	2,199	2,540
France	66,428	20,094	46,334
Germany	200,343	47,937	152,406
Greece	3,758	1,407	2,351
Hungary	15,212	5,850	9,362
Ireland	23,656	13,854	9,802
Italy	93,382	32,128	61,254
Latvia	5,108	1,555	3,553

Lithuania	55,362	23,029	32,333
Luxembourg	1,215	440	775
Malta	31,292	8,573	22,719
Netherlands	323,775	137,084	186,691
Poland	141,849	37,149	104,700
Portugal	14,029	5,704	8,325
Romania	34,736	13,454	21,282
Slovakia	8,169	6,016	2,153
Slovenia	32,944	9,524	23,420
Spain	130,730	36,745	93,985
Sweden	39,057	12,096	26,961
Iceland	68	22	46
Liechtenstein	1,748	248	1,500
Norway	3,172	1,127	2,045
Total EU	**1,501,558**	**524,598**	**976,960**
Total EEA	**1,506,546**	**525,995**	**980,551**

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
Commitment 3			
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.			
	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 3.1	Google Advertising
QRE 3.1.1	Google Advertising works across industry and with civil society to facilitate the flow of information, relevant to tackling disinformation. For example, Google participates in the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Permanent Task-force's dedicated Working Groups. These working groups focus on Integrity of Services, Crisis Response, and Advertising, all of which Google takes part in, and which involve civil society and Industry Signatories discussing relevant trends and technological developments.
Measure 3.2	Google Advertising

QRE 3.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google takes part in the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Permanent Task-force's Working Groups on Crisis Response, Integrity of Services, and Advertising - as mentioned in response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, as Google has publicly communicated, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) continues to engage with other Industry Signatories to the Code in order to stay abreast of cross-platform deceptive practices, such as operations leveraging fake or impersonated accounts.
Measure 3.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 3.3.1	Google Advertising frequently engages with third-party organisations in order to explain, collect feedback on, and improve Google Advertising policies. Google Advertising has also exchanged views with experts at numerous policy roundtables, conferences, and workshops - both in Brussels and in the EU capitals. Please also see QRE 3.1.1 for additional information on the collaboration with third party organisations and government entities.

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 4 Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".			
	C.4	**M 4.1**	**M 4.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 4.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 4.2	*Not subscribed*

QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	*Not subscribed*
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5		
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	**M 5.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 5.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 5.1.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising						
Commitment 6						
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising						
	C.6	**M 6.1**	**M 6.2**	**M 6.3**	**M 6.4**	**M 6.5**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 6.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 6.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.2.2	*Not subscribed*
SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 6.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.3.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 6.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.4.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 6.5	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.5.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 7					
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.					
	C.7	**M 7.1**	**M 7.2**	**M 7.3**	**M 7.4**

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 7.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 7.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.2.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 7.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.3.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.3.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 7.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.4.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 8 Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
	C.8	**M 8.1**	**M 8.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	*Not subscribed*

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 8.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 8.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	*Not subscribed*

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 9.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 9.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 10			
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currency, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.			
	C.10	**M 10.1**	**M 10.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 10.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 10.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 11
Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	*Not subscribed*

of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 11.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 11.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 11.3	*Not subscribed*
Measure 11.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	*Not subscribed*
QRE 11.4.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 12 Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.			
	C.12	**M 12.1**	**M 12.2**	**M 12.3**

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 12.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 12.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 12.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 12.1.1 (for measures 12.1–12.3)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 13 Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.				
	C.13	**M 13.1**	**M 13.2**	**M 13.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 13.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 13.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 13.3	*Not subscribed*

QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)	*Not subscribed*

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:
- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains;
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation.

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:
- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...);
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers;
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search		YouTube	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	● In August 2024, Google Search released new Community Guidelines for user generated content that define the types of content and behavior that are not allowed on Search. The guidelines cover areas such as spam, account hijacking, and deceptive practices. These guidelines also provide users with guidance on how to report different types of potentially harmful user generated content, such as posts and profiles.	● YouTube has long been updating, on a regular and ongoing basis, its internal systems and processes related to the detection of content that violates its policies. This includes investment in automated detection systems.
	In November 2024, Google released a white paper detailing how it is addressing the growing global issue of fraud and scams. In the paper, Google explains that it fights scams and fraud by taking proactive measures to protect users from harm, deliver reliable information, and partner to create a safer internet, through policies and built-in technological protections that help us to prevent, detect, and respond to harmful and illegal content. For details on YouTube and Google Search's approaches to tackling scams, see the full report here.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 14.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 14.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search's systems are designed to elevate high-quality information and combat the threats listed in Commitment 14. While many of those TTPs are not relevant to search engines (e.g. TTPs 1 through 5, TTP 11), by seeking to elevate authentic, original, high-quality information, Search's ranking systems directly tackle threats like inauthentic domains (TTP 4), obfuscation (TTP 6), deceptive manipulated media (TTP 7), hack and leak operations (TTP 8), inauthentic coordination (TTP 9), and a broad range of deceptive practices (TTP 10). More information about the design of Search's ranking systems is outlined in the User Empowerment chapter. Google Search's Overall Content Policies outline that Search takes action against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Learn more about Google Search Webmaster Guidelines. In line with these policies, Search deploys spam protection tools. These efforts address a range of deceptive practices	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Similar to Google Search, YouTube's systems are designed to connect people with high-quality content. In addition, YouTube has various policies which set out what is not allowed on YouTube. These policies, which can be accessed via this landing page in YouTube's Help Centre, address relevant TTPs. Notably, YouTube's policies tend to be broader than the identified TTPs. As such, related SLIs providing information about actions taken related to the TTP may be overinclusive. YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, go beyond these TTPs. In this report, YouTube has provided information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs

and help to reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search through inauthentic behaviours outlined in relevant TTPs.

Moreover, Search has policies and community guidelines specifically governing what can appear in Google Search features (e.g. knowledge panels, content advisories, 'About This Result', etc.) to make sure that Search is showing high quality and helpful content, while also taking action against content that may promote harmful mis-/disinformation. Relevant policies to the threats listed above include the following:

- **Deceptive Practices Policy**: This policy prohibits content that impersonates any person or organisation, misrepresentation or concealment of ownership or primary purpose, and engagement in inauthentic or coordinated behaviour to deceive, defraud, or mislead. This policy does not cover content with certain artistic, educational, historical, documentary, or scientific considerations, or other substantial benefits to the public.
- **Manipulated Media Policy**: This policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place.
- **Transparency Policy**: This policy notes that news sources on Google should provide clear dates and bylines, as well as information about authors, the publication, the publisher, company or network behind it, and contact information.

are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.

| QRE 14.1.2 | Google Search uses a variety of proactive detection efforts to counter spam, which overlaps significantly with TTPs used to disseminate disinformation. As outlined in the overall Google Search Content Policies and Community Guidelines for user generated content, action is taken against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems.

Pursuant to the Spam Content Policy, Google Search deploys spam protection tools, such as SpamBrain (Google's AI-based spam-prevention system), to protect search quality and user safety. Addressing a wider range of content than only mis-/disinformation, these efforts help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search. Additional information can be found in the 2022 Google Search Webspam Report. In March 2024, Google Search released an update to its Spam Policies that addresses 'scaled content abuse' - artificially-generated content (including AI-generated content) that seeks to manipulate Google's search ranking.

In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust and Safety Team are central to Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1. | YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies as quickly as possible, raising high quality information in rankings and recommendations, curbing the spread of harmful misinformation, and rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU.

A YouTube channel may be permanently terminated if the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, or the channel is determined to be wholly dedicated to violating YouTube's guidelines (as may be the case with spam accounts). In some cases, YouTube may terminate a channel for a single case of severe abuse, as explained in the Help Centre. When a channel is terminated, all of its videos are removed.

A user's channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, the user is prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on their YouTube channel. Violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of Service, and may result in termination of all their existing YouTube channels, any new channels that they create or acquire, and channels in which they are repeatedly or prominently featured.

YouTube uses a combination of people and machine learning to detect problematic content automatically and at scale. Machine learning is well-suited to detect patterns, including harmful misinformation, which helps YouTube find |

content similar to other content that YouTube has already removed, even before it is viewed. Every quarter, YouTube publishes data in the [Community Guidelines enforcement report](#) about removals that were first detected by automated means.

YouTube's Intelligence Desk monitors the news, social media, and user reports to detect new trends surrounding inappropriate content, and works to make sure YouTube's teams are prepared to address them before they can become a larger issue.

In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Google and YouTube's Trust and Safety Teams are central to Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1.

YouTube continues to invest in automated detection systems, and rely on both human evaluators and machine learning to train their systems on new data. YouTube's engineering teams also continue to update and improve their detection systems regularly. YouTube aims to leverage an even more targeted mix of classifiers, keywords in additional languages, and information from regional analysts to identify narratives their main classifier does not catch. Over time, this will continue to make YouTube faster and more accurate at catching viral misinformation narratives.

Measure 14.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**

| QRE 14.2.1 | Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content moderation on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and weigh signals of high-quality information so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors and signals to raise high-quality content and reduce low quality content. Google Search's publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Google Search works continuously to improve the quality and effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content.

Furthermore, to ensure its algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a rigorous process that involves both live tests and thousands of trained external Search Quality Raters from around the world. Raters do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search's results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users all around the world. Under the Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines, raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search | Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

YouTube enforces a broad range of policies to help build a safer community. These policies include, but are not limited to, YouTube's Community Guidelines, which include policies covering Spam, Scams, and Deceptive Practices, Impersonation Policy and Fake Engagement Policy. YouTube applies these policies globally, including across the EEA Member States.

Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies
In general, enforcement of YouTube's policies is a joint effort between people and machine learning technology. YouTube starts by giving its most experienced team of content moderators enforcement guidelines (detailed explanations of what makes content violative and non-violative), and asks them to differentiate between violative and non-violative material. If the new guidelines allow them to achieve a very high level of accuracy, YouTube expands the testing group to include hundreds of moderators across different backgrounds, languages and experience levels.

Then YouTube may begin revising the guidelines so that they can be accurately interpreted across a larger, more diverse set of moderators, and is only complete once the group reaches a similarly high degree of accuracy. These findings then help train YouTube's machine learning technology to detect potentially violative content at scale. |

also provides users the ability to flag content that might be violating Google Search policies.	As done with its content moderators, YouTube also tests its models to understand whether it has provided enough context for them to make accurate assessments about what to surface for people to review. Once models are trained to identify potentially violative content, the role of content moderators remains essential throughout the enforcement process. Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content moderators then help confirm or deny whether the content should be removed. This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of YouTube's models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. It also means YouTube's enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube, while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative. For TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9, YouTube provides details around mapping to its policies. To learn more about these methodologies, refer to SLI 14.2.1, SLI 14.2.2, and SLI 14.2.4.

Google Search
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

TTP OR ACTION 1	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter** 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);

9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);

10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;

12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

SLI 14.2.1
Methodology
(1) Manual enforcement instances under relevant policy violations (including Deceptive Practices, Manipulated Media, Medical Content, Misleading Content and Transparency Policies) on a global level in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024).
(2) Domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search on a global level in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024).

Response
(1) In H2 2024, there were 46,792 instances of policy enforcement, globally, which resulted in removal of false, disputed, non-representative facts, misrepresentation information, content that contradicts scientific or medical based consensus and evidence based best practices. The actions were enforced across Search features including knowledge engine, webanswers, news, discover, image and video search.
(2) In H2 2024, there were 275,421 manual actions and 12,251,095 algorithmic actions taken against spam policies. Globally, a total of 12,408,811 unique domains were affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search.

SLI 14.2.2
These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy-violating content.

SLI 14.2.3
This SLI is not applicable for Google Search, as users do not need accounts to use the search engine, and generally do not post content on Google Search.

	SLI 14.2.4 These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy-violating content.											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressi ons before action	Interacti on/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressi ons after action	Interacti on/ engagem ent after action	Penetrati on and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audience s	Trends on narrative s used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressi ons of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/im pression s on the service)	Interacti on/ engagem ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio n/engage ment on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 2				
	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2	SLI 14.2.3	SLI 14.2.4

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 3												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in

									on the service	to overall views/impressions on the service)	relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States											

TTP OR ACTION 4											
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 5												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 6				
	SLI 14.2.1	**SLI 14.2.2**	**SLI 14.2.3**	**SLI 14.2.4**

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 7												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2			SLI 14.2.3				SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in

										on the service	to overall views/impressions on the service)	relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 8												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 9												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 10												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 11												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in

											on the service	to overall views/impressions on the service)	relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States													

TTP OR ACTION 12													
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)	

Member States											

YouTube
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

TTP OR ACTION 1	**SLI 14.2.1** **Methodology** (1) Number of channels for TTP 1, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024); (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024. Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone. YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs. In this report, YouTube has provided information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs. YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below.

<u>SLI 14.2.2</u>
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(3) Views/impressions after action for TTP 1 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

Response
(1) N/A;
(2) N/A;
(3) N/A;
(4) N/A.

<u>SLI 14.2.3</u>
Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

	SLI 14.2.4 **Methodology** (1) Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024; (2) N/A; (3) N/A. **Response** (1) Please see table below; (2, 3) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.															
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**							**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Number of channels identified	**Number of channels removed**	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	**Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals out of all related channel removals**	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States															
Austria	3,789	3,789										43.12%		
Belgium	2,193	2,193										32.95%		
Bulgaria	1,335	1,335										27.23%		
Croatia	505	505										20.87%		
Cyprus	450	450										31.38%		
Czech Republic	1,830	1,830										28.11%		
Denmark	633	633										23.00%		
Estonia	213	213										12.63%		
Finland	686	686										24.04%		
France	14,635	14,635										27.01%		
Germany	14,157	14,157										23.67%		
Greece	3,831	3,831										9.14%		
Hungary	1,945	1,945										37.43%		
Ireland	5,823	5,823										53.86%		
Italy	5,651	5,651										30.51%		
Latvia	611	611										29.59%		
Lithuania	10,170	10,170										66.89%		
Luxembourg	429	429										37.27%		
Malta	193	193										31.08%		
Netherlands	5,055	5,055										21.13%		
Poland	13,947	13,947										37.06%		

Portugal	2,488	2,488										30.35%	
Romania	3,062	3,062										18.71%	
Slovakia	583	583										23.10%	
Slovenia	306	306										32.83%	
Spain	3,812	3,812										20.06%	
Sweden	1,642	1,642										27.20%	
Iceland	211	211										40.50%	
Liechtenstein	6	6										15.38%	
Norway	1,389	1,389										30.95%	
Total EU	**99,974**	**99,974**										**27.61%**	
Total EEA	**101,580**	**101,580**										**27.67%**	

TTP OR ACTION 2												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressi ons before action	Interacti on/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressi ons after action	Interacti on/ engagem ent after action	Penetrati on and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audience s	Trends on narrative s used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressi ons of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/im pression	Interacti on/ engagem ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio

											s on the service)	n/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 3												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 4												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 5	SLI 14.2.1
	Methodology
	(1) Number of channels for TTP 5, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024);
	(2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
	(3) Number of videos for TTP 5, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
	(4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs.

In this report, YouTube has provided information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 5 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) N/A;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) N/A.

