

Code of Practice on
Disinformation – Report of
Meta for the period 01
January 2023 to 30 June 2023

Executive summary

We are proud to share our second report under the 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and are committed to working closely with the Taskforce to ensure that we continue to improve together.

The aim of this report is to provide the latest updates, for January to June 2023, on how Meta approaches misinformation and disinformation. Highlights include:

- **Media literacy:** In summer 2023, we launched a series of media literacy campaigns in Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria to help people identify and respond to misinformation. Those campaigns are the results of discussions with experts during the first half of 2023 to build relevant and impactful campaigns, especially in the context of the upcoming elections in Slovakia. We will give more details about those campaigns in the next iteration of the report.
- **Researcher data access:** We started rolling out Meta's new suite of tools to support independent research into public content on our platforms: [Meta Content Library and API](#). The Content Library includes near real-time public content from Facebook (public posts, pages, groups, and events) and Instagram (from creator and business accounts). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. Together, they provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-available content across Facebook and Instagram of any tool we have offered to researchers to date.
- **State media:** We published a [piece in Lawfare](#) outlining the development of our policies on state-controlled media, including the challenges of creating a framework to designate them media, the trade-offs that led us to a transparency-first approach, and the necessary adaptations during a crisis. Relatedly, Graphika published a [report](#) on Russian state-controlled media on Facebook and Instagram which observed that, six months after the invasion, posting volumes on their pages were down 43% and engagement levels had fallen 80% compared to the same day a year earlier, following our actions to restrict their reach.
- **Generative Artificial intelligence (AI):** We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. We want to work with partners in government, industry, civil society and academia to ensure that we can develop robust, sustainable solutions to tackling AI-generated misinformation. Meta is signed up to the [Partnership on AI's Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media](#), and is committed to cross-industry collaboration to help to maintain the integrity of the online information environment for our users. Besides, to bring more people into this process, we are [launching a Community Forum](#) on Generative AI aimed at producing feedback on the principles people want to see reflected in new AI technologies. It will be held in consultation with Stanford Deliberative Democracy Lab and the Behavioural Insights Team, and is consistent with our open collaboration approach to sharing AI models. We look forward to expanding this effort as a member of the Code's Task Force Working Group on Generative AI, and look forward to working together with its other members.

We also built on and improved the granularity of our reporting, **with two metrics** (in the ad placement chapter, the user empowerment chapter and the fact-checking chapter) **previously shared at EU level only that are now broken down by country**. Here are a few of the figures which are detailed further in the report:

- From 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023, we removed **over 6,900,000 ads** from Facebook and Instagram in EU member states, of which **over 24,000 ads** were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation policy.
- From 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023, we labelled **over 680,000 ads** on both Facebook and Instagram with "paid for by" disclaimers in the EU.

- **We removed 2 networks in Q1 2023 and 1 network in Q2 2023** for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy which targeted one or more European countries. We also take proactive steps to remove fake accounts, prioritising the removal of fake accounts that seek to cause harm. In Q1, we took action against **426 million fake accounts (98.7% of which were found proactively)** and in Q2 2023, we took action against **676 million fake accounts (98.8% of which were found proactively)** on Facebook globally. **We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4-5% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 and Q2 2023.**
- Between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023, **over 190,000 distinct fact-checking articles** on Facebook globally were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 40 million pieces of content in the EU**. As for Instagram, **over 52,000 distinct articles globally** were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 1.1 million pieces of content in the EU**. These numbers demonstrate the powers of our tools to scale the work of independent fact-checkers.
- We are sustaining our global fact-checking program – the largest in the industry – so our independent fact-checking partners can continue to quickly review and rate false content on our apps. We partner with **26 fact-checking organisations** covering **22 different languages** in the EU. As previously shared, when a fact-checking warning screen is placed on a post, **95% of the time people don't click to view it**. We are also sharing a measure of the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content. **On average 38% of people on Instagram and 37% of people on Facebook in the EU who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning that the content has been fact-checked.**

This report – and all future reports – builds on our benchmark report published in February 2023, which provided a detailed overview of the various policies, enforcement techniques, tools, products, resources, and partnerships we have developed across our services in relation to our commitments under the Code. We are looking forward to continuing engagement and dialogue with the European Commission, ERGA, EDMO, our co-signatories, and the rest of the Taskforce to strengthen both our practices and our transparency. We are looking forward, in particular, to working together as part of this Taskforce to ensure both preparedness and effective multi-stakeholder cooperation in preparation for the upcoming EU elections.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
1	<u>Measure 1.1</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 1.2</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 1.3</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 1.4</u>	☐	☐	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 1.5</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 1.6</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
2	<u>Measure 2.1</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 2.2</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 2.3</u>	☐	☑	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 2.4</u>	☑	☑	☐	☐

