

Code of Practice on  
Disinformation – Report of  
Meta for the period 01  
January 2024 to 30 June  
2024

## Executive summary

We are proud to share our fourth report under the 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, which also draws from our working closely with the Code's Taskforce, particularly in the aftermath of the European Parliamentary Elections, which was an area of focus across signatories.

The aim of this report is to provide the latest updates, for January to June 2024, on how Meta approaches misinformation and disinformation in the European Union. We have additionally included any pertinent updates which occurred after the reporting period, where relevant in the report. Highlights include:

- **Elections:** We have aligned this report with Meta's post-elections report which covers the European Parliament elections and is required under the DSA. The EU elections chapter provides an overview of our preparatory work and information regarding our core policies, processes, and upcoming plans, which were in place to ensure the integrity of elections for the European Parliament election, with more fulsome detail being available in the public report. A few highlights include:
  - Connecting people with details about the election in their Member States through in-app 'Voter Information Units' and 'Election Day Information', which users engaged more than 41 million times on Facebook and more than 58 million times on Instagram.
  - Temporarily onboarding 23 national election authorities as well as other competent bodies to a dedicated reporting channel and ensuring timely onboarding of 13 DSCs to our government reporting channels.
  - Organising 34 training sessions and office hours in 21 countries on our policies and products ahead of the election with government organisations, political parties, electoral institutions, and civil society organisations.
  - Reviewing and discussing 14 reports from the rapid response channel (reporting 58 pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram), the majority of which were closed within 24 hours of receipt.
- **Media literacy:** In the first half of 2024 Meta ran a series of Media Literacy campaigns working with several partners such as:
  - The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services' (ERGA)'s awareness raising campaign, with reach to over 64 million users.
  - The European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN)'s AI@EU Elections project, with training for over 200 fact-checkers and a campaign receiving 12.7 million impressions.
  - AFP Fact Check with a Reel video on how to deal with a piece of news that seems unlikely, reaching nearly 2.5 million views.
  - The German Federal Returning Officer and their get out the vote campaign with over 8 million impressions and reach to over 4.7 million users.
- **CIB trends and Doppelganger:** As detailed in our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report for Q1 2024, we observed that in Q1 2024, while public discourse ahead of the EU parliamentary elections focused primarily on foreign threats, including from Doppelganger, the majority of the EU-focused inauthentic behaviour we disrupted so far in 2024 has been domestic in nature. This includes both CIB activity (such as the Croatia example detailed later in the report), and simpler inauthentic clusters we removed in Europe, including in France, Germany, Poland and Italy, who used inauthentic amplification of authentic accounts or Pages of domestic politicians. We did not see evidence of these clusters gaining much traction among authentic audiences.

- **Researcher data access:** Based on feedback from researchers, Meta has been adding some new data and features in 2024, such as download options and adding 'comments' as a new data type within the Meta Content Library.
- **Labelling AI generated images for increased transparency:** Based on feedback from the Oversight Board and Meta's policy review process which included extensive public and expert consultation, we started adding "AI info" labels to a wider range of video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they're uploading AI-generated content. If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. Nearly 6,000 SIEP ads and over 5.7 million pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram in the EU were labelled with AI-related disclaimers around the EP elections, providing enhanced transparency to users.

Here are a few of the figures which can be found throughout the report:

- From 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024, we removed over 4.4 million ads from Facebook and Instagram in EU member states, of which over 170,000 ads were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation policy.
- From 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024, we labelled **over 1 million ads** on both Facebook and Instagram with "paid for by" disclaimers in the EU.
- **We removed 2 networks in Q1 2024 and 4 networks in Q2 2024** for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy which targeted one or more European countries. We also take steps to remove fake accounts, prioritising the removal of fake accounts that seek to cause harm. In Q1, we took action against **631 million fake accounts** and in Q2 2024, we took action against **1.2 billion fake accounts** on Facebook globally. **We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 2024 and 3% during Q2 2024 .**
- We continue to work through our global fact-checking programme, so that our independent fact-checking partners can continue to quickly review and rate false content on our apps. We partner with **29 fact-checking organisations** covering **23 different languages** in the EU. **On average 43% of people on Instagram and 46% of people on Facebook in the EU who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning that the content has been fact-checked.**
- Between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024, **over 150,000 distinct fact-checking articles on Facebook in the EU** were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 30 million pieces of content in the EU**. As for Instagram, **over 39,000 distinct articles in the EU** were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 990,000 pieces of content in the EU**. These numbers demonstrate the powers of our tools to scale the work of independent fact-checkers.

Compiling this report over four reporting cycles and continuously engaging with the Taskforce in between reports resulted in improved granularity in our metrics and strengthened cooperation with the Taskforce's members through new working groups (on Gen AI and elections for instance). We value the balanced approach of the Taskforce and the forum that it creates for structured dialogue and meaningful transparency. We are committed to our partnership with the European Commission, ERGA, EDMO, our co-signatories, and the rest of the Taskforce, to protect the integrity of the EU Parliamentary elections. We are also active participants in the ongoing discussion with the European Commission in relation to the conversion of this code into a code of conduct under Article 45 of the Digital Services Act.

Navigation per Service

| Commitments                          | Measures           | Service A - Facebook                | Service B - Instagram               | Service C - Messenger               | Service D - WhatsApp     |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b> |                    |                                     |                                     |                                     |                          |
| 1                                    | <u>Measure 1.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 1.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 1.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 1.4</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 1.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 1.6</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2                                    | <u>Measure 2.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 2.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 2.3</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 2.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3                                    | <u>Measure 3.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 3.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 3.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>III. Political advertising</b>    |                    |                                     |                                     |                                     |                          |
| 4                                    | <u>Measure 4.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 4.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5                                    | <u>Measure 5.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6                                    | <u>Measure 6.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 6.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 6.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 6.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 6.5</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7                                    | <u>Measure 7.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 7.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 7.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <u>Measure 7.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> |

|                                  |                     |                                     |                                     |                          |                          |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 8                                | <u>Measure 8.1</u>  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 8.2</u>  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9                                | <u>Measure 9.1</u>  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 9.2</u>  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10                               | <u>Measure 10.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 10.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11                               | <u>Measure 11.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 11.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 11.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 11.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12                               | <u>Measure 12.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 12.2</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 12.3</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13                               | <u>Measure 13.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 13.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 13.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>IV. Integrity of services</b> |                     |                                     |                                     |                          |                          |
| 14                               | <u>Measure 14.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 14.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 14.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15                               | <u>Measure 15.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 15.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 16                               | <u>Measure 16.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 16.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>V. Empowering users</b>       |                     |                                     |                                     |                          |                          |
| 17                               | <u>Measure 17.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 17.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 17.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 18                               | <u>Measure 18.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

|  |                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |
|--|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|  | <u>Measure 18.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 18.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 19   | <u>Measure 19.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 19.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 20   | <u>Measure 20.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 20.2</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 21   | <u>Measure 21.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 21.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 21.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 22   | <u>Measure 22.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 22.2</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 22.3</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 22.4</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 22.5</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 22.6</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 22.7</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 23   | <u>Measure 23.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 23.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 24   | <u>Measure 24.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 25   | <u>Measure 25.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 25.2</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>VI. Empowering the research community</b> |                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |
| 26   | <u>Measure 26.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 26.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 26.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 27   | <u>Measure 27.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 27.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 27.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 27.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |

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|--|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 28   | <u>Measure 28.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 28.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 28.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 28.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 29   | <u>Measure 29.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 29.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 29.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| <b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b> |                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |
| 30   | <u>Measure 30.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 30.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 30.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 30.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 31   | <u>Measure 31.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 31.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 31.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 31.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 32   | <u>Measure 32.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 32.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <u>Measure 32.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 33   | <u>Measure 33.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| <b>VIII. Transparency Centre</b>                   |                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |
| 34   | <u>Measure 34.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 34.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 34.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 34.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 34.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 35   | <u>Measure 35.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 35.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <u>Measure 35.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

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|----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                  | <u>Measure 35.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 35.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 35.6</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 36                               | <u>Measure 36.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 36.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 36.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>IX. Permanent Taskforce</b>   |                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |
| 37                               | <u>Measure 37.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 37.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 37.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 37.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 37.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 37.6</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b> |                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |                                     |
| 38                               | <u>Measure 38.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 39                               | -                   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 40                               | <u>Measure 40.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 40.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 40.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 40.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 40.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 40.6</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 41                               | <u>Measure 41.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 41.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <u>Measure 41.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 42                               |                     | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 43                               | -                   | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 44                               | -                   | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |



## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 – 3

## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

### Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

|  | C.1                 | M 1.1               | M 1.2               | M 1.3               | M 1.4 | M 1.5               | M 1.6               |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|---------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | N/A   | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram   |
|--|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <p><b>Improvements to Inventory Filter for Facebook Feed and Reels:</b><br/> <u>Inventory Filter</u> for Facebook Feed and Reels gives advertisers the ability to adjust their preferences for adjacency to different content types. Within this control, advertisers can choose between expanded, moderate, and limited inventory settings based on the suitability level that's right for their brand. We've rolled out the following improvements to this control:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Integration with Audience Estimator:</b> The Audience estimation tool within ads manager estimates audience size based on how many people meet an advertisers targeting criteria. This feature now takes Inventory Filter settings for Facebook Feed into account when populating the estimation.</li> <li>● <b>Language Expansion:</b> Inventory Filter now supports a total of 28 languages on Facebook Feed and Reels. We're further working to expand the number of languages supported by Inventory Filter this year.</li> </ul> | <p><b>Improvements to Inventory Filter for Instagram Feed and Reels:</b><br/> <u>Inventory Filter</u> for Instagram Feed and Reels gives advertisers the ability to adjust their preferences for adjacency to different content types. Within this control, advertisers can choose between expanded, moderate, and limited inventory settings based on the suitability level that's right for their brand. We've rolled out the following improvements to this control:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Integration with Audience Estimator:</b> The Audience estimation tool within ads manager estimates audience size based on how many people meet an advertisers targeting criteria. This feature now takes Inventory Filter settings for Instagram Feed into account when populating the estimation.</li> <li>● <b>Language Expansion:</b> Inventory Filter now supports a total of 28 languages on Instagram Feed and Reels. We're further working to expand the number of languages supported by Inventory Filter this year.</li> </ul> |

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Please note that this language expansion refers to Inventory Filter for Feed and Reels. The Inventory Filter for in-content ads, currently supports <u>37 languages</u> and this work will bring the language support closer to parity between the two controls.</li> </ul> <p><b>Additional Brand Safety &amp; Suitability Meta Business Partners have onboarded to the third-party brand suitability verification solution</b> for Facebook Feed and Reels. This includes, but is not limited to, DoubleVerify and Integral Ad Science.</p> <p><i>(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Please note that this language expansion refers to Inventory Filter for Feed and Reels. The Inventory Filter for in-content ads, currently supports <u>37 languages</u> and this work will bring the language support closer to parity between the two controls.</li> </ul> <p><b>Additional Brand Safety &amp; Suitability Meta Business Partners have onboarded to the third-party brand suitability verification solution</b> for Instagram Feed and Reels. This includes, but is not limited to, DoubleVerify and Integral Ad Science.</p> <p><i>(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)</i></p> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meta will continue investing in country and language expansion for inventory filters on both Facebook and Instagram.</li> <li>Additional Brand Safety &amp; Suitability Meta Business Partners will be onboarding to the third-party brand suitability verification solution for Facebook Feed and Reels.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meta will continue investing in country and language expansion for inventory filters on both Facebook and Instagram.</li> <li>Additional Brand Safety &amp; Suitability Meta Business Partners will be onboarding to the third-party brand suitability verification solution for Instagram Feed and Reels.</li> </ul>   |

|                  |  |  |
|------------------|--|--|
| Measure 1.1      | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 1.1.1</b> | We continue to require compliance from our users with the policies defined in our baseline report regarding monetisation of their content. No additional new policies to report on in this instance. | We continue to require compliance from our users with the policies defined in our baseline report regarding monetisation of their content. No additional new policies to report on in this instance. |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <b>SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)</b> | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i> | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i> |
|---|--|--|

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid<sup>1</sup> or impression<sup>2</sup>) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Taskforce of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <b>SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation</b> | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i> | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i> |
|---|--|--|

|                    |  |   |
|--------------------|--|---|
| <b>Measure 1.2</b> | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 1.2.1</b>   | We continue to discuss potential changes to our Community Standards, Advertising Policies or Product Policies in our <a href="#">Policy Forum meeting</a> . The meetings in the timeframe covered by the report didn't touch upon specific topics related to our advertising policies. | We continue to discuss potential changes to our Community Guidelines, Advertising Policies or Product Policies in our <a href="#">Policy forum meeting</a> . The meetings in the timeframe covered by the report didn't touch upon specific topics related to our advertising policies. |
| <b>SLI 1.2.1</b>   | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>   | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>  |

|                    |   |  |
|--------------------|---|--|
| <b>Measure 1.3</b> | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 1.3.1</b>   | We continue to offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own <a href="#">[see here for details]</a> . | We continue to offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own <a href="#">[see here for details]</a> . |

<sup>1</sup> Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

<sup>2</sup> Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

|             |   |   |
|-------------|---|---|
|             | These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a> .  | These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a> .  |
| Measure 1.4 | N/A   | N/A   |
| QRE 1.4.1   | Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.   | Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.   |
| Measure 1.5 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 1.5.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook received <a href="#">accreditation</a> from the Media Rating Council (MRC) for content-level Brand Safety on Facebook covering Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app. There are no further areas of accreditation for the moment.</p> <p>We are working on the next round of the audit and which placements will be in scope (e.g., FB Feed). Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM) has added misinformation as the 12th category into their floor/framework. Consequently, Meta's enforcement against Misinformation may now be in scope as part of the next audit round.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram is in scope for accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) in the next audit period.</p> <p>We are working on the next round of the audit and which Ad placements will be in scope. GARM has now added misinformation as the 12th category into their floor/framework. Consequently, Meta's enforcement against Misinformation may now be in scope as part of the next audit round.</p>  |
| QRE 1.5.2   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the areas covered by the MRC accreditation are Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile, web and mobile in-app.</p> <p>This is a recurring audit where we will expand the scope to areas meeting the most demand where we have generally available controls. For the next round, we are still determining the final scope but plan to include Facebook Feed placements into the scope as we have suitability controls available on those placements (e.g., <a href="#">Inventory Filter for FB Feed</a>). We do not have any updates on this process at this time.</p>   | Meta will expand the scope of the recurring MRC audit to Instagram in the future. At present Meta is still determining the scope of this audit. We do not have any updates on this process at this time.  |
| Measure 1.6 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 1.6.1   | <p>As mentioned in the baseline report, we continue to offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own <a href="#">[see here for details]</a>. Users can find details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a>.</p>   | <p>As mentioned in the baseline report, we continue to offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own <a href="#">[see here for details]</a>.</p> <p>Users can find details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a>.</p> |

|                  |   |  |
|------------------|---|--|
| <b>QRE 1.6.2</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, when advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.   | As mentioned in our baseline report, when advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.  |
| <b>QRE 1.6.3</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, we provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Facebook, and provide resources to use appropriately.<br><br>Following the launch of third-party brand safety and suitability verification with Zefr last year, we have expanded our offerings with DoubleVerify and Integral Ad Science. All three offer measurement of campaign brand safety and suitability for Facebook and Instagram Feeds and Reels. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Instagram, and provide resources to use appropriately.<br><br>Following the launch of third-party brand safety and suitability verification with Zefr last year, we have expanded our offerings with DoubleVerify and Integral Ad Science. All three offer measurement of campaign brand safety and suitability for Facebook and Instagram Feeds and Reels. |
| <b>QRE 1.6.4</b> | N/A   | N/A  |
| <b>SLI 1.6.1</b> | N/A   | N/A  |

## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

### Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

|  | <b>C.2</b>          | <b>M 2.1</b>        | <b>M 2.2</b>        | <b>M 2.3</b>        | <b>M 2.4</b>        |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram |

|   | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new | No                          | No                           |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| policies, etc)?<br>[Yes/No]   |  |  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, we enforce <u>Advertising Standards</u> on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our <u>Community Standards</u> .<br><br><i>(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)</i>   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we enforce <u>Advertising Standards</u> on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our <u>Community Guidelines</u> .<br><br><i>(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)</i>  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising Standards policies, tools, and processes. | As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising Standards policies, tools, and processes. |

|  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| Measure 2.1  | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 2.1.1</b>   | As noted in our baseline report, advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Service, our <u>Community Standards</u> and our <u>Advertising Standards</u> . As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards. See <u>more</u> here. | As noted in our baseline report, advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Use, our <u>Community Guidelines</u> and our <u>Advertising Standards</u> . As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards. See <u>more</u> here. |
| <b>SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above</b> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</li> <li>Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</li> </ol>          | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</li> <li>Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</li> </ol>       |

|                      | *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent <u>Oversight Board's advice</u> . We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online* |   | *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent <u>Oversight Board's advice</u> . We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online* |   |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|
|                      | Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |
| <b>Member States</b> |   |   |   |   |
| Austria              | Less than 500   | Over 58,000   | Less than 500   | Over 58,000   |
| Belgium              | Less than 500   | Over 93,000   | Less than 500   | Over 93,000   |
| Bulgaria             | Less than 500   | Over 69,000   | Less than 500   | Over 69,000   |
| Croatia              | Less than 500   | Over 24,000   | Less than 500   | Over 24,000   |
| Cyprus               | Less than 500   | Over 46,000   | Less than 500   | Over 46,000   |
| Czech Republic       | Less than 500   | Over 70,000   | Less than 500   | Over 70,000   |
| Denmark              | Less than 500   | Over 56,000   | Less than 500   | Over 56,000   |
| Estonia              | Less than 500   | Over 96,000   | Less than 500   | Over 96,000   |
| Finland              | Less than 500   | Over 33,000   | Less than 500   | Over 33,000   |
| France               | Over 1,300  | Over 380,000  | Over 1,300  | Over 380,000  |
| Germany              | Over 750  | Over 430,000  | Over 750  | Over 430,000  |
| Greece               | Less than 500   | Over 60,000   | Less than 500   | Over 60,000   |
| Hungary              | Less than 500   | Over 80,000   | Less than 500   | Over 80,000   |
| Ireland              | Less than 500   | Over 35,000   | Less than 500   | Over 35,000   |
| Italy                | Over 8,700  | Over 630,000  | Over 8,700  | Over 630,000  |
| Latvia               | Less than 500   | Over 84,000   | Less than 500   | Over 84,000   |
| Lithuania            | Less than 500   | Over 72,000   | Less than 500   | Over 72,000   |
| Luxembourg           | Less than 500   | Over 4,200  | Less than 500   | Over 4,200  |
| Malta                | Less than 500   | Over 22,000   | Less than 500   | Over 22,000   |
| Netherlands          | Over 660  | Over 190,000  | Over 660  | Over 190,000  |



|                 |               |                |               |                |
|-----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Poland          | Over 2,600    | Over 1,000,000 | Over 2,600    | Over 1,000,000 |
| Portugal        | Less than 500 | Over 130,000   | Less than 500 | Over 130,000   |
| Romania         | Over 930      | Over 160,000   | Over 930      | Over 160,000   |
| Slovakia        | Less than 500 | Over 36,000    | Less than 500 | Over 36,000    |
| Slovenia        | Less than 500 | Over 44,000    | Less than 500 | Over 44,000    |
| Spain           | Over 1,400    | Over 370,000   | Over 1,400    | Over 370,000   |
| Sweden          | Less than 500 | Over 69,000    | Less than 500 | Over 69,000    |
| <b>Total EU</b> | Over 170,000  | Over 4,400,000 | Over 170,000  | Over 4,400,000 |

|             |  |  |
|-------------|--|--|
| Measure 2.2 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 2.2.1   | <p>As noted in our baseline report, misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> for more information.</p> <p>In addition to this, Meta’s third party fact-checkers may review ads posted on Facebook, labelling them where a falsity assessment has concluded that they are false.</p>   | <p>As noted in our baseline report, misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> for more information.</p> <p>In addition to this, Meta’s third party fact-checkers may review ads posted on Instagram, labelling them where a falsity assessment has concluded that they are false.</p>  |
| Measure 2.3 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 2.3.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the <a href="#">ad review system</a> checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad’s associated landing page or other destinations, among other information.</p> <p>More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we use technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook. If we find ads that are identical or near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the <a href="#">ad review system</a> checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad’s associated landing page or other destinations, among other information.</p> <p>More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we can use technology to identify near-identical versions across Instagram. If we find ads that are near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.</p> |
| SLI 2.3.1   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</li> <li>Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</li> </ol> <p><i>*Meta’s policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta’s independent Oversight Board’s advice. We now only remove this content in countries</i></p>  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</li> <li>Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</li> </ol> <p><i>*Meta’s policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta’s independent Oversight Board’s advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active</i></p>   |

|                      | <i>with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*</i> |   | <i>COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*</i> |   |
|----------------------|--|---|---|---|
|                      | Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.  | Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |
| <b>Member States</b> |  |   |   |   |
| Austria              | Less than 500  | Over 58,000   | Less than 500   | Over 58,000   |
| Belgium              | Less than 500  | Over 93,000   | Less than 500   | Over 93,000   |
| Bulgaria             | Less than 500  | Over 69,000   | Less than 500   | Over 69,000   |
| Croatia              | Less than 500  | Over 24,000   | Less than 500   | Over 24,000   |
| Cyprus               | Less than 500  | Over 46,000   | Less than 500   | Over 46,000   |
| Czech Republic       | Less than 500  | Over 70,000   | Less than 500   | Over 70,000   |
| Denmark              | Less than 500  | Over 56,000   | Less than 500   | Over 56,000   |
| Estonia              | Less than 500  | Over 96,000   | Less than 500   | Over 96,000   |
| Finland              | Less than 500  | Over 33,000   | Less than 500   | Over 33,000   |
| France               | Over 1,300   | Over 380,000  | Over 1,300  | Over 380,000  |
| Germany              | Over 750   | Over 430,000  | Over 750  | Over 430,000  |
| Greece               | Less than 500  | Over 60,000   | Less than 500   | Over 60,000   |
| Hungary              | Less than 500  | Over 80,000   | Less than 500   | Over 80,000   |
| Ireland              | Less than 500  | Over 35,000   | Less than 500   | Over 35,000   |
| Italy                | Over 8,700   | Over 630,000  | Over 8,700  | Over 630,000  |
| Latvia               | Less than 500  | Over 84,000   | Less than 500   | Over 84,000   |
| Lithuania            | Less than 500  | Over 72,000   | Less than 500   | Over 72,000   |
| Luxembourg           | Less than 500  | Over 4,200  | Less than 500   | Over 4,200  |
| Malta                | Less than 500  | Over 22,000   | Less than 500   | Over 22,000   |
| Netherlands          | Over 660   | Over 190,000  | Over 660  | Over 190,000  |
| Poland               | Over 2,600   | Over 1,000,000  | Over 2,600  | Over 1,000,000  |

|                 |                     |                       |                     |                       |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Portugal        | Less than 500       | Over 130,000          | Less than 500       | Over 130,000          |
| Romania         | Over 930            | Over 160,000          | Over 930            | Over 160,000          |
| Slovakia        | Less than 500       | Over 36,000           | Less than 500       | Over 36,000           |
| Slovenia        | Less than 500       | Over 44,000           | Less than 500       | Over 44,000           |
| Spain           | Over 1,400          | Over 370,000          | Over 1,400          | Over 370,000          |
| Sweden          | Less than 500       | Over 69,000           | Less than 500       | Over 69,000           |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 170,000</b> | <b>Over 4,400,000</b> | <b>Over 170,000</b> | <b>Over 4,400,000</b> |

|             |   |   |
|-------------|---|---|
| Measure 2.4 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 2.4.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, <u>our ad review system</u> relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running. More information can be found in our <u>Business Help Centre</u>.</p> <p>Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time.</p> <p>In case of violations, advertisers will be notified directly if the Page or profile is facing restricted or disabled access to monetisation tools. Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, <u>our ad review system</u> relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running. More information can be found in our <u>Business Help Centre</u>.</p> <p>Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time.</p> <p>In case of violations advertisers will be notified directly if the account is restricted or disabled access to monetisation tools. Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review.</p> |
| SLI 2.4.1   | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>  | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>  |

## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

### Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

|  |                     |                     |                     |                     |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|  | <b>C.3</b>          | <b>M 3.1</b>        | <b>M 3.2</b>        | <b>M 3.3</b>        |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram |

|                      |                       |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Service A - Facebook | Service B - Instagram |
|----------------------|-----------------------|

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | Yes  | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Third-party <u>brand safety and suitability verification</u> became available through our Meta Business Partners DoubleVerify, during the reporting period, and for Integral Ad Science, in February 2024.</li> <li>• <u>Expanded Inventory Filter to additional languages</u>, including Turkish, Japanese, Thai, Malay, Vietnamese, Italian, Polish, Swedish, and 13 languages spoken in the south Asian subcontinent</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Third-party <u>brand safety and suitability verification</u> became available through our Meta Business Partners DoubleVerify, during the reporting period, and for Integral Ad Science, in February 2024.</li> <li>• <u>Expanded Inventory Filter to additional languages</u>, including Turkish, Japanese, Thai, Malay, Vietnamese, Italian, Polish, Swedish, and 13 languages spoken in the south Asian subcontinent</li> </ul>                                       |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | <p>As noted in our baseline report, we continue our close engagement with the Taskforce, GARM, and the Interactive Advertising Bureau ("IAB").</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms, and adjusting our Advertising standards policies, tools, and processes.</p> | <p>As noted in our baseline report, we continue our close engagement with the Taskforce, GARM, and the Interactive Advertising Bureau ("IAB").</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards policies, tools, and processes.</p> |

|                  |   |   |
|------------------|---|---|
| Measure 3.1      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 3.1.1</b> | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above. | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above. |

|             |   |   |
|-------------|---|---|
|             | We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.  | We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.  |
| Measure 3.2 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 3.2.1   | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to engage closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.   | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to engage closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe. |
| Measure 3.3 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 3.3.1   | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.<br><br>As mentioned above, we are also cooperating with Zefr for independent reporting on the context in which ads appear on Facebook Feed. | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.                           |

# III. Political Advertising

## Commitments 4 - 13

| III. Political Advertising   |                     |                     |                     |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Commitment 4   |                     |                     |                     |
| Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of “political and issue advertising”. |                     |                     |                     |
|  | C.4                 | M 4.1               | M 4.2               |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:                                     | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram | Facebook, Instagram |

|   | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram  |
|---|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No   | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”).   | As noted in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”).   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta’s products and or/policies. | As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta’s products and/or policies. |

|             |          |           |
|-------------|----------|-----------|
| Measure 4.1 | Facebook | Instagram |
|-------------|----------|-----------|

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Measure 4.2                                 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), which covers advertising that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns.</li> <li>• Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run (we define social issues as sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result in/relate to existing or proposed legislation. In the EU, those social issues include civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy).</li> <li>• Is regulated by law as political advertising.</li> </ul> <p>Further details of our policies can be found online:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> for ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> <li>• <a href="#">How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">About social issues</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Examples</a> of ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> </ul> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), which covers advertising that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns.</li> <li>• Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run (we define social issues as sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result in/relate to existing or proposed legislation. In the EU, those social issues include civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy).</li> <li>• Is regulated by law as political advertising.</li> </ul> <p>Further details of our policies can be found online:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> for ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> <li>• <a href="#">How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">About social issues</a></li> </ul> |
| <b>QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)</b> | <i>The Taskforce working group on the definition of political ads has not yet begun. We will engage with this working group in due course.</i>   | <i>The Taskforce working group on the definition of political ads has not yet begun. We will engage with this working group in due course.</i>   |

| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>  |                       |                       |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Commitment 5</b>  |                       |                       |
| Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services. |                       |                       |
|  | <b>C.5</b>            | <b>M 5.1</b>          |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:   | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |



|  | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram  |
|--|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook’s policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer.</p> <p>In addition to this, we’ve established measures where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies.</p> <p>In January 2024 Meta launched an AI Disclosure policy to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI.</p> <p>Advertisers must disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.</li> </ul> <p>Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the <a href="#">Ad Library</a>. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram’s policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer.</p> <p>In addition to this, we’ve established measures where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies.</p> <p>In January 2024 Meta launched an AI Disclosure policy to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI.</p> <p>Advertisers must disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.</li> </ul> <p>Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the <a href="#">Ad Library</a>. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser.</p> |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta's products and or/policies. | As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta's products and or/policies. |

| Measure 5.1      | Facebook   | Instagram  |
|------------------|--|--|
| <b>QRE 5.1.1</b> | <p>As mentioned and explained in our baseline report, any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the <u>authorization process required by Meta</u>.</p> <p>This applies to any ad that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns</li> <li>• Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run</li> <li>• Is regulated as political advertising</li> </ul> <p>Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving; disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits and reporting requirements.</p> <p>If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be</p> | <p>As mentioned and explained in our baseline report, any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the <u>authorization process required by Meta</u>.</p> <p>This applies to any ad that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns</li> <li>• Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run</li> <li>• Is regulated as political advertising</li> </ul> <p>Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving; disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits and reporting requirements.</p> <p>If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be</p> |

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
|  | <p>disapproved and added to the Ad Library. From April 2024 the Ad Library in the EU now contains more information about the Advertising or Community Standard that an ad violated (if applicable). We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics.</p> <p>Advertisers also have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered (more detail about this policy is outlined at the start of this commitment).</p> <p>We publicly share resources on our advertising standards covering the topics described above, such as <a href="#">ads about social issues, elections or politics</a> in our Transparency Centre.</p> | <p>disapproved and added to the Ad Library. From April 2024 the Ad Library in the EU now contains more information about the Advertising Standards or Community Guidelines that an ad violated (if applicable). We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics.</p> <p>Advertisers also have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered (more detail about this policy is outlined at the start of this commitment).</p> <p>We publicly share resources on our advertising standards covering the topics described above, such as <a href="#">ads about social issues, elections or politics</a> in our Transparency Centre.</p> |
|--|---|---|

### III. Political Advertising

#### Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising

|  | C.6                   | M 6.1                 | M 6.2                 | M 6.3                 | M 6.4                 | M 6.5     |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Messenger |

|  | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram   | Service C - Messenger |
|--|---|---|-----------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No  | No  | No                    |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | As noted in previous commitments, Meta launched an AI disclosure policy in January 2024 to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook | As noted in previous commitments, Meta launched an AI disclosure policy in January 2024 to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Instagram has been digitally |                       |

|   |  |   |  |
|---|--|---|--|
|   | <p>has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI.</p> <p>Advertisers will have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.</li> </ul> | <p>created or altered, including through the use of AI.</p> <p>Advertisers will have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.</li> </ul> |  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No  | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes.   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes.  | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. |
| Measure 6.1   | Facebook   | Instagram   |  |

|   |  |  |     |
|---|--|--|-----|
| <b>QRE 6.1.1</b>  | <p>As noted in our baseline report, <u>Meta uses disclaimers</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics.</p> <p><u>Not all placement nor formats</u> can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such placements or formats.</p> <p>While some placements are not available at this time, we are working to increase availability.</p> | <p>As noted in our baseline report, <u>Meta uses disclaimers</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics.</p> <p><u>Not all placement nor formats</u> can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such placements or formats.</p> <p>While some placements are not available at this time, we are working to increase availability.</p> | N/A |
| Measure 6.2   | Facebook   | Instagram  | N/A |
| <b>QRE 6.2.1</b>  | As noted in our baseline report, <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.  | As noted in our baseline report, <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.  | N/A |
| <b>QRE 6.2.2</b>  | As noted in our baseline report, examples of political ad labelling <u>may be found in the Ad Library</u> .  | As noted in our baseline report, examples of political ad labelling <u>may be found in the Ad Library</u> .  | N/A |
| <b>SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above</b> | Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 in EU member states.  | Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 in EU member states.   | N/A |
|   | Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.   | Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.   |     |
|   | Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined   | Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined   | N/A |
| <b>Member States</b>  |  |  |     |
| Austria   | Over 32,000  | Over 32,000  |     |
| Belgium   | Over 85,000  | Over 85,000  |     |
| Bulgaria  | Over 8,300   | Over 8,300   |     |
| Croatia   | Over 20,000  | Over 20,000  |     |
| Cyprus  | Over 10,000  | Over 10,000  |     |
| Czech Republic  | Over 23,000  | Over 23,000  |     |
| Denmark   | Over 26,000  | Over 26,000  |     |

|                 |                       |                       |            |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| Estonia         | Over 3,700            | Over 3,700            |            |
| Finland         | Over 19,000           | Over 19,000           |            |
| France          | Over 32,000           | Over 32,000           |            |
| Germany         | Over 84,000           | Over 84,000           |            |
| Greece          | Over 29,000           | Over 29,000           |            |
| Hungary         | Over 96,000           | Over 96,000           |            |
| Ireland         | Over 16,000           | Over 16,000           |            |
| Italy           | Over 140,000          | Over 140,000          |            |
| Latvia          | Over 15,000           | Over 15,000           |            |
| Lithuania       | Over 7,200            | Over 7,200            |            |
| Luxembourg      | Over 1,700            | Over 1,700            |            |
| Malta           | Over 3,300            | Over 3,300            |            |
| Netherlands     | Over 56,000           | Over 56,000           |            |
| Poland          | Over 97,000           | Over 97,000           |            |
| Portugal        | Over 10,000           | Over 10,000           |            |
| Romania         | Over 110,000          | Over 110,000          |            |
| Slovakia        | Over 24,000           | Over 24,000           |            |
| Slovenia        | Over 2,900            | Over 2,900            |            |
| Spain           | Over 34,000           | Over 34,000           |            |
| Sweden          | Over 52,000           | Over 52,000           |            |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 1,000,000</b> | <b>Over 1,000,000</b> | <b>N/A</b> |

|                  |  |   |     |
|------------------|--|---|-----|
| Measure 6.3      | Facebook   | Instagram   |     |
| <b>QRE 6.3.1</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Facebook so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Instagram so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time. | N/A |

|                  |  |  |  |
|------------------|--|--|--|
|                  |  |  |  |
| Measure 6.4      | Facebook   | Instagram  |  |
| <b>QRE 6.4.1</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad. | N/A  |
| Measure 6.5      | N/A  | N/A  | Messenger  |
| <b>QRE 6.5.1</b> | N/A  | N/A  | As noted in our baseline report, when an ad, labelled as SIEP on the Facebook app, is shared via Messenger, the link redirects the user to the ad where the label is visible.<br><br>Our teams will continue to consider potential solutions to meaningfully enhance the visibility of the SIEP label further in the Messenger conversation. |

### III. Political Advertising

#### Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

|  | <b>C.7</b>            | <b>M 7.1</b>          | <b>M 7.2</b>          | <b>M 7.3</b>          | <b>M 7.4</b>          |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation | Yes                         | Yes                          |

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  |   |  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a <u>policy</u> that applies to all “ads about social issues, elections or politics” Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties, elections or social issues will be required to confirm their identity.</p> <p>Ahead of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualified <u>to run ads about social issues, elections and politics</u> across EU Member States unless otherwise prohibited.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a <u>policy</u> that applies to all “ads about social issues, elections or politics”. Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties, elections or social issues will be required to confirm their identity.</p> <p>Ahead of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualified <u>to run ads about social issues, elections and politics</u> across EU Member States unless otherwise prohibited.</p> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes.  | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes.   |

|                  |   |   |
|------------------|---|---|
| Measure 7.1      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 7.1.1</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report: Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the <u>authorisation process</u> and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads, about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management. | As mentioned in our baseline report: Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the <u>authorisation process</u> and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads, about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management. |



|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
|   | <p>Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turning on two-factor authentication</li> <li>• Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Valid photo ID</li> <li>- Two official documents</li> <li>- A notarized form that you download from facebook.com/id</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>To help guard against foreign interference, advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting.</p> <p>European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualify to run ads about social issues, elections, and politics in Member States unless otherwise prohibited.</p> <p>Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions.</p> <p>To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.</p> | <p>Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turning on two-factor authentication</li> <li>• Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Valid photo ID</li> <li>- Two official documents</li> <li>- A notarized form that you download from facebook.com/id</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>To help guard against foreign interference, advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting.</p> <p>European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualify to run ads about social issues, elections, and politics in Member States unless otherwise prohibited.</p> <p>Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions.</p> <p>To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.</p> |
| <b>SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)</b> | Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 in EU member states.  | Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 in EU member states.  |
|   | Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 in EU member states.  | Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 in EU member states.  |
| <b>Member States</b>  |   |   |
| Austria   | Over 8,400  | Over 8,400  |
| Belgium   | Over 16,000   | Over 16,000   |
| Bulgaria  | Over 4,300  | Over 4,300  |
| Croatia   | Over 4,500  | Over 4,500  |
| Cyprus  | Over 5,900  | Over 5,900  |
| Czech Republic  | Over 7,500  | Over 7,500  |
| Denmark   | Over 8,300  | Over 8,300  |

|                 |                     |                     |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Estonia         | Over 2,200          | Over 2,200          |
| Finland         | Over 6,100          | Over 6,100          |
| France          | Over 32,000         | Over 32,000         |
| Germany         | Over 43,000         | Over 43,000         |
| Greece          | Over 9,100          | Over 9,100          |
| Hungary         | Over 15,000         | Over 15,000         |
| Ireland         | Over 6,400          | Over 6,400          |
| Italy           | Over 82,000         | Over 82,000         |
| Latvia          | Over 7,900          | Over 7,900          |
| Lithuania       | Over 3,500          | Over 3,500          |
| Luxembourg      | Over 780            | Over 780            |
| Malta           | Over 2,800          | Over 2,800          |
| Netherlands     | Over 12,000         | Over 12,000         |
| Poland          | Over 56,000         | Over 56,000         |
| Portugal        | Over 9,200          | Over 9,200          |
| Romania         | Over 25,000         | Over 25,000         |
| Slovakia        | Over 6,300          | Over 6,300          |
| Slovenia        | Over 1,500          | Over 1,500          |
| Spain           | Over 24,000         | Over 24,000         |
| Sweden          | Over 9,300          | Over 9,300          |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 410,000</b> | <b>Over 410,000</b> |

| Measure 7.2      | Facebook  | Instagram  |
|------------------|---|--|
| <b>QRE 7.2.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>.</li> <li>As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule,</li> </ul> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>.</li> <li>As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not</li> </ul> |

|             |   |  |
|-------------|---|--|
|             | <p>advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</li> </ul>  | <p>evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</li> </ul>  |
| QRE 7.2.2   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <a href="#">Business Help Centre</a>.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page <a href="#">using a valid disclaimer</a> to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections, social issues or politics can be up to 72 hours.</p>   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <a href="#">Business Help Centre</a>.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account <a href="#">using a valid disclaimer</a> to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections, social issues or politics can be up to 72 hours.</p>  |
| Measure 7.3 | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| QRE 7.3.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We require advertisers to acknowledge how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples before they can post SIEP ads. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.</li> <li>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our Advertising Policies.</li> <li>In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</li> </ul> <p>Facebook's <a href="#">Community Standards</a> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We require advertisers to acknowledge how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples before they can post SIEP ads. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.</li> <li>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Instagram against our Advertising Policies.</li> <li>In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</li> </ul> <p>Instagram's <a href="#">Community Guidelines</a> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.</p> |
| QRE 7.3.2   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process</p>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business</p>   |

|             |   |  |
|-------------|---|--|
|             | <p>and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p> <p>From 2024 Meta launched a new AI Disclosure policy which helps people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook has been digitally created or altered (including through the use of AI) - as a result, advertisers may also incur penalties for advertisements that demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements.</p> | <p>account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p> <p>From 2024 Meta launched a new AI Disclosure policy which helps people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Instagram has been digitally created or altered (including through the use of AI) - as a result, advertisers may also incur penalties for advertisements that demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements.</p> |
| Measure 7.4 | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| QRE 7.4.1   | Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.  | Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.   |

### III. Political Advertising

#### Commitment 8

Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

|  | C.8                   | M 8.1                 | M 8.2                 |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook | Service B - Instagram |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No                   | No                    |

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Facebook with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool. | As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Instagram with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No  | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we will engage with the Taskforce work streams as outlined in Measure 8.2.                             | As mentioned in our baseline report, we will engage with the Taskforce work streams as outlined in Measure 8.2.                              |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Measure 8.1                                   | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| Measure 8.2                                   | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 8.1.1 (for measures 8.1 &amp; 8.2)</b> | <i>The relevant Taskforce workstream on common transparency obligations has not yet begun. Our current transparency measures are outlined under Commitments 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.</i> | <i>The relevant Taskforce workstream on common transparency obligations has not yet begun. Our current transparency measures are outlined under Commitments 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.</i> |

| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |                       |                       |                       |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Commitment 9</b>   |                       |                       |                       |
| Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad. |                       |                       |                       |
|   | <b>C.9</b>            | <b>M 9.1</b>          | <b>M 9.2</b>          |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:  | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | Service A – Facebook   | Service B – Instagram  |
|---|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No   | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Facebook with tools such as the ‘Why am I seeing this Ad’ tool.  | As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Instagram with tools such as the ‘Why am I seeing this Ad’ tool.   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes. |

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| Measure 9.1                                   | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| Measure 9.2                                   | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 9.1.1 (for measures 9.1 &amp; 9.2)</b> | <p>Meta’s <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.</p> <p>In our baseline report, we also discussed how:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation.</li> </ul> | <p>Meta’s <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.</p> <p>In our baseline report, we also discussed how:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation.</li> </ul> |

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them. We also allow Facebook users to see <a href="#">how we decide which ads to show</a> and how users can adjust their preferences to determine the ads users are shown.</li> <li>Our FAQs section in the <a href="#">Ad Library</a> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them. We also allow Instagram users <a href="#">control to see fewer ads about social issues, elections or politics</a>.</li> <li>Our FAQs section in the <a href="#">Ad Library</a> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.</li> </ul> |
|--|---|---|

### III. Political Advertising

#### Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

|  | C.10                  | M 10.1                | M 10.2                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram   |
|--|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <p>From April 2024 the Ad Library in the EU now contains more information about the Advertising or Community Standard that an ad violated (if applicable). We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics.</p> <p>For disapproved ads that received delivery in the EU, images will be blurred and there will be messaging saying that the ad was</p> | <p>From April 2024 the Ad Library in the EU now contains more information about the Advertising Standards or Community Guidelines that an ad violated (if applicable). We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics.</p> <p>For disapproved ads that received delivery in the EU, images will be blurred and there will be messaging saying that the ad was removed. The user can click to see more ad details and see more detailed</p> |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
|   | <p>removed. The user can click to see more ad details and see more detailed reasoning on why the ad was disapproved, including the specific Advertising or Community Standard it violated.</p> <p>This change is applicable only to ads that were added to the Ad Library on or after August 17, 2023.</p>   | <p>reasoning on why the ad was disapproved, including the specific Advertising Standard or Community Guideline it violated.</p> <p>This change is applicable only to ads that were added to the Ad Library on or after August 17, 2023.</p>  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes. |

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| Measure 10.1                                     | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| Measure 10.2                                     | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 &amp; 10.2)</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, the <u>Ad Library</u> provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years. | As mentioned in our baseline report, the <u>Ad Library</u> provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years. |

|                                   |
|-----------------------------------|
| <b>III. Political Advertising</b> |
| <b>Commitment 11</b>              |



Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.”

|  | C.11                  | M 11.1                | M 11.2                | M 11.3                | M 11.4                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram  |
|---|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No   | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, our Ad Library application programming interface (“API”) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our <a href="#">Ad Library report</a> . | As mentioned in our baseline report, our Ad Library application programming interface (“API”) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our <a href="#">Ad Library report</a> . |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising repositories.   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising repositories.   |

|              |          |           |
|--------------|----------|-----------|
| Measure 11.1 | Facebook | Instagram |
|--------------|----------|-----------|

|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| Measure 11.2                               | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| Measure 11.3                               | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| Measure 11.4                               | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library <a href="#">API</a> provides access to data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries.</p> <p>The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. <a href="#">Users can search data</a> for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term, name or Page in the Ad Library. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete <a href="#">these steps</a> to access the API.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library <a href="#">API</a> provides access to data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries.</p> <p>The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. <a href="#">Users can search data</a> for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term or name in the Ad Library. For Instagram accounts that don't have a linked Facebook Page, people will be able to search for an advertiser's ad using their Instagram handle name.</p> |
| <b>QRE 11.4.1</b>                          | As of June 2024 we've made targeting information for 29.56 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads globally available to academic researchers. More details on the original launch of this initiative are available in the baseline report.   | As of June 2024 we've made targeting information for 29.56 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads globally available to academic researchers. More details on the original launch of this initiative are available in the baseline report.  |

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| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |
| <b>Commitment 12</b>  |
| Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices. |
| <b>This commitment applies to civil society organisations.</b>  |

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| <b>III. Political Advertising</b> |
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## Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

|  | <b>C.13</b>           | <b>M 13.1</b>         | <b>M 13.2</b>         | <b>M 13.3</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | <b>Service A - Facebook</b>   | <b>Service B - Instagram</b>  |
|---|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No  | No  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No  | No  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic. |

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| Measure 13.1                               | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| Measure 13.2                               | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| Measure 13.3                               | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)</b> | We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic. | We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic. |

## IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

## IV. Integrity of Services

### Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

|  | <b>C.14</b>           | <b>M 14.1</b>         | <b>M 14.2</b>         | <b>M 14.3</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new | Yes                         | No                           |

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| implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   |  |  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Fake accounts:</b> Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 631 million accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q1 2024 and 1.2 billion fake accounts in Q2 2024 on Facebook globally.</li> <li>- <b>Inauthentic behaviour:</b> We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.</li> </ul> <p>We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Inauthentic behaviour:</b> We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts on Instagram that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally to help us automatically detect bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.</li> </ul> <p>We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation  | As <u>announced</u> in April 2024, we are making changes to the way we handle manipulated media based on feedback from the Oversight Board   | As <u>announced</u> in April 2024, we are making changes to the way we handle manipulated media based on feedback from the Oversight Board that we   |