SLI 14.2.3
Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4
Methodology
(1) Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) Percentage of TTP 5 video removals out of all related video removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(3) N/A;
(4) N/A.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below;
(3, 4) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

	SLI 14.2.1				SLI 14.2.2							SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Number of channels identified	Number of channels removed	Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001 – 10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals out of all related channel removals	Percentage of TTP 5 video removals out of all related video removals	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States																		
Austria	170	170	4	4	1	0	0	2	1	0	0				1.93%	0.03%		
Belgium	237	237	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0				3.56%	0.00%		
Bulgaria	145	145	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0				2.96%	0.01%		
Croatia	66	66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.73%	0.00%		
Cyprus	51	51	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0				3.56%	0.04%		
Czech Republic	159	159	7	7	1	0	0	1	3	2	0				2.44%	0.02%		
Denmark	65	65	12	12	2	1	8	1	0	0	0				2.36%	0.07%		
Estonia	27	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				1.60%	0.00%		
Finland	90	90	45	45	21	3	3	10	8	0	0				3.15%	0.41%		
France	1,277	1,277	237	237	15	10	26	123	62	1	0				2.36%	0.18%		
Germany	1,749	1,749	1,440	1,440	984	190	88	86	63	29	0				2.92%	0.65%		
Greece	124	124	6	6	1	4	1	0	0	0	0				0.30%	0.04%		
Hungary	129	129	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.48%	0.01%		
Ireland	116	116	102	102	3	1	2	75	21	0	0				1.07%	0.65%		
Italy	828	828	250	250	3	1	109	104	31	2	0				4.47%	0.25%		
Latvia	46	46	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.23%	0.00%		
Lithuania	49	49	10	10	2	3	0	5	0	0	0				0.32%	0.10%		
Luxembourg	20	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				1.74%	0.00%		
Malta	13	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.09%	0.00%		
Netherlands	406	406	195	195	28	66	27	38	19	17	0				1.70%	0.27%		
Poland	697	697	6	6	1	0	1	0	2	2	0				1.85%	0.01%		

Portugal	165	165	50	50	3	2	27	18	0	0	0				2.01%	0.18%
Romania	460	460	5	5	3	0	0	2	0	0	0				2.81%	0.01%
Slovakia	47	47	4	4	0	0	0	2	2	0	0				1.86%	0.03%
Slovenia	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.68%	0.00%
Spain	907	907	177	177	8	7	24	40	35	63	0				4.77%	0.15%
Sweden	211	211	10	10	1	1	1	4	3	0	0				3.50%	0.04%
Iceland	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				1.73%	0.00%
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0.00%	0.00%
Norway	97	97	19	19	2	1	1	15	0	0	0				2.16%	0.14%
Total EU	**8,279**	**8,279**	**2,567**	**2,567**	**1,081**	**289**	**317**	**511**	**251**	**118**	**0**				**2.29%**	**0.23%**
Total EEA	**8,385**	**8,385**	**2,586**	**2,586**	**1,083**	**290**	**318**	**526**	**251**	**118**	**0**				**2.28%**	**0.23%**

TTP OR ACTION 6												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio

										on the service)	n/engagement on the service)
Member States											

TTP OR ACTION 7	<u>SLI 14.2.1</u> **Methodology** (1) Number of videos for TTP 7, identified for potential removal, by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024); (2) Number of removals of videos for TTP 7, by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024. Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone. YouTube's [Community Guidelines](#), commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs. In this report, YouTube has provided information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs. YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found [here](#).

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 7 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) N/A;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) N/A.

SLI 14.2.3
Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

Methodology

(1) Percentage of TTP 7 video removals out of all related video removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) N/A;
(3) N/A.

Response

(1) Please see table below;
(2, 3) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2							SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	**Percentage of TTP 7 video removals out of all related video removals**	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States														
Austria	19	19	1	7	6	0	2	3	0			0.13%		
Belgium	38	38	8	9	5	1	10	5	0			0.16%		
Bulgaria	26	26	4	3	5	7	4	3	0			0.12%		
Croatia	4	4	1	2	1	0	0	0	0			0.05%		
Cyprus	26	26	1	5	2	6	8	4	0			0.51%		
Czech Republic	19	19	2	2	7	2	1	5	0			0.05%		
Denmark	8	8	1	5	2	0	0	0	0			0.05%		
Estonia	3	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0			0.05%		
Finland	19	19	3	8	6	2	0	0	0			0.17%		
France	236	236	28	74	63	23	23	25	0			0.18%		
Germany	338	338	70	95	59	48	35	31	0			0.15%		
Greece	96	96	13	11	10	14	24	24	0			0.63%		
Hungary	10	10	2	4	1	2	1	0	0			0.05%		
Ireland	55	55	11	12	8	5	12	7	0			0.35%		
Italy	85	85	15	29	16	11	7	7	0			0.09%		
Latvia	8	8	1	6	0	0	1	0	0			0.09%		
Lithuania	5	5	0	1	2	0	1	1	0			0.05%		
Luxembourg	5	5	3	0	2	0	0	0	0			0.40%		
Malta	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0			0.14%		
Netherlands	143	143	18	36	16	15	20	38	0			0.20%		
Poland	45	45	8	10	11	4	6	6	0			0.05%		

Portugal	27	27	4	12	2	4	3	2	0				0.10%	
Romania	27	27	2	5	5	5	6	4	0				0.03%	
Slovakia	5	5	0	2	0	1	1	1	0				0.04%	
Slovenia	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0				0.07%	
Spain	125	125	14	34	23	28	15	11	0				0.10%	
Sweden	45	45	6	16	10	6	4	3	0				0.16%	
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0.00%	
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0.00%	
Norway	20	20	1	12	2	2	0	3	0				0.14%	
Total EU	**1,421**	**1,421**	**217**	**389**	**264**	**186**	**184**	**181**	**0**				**0.13%**	
Total EEA	**1,441**	**1,441**	**218**	**401**	**266**	**188**	**184**	**184**	**0**				**0.13%**	

TTP OR ACTION 8	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/im pression	Interactio n/ engagem ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio

											s on the service)	n/engage ment on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 9	SLI 14.2.1
	Methodology
	(1) Number of channels for TTP 9, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024);
	(2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
	(3) Number of videos for TTP 9, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
	(4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024.
	Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.
	YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs.
	In this report, YouTube has provided information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.
	YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including

Community Guidelines, can be found [here](#).

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 9 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) N/A;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) N/A.

SLI 14.2.3

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

<u>SLI 14.2.4</u>
Methodology
(1) Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(2) Percentage of TTP 9 video removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H2 2024;
(3) N/A;
(4) N/A.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below;
(3, 4) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2.1				**SLI 14.2.2**							**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**			
Number of channels identified	Number of channels removed	Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001–10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	**Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals out of all related chann**	**Percentage of TTP 9 video removals out of all related video**	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to

Member States													el removals	removals	overall views/impressions on the service)	overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Austria	90	90	67	67	0	1	13	19	13	21	0			1.02%	0.46%		
Belgium	144	144	81	81	0	5	13	23	21	19	0			2.16%	0.35%		
Bulgaria	74	74	30	30	0	1	3	6	10	10	0			1.51%	0.14%		
Croatia	36	36	13	13	0	2	1	3	5	2	0			1.49%	0.17%		
Cyprus	68	68	47	47	0	1	5	11	24	6	0			4.74%	0.93%		
Czech Republic	139	139	183	183	0	2	25	69	61	26	0			2.14%	0.51%		
Denmark	92	92	54	54	0	3	12	16	16	7	0			3.34%	0.33%		
Estonia	17	17	19	19	0	1	2	9	6	1	0			1.01%	0.33%		
Finland	58	58	38	38	0	1	4	20	7	6	0			2.03%	0.35%		
France	603	603	394	394	3	16	58	143	116	58	0			1.11%	0.30%		
Germany	947	947	641	641	3	26	89	266	150	107	0			1.58%	0.29%		
Greece	115	115	59	59	0	1	8	23	13	14	0			0.27%	0.38%		
Hungary	82	82	23	23	0	1	5	5	7	5	0			1.58%	0.12%		

Ireland	61	61	101	101	2	5	18	38	22	16	0				0.56%	0.64%		
Italy	319	319	177	177	1	13	19	58	62	24	0				1.72%	0.18%		
Latvia	34	34	45	45	0	1	7	20	12	5	0				1.65%	0.53%		
Lithuania	142	142	26	26	0	0	2	12	7	5	0				0.93%	0.26%		
Luxembourg	13	13	8	8	0	0	1	5	2	0	0				1.13%	0.65%		
Malta	17	17	5	5	0	1	0	1	2	1	0				2.74%	0.36%		
Netherlands	556	556	866	866	6	34	149	349	273	55	0				2.32%	1.18%		
Poland	1,040	1,040	982	982	128	258	209	231	105	51	0				2.76%	1.06%		
Portugal	146	146	14	14	0	0	0	7	5	2	0				1.78%	0.05%		
Romania	235	235	96	96	0	6	12	30	23	25	0				1.44%	0.12%		
Slovakia	53	53	49	49	0	5	12	14	13	5	0				2.10%	0.39%		
Slovenia	39	39	30	30	0	0	4	10	9	7	0				4.18%	1.03%		
Spain	413	413	133	133	1	7	18	41	38	28	0				2.17%	0.11%		
Sweden	139	139	110	110	0	2	14	42	36	16	0				2.30%	0.39%		
Iceland	8	8	4	4	0	0	1	2	1	0	0				1.54%	0.38%		
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0.00%	0.00%		
Norway	122	122	74	74	0	4	10	27	20	13	0				2.72%	0.54%		
Total EU	**5,672**	**5,672**	**4,291**	**4,291**	**144**	**393**	**703**	**1,471**	**1,058**	**522**	**0**				**1.57%**	**0.39%**		
Total EEA	**5,802**	**5,802**	**4,369**	**4,369**	**144**	**397**	**714**	**1,500**	**1,079**	**535**	**0**				**1.58%**	**0.39%**		

TTP OR ACTION 10				
	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2	SLI 14.2.3	SLI 14.2.4

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 11												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in

										on the service	to overall views/impressions on the service)	relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States													

Measure 14.3	Google Search		YouTube
QRE 14.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The final list of TTPs agreed within the Permanent Task-force in H2 2022 was used by Signatories as part of their reports from then on, as intended. The Permanent Task-force will continue to examine and update the list as necessary in light of the state of the art.		

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 15
Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• After joining the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content, in February 2024, Google collaborated on the newest version (2.1) of the coalition's technical standard, Content Credentials. This version is more secure against a wider range of tampering attacks due to stricter technical requirements for validating the history of the content's provenance. • In July 2024 at the Aspen Security Forum, Google, alongside industry peers, introduced the Coalition for Secure AI (CoSAI) to advance comprehensive security measures for addressing the unique risks that come with AI, for both issues that arise in real time and those over the horizon. The first three areas of focus the coalition will tackle in collaboration with industry and academia include Software Supply Chain Security for AI systems; Preparing defenders for a changing cybersecurity landscape; and AI security governance. • In September 2024, Google announced a Global AI Opportunity Fund, which will invest $120 million to make AI education and training available in communities around the world. Google will provide this in local languages, in partnership with nonprofits and NGOs. • In October 2024, Google released its EU AI Opportunity Agenda, a series of recommendations for governments to seize the full economic and societal potential of AI. The Agenda outlines the need to revisit Europe's workforce strategy, as well as investment in AI infrastructure and research, adoption and accessibility. • In October 2024, The Nobel Prize was awarded to Google DeepMind's Demis Hassabis and John Jumper for their groundbreaking work with AlphaFold 2, which predicted the structures for nearly all proteins known to science. It has been used by more than 2 million researchers around the world, accelerating scientific discovery in important areas like malaria vaccines, cancer treatments, and more. Search • In September 2024, Google announced that they will bring the latest version of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) technical standard, Content Credentials, to Search's 'About This Image' feature. If an image contains C2PA metadata, users will be able to use the feature to see if an image was created or edited with AI tools.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to	Yes	Yes

substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Search hopes Google's SynthID technology can work together with a broad range of solutions for creators and users across society, and it is continuing to evolve SynthID by gathering feedback from users, enhancing its capabilities, and exploring new features. SynthID could be expanded for use across other AI models and Google Search is excited about the potential of integrating it into more Google products and making it available to third parties in the near future — empowering people and organisations to responsibly work with AI-generated content.	YouTube requires that creators disclose when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using AI tools. YouTube applies labels to content indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic, as well as a more prominent label for certain types of content about sensitive topics. YouTube continually invests in the ability to detect policy-violative accounts and evolves this work accordingly.

Measure 15.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The Google Search features Manipulated Media Policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. This includes if such content would cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different understanding or impression, such that it might cause significant harm to groups or individuals, or	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated. YouTube's long-standing Misinformation Policies prohibit content that has been technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (usually beyond clips taken out of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm. YouTube detects content that violates Community

	significantly undermine participation or trust in electoral or civic processes.	Guidelines using a combination of machine learning and human review. YouTube also has policies on Spam & Deceptive Practices that prohibit, for example, spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advantage of the YouTube community, Impersonation, and Fake Engagement. Refer to QRE 18.2.1 for how YouTube enforces these policies.
Measure 15.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 15.2.1	Google's AI principles set out Google's commitment to develop technology responsibly. Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content. However, if AI is used for the primary purpose of manipulating search rankings, that is a violation of Google Search's long-standing policy against spammy automatically-generated content. Across its services, Google has been examining the risks and challenges associated with more powerful language models. Improved AI systems can help bolster spam fighting capabilities and even help combat known loss patterns. Google Search introduced a system to better identify queries seeking explicit content, so Google Search can better avoid shocking or offending users not looking for	Google's AI principles set out Google's commitment to develop technology responsibly and establish specific application areas that will not be pursued. YouTube responsibly applies Google AI principles to all its products. **YouTube's approach to responsible AI innovation** All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated. YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using AI tools. YouTube also informs viewers that content may be altered or synthetic in two ways. A label may be added to the description panel indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic. For certain types of content about sensitive topics, YouTube will apply a more prominent label to the video player. Examples of content that require disclosures can be found here. YouTube has noted feedback from its community, including creators, viewers, and artists, about the ways in which

that information, and ultimately make the Google Search experience safer for everyone.

In May 2024, Google published a white paper outlining its end-to-end AI Responsibility Lifecycle: a four-phase process (Research, Design, Govern, Share) that guides responsible AI development at Google. The initial Research and Design phases foster innovation, while the Govern and Share phases focus on risk assessment, testing, monitoring, and transparency. In this paper, Google aims to share its thoughts on emerging best practices for generative AI responsibility with others across the AI ecosystem, and discusses examples of how it has taken what it has learned about new applications, extensions and risks to inform innovation. For each phase of the AI Responsibility Lifecycle, Google also outlines the specific progress it has made towards building safer products that maximise the positive benefits of AI to society, and looks ahead to what is next.

In line with Google's principled and responsible approach to its Generative AI products, Google has prioritised testing across safety risks ranging from cybersecurity vulnerabilities to misinformation and fairness.

Reiterating Google's approach to AI Principles governance rests on a corporate-wide end-to-end commitment to three pillars:

1. **AI Principles** serve as Google's ethical charter and inform its product policies. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and published

emerging technologies could impact them. YouTube makes it possible to request the removal of AI-generated or other synthetic or altered content that simulates an identifiable individual, including their face or voice, using its privacy request process. Not all content will be removed from YouTube, and YouTube will consider a variety of factors when evaluating these requests, some examples can be found here.

Additionally, YouTube has highlighted how it will build responsibility into its AI tools and features for creators. This includes significant, ongoing work to develop guardrails that will prevent its AI tools from generating the type of content that does not belong on YouTube.

YouTube incorporates user feedback to continuously improve protections. And within YouTube, dedicated teams like the intelligence desk are specifically focused on adversarial testing and threat detection to ensure YouTube's systems meet new challenges as they emerge. All content generated by YouTube's AI tools will include a SynthID watermark, which is a tool for watermarking and identifying AI-generated images. Across the industry, Google, including YouTube, continues to help increase transparency around digital content. This includes its work as a steering member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA).

Deploying AI technology to power content moderation
YouTube has always used a combination of people and machine learning technologies to enforce its Community Guidelines. AI classifiers help YouTube detect potentially

AI Principles in 2018 to guide its work. Its robust internal governance focuses on responsibility throughout the AI development lifecycle, covering model development, application deployment, and post-launch monitoring. While the Principles were recently updated to adapt to shifts in technology, the global conversation, and the AI ecosystem, Google's deep commitment to responsible AI development remains unchanged.

2. **Education and resources** provide ethics training and technical tools to test, evaluate and monitor the application of the AI Principles to all of Google's products and services. Google is sharing for the first time details of a new company-wide tool for monitoring products' responsible AI maturity, and updates on technical approaches to fairness, data transparency, and more.

3. **Structures and processes** include risk assessment frameworks, ethics reviews, and Executive accountability. This report provides a dive deep into how risk is identified and measured in the AI Principles reviews.