3	<u>Measure 3.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 3.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 3.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
III. Political advertising					
4	<u>Measure 4.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 4.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<u>Measure 5.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	<u>Measure 6.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	<u>Measure 7.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	<u>Measure 8.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 8.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	<u>Measure 9.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 9.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	<u>Measure 10.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 10.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	<u>Measure 11.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	<u>Measure 12.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 12.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 12.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	<u>Measure 13.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 13.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 13.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IV. Integrity of services					
14	<u>Measure 14.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 14.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 14.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	<u>Measure 15.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 15.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	<u>Measure 16.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 16.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
V. Empowering users					
17	<u>Measure 17.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 17.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 17.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	<u>Measure 18.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 18.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 18.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	<u>Measure 19.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 19.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	<u>Measure 20.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 20.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	<u>Measure 21.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 21.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 21.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22	<u>Measure 22.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.6</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.7</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

23	<u>Measure 23.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 23.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	<u>Measure 24.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25	<u>Measure 25.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 25.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VI. Empowering the research community					
26	<u>Measure 26.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 26.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 26.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27	<u>Measure 27.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	<u>Measure 28.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29	<u>Measure 29.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 29.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 29.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
30	<u>Measure 30.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31	<u>Measure 31.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32	<u>Measure 32.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 32.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 32.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33	<u>Measure 33.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
VIII. Transparency centre					
34	<u>Measure 34.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
35	<u>Measure 35.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
36	<u>Measure 36.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 36.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 36.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IX. Permanent Task-Force					
37	<u>Measure 37.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	<u>Measure 38.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
39	-	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
40	<u>Measure 40.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 40.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
41	<u>Measure 41.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 41.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 41.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
42		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 – 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Meta's new inventory filters</u> for Facebook Feeds are now rolling out to advertisers in English- and Spanish-speaking markets. We built a multi-stage AI review system to classify content for advertisers to ensure brand suitability controls are in place. These models will complement our existing technology, which already identifies content that violates or potentially violates our Community Standards and restricts ad placement against such content. This system learns to classify content in Facebook Feed, in text, video and images, to determine if it meets our monetisation policies. • We have developed controls that align with GARM's Suitability Framework, which defines high, medium and low risk content. Advertisers can now choose from the following three settings to control the type of monetizable content that can appear above 	<p>We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Meta's new inventory filters</u> for Instagram Feeds are now rolling out to advertisers in English- and Spanish-speaking markets. We built a multi-stage AI review system to classify content for advertisers to ensure brand suitability controls are in place. These models will complement our existing technology, which already identifies content that violates or potentially violates our Community Guidelines and restricts ad placement against such content. This system learns to classify content in Instagram Feed, in text, video and images, to determine if it meets our monetisation policies. • We have developed controls that align with GARM's Suitability Framework, which defines high, medium and low risk content. Advertisers can now choose from the following three settings to control the type of monetizable content that can appear above and

	<p>and below an ad (Expanded inventory, moderate inventory, limited inventory).</p> <p>We have also been working with Zefr to test and build an independent AI-powered solution to report the context in which ads appear on Facebook Feed (third-party verification solution for Facebook Feed). In early testing, we found through third party verification with Zefr, that less than one percent of content on Facebook Feed falls into the high risk GARM suitability category. Zefr's AI product assesses video, image, text and audio to label Feed content based on the GARM suitability standards. The solution allows advertisers to measure, verify and understand the suitability of content near their ads to help them make informed decisions in order to reach their marketing goals.</p> <p><i>(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)</i></p>	<p>below an ad (Expanded inventory, moderate inventory, limited inventory).</p> <p><i>(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)</i></p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Later this year, Meta's new inventory filters for Facebook Feeds will expand to support additional languages and make them available to advertisers in more countries. We'll also start testing them on additional placements including Reels, Stories, Video Feeds and other surfaces across Facebook as we learn more about advertiser preferences to improve and enhance this technology.</p> <p>We will be rolling out the third-party brand suitability verification developed with Zefr to additional badged Meta Business Partners later this year.</p> <p>This report covers January to June 2023, please find here the most recent updates which will be mentioned in more details in our next report.</p>	<p>Later this year, Meta's new inventory filters for Instagram Feeds will expand to support additional languages and make them available to advertisers in more countries. We'll also start testing them on additional placements including Reels, Stories, Video Feeds and other surfaces across Instagram as we learn more about advertiser preferences to improve and enhance this technology.</p> <p>This report covers January to June 2023, please find here the most recent updates which will be mentioned in more details in our next report.</p>

Measure 1.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.1.1	We continue to require compliance from our users with the policies defined in our baseline report regarding monetisation of their content. No additional new policies to report on in this instance.	We continue to require compliance from our users with the policies defined in our baseline report regarding monetisation of their content. No additional new policies to report on in this instance.
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid¹ or impression²) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>
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Measure 1.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.2.1	We continue to discuss potential changes to our Community Standards, Advertising Policies or Product Policies in our <u>Policy Forum meeting</u> . The meetings in the timeframe covered by the report didn't touch upon specific topics related to our advertising policies.	We continue to discuss potential changes to our Community Guidelines, Advertising Policies or Product Policies in our <u>Policy forum meeting</u> . The meetings in the timeframe covered by the report didn't touch upon specific topics related to our advertising policies.
SLI 1.2.1	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>