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| <p>measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p> | <p>that we should update our approach to reflect a broader range of content that exists today and provide context about the content through labels. These changes are also informed by Meta’s policy review process that included extensive public opinion surveys and consultations with academics, civil society organisations and others.</p> <p>Instead of removing misleading manipulated videos that do not otherwise violate our Community Standards, we will begin adding “AI info” labels to a wider range of video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they’re uploading AI-generated content.</p> <p>If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. This overall approach gives people more information about the content so they can better assess it and so they will have context if they see the same content elsewhere.</p> <p>We started labelling organic AI-generated content in May 2024 and stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy in July 2024. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.</p> | <p>should update our approach to reflect a broader range of content that exists today and provide context about the content through labels. These changes are also informed by Meta’s policy review process that included extensive public opinion surveys and consultations with academics, civil society organisations and others.</p> <p>Instead of removing misleading manipulated videos that do not otherwise violate our Community Guidelines, we will begin adding “AI info” labels to a wider range of video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they’re uploading AI-generated content.</p> <p>If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. This overall approach gives people more information about the content so they can better assess it and so they will have context if they see the same content elsewhere.</p> <p>We started labelling organic AI-generated content in May 2024 and stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy in July 2024. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Guidelines, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.</p> |
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| <p>Measure 14.1</p>      | <p>Facebook</p>  | <p>Instagram</p>  |
| <p><b>QRE 14.1.1</b></p> | <p>To clarify what we’ve included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:</p> <p><b>Inauthentic Behaviour</b> - Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts.</p> <p><b>CIB Policies</b> - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as “the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behaviour (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation”, the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> | <p>To clarify what we’ve included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:</p> <p><b>Inauthentic Behaviour</b> - Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram.</p> <p><b>CIB Policies</b> - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as “the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behaviour (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation”, the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> |

|  |   |  |
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|  | <p>CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification and (6) account hijacking or impersonation and (7) inauthentic coordination.</p> <p>We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on <u>Account Integrity and Authentic Identity</u>. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can to minimise opportunities for IO threat actors to operate on our platforms.</p> <p><b>Cybersecurity</b> – Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p><b>Manipulated Media (sometimes also known as deep fakes)</b> – We remove videos <u>under this policy</u> if specific criteria are met: (1) the video has been edited or synthesised, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say; and (2) the video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g. a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, replaces and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears authentic. This is pertinent for the TTP on deceptive manipulated media. As outlined at the beginning of this commitment, our approach to manipulated media changed (after the reporting period) based on feedback from a range of stakeholders including our independent Oversight Board. The Manipulated Media policy was deprecated accordingly from July 2024.</p> <p><b>Spam</b> – We work hard to <u>limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or</p> | <p>CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification and (6) account hijacking or impersonation and (7) inauthentic coordination.</p> <p><b>Cybersecurity</b> – Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p><b>Manipulated Media (sometimes also known as deep fakes)</b> – We remove videos <u>under this policy</u> if specific criteria are met: (1) the video has been edited or synthesised, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say; and (2) the video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g. a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, replaces and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears authentic. This is pertinent for the TTP on deceptive manipulated media. As outlined at the beginning of this commitment, our approach to manipulated media changed (after the reporting period) based on feedback from a range of stakeholders including our independent Oversight Board. The Manipulated Media policy was deprecated accordingly from July 2024.</p> <p><b>Spam</b> – We work hard to <u>limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices.</p> <p><b>Branded Content Policies</b> – <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram</p> |
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|                   | <p>subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic Pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices.</p> <p><b>Branded Content Policies</b> - <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages.</p> <p><b>Privacy</b> - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>  | <p>accounts with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages.</p> <p><b>Privacy</b> - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>  |
| <b>QRE 14.1.2</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.</p> <p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale.</p> <p>Besides, Pages and Groups directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours exhibited, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Guidelines, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.</p> <p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale.</p> <p>Besides, accounts directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |
| Measure 14.2      | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 14.2.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <p>Our fake accounts policies:</p>   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the policy most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <p>Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies:</p>   |

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|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Q1 2024, we took action against 631 million fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 2024.</li> <li>In Q2 2024, we took action against 1.2 billion fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 3% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q2 2024.</li> </ul> <p>Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Q1 2024, we took down 104 Facebook accounts, 39 Pages, while removing a network which originated in Croatia. We also removed 1,326 Facebook accounts, 80 Pages, 1 Group while removing a network with an unknown origin (more detail provided in Commitment 16).</li> <li>In Q2 2024, we took down 20 Facebook accounts, 14 Pages, while removing a network which originated in Russia. We also removed 43 Facebook accounts, 85 Pages while removing (another) network originating in Russia. We removed 12 Facebook accounts, 32 Pages, 5 groups while removing a (third) network originating in Russia. Finally, we took down 112 Facebook accounts, 65 Pages accounts while removing a network which originated in Vietnam.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Q1 2024, we took down seven Instagram accounts while removing a network which originated in Croatia. We also removed 1 Instagram account while removing a network with an unknown origin (more detail provided in Commitment 16).</li> <li>In Q2 2024, we took down nine Instagram accounts while removing a network which originated in Russia. We also removed 3 Instagram accounts while removing (another) network originating in Russia. Finally, we took down forty-nine Instagram accounts while removing a network which originated in Vietnam.</li> </ul> |
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| <b>FACEBOOK</b>   |   |
| <b>SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4</b>  |   |
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 1:<br/>COORDINATED<br/>INAUTHENTIC<br/>BEHAVIOUR</b> | <p><b>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:</b> This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour</u>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)</li> <li>Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> <li>Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification</li> <li>Account hijacking or impersonation</li> </ul> |

| <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b> coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal, in which fake accounts are central to the operation. In each case, people coordinate with one another and use fake accounts to mislead others about who they are and what they are doing. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content – no matter who’s behind them, what they post or whether they’re foreign or domestic. <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</u></p> |  |  |                                       |   |                                      |   |                              |   |  |   |   |  |
|---|--|--|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|--|---|---|--|
| SLI 14.2.1  |  | SLI 14.2.2   |                                       |   |                                      | SLI 14.2.3                              |                              |   | SLI 14.2.4   |   |   |  |
| Number of instances of identified TTPs  | Number of actions taken by type                            | Views/ impressions before action                           | Interaction/ engagement before action | Views/ impressions after action   | Interaction/ engagement after action | Penetration and impact on genuine users | Trends on targeted audiences | Trends on narratives used   | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service | Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) | Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service) |  |
| Croatia   | Removal of 104 Facebook accounts, 39 Pages                 | Removal of 104 Facebook accounts, 39 Pages                 |                                       | About 100 accounts followed one or more of these Pages  | 0 (deleted)                          | 0 (deleted)                             |                              | Targeted Croatian audiences about issues related to the national elections, economy, successes of the HDZ-led government, as well as critical commentary about opposition figures, the President of Croatia and his Social Democratic Party.  |  |   |   |  |
| Unknown Origin  | Removal of 1,326 Facebook accounts, 80 Pages and one Group | Removal of 1,326 Facebook accounts, 80 Pages and one Group |                                       | About 20,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, under 200 accounts joined this Group | 0 (deleted)                          | 0 (deleted)                             |                              | Targeted audiences in Moldova and Madagascar. This network posted primarily in Romanian, Russian and Malagasy, and also in French about news and current events in Moldova and Madagascar. In Moldova, they posted about the Gagauzia region, public figures including Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan politician, and Marina Tauber, a member of the Șor Party. |  |   |   |  |
| Russia  | Removal of 20 Facebook accounts, 14 Pages                  | Removal of 20 Facebook accounts, 14 Pages                  |                                       | About 300 accounts followed one or more of these Pages  | 0 (deleted)                          | 0 (deleted)                             |                              | This network appeared to be focused on two main topics. For French-speaking audiences in Francophone Africa, this operation promoted Russian integration in   |  |   |   |  |

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|               |   |   |  |  |             |             |  | the region and criticised France's presence there, including through cartoon-style images. For English-speaking audiences, this campaign posted primarily about diminishing support for Ukraine in the West, including AI-generated newsreaders on YouTube focused on criticising US President Biden and Democrats for providing aid to Ukraine instead of investing in their own country.  |  |  |  |  |
| <b>Russia</b> | Removal of 43 Facebook accounts, 85 Pages           | Removal of 43 Facebook accounts, 85 Pages           |  | About 32,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages  | 0 (deleted) | 0 (deleted) |  | This operation used Pages and accounts to appeal to people in Ukraine and its diaspora abroad. The people behind it posted about news and current events, including criticism of the current government for failing to defend the country, low military mobilisation rates and calls to hold the Presidential election in 2024, claiming that President Zelensky's decision to postpone it violates Article 103 of the Constitution. Finally, the operation repeatedly used its Pages to amplify TikTok videos about politics by an individual publicly reported to have been recruited by the GRU (Russia's military intelligence service) to participate in the 2023 Star of David graffiti stunt in Paris. The amplification of this graffiti on X (former Twitter) was linked to Doppelganger by the French government. |  |  |  |  |
| <b>Russia</b> | Removal of 12 Facebook accounts, 32 Pages, 5 groups | Removal of 12 Facebook accounts, 32 Pages, 5 groups |  | About 23,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, around 18,500 accounts joined one or more of these Groups | 0 (deleted) | 0 (deleted) |  | The primary effort targeted at Ukraine included creating a Page for what appears to be a fictitious entity: Center for Information Defense. This cluster shared long-form text posts in Ukrainian about domestic politics, conscription, claims of disinformation, and criticism of the government and President Zelensky. A small effort targeted at Poland included posting in Polish about Ukrainian migrants,   |  |  |  |  |

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|---------|--|--|--|---|-------------|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|         |  |  |  |   |             |             |  | including suggesting that Polish schools should teach students Ukrainian language, history and literature to help Ukrainian refugees feel more comfortable in Poland. The efforts targeted at the EU and US included posting in English primarily about Western aid provided to Ukraine, war casualties among Ukrainian soldiers, claims that Ukraine's government has failed to protect its people, and criticism of the West for providing lethal weapons to Ukraine and for allowing war crimes in Gaza.        |  |  |  |  |
| Vietnam | Removal of 112 Facebook accounts, 65 Pages | Removal of 112 Facebook accounts, 65 Pages |  | About 38,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages | 0 (deleted) | 0 (deleted) |  | This operation ran four regional campaigns. The French-language effort targeted France. It posted about the alleged alliance between Qatar and Iran, the importance of retaining traditional French values and secularism, and criticised Shia Islam and Qatari investments in Europe. The French- and Arabic-language efforts targeted Lebanon. It posted in support of Palestine, criticised Iran's involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, and called for Lebanon to avoid a repeat of the 2006 war in the region. |  |  |  |  |

|                 |   |            |            |            |
|-----------------|---|------------|------------|------------|
| TTP OR ACTION 2 | <b>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:</b> This action covers the following TTPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> </ul> |            |            |            |
|                 | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b> Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information <a href="#">here</a> .  |            |            |            |
|                 | SLI 14.2.1  | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 |

|                       | Number of instances of identified TTPs | Number of actions taken by type | Views/ impressions before action | Interaction/ engagement before action | Views/ impressions after action | Interaction/ engagement after action | Penetration and impact on genuine users | Trends on targeted audiences | Trends on narratives used | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service | Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) | Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service) |
|-----------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---------------------------|--|---|---|
| <b>GLOBAL Q1 2024</b> | 631 mn accounts                        | Removal of 631 mn accounts      |                                  |                                       | 0(deleted)                      | 0 (deleted)                          |   |                              |                           |  |   |   |
| <b>GLOBAL Q2 2024</b> | 1.2 bn accounts                        | Removal of 1.2 bn accounts      |                                  |                                       | 0 (deleted)                     | 0 (deleted)                          |   |                              |                           |  |   |   |

| <b>INSTAGRAM</b>               |  |                   |                   |
|--------------------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4</b> |  |                   |                   |
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 1</b>         | <p><b>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:</b> This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> <li>- Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification</li> </ul> <p>Methodology of data measurement: <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European countries (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</u></p> |                   |                   |
|                                | <b>SLI 14.2.1</b>  | <b>SLI 14.2.2</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.3</b> |

| Origin of network | Number of instances of identified TTPs | Number of actions taken by type | Views/ impressions before action | Interaction/ engagement before action                                 | Views/ impressions after action | Interaction/ engagement after action | Penetration and impact on genuine users | Trends on targeted audiences  | Trends on narratives used | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service | Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) | Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service) |
|-------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------|--|---|--|
| Croatia           | Removal of seven accounts              | Removal of seven accounts       |                                  |   | 0 (deleted)                     | 0 (deleted)                          |   | Targeted Croatian audiences about issues related to the national elections, economy, successes of the HDZ-led government, as well as critical commentary about opposition figures, the President of Croatia and his Social Democratic Party.  |                           |  |   |  |
| Unknown Origin    | Removal of one account                 | Removal of one account          |                                  |   | 0 (deleted)                     | 0 (deleted)                          |   | Targeted audiences in Moldova and Madagascar. This network posted primarily in Romanian, Russian and Malagasy, and also in French about news and current events in Moldova and Madagascar. In Moldova, they posted about the Gagauzia region, public figures including Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan politician, and Marina Tauber, a member of the Sor Party. |                           |  |   |  |
| Russia            | Removal of nine accounts               | Removal of nine accounts        |                                  | About 1,800 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts | 0 (deleted)                     | 0 (deleted)                          |   | This network appeared to be focused on two main topics. For French-speaking audiences in Francophone Africa, this operation promoted Russian integration in the region and criticised France's presence there, including through cartoon-style images. For English-speaking audiences, this campaign posted primarily about diminishing                           |                           |  |   |  |

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|                |                                |                                |  |   |             |             |  | support for Ukraine in the West, including AI-generated newsreaders on YouTube focused on criticising US President Biden and Democrats for providing aid to Ukraine instead of investing in their own country.   |  |  |  |  |
| <b>Russia</b>  | Removal of three accounts      | Removal of three accounts      |  | About 280 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts | 0 (deleted) | 0 (deleted) |  | The primary effort targeted at Ukraine included creating a Page for what appears to be a fictitious entity: Center for Information Defense. This cluster shared long-form text posts in Ukrainian about domestic politics, conscription, claims of disinformation, and criticism of the government and President Zelenskyy. A small effort targeted at Poland included posting in Polish about Ukrainian migrants, including suggesting that Polish schools should teach students Ukrainian language, history and literature to help Ukrainian refugees feel more comfortable in Poland. The efforts targeted at the EU and US included posting in English primarily about Western aid provided to Ukraine, war casualties among Ukrainian soldiers, claims that Ukraine's government has failed to protect its people, and criticism of the West for providing lethal weapons to Ukraine and for allowing war crimes in Gaza. |  |  |  |  |
| <b>Vietnam</b> | Removal of forty-nine accounts | Removal of forty-nine accounts |  | Zero accounts followed these Instagram accounts                     | 0 (deleted) | 0 (deleted) |  | This operation ran four regional campaigns. The French-language effort targeted France. It posted about the alleged alliance between Qatar and Iran, the importance of retaining   |  |  |  |  |



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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | traditional French values and secularism, and criticised Shia Islam and Qatari investments in Europe. The French- and Arabic-language efforts targeted Lebanon. It posted in support of Palestine, criticised Iran's involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, and called for Lebanon to avoid a repeat of the 2006 war in the region. |  |  |  |  |
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| Measure 14.3 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 14.3.1   | We continue to engage with this working group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1-14.2.4 above. | We continue to engage with this working group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1-14.2.4 above. |

| <b>IV. Integrity of Services</b>  |                       |                       |                       |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Commitment 15</b>  |                       |                       |                       |
| Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act. |                       |                       |                       |
|   | C.15                  | M 15.1                | M 15.2                |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:  | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook | Service B - Instagram |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes                  | Yes                   |

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| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <p>We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. In this context, Meta signed up to the Partnership on AI's Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media, and is committed to cross-industry collaboration to help to maintain the integrity of the online information environment for our users.</p> <p>As <u>announced</u> in April 2024, we are making changes to the way we handle manipulated media based on feedback from the Oversight Board that we should update our approach to reflect a broader range of content that exists today and provide context about the content through labels. These changes are also informed by Meta's policy review process that included extensive public opinion surveys and consultations with academics, civil society organisations and others.</p> <p>Instead of removing misleading manipulated videos that do not otherwise violate our Community Standards, we will begin adding "AI info" labels to a wider range of video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they're uploading AI-generated content.</p> <p>If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. This overall approach gives people more information about the content so they can better assess it and so they will have context if they see the same content elsewhere.</p> <p>We started labelling organic AI-generated content in May 2024 and stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy in July 2024. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.</p> | <p>We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. In this context, Meta signed up to the Partnership on AI's Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media, and is committed to cross-industry collaboration to help to maintain the integrity of the online information environment for our users.</p> <p>As <u>announced</u> in April 2024, we are making changes to the way we handle manipulated media based on feedback from the Oversight Board that we should update our approach to reflect a broader range of content that exists today and provide context about the content through labels. These changes are also informed by Meta's policy review process that included extensive public opinion surveys and consultations with academics, civil society organisations and others.</p> <p>Instead of removing misleading manipulated videos that do not otherwise violate our Community Guidelines, we will begin adding "AI info" labels to a wider range of video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they're uploading AI-generated content.</p> <p>If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. This overall approach gives people more information about the content so they can better assess it and so they will have context if they see the same content elsewhere.</p> <p>We started labelling organic AI-generated content in May 2024 and stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy in July 2024. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Guidelines, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.</p> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>Yes</p>   | <p>Yes</p>   |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to</p>  | <p>Following discussion, assessment and feedback, in July 2024 <u>we announced we're making changes to our 'made with AI' label programme.</u></p>   | <p>Following discussion, assessment and feedback, in July 2024 <u>we announced we're making changes to our 'made with AI' label programme.</u></p>   |

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| <p>put in place in the next 6 months?</p> | <p>We want people to know when they see posts that have been made with AI. As described above, earlier in 2024, we announced a new approach for labelling AI-generated content. An important part of this approach relies on industry standard indicators that other companies include in content created using their tools, which help us assess whether something is created using AI.</p> <p>Like others across the industry, we've found that our labels based on these indicators weren't always aligned with people's expectations and didn't always provide enough context. For example, some content that included minor modifications using AI, such as retouching tools, included industry standard indicators that were then labelled "Made with AI." While we continue to work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI info" across our apps, which people can click for more information. This update occurred alongside the deprecation of our manipulated media policy in July 2024.</p> | <p>We want people to know when they see posts that have been made with AI. As described above, earlier in 2024, we announced a new approach for labelling AI-generated content. An important part of this approach relies on industry standard indicators that other companies include in content created using their tools, which help us assess whether something is created using AI.</p> <p>Like others across the industry, we've found that our labels based on these indicators weren't always aligned with people's expectations and didn't always provide enough context. For example, some content that included minor modifications using AI, such as retouching tools, included industry standard indicators that were then labelled "Made with AI." While we continue to work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI info" across our apps, which people can click for more information. This update occurred alongside the deprecation of our manipulated media policy in July 2024.</p> |
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| <p>Measure 15.1</p>      | <p>Facebook</p>  | <p>Instagram</p>   |
| <p><b>QRE 15.1.1</b></p> | <p>We address potential abuses from AI-generated content in two primary ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; and (2) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated.</p> <p>In February 2024 Meta's Oversight Board provided <u>feedback</u> regarding our approach to manipulated media, arguing that we unnecessarily risk restricting freedom of expression when we remove manipulated media that does not otherwise violate our Community Standards. It recommended a "less restrictive" approach to manipulated media, such as labels with context.</p> <p>We agree that providing transparency and additional context is now the better way to address this content. In <u>May 2024 we began labelling AI generated or edited content</u> (based on industry aligned standards on identifying AI as well as through users self declaring AI influenced content) with the label 'Made with AI'. While we work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI</p> | <p>We address potential abuses from AI-generated content in two primary ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Guidelines regardless of how it was generated; and (2) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated.</p> <p>In February 2024 Meta's Oversight Board provided <u>feedback</u> regarding our approach to manipulated media, arguing that we unnecessarily risk restricting freedom of expression when we remove manipulated media that does not otherwise violate our Community Guidelines. It recommended a "less restrictive" approach to manipulated media, such as labels with context.</p> <p>We agree that providing transparency and additional context is now the better way to address this content. In <u>May 2024 we began labelling AI generated or edited content</u> (based on industry aligned standards on identifying AI as well as through users self declaring AI influenced content) with the label 'Made with AI'. While we work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI</p> |

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|                   | <p>info” across our apps, which people can click for more information. These labels cover a broader range of content in addition to the manipulated content that the Oversight Board also recommended labelling in their feedback.</p> <p>If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context.</p> | <p>info” across our apps, which people can click for more information. These labels cover a broader range of content in addition to the manipulated content that the Oversight Board also recommended labelling in their feedback.</p> <p>If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context.</p> |
| Measure 15.2      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 15.2.1</b> | <p>Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We began adding “AI info” labels to video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they’re uploading AI-generated content.</li> </ul>   | <p>Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We began adding “AI info” labels to video, audio and image content when we detect industry standard AI image indicators or when people disclose that they’re uploading AI-generated content.</li> </ul>   |

#### IV. Integrity of Services

##### Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

|  | <b>C.16</b>           | <b>M 16.1</b>         | <b>M 16.2</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes | No                          | No                           |

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| to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   |   |   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.  | As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No  | No  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. |

|                   |   |   |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Measure 16.1      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 16.1.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p> <p>In May 2024, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (<u>Q1 2024</u>) with information on two Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour networks originating in Croatia and a second network with an unknown origin. We also provided updates on behaviour from Doppelganger.</p> <p><b>Croatia:</b> We removed 104 Facebook accounts, 39 Pages which targeted Croatian audiences about issues related to the national elections, economy, successes of the HDZ-led government, as well as critical commentary about opposition figures, the President of Croatia and his Social Democratic Party.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p> <p>In May 2024, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (<u>Q1 2024</u>) with information on two Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour networks originating in Croatia and a second network with an unknown origin. We also provided updates on behaviour from Doppelganger.</p> <p><b>Croatia:</b> We removed seven accounts on Instagram which targeted Croatian audiences about issues related to the national elections, economy, successes of the HDZ-led government, as well as critical commentary about opposition figures, the President of Croatia and his Social Democratic Party.</p> |

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|  | <p><b>Unknown Origin network:</b> For the second network with an unknown origin we removed 1,326 Facebook accounts, 80 Pages and one Group which targeted audiences in Moldova and Madagascar. This network posted primarily in Romanian, Russian and Malagasy, and also in French about news and current events in Moldova and Madagascar. In Moldova, they posted about the Gagauzia region, public figures including Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan politician, and Marina Tauber, a member of the Șor Party, in addition to criticising the incumbent government and its efforts towards EU integration, including with parody videos about the current President.</p> <p>Some key takeaways we noticed during Q1 2024 were that while public discourse ahead of the EU parliamentary elections focused primarily on foreign threats, including from Doppelganger, the majority of the EU-focused inauthentic behaviour we disrupted so far in 2024 has been domestic in nature. This includes both CIB activity (such as the Croatian example detailed above and in the report) and simpler inauthentic clusters we removed in the reporting period in Europe, including in France, Germany, Poland and Italy. What stood out to us is that these groups had:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Small number of assets within each cluster or network</li> <li>● Primarily targeted audiences in their own countries</li> <li>● Mostly focused on local elections, rather than the EU parliamentary elections</li> <li>● Many were linked to individuals associated with local campaigns or candidates</li> <li>● Tactics included inauthentic amplification of authentic accounts or Pages of domestic politicians through likes, shares and comments to make them appear more popular than they were</li> <li>● We did not see evidence of these clusters gaining much traction among authentic audiences.</li> </ul> <p><b>Doppelganger:</b> The Q1 adversarial threats report shares a detailed assessment and breakdown of Doppelgangers behaviour, and is the 7th report which has provided detail on tactics and behaviour of this network. Some behaviour shifts were noticed on Meta’s platforms from Doppelganger, although the campaign continues to be a “smash-and-grab” effort expending a large amount of resources in the face of a very high detection rate and daily loss of assets, Doppelganger has largely ceased to engage in the following tactics on our apps, while still actively deploying them elsewhere online:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● No linking to spoofed websites impersonating news media or government agencies;</li> <li>● No commenting on posts by other people;</li> </ul> | <p><b>Unknown Origin network:</b> For the second network with an unknown origin We removed one account on Instagram which targeted audiences in Moldova and Madagascar. This network posted primarily in Romanian, Russian and Malagasy, and also in French about news and current events in Moldova and Madagascar. In Moldova, they posted about the Gagauzia region, public figures including Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan politician, and Marina Tauber, a member of the Șor Party, in addition to criticising the incumbent government and its efforts towards EU integration, including with parody videos about the current President.</p> <p>Some key takeaways we noticed during Q1 2024 were that while public discourse ahead of the EU parliamentary elections focused primarily on foreign threats, including from Doppelganger, the majority of the EU-focused inauthentic behaviour we disrupted so far in 2024 has been domestic in nature. This includes both CIB activity (such as the Croatian example detailed above and in the report) and simpler inauthentic clusters we removed in the reporting period in Europe, including in France, Germany, Poland and Italy. What stood out to us is that these groups had:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Small number of assets within each cluster or network</li> <li>● Primarily targeted audiences in their own countries</li> <li>● Mostly focused on local elections, rather than the EU parliamentary elections</li> <li>● Many were linked to individuals associated with local campaigns or candidates</li> <li>● Tactics included inauthentic amplification of authentic accounts of domestic politicians through likes, shares and comments to make them appear more popular than they were</li> <li>● We did not see evidence of these clusters gaining much traction among authentic audiences.</li> </ul> <p><b>Doppelganger:</b> The Q1 adversarial threats report shares a detailed assessment and breakdown of Doppelgangers behaviour, and is the 7th report which has provided detail on tactics and behaviour of this network. Some behaviour shifts were noticed on Meta’s platforms from Doppelganger, although the campaign continues to be a “smash-and-grab” effort expending a large amount of resources in the face of a very high detection rate and daily loss of assets, Doppelganger has largely ceased to engage in the following tactics on our apps, while still actively deploying them elsewhere online:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● No linking to spoofed websites impersonating news media or government agencies;</li> <li>● No commenting on posts by other people;</li> <li>● No fictitious brands present on platform (e.g., Reliable Recent News);</li> </ul> |
|--|---|---|