See additional details here.

violative content at scale, and reviewers work to confirm whether content has actually crossed policy lines. AI is continuously increasing both the speed and accuracy of YouTube's content moderation systems.

Improved speed and accuracy of YouTube's systems also allows it to reduce the amount of harmful content human reviewers are exposed to.

Google's Commitment to Safe and Secure AI
Google has a long history of supporting collective security through the Vulnerability Rewards Program (VRP), Project Zero and in the field of Open Source software security. Google believes incentivising research around AI safety and security, and bringing potential issues to light, will ultimately make AI safer for everyone. The latest updates about Google's AI efforts can be found here.

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services,

	with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.		
	C.16	**M 16.1**	**M 16.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	- Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published its <u>Q3 2024</u>, and <u>Q4 2024</u> Quarterly Bulletin, which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms. - In H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), Google TAG published 2 examples of information sharing and learnings in the <u>TAG Blog</u>: - August 2024 - <u>Iranian backed group steps up phishing campaigns against Israel, U.S.</u>; - August 2024 - <u>State-backed attackers and commercial surveillance vendors repeatedly use the same exploits</u>.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 16.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 16.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Team work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States. One of TAG's missions is to understand and disrupt coordinated information operations threat actors. TAG's work enables Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by rigorous analysis. TAG's investigations do not focus on making judgements about the content on Google platforms, but rather examining technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural patterns to make an assessment that activity is coordinated inauthentic behaviour. TAG regularly publishes its TAG Bulletin, updated quarterly [here](#), which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, as well as additional periodic blog posts. TAG also engages with other platform Signatories to receive and, when strictly necessary for security purposes, share information related to threat actor activity – in compliance with applicable laws. To learn more, refer to SLI 16.1.1. See Google's disclosure policies about [handling security vulnerabilities](#) for developers and security professionals.	
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) posts a quarterly Bulletin, which includes disclosure of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's products and services, as well as additional periodic blog posts. In the Bulletin, TAG often notes when findings are similar to or supported by those reported by other platforms. The publicly available H2 2024 TAG Bulletins (1 July 2024 - 31 December 2024) show 81,773 YouTube channels across 57 separate actions were involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. Industry partners supported two of those	

separate actions by providing leads. The TAG Bulletin and periodic blog posts are Google's, including YouTube's, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues.

As reported in the Bulletin, some channels YouTube took action on were part of campaigns that uploaded content in some EEA languages, specifically: French (546 channels), German (460 channels), Polish (389 channels), Italian (362 channels), Spanish (128 channels), Romanian (15 channels), Czech (12 Channels), and Hungarian (12 channels). Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in an EEA Member State language does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State. For more information, please see the TAG Bulletin.

Data		
Measure 16.2	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
QRE 16.2.1	*Not subscribed*	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States. Refer to the TAG Bulletin articles that cover the reporting period to learn more about the number of YouTube channels terminated as part of TAG's investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia, Poland, and other countries around the world.

| | | The most recent examples of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as how Google collaborates and shares information, can be found in Google's [TAG Blog](). |

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 17 In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.				
	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• In May 2024, Google announced that it would open-source SynthID text watermarking through its updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit to help others benefit from and improve on the advances Google is making. In addition, Google expanded SynthID's capabilities to include watermarking AI-generated text in the Gemini app and web experience, as well as video in Veo, its recently announced and most capable generative video model. • Google Search expanded the 'About This Image' tool to 40 additional languages	• YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels.

	around the world, including French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese. ● In July 2024, Google announced 'About This Image' is now available on Circle to Search and Google Lens, giving users more ways to quickly get context on images that they see wherever they come across them. ● In September 2024, Google announced that it would bring the latest version of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) technical standard, Content Credentials, to Search's 'About This Image' feature. If an image contains C2PA metadata, users will be able to use the feature to see if an image was created or edited with AI tools.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	No	YouTube plans to continue rolling out new content as part of its 'Hit Pause' campaign.

Measure 17.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search aims to connect users with high quality information, and help users understand and evaluate that information. Google Search has deeply invested in both information quality and information literacy. Some ways in which Google Search does this include: ● **'About This Result':** Next to most results on Google Search, there is a menu icon that users can tap to learn more about the result or feature and where the information is coming from. With this additional context, users can make a more informed decision about the sites they want to visit and what results will be most useful for them. When available, users will see a description of the website from Wikipedia, which provides free, reliable information about tens of millions of sites on the web. If a website does not have a Wikipedia description, Google Search will show additional context that may be available, such as when Google Search first indexed the site. Users will also be able to quickly see if their connection to the site is secure based on its use of the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts all data between the website and the browser they are using, to help them stay safe as they browse the web. More	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube takes its responsibility efforts seriously, outlining clear policies used to moderate content on the platform and providing tools that users can leverage to improve their media literacy education and better evaluate what content and sources to trust. Information panels may also appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. For example, topics that are more prone to misinformation may have information panels that show basic background info, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more context on the topic. If a user wants to learn more, the panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels. During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users. Further EEA Member State coverage can be found in SLI 17.1.1.

information on the 'About This Result' feature can be found [here](), and [here]().

The 'More About This Page' link within the 'About This Result' feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:

- **See more information about the source**: Users will be able to read what a site says about itself in its own words, when that information is available.
- **Find what others on the web have said about a site**: Reading what others on the web have written about a site can help users better evaluate sources.
- **Learn more about the topic**: In the 'About the topic' section, users can find information about the same topic from other sources.

In December 2023, Google Search expanded this feature to 40 new languages, including Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, Greek, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, and Swedish.

Additional information can be found in the Google Search blog post [here]().

- **'About This Image':** With added insights in 'About

This Image', users will know if an image may have been generated with Google's AI tools when they come across it in Search or Chrome. All images generated with Imagen 2 in Google's consumer products will be marked by SynthID, a tool developed by Google DeepMind that adds a digital watermark directly into the pixels of images generated. SynthID watermarks are imperceptible to the human eye but detectable for identification. In addition, Search expanded the 'About This Image' tool to 40 additional languages around the world, including French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.

- Consistent with its AI principles, Google Search also conducted extensive adversarial testing and red teaming to identify and mitigate potential harmful and problematic content. Google Search is also applying filters to avoid generating images of named people. Google Search will continue investing in new techniques to improve the safety and privacy protections of its models.

More information on the 'About This Image' feature can be found here.

- **Content Advisory Notices:** Helpful notices for users that highlight when information is scarce or when interest is travelling faster than facts. These are specifically designed to address data voids

	which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic.	
SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	(1) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State; (3) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for potentially unreliable sets of results in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State; Note metrics 1-3 are estimated proportions; metric 1 represents the number of content advisories for low relevance results out of all queries over the reporting period; metric 2 and 3 follow the same logic but are for content advisories for rapidly changing results and content advisories for potentially unreliable sets of results, respectively. (4) Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State; (5) Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State;	Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panel, non-COVID medical panels) in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State. Note: Due to a technical issue, some info panel impressions were undercounted. YouTube relies on a number of systems to calculate this metric and make the best effort to be as accurate as possible.

	(6) Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State; (7) Number of times the 'Personalisation' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State.							
	Search only							YouTube only
	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results (%)	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results (%)	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for potentially unreliable set of results (%)	Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed	Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Personalisation' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-COVID medical panels)
Level	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions
Member States								
Austria	0.009%	0.00007%	0.0000079%	492,336	10,161,776	10,002,348	8,443,368	35,930,356
Belgium	0.008%	0.00006%	0.0000062%	694,484	12,635,380	12,451,036	10,479,372	140,278,448
Bulgaria	0.015%	0.00004%	0.0000075%	418,008	5,520,908	5,427,300	4,564,196	34,494,718
Croatia	0.011%	0.00004%	0.0000067%	306,460	5,169,452	5,050,320	4,322,968	45,489,297
Cyprus	0.019%	0.00010%	0.0000329%	106,152	1,194,376	1,177,588	1,003,436	4,709,568
Czech Republic	0.009%	0.00003%	0.0000034%	658,648	9,308,096	9,185,980	7,769,180	76,755,521

Denmark	0.008%	0.00010%	0.0000045%	290,416	5,980,168	5,903,776	5,005,248	18,153,587
Estonia	0.015%	0.00011%	0.0000233%	86,100	1,521,468	1,506,608	1,285,236	13,864,098
Finland	0.009%	0.00012%	0.0000057%	333,476	7,408,228	7,328,700	6,237,504	14,400,111
France	0.007%	0.00005%	0.0000059%	4,434,580	86,918,604	85,351,180	72,299,248	909,171,599
Germany	0.011%	0.00010%	0.0000061%	4,744,012	96,729,900	94,959,380	80,156,384	1,931,996,858
Greece	0.017%	0.00003%	0.0000044%	753,108	11,418,624	11,171,708	9,546,464	29,433,930
Hungary	0.012%	0.00003%	0.0000046%	590,120	8,314,240	8,170,540	6,923,408	55,347,902
Ireland	0.010%	0.00010%	0.0000054%	432,868	7,267,604	7,130,680	6,061,364	68,473,652
Italy	0.015%	0.00004%	0.0000016%	4,336,524	79,300,560	77,454,444	66,299,316	559,067,820
Latvia	0.018%	0.00010%	0.0000184%	113,092	1,673,808	1,653,056	1,398,732	39,720,895
Lithuania	0.016%	0.00006%	0.0000127%	171,912	2,746,672	2,716,224	2,288,856	36,214,789
Luxembourg	0.013%	0.00015%	0.0000432%	37,252	707,288	695,948	591,364	2,825,126
Malta	0.015%	0.00018%	0.0000540%	49,240	703,072	691,912	594,788	2,407,322
Netherlands	0.009%	0.00006%	0.0000022%	1,347,040	23,309,716	22,909,616	19,352,032	357,656,982
Poland	0.006%	0.00002%	0.0000008%	2,240,116	47,084,536	46,397,932	39,155,200	187,672,506
Portugal	0.007%	0.00006%	0.0000052%	754,972	11,476,200	11,293,812	9,653,604	36,677,338
Romania	0.011%	0.00003%	0.0000037%	887,976	12,030,632	11,798,700	10,039,572	90,075,363
Slovakia	0.013%	0.00003%	0.0000104%	328,608	4,527,972	4,463,864	3,762,372	25,112,829
Slovenia	0.015%	0.00004%	0.0000182%	128,052	2,411,732	2,380,088	2,020,268	14,414,991
Spain	0.006%	0.00008%	0.0000070%	4,078,508	58,946,872	57,742,752	49,286,500	417,913,504
Sweden	0.007%	0.00012%	0.0000030%	614,072	13,062,580	12,902,600	10,946,140	109,624,386
Iceland	0.013%	0.00021%	0.0000000%	13,536	376,920	371,588	316,908	1,117,258
Liechtenstein	0.013%	0.00104%	0.0000000%	1,588	39,644	39,068	32,924	149,057

Norway	0.006%	0.00009%	0.0000043%	315,956	5,814,192	5,747,832	4,853,060	19,947,673
Total EU	**0.010%**	**0.00006%**	**0.0000053%**	**29,428,132**	**527,530,464**	**517,918,092**	**439,486,120**	**5,257,883,496**
Total EEA	**0.010%**	**0.00006%**	**0.0000053%**	**29,759,212**	**533,761,220**	**524,076,580**	**444,689,012**	**5,279,097,484**

Measure 17.2	Google Search	YouTube

QRE 17.2.1	**Grants**
	
	In H2 2024, Google.org has supported a number of organisations that seek to help build a safer and more tolerant online world, and promote media literacy. This includes:
	
	• **In H2 2024, Google.org announced $10 million** in funding to the Raspberry Pi Foundation to further expand access to Experience AI. This educational program was co-created with Google DeepMind as part of Google.org's broader commitment to support organisations helping young people build AI literacy.
	
	    Experience AI provides teachers with the training and resources needed to both educate and inspire young people aged 11-14 about AI.
	
	    The curriculum focuses on a structured learning journey, ethical considerations, real-world examples and role models, and culturally relevant content to engage learners in understanding AI and how to use it responsibly. Raspberry Pi Foundation and Google DeepMind continued to develop further resources, including three new lessons centred around AI safety: AI and Your Data, Media Literacy in the Age of AI, and Using Generative AI Responsibly.
	
	Search
	To raise awareness of its features and build literacy across society, Google Search is working with information literacy experts to help design tools in a way that allows users to feel confident and in control of the information they consume and the choices they make.
	
	In addition, Google Search builds capacity for librarians to empower their patrons and the general public with information literacy. At the end of September 2022, in cooperation with Google Search's partner, 'Public Libraries 2030', Google Search launched a Training of Trainers program called 'Super Searchers' for librarians and library staff that seeks to achieve the following objectives: (a) provide librarians and library staff with the skills to build the information literacy capacity of the general public; (b) increase the information literacy capacity of library patrons and the general public.	

	Since the launch, Google and '[Public Libraries 2030](#)' have provided Super Searchers training in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK. Note, Public Libraries 2030 (PL2030), Google Search's implementing partner, shared feedback that language barriers and lack of interest from patrons made it challenging to scale this program across the EU. While the agreement with PL2030 ended in H1 2023, the pilot program continued to expand in non-EU countries (e.g. in the US through the Public Library Association). **YouTube** YouTube remains committed to supporting efforts that deepen users' collective understanding of misinformation. To empower users to think critically and use YouTube's products safely and responsibly, YouTube invests in media literacy campaigns to improve users' experiences on YouTube. In 2022, YouTube launched 'Hit Pause', a global media literacy campaign, which is live in all EEA Member States and the campaign has run in 40+ additional countries around the world, including all official EU languages. The program seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs) via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated [YouTube channel](#). The YouTube channel hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content, as well as additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation – from using emotional language to cherry picking information. The content of this campaign helps to amplify other in-product interventions, such as information panels, which are meant to provide context for topics that are often subject to misinformation. EEA Member State coverage of 'Hit Pause' media literacy impressions can be found in SLI 17.2.1.	
SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above	In H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), as part of the Super Searchers Program, 517 librarians were trained across the 17 training sessions held in Europe. Specifically, in Portugal, after a successful pilot programme, MiudosSegurosNa.Net and Agarrados à Net launched Super Searchers in October 2024 in collaboration with the National Schools Coordinator. Working through schools and municipal libraries, the	Media Literacy campaign impressions in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.

		Impressions from YouTube's media literacy campaigns
Level		**Impressions**
Member States		
Austria		3,051,110
Belgium		4,052,296
Bulgaria		5,131,069
Croatia		3,451,905
Cyprus		633,076
Czech Republic		10,984,244
Denmark		4,651,692
Estonia		622,296
Finland		3,382,016
France		11,950,238
Germany		33,707,796
Greece		11,984,135
Hungary		3,544,139
Ireland		3,009,023
Italy		25,554,069
Latvia		1,016,128
Lithuania		1,958,077
Luxembourg		177,872

The top-left cell of the table contains the text:

programme has already trained 490 trainers in 16 sessions around the country, with a current estimated reach of 14,700 students.

Malta		202,535
Netherlands		10,340,630
Poland		45,007,000
Portugal		5,495,194
Romania		9,622,147
Slovakia		5,236,812
Slovenia		1,365,628
Spain		28,050,584
Sweden		6,719,603
Iceland		112,624
Liechtenstein		18,828
Norway		1,119,845
Total EU		**240,901,314**
Total EEA		**242,152,611**

Measure 17.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.3.1	See response to QRE 17.2.1.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube partners with media literacy experts and researchers to identify unique and engaging ways to build up the YouTube Community's media literacy. For example, to inform the 'Hit Pause' global campaign, YouTube partnered with the National Association for Media Literacy

		Education (NAMLE), a U.S.-based organisation, to identify which competency areas the campaign should focus on. For additional information about YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign, please refer to QRE 17.2.1.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5" align="center">V. Empowering Users</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5" align="center">Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>C.18</td><td>M 18.1</td><td>M 18.2</td><td>M 18.3</td></tr>
<tr><td>We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:</td><td>Google Search
YouTube</td><td>Not subscribed</td><td>Google Search
YouTube</td><td>Google Search
YouTube</td></tr>
</table>

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	YouTube has long been updating, on a regular and ongoing basis, its internal systems and processes related to the detection of content that violates its policies. This includes investment in automated detection systems.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in	No	No

place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 18.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 18.1.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 18.1.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 18.1.3	*Not subscribed*
SLI 18.1.1 – actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 18.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 18.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search has the following policies which complement the Content Policies outlined in QRE 14.1.1:	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** See response to QRE 14.1.1 to see how YouTube's Community Guidelines map to the TTPs. These policies seek to, among other things, limit the spread of misleading or deceptive content that poses a serious risk of egregious harm.