¹ Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

² Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

Measure 1.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.3.1	<p>We continue to offer several brand safety controls for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details].</p> <p>Users can find details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.</p>	<p>We continue to offer several brand safety controls for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details].</p> <p>Users can find details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.</p>
Measure 1.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.4.1	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.
Measure 1.5	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.5.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook received accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) for content-level Brand Safety on Facebook covering Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app. There are no further areas of accreditation for the moment.</p> <p>We are currently scoping the next round of the audit and which placements will be in scope (e.g., FB Feed). As GARM has added misinformation as the 12th category into their floor/framework. Consequently, Meta's enforcement against Misinformation may now be in scope as part of the next audit round.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report Instagram is in scope for accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) in 2023.</p> <p>We are currently scoping the next round of the audit and which Ad placements will be in scope. GARM has now added misinformation as the 12th category into their floor/framework. Consequently, Meta's enforcement against Misinformation may now be in scope as part of the next audit round.</p>
QRE 1.5.2	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the areas covered by the MRC accreditation are Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile, web and mobile in-app.</p> <p>This is a recurring audit where we will expand the scope to areas meeting the most demand where we have generally available controls. For the next round, we are still determining the final scope but plan to include Facebook Feed placements into the scope as we have suitability controls available on those placements (e.g. Inventory Filter for FB Feed).</p>	Meta will expand the scope of the recurring MRC audit to Instagram in the future. At present Meta is still determining the scope of this audit.

Measure 1.6	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.6.1	As mentioned in the baseline report, we continue to offer several <u>brand safety controls</u> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can <u>see and update brand safety settings</u> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [<u>see here for details</u>] Users can find details about <u>Meta's brand safety description of methodology</u> .	As mentioned in the baseline report, we continue to offer several <u>brand safety controls</u> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can <u>see and update brand safety settings</u> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [<u>see here for details</u>] Users can find details about <u>Meta's brand safety description of methodology</u> .
QRE 1.6.2	As mentioned in our baseline report when advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.	As mentioned in our baseline report when advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.
QRE 1.6.3	As mentioned in our baseline report we provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Facebook and provide resources to use appropriately.	As mentioned in our baseline report we provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Instagram and provide resources to use appropriately.
QRE 1.6.4	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.6.1	N/A	N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation	Yes	Yes

measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report we enforce Advertising Standards on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our Community Standards . We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level metrics, instead of EU level metrics. <i>(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)</i>	As mentioned in our baseline report we enforce Advertising Standards on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our Community Guidelines . We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level metrics, instead of EU level metrics. <i>(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)</i>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As noted in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As noted in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 2.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.1.1	As noted in our baseline report advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of service, our Community Standards and our Advertising Standards . As such, Misinformation is	As noted in our baseline report advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of use, our Community Guidelines and our Advertising Standards . As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards. See more here .

	considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards. See more here.			
SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 . Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU.	Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU.	Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Member States				
Austria	Less than 500	Over 96,000	Less than 500	Over 9,6000
Belgium	Less than 500	Over 130,000	Less than 500	Over 130,000
Bulgaria	Less than 500	Over 230,000	Less than 500	Over 230,000
Croatia	Less than 500	Over 42,000	Less than 500	Over 42,000
Cyprus	Less than 500	Over 110,000	Less than 500	Over 110,000
Czech Republic	Less than 500	Over 110,000	Less than 500	Over 110,000
Denmark	Less than 500	Over 100,000	Less than 500	Over 100,000
Estonia	Less than 500	Over 230,000	Less than 500	Over 230,000
Finland	Less than 500	Over 74,000	Less than 500	Over 740,00
France	Over 1,800	Over 1,000,000	Over 1,800	Over 1,000,000
Germany	Over 2,900	Over 650,000	Over 2,900	Over 650,000
Greece	Less than 500	Over 110,000	Less than 500	Over 110,000
Hungary	Less than 500	Over 130,000	Less than 500	Over 130,000
Ireland	Less than 500	Over 63,000	Less than 500	Over 63,000
Italy	Over 3,900	Over 710,000	Over 3,900	Over 710,000
Latvia	Less than 500	Over 120,000	Less than 500	Over 120,000
Lithuania	Over 3,600	Over 130,000	Over 3,600	Over 130,000
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Over 7,700	Less than 500	Over 7,700
Malta	Less than 500	Over 33,000	Less than 500	Over 33,000
Netherlands	Over 790	Over 280,000	Over 790	Over 280,000
Poland	Over 3,500	Over 1,100,000	Over 3,500	Over 1,100,000
Portugal	Over 900	Over 210,000	Over 900	Over 210,000
Romania	Over 760	Over 250,000	Over 760	Over 250,000
Slovakia	Less than 500	Over 69,000	Less than 500	Over 69,000

Slovenia	Less than 500	Over 100,000	Less than 500	Over 100,000
Spain	Over 2,300	Over 440,000	Over 2,300	Over 440,000
Sweden	Less than 500	Over 140,000	Less than 500	Over 140,000
Total EU	Over 24,000	Over 6,900,000	Over 24,000	Over 6,900,000