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No fictitious brands present on platform (e.g., Reliable Recent News);</li> <li>• No seeding of links to drive traffic off-platform (in ads, posts, comments, etc.), including via multiple redirects;</li> </ul> <p>While these are significant shifts in on-platform behaviour, we know this may change as Doppelganger tries to evolve. Our teams remain vigilant to block any new tactics.</p> <p>Similarly, In Q2 2024, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (Q2 2024) with information on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour networks originating in Russia and Vietnam.</p> <p><b>Russia:</b> We removed 20 Facebook accounts, 14 Pages for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily English- and French-speaking audiences globally.</p> <p><b>Russia (2):</b> We removed 43 Facebook accounts and 85 Pages for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Ukraine, Moldova and Ukrainians living in Europe, and to a lesser extent France and Germany.</p> <p><b>Russia (3):</b> We removed 12 Facebook accounts, 32 Pages, five Groups for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Ukraine, and to a much lesser extent Poland and the broader European Union and the United States.</p> <p><b>Vietnam:</b> We removed 112 Facebook accounts, 65 Pages for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Vietnam and targeted primarily Lebanon, the US, UK, and France, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and Qatar.</p> <p>Our Q2 adversarial threats report also includes further updates and analysis on Doppelganger.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No seeding of links to drive traffic off-platform (in ads, posts, comments, etc.), including via multiple redirects;</li> </ul> <p>While these are significant shifts in on-platform behaviour, we know this may change as Doppelganger tries to evolve. Our teams remain vigilant to block any new tactics.</p> <p>Similarly, In Q2 2024, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (Q2 2024) with information on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour networks originating in Russia and Vietnam.</p> <p><b>Russia:</b> We removed nine accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily English- and French-speaking audiences globally.</p> <p><b>Russia (3):</b> We removed three accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Ukraine, and to a much lesser extent Poland and the broader European Union and the United States.</p> <p><b>Vietnam:</b> We removed 49 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Vietnam and targeted primarily Lebanon, the US, UK, and France, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and Qatar.</p> <p>Our Q2 adversarial threats report also includes further updates and analysis on Doppelganger.</p> |
| <b>SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing</b> | We removed 1 Coordinated inauthentic behaviour network after reviewing information from Microsoft. The Network originated in Iran and targeted audiences in Israel, Bahrain, and France.  |   |
| Measure 16.2  | Facebook  | Instagram   |

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| <p><b>QRE 16.2.1</b></p> | <p>We publish quarterly our Adversarial Treat reports, to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see.</p> <p>In our <u>Q1 2024 report</u>, in addition to sharing our analysis and threat research, we also provided key insights into behaviour changes and trends regarding Doppelganger, as well as, summarising key trends we witnessed ahead of the EU Parliamentary elections in June 2024 (see QRE 16.1.1).</p> <p>In our Q2 2024 report in addition to sharing our analysis and threat research, we also publish further thematic updates and trends relating to Doppelganger.</p> | <p>We publish quarterly our Adversarial Treat reports, to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see.</p> <p>In our <u>Q1 2024 report</u>, in addition to sharing our analysis and threat research, we also provided key insights into behaviour changes and trends regarding Doppelganger, as well as, summarising key trends we witnessed ahead of the EU Parliamentary elections in June 2024 (see QRE 16.1.1).</p> <p>In our Q2 2024 report in addition to sharing our analysis and threat research, we also publish further thematic updates and trends relating to Doppelganger.</p> |
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# V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

|  | <b>C.17</b>           | <b>M 17.1</b>         | <b>M 17.2</b>         | <b>M 17.3</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | <b>Service A - Facebook</b>   | <b>Service B - Instagram</b>   |
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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?<br>[Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union.</p> <p>During the reporting period Meta ran a range of media literacy topics, focusing on a range of areas, including Youth, EU Elections, Gen AI, as well as national elections in France. These campaigns are outlined in more detail in QRE 17.2.1 with reach metrics outlined in SLI 17.2.1.</p> <p>Meta also supported the European Disability Forum, collaborating to organise a webinar for disability rights organisations ahead of the elections focusing on online campaigning. The second part of this collaboration will</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union.</p> <p>During the reporting period Meta ran a range of media literacy topics, focusing on a range of areas, including Youth, EU Elections, Gen AI, as well as national elections in France. These campaigns are outlined in more detail in QRE 17.2.1 with reach metrics outlined in SLI 17.2.1.</p> <p>Meta also supported the European Disability Forum, collaborating to organise a webinar for disability rights organisations ahead of the elections focusing on online campaigning. The second part of this collaboration will be</p> |

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|   | be to run a media literacy campaign focusing on inclusion and accessible elections.  | to run a media literacy campaign focusing on inclusion and accessible elections.   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | In the second half of 2024, Meta will launch a Youth campaign running across several Member States in the EU, as well as a Fraud and Scams campaign, also running across several Member States.<br><br>In addition to this Meta will continue its work with the European Disability forum, with a media literacy campaign on accessible elections. | In the second half of 2024, Meta will launch a Youth campaign running across several Member States in the EU, as well as a Fraud and Scams campaign, also running across several Member States.<br><br>In addition to this Meta will continue its work with the European Disability forum, with a media literacy campaign on accessible elections. |

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| Measure 17.1      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 17.1.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.</p> <p>A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Violent or graphic imagery.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.</p> <p>A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Warning screens on sensitive content on Instagram: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To help people avoid coming across content that they'd rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |

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|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness.</li> <li>• Some forms of nudity.</li> <li>• Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts.</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verified badges on Facebook: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with.</li> <li>• To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Notification screens on outdated articles on the Facebook app: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our goal is to make it easier for people to identify content that's timely, reliable and most valuable to them.</li> <li>• To give people more context about a news article before they share it on Facebook, Meta includes a notification screen if the article is more than 90 days old. After which, we allow people to continue sharing it if they desire. This notification helps people understand how old a given news article is and its source.</li> <li>• To ensure that we don't slow the spread of credible information, especially in the health space, content posted by government health authorities and recognised global health organisations does not have this notification screen.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <p>screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verified badges on Instagram: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with.</li> <li>• To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
| <b>SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above</b> | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>   | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>   |

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| Measure 17.2      | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 17.2.1</b> | <b>EU Elections:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta launched a campaign to raise awareness on tools and features available on Facebook ahead of the elections to the European Parliament on 6-9 June 2024. This campaign ran in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania and used a range of relevant mediums including on Meta's platforms (Facebook and Instagram) , via Newsletter, Audio, Print, and on LinkedIn. The focus of the campaign varied between countries but looked at topics such as how users could benefit from Meta's fact-checking programme.</li> </ul> | <b>EU Elections:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta launched a campaign to raise awareness on tools and features available on Facebook ahead of the elections to the European Parliament on 6-9 June 2024. This campaign ran in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania and used a range of relevant mediums including on Meta's platforms (Facebook and Instagram) , via Newsletter, Audio, Print, and on LinkedIn. The focus of the campaign varied between countries but looked at topics such as how users could benefit from Meta's fact-checking</li> </ul> |

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|  | <p>verified political advertisements, our approach to tackling AI misinformation in elections and how we safeguard candidate accounts, with a view to showing users how they could be empowered to know what information is genuine.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta provided ad credit support to the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA)'s awareness raising campaign against disinformation.</li> <li>- We showcased the European Digital Media Observatory's <a href="#">#BeElectionSmart website</a> in leadership posts and in our <a href="#">elections hub</a>.</li> <li>- Germany: We supported the German Federal Returning Officer (Germany's independent electoral body) with their get-out-the-vote campaign.</li> <li>- France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A collaboration with the local fact-checking partner AFP Fact Check, producing a Reel video featuring popular French astronaut Thomas Pesquet reviewing a series of pictures and videos that had been shared online as hoaxes. He explains best practices and tools people should leverage when faced with a piece of news that seems unlikely.</li> <li>- Participation in a multi-platform campaign operated by the French partner NGO Génération Numérique, consisting of a series of educational short videos gathering tips and recommendations on avoiding becoming a victim of misinformation</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>France Elections:</b> Meta launched a campaign on Meta owned channels (Facebook and Instagram) ahead of the general legislative election in France. This campaign aimed to increase awareness of the tools and processes that Meta deploys on its own platforms (Facebook and Instagram) in advance of an election, to help inform French users how Meta works to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference and protect electoral candidates. The campaign ran from the 20th of June until the second round election on the 4th of July 2024.</p> <p><b>EFCSN Project:</b> Meta worked with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) on a <a href="#">project</a> to help improve the skills and capabilities of the European fact-checking community in debunking and countering AI-generated misinformation, facilitate common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and raise the wider public's awareness on this type of misinfo through media literacy campaigns. This included a series of 5 workshops with experts giving training to over 200 individual fact-checkers across Europe. The media literacy campaign which included a one-pager,</p> | <p>programme, verified political advertisements, our approach to tackling AI misinformation in elections and how we safeguard candidate accounts, with a view to showing users how they could be empowered to know what information is genuine.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta provided ad credit support to the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA)'s awareness raising campaign against disinformation.</li> <li>- We showcased the European Digital Media Observatory's <a href="#">#BeElectionSmart website</a> in leadership posts and in our <a href="#">elections hub</a>.</li> <li>- Germany: We supported the German Federal Returning Officer (Germany's independent electoral body) with their get-out-the-vote campaign.</li> <li>- France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A collaboration with the local fact-checking partner AFP Fact Check, producing a Reel video featuring popular French astronaut Thomas Pesquet reviewing a series of pictures and videos that had been shared online as hoaxes. He explains best practices and tools people should leverage when faced with a piece of news that seems unlikely.</li> <li>- Participation in a multi-platform campaign operated by the French partner NGO Génération Numérique, consisting of a series of educational short videos gathering tips and recommendations on avoiding becoming a victim of misinformation</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>France Elections:</b> Meta launched a campaign on Meta owned channels (Facebook and Instagram) ahead of the general legislative election in France. This campaign aimed to increase awareness of the tools and processes that Meta deploys on its own platforms (Facebook and Instagram) in advance of an election, to help inform French users how Meta works to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference and protect electoral candidates. The campaign ran from the 20th of June until the second round election on the 4th of July 2024.</p> <p><b>EFCSN Project:</b> Meta worked with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) on a <a href="#">project</a> to help improve the skills and capabilities of the European fact-checking community in debunking and countering AI-generated misinformation, facilitate common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and raise the wider public's awareness on this type of misinfo through media literacy campaigns. This included a series of 5 workshops with experts giving training to over 200 individual</p> |
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|   | <p>explainer video and infographics was published in 27 different languages across Europe.</p> <p><b>Youth:</b> Meta launched a campaign that ran in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of tools available to protect Youth well-being, such as Daily time -limits, default private accounts, our family centre and other supervision tools. The campaign ran for 6 weeks from the 20th May 2024 on a range of channels including Meta-owned channels, print, digital, audio, TV and Outdoors.</p> <p><b>European Disability Forum:</b> Meta collaborated with the European Disability forum to organise a webinar for disability rights organisations ahead of the elections focusing on online campaigning.</p> <p>CEE Digital Awareness Day: a flagship activation in CEE to promote media literacy which gathered over 80 experts from 17 CEE countries.</p>  | <p>fact-checkers across Europe. The media literacy campaign which included a one-pager, explainer video and infographics was published in 27 different languages across Europe.</p> <p><b>Youth:</b> Meta launched a campaign that ran in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of tools available to protect Youth well-being, such as Daily time -limits, default private accounts, our family centre and other supervision tools. The campaign ran for 6 weeks from the 20th May 2024 on a range of channels including Meta-owned channels, print, digital, audio, TV and Outdoors.</p> <p><b>European Disability Forum:</b> Meta collaborated with the European Disability forum to organise a webinar for disability rights organisations ahead of the elections focusing on online campaigning.</p> <p>CEE Digital Awareness Day: a flagship activation in CEE to promote media literacy which gathered over 80 experts from 17 CEE countries.</p>   |
| <p><b>SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above</b></p> | <p>Below we have provided some engagement statistics for the above described media literacy campaigns:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● EU Elections: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ On Meta-owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 12.3 million users in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania, generating 151 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 4.74 million users in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania, generating 64 million impressions.</li> <li>○ ERGA: The campaign resulted in over 87 million impressions, with reach to over 64 million users.</li> <li>○ Germany: The campaign resulted in over 8 million impressions, with reach to over 4.7 million users.</li> <li>○ France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ AFP Fact Check: According to AFP, the videos resulted in nearly 2.5 million views on Instagram and Facebook.</li> <li>■ Génération Numérique: According to Génération Numérique, the videos reached over 200k users and generated nearly 300k impressions on Instagram and Facebook alone.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>● France Elections: Reached 2.1 million users in France, generating 10.6 million impressions. This ran on Meta owned platforms only.</li> <li>● Youth: On Meta owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 5.9 million users in Spain, Ireland and the</li> </ul> | <p>Below we have provided some engagement statistics for the above described media literacy campaigns:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● EU Elections: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ On Meta-owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 12.3 million users in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania, generating 151 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 4.74 million users in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania, generating 64 million impressions.</li> <li>○ ERGA: The campaign resulted in over 87 million impressions, with reach to over 64 million users.</li> <li>○ Germany: The campaign resulted in over 8 million impressions, with reach to over 4.7 million users.</li> <li>○ France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ AFP Fact Check: According to AFP, the videos resulted in nearly 2.5 million views on Instagram and Facebook.</li> <li>■ Génération Numérique: According to Génération Numérique, the videos reached over 200k users and generated nearly 300k impressions on Instagram and Facebook alone.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>● France Elections: Reached 2.1 million users in France, generating 10.6 million impressions. This ran on Meta owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram).</li> </ul> |

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|  | <p>Netherlands, generating 103 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 4.45 million users in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands, generating 405 million impressions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EFCSN Project: This project reached a total of 12.7 million impressions.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Youth: On Meta owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 5.9 million users in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands, generating 103 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 4.45 million users in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands, generating 405 million impressions.</li> <li>• EFCSN Project: This project reached a total of 12.7 million impressions.</li> </ul> |
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| Measure 17.3 | Facebook  | Instagram  |
| QRE 17.3.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party fact-checkers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more.</p> <p>Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the <a href="#">EU Digital Citizenship working group</a>, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship. Its latest in-person meeting, held in Brussels in January 2024, focused on digital citizenship during elections and how to ensure it is inclusive. The Group launched a <a href="#">new website</a> including a <a href="#">one-pager on election integrity</a>.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party factcheckers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, the Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more.</p> <p>Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the <a href="#">EU Digital Citizenship working group</a>, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship. Its latest in-person meeting, held in Brussels in January 2024, focused on digital citizenship during elections and how to ensure it is inclusive. The Group launched a <a href="#">new website</a> including a <a href="#">one-pager on election integrity</a>.</p> |

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

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| C.18 | M 18.1 | M 18.2 | M 18.3 |
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| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook Instagram | Facebook Instagram | Facebook Instagram | Facebook Instagram |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|

|   | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram   |
|---|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No  | No  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of <u>misinformation</u> .  | As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of <u>misinformation</u> .  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No  | No  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. |

| Measure 18.1      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
|-------------------|---|---|
| <b>QRE 18.1.1</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through: Meta's <u>technologies</u> , as well as through human review teams.<br><br>In our baseline report we mentioned our <u>Content Distribution Guidelines</u> outline some of the most significant reasons why content receives | As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through: Meta's <u>technologies</u> as well as through human review teams .<br><br>In our January to June 2023 report, we mentioned the publication of our <u>Content Distribution Guidelines</u> for Instagram. |



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|                          | <p>reduced distribution in Feed. In 2023 we summarised the changes that we've made to the <a href="#">Content Distribution Guidelines</a> and <a href="#">detailed any specific adjustments</a> to the types of content we demote. For example by removing the guideline for posts from broadly untrusted news publishers, because we no longer use it as a ranking signal.</p>  | <p>It lays down our guidelines for content lowered in feed and stories, which outline types of content that may be shown lower in feed and stories.</p>  |
| <p><b>QRE 18.1.2</b></p> | <p>As mentioned in our last report, <a href="#">Facebook system cards</a> help people understand <a href="#">how AI shapes</a> their product experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook.</p> <p>These cards provide detail on how our systems work in a way that is accessible for those who don't have deep technical knowledge. In June 2023, we released 14 system cards for Facebook. There are now 15 system cards for Facebook which are periodically updated, and the most recent updates occurred during the reporting period. They give information about how our AI systems rank content, some of the predictions each system makes to determine what content might be most relevant, as well as the controls users can use to help customise users' experience. They cover Feed, Stories, Reels and other surfaces where people go to find content from the accounts or people they follow. The system cards also cover AI systems that recommend "unconnected" content from people, groups, or accounts they don't follow. A more detailed explanation of the AI behind content recommendations is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p>To give a further level of detail beyond what's published in the system cards, we have shared the types of inputs – known as signals – as well as the predictive models these signals inform that help determine what content users may find most relevant from their network on Facebook. Users can find these signals and predictions in the <a href="#">Transparency Centre</a>, along with how frequently they tend to be used in the overall ranking process.</p> <p>We also use signals to help identify harmful content, which we remove as we become aware of it, as well as to help reduce the distribution of</p> | <p>As mentioned in our last report, <a href="#">Instagram System Cards</a> help people <a href="#">understand how AI shapes</a> their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram.</p> <p>These cards provide detail on how our systems work in a way that is accessible for those who don't have deep technical knowledge. In June 2023, we released 8 system cards for Instagram. There are now 15 system cards for Facebook which are periodically updated, and the most recent updates occurred during the reporting period. They give information about how our AI systems rank content, some of the predictions each system makes to determine what content might be most relevant, as well as the controls users can use to help customise users' experience. They cover Feed, Stories, Reels and other surfaces where people go to find content from the accounts or people they follow. The system cards also cover AI systems that recommend "unconnected" content from people, groups, or accounts they don't follow. A more detailed explanation of the AI behind content recommendations is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p>To give a further level of detail beyond what's published in the system cards, we have shared the types of inputs – known as signals – as well as the predictive models these signals inform that help determine what content users may find most relevant from their network on Instagram. Users can find these signals and predictions in the <a href="#">Transparency Centre</a>, along with how frequently they tend to be used in the overall ranking process.</p> <p>We also use signals to help identify harmful content, which we remove as we become aware of it, as well as to help reduce the distribution of other types of problematic or low-quality content in line with our Content Distribution Guidelines.</p> |

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
|  | other types of problematic or low-quality content in line with our Content Distribution Guidelines.  |  |
| <b>QRE 18.1.3</b>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes. For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organisations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves.</li> </ul> <p>Regarding the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content: on average 46% of people on Facebook in the EU do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes.</li> <li>For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organisations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves.</li> </ul> <p>Regarding the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content: on average 43% of people on Instagram in the EU who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.</p> |
| <b>SLI 18.1.1 – actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies</b> | Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 .   |
|  | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Facebook between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Instagram between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.  |
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |  |
| Austria  | 43%  | 41%  |
| Belgium  | 44%  | 39%  |
| Bulgaria   | 49%  | 46%  |
| Croatia  | 44%  | 36%  |
| Cyprus   | 49%  | 44%  |
| Czech Republic   | 35%  | 37%  |
| Denmark  | 39%  | 42%  |
| Estonia  | 38%  | 45%  |

|                   |  |  |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Finland           | 38%  | 38%  |
| France            | 52%  | 44%  |
| Germany           | 41%  | 43%  |
| Greece            | 47%  | 48%  |
| Hungary           | 51%  | 42%  |
| Ireland           | 41%  | 37%  |
| Italy             | 52%  | 47%  |
| Latvia            | 37%  | 44%  |
| Lithuania         | 44%  | 42%  |
| Luxembourg        | 42%  | 51%  |
| Malta             | 57%  | 40%  |
| Netherlands       | 36%  | 37%  |
| Poland            | 43%  | 40%  |
| Portugal          | 56%  | 42%  |
| Romania           | 39%  | 42%  |
| Slovakia          | 40%  | 38%  |
| Slovenia          | 34%  | 39%  |
| Spain             | 55%  | 44%  |
| Sweden            | 47%  | 40%  |
| <b>Total EU</b>   | <b>46%</b>   | <b>43%</b>   |
| Measure 18.2      | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 18.2.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies and approach to tackle misinformation - which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 - are published in our Transparency Centre:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meta Community Standards - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> <li>• Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> </ul> <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly</u> share misinformation. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies and approach to tackle misinformation - which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 - are published in our Transparency Centre:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meta Community Guidelines - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> <li>• Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> </ul> <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly violate our policies</u>. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what</p> |

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
|   | <p>Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.</p> <p>In 2023, we updated our penalty system to <u>restrict accounts</u> that violate our Community Standards on the platform. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Facebook Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.</p> <p>These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, <u>these restrictions</u> only apply to Facebook accounts).</p> <p>If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.</p> <p>For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Facebook Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p> | <p>fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.</p> <p>For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Instagram Community Guidelines in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.</p> <p>If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.</p> <p>For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Instagram Community Guidelines after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p> |
| <p><b>SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations</b></p> | <p>Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</p> <p>Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.</p> <p><i>*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent <u>Oversight Board's advice</u>. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*</i></p>   | <p>Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</p> <p>Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.</p> <p><i>*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent <u>Oversight Board's advice</u>. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*</i></p>   |

| <b>Member States</b> |     |    |
|----------------------|-----|----|
| Austria              | 19  | 2  |
| Belgium              | 22  | 0  |
| Bulgaria             | 6   | 5  |
| Croatia              | 17  | 0  |
| Cyprus               | 2   | 0  |
| Czechia              | 24  | 0  |
| Denmark              | 23  | 0  |
| Estonia              | 4   | 0  |
| Finland              | 7   | 0  |
| France               | 113 | 12 |
| Germany              | 89  | 11 |
| Greece               | 6   | 0  |
| Hungary              | 16  | 1  |
| Ireland              | 31  | 5  |
| Italy                | 155 | 3  |
| Latvia               | 1   | 1  |
| Lithuania            | 1   | 0  |
| Luxembourg           | 3   | 0  |
| Malta                | 3   | 0  |
| Netherlands          | 65  | 1  |
| Poland               | 40  | 1  |
| Portugal             | 22  | 11 |
| Romania              | 75  | 3  |
| Slovakia             | 57  | 5  |
| Slovenia             | 9   | 1  |

|                   |   |   |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Spain             | 85  | 17  |
| Sweden            | 23  | 2   |
| <b>Total EU</b>   | <b>918</b>  | <b>81</b>   |
| Measure 18.3      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 18.3.1</b> | <p>As noted in our baseline report, the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as <b>Social Science Research, Data for Good, the Research Platform for coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) Network Disruptions</b></p> <p><b>Research Grants &amp; Awards.</b> In our baseline report, we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. Details of our most recent awards can be found <a href="#">here</a>.</p> | <p>As noted in our baseline report, the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as <b>Social Science Research, Data for Good, the Research Platform for coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) Network Disruptions</b></p> <p><b>Research Grants &amp; Awards.</b> In our baseline report, we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. Details of our most recent awards can be found <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

|  | <b>C.19</b>           | <b>M 19.1</b>         | <b>M 19.2</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | <b>Service A - Facebook</b>   | <b>Service B - Instagram</b>   |
|--|---|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No  | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation  | As mentioned in our reports covering 2023, we launched <b>Facebook system cards</b> to help people understand how AI shapes their product | As mentioned in our reports covering 2023, we launched <b>Instagram System Cards</b> to help people understand how AI shapes their product |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| measures here [short bullet points].  | experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook. These can be found in Meta's Transparency Centre and more detail regarding the system cards is available above under Commitment 18.   | experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram. These can be found in Meta's Transparency Centre and more detail regarding the system cards is available above under Commitment 18.   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools. |

|                                   |  |   |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| Measure 19.1                      | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 19.1.1</b>                 | <p>The range of measures and policies put in place in relation to this measure have been described in previous reports and are explained in greater detail on Meta's Transparency Centre. For example, there it is possible to find detailed explanations relating to <a href="#">Facebook System Cards that help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences</a>.</p> <p>The policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.</p> | <p>The range of measures and policies put in place in relation to this measure have been described in previous reports and are explained in greater detail on Meta's Transparency Centre. For example, there it is possible to find detailed explanations relating to <a href="#">Instagram System Cards</a> that help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences.</p> <p>The policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.</p> |
| Measure 19.2                      | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>SLI 19.2.1 - User Settings</b> | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>   | <i>We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.</i>  |

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| <b>V. Empowering Users</b> |
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## Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

As mentioned in our baseline report, the tools assessing provenance and edit history of digital content are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. Other tools to achieve this objective, including as set forth in Commitment 21 are relevant and pertinent to our subscribed products at this time.

