

Code of Practice on
Disinformation – January
2023 Baseline Report of
Twitch

Table of Content

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements	1
Commitment 1	1
Commitment 3	3
IV. Integrity of Services	4
Commitment 14	4
Commitment 16	6
V. Empowering Users	7
Commitment 17	7
Commitment 18	8
Commitment 19	8
Commitment 23	9
Commitment 24	10
VI. Empowering the research community	11
Commitment 27	11
VIII. Transparency Centre	11
Commitment 34	11
Commitment 35	11
Commitment 36	12
IX. Permanent Task-Force	12
Commitment 37	12
X. Monitoring of Code	14
Commitment 38	14
Commitment 39	14
Commitment 40	14
Commitment 42	15
Commitment 43	15

Executive summary

Twitch is a live-streaming service where the vast majority of content is long form and ephemeral. Twitch is primarily focused on video gaming content, in addition to other content types such as cooking, music, and talk-based streams.

At Twitch, we strive to create welcoming, interactive communities where people from all around the world can express themselves safely and find belonging. Our goal is to foster an environment that supports and sustains streamers, welcomes and entertains viewers, and minimises harm. For Twitch, this means deterring harm while giving streamers the guidelines, tools, technology, and education they need to build vibrant communities with standards and norms that work for them.

We're proud that Twitch can bring people together—but we do not believe that individuals who use online services to spread false, harmful information, have a place in our community. While these individuals are not prevalent on Twitch, they could cause significant harm if allowed on our service.

We partnered with over a dozen researchers and experts to understand how harmful misinformation spreads online and ensure our approach to mitigating its risks in our community is effective for Twitch given the unique way the service operates. We learned that Harmful Misinformation Actors account for a disproportionate amount of damaging, widely debunked misinformation online. Together, we identified three characteristics that all of these actors share: their online presence—whether on or off Twitch—is dedicated to (1) persistently sharing (2) widely disproven and broadly shared (3) harmful misinformation topics, such as conspiracies that promote violence. Under our Harmful Misinformation Actor policy, we prohibit users whose online presence meets these three criteria. We selected the criteria because taken together they create the highest risk of harm including inciting real-world harm.

Twitch misinformation enforcement numbers are relatively low due to two factors: 1) The mechanics of Twitch are not conducive to spreading misinformation or investing in large-scale disinformation campaigns. It is extremely difficult for a new streamer to garner large amounts of concurrent viewers; it takes to grow an audience on Twitch. Additionally, most content is gone the moment it is created so it is not shared and does not go viral in the same way. 2) Our targeted policy only applies to those who persistently share harmful misinformation topics. This means singular statements or briefly sharing a belief in a conspiracy theory does not meet our bar to be removed from Twitch. This makes sense for Twitch—due to the long-form nature of Twitch's content, we are focused on a streamer's aggregated content rather than a specific, isolated statement within a longer piece of content.

In addition to misinformation, Twitch invests significant resources to ban bots, spammers, impersonators, and other forms of bad actors to combat inauthenticity on our service. We have proactive detection to work alongside our reporting system to programmatically remove bots, known bad actors, and those who are trying to evade a suspension or ban.

Community safety is not an end state, and we are always evolving our approach in accordance with expert guidance and trends in our community. While harmful misinformation is not currently prevalent on Twitch, we understand that it can evolve very quickly, and we will continue to engage with academia, civil society, and industry to adapt our approach as necessary to ensure its continuing effectiveness.

The Code provides a useful framework for information sharing and collaboration that will help strengthen the industry's abilities to react quickly to the spread of misinformation. As a signatory to the Code, Twitch hopes to make meaningful contributions and learn from industry peers. We are committed to combating misinformation on Twitch in an effective yet targeted manner that balances freedom of expression with keeping our communities safe.

Guidelines for filling out the report

Baseline reports are detailing how Signatories have implemented their Commitments under the Code and provide the Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) and Service Level Indicators (SLIs), as they stand one month after the implementation. The baseline report should also include a comparison between the measures in place under the previous Code to the measures taken to implement the new Code. The measures taken to implement the new Code should be outlined per commitment in the dedicated field of the reporting template.