Measure 2.2	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 2.2.1	As noted in our baseline report misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our Advertising Standards for more information.		As noted in our baseline report misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our Advertising Standards for more information.	
Measure 2.3	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 2.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report the ad review system checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we use technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook. If we find ads that are identical or near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.		As mentioned in our baseline report the ad review system checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we can use technology to identify near-identical versions across Instagram. If we find ads that are near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.	
SLI 2.3.1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 	
	Number of ads removed specifically for misinformation in between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states.	Number of ads removed between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states.	Number of ads removed specifically for misinformation in between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states.	Number of ads removed between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states.
Member States				
Austria	Less than 500	Over 96,000	Less than 500	Over 96,000
Belgium	Less than 500	Over 130,000	Less than 500	Over 130,000
Bulgaria	Less than 500	Over 230,000	Less than 500	Over 230,000
Croatia	Less than 500	Over 42,000	Less than 500	Over 42,000
Cyprus	Less than 500	Over 110,000	Less than 500	Over 110,000

Czech Republic	Less than 500	Over 110,000	Less than 500	Over 110,000
Denmark	Less than 500	Over 100,000	Less than 500	Over 100,000
Estonia	Less than 500	Over 230,000	Less than 500	Over 230,000
Finland	Less than 500	Over 74,000	Less than 500	Over 74,000
France	Over 1,800	Over 1,000,000	Over 1,800	Over 1,000,000
Germany	Over 2,900	Over 650,000	Over 2,900	Over 650,000
Greece	Less than 500	Over 110,000	Less than 500	Over 110,000
Hungary	Less than 500	Over 130,000	Less than 500	Over 130,000
Ireland	Less than 500	Over 63,000	Less than 500	Over 63,000
Italy	Over 3,900	Over 710,000	Over 3,900	Over 710,000
Latvia	Less than 500	Over 120,000	Less than 500	Over 120,000
Lithuania	Over 3,600	Over 130,000	Over 3,600	Over 130,000
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Over 7,700	Less than 500	Over 7,700
Malta	Less than 500	Over 33,000	Less than 500	Over 33,000
Netherlands	Over 790	Over 280,000	Over 790	Over 280,000
Poland	Over 3,500	Over 1,100,000	Over 3,500	Over 1100,000
Portugal	Over 900	Over 210,000	Over 900	Over 210,000
Romania	Over 760	Over 250,000	Over 760	Over 250,000
Slovakia	Less than 500	Over 69,000	Less than 500	Over 69,000
Slovenia	Less than 500	Over 100,000	Less than 500	Over 100,000
Spain	Over 2,300	Over 440,000	Over 2,300	Over 440,000
Sweden	Less than 500	Over 140,000	Less than 500	Over 140,000
Total EU	Over 24,000	Over 6,900,000	Over 24,000	Over 6,900,000

Measure 2.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.4.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our ad review system relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running. More information can be found in our Business Help Center.</p> <p>Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time.</p> <p>In case of violations, advertisers will be notified directly if the Page or profile is facing restricted or disabled access to monetisation tools. Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our ad review system relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running. More information can be found in our Business Help Center.</p> <p>Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time.</p> <p>In case of violations advertisers will be notified directly if the account is restricted or disabled access to monetisation tools. Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review.</p>

SLI 2.4.1	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>
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II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Meta's new inventory filters</u> for Facebook Feeds are now rolling out to advertisers. <p>As noted in our baseline report we are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and as well as GARM and IAB Europe.</p>	<p>We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Meta's new inventory filters</u> for Instagram Feeds are now rolling out to advertisers. <p>As noted in our baseline report we are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and as well as GARM and IAB Europe.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	No	No

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<p>As noted in our baseline report we continue our close engagement with the Taskforce, GARM, and IAB.</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards, tools, or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	<p>As noted in our baseline report we continue our close engagement with the Taskforce, GARM, and IAB.</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards, tools, or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>

Measure 3.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.1.1	<p>As noted in our baseline report we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.</p> <p>We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.</p>	<p>As noted in our baseline report we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.</p> <p>We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.</p>
Measure 3.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.2.1	As noted in our baseline report we continue to engage closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.	As noted in our baseline report we continue to engage closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetisation and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.
Measure 3.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.3.1	As noted in our baseline report we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above. As mentioned above, we are also cooperating with Zefr for independent reporting on the context in which ads appear on Facebook Feed.	As noted in our baseline report we continue to work with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 – 13

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of “political and issue advertising”.

	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As noted in our baseline report we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”).	As noted in our baseline report we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will continue our work to ensure harmonisation and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.	We will continue our work towards harmonisation and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.

Measure 4.1	Facebook	Instagram
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Measure 4.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), and further details of our policies may also be found online. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Advertising Standards</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics • <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined</u> • <u>About social issues</u> • <u>Examples</u> of ads about social issues, elections or politics 	As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), and further details of our policies may also be found online. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Advertising Standards</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics • <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined on Instagram</u> • <u>About social issues</u> • <u>Examples</u> of ads about social issues, elections or politics
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	<i>The Taskforce working group on the definition of political ads has not yet begun. We will engage with this working group in due course.</i>	<i>The Taskforce working group on the definition of political ads has not yet begun. We will engage with this working group in due course.</i>

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 5

Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.

	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook's policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce	As mentioned in our baseline report Instagram's policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads

	<p>consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer.</p> <p>In addition to this, we've established measures where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies.</p>	<p>indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer.</p> <p>In addition to this, we've established measures where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will continue to work to ensure harmonisation and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.	We will continue to work to ensure harmonisation and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.