Medical Content Policy: This policy prohibits content that contradicts or runs contrary to scientific or medical consensus and evidence-based best practices.

Misleading Content Policy: This policy states that Search features and News prohibits preview content that misleads users to engage with it by promising details which are not reflected in the underlying content.

These policies also provide users with information on how to report specific types of content that violate those policies. Google Search removes content for policy violations based on user reports as well as through its internal content moderation processes. More extensive policies are deployed for Search features, and can be found at the Content Policies Help Centre.

In addition, Google Search removes content that has been determined to be unlawful under applicable law, in response to a notification from a third party, such as a user or an authority. Examples include material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid 'right to be forgotten request' or material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid court order. Google Search measures the number of court and government Legal Removal requests biannually (across all products), and publishes this information in transparency reports.

Community Guidelines Enforcement
After a creator's first Community Guidelines violation, they will typically get a warning with no penalty to their channel. They will have the chance to take a policy training to allow the warning to expire after 90 days. Creators will also get the chance to receive a warning in another policy category. If the same policy is violated within that 90 day window, the creator's channel will be given a strike.

If the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, their channel may be permanently removed from YouTube. In some cases, YouTube may terminate a channel for a single case of severe abuse, as explained in the Help Centre. YouTube may also remove content for reasons other than Community Guidelines violations, such as a first-party privacy complaint or a court order. In these cases, creators will not be issued a strike.

If a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain the action taken on their content and which of YouTube's policies the content violated. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes here.

YouTube also reserves the right to restrict a creator's ability to create content on YouTube at its discretion. A channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, users are prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2"></td><td rowspan="2"></td><td>restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on the YouTube channel. A violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of Service, and may result in termination of all existing YouTube channels of the user, any new channels created or acquired, and channels in which the user is repeatedly or prominently featured.

Refer to SLI 18.2.1 on YouTube's enforcement at an EEA Member State level.</td></tr>
</table>

| SLI 18.2.1 – actions taken in response to policy violations | See response to SLI 14.2.1. | (1) Number of videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State;

(2) Views threshold on videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State. |

YouTube only

Level	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001- 10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views
	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos
Member States							
Austria	196	19	59	55	28	26	9
Belgium	200	30	53	56	32	22	7
Bulgaria	128	28	27	20	30	15	8

Country						
Croatia	54	9	12	17	8	6	2
Cyprus	71	5	15	13	14	17	7
Czech Republic	95	7	19	31	16	8	14
Denmark	112	7	23	36	30	12	4
Estonia	74	5	22	19	17	9	2
Finland	110	19	32	22	22	13	2
France	1,019	115	312	283	150	102	57
Germany	1,808	205	453	498	362	201	89
Greece	225	30	45	42	42	39	27
Hungary	69	6	26	19	9	5	4
Ireland	614	68	233	158	87	52	16
Italy	1,279	123	390	348	243	113	62
Latvia	87	8	26	24	14	11	4
Lithuania	88	8	27	27	13	9	4
Luxembourg	9	3	0	5	0	1	0
Malta	10	1	2	1	3	3	0
Netherlands	723	77	183	200	123	85	55
Poland	237	38	54	66	38	25	16
Portugal	242	39	66	54	50	23	10
Romania	154	24	39	38	31	18	4
Slovakia	34	3	13	10	3	2	3
Slovenia	90	8	28	24	27	2	1
Spain	2,075	271	539	488	428	244	105

Sweden	303	26	82	69	76	37	13
Iceland	10	1	1	2	6	0	0
Liechtenstein	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Norway	227	17	43	51	65	43	8
Total EU	**10,106**	**1,182**	**2,780**	**2,623**	**1,896**	**1,100**	**525**
Total EEA	**10,344**	**1,200**	**2,824**	**2,676**	**1,967**	**1,144**	**533**
Measure 18.3	**Google Search**				**YouTube**		

QRE 18.3.1	Google, including YouTube, works with industry leaders across the technology sector, government, and civil society to set good policies, remain abreast of emerging challenges, and establish, share, and learn from industry best practices and research.

Described below are examples that demonstrate Google's, including YouTube, commitment to these actions:

Jigsaw-led Research
Jigsaw is a unit within Google that explores threats to open societies and builds technology that inspires scalable solutions. Jigsaw began conducting research on 'information interventions' more than 10 years ago. Jigsaw has since contributed research and technology on ways to make people more resilient to disinformation. Their research efforts are based on behavioural science and ethnographic studies that examine when people might be vulnerable to specific messages and how to provide helpful information when people need it most. These interventions provide a methodology for proactively addressing a range of threats to people online, as a complement to approaches that focus on removing or downranking material online.

An example of a notable research effort by Jigsaw run on and with YouTube is:
- Accuracy Prompts (APs): APs remind users to think about accuracy. The prompts work by serving users bite-sized digital literacy tips at a moment when it might matter. Lab studies conducted across 16 countries with over 30,000 participants, suggest that APs increase engagement with accurate information and decrease engagement with less accurate information. Small experiments on YouTube suggest users enjoy the experience and report that it makes them feel safer online.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 19
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, Search has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but Search regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to its recommendation system.	No, YouTube has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but YouTube regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to its recommendation system.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 19.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**

| QRE 19.1.1 | **Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

Google Search's ranking systems sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user's query include:

• **Meaning of your query**: To return relevant results, Google Search first needs to establish the intent behind a user's query. Google Search builds language models to decipher how the words that a user enters into the search box match up to the most useful content available.

• **Relevance of content**: Next, Google Search systems analyse the content to assess whether it contains information that might be relevant to what the user is looking for. The most basic signal that information is relevant is when content contains the same keywords as the user's search query.

• **Quality of content**: Google Search systems prioritise content that seems most helpful by identifying signals that can help determine which content demonstrates expertise, high quality, and trustworthiness. For example, one of several factors that Google Search uses to help determine this is by understanding if other prominent websites link or refer to the content. | On YouTube, recommendations help users discover more of the videos they love, whether it is a great new recipe to try or finding their next favourite song.

Users can find recommendations across the platform, including the homepage, the 'Up Next' panel, and the Shorts tab:

• **Homepage**: A user's homepage is what they typically see when they first open YouTube.
• **Up Next**: The Up Next panel appears when a user is watching a video. It suggests additional content based on what they are currently watching and personalised signals (details below).
• **Shorts:** Shorts are ranked based on their performance and relevancy to that individual viewer.

YouTube understands that individuals have unique viewing habits and uses signals to recommend content. YouTube's system compares the user's viewing habits with those that are similar to others, and uses that information to suggest other content.

YouTube's recommendation system is constantly evolving, learning every day from over 80 billion pieces of information or 'signals,' the primary ones being:

• **Watch history**: YouTube's system uses the videos a user watches to give better recommendations, remember where a user left off, and more. |

Aggregated feedback from the Google Search quality evaluation process is used to further refine how Google Search systems discern the quality of information.

- **Usability**: Google Search systems also consider the usability of content. When all things are relatively equal, content that people will find more accessible may perform better.
- **Context and settings**: Information such as user location, past Google Search history, and Search settings all help Google Search ensure user results are what is most useful and relevant at that moment. Google Search uses the user's country and location to deliver content relevant to their area. For instance, if a user in Chicago searches 'football', Google Search will likely show the user results about American football and the Chicago Bears first. Whereas if the user searches 'football' in London, Google will show results about soccer and the Premier League. Google Search settings are also an important indicator of which results a user is likely to find useful, such as if they set a preferred language or opted in to SafeSearch (a tool that helps filter out explicit results). Google Search also includes features that personalise results based on the activity in their Google account. The user can control what Google Search activity is used to improve their experience, including adjusting what data is saved to their Google account at myaccount.google.com. To disable Google Search personalisation based on activity in a

- **Search history**: YouTube's system uses what a user searches for on YouTube to influence future recommendations.
- **Channel subscriptions**: YouTube's system uses information about the channels a user subscribes to in order to recommend videos they may like.
- **Likes**: YouTube's system uses a user's likes information to try to predict the likelihood that they will be interested in similar videos in the future.
- **Dislikes**: YouTube's system uses videos a user dislikes to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- **'Not interested' feedback selections**: YouTube's system uses videos a user marks as 'Not interested' to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- **'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections**: YouTube's system uses 'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections as a signal that the channel content likely is not something a user enjoyed watching.
- **Satisfaction surveys**: YouTube's system uses user surveys that ask a user to rate videos that they watched, which helps the system understand satisfaction, not just watch time.

Different YouTube features rely on certain recommendation signals more than others. For example, YouTube uses the video a user is currently watching as an important signal when suggesting a video to play next. The influence of each signal on recommendations can vary

user's account, the user can turn off personal results in Search. Users can also prevent activity being stored to the user's account or delete particular history items in Web & App Activity. Google Search systems are designed to match a user's interests, but they are not designed to infer sensitive characteristics like race, religion or political party.

The How Search Works website explains the ins and outs of Google Search. The following links provide additional information about helping people and businesses learn how Search works and how results are automatically generated.

based on many variables, including but not limited to the user's device type and the type of content they are watching. This is why the same user will see different recommendations on a mobile phone vs. a television.

Recommendations
Recommendations connect viewers to high-quality information and complement the work done by the robust Community Guidelines that define what is and is not allowed on YouTube. YouTube raises up videos in search and recommendations to viewers on certain topics where quality is key. Human evaluators, trained using publicly available guidelines, assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos.

These human evaluations are used to train YouTube's system to model their decisions, and YouTube then scales their assessments to all videos across the platform. Learn more about how YouTube elevates high-quality information on the How YouTube Works website and the YouTube Blog.

Controls to personalise recommendations
YouTube has built controls that help users decide how much data they want to provide. Users can view, delete, or turn on or off their YouTube watch and search history whenever they want. And, if users do not want to see recommendations at all on the homepage or on the Shorts tab, they can turn off and clear their YouTube watch history. For users with YouTube watch history off and no significant prior watch history, the homepage will show the search bar and the Guide menu, with no feed of recommended videos.

		Users can also tell YouTube when it is recommending something a user is not interested in. For example, buttons on the homepage and in the 'Up next' section allow users to filter and choose recommendations by specific topics. Users can also click on 'Not interested' and/or 'Don't recommend channel' to tell YouTube that a video or channel is not what a user wanted to see at that time, and YouTube will consider that when generating recommendations for that viewer in the future. Additional information about how a user can manage their recommendation settings are outlined [here](#) in YouTube's Help Centre.
Measure 19.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Number of impressions on the personal results control for logged in users in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.	YouTube is sharing the percentage of Daily Active Users that are signed in to the platform (those not signed in are signed out). Signed in users are able to amend their settings in their YouTube or Google Accounts. The average percentage of signed in Daily Active Users over H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.
	Number of impressions on the personal results control for logged in users	**Percentage of daily active users that are signed in**
Level	**Impressions**	**Signed In Users**
Member State		
Austria	52,907	69%
Belgium	56,149	71%

Bulgaria	27,334	73%
Croatia	21,902	74%
Cyprus	5,496	75%
Czech Republic	46,097	72%
Denmark	18,909	65%
Estonia	6,491	73%
Finland	36,868	70%
France	367,129	72%
Germany	496,001	69%
Greece	51,962	74%
Hungary	40,270	73%
Ireland	27,259	67%
Italy	366,985	76%
Latvia	9,414	73%
Lithuania	16,238	75%
Luxembourg	2,675	67%
Malta	1,785	74%
Netherlands	104,851	70%
Poland	205,946	75%
Portugal	44,586	76%
Romania	67,616	76%
Slovakia	26,380	73%
Slovenia	9,011	72%

Spain	303,773	76%
Sweden	47,411	66%
Iceland	968	67%
Liechtenstein	138	57%
Norway	23,503	63%
Total EU	**2,461,445**	**72%**
Total EEA	**2,486,054**	**72%**

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 20
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

	C.20	M 20.1	M 20.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially	*Not subscribed*

improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 20.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 20.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 20.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 20.2.1	*Not subscribed*

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 21.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 21.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*

Measure 21.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 21.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 21.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 21.3.1	*Not subscribed*

V. Empowering Users								
Commitment 22 Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.								
	C.22	M 22.1	M 22.2	M 22.3	M 22.4	M 22.5	M 22.6	M 22.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 22.1	Not subscribed
QRE 22.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 22.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 22.2	Not subscribed
QRE 22.2.1	Not subscribed
Measure 22.3	Not subscribed
QRE 22.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 22.4	Not subscribed
QRE 22.4.1	Not subscribed
SLI 22.4.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 22.5	Not subscribed
QRE 22.5.1	Not subscribed
SLI 22.5.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

SLI 22.5.2 - actions enforcing policies above	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 22.6	Not subscribed
QRE 22.6.1	Not subscribed

SLI 22.6.1 - actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*	
	Not subscribed	
Data	*Not subscribed*	
Measure 22.7	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 22.7.1	Google Search deploys the following feature: ● **'SOS Alerts':** Structured content that appears on a Google Search page, including high-quality help links and local relevant information when a crisis strikes. The alerts aim to make emergency information more accessible during a crisis. Google brings together relevant and high-quality content from the web, media, and Google products, and then highlights that information across Google products such as Google Search and Google Maps. See Help Centre for more information.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube highlights information from high-quality, third-party sources using information panels. As users navigate YouTube, they might see a variety of different information panels. These panels provide additional context, with each designed to help users make their own decisions about the content they find. These information panels will show regardless of what opinions or perspectives are expressed in a video. If users want to learn more, most panels also link to the third-party partner's website. Information panels on YouTube include, but are not limited to: ● **Panels on topics prone to misinformation:** Topics that are prone to misinformation, such as the moon landing, may display an information panel at the top of search results or under a video. These information panels show basic background information, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more

context on a topic. The panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels. More details found [here](#).

- **Election information panels:** The election-related features are only available in select countries/regions during election cycles. Users may see candidate information panels, voting information panels, election integrity information panels, or election results information panels. More details found [here](#).
- **Health-related information panels:** Health-related topics, such as cancer treatment misinformation, may have a health information panel in your search results. These panels show info like symptoms, prevention and treatment options. More details found [here](#).
- **Crisis resource panels**: These panels let users connect with live support, 24/7 from recognised service partners. The panels may surface on the Watch page, when a user watches videos on topics related to suicide or self-harm, or in search results, when a user searches for topics related to certain health crises or emotional distress. More details found [here](#).

Additional data points and EEA Member State coverage is provided in SLI 22.7.1.

SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Number of views/impressions on the following Google Search features in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), for EEA Member States: ● Crisis Response (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts'); ● Structured features for COVID-19.	Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-COVID medical panels) in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State. Note: Due to a technical issue, some information panel impressions were undercounted. YouTube relies on a number of systems to calculate this metric and make the best effort to be as accurate as possible.
	In H2 2024, the following number of views/impressions were made on the Google Search features below: ● 92,530,020 views/impressions on Crisis Response alerts (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts'); ● 2,800 views/impressions on COVID-19 Structured Features.	
		Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-COVID medical panels)
Level		Impressions
Member States		
Austria		35,930,356
Belgium		140,278,448
Bulgaria		34,494,718
Croatia		45,489,297
Cyprus		4,709,568
Czech Republic		76,755,521
Denmark		18,153,587
Estonia		13,864,098

Finland		14,400,111
France		909,171,599
Germany		1,931,996,858
Greece		29,433,930
Hungary		55,347,902
Ireland		68,473,652
Italy		559,067,820
Latvia		39,720,895
Lithuania		36,214,789
Luxembourg		2,825,126
Malta		2,407,322
Netherlands		357,656,982
Poland		187,672,506
Portugal		36,677,338
Romania		90,075,363
Slovakia		25,112,829
Slovenia		14,414,991
Spain		417,913,504
Sweden		109,624,386
Iceland		1,117,258
Liechtenstein		149,057
Norway		19,947,673
Total EU		**5,257,883,496**

Total EEA		5,279,097,484

V. Empowering users

Commitment 23
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• In August 2024, Google Search released new Community Guidelines for user generated content that define the types of content and behavior that are not allowed on Search and incorporates Search's overall content policies. The guidelines also provide users with guidance on how to report different types of potentially harmful user generated content, such as posts and profiles.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially	No	No

improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 23.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 23.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search aims to make the process of submitting removal requests as easy as possible, and has built reporting tools, which allow users in all EU Member States to report potentially violative content for review under Search's Content Policies and Community Guidelines for user generated content. The Report Content On Google tool, for example, guides users to the right reporting form to provide the necessary information for the legal or policy issue they seek to flag. Google Search has reporting tools for Search features, such as knowledge panels and featured snippets. For overall Search Results, users can flag content via the three dots in Search features and 10 blue links. Using the Send Feedback option in 'About This Result', users can then send feedback about the result, describing the issue and attaching a screenshot.	YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies as quickly as possible, and surfacing high-quality information in ranking and recommendations. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU. **Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies** Each of YouTube's policies is carefully thought through so they are consistent, well-informed, and can be applied to content from around the world. They are developed in consultation with a wide range of external industry and policy experts, as well as YouTube Creators. New policies go through testing before they go live to ensure YouTube's global team of content reviewers can apply them accurately and consistently. **Flagging inappropriate or harmful content on YouTube** YouTube offers YouTube users an opportunity to report or flag content that they believe violates YouTube's Community Guidelines or other policies. Users can report content using YouTube's flagging feature, which is available to signed-in users in all EU Member States via computer (desktop or laptop), mobile devices, and other surfaces.

| | | Details on how to report different types of content using YouTube's flagging feature is outlined in YouTube's [Help Centre](#).

In addition to user flagging, YouTube uses machine learning technology to flag videos for review. YouTube developed powerful machine learning that detects content that may violate YouTube's policies and sends it for human review. In some cases, that same machine learning automatically takes an action, if there is high confidence that content is violative given information about similar or related content that has been previously removed.

Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content moderators then help confirm whether the content should be removed or remain on the platform. YouTube relies on this combination of humans and machine learning technology to flag inappropriate content and enforce YouTube's community guidelines. This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of these models over time. It also means that the enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube, while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

Information about YouTube's content moderation efforts across the official EU Member State languages can be found in the **Human Resources involved in Content Moderation** section of the [VLOSE/VLOP Transparency](#) |
|---|---|---|

		  Reporting illegal content While YouTube's Community Guidelines are policies that apply globally, YouTube is available in more than 100 different countries; therefore, processes are in place to review and appropriately act on requests from users, courts, and governments about content that violates local laws. Users can report illegal content using [webforms](#) dedicated to specific legal issues such as trademark, copyright, counterfeit and defamation. Webforms may also be accessed via the flagging feature after selecting Legal Issue as the report reason. To expedite the review, users should report content that violates the legal policies outlined [here](#) in YouTube's Help Centre.
Measure 23.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 23.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search carefully scrutinises most removal complaints that arrive in Google Search systems. Removal requests are handled according to the product area, issue type, and region, by a global team of front-line reviewers and Policy Leads who have expertise in a range of product areas, issue types (such as defamation or copyright infringement), local laws, and languages. Removal requests are processed in accordance with the mission of complying	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Content can be flagged by YouTube users, YouTube's machine learning technology, and human content moderators. All users agree to not 'misuse any reporting, flagging, complaint, dispute, or appeals process, including by making groundless, vexatious, or frivolous submissions' in YouTube's [Terms of Service](#). Additionally, YouTube ensures integrity of its systems through:

with the law and Google's policies while maximising access to information and preserving user expression.

For most classes of requests, trained reviewers manually assess the removals. In some cases, such as copyright takedowns, Google Search deploys automation to speed the processing of high-volume complaints. To avoid abuse in this process, Google Search relies upon:

1) Limitations on who may submit high volumes of requests through flows like the Trusted Copyright Removals Program, ensuring that participants in this program are organisations with bona fide copyright interests unlikely to abuse their rights to suppress unrelated content;

2) Legal protections, such as those found in the Digital Services Act, or the possibility for Google or webmasters to file suit against submitters of bad-faith copyright complaints;

3) Handling counter-notifications from affected webmasters;

4) Tracking patterns of abusive behaviour and adjusting Google Search automation to avoid automatically honouring abusive takedowns of a kind Google Search has become aware of.

- Having a dedicated team to identify and mitigate the impact of sophisticated bad actors on YouTube at scale, while protecting the broader community;
- Partnering with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post (See QRE 16.1.1 and QRE 16.2.1);
- Educating users about Community Guidelines violations through its guided policy experience;
- Providing clear communication on appeals processes and notifications, and regular policy updates on its Help Centre;
- Investing in automated systems to provide efficient detection of content to be evaluated by human reviewers.

Where appropriate, YouTube makes it clear to users that it has taken action on their content and provides them the opportunity to appeal that decision.

For more detailed information about YouTube's complaint handling systems (i.e. appeals), please see the latest VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA).

V. Empowering users		
Commitment 24 Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.		
	C.24	**M 24.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**YouTube**	**YouTube**

	Not subscribed	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*	YouTube has long been updating, on a regular and ongoing basis, its internal systems and processes related to the detection of content that violates its policies. This includes investment in automated detection systems.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*	N/A

Measure 24.1	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
QRE 24.1.1	*Not subscribed*	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** As noted in QRE 18.2.1, if a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain what content was removed or age restricted, which policies the content violated, how it affects the user's channel, and what the creator can do next. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes here. Sometimes a single case of severe abuse will result in channel termination without warning. The below appeals processes are available in all Member States, which are outlined in the YouTube Help Centre: • Appeal a Community Guidelines strike; • Appeal a Community Guidelines video removal; • Appeal the age restriction of a video; • Appeal playlist or thumbnail removals; • Appeal a channel termination. **After a creator submits an appeal**

After a creator submits an appeal, they will get an email from YouTube letting them know the appeal outcome. One of the following will happen:

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, YouTube will reinstate it and remove the strike from their channel. If a user appeals a warning and the appeal is granted, the next offence will be a warning.

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, but is not appropriate for all audiences, YouTube will apply an age-restriction. If it is a video, it will not be visible to users who are signed out, are under 18 years of age, or have Restricted Mode turned on. If it is a custom thumbnail, it will be removed.

- If YouTube finds that a user's content was in violation of YouTube's Community Guidelines, the strike will stay and the video will remain down from the site. There is no additional penalty for appeals that are rejected.

For a more granular Member State level breakdown, refer to SLI 24.1.1.

For more information about YouTube's median time needed to action a complaint, please see the latest VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA).

SLI 24.1.1 – enforcement actions	*Not subscribed*	(1) Appeals following video removal for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Video reinstatements following a successful appeal against content removals for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State.	
	Not subscribed	**Number of videos removed that were subsequently appealed**	**Number of videos removed that were then reinstated following a creator's appeal**
Member States	*Not subscribed*		
Austria		46	8
Belgium		26	4
Bulgaria		16	0
Croatia		10	1
Cyprus		4	1
Czech Republic		11	3
Denmark		18	3
Estonia		13	2
Finland		28	2
France		127	18
Germany		282	34
Greece		47	4
Hungary		11	2

Ireland		101	5
Italy		186	33
Latvia		7	0
Lithuania		9	1
Luxembourg		0	0
Malta		3	0
Netherlands		121	12
Poland		63	7
Portugal		26	1
Romania		25	2
Slovakia		3	0
Slovenia		13	0
Spain		276	28
Sweden		32	4
Iceland		1	0
Liechtenstein		0	0
Norway		25	2
Total EU		**1,504**	**175**
Total EEA		**1,530**	**177**

V. Empowering users
Commitment 25
In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.			
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 25.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 25.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 25.1.1	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 25.2	*Not subscribed*

QRE 25.2.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 25.2.1 – use of select tools	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26
Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 26.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 26.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Trends** Google Search and YouTube provide publicly available data via Google Trends, which provides access to a largely unfiltered sample of actual search requests made to Google Search and YouTube's search function. It is anonymised (no one is personally identified), categorised (determined by the topic for a search query) and aggregated (grouped together). This allows Google Trends to display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography. See Trends [Help Centre](#) for details. **Google Fact Check Explorer** Google Search also provides tools like Fact Check Explorer and the Google FactCheck Claim Search API. Google Search Fact Check Explorer allows anyone to explore the Fact Check articles that are using the ClaimReview markup. Additional information about ClaimReview markup can be found [here](#). Using the [Google FactCheck Claim Search API](#), users can query the same set of Fact Check results available via the [Fact Check Explorer](#) or a developer could continuously get the latest updates on a particular query. Use of the FactCheck Claim Search API is subject to [Google's API Terms of Service](#). To learn more, check the detailed [API documentation](#). **Google Researcher Program** As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](#). Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact. For additional details, see the [Researcher Program landing page](#). **YouTube Researcher Program** The [YouTube Researcher Program](#) provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for eligible academic researchers from around the world, who are affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution. Learn more about the data available in the [YouTube API reference](#).	

	Transparency into paid content on YouTube YouTube provides users a bespoke [front end search page](#) to access publicly available data containing organic content with paid product placements, sponsorships and endorsements as disclosed by creators. This is to enable users to understand that creators may receive goods or services in exchange for promotion. This search page complements YouTube's existing process of displaying a disclosure message when creators disclose to YouTube that their content contains paid promotions. Learn more about adding paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements [here](#). Users can also query the same set of results using the [YouTube Data API](#). Use is subject to [YouTube's API Terms of Service](#).
QRE 26.1.2	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Trends** The information provided via Google Trends is a sample of all of Google Search and YouTube's search activity. The 2 different samples of Google Trends data that can be accessed are: ● **Real-time data** - a sample covering the last seven days; ● **Non-realtime data** - a separate sample from real-time data that goes as far back as 2004 and up to 72 hours before one's search. Only a sample of Google Search and YouTube searches are used in Google Trends (a publicly available research tool), because Google, including YouTube, handles billions of searches per day. Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, Google can look at a dataset representative of all searches on Google, which includes YouTube, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world. See Trends [Help Centre](#) for details. **Google Fact Check Explorer** The Fact Check Explorer includes the following information, from fact-check articles using the ClaimReview markup: ● **Claim made by:** Name of the publisher making the claim; ● **Rating text:** True or False; ● **Fact Check article:** The fact-checking article on the publisher's site; ● **Claim reviewed:** A short summary of the claim being evaluated; ● **Tags:** The tags that show up next to the claim.

For additional details on fields included on Google Fact Check API, see API documentation.

Google Researcher Program
Approved researchers will receive permissions and access to public data for Search and YouTube in the following ways:
- **Search**: Access to an API for limited scraping with a budget for quota;
- **YouTube**: Permission for scraping limited to metadata.

For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page.

YouTube Researcher Program
The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. The program allows eligible academic researchers around the world to independently analyse the data they collect, including generating new/derived metrics for their research. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data.

Transparency into paid content on YouTube
The information provided via the bespoke front end search page allows users to view videos with active paid product placements, sponsorships, and endorsements that have been declared on YouTube.
- **Paid product placements**
  - Videos about a product or service because there is a connection between the creator and the maker of the product or service;
  - Videos created for a company or business in exchange for compensation or free of charge products/services;
  - Videos where that company or business's brand, message, or product is included directly in the content and the company has given the creator money or free of charge products to make the video.
- **Endorsements -** Videos created for an advertiser or marketer that contains a message that reflects the opinions, beliefs, or experiences of the creator.
- **Sponsorships -** Videos that have been financed in whole or in part by a company, without integrating the brand, message, or product directly into the content. Sponsorships generally promote the brand, message, or product of the third party.

	Definitions can be found on the [YouTube Help Centre](#). Additional data points are provided in SLI 26.1.1 and 26.2.1.	
SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	(1) Number of Fact Check API tool requests from users in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), globally; (2) Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below); (3) Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to Google Search in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).	Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to YouTube in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).
	(1) In H2 2024, the Fact Check Search API received approximately 211,980 requests from Google Search users, globally.	

	Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users	**Number of Google Trends users researching Google Search**	**Number of Google Trends users researching YouTube**
Level	Users	Users	Users
Member State			
Austria	485	258,045	1,535
Belgium	732	256,912	1,748
Bulgaria	373	345,279	1,366
Croatia	216	116,183	702
Cyprus	80	69,882	607

Czech Republic	702	258,373	1,582
Denmark	521	158,667	1,403
Estonia	80	50,727	390
Finland	344	124,093	1,073
France	3,592	1,222,099	11,281
Germany	4,364	2,059,534	16,423
Greece	421	538,344	1,947
Hungary	368	448,879	2,107
Ireland	479	14,021,955	2,030
Italy	1,821	1,589,810	9,452
Latvia	104	84,437	550
Lithuania	104	120,403	784
Luxembourg	67	61,699	203
Malta	25	16,651	210
Netherlands	1,439	619,239	5,890
Poland	1,372	811,290	6,697
Portugal	538	283,543	3,111
Romania	453	481,999	3,000
Slovakia	289	116,546	712
Slovenia	129	56,493	454
Spain	5,530	1,388,768	10,955
Sweden	734	292,843	2,726
Iceland	25	6,396	63

Liechtenstein	9	697	10
Norway	974	147,732	1,408
Total EU	**25,362**	**25,852,693**	**88,938**
Total EEA	**26,370**	**26,007,518**	**90,419**
Measure 26.2	*Not subscribed*		**YouTube**
QRE 26.2.1	*Not subscribed*		Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2.
QRE 26.2.2	*Not subscribed*		Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2.
QRE 26.2.3	*Not subscribed*		**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Researcher Program** The Google Researcher Program, which includes YouTube, has a 3-step application process: 1. Review and confirm the applicant's eligibility; 2. Submit an application, which requires a Google account; 3. If approved, the applicant gains permission to access public data relevant to their research. Once an application has been submitted, accepted researchers will be notified via email. **YouTube Researcher Program** The YouTube Researcher Program has a 3-step application process:

		1. YouTube verifies the applicant is an academic researcher affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution; 2. The Researcher creates an API project in the Google Cloud Console and enables the relevant YouTube APIs. They can learn more by visiting the [enabled APIs page](#); 3. The Researcher [applies](#) with their institutional email (e.g. with a .edu suffix), includes as much detail as possible, and confirms that all of their information is accurate. Once an application has been submitted, YouTube's operations team will conduct a review and let applicants know if they are accepted into the program.
SLI 26.2.1 – meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	*Not subscribed*	(1-4) Applications received, approved, rejected or under review for the YouTube Researcher Program in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), broken down by EEA Member States (* indicates applications that were rejected on the basis of incorrect/incomplete application); (5) Total number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher Program API in H2 2024, broken down by EEA Member States; (6) Median application resolution time in days in H2 2024, reported at the EU and EEA level. Please note the following: • Cells with '0' under applications received signify that

		Applications Received	Applications Approved	Applications Rejected	Applications under Review	Number of unique researchers accessing the API	Median application resolution time
		there were no applications submitted by a researcher from that country. Similarly, cells with '0' signify that there were no applications approved, rejected, or under review for that country. ● Applications under review reflect those applications still being processed at the end of the reporting period. The outcomes of these applications will be included in the next reporting period. ● Researchers accessing the Researcher Program API from 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024 may have been approved before H2 2024. There can be more than one researcher per application. ● Median Application Resolution time is the median number of days from application creation to application resolution. Applications may go back and forth between the applicant and API Ops Agents throughout the approval process. This metric does not reflect YouTube's first response back to the applicant.					
	Not subscribed						
Member State	*Not subscribed*						

Country		3	0	1	2	2	-
Austria		3	0	1	2	2	-
Belgium		1	0	0	1	2	-
Bulgaria		0	0	0	0	0	-
Croatia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Cyprus		0	0	0	0	0	-
Czech Republic		0	0	0	0	0	-
Denmark		1	0	1	0	1	-
Estonia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Finland		1	0	1	0	0	-
France		2	0	1	1	5	-
Germany		14	3	5	6	16	-
Greece		0	0	0	0	0	-
Hungary		0	0	0	0	0	-
Ireland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Italy		4	1	1	2	6	-
Latvia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Lithuania		0	0	0	0	0	-
Luxembourg		0	0	0	0	0	-
Malta		0	0	0	0	0	-
Netherlands		4	2	2	0	3	-
Poland		1	1	0	0	0	-
Portugal		0	0	0	0	0	-
Romania		0	0	0	0	1	-

Slovakia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Slovenia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Spain		4	3	0	1	3	-
Sweden		1	1	0	0	2	-
Iceland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	0	-
Norway		0	0	0	0	0	-
Total EU		**36**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**41**	**24.0 days**
Total EEA		**36**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**41**	**24.0 days**
Measure 26.3	**Google Search**				**YouTube**		

| QRE 26.3.1 | **Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

Google Trends
For Google Trends, users have an option to report an issue by taking a screenshot of the malfunction area and then submitting it for feedback via the Send Feedback option on the Google Trends page. Additionally, users can access the Trends Help Centre to troubleshoot any issues they may be experiencing.