Reporting period

The reporting period to be covered in the baseline reports is from 16 December 2022 to 16 January 2023 for all Signatories. (The implementation period of the Code from 16 June 2022 to 16 December 2022 is followed by a one-month reporting period from 16 December 2022 to 16 January 2023.) Signatories shall submit baseline reports outlining policy updates and actions taken to implement the Code during the implementation period. Data, e.g. on the number of actions taken under a specific policy, should be reported on from the end of the implementation period (16 December 2022) until the cut-off date of 16 January 2023. In case specific data is not available for the first reporting period (from 16 December 2022 to 16 January 2023), please provide the monthly average based on the previous quarter, clearly outlining the methodology used in the relevant field. The submission date for baseline reports is January 31, 2023.

Adjusting the reporting template

Non-VLOPs can adapt the template to specific commitments and measures they subscribed to. This may include adapted wording for commitments, measures, QREs and SLIs. Non-VLOPs signatories will report only on commitments and measures they subscribed to and provide Member State-level data only if feasible.

Reporting per Service

When filling in a report for several services, use colour codes to clearly distinguish between services. At the beginning of the report, clarify what colour is used for which service.

Reporting in text form

Reporting in the form of written text is required for several parts of the report. Most of them are accompanied by a target character limit. Please stick to the target character limit as much as possible. We encourage you to use bullet points and short sentences. Links should only be used to provide examples or to illustrate the point. They should not be used to replace explanations or to provide data in the forms. All relevant explanations and data must be included in the table directly, in written form.

Reporting SLIs and data

Reporting on Service Level Indicators requires quantitative information to be reported in the reporting template. We ask you to report data in the format provided by the reporting template, not on external links.

Reporting on TTPs

If subscribed to Commitment 14, Integrity of Services, we ask you to report on each identified TTP individually. The number of identified TTPs may vary per service. Where more than one TTP are reported under the same action, clarify the reasoning in the methodology. Where input is not provided, keep the placeholder for the relevant TTP and explain reasons and planned remedial action. Additionally, as with all other SLIs, data can be provided per Member State for each individual TTP.

Missing Data

In case that at the time of reporting there is no data available yet, the data is insufficient or the methodology is lacking, please outline in the dedicated field (i.e. in the field about further implementation measures planned) how this will be addressed over the upcoming six months, being as specific as possible. Please also indicate inconsistencies or gaps regarding methodology in the field dedicated to methodology.

Attachments

We ask you not to enclose any additional attachments to the harmonised reporting template.

Uploading data to the Transparency Centre

After the submission of the baseline reports and the launch of the Transparency Centre website, all data from the reporting template must be uploaded to the Transparency Centre within maximum 7 days, allowing easy data access and filtering. It is the responsibility of the Signatories to ensure that the uploading takes place and is executed on time. Signatories are also responsible to ensure that the Transparency Centre is operational and functional by the time of the reports' submission, that the data from the reports are uploaded and made accessible in the Transparency Centre within the above deadline, and that users are able to read, search, filter and download data as needed in a user-friendly way and format.

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

Measure 1.1

[adapted] Relevant Signatories involved in the selling of advertising, inclusive of media platforms, publishers and ad tech companies, will deploy, disclose, and enforce policies with the aims of:

- first avoiding the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation to protect the integrity of advertising supported businesses
- second taking meaningful enforcement and remediation steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or on sources that repeatedly violate these policies
-

QRE 1.1.1

From Twitch's [Community Guidelines](#):

"We remove users whose online presence is dedicated to (1) persistently sharing (2) widely disproven and broadly shared (3) harmful misinformation topics.

This policy is focused on Twitch users who persistently share harmful misinformation. It will not be applied to users based upon individual statements or discussions that occur on the channel. We will evaluate whether a user violates the policy by assessing both their on-platform behaviour as well as their off-platform behaviour. You can report these actors by sending an email to our internal investigations team with the account name and any available supporting evidence.