Measure 5.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 5.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the <u>authorization process required by Meta</u>.</p> <p>Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving; disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits and reporting requirements.</p> <p>If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library.</p> <p>We publicly share resources on these topics to explain our policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advertising standards covering <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the <u>authorization process required by Meta</u>.</p> <p>Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving; disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits and reporting requirements.</p> <p>If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library.</p> <p>We publicly share resources on these topics to explain our policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advertising standards covering <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dedicated public website on election integrity - Dedicated public website on the requirements for ads about social issues, elections or politics within the European Union - Details on ads about social issues, elections or politics - Details on what we consider as issue ads within the EU - How ads about social issues, elections or politics are reviewed (with examples specific to the European Union) - Availability for ads about social issues, elections or politics - Information on prohibited ads related to voting and ads about social issues, elections or politics - How to create ads about social issues, elections or politics in Ads Manager 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dedicated public website on election integrity - Dedicated public website on the requirements for ads about social issues, elections or politics within the European Union - Details on ads about social issues, elections or politics - Details on what we consider as issue ads within the EU - How ads about social issues, elections or politics are reviewed (with examples specific to the European Union) - Availability for ads about social issues, elections or politics - Information on prohibited ads related to voting and ads about social issues, elections or politics - How to create ads about social issues, elections or politics in Ads Manager
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III. Political Advertising						
Commitment 6						
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising						
	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Messenger

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook's policy requires advertisers to include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on Ads about social issues, elections or politics ("SIEP ads") to show the entity or person responsible	As mentioned in our baseline report Instagram's policy requires advertisers to include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on Ads about social issues, elections or politics ("SIEP ads") to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad. We also provide more	

	for running the ad. We provide more information on how disclaimers work for ads about social issues, elections or politics in our help centre .	information on how disclaimers work for ads about social issues, elections or politics in our help centre.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As noted in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As noted in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As noted in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 6.1	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.1.1	<p>As noted in our baseline report Meta uses disclaimers for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Not all placement nor formats can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such supports.</p> <p>While some placements are not available at this time, such as Marketplace, Search, Facebook Stories,</p>	<p>As noted in our baseline report Meta uses disclaimers for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Not all placement nor formats can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such supports.</p> <p>While some placements are not available at this time, we are working to increase availability.</p> <p>We recently extended the disclaimer to Instagram Reels [as the launch didn't occur during the reporting</p>	

	Suggested Videos, Video feed, we are working to increase availability. We recently extended the disclaimer to Facebook Reels [as the launch didn't occur during the reporting period covered, we will include this in our next report]	period covered, we will include this in our next report]	
Measure 6.2	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.2.1	As noted in our baseline report Ads about social issues, elections or politics require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.	As noted in our baseline report Ads about social issues, elections or politics require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.	
QRE 6.2.2	As noted in our baseline report examples of political ad labelling may be found in the Ad Library .	As noted in our baseline report examples of political ad labelling may be found in the Ad Library .	
SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	
	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	
Member States			
Austria	Over 290,00	Over 29,000	
Belgium	Over 260,00	Over 26,000	
Bulgaria	Over 8,100	Over 8,100	
Croatia	Over 10,000	Over 10,000	
Cyprus	Over 3,600	Over 3,600	
Czech Republic	Over 16,000	Over 16,000	
Denmark	Over 18,000	Over 18,000	
Estonia	Over 7,800	Over 7,800	
Finland	Over 35,000	Over 35,000	

France	Over 34,000	Over 34,000	
Germany	Over 59,000	Over 59,000	
Greece	Over 44,000	Over 44,000	
Hungary	Over 39,000	Over 39,000	
Ireland	Over 4,800	Over 4,800	
Italy	Over 100,000	Over 100,000	
Latvia	Over 6,200	Over 6,200	
Lithuania	Over 8,900	Over 8,900	
Luxembourg	Over 3,100	Over 3,100	
Malta	Over 1,400	Over 1,400	
Netherlands	Over 33,000	Over 33,000	
Poland	Over 36,000	Over 36,000	
Portugal	Over 5,900	Over 5,900	
Romania	Over 25,000	Over 25,000	
Slovakia	Over 18,000	Over 18,000	
Slovenia	Over 1,800	Over 1,800	
Spain	Over 59,000	Over 59,000	
Sweden	Over 29,000	Over 29,000	
Total EU	Over 680,000	Over 680,000	

Measure 6.3	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report we have developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Facebook so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time.	As mentioned in our baseline report we have developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Instagram so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time.	
Measure 6.4	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or	As mentioned in our baseline report we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still	

	politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	
Measure 6.5	N/A	N/A	Messenger
QRE 6.5.1	N/A	N/A	As noted in our baseline report when an ad, labelled as SIEP on the Facebook app, is shared via Messenger, the link redirects the user to the ad where the label is visible. Our teams are trying to find adequate solutions to continue to improve the visibility of the SIEP label further in the Messenger conversation.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report we have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a <u>policy</u> that applies to all "ads about social issues, elections or politics" Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political	As mentioned in our baseline report we have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a <u>policy</u> that applies to all "ads about social issues, elections or politics". Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties,

	parties, elections or social issues will be required to confirm their identity by submitting identification document(s) issued by the country where they want to run the ad.	elections or social issues will be required to confirm their identity by submitting identification document(s) issued by the country where they want to run the ad.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 7.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the <u>authorisation process</u> and have a "Paid for by" label. - To help guard against foreign interference, all advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting. - Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions. - To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" label. - To help guard against foreign interference, all advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting. - Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions. - To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states.	Number of unique ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 in EU member states in EU member states.

(comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Number of SIEP ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of SIEP ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined
Member States		
Austria	Over 11,000	Over 11,000
Belgium	Over 11,000	Over 11,000
Bulgaria	Over 4,200	Over 4,200
Croatia	Over 3,400	Over 3,400
Cyprus	Over 2,900	Over 2,900
Czech Republic	Over 9,500	Over 9,500
Denmark	Over 10,000	Over 10,000
Estonia	Over 3,300	Over 3,300
Finland	Over 11,000	Over 11,000
France	Over 42,000	Over 42,000
Germany	Over 50,000	Over 50,000
Greece	Over 21,000	Over 21,000
Hungary	Over 12,000	Over 12,000
Ireland	Over 3,400	Over 3,400
Italy	Over 62,000	Over 62,000
Latvia	Over 3,400	Over 3,400
Lithuania	Over 4,600	Over 4,600
Luxembourg	Over 1,500	Over 1,500
Malta	Over 1,000	Over 1,000
Netherlands	Over 16,000	Over 16,000
Poland	Over 32,000	Over 32,000
Portugal	Over 10,000	Over 10,000
Romania	Over 13,000	Over 13,000
Slovakia	Over 8,500	Over 8,500

Slovenia	Over 2,100	Over 2,100
Spain	Over 43,000	Over 43,000
Sweden	Over 13,000	Over 13,000
Total EU	Over 410,000	Over 410,000

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.2.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>. - As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. - Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>. - As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. - Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.
QRE 7.2.2	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <u>Business Help Center</u>.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page <u>using a valid disclaimer</u> to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <u>Business Help Center</u>.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account <u>using a valid disclaimer</u> to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.</p>
Measure 7.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.3.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We require advertisers to know how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We require advertisers to know how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our Advertising Policies. - In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it. <p>Facebook's <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Instagram against our Advertising Policies. - In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it. <p>Instagram's <u>Community Guidelines</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.</p>
QRE 7.3.2	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our <u>Advertising standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behaviour similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our <u>Advertising standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behaviour similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p>
Measure 7.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.4.1	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 8
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We have been implemented over the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measure: We updated our " <u>Why am I seeing this Ad</u> " tool on Facebook to provide more transparency about how users' activity both on and off our technologies may inform the machine learning models we use to shape and deliver the ads users can see. This update has also provided more examples and illustrations, as well as making it easier to access Ads controls. The " <u>Why am I seeing this Ad</u> " tool is now available for all Ads on facebook.	We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measure: We updated our " <u>Why am I seeing this Ad</u> " tool on Instagram to provide more transparency about how users' activity both on and off our technologies may inform the machine learning models we use to shape and deliver the ads users can see. This update has also provided more examples and illustrations, as well as making it easier to access Ads controls. The " <u>Why am I seeing this Ad</u> " tool is now available for all Ads on Instagram.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report we will engage with the Taskforce work streams as outlined in Measure 8.2.	As mentioned in our baseline report we will engage with the Taskforce work streams as outlined in Measure 8.2.

Measure 8.1	Facebook	Instagram
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Measure 8.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	<i>The relevant Taskforce workstream on common transparency obligations has not yet begun. Our current transparency measures are outlined under Commitments 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.</i>	<i>The relevant Taskforce workstream on common transparency obligations has not yet begun. Our current transparency measures are outlined under Commitments 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.</i>

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>In February 2023 we <u>updated</u> our “<u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u>” tool, providing more transparency about how user’s activity may inform the machine learning models we use to shape and deliver the ads users see.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information is summarised into topics about how users’ activity both on and off our technologies – such as liking a post on a friend’s Facebook page or interacting with their favourite sports website – may inform the machine learning models we use to shape and deliver the ads users see. - Include new examples and illustrations explaining how our machine learning models connect various topics to show users relevant ads. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the “<u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u>” feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. There are also additional details about when information on an advertiser’s audience list matches a person’s profile.</p>

	<p>We also made it easier for people to find our ads controls, directly from additional pages in the “Why am I seeing this ad?” tool.</p> <p>This updated version of “Why am I seeing this ad?” has rolled out globally on Facebook.</p>	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	We are planning to expand the updated version of “Why am I seeing this ad?” rolled out on Facebook to Instagram in the future.