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

|  | C.21                  | M 21.1                | M 21.2                | M 21.3                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram   |
|--|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | We updated our fact-checking program guidelines to clarify that our existing policies allow fact-checkers to rate digitally created or edited content - including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) - when content risks misleading people about something consequential that has no basis in fact. We also employed measures to improve fact-checkers ability to apply their ratings to fake or manipulated audio content. | We updated our fact-checking program guidelines to clarify that our existing policies allow fact-checkers to rate digitally created or edited content - including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) - when content risks misleading people about something consequential that has no basis in fact. We also employed measures to improve fact-checkers ability to apply their ratings to fake or manipulated audio content. |



|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our fact-checking programme or processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our fact-checking programme or processes. |

|                   |   |   |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Measure 21.1      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 21.1.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta partners with over 45 Independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) in Europe. In the EU specifically we work with over 29 partners, covering 23 languages, and 26 countries. The work of these fact-checkers has a global impact, as the treatment of their false-rated posts (i.e., demotion, notification, and warning) are applied globally. Our third-party fact-checking programme includes almost 100 organisations working in more than 60 languages globally to help fight viral misinformation.</p> <p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. Further details are shared on <a href="#">our Transparency Centre</a> on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings.</p> <p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta partners with over 45 Independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) in Europe. In the EU specifically we work with over 29 partners, covering 23 languages, and 26 countries. The work of these fact-checkers has a global impact, as the treatment of their false-rated posts (i.e., demotion, notification, and warning) are applied globally. Our third-party fact-checking programme includes almost 100 organisations working in more than 60 languages globally to help fight viral misinformation.</p> <p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. Further details are shared on <a href="#">our Transparency Centre</a> on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings.</p> <p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> |

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
|  | There is more detail on all the actions taken under QRE 31.1 as well as in our baseline report. | There is more detail on all the actions taken under QRE 31.1.1 as well as in our baseline report. |
| <b>SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1</b> | <i>See SLI 21.1.2 below</i>   |   |

|  |  |   |   |  |  |  |
|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| <b>SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1</b> | <p>1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used to apply a fact-checking label to content on Facebook from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</p> <p>2. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</p> <p>3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</p> <p>*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU member state. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all member states exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (150,000). This is expected.</p> |   |   | <p>1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used to apply a fact-checking label to content on Instagram from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</p> <p>2. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</p> <p>3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</p> <p>*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU member state. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all member states exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (39,000). This is expected.</p> |  |  |
|  | Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.  | Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |
| <b>Member States</b>                                 |  |   |   |  |  |  |
| Austria  | Over 47,000  | Over 920,000  | 43%   | Over 13,000  | Over 80,000  | 41%  |
| Belgium  | Over 57,000  | Over 1,200,000  | 44%   | Over 14,000  | Over 98,000  | 39%  |
| Bulgaria   | Over 36,000  | Over 770,000  | 49%   | Over 8,000   | Over 39,000  | 46%  |
| Croatia  | Over 34,000  | Over 530,000  | 44%   | Over 8,700   | Over 40,000  | 36%  |
| Cyprus   | Over 30,000  | Over 260,000  | 49%   | Over 8,000   | Over 35,000  | 44%  |
| Czech Republic                                       | Over 38,000  | Over 840,000  | 35%   | Over 10,000  | Over 59,000  | 37%  |

|                 |                     |                        |            |                    |                     |            |
|-----------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------|
| Denmark         | Over 40,000         | Over 600,000           | 39%        | Over 10,000        | Over 70,000         | 42%        |
| Estonia         | Over 18,000         | Over 110,000           | 38%        | Over 5,300         | Over 18,000         | 45%        |
| Finland         | Over 34,000         | Over 260,000           | 38%        | Over 10,000        | Over 54,000         | 38%        |
| France          | Over 81,000         | Over 5,300,000         | 52%        | Over 19,000        | Over 230,000        | 44%        |
| Germany         | Over 92,000         | Over 5,200,000         | 41%        | Over 25,000        | Over 320,000        | 43%        |
| Greece          | Over 46,000         | Over 1,200,000         | 47%        | Over 12,000        | Over 96,000         | 48%        |
| Hungary         | Over 36,000         | Over 630,000           | 51%        | Over 8,600         | Over 49,000         | 42%        |
| Ireland         | Over 50,000         | Over 790,000           | 41%        | Over 14,000        | Over 92,000         | 37%        |
| Italy           | Over 83,000         | Over 5,600,000         | 52%        | Over 21,000        | Over 340,000        | 47%        |
| Latvia          | Over 19,000         | Over 220,000           | 37%        | Over 5,400         | Over 19,000         | 44%        |
| Lithuania       | Over 26,000         | Over 310,000           | 44%        | Over 5,800         | Over 26,000         | 42%        |
| Luxembourg      | Over 23,000         | Over 130,000           | 42%        | Over 5,700         | Over 16,000         | 51%        |
| Malta           | Over 23,000         | Over 110,000           | 57%        | Over 5,100         | Over 15,000         | 40%        |
| Netherlands     | Over 63,000         | Over 1,300,000         | 36%        | Over 17,000        | Over 150,000        | 37%        |
| Poland          | Over 55,000         | Over 2,300,000         | 43%        | Over 13,000        | Over 120,000        | 40%        |
| Portugal        | Over 54,000         | Over 1,600,000         | 56%        | Over 16,000        | Over 150,000        | 42%        |
| Romania         | Over 47,000         | Over 1,500,000         | 39%        | Over 11,000        | Over 73,000         | 42%        |
| Slovakia        | Over 30,000         | Over 560,000           | 40%        | Over 7,800         | Over 38,000         | 38%        |
| Slovenia        | Over 26,000         | Over 310,000           | 34%        | Over 6,300         | Over 22,000         | 39%        |
| Spain           | Over 77,000         | Over 4,500,000         | 55%        | Over 22,000        | Over 270,000        | 44%        |
| Sweden          | Over 53,000         | Over 850,000           | 47%        | Over 14,000        | Over 100,000        | 40%        |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 150,000</b> | <b>Over 30,000,000</b> | <b>46%</b> | <b>Over 39,000</b> | <b>Over 990,000</b> | <b>43%</b> |

|                   |  |   |
|-------------------|--|---|
| Measure 21.2      | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 21.2.1</b> | Between January and June 2024, we displayed warnings on over 30 million distinct pieces of content on Facebook (including re-shares) in the EU based on over 150,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners in the EU. | Between January and June 2024, we displayed warnings on over 990,000 distinct pieces of content on Instagram (including re-shares) in the EU based on over 39,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners in the EU. |

|                   |   |   |
|-------------------|---|---|
|                   | The impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024, meant that 46% of reshares attempted on Fact-Checked content on Facebook in EU Member States were not completed.   | The impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024, meant that 43% of reshares attempted on Fact-Checked content on Instagram in EU Member States were not completed.  |
| Measure 21.3      | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 21.3.1</b> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the fact-checking programme's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. We continue to engage with fact-checkers and content moderation experts across our policies.</p> <p>Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the fact-checking programme's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. We continue to engage with fact-checkers and content moderation experts across our policies.</p> <p>Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.</p> |

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

As mentioned in our baseline report, trustworthiness indicators are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. This is acknowledged by the Commission's 2021 Guidance, which describes them as a tool signatories "could" explore, and negotiations of the updated Code which confirmed this to be a direction signatories are encouraged but not expected to follow. Other tools to achieve this objective covered elsewhere in this section - Commitment 21 in particular - are relevant and pertinent for our subscribed products at this time.

We note however that we use several of the products and features listed under Measure 22.7 (in particular information panels, banners, pop-ups, and prompts) as already outlined under Commitment 21 above, as well as in our crisis monitoring reports below.

## V. Empowering users

### Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

|  | C.23                  | M 23.1                | M 23.2                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram   |
|---|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No  | No  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, we maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information (in addition to content that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards).   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information (in addition to content that they believe violates any of our other Community Guidelines).  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No  | No  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes. |

|              |  |  |
|--------------|--|--|
| Measure 23.1 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 23.1.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <a href="#">outlined on our website</a>.</p> <p>We also provide an appeal system. More details about these systems can be found in our baseline and January to June 2023 report.</p>   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <a href="#">outlined on our website</a>.</p> <p>We also provide an appeal system. More details about these systems can be found in our baseline and January to June 2023 report.</p>   |
| Measure 23.2 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 23.2.1   | <p>Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.</p> <p><b>Mass reporting:</b> We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high.</p> <p>Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.</p> <p><b>Protection against misuse:</b> We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.</p> <p><b>Anonymous reporting:</b> When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.</p> | <p>Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.</p> <p><b>Mass reporting:</b> We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high.</p> <p>Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.</p> <p><b>Protection against misuse:</b> We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.</p> <p><b>Anonymous reporting:</b> When something gets reported to Instagram, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Guidelines. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.</p> |

## V. Empowering users

### Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

|  | C.24                  | M 24.1                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram  |
|---|---|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No  | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content. In June 2023, we also took steps to <u>improve our penalty system</u> to make it fairer and more effective.</p> <p>Relevant updates to user notice and appeal processes were also made in 2023, in line with DSA requirements.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Guidelines or when a fact-checker rated their content. In June 2023, we also took steps to <u>improve our penalty system</u> to make it fairer and more effective.</p> <p>Relevant updates to user notice and appeal processes were also made in 2023, in line with DSA requirements.</p> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No  | No   |

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our processes. |
|---|---|---|

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| Measure 24.1                            | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 24.1.1</b>                       | As mentioned in our baseline report, <u>when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.<br><br>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.  | As mentioned in our baseline report, <u>when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Guidelines. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.<br><br>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.  |
| <b>SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions</b> | Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.<br><br><i>*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*</i> | Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.<br><br><i>*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*</i> |
| <b>Member States</b>                    |  |   |
| Austria                                 | 19   | 2   |
| Belgium                                 | 22   | 0   |
| Bulgaria                                | 6  | 5   |
| Croatia                                 | 17   | 0   |
| Cyprus                                  | 2  | 0   |



|                 |            |           |
|-----------------|------------|-----------|
| Czechia         | 24         | 0         |
| Denmark         | 23         | 0         |
| Estonia         | 4          | 0         |
| Finland         | 7          | 0         |
| France          | 113        | 12        |
| Germany         | 89         | 11        |
| Greece          | 6          | 0         |
| Hungary         | 16         | 1         |
| Ireland         | 31         | 5         |
| Italy           | 155        | 3         |
| Latvia          | 1          | 1         |
| Lithuania       | 1          | 0         |
| Luxembourg      | 3          | 0         |
| Malta           | 3          | 0         |
| Netherlands     | 65         | 1         |
| Poland          | 40         | 1         |
| Portugal        | 22         | 11        |
| Romania         | 75         | 3         |
| Slovakia        | 57         | 5         |
| Slovenia        | 9          | 1         |
| Spain           | 85         | 17        |
| Sweden          | 23         | 2         |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>918</b> | <b>81</b> |

## V. Empowering users

### Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

|  | <b>C.25</b>           | <b>M 25.1</b>         | <b>M 25.2</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Messenger<br>Whatsapp | Messenger<br>Whatsapp | Messenger<br>Whatsapp |

|   | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> | <b>Service C - Messenger</b>   | <b>Service D - WhatsApp</b>   |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | N/A                         | N/A                          | No   | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  |                             |                              | As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to regularly review the measures we have in place in Messenger, in conjunction with the measures on the linked social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram). We will continue to actively review measures, including as we launch new products and disinformation trends change. | As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp is deeply committed to addressing misinformation while protecting people's privacy – without weakening encryption. Our approach is centred around limiting virality, preventing coordinated misuse, and empowering users. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] |                             |                              | No   | No  |

|   |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? |  |  | As mentioned in our baseline report, misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation. | As mentioned in our baseline report, misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation. |
|---|--|--|--|--|

|              |  |  |  |  |
|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| Measure 25.1 |  |  | Messenger  | WhatsApp   |
| QRE 25.1.1   |  |  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false or partly false by our fact-checkers are prominently labelled when re-shared in Messenger, this includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Misinformation labels (clear, visual labels to content that has been debunked by fact-checkers, and surfaces their fact-checking articles for additional context)</li> <li>• Warning screens (when someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share).</li> </ul> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with accurate information. To this purpose, WhatsApp partners with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Organisations certified by the IFCN</b> around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Because private messages and calls on WhatsApp are secured with end-to-end encryption, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated reporting. Users can flag potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organisations by sending them a message, and fact-checking organisations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article.</li> <li>• <b>Government agencies and nonprofit organisations</b> to help make authoritative information available to users on WhatsApp</li> </ul> <p><b>WhatsApp also works to empower users by supporting fact-checking through grants.</b> In September 2022, as part of the <a href="#">Spread the Facts Grant Program</a> in partnership with IFCN, WhatsApp awarded \$450,000 in grants to organisations working to lessen the impact of misinformation on WhatsApp. Recipients have worked on projects ranging from developing audio fact-checks to reach indigenous communities to launching a media literacy course. During the reporting period, Meta's</p> |

|  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  |  | partners presented to the broader fact-checking community on how they used this grant, including its impact, and shared learnings from their work.   |
| SLI 25.1.1   |  |  | Please see section 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers. | <p><b>Partnerships with fact-checkers:</b> 13 fact-checking organisations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business App and/or the WhatsApp Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information.</p> <p>The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. A reduction in the number of partners using the tool does not necessarily reflect a change in the number of fact-checking partners WhatsApp has in its WhatsApp fact-checking programme.</p> <p>WhatsApp has a formal fact-checking programme which utilises the WhatsApp Business Platform and has not seen a reduction during this reporting period of its partner numbers.</p>   |
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |  |  |  |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) |  |  |  | <p>The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. A reduction in the number of partners using the tool does not necessarily reflect a change in the number of fact-checking partners WhatsApp has in its WhatsApp fact-checking programme.</p> <p>Directory of fact-checking organisations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) during the period of this report]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 20 Minutes (French)</li> <li>○ AFP France (French)</li> <li>○ AFP Africa (English)</li> <li>○ France24 (French)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Germany <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ CORRECTIV (German)</li> <li>○ AFP Faktencheck (German)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |

|                                  |  |  |  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
|                                  |  |  |  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ dpa Faktencheck (German)</li> <li>● Greece <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Ellinika Hoaxes (Greek)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Italy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Pagella Politica / Facta (Italian)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Portugal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Polígrafo (Portuguese)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Spain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ EFE Verifica (Spanish)</li> <li>○ Maldita (Spanish)</li> <li>○ Newtral (Spanish)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>  |
| Measure 25.2                     |  |  | Messenger  | WhatsApp   |
| QRE 25.2.1                       |  |  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, to <u>help</u> reduce the spread of viral misinformation and harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger. For example, when a user shares content from their feed into a private chat, and that content has been rated by a 3pfc, we continue to show the label on the content.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default for all private messages and calls. In this context, we work to counter misinformation both by limiting virality on our platform, and by encouraging users to think about the messages that are forwarded to them. We do this by using:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Forwarding labels</li> <li>● Limits to messaging forwarding</li> </ul> <p>WhatsApp provides a simple way to double check messages that have been forwarded many times: using the “Search on web” tool. This tool helps our users find news results or other sources of information about content they have received. This feature works by allowing users to tap a link that enables them to upload the message via their browser.</p> <p>We continue to evolve our efforts and approaches to tackling misinformation on WhatsApp. This ongoing work is focused on making sure we have the most efficient surface impact and consistently improving reach of our partners.</p> |
| SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools |  |  |  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the introduction of the additional forwarding limits in April 2020 reduced virality immediately by 70%. When we introduced the new group chat</p>  |

|  |  |  |   |  |
|--|--|--|---|--|
|  |  |  |   | forwarding limit in 2022, we saw a reduction of approximately 20% in the number of forwarded messages sent to groups on WhatsApp globally. |
|  |  |  | <i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i> | <i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i>  |

# VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

## VI. Empowering the research community

### Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

|  | C.26                  | M 26.1                | M 26.2                | M 26.3                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|   | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram   |
|---|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?<br>[Yes/No] | In the <u>first 6 months of 2024</u> , Meta added some new data and features to the Meta Content Library and API. Specifically, we made it possible for researchers to download a subset of publicly-accessible content posted by widely-known individuals and entities. We also added a subset of personal Facebook profiles' content and 'comments' as a new data type within the Meta Content Library. This will help researchers study how people around the world receive, discuss and reinterpret content across publicly-accessible pages and posts.  | In the <u>first 6 months of 2024</u> , Meta added some new data and features to the Meta Content Library and API. Specifically, we made it possible for researchers to download a subset of publicly-accessible content posted by widely-known individuals and entities. We also added a subset of personal Instagram content and 'comments' as a new data type within the Meta Content Library. This will help researchers study how people around the world receive, discuss and reinterpret content across publicly-accessible pages and posts.  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <p>As mentioned in our previous report, in 2023, <u>Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content on Facebook. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p>Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for</p> | <p>As mentioned in our previous report, in 2023, <u>Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p>Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for</p> |



|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
|   | <p>research, starting with the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR’s Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Facebook via its <a href="#">Transparency Centre</a>. We’ve shared our quarterly reports throughout 2024 there:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">The Community Standards Enforcement Report</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">The Adversarial Threat Report</a></li> </ul> | <p>research, starting with the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR’s Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Instagram via its <a href="#">Transparency Centre</a>. We’ve shared our quarterly reports throughout Q1 2024 there:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">The Community Standards Enforcement Report</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">The Adversarial Threat Report</a></li> </ul> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.   | We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.   |

|                   |  |  |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Measure 26.1      | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 26.1.1</b> | As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Centre including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: <a href="https://transparency.fb.com/data/">https://transparency.fb.com/data/</a> . We also publish extensive reports on our | As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Centre including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: <a href="https://transparency.fb.com/data/">https://transparency.fb.com/data/</a> . We also publish extensive reports on our |

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|   | findings about coordinated behaviour in our newsroom and we have a dedicated public website hosting our <a href="#">Ad Library tools</a> .   | findings about coordinated behaviour in our newsroom and we have a dedicated public website hosting our <a href="#">Ad Library tools</a> .   |
| <b>QRE 26.1.2</b>   | <p><b>Ad Library Tools:</b> The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Centre numerous reports :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Community Standards Enforcement Report:</b> We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Centre on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 14 policies on Facebook).</li> <li>• <b>Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report:</b> We share publicly our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we will publish information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.</li> </ul> | <p><b>Ad Library Tools:</b> The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Centre numerous reports :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Community Standards Enforcement Report:</b> We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Centre on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Guidelines (against 12 policies on Instagram).</li> <li>• <b>Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report:</b> We share publicly our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we will publish information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.</li> </ul> |
| <b>SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1</b> | Over 150 users globally had access to the MCL User Interface, and more than 100 had access to the MCL API.   | Over 150 users globally had access to the MCL User Interface, and more than 100 had access to the MCL API.   |
| Measure 26.2  | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 26.2.1</b>   | <p>Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:</p>   | <p>Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Instagram. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:</p>  |

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|            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.</li> <li>● Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.</li> <li>● Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.</li> </ul> <p>Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Facebook Pages, posts, , groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts.</li> <li>● Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query.</li> <li>● Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API.</li> </ul> <p>For more details - see <a href="#">here</a>.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.</li> <li>● Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.</li> <li>● Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.</li> </ul> <p>Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Instagram posts, including a subset of personal Instagram accounts.</li> <li>● Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query.</li> <li>● Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API.</li> </ul> <p>For more details - see <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |
| QRE 26.2.2 | <p>Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts.</li> <li>● Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements</li> <li>● The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen</li> </ul> <p>For more details - see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>  | <p>Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Posts shared by and information about Instagram business and creator accounts including from a subset of personal accounts.</li> <li>● Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements</li> <li>● The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen</li> </ul> <p>For more details - see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>  |

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| <b>QRE 26.2.3</b>  | Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).<br>For more details on the application process - see <a href="#">here</a> . | Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).<br>For more details on the application process - see <a href="#">here</a> . |
| <b>SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2</b> | On June 30, 2024, there were over 150 users globally with access to the MCL User Interface, and more than 100 with access to the MCL API. Finally more than 300 global research teams are in the pipeline for access to the MCL User Interface and API tools.   |   |
| Measure 26.3   | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 26.3.1</b>  | We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our <a href="#">website</a> , which also include a dedicated <a href="#">help centre</a> .  | We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our <a href="#">website</a> , which also include a dedicated <a href="#">help centre</a> .  |

## VI. Empowering the research community

### Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

|  | <b>C.27</b>           | <b>M 27.1</b>         | <b>M 27.2</b>         | <b>M 27.3</b>         | <b>M 27.4</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your | Yes                         | Yes                          |

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| terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   |  |  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we are actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers.</p> <p>We believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential for an effective and transparent data sharing process. To enable this, we participated in a pilot with EDMO researchers that tested the platform-to-researchers data sharing process. In this pilot, we shared data with vetted researchers via the Centre D'Accès Sécurisé Aux Données (CASD), a France-based 3rd party secure data access centre, in a privacy-preserving way.</p> <p>We have also expanded our partnership with ICPSR, who vets users for access to the Meta Content Library tools.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we are actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers.</p> <p>We believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential for an effective and transparent data sharing process. To enable this, we participated in a pilot with EDMO researchers that tested the platform-to-researchers data sharing process. In this pilot, we shared data with vetted researchers via the Centre d'Accès Sécurisé Aux Données (CASD), a France-based 3rd party secure data access centre, in a privacy preserving way.</p> <p>We have also expanded our partnership with ICPSR, who vets users for access to Meta Content Library tools.</p> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | <p>We will continue to participate in the EDMO working group to further support the development of an independent intermediary body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing. This will include feeding learnings from the EDMO pilot described above into the EDMO working group.</p> <p>We are collaborating with ICPSR which is vetting users and providing access to the Meta Content Library tools. ICPSR will review applications on a rolling basis.</p>   | <p>We will continue to participate in the EDMO working group to further support the development of an independent intermediary body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing. This will include feeding learnings from the EDMO pilot described above into the EDMO working group.</p>  |