Under this policy we cover the following topic areas, and will continue to update this list as new trends emerge:

- Misinformation that targets protected groups, which is already prohibited under our Hateful Conduct & Harassment Policy
- Harmful health misinformation and wide-spread conspiracy theories related to dangerous treatments, COVID-19, and COVID-19 vaccine misinformation
- Discussions of treatments that are known to be harmful without noting the dangers of such treatments
- For COVID-19—and any other WHO-declared Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)—misinformation that causes imminent physical harm or is part of a broad conspiracy
- Misinformation promoted by conspiracy networks tied to violence and/or promoting violence
- Civic misinformation that undermines the integrity of a civic or political process
- Promotion of verifiably false claims related to the outcome of a fully vetted political process, including election rigging, ballot tampering, vote tallying, or election fraud*
- In instances of public emergencies (e.g., wildfires, earthquakes, active shootings), we may also act on misinformation that may impact public safety)"

SLI 1.1.1 – [adapted] actions taken to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict advertising on pages and/or domains that disseminate harmful Disinformation.	This data represents an average number of monthly suspensions between October and December 2022. Twitch saw a high number of enforcements at the launch of our Harmful Misinformation Actor policy in March 2022 but has seen a lower monthly average since launch.
	Twitch’s enforcement is focused on indefinitely suspending all dedicated misinformation actors and any of their related accounts, and removing any associated content.
Level	Page
Data	4 Indefinite Suspensions
Measure 1.2	
QRE 1.2.1	Please refer to QRE 1.1.1 which outlines Twitch’s Harmful Misinformation Actor Policy in the Community Guidelines. Actors that systematically provide harmful misinformation are prohibited and are not eligible for monetization.
Measure 1.5	
QRE 1.5.1	We are currently accredited by TAG for Brand Safety. As part of this accreditation, Twitch has been audited by external auditor BPA WW to ensure that all of our digital advertising agreements and practices adhere to brand safety and anti-piracy principles, and we have robust policies and procedures in place to minimise, monitor and detect ad misplacement. https://www.tagtoday.net/registry
QRE 1.5.2	Current industry body accreditations do not evaluate specific components under 1.5 Twitch does not conduct independent accreditation via audits.

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

Measure 3.1	
QRE 3.1.1	<p>Twitch currently engages in partnerships with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Global Disinformation Index (GDI) - Twitch partnered closely with the GDI to develop our Harmful Misinformation Actor Policy and continue to partner with them to ensure we're staying ahead of misinformation trends and identifying potential misinformation actors on our service. ● Mediawise - Twitch is currently engaged in developing an array of educational materials that teach Twitch streamers and viewers how to better identify and avoid spreading mis/disinformation online. ● GARM - Twitch participates in GARM's working groups and annual report exercise to ensure we are up-to-date on advertising and monetization concerns.
Measure 3.2	
QRE 3.2.1	<p>Twitch is a participant in the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures working group and will continue to regularly attend to learn and share any new tactics that the industry is seeing arise from misinformation actors.</p> <p>As a participant in GARM, Twitch regularly engages with social media platforms and advertising industry members through community and working group meetings. As GARM pushed social media platforms and other tech companies to enact misinformation policies, Twitch contributed to discussions to add misinformation to GARM's brand safety floor and suitability framework, and worked to align our policy with these criteria.</p>
Measure 3.3	
QRE 3.3.1	<p>Twitch partnered closely with the Global Disinformation Index (GDI) to develop our Harmful Misinformation Actor Policy and continue to partner with them in order to ensure we're staying ahead of misinformation trends and identifying potential misinformation actors on our service.</p> <p>GDI provides regular misinformation analytic reports based on trending misinformation topics. Recently, Twitch has received proactive notifications on elections, the Great Replacement theory, and Accelerationism among other types of misinformation.</p>

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

[adapted] In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

Measure 14.1

QRE 14.1.1

Establishing Online Assets and Legitimacy: Twitch has policies related to bots, spam, scams, malicious content, impersonation, and suspension evasion which are aimed at preventing inauthentic actors from having a presence on Twitch.

QRE 14.1.2

In terms of proactivity, Twitch regularly engages with and receives reports from the Global Disinformation Index to stay abreast of upcoming trends that directly/indirectly involve Twitch. We also conduct audits of