Measure 9.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 9.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 9.1.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	<p>As mentioned above, the <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.</p> <p>In February 2023 we <u>updated</u> our <u>“Why am I seeing this ad?”</u> tool with some improvements to make it easier to use and understand. The new features will now include information summarised into topics about how users activity both on and off our technologies, examples and illustrations explaining how our machine learning models connect various topics to show users relevant ads and more ways to find our ads controls.</p> <p>Users can click on the three-dot menu in the upper-right-hand corner of any ad they see in their Facebook Feed and navigate to “Why am I seeing this ad.”</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p>	<p>As mentioned above, the <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. - Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the “Paid for by” political disclaimer on them. We also allow Instagram users to <u>control to see fewer ads about social issues, elections or politics</u>. - Our FAQs section in the <u>Ad Library</u> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. - Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the “Paid for by” political disclaimer on them. We also allow Facebook users to see <u>how we decide which ads to show</u> and how users can adjust their preferences to determine the ads users are shown. - Our FAQs section in the <u>Ad Library</u> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads. 	
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III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 10			
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.			
	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We’ve added new features to the Ads Library: Users can now save searches. Whenever a user is logged in, the user 	<p>We have been implemented over the the last 6 months from January to June 2023 the following measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We’ve added new features to the Ads Library: Users can now save searches. Whenever a user is logged in, the user can save

	<p>can save and name their most frequent queries so that filtered results can be found quickly on the Ad Library.</p> <p>This report covers January to June 2023, please find on the Ads Library the most recent updates which will be mentioned in more detail in our next report.</p>	<p>and name their most frequent queries so that filtered results can be found quickly on the Ad Library.</p> <p>This report covers January to June 2023, please find on the Ads Library the most recent updates which will be mentioned in more detail in our next report.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 10.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 10.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	As mentioned in our baseline report the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years.	As mentioned in our baseline report the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years.

<h3>III. Political Advertising</h3> <h4>Commitment 11</h4>
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Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.”					
	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report our Ad Library application programming interface (API) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report .	As mentioned in our baseline report our Ad Library application programming interface (API) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report .
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising repositories. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising repositories. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 11.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.3	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	As mentioned in our baseline report the Ad Library API provides access data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term, name or Page in the Ad Library. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete these steps to access the API.	As mentioned in our baseline report the Ad Library API provides access data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term, name or Page in the Ad Library. For Instagram accounts that don't have a linked Facebook Page, people will be able to search for an advertiser's ad using their Instagram handle name.
QRE 11.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report in 2021 we started making targeting information for more than 1.65 million social issues, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads available to academic researchers for the first time. More details on this launch are available through the baseline report.	As mentioned in our baseline report in 2021 we started making targeting information for more than 1.65 million social issues, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads available to academic researchers for the first time. More details on this launch are available through the baseline report.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 12
Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.
This commitment applies to civil society organisations.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.	As mentioned in our baseline report we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.	As mentioned in our baseline report we are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.

Measure 13.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)	We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.	We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation	Yes	Yes

measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fake accounts: Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 426 million accounts against our fake accounts policy in <u>Q1 2023</u> and 676 million fake accounts in Q2 2023 on Facebook globally. - Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down. <p>We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts on Instagram that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally to help us automatically detect bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down. <p>We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks

to put in place in the next 6 months?	our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
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Measure 14.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.1.1	<p>To clarify what we've included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:</p> <p>Inauthentic Behaviour - Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts.</p> <p>CIB Policies - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behaviour (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation", the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> <p>CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (1) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (2) the use of fake followers or subscribers (3) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains (4) Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification and (5) Account hijacking or impersonation and (6) inauthentic coordination.</p> <p>Working alongside the CIB policy is our policy on <u>Account Integrity and Authentic Identity</u>, which allows us to remove millions of fake accounts every day. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can to minimise opportunities for IO threat actors to operate on our platforms.</p> <p>Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in</p>	<p>To clarify what we've included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:</p> <p>Inauthentic Behaviour - Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram.</p> <p>CIB Policies - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behaviour (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation", the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> <p>CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (1) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (2) the use of fake followers or subscribers (3) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains (4) Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification and (5) Account hijacking or impersonation and (6) inauthentic coordination</p> <p>Working alongside the CIB policy is our policy on <u>Account Integrity and Authentic Identity</u> which allows us to remove millions of fake accounts every day. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Instagram as we can to minimise opportunities for IO threat actors to operate on our platforms.</p> <p>Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information</p>

	<p>unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p>Deep Fakes - We remove videos <u>under this policy</u> if specific criteria are met: (1) the video has been edited or synthesised, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say; and (2) the video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g. a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, replaces and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears authentic. This is pertinent for the TTP on deceptive manipulated media</p> <p>Spam - We work hard to <u>limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (1) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (2) the use of fake followers or subscribers (3) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (4) use of deceptive practices.</p> <p>Branded Content Policies - <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages.</p> <p>Privacy - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>	<p>or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p>Deep Fakes - We remove videos <u>under this policy</u> if specific criteria are met: (1) the video has been edited or synthesised, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say; and (2) the video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g. a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, replaces and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears authentic. This is pertinent for the TTP on deceptive manipulated media</p> <p>Spam - We work hard to <u>limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (1) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (2) the use of fake followers or subscribers (3) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (4) use of deceptive practices.</p> <p>Branded Content Policies - <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non transparent promotional messages</p> <p>Privacy - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>
<p>QRE 14.1.2</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours exhibited, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Guidelines, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.</p>