Google Fact Check Explorer
Within Google Search's Fact Check Explorer, the Report Issue option provides users the ability to report issues to Google.

Google Researcher Program
For the Google Researcher Program, the most up to date information is captured in the Program description on the Transparency Centre, and also on the Acceptable Use Policy page. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines.

YouTube Researcher Program
For the YouTube Researcher Program, there is support available via email. Researchers can contact YouTube, with |
|---|---|

	questions and to report technical issues or other suspected faults, via a unique email alias, provided upon acceptance into the program. Questions are answered by YouTube's Developer Support team and by other relevant internal parties as needed. Google is not aware of any malfunctions during the reporting period that would have prevented access to these reporting systems.	

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	*Not subscribed*

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 27.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 27.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 27.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 27.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 27.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 27.3.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 27.3.1 – research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 27.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 27.4.1	*Not subscribed*

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28					
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	**M 28.1**	**M 28.2**	**M 28.3**	**M 28.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• In 2024, Google hosted a workshop with over 30 attendees, including academics, at the Trust & Safety Forum in Lille, France exploring Safety by Design frameworks and implementation constraints, including misinformation. • In October 2024, Google announced the first-ever Google Academic Research Award (GARA) winners. In this first cycle, the program will support 95 projects led by 143 researchers globally.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 28.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.1.1	Google has a longstanding commitment to transparency, and has led the way in transparency reporting of content removals and government requests for user data over the past decade plus. Google and YouTube's products, processes, and practices via the Lumen Database, Google Trends, and Fact Check Explorer show some of the ways that Google provides tools to support not only researchers, but journalists and others, to understand more about Google. Please refer to QRE 26.1.1, QRE 26.1.2, and QRE 26.3.1 for further information about Google Fact Check Tool API and	

Google Trends.

Google
Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.

Google has teams that operate the Google Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and evaluate potential updates and developments for the Google Researcher Program. Additional information can be found on the Google Transparency Centre. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines.

Additionally, Google's partnership with Lumen is an independent research project managed by the Berkman Klein Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. The Lumen database houses millions of content takedown requests that have been voluntarily shared by various companies, including Google. Its purpose is to facilitate academic and industry research concerning the availability of online content. As part of Google's partnership with Lumen, information about the legal notices Google receives may be sent to the Lumen project for publication. Google informs users about its Lumen practices under the 'Transparency at our core' section of the Legal Removals Help Centre. Additional information on Lumen can be found here.

Trust & Safety Research partners internally with Google.org's Scientific Progress team to strategically fund and engage with academics working on cutting-edge interdisciplinary research in areas of mutual interest and societal benefit. In October 2024, Google announced the first-ever Google Academic Research Award (GARA) winners. Overall, the program supported 95 projects led by 143 researchers globally; within the Trust & Safety topic, Google funded 21 projects across 12 countries.

YouTube
The YouTube Researcher Program provides eligible academic researchers from around the world with scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data. (See YouTube API reference for more information).

	YouTube has teams that operate the YouTube Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and provide technical support throughout the research project. They also evaluate potential updates and developments for the YouTube Researcher Program. Researchers can use any of the options below to obtain support:
	- YouTube provides a contact email alias to researchers who have been granted access to the program; - YouTube API Code Samples at GitHub. In addition, Google Search and YouTube's Product and Policy teams regularly communicate with researchers who reach out with questions about the functioning of YouTube or seek to receive feedback on past or future research projects.

Measure 28.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.2.1	See response to QRE 28.1.1.	

Measure 28.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.3.1	Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force and with EDMO. As of the time of this report, no annual consultation has yet taken place, but Google Search and YouTube stand ready to collaborate with EDMO to that end in 2025. Additionally, refer to QRE 26.1.1 to learn more about how Google, including YouTube, provides opportunities for researchers on its platforms.	

Measure 28.4	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.4.1	In 2021, Google contributed €25M to help launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF). The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund's support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications. To date, at least 107 projects related to information quality across 25 countries (including 23 EEA Member States) have been granted €17.70 million.	

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 29 Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.				
	C.29	M 29.1	M 29.2	M 29.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 29.1	Not subscribed

QRE 29.1.1	Not subscribed
QRE 29.1.2	Not subscribed
QRE 29.1.3	Not subscribed
SLI 29.1.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 29.2	Not subscribed
QRE 29.2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 29.2.2	Not subscribed
QRE 29.2.3	Not subscribed
SLI 29.2.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (of various resilience-fostering measures)	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 29.3	Not subscribed
QRE 29.3.1	Not subscribed
SLI 29.3.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (effective	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed

repositories of advertising)	
Data	*Not subscribed*

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 30 Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.					
	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 30.1	*Not subscribed*

QRE 30.1.1	Not subscribed
QRE 30.1.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.1.3	Not subscribed
SLI 30.1.1 – Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 30.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.3	Not subscribed
Measure 30.3	Not subscribed
QRE 30.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 30.4	Not subscribed
QRE 30.4.1	Not subscribed

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 31					
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.					
	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed

	Not subscribed

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 31.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 31.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 31.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Not subscribed
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 31.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 31.3.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 31.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 31.4.1	*Not subscribed*

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 32.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 32.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 32.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 32.1.1 – use of the interfaces and other tools	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 32.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 32.3.1	*Not subscribed*

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community		
Commitment 33 Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.		
	C.33	**M 33.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 33.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 33.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 33.1.1 - number of European	*Not subscribed*
fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre						
Commitment 34 To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website						
	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments and alongside other Signatories, Google helped maintain the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Transparency Centre, located at https://disinfocode.eu in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 34.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**

Measure 34.3	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.4	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.5	Google, on behalf of related services

VIII. Transparency Centre
Commitment 35
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, and alongside other Signatories, Google populated the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Transparency Centre with related relevant information in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 35.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.6	**Google, on behalf of related services**

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36 Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	**M 36.1**	**M 36.2**	**M 36.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, Google uploaded its report to the newly launched Transparency Centre in March 2025.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In line with Code commitments, Google plans to upload reports and pertinent updates to the Transparency Centre located at https://disinfocode.eu.

Measure 36.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 36.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 36.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34–36)	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google continues to upload its report according to the approved deadlines.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34–36)	Google is committed to maintaining the website and supporting the development of relevant SLIs.
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	Between 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024, the common Transparency Centre was visited by approximately 20,255 unique users, and reports were downloaded approximately 5,600 times from about 1,400 unique users. Download metrics specifically for Google's EU Code of Practice on Disinformation reports between 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024 are listed below: ● The baseline report published in January 2023 was downloaded 237 times by 188 unique users. ● The H1 2023 report published in July 2023 was downloaded 43 times by 34 unique users. ● The H2 2023 report published in March 2024 was downloaded 210 times by 91 unique users. ● The H1 2024 report published in September 2024 was downloaded 1,038 times by 172 unique users.
Data	

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force								
Commitment 37 Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.								
	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6	M 37.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 37.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**

Measure 37.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.6	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 37.6.1	Google has continued to meaningfully engage in Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to participation and/or co-steering of meetings, producing documents, and providing feedback.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code		
Commitment 38		
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.		
	C.38	**M 38.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 38.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 38.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google has several teams across the company, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments made under this Code. This is core to Google's mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful

	content. To enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google relies both on specially-trained experts and machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 39 Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), Google provided its fifth report to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code							
Commitment 40 Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.							
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**C.40** Google, on behalf of related services	**M 40.1** Google, on behalf of related services	**M 40.2** Google, on behalf of related services	**M 40.3** Google, on behalf of related services	**M 40.4** Google, on behalf of related services	**M 40.5** Google, on behalf of related services	**M 40.6** Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024), Google provided its fifth report which included reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	- Google has been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators. - Google supported the publication of Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through its collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 42
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As requested by the European Commission, Google provides an Annex on Elections to this report. In H2 2024, Google activated temporary RRSs for the elections in Romania and France at the EC's request and also participated in discussions on the establishment of a permanent rapid response system (RRS) by the Task-Force.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Commitment 43

Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.

	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

	C.44

	We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A - It was agreed with the European Commission that this commitment is duplicative of DSA requirements, and should therefore be deleted from the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation text. Google is taking steps to be subject to an audit under the DSA, for relevant services.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
War in Ukraine

Overview

The ongoing war in Ukraine has continued throughout 2024, and Google continues to help by providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, and providing high-quality information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during this conflict:

1. Continued online services manipulation and coordinated influence operations;
2. Advertising and monetisation linked to state-backed Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.

The following sections summarise Google's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the war in Ukraine.

1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations

Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is helping Ukraine by monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors. Google has also announced new long-term partnerships across Central and Eastern Europe.

In the Baltics, Google entered into long-term partnerships with the Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence. These two organisations have received €1.3 million in funding from Google to build on their impactful work towards increasing media literacy, building further resilience and actively tackling disinformation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Furthermore, Google is partnering with the Charles University in Prague, the main research centre of the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO) project, and providing €1 million in funding for CEDMO to further expand its research into information disorders, and work to increase the level of media and digital literacy in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia.

2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation

By H2 2024, Google had paused the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia, ads on Google's properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, new Cloud sign ups, the payments functionality for most of Google's services, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Due to the war in Ukraine, Google paused ads containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with

AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager in August 2024. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure

Google expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google's free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the war in Ukraine broke out. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats.

TAG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the war, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. TAG's findings have shown that government-backed actors from Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, NGOs, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the war as a lure for malicious campaigns.

Google is continuing to provide critical cybersecurity and technical infrastructure support by donating 50,000 new Google Workspace licences to the Ukrainian government. By providing these licences and a year of free access to Google Workspace solutions, including Google's cloud-first, zero-trust security model, Google can help provide Ukrainian public institutions with the security and protection they need to deal with constant threats to their digital systems. In February 2023, Google also announced an extension of the free access to premium Google Workspace for Education features for 250 universities and colleges until the end of August 2023.

Google aims to continue to follow the following approach when responding to future crisis situations:
- Elevate access to high-quality information across Google services;
- Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
- Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
- Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

Future measures

Google is continually making investments in products, programs and partnerships to help fight disinformation, both in Ukraine and globally. Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational

responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the war in Ukraine, including its Sensitive Events Policy.	No changes to Ads policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the war in Ukraine during this reporting period. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Monetisation Policies	In August 2024, due to ongoing developments in Russia, Google AdSense announced it was pausing the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense.	In H2 2024, Google AdSense deactivated all Russia-based AdSense accounts. As a result, publishers are not able to monetise with AdSense accounts based in Russia. This follows several measures Google AdSense has taken since 2022.
Google Search		
N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		

Enforces the Google Ads [Misleading Representation](#) which does not allow ads or destinations that deceive users by excluding relevant product information or providing misleading information about products, services, or businesses.	Specifically for the war in Ukraine, Google Ads focused on the Manipulated Media sub-category in the Misleading Representation Policy which disallows the practice of deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues or matters of public concern. Google Ads also enforced the Clickbait Ads Policy which is a sub-category under the Misleading Representation Policy. This policy prohibits ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic.
	Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for more details on Google Ads Misrepresentation Policy, including Manipulated Media and Clickbait Ads sub-categories.
As noted above, Google Ads enforces the [Sensitive Events Policy](#) which does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google Ads enforced [the Sensitive Events Policy](#) and paused ads on pages containing content that is exploitative, dismissive, or condones the invasion in March 2022. This is in addition to the [pausing of ads](#) from and on Russian Federation state-funded media in February 2022.
	Google Advertising continues to remain vigilant in enforcing all relevant policies, including the Sensitive Events Policy, related to the war in Ukraine.
Enforces the [Inappropriate Content Policy](#) which does not allow ads or destinations that display shocking content or that promote hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google Ads focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory and Shocking Content sub-categories of the Inappropriate Content Policy. The Dangerous or Derogatory sub-category does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. The Shocking Content sub-category does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
	Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for more details on Google Ads Inappropriate Content Policy.

Enforces [Other Restricted Businesses](#) which restrict certain kinds of businesses from advertising with Google Ads to prevent users from being exploited, even if individual businesses appear to comply with other policies.	In order to protect users, Google Ads specifically focused on enforcing the Government Documents and Official Services Policy which disallows the promotion of documents and/or services that facilitate the acquisition, renewal, replacement or lookup of official documents or information that are available directly from a government or government delegated provider.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Enforces policies, such as the [Misleading Representation Policy](#) and the [Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy](#), on AdSense that aim to prohibit the monetisation of content that has misleading representation, unreliable and harmful claims, deceptive practices, manipulated media, or is deemed dangerous or derogatory.	Google AdSense will continue to monitor and prevent monetisation of content that violates these policies.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused Google AdSense's monetisation of Russian Federation state-funded media.	Beginning in February 2022, Google AdSense prohibited the monetisation of any Russian Federation state-funded media (i.e. sites, apps, YouTube channels). It is important to note that Google's current [Publisher Policies](#) and [advertiser-friendly guidelines](#) already prohibited many forms of content related to the war in Ukraine from monetising. In addition, Google Advertising paused the monetisation of content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the invasion across services.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused the ability of Russian-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager.	In August 2024, due to ongoing developments in Russia, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media since February 2022.	Google also paused ads from and for Russian Federation [state-funded media](#).
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Enforced the Coordinated Deceptive Practices Policy which prohibits advertisers from promoting content related to public concerns while misrepresenting or concealing their identity or country or origin.	Accounts found to be engaging in Coordinated Deceptive Practices are suspended immediately and without prior warning. Clickbait ads are disapproved upon detection. Repeated violations of this policy can lead to an account suspension.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
N/A	N/A
	N/A

Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Continued to enforce Spam and Webmaster Policies.	See more details about Google Search's implementation of its Spam and Webmaster Policies in the response to QRE 14.1.2.
	See overall spam metrics in SLI 14.2.1. Google Search is unable to provide spam metrics specific to this crisis event.
YouTube	
YouTube continues to enforce its Community Guidelines, including but not limited to misinformation policies, which establish what type of content and behaviour is not allowed on the platform.	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for information on how YouTube enforces its Community Guidelines.