	<p>suspicious users who may be evading suspensions for botting or spam. If we find that these suspicious users are linked via account metadata, we will take mass action to remove them from our service.</p> <p>Twitch's Trust & Safety, Marketing/Communications Teams, and other internal teams monitor social media for potential bad actors proclaiming a move to Twitch.</p>	
Measure 14.2	<p>[adapted] Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services, and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats. The list of TTPs will serve as the base for the TTPs to be reported upon and relevant signatories will work within the Permanent Task-force to further develop and refine related indicators on the impact/effectiveness of their related actions.</p>	
QRE 14.2.1 [adapted] Report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed	<p>Twitch's Harmful Misinformation Actor policy came into force in March 2022. The policy covers removal of dedicated misinformation actors from the Twitch service. There are supplemental policies related to prohibiting inauthenticity such as bots or paid engagement that augment our efforts to counter misinformation.</p> <p>The most relevant TTPs for Twitch are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets • Use of fake followers or subscribers • Account hijacking or impersonation <p>The other TTPs are not tracked by Twitch and do not present a threat on our service. However, Twitch will continue to participate in the working group and monitor for these potential threats.</p>	
SLI 14.2.1		
TTP OR ACTION 1 [replicate for number of TTPs or actions reported]	<p>This table will cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets • Use of fake followers or subscribers • Account hijacking or impersonation <p>The data provided is the average monthly data from October to December 2022. Twitch's Nr of instances of identified TTPs will be the same as the Nr of actions taken by type since these types of violations will result in an account enforcement action.</p>	
	SLI 14.2.1	
	[adapted] Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken under policies addressing each of the TTPs as well as information on the type of content.	
	Nr of instances of Creation of Inauthentic Accounts or Botnets	Nr of actions taken
Data	270,921	270,921 account enforcements
	Nr of instances of Use of Fake Followers or Subscribers	Nr of actions taken
	6	6 account enforcements
	Nr of instances of Account hijacking or impersonation	Nr of actions taken
	32	32 account enforcements

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

Measure 16.1			
QRE 16.1.1	<p>Twitch regularly participates in working groups and ad hoc meetings related to misinformation incidents/campaigns through the EU Disinformation Code, GARM, and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT).</p> <p>While Twitch has not made any specific changes to our policy based on these discussions, they help inform the trends that we investigate, and aid us in staying up to speed on misinformation topics. We will continue to participate and will take action in situations that fit our policy approach.</p>		
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	<p>Twitch completes regular reviews of our processes to ensure that we are in line with best practices as they apply to Twitch. For example, as part of our membership in GARM, Twitch regularly evaluates our community guidelines and content policies against the GARM brand safety floor. Twitch also participated in information sharing exercises related to the Ukraine-Russia crisis where services were alerted to Russian State Media accounts becoming active after being suspended elsewhere.</p>		
Data	Nr of actions taken (total)	Type of detected content	Other relevant metrics
Measure 16.2	0	0	N/A
QRE 16.2.1	<p>We monitor misinformation actors closely across the online ecosystem, and have seen misinformation actors move to our service after being removed elsewhere, such as from Facebook and YouTube. We have used our harmful misinformation policy to remove some of these actors, such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In July 2022, the Global Disinformation Index (GDI) alerted us to a number of Harmful Misinformation Actors dedicated to promoting the core tenets of the violent conspiracy network, QAnon. Based on their information we investigated their online presence and were able to remove 6 of these actors from our service. In many cases they had already been banned by peer companies. • We have seen a handful of accounts dedicated to exclusively restreaming Alex Jones's InfoWars content. We consider these cases violations of our Harmful Misinformation Actor policy and remove them. • When our Misinformation Actor policy launched in March 2022, we removed several high profile dedicated misinformation actors who persistently spread health misinformation, civic 		

	misinformation, and misinformation supporting violent conspiracy networks, such as QAnon. Some actors had previously been removed from both YouTube and Twitter.
--	--

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission’s initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