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| Measure 27.1 | Facebook | Instagram |
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| QRE 27.1.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we've been actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we shared extensive comments in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research.</p> <p>We are participating in the <u>EDMO working group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms</u>. In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the working group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40 Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners. In 2024 we continue our involvement in the EDMO working group, and are actively participating in the suggested design of an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) to enable GDPR compliant data sharing. As described above, we participated in a pilot with EDMO researchers that tested the platform-to-researchers data sharing process. In this pilot, we shared data with vetted researchers via the Centre D'Accès Sécurisé Aux Données (CASD), a France-based 3rd party secure data access centre, in a privacy-preserving way.</p> <p>We are hoping to continue to make important progress in the coming year as we believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential for an effective and transparent data sharing process.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we've been actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we shared extensive comments in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research.</p> <p>We are participating in the <u>EDMO working group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms</u>. In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the working group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40 Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners. In 2024 we continue our involvement in the EDMO working group, and are actively participating in the suggested design of an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) to enable GDPR compliant data sharing. As described above, we participated in a pilot with EDMO researchers that tested the platform-to-researchers data sharing process. In this pilot, we shared data with vetted researchers via the Centre D'Accès Sécurisé Aux Données (CASD), a France-based 3rd party secure data access centre, in a privacy-preserving way.</p> <p>We are hoping to continue to make important progress in the coming year as we believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential for an effective and transparent data sharing process.</p> |
| Measure 27.2   | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 27.2.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, while the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills-based sponsorship and participation in the EDMO pilot. Separately, we have funded a third party (CASD) to act as a third-party data sharing intermediary as part of the pilot.</p>   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, while the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills-based sponsorship and participation in the EDMO pilot. Separately, we have funded a third party (CASD) to act as a third-party data sharing intermediary as part of the pilot.</p>   |
| Measure 27.3   | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 27.3.1   | N/A at this stage   | N/A at this stage   |
| <b>SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body</b> | <p>At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another highly experienced third-party, ICPSR, who is vetting researchers and hosting access to datasets about the US 2020 election, and the Meta Content Library and API.</p>  | <p>At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another highly experienced third-party, ICPSR, who is vetting researchers and hosting access to datasets about the US 2020 election, and the Meta Content Library and API.</p>  |
| Measure 27.4   | Facebook  | Instagram   |

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| QRE 27.4.1 | As mentioned in our baseline report, since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). Since <u>2021</u> , we have been expanding our Influence Operations (IO) Archive dataset – which provides information on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> and contains more than 100 removed networks to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide. This dataset provides access to raw data where researchers can visualise and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis. | As mentioned in our baseline report, since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). Since 2021, we have been expanding our Influence Operations (IO) Archive dataset– which provides information on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> and contains more than 100 removed networks – to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide. This dataset provides access to raw data where researchers can visualise and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis. |
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## VI. Empowering the research community

### Commitment 28

Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

|  | <b>C.28</b>           | <b>M 28.1</b>         | <b>M 28.2</b>         | <b>M 28.3</b>         | <b>M 28.4</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | <b>Service A - Facebook</b> | <b>Service B - Instagram</b> |
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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No                          | No                           |

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| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <p>Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports.</p> <p>Following the <u>rollout</u> of our Meta Content Library tool we gathered feedback from researchers to ensure the sort of publicly-accessible data they need is available to them in a way that's effective for their research. Based on that feedback, we added some new data and features. Specifically, we made it possible for researchers to download a subset of publicly-accessible content posted by widely-known individuals and entities. This data is accessible in a downloadable CSV format through the Meta Content Library user interface. We also added 'comments' as a new data type within the Meta Content Library. This will help researchers study how people around the world receive, discuss and reinterpret content across publicly-accessible pages and posts.</p> | <p>Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports.</p> <p>Following the <u>rollout</u> of our Meta Content Library tool we gathered feedback from researchers to ensure the sort of publicly-accessible data they need is available to them in a way that's effective for their research. Based on that feedback, we added some new data and features. Specifically, we made it possible for researchers to download a subset of publicly-accessible content posted by widely-known individuals and entities. This data is accessible in a downloadable CSV format through the Meta Content Library user interface. We also added 'comments' as a new data type within the Meta Content Library. This will help researchers study how people around the world receive, discuss and reinterpret content across publicly-accessible pages and posts.</p> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>Yes</p>   | <p>Yes</p>   |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including enhancing application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.</p>  | <p>We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including enhancing application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.</p>  |

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| <p>Measure 28.1</p>      | <p>Facebook</p>  | <p>Instagram</p>   |
| <p><b>QRE 28.1.1</b></p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world.</p> <p>Relevant details about research tools are available on our <a href="#">Transparency Centre</a>.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world.</p> <p>Relevant details about research tools are available on our <a href="#">Transparency Centre</a>.</p> |
| <p>Measure 28.2</p>      | <p>Facebook</p>  | <p>Instagram</p>   |



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| <p><b>QRE 28.2.1</b></p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta provides a variety of data sets and tools for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <a href="#">one place</a>.</p> <p>The main data available only to researchers are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Meta Content Library and API.</b> The Library includes data from certain public profiles, public posts, pages, groups, and events on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API.</li> <li>- <b>Ad Targeting Data Set,</b> which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. <b>140+ researchers globally have access to Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.</b></li> <li>- <b>URL Shares Data Set,</b> which includes differentially private individual-level counts of the number of people who viewed, clicked, liked, commented, shared, or reacted to any URL on Facebook between January 2017 and September 2022. Counts are aggregated at the level of country, year-month, age bracket, gender. The URL Shares data set is now in a steady state and previous updates are available to approved users. In order to maintain the independence of researchers who use these data, access to the URL Shares is granted by <a href="#">Social Science One</a>. New researchers are onboarded once per quarter and access is governed by a <a href="#">Research Data Agreement</a>. 200+ researchers globally have access to the URL Shares dataset since its release in February 2020.</li> <li>- <b>Influence Operations Research Archive for</b> coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) Network Disruptions, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.</li> <li>- <b>Data for Good.</b> Provides a range of dashboards that make our data easier to understand.</li> </ul> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta provides a variety of data sets and tools for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <a href="#">one place</a>.</p> <p>The main data available only to researchers are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Meta Content Library and API.</b> For Instagram, it will include public posts and data. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API.</li> <li>- <b>Ad Targeting Data Set,</b> which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. <b>160+ researchers globally have access to Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.</b></li> <li>- <b>Influence Operations Research Archive for</b> coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) <b>Network Disruptions,</b> as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Measure 28.3</p>      | <p>Facebook</p>  | <p>Instagram</p>  |
| <p><b>QRE 28.3.1</b></p> | <p>No reporting possible at this stage</p>   | <p>No reporting possible at this stage</p>  |
| <p>Measure 28.4</p>      | <p>Facebook</p>  | <p>Instagram</p>  |
| <p><b>QRE 28.4.1</b></p> | <p>No reporting possible at this stage</p>   | <p>No reporting possible at this stage</p>  |

**VI. Empowering the research community**

**Commitment 29**

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

Commitment 29 applies to research organisations.

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

### Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

|  | C.30                  | M 30.1                | M 30.2                | M 30.3                | M 30.4                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook  | Service B - Instagram   |
|--|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we continued to strengthen our fact-checking program - which is the largest global fact-checking network of any platform. We are committed to supporting the long-term strength of the fact-checking industry by helping fact-checkers develop new skills, pursue innovation and scale their efforts to better address misinformation online. We are also co-chair of the fact-checking working group of the Code's Taskforce.</p> <p>We continued to fund licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms. We also created bespoke dashboards to help 3PFCs monitor election misinformation and offered advanced level training for fact-checkers.</p> <p>In this reporting period Meta announced that it now accepts the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) as fulfilling a prerequisite for joining Meta's Third Party Fact-Checking Programme for Europe-based fact-checking organisations in recognition of the strong standards it has established for the European fact-checking community.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we continued to strengthen our fact-checking program - which is the largest global fact-checking network of any platform. We are committed to supporting the long-term strength of the fact-checking industry by helping fact-checkers develop new skills, pursue innovation and scale their efforts to better address misinformation online. We are also co-chair of the fact-checking working group of the Code's Taskforce.</p> <p>We continued to fund licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms. We also created bespoke dashboards to help 3PFCs monitor election misinformation and offered advanced level training for fact-checkers.</p> <p>In this reporting period Meta announced that it now accepts the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) as fulfilling a prerequisite for joining Meta's Third Party Fact-Checking Programme for Europe-based fact-checking organisations in recognition of the strong standards it has established for the European fact-checking community.</p> |

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|  | <p>Meta also added three new local fact-checking partners to their EU programme in this reporting period. Those partners were Les Surligneurs (France), Demagog.sk (Slovakia), and Factcheck.bg (Bulgaria)</p> <p>Meta also funded and supported the EFCSN in a <u>new project</u> ahead of the EU Election focused on identifying AI generated/digitally altered media misinformation. The goal of this project was to improve the skills and capabilities of the European fact-checking community in debunking and countering AI-generated misinformation, facilitate common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and raise the wider public's awareness on this type of misinformation through media literacy campaigns. The results of this project included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A series of 5 workshops with experts that gave training to over 200 individual fact-checkers across Europe.</li> <li>• A <u>media literacy campaign</u> which included a one-pager, explainer video and infographics that was published in 27 different languages across Europe and reached a total of 12.7 million impressions.</li> <li>• Facilitating the development of common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and informing relevant stakeholders of the state of AI generated misinformation across EU markets.</li> </ul> <p>In advance of the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Meta launched a refresher training series for partners in their European programme. The aim of these trainings was to ensure that fact-checkers were up to date on the latest programme policies, product updates as well as Newship offerings. This training series included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A misinformation policy training, which touched on our latest policies and provided guidance on reviewing Gen AI content.</li> <li>• A misinformation product refresher, which looked at the various labels fact-checker's can use and how to interpret components of a piece of content when deciding how to rate it as well as product workflows.</li> <li>• A Newship dashboard training: this session was run by Newship where they demonstrated the use of key dashboards</li> </ul> | <p>Meta also added three new local fact-checking partners to their EU programme in this reporting period. Those partners were Les Surligneurs (France), Demagog.sk (Slovakia), and Factcheck.bg (Bulgaria)</p> <p>Meta also funded and supported the EFCSN in a <u>new project</u> ahead of the EU Election focused on identifying AI generated/digitally altered media misinformation. The goal of this project was to improve the skills and capabilities of the European fact-checking community in debunking and countering AI-generated misinformation, facilitate common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and raise the wider public's awareness on this type of misinformation through media literacy campaigns. The results of this project included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A series of 5 workshops with experts that gave training to over 200 individual fact-checkers across Europe.</li> <li>• A <u>media literacy campaign</u> which included a one-pager, explainer video and infographics that was published in 27 different languages across Europe and reached a total of 12.7 million impressions.</li> <li>• Facilitating the development of common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and informing relevant stakeholders of the state of AI generated misinformation across EU markets.</li> </ul> <p>In advance of the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Meta launched a refresher training series for partners in their European programme. The aim of these trainings was to ensure that fact-checkers were up to date on the latest programme policies, product updates as well as Newship offerings. This training series included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A misinformation policy training, which touched on our latest policies and provided guidance on reviewing Gen AI content.</li> <li>• A misinformation product refresher, which looked at the various labels fact-checker's can use and how to interpret components of a piece of content when deciding how to rate it as well as product workflows.</li> <li>• A Newship dashboard training: this session was run by Newship where they demonstrated the use of key dashboards</li> </ul> |
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|   | <p>on elections related topics, as well as providing useful tooling tips.</p> <p>Meta also provided all 3PFCs working on Meta fact-checking programs with access to the <a href="#">Meta Content Library (MCL)</a>, during the reporting period. MCL is a web-based tool where fact-checkers can analyse public content, identify misinformation in their country/language, and study how it is spreading. It enables:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Searching public posts across Facebook is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.</li> <li>• Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.</li> <li>• Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results.</li> </ul> | <p>on elections related topics, as well as providing useful tooling tips.</p> <p>Meta also provided all 3PFCs working on Meta fact-checking programs with access to the <a href="#">Meta Content Library (MCL)</a>, during the reporting period. MCL is a web-based tool where fact-checkers can analyse public content, identify misinformation in their country/language, and study how it is spreading. It enables:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Searching public posts across Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.</li> <li>• Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.</li> <li>• Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results.</li> </ul> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes   | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | We are constantly analysing and working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community. In the second half of 2024, Meta plans to reinforce its guidance for 3PFCs relating to rating AI generated content. We also intend to conduct further training programmes for all 3PFCs on using the MCL.  | We are constantly analysing and working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community. In the second half of 2024, Meta plans to reinforce its guidance for 3PFCs relating to rating AI generated content. We also intend to conduct further training programmes for all 3PFCs on using the MCL.   |

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| Measure 30.1 | Facebook | Instagram |
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| <p><b>QRE 30.1.1</b></p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta’s fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.<br/>All fact-checking partners follow IFCN’s <a href="#">Code of Principles</a>, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.</p> <p>The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e., how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta’s fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.<br/>All fact-checking partners follow IFCN’s <a href="#">Code of Principles</a>, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.</p> <p>The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e., how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |   |
| <p><b>QRE 30.1.2</b></p> | <p>Austria (German, Dutch, French)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a></p>  | <p>Austria (German, Dutch, French)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Belgium (Dutch, French, German)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a><br/><a href="#">Knack</a></p>  | <p>Belgium (Dutch, French, German)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a><br/><a href="#">Knack</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Bulgaria (Bulgarian)</p>  | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">FactCheck.bg</a></p>   | <p>Bulgaria (Bulgarian)</p>  | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">FactCheck.bg</a></p>   |
|                          | <p>Croatia (Croatian)</p>  | <p><a href="#">Faktograf.hr</a><br/><a href="#">AFP</a></p>   | <p>Croatia (Croatian)</p>  | <p><a href="#">Faktograf.hr</a><br/><a href="#">AFP</a></p>   |
|                          | <p>Cyprus (Greek)</p>  | <p><a href="#">AFP</a></p>  | <p>Cyprus (Greek)</p>  | <p><a href="#">AFP</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Czechia (Czech)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Demagog.cz</a></p>   | <p>Czechia (Czech)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Demagog.cz</a></p>   |
|                          | <p>Denmark (Danish)</p>  | <p><a href="#">TjekDet</a></p>  | <p>Denmark (Danish)</p>  | <p><a href="#">TjekDet</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)</p>  | <p><a href="#">Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M</a></p>   | <p>Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)</p>  | <p><a href="#">Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M</a></p>   |
|                          | <p>Finland (Finnish)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a></p>  | <p>Finland (Finnish)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>France (French, English)</p>  | <p><a href="#">20 Minutes</a><br/><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Les Observateurs de France 24</a><br/><a href="#">Les Surligneurs</a></p> | <p>France (French, English)</p>  | <p><a href="#">20 Minutes</a><br/><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Les Observateurs de France 24</a><br/><a href="#">Les Surligneurs</a></p> |
|                          | <p>Germany (German, Dutch, French)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Correctiv</a><br/><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a></p>  | <p>Germany (German, Dutch, French)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Correctiv</a><br/><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Greece (Greek)</p>  | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Ellinika Hoaxes</a></p>  | <p>Greece (Greek)</p>  | <p><a href="#">AFP</a><br/><a href="#">Ellinika Hoaxes</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Hungary (Hungarian)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a></p>  | <p>Hungary (Hungarian)</p>   | <p><a href="#">AFP</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Ireland (English)</p>   | <p><a href="#">TheJournal.ie</a></p>  | <p>Ireland (English)</p>   | <p><a href="#">TheJournal.ie</a></p>  |
|                          | <p>Italy (Italian)</p>   | <p><a href="#">Open</a><br/><a href="#">Pagella Politica</a></p>  | <p>Italy (Italian)</p>   | <p><a href="#">Open</a><br/><a href="#">Pagella Politica</a></p>  |

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|  | Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)   | <a href="#">Delfi</a><br><a href="#">Re:Baltica</a>  | Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)   | <a href="#">Delfi</a><br><a href="#">Re:Baltica</a>   |
|  | Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)   | <a href="#">Delfi</a><br><a href="#">Patikrinta 15min</a>  | Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)   | <a href="#">Delfi</a><br><a href="#">Patikrinta 15min</a>   |
|  | Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)   | <a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>  | Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)   | <a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>   |
|  | Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)  | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>   | Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)  | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>  |
|  | Poland (Polish)  | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">Demagog</a>   | Poland (Polish)  | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">Demagog</a>  |
|  | Portugal (Portuguese)  | <a href="#">Poligrafo</a><br><a href="#">Observador</a>  | Portugal (Portuguese)  | <a href="#">Poligrafo</a><br><a href="#">Observador</a>   |
|  | Romania (Romanian)   | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro</a>  | Romania (Romanian)   | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro</a>   |
|  | Slovakia (Slovak)  | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">Demagog.cz</a><br><a href="#">Demagog.sk</a>                                | Slovakia (Slovak)  | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">Demagog.cz</a><br><a href="#">Demagog.sk</a>                                       |
|  | Slovenia (Slovene)   | <a href="#">Oštro</a>  | Slovenia (Slovene)   | <a href="#">Oštro</a>   |
|  | Spain (Spanish, Catalan)   | <a href="#">AFP</a><br><a href="#">EFE Verifica</a><br><a href="#">Maldito Buló</a><br><a href="#">Newtral</a> | Spain (Spanish, Catalan)   | <a href="#">AFP España</a><br><a href="#">EFE Verifica</a><br><a href="#">Maldito Buló</a><br><a href="#">Newtral</a> |
|  | Sweden (Swedish, English)  | <a href="#">Kallkritikbyran</a>  | Sweden (Swedish, English)  | <a href="#">Kallkritikbyran</a>   |
| <b>QRE 30.1.3</b>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>In addition to the remuneration of our fact-checking partners for their work on our platforms, Meta also contributes to programs such as industry initiatives, sponsorships, fellowships, and grant programs, such as the Meta funded collaboration with the EFCSN which took place during the January-June 2024 reporting period, ahead of the European Parliamentary elections.</p> <p>We continue to fund licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.</p> |  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>In addition to the remuneration of our fact-checking partners for their work on our platforms, Meta also contributes to programs such as industry initiatives, sponsorships, fellowships, and grant programs, such as the Meta funded collaboration with the EFCSN which took place during the January-June 2024 reporting period, ahead of the European Parliamentary elections.</p> <p>We continue to fund licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.</p> |   |
| <b>SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations</b> | Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.   |  | Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.   |   |
|  | <i>See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2</i>   |  | <i>See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2</i>   |   |



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| Measure 30.2 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 30.2.1   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's <u>Code of Principles</u>, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.</p> <p>From 2024, third-party fact-checkers may also be onboarded to Meta if they are certified with the European Fact-Checking Standards Networks (EFCSN).</p>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's <u>Code of Principles</u>, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.</p> <p>From 2024, third-party fact-checkers may also be onboarded to Meta if they are certified with the European Fact-Checking Standards Networks (EFCSN).</p>  |
| QRE 30.2.2   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular initiatives to collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools.</p> <p>Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking. We have similarly updated our 3PFC online training centre with the most up to date guidance on Meta's policies and products to support effective fact-checking.</p> | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together.</p> <p>Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking. We have similarly updated our 3PFC online training centre with the most up to date guidance on Meta's policies and products to support effective fact-checking.</p> |
| QRE 30.2.3   | <i>QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations</i>   | <i>QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations</i>   |
| Measure 30.3 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 30.3.1   | As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.   | As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.   |
| Measure 30.4 | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| QRE 30.4.1   | As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.  | As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.   |

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

### Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

|  | C.31                  | M 31.1                | M 31.2                | M 31.3                | M 31.4                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram   |
|--|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <p>Meta provided all 3PFCs working on Meta fact-checking programs with access to a new tool: <a href="#">Meta Content Library (MCL)</a>, during the reporting period. MCL is a web-based tool where fact-checkers can analyse public content, identify misinformation in their country/language, and study how it is spreading. It enables:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Searching public posts across Facebook is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.</li> <li>• Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.</li> <li>• Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results.</li> </ul> | <p>Meta provided all 3PFCs working on Meta fact-checking programs with access to a new tool: <a href="#">Meta Content Library (MCL)</a>, during the reporting period. MCL is a web-based tool where fact-checkers can analyse public content, identify misinformation in their country/language, and study how it is spreading. It enables:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Searching public posts across Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.</li> <li>• Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.</li> <li>• Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results.</li> </ul> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve  | No   | No  |

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| the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]                                 |   |   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community. |

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| Measure 31.1                           | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| Measure 31.2                           | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 31.1.1</b>                      | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. The current warning in place says that accounts that repeatedly share false information may experience temporary restrictions, including having their posts reduced.</p> <p><b>Regarding rating AI-generated content.</b> Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.</p>   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. The current warning in place says that accounts that repeatedly share false information may experience temporary restrictions, including having their posts reduced.</p> <p><b>Regarding rating AI-generated content.</b> Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.</p>   |
| <b>SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks</b> | <p>Filtered to content created on Facebook in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</li> <li>2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</li> </ol> <p>*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (150,000). This is expected.</p> | <p>Filtered to content created on Instagram in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.</li> <li>2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.*</li> </ol> <p>*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (39,000). This is expected.</p> |

|                      | Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |
|----------------------|---|---|--|--|
| <b>Member States</b> |   |   |  |  |
| Austria              | Over 920,000  | Over 47,000   | Over 80,000  | Over 13,000  |
| Belgium              | Over 1,200,000  | Over 57,000   | Over 98,000  | Over 14,000  |
| Bulgaria             | Over 770,000  | Over 36,000   | Over 39,000  | Over 8,000   |
| Croatia              | Over 530,000  | Over 34,000   | Over 40,000  | Over 8,700   |
| Cyprus               | Over 260,000  | Over 30,000   | Over 35,000  | Over 8,000   |
| Czech Republic       | Over 840,000  | Over 38,000   | Over 59,000  | Over 10,000  |
| Denmark              | Over 600,000  | Over 40,000   | Over 70,000  | Over 10,000  |
| Estonia              | Over 110,000  | Over 18,000   | Over 18,000  | Over 5,300   |
| Finland              | Over 260,000  | Over 34,000   | Over 54,000  | Over 10,000  |
| France               | Over 5,300,000  | Over 81,000   | Over 230,000   | Over 19,000  |
| Germany              | Over 5,200,000  | Over 92,000   | Over 320,000   | Over 25,000  |
| Greece               | Over 1,200,000  | Over 46,000   | Over 96,000  | Over 12,000  |
| Hungary              | Over 630,000  | Over 36,000   | Over 49,000  | Over 8,600   |
| Ireland              | Over 790,000  | Over 50,000   | Over 92,000  | Over 14,000  |
| Italy                | Over 5,600,000  | Over 83,000   | Over 340,000   | Over 21,000  |
| Latvia               | Over 220,000  | Over 19,000   | Over 19,000  | Over 5,400   |
| Lithuania            | Over 310,000  | Over 26,000   | Over 26,000  | Over 5,800   |
| Luxembourg           | Over 130,000  | Over 23,000   | Over 16,000  | Over 5,700   |
| Malta                | Over 110,000  | Over 23,000   | Over 15,000  | Over 5,100   |
| Netherlands          | Over 1,300,000  | Over 63,000   | Over 150,000   | Over 17,000  |
| Poland               | Over 2,300,000  | Over 55,000   | Over 120,000   | Over 13,000  |
| Portugal             | Over 1,600,000  | Over 54,000   | Over 150,000   | Over 16,000  |

|                 |                        |                     |                     |                    |
|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Romania         | Over 1,500,000         | Over 47,000         | Over 73,000         | Over 11,000        |
| Slovakia        | Over 560,000           | Over 30,000         | Over 38,000         | Over 7,800         |
| Slovenia        | Over 310,000           | Over 26,000         | Over 22,000         | Over 6,300         |
| Spain           | Over 4,500,000         | Over 77,000         | Over 270,000        | Over 22,000        |
| Sweden          | Over 850,000           | Over 53,000         | Over 100,000        | Over 14,000        |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 30,000,000</b> | <b>Over 150,000</b> | <b>Over 990,000</b> | <b>Over 39,000</b> |

|   |   |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| <b>SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken</b> | 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.<br>2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |   | 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.<br>2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |  |
|   | Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. | Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.  | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024. |
| <b>Member States</b>                        |   |   |   |  |
| Austria                                     | Over 920,000  | 43%   | Over 80,000   | 41%  |
| Belgium                                     | Over 1,200,000  | 44%   | Over 98,000   | 39%  |
| Bulgaria                                    | Over 770,000  | 49%   | Over 39,000   | 46%  |
| Croatia                                     | Over 530,000  | 44%   | Over 40,000   | 36%  |
| Cyprus                                      | Over 260,000  | 49%   | Over 35,000   | 44%  |
| Czech Republic                              | Over 840,000  | 35%   | Over 59,000   | 37%  |
| Denmark                                     | Over 600,000  | 39%   | Over 70,000   | 42%  |
| Estonia                                     | Over 110,000  | 38%   | Over 18,000   | 45%  |
| Finland                                     | Over 260,000  | 38%   | Over 54,000   | 38%  |
| France                                      | Over 5,300,000  | 52%   | Over 230,000  | 44%  |
| Germany                                     | Over 5,200,000  | 41%   | Over 320,000  | 43%  |
| Greece                                      | Over 1,200,000  | 47%   | Over 96,000   | 48%  |

|                 |                        |            |                     |            |
|-----------------|------------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|
| Hungary         | Over 630,000           | 51%        | Over 49,000         | 42%        |
| Ireland         | Over 790,000           | 41%        | Over 92,000         | 37%        |
| Italy           | Over 5,600,000         | 52%        | Over 340,000        | 47%        |
| Latvia          | Over 220,000           | 37%        | Over 19,000         | 44%        |
| Lithuania       | Over 310,000           | 44%        | Over 26,000         | 42%        |
| Luxembourg      | Over 130,000           | 42%        | Over 16,000         | 51%        |
| Malta           | Over 110,000           | 57%        | Over 15,000         | 40%        |
| Netherlands     | Over 1,300,000         | 36%        | Over 150,000        | 37%        |
| Poland          | Over 2,300,000         | 43%        | Over 120,000        | 40%        |
| Portugal        | Over 1,600,000         | 56%        | Over 150,000        | 42%        |
| Romania         | Over 1,500,000         | 39%        | Over 73,000         | 42%        |
| Slovakia        | Over 560,000           | 40%        | Over 38,000         | 38%        |
| Slovenia        | Over 310,000           | 34%        | Over 22,000         | 39%        |
| Spain           | Over 4,500,000         | 55%        | Over 270,000        | 44%        |
| Sweden          | Over 850,000           | 47%        | Over 100,000        | 40%        |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 30,000,000</b> | <b>46%</b> | <b>Over 990,000</b> | <b>43%</b> |