	Since 24 February 2022, related to the ongoing war in Ukraine: - YouTube has removed over 12,000 channels and removed over 152,000 videos related to the ongoing war in Ukraine for violating its content policies, including those pertaining to misinformation, hate speech, and graphic violence. - YouTube has blocked over 1,000 channels and over 5.8 million videos related to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Google, on behalf of related services	
Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative — including compromise assessments, incident response services, shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.	N/A
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Announced a new Online Safety and Security Partnership with the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) to provide free security training and tools to high-risk users. Google's new partnership with IFES combines Google's account security tools, like the Advanced Protection Program (APP), and IFES's history in supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections management bodies.	IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across the world, including: **Security training:** In collaboration with Google's Safety Engineering Centre, IFES will expand its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices and create content for specialised audiences. **Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries:** Google's tools and resources for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES's international networks, helping more people use things like Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google's strongest form of account security for high-risk users, Google Titan Security Keys, Project Shield, a free tool to help protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more. **Industry thought leadership and case studies:** IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES's partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its Threat Analysis Group (TAG) to help IFES

	further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google's free protection against DDoS attack, so that Ukrainian government websites, embassies worldwide and other governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves and continue to offer their crucial services.	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks. In H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), Project Shield expanded eligibility to select government entities under exigent circumstances.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Added websites and domains identified as threats to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.	Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine. Google sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Automatically increased Google account security protections (including more frequent authentication challenges) for people in Ukraine and the surrounding region.	Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection Program — which delivers Google's highest level of security — is currently protecting the accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated	Throughout 2024, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. For example, in July 2024, TAG identified a campaign that was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine and Western institutions.

information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the war in Ukraine. TAG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.	For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2024 TAG Bulletin and Q4 2024 TAG Bulletin.
	Please refer to the Q3 2024 TAG Bulletin and Q4 2024 TAG Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Empowering Users	
Google Search	
Limited recommendations globally for a number of Russian state-funded media outlets.

Enforced its Content Policies, including Misinformation Policies, which establish what types of content is not allowed on Google Search. | As stipulated by the EU's Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350, Search removed RT and Sputnik from Google's Search results in the EU. |
| | Google removed 432 URLs and 207 websites that were delisted under the EU sanctions on Russian state media in H2 2024 (1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024). |
| In efforts to help users find accurate and fact-checked information online, Google Search deployed 'About This Image' to English language users globally in October 2023, and was made available on Circle to Search and Google Lens starting in July 2024. | 'About This Image' enables users to check the credibility and context of an image or photo found online. This feature allows users to discover the image's history, how other websites are using the image, and any metadata available. In April 2024, Google Search announced that it expanded the tool to 40 additional languages around the world, including French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese. Then, in July 2024, Google announced 'About This Image' is now available on Circle to Search and Google Lens, giving users more ways to quickly get context on images that they see wherever they come across them.

In addition, after joining the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content, Google recently announced that they will bring the latest version of the coalition's technical standard, Content Credentials, to Search's 'About This Image' feature. If an image |

	contains C2PA metadata, users will be able to use the feature to see if an image was created or edited with AI tools.
	Please refer to QRE 17.1.1 for more details on 'About This Image'.
Deploys features that enhance access to high-quality information on Search.	Globally, Google has surfaced features on Search to provide quick access to high-quality information, including highlighting news coverage from trusted sources and other helpful context about the invasion. See below for details on features in Ukraine.
	Search reports metrics on the 'About this result' & the 'More About this page' features in SLI 17.1.1. Search also provides metrics on the COVID-19 and Crisis Response alerts features in SLI 22.7.1.
Displays an 'SOS Alert' on Google Search in Ukraine and Eastern Europe and works with expert organisations to source helpful humanitarian information.	Google Search features an 'SOS Alert' in Ukraine that provides refugees with information in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. This includes links to UNHCR's Ukraine Help pages and hotline, safety tips from the ICRC, and a link to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Foreign student emergency info hotline. Google Search also launched an 'SOS Alert' in Poland that provides refugees with information in English, Polish, and Ukrainian, including links to the 'I Help Ukrainians Hub' created by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland and the 'Information for Ukrainian citizens' page hosted by the Polish Office for Foreigners.
	See overall metrics in SLI 22.7.1.
Displayed content advisories when results for a query are rapidly evolving, providing a message that lets users know the topic may still be developing.	This notice is particularly important during the crisis, given how quickly new search terms are developing. In such cases, it is helpful to alert users to the fact that a new search term or query is so new that high-quality information has not been published yet on the open web. Among other languages, these notices are launched in Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.

	See SLI 17.1.1 for metrics on the impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results.
To help the increasing number of refugees in the region, Google developed ways for businesses to flag if they are providing services to refugees.	Hotel owners in countries neighbouring Ukraine can indicate on their Business Profile whether they are offering free or discounted accommodations for refugees. Local businesses can post to their Business Profile on Search and Maps to offer various services and aid to refugees from Ukraine.
	Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
YouTube	
YouTube continues its 'Hit Pause' global media literacy campaign, to teach viewers critical skills and to improve users' experiences on YouTube.	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign has been teaching viewers critical media literacy skills. These skills are important in all crisis situations, including the war in Ukraine.
	See Commitment 17 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to surface videos from high-quality sources in search results and recommendations.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube surfaces videos from high-quality sources in search results and recommendations. These high-quality sources are important in all crisis situations, including the war in Ukraine.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to provide features to enhance access to high-quality information, including Information Panels, on YouTube.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube enhances access to high-quality information, including information panels on topics prone to misinformation.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	

Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts.	Access to high-quality information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google worked closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas, and to feature information on Search and Maps about shelter, humanitarian services, and aid points. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

Empowering the research community	
Google Search	
See more details about how Google Search provides access to researchers in the response to Commitment 26 and 28.	
YouTube	
YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	

Continued new long-term partnerships across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), a region considered highly vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda due to its geographic proximity to the war in Ukraine.	In the Baltics, Google entered into long-term partnership with the Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, two established and well-respected organisations, to provide funding to build on their impactful work towards increasing media literacy, building further resilience and enhancing information quality efforts in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Furthermore, Google partnered with the Charles University in Prague, the main research centre of the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO) project, to further expand its research into information quality efforts, and work to increase the level of media and digital literacy in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia.
	The Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence received €1.3 million in funding from Google as part of Google's commitment to invest $10 million to address information quality issues surrounding the war in Ukraine. As part of that commitment, Google also provided €1 million in funding for CEDMO.
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate the intensified cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine. LetsData is one	The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation. Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate this challenge. LetsData offers AI radar against disinformation. It provides real-time media and social media monitoring in more than 50 countries, empowering state agencies, businesses and civil societies to proactively navigate risks and seize opportunities in the face of disinformation.

of [17 companies](#) joining the second cohort of the [Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program](#).	Since launching, their AI-powered solution has experienced rapid growth, establishing operations in the U.S. while continuing to anchor their technology and product development in Europe. Now, they are one of [17 companies](#) joining the second cohort of the [Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program](#). This group of startups, from nine countries across Europe and North America, will get access to Google's tools, partners and practices to help them continue to scale — and ultimately make the world a safer place.
	See Commitment 28 for metrics on these efforts.
In September 2024, Google [announced](#) the latest recipients of the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, a $10 million fund providing additional equity-free cash awards along with Google support, mentorship and product expertise to Ukrainian-founded tech companies.	In March 2022, Google launched the [Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund](#), which has gone on to provide $5 million in equity-free cash awards to 58 recipients. Startups supported by the Ukraine Support Fund have received $15.8 million in follow-on funding, created 100% revenue growth and significantly increased their employment despite the war and hardships they have faced. In September 2024, Google [announced](#) the latest 24 recipients of the program in Lviv, Ukraine. Each startup will receive up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, as well as ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $350,000 in Cloud credits. This hands-on support is designed to help Ukrainian entrepreneurs maintain and grow their businesses, strengthen their community and build a foundation for post-war economic recovery. Applications will open later this year.
	The 24 recipients will receive up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, as well as ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $350,000 in Cloud credits.
Empowering the fact-checking community	
Google Search	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
YouTube	

N/A	N/A
	N/A
Google, on behalf of related services	
N/A	N/A
	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
Israel-Gaza conflict

Overview

Following the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google has [actively worked](#) to support humanitarian and relief efforts, ensure platforms and partnerships are responsive to the current crisis, and counter the threat of disinformation. Google identified a few areas of focus for addressing the ongoing crisis:

- Humanitarian and relief efforts;
- Supporting Israeli tech firms and Palestinian businesses; and
- Platforms and partnerships to protect our services from coordinated influence operations, hate speech, and graphic and terrorist content.

Humanitarian and relief efforts

Google.org provided $6 million in Google.org funding, with $3 million to Israel organisations focused on mental health support, and $3 million in support to Gaza organisations focused on humanitarian aid and relief, including $1 million to Save the Children, $1 million to Palestinian Red Crescent, and $1 million to International Medical Corps (IMC). Specifically, Google's humanitarian and relief efforts with these organisations include:

- Natal - Israel Trauma and Resiliency Centre: In the early days of the war, calls to Natal's support hotline went from around 300 a day to 8,000 a day. With our funding, they were able to scale their support to patients by 450%, including multidisciplinary treatment and mental & psychosocial support to direct and indirect victims of trauma due to terror and war in Israel.
- International Medical Corps (IMC): As of October 2024, our support helped fund the delivery of two mobile operating theaters, doubling the surgical capacity of IMC's field hospital, and enabling them to provide over 210,000 health consultations and well over 7,000 (often lifesaving) surgeries, as well as other support such as access to safe drinking water to nearly 200,000 people.

In addition, Google employees also directed more than $11 million in funding including employee donations and matching funding from [Google.org](#) to organisations providing aid and support in Israel and Gaza.

Supporting Israeli tech firms and Palestinian businesses

Across Europe and Israel, Google is committed to supporting startups as they work at the forefront of innovation: striving to solve some of the most critical issues facing the world. These pioneering startups and businesses often struggle to access the support, expertise and tools they

need to help them scale. In light of the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google is investing $8 million to support Israeli tech firms and Palestinian businesses. Of that investment, Google is providing $4 million to support Israeli AI startups and offer access to Google's knowledge, expertise (e.g. Cloud support), and mentorship opportunities in Israel and $4 million to support Palestinian startups and businesses. In addition, Google has announced that it will provide loans and grants to 1,000 Palestinian small businesses in partnership with local and global non-profit organisations, and will also provide seed grants to 50 Palestinian tech startups in hopes to preserve 4,500 jobs and create additional job opportunities.

Platforms and partnerships
As the conflict continues, Google is committed to tackling misinformation, hate speech, graphic content and terrorist content by continuing to find ways to provide support through its products. For example, Google has deployed language capabilities to support emergency efforts including emergency translations, and localising Google content to help users, businesses and NGOs. Google has also pledged to help its partners in these extraordinary circumstances. For example, when schools closed in October 2023, the Ministry of Education in Israel used Meet as their core teach-from-home platform and Google provided support. Google has been in touch with Gaza-based partners and participants in its Palestine Launchpad program, its digital skills and entrepreneurship program for Palestinians, to try to support those who have been significantly impacted by this crisis.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the Israel-Gaza conflict.	No changes to Ads policies or to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google Search		
Enhanced enforcement of existing policies	While Google Search relied on existing policies to address the information challenges posed by the Hamas attacks and Israel's response,	No changes to Search policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Search continues

	Google Search gave special priority to reports of issues related to the crisis in recognition of the importance and urgency of the risks to human life.	to enforce all Google Search policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
YouTube		
Enforcement of existing policies, including YouTube's Hate Speech Policy	YouTube's Hate Speech Policy prohibits content denying, trivialising, or minimising violent historical events, including the 7 October Hamas attacks in Israel. YouTube relies on a variety of factors to determine whether a major violent event is covered, using guidance from outside experts and governing bodies to inform its approach.	No changes to YouTube Community Guidelines and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. YouTube continues to enforce all policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		
Google AdSense enforces the Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy which does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group of people on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, or nationality.	In order to protect users and advertisers, Google requires that all publishers comply with Google Publisher Policies in order to monetise on AdSense. Due to the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google AdSense focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy. Under this policy, Google AdSense does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. Nor is content allowed that harasses, intimidates, or bullies an individual or group of individuals. In addition, content that threatens or advocates for physical or mental harm to oneself or others is also not allowed. Google also does not allow content that seeks to exploit others, like extortion, blackmail.	

	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Implementation of a [Sensitive Event]	Since 7 October 2023, Google Ads has taken several measures across its platforms in response to the Israel-Gaza conflict, including implementing a sensitive event to help prevent exploitative ads around this conflict. Google's mission to elevate high quality information and enhance information quality across its services is of utmost importance and Google Ads has and will continue to rigorously enforce its policies. Google Ads often institutes sensitive events following natural disasters or other tragic events. When a sensitive event is declared, Google Ads does not allow ads that exploit or capitalise on these tragedies. Google does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence. Google does not allow ads that claim victims of a sensitive event were responsible for their own tragedy or similar instances of victim blaming; ads that claim victims of a sensitive event are not deserving of remedy or support.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.
Within the Inappropriate Content Policy, Google Advertising does not allow [Shocking Content].	Google does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma. Google does not allow promotions containing gratuitous portrayals of bodily fluids or waste. Google does not allow promotions containing obscene or profane language. Google does not allow promotions that are likely to shock or scare.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.

Google Advertising enforces the Misrepresentation Policy, which includes [Clickbait ads]().	Google does not allow ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic. Google also does not allow ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.
No changes to the enforcement of Ads Policies as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict.	To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violate these policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks. Google Ads policy violations can lead to ad or asset disapproval, or account suspension.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Teams across the company are dedicating resources as part of an urgent escalations workforce to respond to the Israel-Gaza conflict and take quick measures as needed.	Google Advertising invests heavily in the enforcement of its policies. Google Advertising has a team of thousands working around the clock to create and enforce its policies at scale.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is closely monitoring relevant activity concerning the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza, focusing on the safety and	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Team work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not

security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States.
	See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts.

YouTube's teams have been working quickly to remove content that violates its policies including those pertaining to hate speech, violent extremism, violent or graphic content, harassment, and misinformation. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.	- Per YouTube's Hate Speech Policy, content that promotes violence or hatred against groups based on their ethnicity, nationality, race or religion is not allowed on YouTube. This includes Jewish, Muslim, and other religious or ethnic communities. - Per YouTube's Violent Extremist Policy, content that praises, promotes or in any way aids violent criminal organisations is prohibited. Additionally, content produced by designated terrorist organisations, such as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (U.S.), or organisation identified by the United Nations, is not allowed on YouTube. This includes content produced by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). - In addition, YouTube has a dedicated button underneath every video on YouTube to flag content with the option to mark it as 'promotes terrorism.' - Per YouTube's Violent or Graphic Content Policies, YouTube prohibits violent or gory content intended to shock or disgust viewers. Additionally, content encouraging others to commit violent acts against individuals or a defined group of people, including the Jewish, Muslim and other religious communities, is not allowed on YouTube. - Per YouTube's Harassment Policies, content that promotes harmful conspiracy theories or targets individuals based on their protected group status is not allowed on YouTube. Additionally, content that realistically simulates deceased minors or victims of deadly or well-documented major violent events describing their death or violence experienced, is not allowed on YouTube. - Per YouTube's Misinformation Policies, content containing certain types of misinformation that can cause real-world harm, including certain types of misattributed content, is not allowed on YouTube.
	As of 31 December 2024, following the terrorist attack by Hamas in Israel and the escalated conflict now underway in Israel and Gaza, YouTube has globally: Removed over 130,000 videos;

	• Terminated over 5,500 channels; and • Removed over 350 million comments.

Google, on behalf of related services	
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. TAG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.	Throughout 2024, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. For example, in October 2024, TAG identified a campaign that was sharing content in Arabic, English, French and Spanish about various topics including the Israel-Gaza conflict. For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2024 TAG Bulletin and Q4 2024 TAG Bulletin.
	Please refer to the Q3 2024 TAG Bulletin and Q4 2024 TAG Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Empowering Users	

Google Search	
In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality and high-quality information to users.	See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report.
	See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.

YouTube	
YouTube is continuing to actively surface high-quality news content in search results for queries about Israel and Gaza, including through its breaking news and top news shelves.	YouTube's recommendation system is prominently surfacing news from high-quality sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates. YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves are surfacing at the top of search results related to the attacks in Israel and on the homepage, prominently featuring content from high-quality news sources.

	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
Empowering the research community	
Google Search	
Google established the Google Research Program in August 2023, which provides eligible EU researchers to apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
Empowering the fact-checking community	

Google Search	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
YouTube	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Google, on behalf of related services	
N/A	N/A
	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election
Elections in the EU

Overview

In elections and other democratic processes, people want access to high-quality information and a broad range of perspectives. High-quality information helps people make informed decisions when voting and counteracts abuse by bad actors. Consistent with its broader approach to elections around the world, during the various elections across the EU in H2 2024, Google was committed to supporting this democratic process by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training.