Measure 17.1	
QRE 17.1.1 [adapted] Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment.	<p>Twitch is collaborating with media literacy expert MediaWise to develop an array of educational materials that teach Twitch streamers and viewers how to better identify, and avoid spreading, misinformation and disinformation online. As part of Twitch’s collaboration with MediaWise, in the fall of 2022, Twitch organised a joint live stream with participants from MediaWise, Twitch, and the Twitch community. This was to improve media literacy and provide tips and tricks on how to spot fake news and misinformation ahead of the US midterm election cycle.</p> <p>The livestream produced together with MediaWise is available as a recording along with additional original content directly from MediaWise on digital literacy. These tools are part of our Twitch Safety Center and were released in January 2023.</p>
SLI 17.1.1 – [adapted] Relevant Signatories will report on metrics pertinent to assessing the effects of the tools described in the qualitative reporting element for Measure 17.1, which will include: the total count of impressions of the tool; and information on the interactions/engagement with the tool.	<p>We have published a collaborative livestream as a replayable VOD in one of our Help Centers discussing media literacy with our streamers, our VP of Trust and Safety, and experts at MediaWise. We are measuring interactions or engagements as the number of users who visit the page since the VOD is one piece of a larger fact sheet on media literacy. The data below is the number of interactions from December 2022 to January 2023.</p>
Data	<p>Interactions/ engagement with the tool</p> <p>2,800 interactions</p>
Measure 17.2	
QRE 17.2.1 [adapted] Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base.	<p>As part of Twitch’s collaboration with MediaWise, Twitch organised a joint live stream with participants from MediaWise, Twitch, and the Twitch community.</p> <p>Twitch is continuing to explore educational and research opportunities related to misinformation.</p> <p>For more information, please refer to QRE 17.1.1 above.</p>

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 18				
Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.				
Measure 18.2				
QRE 18.2.1	Persistent sharing of harmful misinformation will result in a violation of our policies and a permanent ban from the service. If alternate accounts are created to avoid this ban, those accounts will be immediately removed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Link to our Harmful Misinformation Actor policy. 			
SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	Almost all of our removals under the misinformation actor policy are of smaller accounts that did not have a meaningful number of followers, subscribers, or engagement on Twitch. This does not mean these actors were not larger on other platforms but their Twitch presence was small. As such, we are not able to track meaningful metrics to measure the impact of removing these actors from our service. The numbers below reflect a monthly average between October and December 2022.			
	Total no of violations	Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 2: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 3: indicating the impact of the action taken
Data	4 Indefinite Suspensions	N/A	N/A	N/A

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 19	
[adapted] Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding how the algorithms are expected to behave and the outcomes prioritised and deprioritized on behalf of users, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.	
Measure 19.1	[adapted] Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main behaviours recommenders use and optimise for.

QRE 19.1.1 [adapted] Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main behaviours recommenders use and optimise for.	In H2 2022, Twitch staffed a Responsible AI team to invest in—among other responsible AI principles—explainability of its recommender system. This team presented at Twitch’s user conference on the behaviours that its recommender system uses and optimises for, and intends to publish this information on its service in 2023.
Measure 19.2	
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Users can customise their recommendations on Twitch through feedback on channels and content categories that are then excluded from recommendations. On Twitch’s front page, users can let Twitch know if they are “not interested” in a streamer or content category that is recommended to them. At any time, users can navigate to their settings page and review what they have marked as “not interested” and then edit those selections. Below is the number of times users navigated to the settings page.
	No of times users actively engaged with these settings. The data below is the monthly average from October to December 2022.
Data	approximately 600,000 users per month

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 23	
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.	
Measure 23.1	
QRE 23.1.1	The Harmful Misinformation Actors policy includes information about how to submit a report and a link, which automatically opens up a new email in a user’s default email application to contact our Off-Service Investigations Team. Alternatively, users can find our misinformation category in our on-service reporting tool either through a dropdown or a search bar. Because our misinformation policy takes into account content both on and off Twitch, reports of such content are handled by our specialised Off-Service Investigations Team. This means that users cannot submit a report through the standard reporting tool. Instead, once they select “Misinformation,” they are presented with a link that brings them to the Misinformation Policy page, which includes information on how to submit a report.
Measure 23.2	
QRE 23.2.1	Our highly trained and experienced professionals review user reports and content that is flagged by our machine detection tools. These content moderation professionals work across multiple locations, and support

	over 25 languages, in order to provide 24/7/365 capacity to review reports as they come in across the globe. Reports are prioritised so that the most harmful behaviour can be dealt with most quickly.
--	---