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <b>SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2</b> | Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.  | Average of monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024.   |
|  | Denominator to be decided within the Taskforce ahead of the baseline report - <i>Pending further Taskforce discussions</i>   | Denominator to be decided within the Taskforce ahead of the baseline report - <i>Pending further Taskforce discussions</i>   |
| <b>Monthly Active Users</b>  | Over a 6-month period, ending 31 March 2024 (i.e., 1 October 2023 - 31 March 2024), there were a total of approximately 260.7 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report. | Over a 6-month period, ending 31 March 2024 (i.e., 1 October 2023 - 31 March 2024), there were a total of approximately 264.3 million average monthly active users on Instagram in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Instagram DSA transparency report. |

|                   |  |  |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Measure 31.3      | Facebook   | Instagram  |
| <b>QRE 31.3.1</b> | Meta is an active member of the Taskforce sub-group on fact-checking which will, among other things, work towards this repository. | Meta is an active member of the Taskforce sub-group on fact-checking which will, among other things, work towards this repository. |

|              |   |   |
|--------------|---|---|
| Measure 31.4 | Facebook  | Instagram   |
| QRE 31.4.1   | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta joined the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023. | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta joined the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023. |

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

### Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

|  | C.32                  | M 32.1                | M 32.2                | M 32.3                |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

|  | Service A - Facebook   | Service B - Instagram  |
|--|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No   | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | As mentioned in our baseline report, fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation. | As mentioned in our baseline report, fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation. |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we will work (as outlined in Commitment 32) with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.<br><br>We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we will work (as outlined in Commitment 32) with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.<br><br>We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community. |

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| Measure 32.1  | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| Measure 32.2  | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 32.1.1</b>   | As mentioned in our baseline report, all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program, and we continue to improve it. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. | As mentioned in our baseline report, all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program, and we continue to improve it. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Instagram, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. |
| <b>SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools</b> | <i>See list in QRE 30.1.2 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.</i>  |   |
| Measure 32.3  | Facebook   | Instagram   |
| <b>QRE 32.3.1</b>   | As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular conversations to collect feedback on the information, tools and interface we make available to our fact-checkers in an effort to improve them.   | As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular conversations to collect feedback on the information, tools and interface we make available to our fact-checkers in an effort to improve them.  |



|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
|  | <p>For example, in advance of the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Meta launched a refresher training series for partners in their European programme. The aim of these trainings was to ensure that fact-checkers were up to date on the latest programme policies, product updates as well as Newship offerings. This training series included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A misinformation policy training, which touched on our latest policies and provided guidance on reviewing Gen AI content.</li> <li>• A misinformation product refresher, which looked at the various labels fact-checker’s can use and how to interpret components of a piece of content when deciding how to rate it as well as product workflows.</li> <li>• A Newship dashboard training: this session was run by Newship where they demonstrated the use of key dashboards on elections related topics, as well as providing useful tooling tips.</li> </ul> <p>Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.</p> | <p>For example, in advance of the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Meta launched a refresher training series for our 3PFC partners. The aim of these programmes was to ensure that 3PFCs were refreshed and up to date on understanding our programme policies, product updates and work flows as well as our Newship offerings. This training series included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A misinformation policy refresher, which touched on our policies and provided guidance on reviewing Gen AI content.</li> <li>• A misinformation product refresher, which looked at the various labels 3PFCs can use and how to interpret components of a piece of content when deciding how to rate it as well as matching and appeals.</li> <li>• A Newship dashboard training: this session was run by Newship partners where they demonstrated the use of key dashboards on elections related topics, as well as providing useful tooling tips.</li> </ul> <p>Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.</p> |
|--|---|--|

|   |
|---|
| <b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b>  |
| <b>Commitment 33</b>  |
| Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence. |
| Commitment 33 applies to fact-checking organisations.   |

## VIII. Transparency Centre Commitments 34 – 36

### VIII. Transparency Centre

#### Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website

|  | <b>C.34</b>                                    | <b>M 34.1</b>                                  | <b>M 34.2</b>                                  | <b>M 34.3</b>                                  | <b>M 34.4</b>                                  | <b>M 34.5</b>                                  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger |

|   |   |     |
|---|---|-----|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | Yes   | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) co-funded the Transparency Centre website's development, to ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code.                             |     |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes   |     |
| If yes, which further implementation  | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) plans to continue to participate in the Transparency Centre working group, notably through the review of the launched product to oversee any key necessary improvements. |     |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? |  |
|--|--|

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Measure 34.1 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 34.2 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 34.3 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 34.4 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 34.5 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |

| VIII. Transparency Centre   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Commitment 35   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | C.35   | M 35.1   | M 35.2   | M 35.3   | M 35.4   | M 35.5   | M 35.6   |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:  | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Centre in due course. |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Centre in due course. |

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Measure 35.1 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 35.2 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 35.3 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 35.4 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 35.5 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
| Measure 35.6 | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |

| VIII. Transparency Centre   |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| Commitment 36   |  |  |  |  |
| Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner. |  |  |  |  |
|   | C.36   | M 36.1   | M 36.2   | M 36.3   |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:  | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms) | Yes |
|---|-----|

|   |  |
|---|--|
| of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   |  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload this report in due course and support other signatories in their efforts to upload their own reports.        |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload all future reports in due course and support other signatories in their efforts to upload their own reports. |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Measure 36.1   | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 36.2   | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 36.3   | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| <b>QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)</b>  | Having supported the working group in collecting feedback on the user experience of the website, we then worked with the group and VOST Europe in particular to ensure key improvements to the Transparency Centre navigability and user friendliness as well as simplifying the report uploading process for signatories. |
| <b>QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)</b>  | The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.  |
| <b>SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.</b> | The common Transparency Centre was visited by around 6,200 unique users between 01/01/2024 to 30/06/2024 and around 1,800 users downloaded reports 7,600 times during this period. For Meta specifically, over 1,400 downloads (combined) occurred of our most recent and previous reports by over 430 unique users.       |

# IX. Permanent Taskforce

## Commitment 37

## IX. Permanent Taskforce

### Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Taskforce. The Taskforce includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Taskforce can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Taskforce are made by consensus.

|  | <b>C.37</b>                                    | <b>M 37.1</b>                                  | <b>M 37.2</b>                                  | <b>M 37.3</b>                                  | <b>M 37.4</b>                                  | <b>M 37.5</b>                                  | <b>M 37.6</b>                                  | <b>M 37.7</b>                                  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?<br>[Yes/No]                  | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) is an active member of the Taskforce and its varied working groups, particularly on elections, crisis monitoring, the Transparency Centre, reporting, fact-checking (which Meta also co-chairs) and generative AI. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?<br>[Yes/No] | Yes  |



|   |   |
|---|---|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) will continue its involvement in the working groups listed above. |
|---|---|

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 37.1      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 37.2      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 37.3      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 37.4      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 37.5      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| Measure 37.6      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| <b>QRE 37.6.1</b> | Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) is an active member of the Taskforce and its varied working groups, particularly on elections, crisis monitoring, the Transparency Centre, reporting, fact-checking, and generative AI by attending regular meetings on each of those workstreams and co-chairing the fact-checking working group. |

# X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

## X. Monitoring of Code

### Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

|  |  |               |
|--|--|---------------|
|  | <b>C.38</b>                              | <b>M 38.1</b> |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |               |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | Globally we have around 40,000 people working on safety and security.  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies benefit from our experience and expertise. While we don't foresee substantial changes, we are constantly assessing how to best ensure the implementation of this Code and improve our reporting. |

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 38.1      | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger   |
| <b>QRE 38.1.1</b> | Globally we have around 40,000 people working on safety and security including around 15,000 content reviewers. All of these investments work to combat the spread of harmful content, including disinformation and misinformation, and thereby contribute to our implementation of the Code. Teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, trust and safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity and product development all work on these challenges. These teams are distributed globally, and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners. |

| <b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>  |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Commitment 39</b>  |  |
| Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble. |  |
|   | <b>C.39</b>                              |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:  | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | This report was submitted within the required timeline. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve  | No  |

|   |   |
|---|---|
| the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]                                 |   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | This report was submitted within the required timeline. |

### X. Monitoring of the Code

#### Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

|  | <b>C.40</b>                                    | <b>M 40.1</b>                                  | <b>M 40.2</b>                                  | <b>M 40.3</b>                                  | <b>M 40.4</b>                                  | <b>M 40.5</b>                                  | <b>M 40.6</b>                                  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger | Facebook<br>Instagram<br>Whatsapp<br>Messenger |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | In this report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger continue to provide QREs and SLIs across the different chapters at a level of granularity that goes beyond any previous transparency efforts. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the                            | Yes   |

|   |   |
|---|---|
| implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]   |   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to work to improve the information they provide in their QREs and to strengthen their SLIs across the chapters of this Code. |

## X. Monitoring of the Code

### Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Taskforce towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

|  | <b>C.41</b>           | <b>M 41.1</b>         | <b>M 41.2</b>         | <b>M 41.3</b>         |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram | Facebook<br>Instagram |

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | We have been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators.<br>We supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through our collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the   | Yes  |

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| next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] |  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?        | Moving forward, we will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope. |

| <b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>   |                     |
|--|---------------------|
| <b>Commitment 42</b>   |                     |
| Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce. |                     |
|  | <b>C.42</b>         |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:   | Facebook, Instagram |

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook and Instagram engaged on a regular basis with both the European Commission and the wider Taskforce working group on crisis monitoring to share information on the war in Ukraine, the Hamas-Israel war, and the upcoming European elections. We are in this capacity taking part in discussions on a crisis reporting template and the appropriate response mechanism. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the   | Yes  |

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| next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] |   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?        | As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook and Instagram will continue their active participation in the Taskforce's crisis monitoring working group and election working group as well as their engagement with the European Commission on this topic, notably the harmonisation with the obligations under the Digital Services Act. |

| <b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>   |  |
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| <b>Commitment 43</b>   |  |
| Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Taskforce. |  |
|  | <b>C.43</b>                              |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:   | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the   | Yes  |



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| next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] |   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?        | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide the required information in the template provided, and will engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves. |

## X. Monitoring of the Code

### Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

#### C.44

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| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger |
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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits under the DSA. |

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| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits. |

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

## Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

### War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

As outlined in our benchmark report, we took a variety of actions with the objectives of:

- Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: We've added several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted.
- Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared.
- Reducing the spread of misinformation: We are taking extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and continuing to consult with outside experts. This included expanding our 3PFC network in Slovakia and Bulgaria, with partners [demagog.sk](#) and [factcheck.bg](#).
- Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetizing and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites.
- In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today, Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others.
- On June 25th 2024, we added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included: Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

Our main strategies are in line with what we outlined in our benchmark report, with a focus on safety features in Ukraine and Russia, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation (including through media literacy campaigns), tools to help our community access crucial resources, transparency around state controlled media and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

This means (as outlined in previous reports) we will continue to:

- Monitor for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other adversarial networks (See commitment 16 for more information on behaviour we saw from Doppelganger during the reporting period).
- Enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines
- Work closely with fact-checkers on the ground
- Strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the Central and Eastern Europe region

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

### Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy   | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)   | Rationale  |
|--|---|--|
| No further policy updates since our benchmark report   | N/A   | We continue to enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines and prioritise people’s safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta’s technologies, tools and processes. There are no substantial changes to report on for this period. |
| <b>Scrutiny of Ads Placements</b>  |   |  |
| As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes in our approach to ad placement for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.                   |   |  |
| <b>Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)</b>   | As mentioned in our baseline report, our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> prohibit ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies. For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our <a href="#">Content Monetisation Policies</a> , any content that’s labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our <a href="#">Partner Monetisation Policies</a> . |  |
|  | As mentioned in our baseline report, we prohibited ads or monetisation from all Russian state-controlled media. Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.   |  |
| <b>Political Advertising</b>   |   |  |
| As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes in our approach to political advertising for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.         |   |  |
| <b>Integrity of Services</b>   |   |  |
| As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes in our approach to the integrity of our services for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes. |   |  |

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| <p><b>Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs ( Commitment 14)</b></p>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.</p> <p>Since the invasion began, <a href="#">we've provided updates on our response</a>, including the measures we've taken to help keep Ukrainians and Russians safe, our approach to misinformation, state-controlled media and ensuring reliable access to trusted information.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our security teams took down three distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war (announced <a href="#">here</a>, <a href="#">here</a>, and <a href="#">here</a>) and have continued to monitor and enforce against Russian threat actors engaged in coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). We also took <a href="#">action</a> to secure accounts that we believe were targeted by Ghostwriter, a threat actor that has been tracked for some time by the security community. In August 2023, we provided <a href="#">updated analysis</a> on the work we've done to remove efforts by a Russian CIB network, known in the security field as "Doppelganger," to return to our platforms. We also published <a href="#">recommendations</a> on how to improve cross-Internet responses to the domain name abuse we've observed in this case. Similarly, our <a href="#">Q4 2023 adversarial threats report</a> detailed how we removed 1,020 Facebook accounts, five Pages, two Groups and 711 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Ukraine and targeted audiences in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The people behind this activity posted primarily in Russian about political events in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.</p> <p>The Q1 2024 adversarial threats report shares a detailed assessment and breakdown of Doppelganger's behaviour, and is the 7th report which has provided detail on tactics and behaviour of this network. Some behaviour shifts were noticed on Meta's platforms from Doppelganger, although the campaign continues to be a "smash-and-grab" effort expending a large amount of resources in the face of a very high detection rate and daily loss of assets, Doppelganger has largely ceased to engage in the following tactics on our apps, while still actively deploying them elsewhere online:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No linking to spoofed websites impersonating news media or government agencies;</li> <li>• No commenting on posts by other people;</li> <li>• No fictitious brands present on platform (e.g., Reliable Recent News); and</li> <li>• No seeding of links to drive traffic off-platform (in ads, posts, comments, etc.), including via multiple redirects.</li> </ul> <p>While these are significant shifts in on-platform behaviour, we know this may change as Doppelganger tries to evolve. Our teams remain vigilant to block any new tactics.</p> |
| <p><b>Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitment 14 -16)</b></p> | <p>As mentioned in the baseline report, throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.</p> <p>We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the platform around the clock, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.</p>   |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>  |  |

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| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes in our approach to empowering users for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.</p>                  |   |
| <p><b>Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)</b></p>   | <p><b>State controlled media:</b> We continue to take the actions we outlined in our benchmark report. We have taken further action to limit the impact of state controlled media, described above.</p> <p><b>Escalation channel:</b> This channel continues to operate as outlined in our benchmark report.</p> <p><b>Covert influence campaigns:</b> We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. Specifically, while we originally removed two Russian covert influence campaigns last year, we've seen thousands of recidivist attempts to create fake accounts. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.</p>   |
| <p><b>Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)</b></p>   | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we're providing tools to help our community access crucial resources and take action to support people in need.</p> <p>We supported the Halo Trust and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to spread authoritative factual information about the risks in contaminated areas, risks related to unexploded ordinances and life-saving information around shelters. Notably we sponsored the targeted ads campaigns of Halo Trust and improved the WhatsApp chat bot run by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to ensure a safe and secure infoline.</p> <p>We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine.</p> <p>We continue to work through our Data for Good program, and maintain our tools to connect people in Ukraine with high-quality, timely information to stay safe, find family and friends, and locate support services.</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering the Research Community</b></p>  |   |
| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes in our approach to empowering the research community for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.</p> |   |
| <p><b>Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 17-25)</b></p>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the Data for Good program shares privacy-protected data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty and climate change. All three key areas of this program (maps, surveys, insights from public posts) have been activated to assist the Ukraine humanitarian response.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we provided <b>baseline population density maps</b> (the high resolution settlement layer) of Ukraine and surrounding countries to humanitarian organisations for supply-chain planning and to aid demining efforts. These are the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e., no Facebook user data).</p>  |

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|  | <p>Our <b>Social Connectedness Index</b> has been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission – Joint Research Centre unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to quantify the rate at which Ukrainian refugees seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.</p> <p>We provided regular <b>Ukraine Displacement reports</b> to a small set of leading humanitarian organisations and agencies.</p>  |
| <b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b>  |  |
| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes in our approach to empowering the fact-checking community for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p> |  |
| <p><b>Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU (Commitment 30-33)</b></p>  | <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, for misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we continue to work with our growing network of independent third-party fact-checking partners.</p> <p>The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.</p> <p>Since our last report, which already documented an expansion in our network, we also expanded the programme with three new fact-checkers, two of which are based in Slovakia and Bulgaria, with partners <a href="#">demagog.sk</a> and <a href="#">factcheck.bg</a>.</p> <hr/> <p>In Europe, we partner with 45 fact-checking organisations, covering 36 languages. This includes 29 partners covering 26 countries and 23 different languages in the EU.</p> |

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| <b>Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis</b>  |  |
| <b>Israel – Hamas War</b>   |  |
| <p><b>Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]:</b><br/>         In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the Israel – Hamas War.</p>  |  |
| <p><b>Mitigations in place or planned – at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]:</b><br/>         In the wake of the 07/10/2023 terrorist attacks in Israel and Israel's response in Gaza, expert teams from across Meta took immediate crisis response measures, while protecting people's ability to use our apps to shed light on important developments happening on the ground. As we did so, we were guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, the protection of the dignity of victims, and the right to non-discrimination – as well as balancing those with the right to freedom of expression. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to prioritise and mitigate the most salient human rights risks: in this case, that people may use Meta platforms to further inflame an already violent conflict. We also looked to international humanitarian law (IHL) as an important source of reference for</p> |  |



assessing online conduct. We have provided a [public overview](#) of our efforts related to the war in our Newsroom. The following are some examples of the specific steps we have taken:

#### **Taking Action on Violating Content:**

- We quickly established a special operations centre staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. This allows us to remove content that violates our Community Standards or Community Guidelines faster, and serves as another line of defence against misinformation.
- We continue to enforce our policies around [Dangerous Organisations and Individuals](#), [Violent and Graphic Content](#), [Hate Speech](#), [Violence and Incitement](#), [Bullying and Harassment](#), and [Coordinating Harm](#).
- Our teams are monitoring the situation and in some cases temporarily introducing limited, proportionate and time-bound measures to address specific, emerging risks, including stronger steps to avoid recommending borderline content, hashtag blocking, restrictions on Facebook and Instagram live, collaborating with local partners and protecting the identity of hostages.

#### **Safety and Security:**

- In addition to this, our teams have detected and taken down a cluster of activity linked to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) and [attributed](#) to Hamas in 2021. These fake accounts attempted to re-establish their presence on our platforms.
- In Q1 2024, we also removed 510 Facebook accounts, 11 Pages, one Group, and 32 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Israel and primarily targeted audiences in the United States and Canada. The network posted primarily in English about the Israel-Hamas war, including calls for the release of hostages; praise for Israel's military actions; criticism of campus antisemitism, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and Muslims claiming that 'radical Islam' poses a threat to liberal values in Canada.
- We [memorialise accounts](#) when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

#### **Reducing the Spread of Misinformation:**

- We're working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta has a large third-party fact-checking network, with coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, Reuters and Fatabyano. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
- We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
- We're also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers.
- We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

#### **User Controls:**

We continue to provide [tools](#) to help people control their experience on our apps and protect themselves from content they don't want to see. These include but aren't limited to:

- Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
- Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
- Comment controls: You can [control](#) who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
- Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook.

- Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed.
- Sensitive Content Control: Instagram’s Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations.

More detail on these tools can be found in the chapter sections below.

**Oversight Board cases:**

The Oversight Board remains another avenue for review of Meta’s crisis response, and during the reporting period the Board has reviewed and decided on 5 cases relating to the Hamas-Israel war. Details of these cases can be found here:

- <https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-q98qpzb1/>
- <https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/bun-3bczqsyp/> (2 cases)
- <https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-o78k5lg3/>
- <https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/bun-jexzgiy5/>

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

**Policies and Terms and Conditions**

There are no changes to Meta’s policies to report on at this time.

For the duration of the ongoing crisis, Meta has taken various actions to mitigate the possible content risks emerging from the crisis. This includes, inter alia, under the Dangerous Organisations and Individuals Policy, removes imagery depicting the moment an identifiable individual is abducted, unless such imagery is shared in the context of condemnation or a call to release, in which case we allow with a Mark as Disturbing (MAD) interstitial; and, remove Hamas-produced imagery for hostages in captivity in all contexts. Meta has some further discretion policies which may be applied when content is escalated to us.