To do so, Google will continue its efforts in 2025 to:
- Safeguard its platforms;
- Inform voters by surfacing high-quality information;
- Equip campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training; and
- Help people navigate AI-generated content.

Across Google, various teams support democratic processes by connecting people to election information like practical tips on how to register to vote or providing high-quality information about candidates. In 2024, a number of key elections took place around the world. In June 2024, voters across the 27 Member States of the European Union took to the polls to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). In H2 2024, voters also cast their ballots in the Romanian presidential election and in the second round of the French legislative election. Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. Across its efforts, Google also has an increased focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and the part it can play in the misinformation landscape — while also leveraging AI models to augment Google's abuse-fighting efforts.

Safeguarding Google platforms and disrupting the spread of misinformation

To better secure its products and prevent abuse, Google continues to enhance its enforcement systems and to invest in Trust & Safety operations — including at its Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) for Content Responsibility in Dublin, dedicated to online safety in Europe and around the world. Google also continues to partner with the wider ecosystem to combat misinformation.
- **Enforcing Google policies and using AI models to fight abuse at scale:** Google has long-standing policies that inform how it approaches areas like manipulated media, hate and harassment, and incitement to violence — along with policies around demonstrably

false claims that could undermine democratic processes, for example in YouTube's Community Guidelines and its Political Content Policies for advertisers. To help enforce Google policies, Google's AI models are enhancing its abuse-fighting efforts. With recent advances in Google's Large Language Models (LLMs), Google is building faster and more adaptable enforcement systems that enable us to remain nimble and take action even more quickly when new threats emerge.

- **Working with the wider ecosystem:** Since Google's inaugural contribution of €25 million to help launch the European Media & Information Fund, an effort designed to strengthen media literacy and information quality across Europe, 70 projects have been funded across 24 countries so far. Google also supports numerous civil society, research and media literacy efforts from partners, including the Civic Resilience Initiative, Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, CEDMO and more.

Helping people navigate AI-generated content

Like any emerging technology, AI presents new opportunities as well as challenges. For example, generative AI makes it easier than ever to create new content, but it can also raise questions about trustworthiness of information. Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate content that was AI-generated. Overall, harmful altered or synthetic political content did not appear to be widespread on Google's platforms. Measures that helped mitigate that risk include:

- **Ads disclosures:** Google expanded its Political Content Policies to require advertisers to disclose when their election ads include synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. Google's ads policies already prohibit the use of manipulated media to mislead people, like deep fakes or doctored content.
- **Content labels on YouTube:** YouTube's Misinformation Policies prohibit technically manipulated content that misleads users and could pose a serious risk of egregious harm — and YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created realistic altered or synthetic content, and will display a label that indicates for people when the content they are watching is synthetic. For sensitive content, including election related content, that contains realistic altered or synthetic material, the label appears on the video itself and in the video description.
- **A responsible approach to Generative AI products**: In line with its principled and responsible approach to its Generative AI products like Gemini, Google has prioritised testing across safety risks ranging from cybersecurity vulnerabilities to misinformation and fairness. Out of an abundance of caution on such an important topic, Google is restricting the types of election-related queries for which Gemini will return responses.
- **Provide users with additional context:** 'About This Image' in Search helps people assess the credibility and context of images found online.
- **Digital watermarking:** SynthID, a tool in beta from Google DeepMind, directly embeds a digital watermark into AI-generated images, audio, text, or audio. Google recently expanded SynthID's capabilities to watermark AI-generated text in the Gemini app and web experience, as well as to video in Veo, Google's recently announced and most capable generative video model.

- **Industry collaboration**: Google joined the C2PA coalition and standard, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content. Alongside other leading tech companies, Google also pledged to help prevent deceptive AI-generated imagery, audio or video content from interfering with this year's global elections. The 'Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections' is a set of commitments to deploy technology countering harmful AI-generated content meant to deceive voters.

Informing voters surfacing high-quality information

In the build-up to elections, people need useful, relevant and timely information to help them navigate the electoral process. Here are some of the ways Google makes it easy for people to find what they need, and which were deployed during elections that took place across the EU in 2024:

- **Voting details and Election Results on Google Search:** Google put in place a 'How to Vote' and 'How to Register' feature for the national parliamentary elections in France, which featured aggregated voting information from the French Electoral Commission on Google Search.
- **High-quality Information on YouTube:** For news and information related to elections, YouTube's systems prominently surface high-quality content, on the YouTube homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube also displays information panels at the top of search results and below videos to provide additional context. For example, YouTube may surface various election information panels above search results or on videos related to election candidates, parties or voting.
- **Ongoing transparency on Election Ads**: All advertisers who wish to run election ads in the EU on Google's platforms are required to go through a verification process and have an in-ad disclosure that clearly shows who paid for the ad. These ads are published in Google's Political Ads Transparency Report, where anyone can look up information such as how much was spent and where it was shown. Google also limits how advertisers can target election ads.

Equipping campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training

As elections come with increased cybersecurity risks, Google works hard to help high-risk users, such as campaigns and election officials, civil society and news sources, improve their security in light of existing and emerging threats, and to educate them on how to use Google's products and services.

- **Security tools for campaign and election teams**: Google offers free services like its Advanced Protection Program — Google's strongest set of cyber protections — and Project Shield, which provides unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Google also partners with Possible, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Deutschland sicher im Netz (DSIN) to scale account security training and to provide security tools including Titan Security Keys, which defend against phishing attacks and prevent bad actors from accessing users' Google Accounts.

- **Tackling coordinated influence operations**: Google's Threat Intelligence Group helps identify, monitor and tackle emerging threats, ranging from coordinated influence operations to cyber espionage campaigns against high-risk entities. Google reports on actions taken in its quarterly bulletin, and meets regularly with government officials and others in the industry to share threat information and suspected election interference. Mandiant also helps organisations build holistic election security programs and harden their defences with comprehensive solutions, services and tools, including proactive exposure management, proactive intelligence threat hunts, cyber crisis communication services and threat intelligence tracking of information operations. A recent publication from the team gives an overview of the global election cybersecurity landscape, designed to help election organisations tackle a range of potential threats.
- **Helpful resources at euelections.withgoogle**: Google launched an EU-specific hub at euelections.withgoogle with resources and trainings to help campaigns connect with voters and manage their security and digital presence. In advance of the European Parliamentary elections in 2019, Google conducted in-person and online security training for more than 2,500 campaign and election officials, and, for the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections, Google built on these numbers by directly reaching 3,500 campaigners through in-person trainings and briefings on election integrity and tackling misinformation across the region.

Google is committed to working with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union — building on its commitments made in the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.
Google Search		
N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube		
N/A	N/A	N/A

Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A

Scrutiny of Ads Placements		

Google Advertising		
Political Content Policy	In 2019, Google launched the [EU Election Ads Policy](#), which requires advertisers wishing to run EU Election Ads in the EU to complete a two-step [verification process](#). Once an advertiser has completed EU Election Ads verification, all their EU Election Ads must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process. All EU Election Ads run by verified EU election advertisers in the EU are also subject to targeting restrictions, whereby only the following criteria may be used to target election ads: - Geographic location (except radius around a location); - Age, gender; - Contextual targeting options such as: ad placements, topics, keywords against sites, apps, pages and videos. All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads. To provide transparency for users, Google publishes a [Political Advertising](#) transparency report and a political ads library. Only ads that are in scope of the Election Ads Policy, and that are run by verified election advertisers, will be included in the report at this time. For example, EU Election Ads run by a verified EU election advertiser that serve in the EU will be included in the report. US Election Ads run by a verified EU election advertiser that serve in the EU will not be included. In July 2024, Google [updated](#) the Disclosure requirements for synthetic content under the Political Content Policy, requiring advertisers to disclose election ads that contain synthetic or digitally altered content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events by selecting the checkbox in the 'Altered or synthetic content' section in their campaign settings.		

	Google will generate an in-ad disclosure based on that checkbox, for certain types of formats. This is because Google believes that users should have information to make informed decisions when viewing election ads that contain synthetic content that has been digitally altered or generated. Accordingly, verified election advertisers in regions where verification is required, must prominently disclose when their ads contain synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. This disclosure must be clear and conspicuous and must be placed in a location where it is likely to be noticed by users. This policy applies to image, video and audio content. In May 2024, Google updated the policy for EU Election Ads to include restrictions in Italy that 'Advertisers must comply with applicable local electoral laws, including pausing ads as required during periods defined by law as silence periods. Google does not allow EU Election Ads, as defined by Ads' policies, to serve in Italy during a silence period.' This is because Google supports responsible political advertising, and has consistently expected all political ads and destinations to comply with local legal requirements. This includes campaign and election laws and election 'silence periods' for any geographic areas they target. Google requires all advertisers to fully comply with applicable laws and regulations, including local electoral laws. Advertisers are expected to familiarise themselves with the local law and regulations for any location their ads target.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Misrepresentation Policy	AdSense policies that disrupt the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors related to politics in the AdSense ecosystem that publishers must adhere to include Manipulated Media and Deceptive Practices. Google Ads provides a way for advertisers and businesses to reach new customers as they search on Google for words related to an advertiser's business, or browse websites with related themes. However, Google Ads enforces policies that do not allow ads or destinations related to politics that display Inappropriate Content or Misrepresentation. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Inappropriate Content include the Sensitive Event Policy and

	Hacked Political Materials Policy. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Misrepresentation include the Coordinated Deceptive Practices and Manipulated Media Policy.
	In March 2024, Google Advertising updated the Unacceptable business practices portion of the Misrepresentation Policy to include enticing users to part with money or information by impersonating or falsely implying affiliation with or endorsement by a public figure, brand, or organisation. Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in March 2024 for advertisers outside of France. For advertisers in France, Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in April 2024. The reason for this was that toward the end of 2023 and into 2024, Google Advertising faced a targeted campaign of ads featuring the likeness of public figures to scam users, often through the use of deep fakes. When Google Advertising detected this threat, it created a dedicated team to respond immediately. It also pinpointed patterns in the bad actors' behaviour, trained its automated enforcement models to detect similar ads and began removing them at scale. Google Advertising also updated its Misrepresentation Policy to better enable it to rapidly suspend the accounts of bad actors.
	Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for metrics related to these policies.
Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Search works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. Search policies are enforced globally.	See Commitment 14-15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Search's policies are enforced globally, including during elections in the EU. Search continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updates to policies can be found here.

	See Commitment 14-15 for metrics on these efforts.
Google Search has published guidance on [AI-generated content](). This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Search will approach responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to [future elections]().
	See Commitment 15 for more details on these efforts.

YouTube	
YouTube works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.	YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updates policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found [here]().
	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for more details on this effort.
YouTube creators are [required]() to disclose when they upload a video that contains realistic altered or synthetic content, after which YouTube adds a transparency label so that viewers have this important context.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube approaches responsible AI innovation, which were applied to elections, like the French, Romanian, and EU Parliamentary Elections that were held in 2024.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Google, on behalf of related services	
In February 2024, Google signed the '[Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections]()' pledging to work collaboratively on tools to detect and address online distribution of AI content, drive educational campaigns, and provide transparency, among other concrete steps along with other leading technology companies.	Google signed this accord as a voluntary framework and committed to taking action to advance the seven principal goals. Additionally, Google committed to the following steps in 2024: ● Developing and implementing technology to mitigate risks related to Deceptive AI Election content; ● Assessing models in scope of this accord to understand the risks they may present regarding Deceptive AI Election Content; ● Seeking to detect the distribution of Deceptive AI election content;

	- Seeking to appropriately address Deceptive AI Election Content that is detected; - Fostering cross-industry resilience to Deceptive AI Election Content; - Providing transparency to the public; - Continuing to engage with a diverse set of global civil society organisations, academics; and, - Supporting efforts to foster public awareness and all-of-society resilience.
	Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world.
	See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the TAG Bulletin Q3 2024 and TAG Bulletin Q4 2024.
Google helped develop the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) to streamline the exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms.	The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the code of practice to ensure rapid and effective cooperation and communication between them ahead and during the election period. The RRS allows non-platform Signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies. The RRS also provides an opportunity for platform Signatories to provide feedback - such as on broader trends - to the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Permanent Task-force Working Group with Member State authorities, independent experts and civil society organisations.
	YouTube received one notification for the France election and one notification for the Croatia election through the RRS escalation channel. Google did not receive any notifications for Search or Ads through the RRS escalation channel. This indicates that Google's existing public flagging channels are capable of addressing concerns about how to raise escalations.

In an effort to equip election campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training, Google's Project Shield provides free and unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks - a method of censorship and intimidation.	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.
	During the EU Parliamentary elections (6 June 2024 to 9 June 2024): ● Project Shield saw a higher number of DDoS attacks against Project Shield beneficiaries compared to previous elections. ● Poland received the most attacks, followed by Ireland, and then Romania. ● The largest number of attacks was seen on 9 June 2024, and the single largest attack was also observed on the same day.
Empowering Users	
Google Search	
In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality information to voters.	See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report.
	See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.
Users often see a Knowledge Panel on the Search Results page for searches about people and organisations—a box with an overview of key information (e.g. candidates and parties) to help them go deeper. See here for more information.	Search is committed to providing timely and high-quality information on Google Search to help voters understand, navigate, and participate in democratic processes. Through its products, Google Search hopes to connect users with the civic information that they need. Find more information here.
	Google Search will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
YouTube	

YouTube's systems prioritise connecting viewers with high-quality information, including on events such as elections in the EU.	YouTube's recommendation system prominently surfaces news from high-quality sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates. YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves surface at the top of search results, prominently featuring content from high-quality news sources, which may include information about EU elections.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
Election information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about election related content they are viewing.	Information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.
	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for more details on this effort.
Google on behalf of related services	
Leading up to and during key elections in the EU, Google Search deployed 'How to Vote', 'How to Register', and Election Results features to help users prepare for the election and access high-quality election information.	In advance of the 2024 elections in France and Romania, Google launched features to help users prepare for the election and access high-quality election information. Specifically for Romania: • Google partnered with the Ministry of Digitalisation who launched a platform where citizens could report violating content on all social media platforms and the Ministry's task-force would direct the requests to the relevant channels of the respective platforms. • To help raise voter awareness about the Romanian election, Google Search launched a Romanian-customised Doodle on the Google homepage. Specifically for France:

	- On Search, to help voters find their way around the electoral process, an official resources result page was launched for queries such as '*How to vote in France*' or '*Where to vote in France*'; redirecting users to information from interieur.gouv.fr and info.gouv.fr websites. Google Search also raised awareness of the vote through home page promotions and a French-customised Doodle. - YouTube launched two promos about 'How to Vote' on the homepage, one for each round, redirecting users to the official Government website. - Google launched a dedicated French political trends page, surfacing users' search trends on the ballot, political parties and personalities. - In anticipation of the 'silent period', YouTube posted a message to creators from the 'YouTube créateurs' channel's community tab to remind them of what the law prohibits during election weekends.
	Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Google partnered with ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank, to empower young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities.	With the voting age lowered to 16+ in some European countries, more young people can participate in the democratic process. To support them, Google.org is awarding a $1 million grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank. The grant funded youth-led hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to focus on information quality and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018.
	In September 2024, with Google's support, two winners were awarded €10,000 at the Paris Hackathon. In December 2024, another two winners were awarded €10,000 at the Brussels Hackathon.
Empowering the Research Community	
Google Search	

Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.
	Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the [YouTube Researcher Program](#), which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to EU elections in 2024.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.
Google on behalf of related services	
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](#). This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the EU elections in 2024.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
Google regularly undertakes stakeholder engagement to discuss Google's election preparedness.	Google's consultations with civil society organisations, academics and other relevant subject matter experts serve to both inform and share its resources and technologies. In advance of the 2024 elections in France and Romania, Google hosted and sponsored events in these markets to convene policymakers, civil society, media and experts on election integrity and tackling misinformation. Google also offered training to political parties on how to efficiently use Google platforms ahead of elections and secured direct communication channels with all these parties and key candidates.

	Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community	
Google Search	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
YouTube	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Google on behalf of related services	
N/A	N/A
	N/A