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

Measure 24.1				
QRE 24.1.1 [adapted] Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.	<p>When an enforcement is issued for a user, they are immediately given a written warning (if their account is not suspended) or are immediately notified that their account has been suspended. This notification includes information on the type and date of the violation as well as a link to our Community Guidelines to learn more.</p> <p>Appeals can be filed via our appeals portal. The appeals portal provides visibility into the enforcements that are eligible for appeal and also displays the status and outcome of ongoing and prior requests.</p>			
SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	<p>To qualify as a harmful misinformation actor, you must meet the criteria outlined in our Harmful Misinformation Actor policy. Your online presence must be dedicated to: (1) persistently sharing (2) widely disproven and broadly shared (3) harmful misinformation topics.</p> <p>These strict criteria combined with a time-intensive, thorough investigation means that our enforcements are accurate and our successful appeal rate will be and is low.</p> <p>The data below is the monthly average from October to December 2022.</p>			
	Nr of enforcement actions	Nr of actions appealed	Metrics on results of appeals	Metrics on the duration and effectiveness of the appeal process
Data	4 account enforcements	2 appeals	0 approved	100% accuracy

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 27

[adapted] Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation

Measure 27.4

QRE 27.4.1

In 2023, we will investigate a pilot program to help academic researchers access Twitch users who would like to opt in to surveys and focus groups related to mis- and disinformation.

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

Measure 34.1

Measure 34.2

Measure 34.3

Measure 34.4

Measure 34.5

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

Measure 35.1	
Measure 35.2	[adapted] Signatories provide information on the implementation and enforcement of their policies per service.
Measure 35.3	
Measure 35.4	
Measure 35.5	
Measure 35.6	[adapted] The Transparency Centre will enable users to easily access and understand the Service Level Indicators and Qualitative Reporting Elements tied to each Commitment and Measure of the Code for each service, in a standardised and searchable way. The Transparency Centre should also enable users to easily access and understand Structural Indicators for each Signatory.

VIII. Transparency Centre	
Commitment 36	
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.	
Measure 36.1	
Measure 36.2	
Measure 36.3	
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	We are pleased to confirm that we have been an active participant in the subgroup that has successfully launched the common Transparency Centre this year. We have assisted with establishing the website's requirements, selecting a vendor to build the website and overseeing the development of the website's key functionalities and interface. We have ensured that the Center will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Center to be navigated both by commitment and signatory). Each signatory will be responsible for ensuring that the information they upload to the website is correct and accurate. Entities interested in joining the Code's task-force will be able to sign up through a dedicated online application form on the website.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage	
Data	

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

Measure 37.1

Measure 37.2

[adapted] Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks:

- Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises.
- Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis
- Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes.
- Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed.
- Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation.
- Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them.
- Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.
- Seek out and discuss research, expert input and up-to-date evidence relevant to the Code's commitments, such as, *inter alia*, emerging best practices in safe design, retroactive flagging, repository of fact-checks, provenance tools.
- Discuss and provide guidance on the adequate quantitative information to be provided by signatories to fulfil their reporting obligations regarding agreements with fact-checking organisations across different services.
- Regularly discuss whether the Code's Commitments and Measures need updating in view of technological, societal, market and legislative developments, as well as in view of accommodating new signatories and, where the Task-force agrees to be necessary, carry out such updates.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review the appropriateness and consistency of adapted Measures for smaller or emerging services. - Promote the Code among relevant peers and integrate new Signatories to the Code.
Measure 37.3	
Measure 37.4	
Measure 37.5	
Measure 37.6	
QRE 37.6.1	Twitch focuses on actor-level misinformation and our data and monitoring suggest that we are not a current hub for misinformation actors relative to other platforms due to the nature of content on Twitch. As a Non-VLOP, Twitch is participating in the working groups in a learning capacity to be aware of what the rest of the signatories are facing so we can take proactive action if needed.

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 38	
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.	
Measure 38.1	
QRE 38.1.1 [adapted] Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal Teams <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trust & Safety: Policy, Business Operations, Safety Operations, Law Enforcement Response ○ Product: Community Health ○ Legal: Public Policy • Twitch has committed to and implemented regular internal audits of yearly transparency reports with scoping of resources needed to complete various measures outlined in the code.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 40

[adapted] Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory.

Measure 40.2	[adapted] Other Signatories will report yearly on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures taken under the present Code, including on the relevant QREs and SLIs.
Measure 40.3	
Measure 40.4	
Measure 40.5	
Measure 40.6	[adapted] Signatories will cooperate with the European Commission, respond to its reasonable requests and provide the European Commission with reasonable information, data and further input necessary to assess the implementation of the Code, allowing for the Code's efficient and thorough monitoring.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 43

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.