**Scrutiny of Ads Placements**

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes in our approach to Ad placements for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

**Political Advertising**

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| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes in our approach to Political Advertising for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p>        |   |
| <p><b>AI Generated or altered SIEP ads disclosure</b><br/>(Commitment 3)</p>   | <p><u>Meta announced in November 2023</u> an AI Disclosure policy to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. This policy went into effect in early 2024 and is required globally.</p> <p>Advertisers now have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or</li> <li>● Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or</li> <li>● Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video or audio recording of the event.</li> </ul> |
|  | <p>Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the <u>Ad Library</u>. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser.</p> <p>The AI Disclosure policy helps inform people about digitally altered or created Ads. This way, people will be more aware about the authenticity of messaging, which will help combat Disinformation.</p>  |
|  | <p><b>Integrity of Services</b></p>   |
| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes in our approach to the integrity of our services for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.</p> |   |
| <p><b>Removing a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour Network</b> (Commitment 14, Commitment 16)</p>  | <p>In Q1 2024, we also removed 510 Facebook accounts, 11 Pages, one Group, and 32 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Israel and primarily targeted audiences in the United States and Canada. The network posted primarily in English about the Israel-Hamas war, including calls for the release of hostages; praise for Israel's military actions; criticism of campus antisemitism, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and Muslims claiming that 'radical Islam' poses a threat to liberal values in Canada.</p>  |
|  | <p>We found and removed this network early in its audience building efforts, before they were able to gain engagement among authentic communities.</p>  |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>   |   |

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| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes in our approach to empowering users for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p> |   |
| <p><b>Warning Screens on sensitive content, Sensitive Content Control and Facebook Reduce:</b><br/>(Commitment 17)</p>   | <p>The 07/10/2023 attack by Hamas was designated as a Terrorist Attack under Meta's <u>Dangerous Organisation and Individuals</u> policy. Consistent with that designation, we removed all content showing identifiable victims at the moment of the attack. Following that, people began sharing this type of footage in order to raise awareness and condemn the attacks. Meta's <u>goal</u> is to allow people to express themselves while still removing harmful content. In turn, we began allowing people to post this type of footage within that context only, with the addition of a warning screen to inform users that it may be disturbing. If the user's intent in sharing the content is unclear, we err on the side of safety and remove it.</p> |
|  | <p>However, there are additional protections in place to ensure people have choices when it comes to this content.</p>  |
|  | <p>Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. We try not to recommend sensitive content in these places by default, but people can also choose to see less, to further reduce the possibility of seeing this content from accounts they don't follow.</p>  |
|  | <p>Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed. Or if preferred, they can turn many of these demotions off entirely. They can also choose to maintain Meta's current demotions.</p>   |
| <p>These actions ensure that we balance the protection of voice with removing harmful content. In this context, it has allowed for important discussion and condemnation of violence, while also empowering people to make choices in reaction to the content they see on Facebook and Instagram.</p>  |   |
| <p><b>Hidden words Filter</b><br/>(Commitment 18, Commitment 19)</p>   | <p>When turned on, Hidden Words filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments, so people never have to see them. People can customise this list, to make sure the terms they find offensive are hidden.</p>   |
|  | <p>Hidden Words help people choose offensive terms and phrases to hide, so they are protected from seeing them.</p>   |
| <p><b>Limits</b> (Commitment 18, Commitment 19.)</p>   | <p>When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.</p>   |
|  | <p>This tool gives people choice about DM and requests they receive, which may be important when engaging online around sensitive topics.</p>   |
| <p><b>Comment Controls</b><br/>(Commitment 18, Commitment 19)</p>  | <p>People can <u>control</u> who can comment on their posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.</p>   |
|  | <p>This tool gives people control over engagement with what they post on Facebook and Instagram.</p>  |

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| <p><b>Show more Show less:</b><br/>(Commitment 18, Commitment 19)</p>  | <p>Show More, Show Less gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. Selecting “Show more” will temporarily increase the amount of content that is like the post a user gave feedback on, while selecting “Show Less” means a user will temporarily see fewer posts like the one that feedback was given on.</p> <p>This tool provides people with more direct control over what they see, which is important for protecting people’s well-being during high profile crisis events.</p>  |
| <p><b>Empowering the Research Community</b></p>  |  |
| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes in our approach to empowering the research community for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p>      |  |
| <p><b>Content Library and API tools</b> (Commitment 26)</p>  | <p>As we previously reported, <a href="#">Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and API tools</a> to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date.</p> <p>Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR’s Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements.</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b></p>   |  |
| <p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes in our approach to empowering the fact-checking community for this event, we are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p> |  |
| <p><b>Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection</b> (Commitment 30)</p>  | <p>Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta has a large third-party fact-checking network, with coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, Reuters and Fatabyyano. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we’ve made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.</p> <p>When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.</p>  |

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| <b>Content Warning Labels</b><br>Commitment 31) | Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party. |
|   | Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.  |

## Reporting on the service's response during an election

## Reporting on the service's response during an election

### European Elections

Meta engaged in significant preparatory work for the EU Parliamentary elections. While each election is unique, this work drew on key lessons we have learned from more than 200 elections around the world since 2016, as well as the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act and our commitments under this Code. These lessons help us focus our teams, technologies and investments so they could have the greatest impact.

For every election, we evaluate whether our standard mechanisms (which include the policies, tools and processes that we document in our reports under this Code) address the election-specific threats for that election. Should there be any outlying risks, we work across several teams and sometimes with external partners to put appropriate measures in place to mitigate those risks. The below chapter is aligned with the 2024 [European Parliament Post-Elections report](#) under the DSA. While this chapter focuses on and summarises 2 key aspects, which are:

- Cooperation with external stakeholders in advance of the elections:
  - Engagement with the European Commission
  - Working Group on Elections & Rapid Response System
  - Engagement with national authorities
  - The outcome of the rapid response system
- Our work in the Generative AI space

The full range of topics covered in the Post-elections report is listed below, and readers may read in full from the source text linked above.

#### **Topics covered under the EP Post-Elections report:**

1. Utilising and deploying our policies, and our overall content moderation efforts, to remove policy-violating content and help keep people safe on our platforms
2. Our election risk management processes
3. Cooperation with external stakeholders
4. Tools to support civic engagement
5. Preventing interference and disinformation
6. Reducing the spread of misinformation
7. Safeguards and transparency efforts related to political advertising
8. Responsible approach to Generative AI

#### **Cooperation with External Stakeholders**

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

Below, we outline in particular our engagement with the European Commission, as well as authorities and partners at the member state level.

## **Engagement with the European Commission:**

### **Pre-Election Engagements:**

In the lead up to the EP elections, Meta participated in the [Stress Test exercise](#) organised by the European Commission on April 24, 2024 (focused on threat ideation)<sup>3</sup>, as well as three subsequent online technical roundtables also with the Commission on May 17, June 3, and July 10, 2024. Meta welcomed the opportunity to provide comments on its efforts to prepare for the EP elections and to learn from and engage with other industry players, Digital Services Coordinators, civil society organisations, and fact-checkers on their preparation and capacity to tackle specific risks related to the elections, including information operations, misinformation, and other cyber threats. These regular exchanges helped strengthen communication with other stakeholders, enabling a faster response and cooperation in case of major incidents. The multi-stakeholder and multi-pronged approach were central in our election readiness work, regularly integrating feedback from the Commission and lessons learned from the direct discussions undertaken at these engagements.

### **Working Group on Elections & Rapid Response System:**

Meta is also an active member of the EU Code of Practice (“CoP”) on Disinformation Taskforce’s Working Group on Elections and took part in its [Rapid Response System](#). To this end, Meta set up an email alias for Taskforce members as well as the European Commission to flag trends and on-boarded the 16 organisations in the working group to a direct escalation channel to report content which poses serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process and support its prompt review.

During the course of the electoral period, we received 14 reports through this channel (reporting 58 pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram), all of which were reviewed, discussed within the Working Group, and closed. We took action on 32 of those pieces of content as follows: we restricted access to 1 piece of content on the basis of local law in the jurisdiction it was alleged to be unlawful, removed 6 assets for violations of our policies, enqueued 9 pieces of content to third-party fact-checkers, and removed 16 unlabelled social issues, electoral political ads. Most cases were closed within 24 hours of receipt.

## **Engagement with National Authorities and Civil Society:**

### **National Election Authorities:**

For the EP elections, Meta conducted outreach and established communication channels with national election authorities across all 27 member states. We temporarily onboarded 23 national election authorities as well as other competent bodies to a dedicated reporting channel, allowing them to directly report content that may violate our policies or election laws, and we delivered a training session on this channel and on our elections-related policies. During the course of the electoral period, we received 358 reports through this channel (reporting 769 pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram).

In the lead-up to the elections, Meta organised deep dive sessions with the relevant national authorities in France, Germany, and Poland, as well as with the European Commission team in charge of the EU CoP on Disinformation to discuss our enforcement efforts against the Russian Influence Operation Doppelganger. We also used these meetings to share Meta’s [Q1 2024 Adversarial Threat Report](#) where we include a public, machine-readable list of threat indicators to contribute to the security community’s efforts to detect and counter malicious activity elsewhere on the internet. More information on the report and our actions to prevent interference and disinformation is available in Section 5 of the [EP Post-Elections report](#).

### **Responsible Approach to Gen AI**

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<sup>3</sup> This was a simulation exercise with designated platforms, Digital Services Coordinators, and civil society organisations to test their readiness against election manipulation and interference in relation to the European election. See <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-stress-tests-platforms-election-readiness-under-digital-services-act>.



Meta's approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for elections in the EU. Below, we provide information on our approach and the volume of AI-labelled content in the EU around the EP elections.

#### **Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling:**

Meta's Community Standards, Community Guidelines, and [Advertising Standards](#) apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by Meta's third-party fact-checking partners, whose [rating options](#) allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is created or edited by AI.

Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney, and Shutterstock that users post to Facebook and Instagram.

Meta has begun labelling a wider range of video, audio, and image content when we detect industry-standard AI image indicators or when users disclose that they're uploading AI-generated content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context.

#### **Political Ads and Meta's AI Disclosure Policy:**

Meta announced in [November 2023](#) a disclosure policy to help people understand when a SIEP ad (as described in Section 6) on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. This policy went into effect in January 2024.

Advertisers now have to disclose whenever a SIEP ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:

- Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or
- Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or
- Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video or audio recording of the event.

If advertisers do not disclose these specified scenarios, the ad may be disapproved. Repeated failure to disclose may result in further penalties to the account.

#### **AI Content Around the EP Elections:**

As a result of the above policies and measures, nearly 6,000 SIEP ads and over 5.7 million pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram in the EU were labelled with AI-related disclaimers around the EP elections, providing enhanced transparency to users.

The below table provides the total count of all SIEP ads and non-paid content created by users in the EU which were labelled with AI-related disclaimers, applied through self-disclosure or proactive detection. This is provided across Facebook and Instagram for the period between May 20, 2024 and June 23, 2024, broken down by EU member state.

| Member State    | Number of unique SIEP Ads with "digitally created" disclaimer on Facebook and Instagram combined <sup>4</sup> | Number of unique pieces of content with GenAI disclaimer on Facebook <sup>5</sup> | Number of unique pieces of content with GenAI disclaimer on Instagram <sup>6</sup> |
|-----------------|---|---|--|
| Austria         | Over 50   | Over 34,500   | Over 30,500  |
| Belgium         | Over 350  | Over 108,500  | Over 48,000  |
| Bulgaria        | Less Than 50  | Over 130,500  | Over 26,500  |
| Croatia         | Less Than 50  | Over 26,500   | Over 13,500  |
| Cyprus          | Over 100  | Over 29,000   | Over 21,000  |
| Czech Republic  | Over 50   | Over 89,500   | Over 49,000  |
| Denmark         | Over 100  | Over 41,000   | Over 21,500  |
| Estonia         | Less Than 50  | Over 7,000  | Over 6,000   |
| Finland         | Less Than 50  | Over 22,500   | Over 16,500  |
| France          | Over 50   | Over 505,000  | Over 236,500   |
| Germany         | Over 450  | Over 354,500  | Over 290,500   |
| Greece          | Over 50   | Over 111,000  | Over 76,000  |
| Hungary         | Over 1,050  | Over 147,500  | Over 35,500  |
| Ireland         | Over 50   | Over 26,000   | Over 19,500  |
| Italy           | Over 1,500  | Over 558,500  | Over 378,500   |
| Latvia          | Less Than 50  | Over 8,000  | Over 6,500   |
| Lithuania       | Less Than 50  | Over 38,500   | Over 13,500  |
| Luxembourg      | Less Than 50  | Over 5,500  | Over 3,000   |
| Malta           | Less Than 50  | Over 11,500   | Over 5,500   |
| Netherlands     | Over 50   | Over 92,000   | Over 66,000  |
| Poland          | Over 50   | Over 281,000  | Over 192,000   |
| Portugal        | Over 50   | Over 176,500  | Over 129,500   |
| Romania         | Over 1,100  | Over 322,500  | Over 78,500  |
| Slovakia        | Over 50   | Over 58,500   | Over 23,000  |
| Slovenia        | Less Than 50  | Over 15,000   | Over 7,500   |
| Spain           | Less Than 50  | Over 285,500  | Over 291,000   |
| Sweden          | Over 300  | Over 102,000  | Over 64,500  |
| <b>Total EU</b> | <b>Over 5900</b>  | <b>Over 3,595,000</b>   | <b>Over 2,156,000</b>  |

<sup>4</sup> Country is determined by advertiser's home country.

<sup>5</sup> Country is determined by content creator's home country.

<sup>6</sup> Country is determined by content creator's home country.

**Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration:**

Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the [Partnership on AI](#), for example, and signed onto [the tech accord](#) designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2024 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

**Policies and Terms and Conditions**

All the measures outlined in this report are in place ahead of the European Parliament elections. In addition, we have the policy change outlined below.

| Policy                       | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)                      | Rationale  |
|------------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Prohibited Ads Policy</b> | We expanded the scope of our <a href="#">prohibited ads policy</a> to apply to the EU Parliamentary elections. | Ads targeting the EU with the following content aren't allowed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Ads that discourage people from voting in an election. This includes ads that portray voting as useless/meaningless and/or advise people not to vote.</li><li>- Ads that call into question the legitimacy of an upcoming or ongoing election.</li><li>- Ads with premature claims of election victory.</li></ul> This prohibition includes ads that call into question the legitimacy of the methods and processes of elections, as well as their outcomes. |

**Scrutiny of Ads Placements**

The measures outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 of this report were in place for the European Parliamentary elections. They were complemented by the prohibited ads policy outlined above. Most pertinently, under these policies, content that is fact-checked cannot be used for an ad under our [Advertising Standards](#).

**Political Advertising**

We continue to enforce our policy for [Ads about social issues, elections or politics](#) (“SIEP ads”) as outlined in chapters 4 to 13 of this report. As a result of those policies and measures, we removed over 188,000 SIEP ads in the EU around the time of the EP elections for non-compliance with Meta’s SIEP policy.

The below table shows information on the number of ads accepted and run with SIEP disclaimers as well as the number of ads removed for non-compliance with Meta’s SIEP policy in EU member states between May 7 – June 23, 2024. Country is determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.

| Member State   | Number of SIEP ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined | Number of SIEP ads removed for not complying with our SIEP ads policy on Facebook and Instagram combined |
|----------------|---|--|
| Austria        | Over 9,500  | Over 1,800   |
| Belgium        | Over 32,000   | Over 6,500   |
| Bulgaria       | Over 5,200  | Over 1,700   |
| Croatia        | Over 4,600  | Over 550   |
| Cyprus         | Over 5,300  | Over 2,600   |
| Czech Republic | Over 9,400  | Over 2,400   |
| Denmark        | Over 11,000   | Over 2,100   |
| Estonia        | Over 1,400  | Over 710   |
| Finland        | Over 7,300  | Over 1,500   |
| France         | Over 9,300  | Over 9,900   |
| Germany        | Over 36,000   | Over 15,000  |
| Greece         | Over 11,000   | Over 2,600   |
| Hungary        | Over 48,000   | Over 6,500   |
| Ireland        | Over 9,700  | Over 2,400   |
| Italy          | Over 71,000   | Over 29,000  |
| Latvia         | Over 6,000  | Over 4,900   |
| Lithuania      | Over 2,400  | Over 1,100   |
| Luxembourg     | Over 510  | Less than 500  |
| Malta          | Over 1,900  | Over 1,300   |
| Netherlands    | Over 20,000   | Over 3,500   |
| Poland         | Over 14,000   | Over 11,000  |
| Portugal       | Over 2,500  | Over 2,700   |
| Romania        | Over 58,000   | Over 9,300   |

|              |                     |                     |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Slovakia     | Over 8,600          | Over 1,800          |
| Slovenia     | Over 1,400          | Less than 500       |
| Spain        | Over 11,000         | Over 7,400          |
| Sweden       | Over 15,000         | Over 2,800          |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>Over 410,000</b> | <b>Over 130,000</b> |

In addition, we both expanded advertiser abilities and increased safeguards for the European Parliamentary elections (more details below).

|   |  |
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| <b>Expanding cross-border advertising capability in the EU.</b> | Meta now permits Cross-Border advertising of SIEP ads for EU institutions as well as registered parties and groups. This update launched in January 2024.  |
|   | This expansion allows EU institutions, International Governmental Organisations and EU political parties to advertise across the EU, including therefore the EU Parliamentary elections.   |
| <b>Policy updates regarding digitally altered content</b>       | Meta launched a new policy to help people understand when a social issue, election or political advertisement on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI.   |
|   | Advertisers must disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or</li> <li>• Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.</li> </ul> |
|   | Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the <a href="#">Ad Library</a> . If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser.  |
|   | The expected impact of this policy will be to increase users' awareness of when they are viewing advertisements related to social issues, elections or politics that are digitally altered. It will also increase the transparency of these ads by requiring that advertisers disclose this information.   |

### Integrity of Services

All the measures outlined in Chapters 14 to 16 of this report were in place ahead of the European Parliamentary elections. In addition, we had the measures outlined below.

| <b>Threat ideation session</b>  | We conducted a threat ideation session with subject matter experts across the company to identify potential adversarial tactics specifically associated with the EU Parliamentary elections.   |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
|---|--|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|
|   | The threat ideation session surfaced a variety of trends and scenarios which could play out during the elections, and mapped specific on-platform risks from those with known processes and mitigations, and raised awareness across the teams responsible for managing those processes of the potential adversarial tactics. See the EP Post-Election report for further detail on this session.  |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
| <b>Empowering Users</b>   |  |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
| All the measures outlined in Chapters 17 to 25 of this report to combat disinformation and misinformation were in place ahead of the European Parliamentary elections. In addition, we had the measures outlined below. |  |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
| <b>Reminders</b>  | We connected people with information on when and where to vote ahead of and on the day of the election, based on authoritative information. In doing so, we worked closely with local election authorities as well as the European Parliament to ensure the right information was provided.  |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
|   | <p>Users in the EU engaged these in-app notifications more than 41 million times on Facebook and more than 58 million times on Instagram. For a full breakdown of the reach these in-app notifications had on EU users, see below:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="678 783 1738 1050"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Facebook Clicks</th> <th>Instagram Clicks</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Voter Information Unit</td> <td>23.4 million</td> <td>32.5 million</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Election Day Information</td> <td>18.0 million</td> <td>26.4 million</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> |                  | Facebook Clicks | Instagram Clicks | Voter Information Unit | 23.4 million | 32.5 million | Election Day Information | 18.0 million |
|   | Facebook Clicks  | Instagram Clicks |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
| Voter Information Unit  | 23.4 million   | 32.5 million     |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
| Election Day Information  | 18.0 million   | 26.4 million     |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
| <b>Media Literacy Partnerships</b>  | We worked with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) on a project to help train fact-checkers across Europe on the best way to evaluate AI-generated and digitally altered media, and on a media literacy campaign to raise public awareness of how to spot that type of content. Meta also supported the European Disability Forum to run a media literacy campaign focusing on inclusion ahead of EU Elections.   |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |
|   | See Commitment 17 above and the EP Post-Election report for further detail on these campaigns.   |                  |                 |                  |                        |              |              |                          |              |

|                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| <b>Training political candidates</b> | We delivered training sessions to political candidates to ensure they were aware of our tools and features to protect their account, educate them on our different support channels, and familiarise them with our authorisation processes for political advertising. We additionally launched an EU Election Center ( <a href="https://www.facebook.com/government-nonprofits/eu">https://www.facebook.com/government-nonprofits/eu</a> ) in all 24 EU official languages to support our government partners.               |
|                                      | Meta organised 34 training sessions and office hours in 21 countries on our policies and products ahead of the election with government organisations, political parties, electoral institutions, and civil society organisations. We participated in the EU Parliament Social Media Conference organised by the EU Directorate-General for Communication, which was attended by around 200 Members of the EU Parliament and their assistants.<br><br>See the EP Post-Election report for further detail on these campaigns. |

### Empowering the Research Community

All the measures outlined in Chapters 26 to 29 of this report were in place ahead of the European Parliamentary elections. Meta provided all 3PFCs working on Meta fact-checking programs in the EU with access to the MCL, during the first 6 months of 2024.

### Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

All the measures outlined in Chapters 30 to 33 of this report were in place ahead of the European Parliamentary elections. As a result of our misinformation policies and measures, **we treated over 11 million pieces of content on Facebook, and over 300,000 pieces of content on Instagram**, with fact checks in the month leading up to and including the electoral period.

#### Content Treated with Misinformation Labels Around the EP Elections

The below table shows information on content created by EU users which was treated with misinformation labels on Facebook and Instagram between May 7 – June 23, 2024, as well as attempted reshares.

| Member State | Facebook  |   | Instagram  |  |
|--------------|---|---|--|--|
|              | Content treated with fact checks on Facebook due to violating assessment by 3PFCs | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook | Content treated with fact checks on Instagram due to violating assessment by 3PFCs | % of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram |
| Austria      | Over 310,000  | 44%   | Over 21,000  | 44%  |
| Belgium      | Over 430,000  | 46%   | Over 25,000  | 41%  |

|                   |                        |            |                     |            |
|-------------------|------------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|
| Bulgaria          | Over 300,000           | 52%        | Over 9,400          | 47%        |
| Cyprus            | Over 200,000           | 45%        | Over 9,700          | 39%        |
| Croatia           | Over 87,000            | 48%        | Over 8,900          | 48%        |
| Czech Republic    | Over 290,000           | 34%        | Over 14,000         | 43%        |
| Denmark           | Over 220,000           | 41%        | Over 15,000         | 41%        |
| Estonia           | Over 38,000            | 38%        | Over 4,200          | 43%        |
| Finland           | Over 83,000            | 39%        | Over 13,000         | 40%        |
| France            | Over 1,800,000         | 57%        | Over 60,000         | 44%        |
| Germany           | Over 1,800,000         | 44%        | Over 90,000         | 43%        |
| Greece            | Over 450,000           | 51%        | Over 21,000         | 47%        |
| Hungary           | Over 220,000           | 53%        | Over 11,000         | 42%        |
| Ireland           | Over 250,000           | 43%        | Over 24,000         | 39%        |
| Italy             | Over 1,900,000         | 53%        | Over 70,000         | 48%        |
| Latvia            | Over 72,000            | 40%        | Over 4,600          | 43%        |
| Lithuania         | Over 110,000           | 48%        | Over 5,600          | 49%        |
| Luxembourg        | Over 40,000            | 45%        | Over 4,200          | 48%        |
| Malta             | Over 37,000            | 56%        | Over 3,800          | 32%        |
| Netherlands       | Over 460,000           | 39%        | Over 40,000         | 41%        |
| Poland            | Over 880,000           | 42%        | Over 27,000         | 46%        |
| Portugal          | Over 570,000           | 56%        | Over 37,000         | 42%        |
| Romania           | Over 540,000           | 35%        | Over 17,000         | 45%        |
| Slovakia          | Over 200,000           | 45%        | Over 9,000          | 39%        |
| Slovenia          | Over 100,000           | 38%        | Over 6,000          | 44%        |
| Spain             | Over 1,500,000         | 55%        | Over 73,000         | 48%        |
| Sweden            | Over 270,000           | 41%        | Over 27,000         | 45%        |
| <b>Overall EU</b> | <b>Over 11,000,000</b> | <b>48%</b> | <b>Over 300,000</b> | <b>44%</b> |

In addition, we had the measures outlined below.



|                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| <b>Trending event</b>            | <p>We used keyword detection to group content related to the election to make it easier for fact-checkers to identify this content.</p>  |
|                                  | <p>This tool made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the election. We recognise this is particularly important during an election. More details on the range of tools and preparations we utilised for the elections can be found in the EP Post election report.</p> |
| <b>Policy expansion to EFCSN</b> | <p>We began accepting EFCSN certification as a prerequisite for consideration in the Meta fact-checking programme in Europe, in recognition of the strong standards it has established for the European fact-checking community.</p>   |