	<p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale.</p> <p>Besides, Pages and Groups directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.</p>	<p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale.</p> <p>Besides, accounts directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.</p>
Measure 14.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.2.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Our fake accounts policies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In Q1 2023, we took action against 426 million fake accounts (98,7% of which were found proactively). We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4-5% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 2023. ○ In Q2 2023, we took action against 676 million fake accounts (98,8% of which were found proactively). We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4-5% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q2 2023. ● Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies: In Q1 2023, we took down 2 networks which targeted at least one country in Europe, which originated in Iran and China. In Q2 2023, we removed 1 network which targeted at least one country in Europe, which originated in China. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Iran (Q1 2023): We removed 40 Facebook accounts, eight Pages and one Group for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Iran and targeted primarily Israel, and also Bahrain and France. Around 750 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and around 80 accounts joined one or more of these Groups. ○ China (Q1 2023): We removed 107 Facebook accounts and six Groups for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in China and targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, Sub-Saharan 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the policy most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies: In Q1 2023, we took down 1 network which targeted at least one country in Europe, which originated in China.. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ China (Q1 2023): We removed 35 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in China and targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, Sub-Saharan Africa, Japan, Central Asia, and the Uyghur community around the world. About 200 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts. ○ China (Q2 2023): We removed 15 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated from China and targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and global Chinese-speaking audiences. About 870 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.

	<p>Africa, Japan, Central Asia and the Uyghur community around the world. Around 15,500 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, around 200 accounts joined one or more of these Groups.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> China (Q2 2023): We removed 7,704 Facebook accounts, 930 Pages, and 15 Groups for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in China and targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and global Chinese-speaking audiences. Around 560,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and fewer than 10 accounts joined one or more of these Groups. We assess that this network's Pages were likely acquired from spam operators with built-in inauthentic followers primarily from Vietnam, Bangladesh and Brazil – none of which we assess to be the targets of this operation. 	
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FACEBOOK			
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4			
TTP OR ACTION: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR	<p>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour</u>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments) Use of fake followers or subscribers Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification Account hijacking or impersonation <p>Methodology of data measurement: CIB covers coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal, in which fake accounts are central to the operation. In each case, people coordinate with one another and use fake accounts to mislead others about who they are and what they are doing. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content – no matter who's behind them, what they post or whether they're foreign or domestic. <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</u></p>		
	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2	SLI 14.2.3

	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction /engagement on the service)
Iran	40 Facebook accounts, eight Pages, one Group	Removal of 40 Facebook accounts, eight Pages, and one Group		Around 750 accounts followed one or more of these pages; around 80 accounts joined one or more of these Groups.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted primarily Israel and also Bahrain and France.				
China	107 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, six Groups	Removal of 107 Facebook accounts, 36 Pagees, and six Groups.		Around 15,500 accounts followed one or more of these Pages; around 200 accounts joined one or more of these Groups.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, Sub-Saharan Africa, Japan, Central Asia and the Uyghur community around the world.				
China	7,704 Facebook accounts, 954 Pages and 15 Groups	Removal of 7,704 Facebook accounts, 954 Pages and 15 Groups.		Around 560,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, fewer than 10 accounts joined one or more of these Groups. We	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and				

				<p>assess that this network's Pages were likely acquired from spam operators with built-in inauthentic followers primarily from Vietnam, Bangladesh and Brazil – none of which we assess to be the targets of this operation.</p>					<p>global Chinese-speaking audiences.</p>				
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TTP OR ACTION 2	<p>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts) - Use of fake followers or subscribers - Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains <p>Methodology of data measurement: Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information here.</p>											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

GLOBAL Q1 2023	426 mn accounts	Removal of 426 mn accounts			0(deleted)	0 (deleted)	Approximately 98.7% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 2023.					
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INSTAGRAM												
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4												
TTP OR ACTION 1	<p>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments) - Use of fake followers or subscribers - Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains - Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification <p>Methodology of data measurement: <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European countries (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</u></p>											
	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2					SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Origin of network	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)
China	35 accounts	Removal of 35 accounts		About 200 accounts followed one or more of these	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted many regions around the world, including				

				Instagram accounts.				Taiwan, Sub-Saharan Africa, Japan, Central Asia and the Uyghur community around the world.				
China	15 accounts	Removal of 15 accounts		About 870 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted many regions around the world, including Taiwan, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and global Chinese-speaking audiences.				

Measure 14.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.3.1	We continue to engage with this Working Group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1-14.2.4 above.	We continue to engage with this Working Group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1-14.2.4 above.

IV. Integrity of Services			
Commitment 15			
Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.			
	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
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In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. In this context, Meta has signed up to the Partnership on AI's Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media, and is committed to cross-industry collaboration to help to maintain the integrity of the online information environment for our users.	We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. In this context, Meta has signed up to the Partnership on AI's Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media, and is committed to cross-industry collaboration to help to maintain the integrity of the online information environment for our users.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We want to work with partners in government, industry, civil society and academia in Europe and around the world, to ensure that we can develop robust, sustainable solutions to tackling AI-generated misinformation. We will participate in the newly formed working group on AI-generated disinformation under the EU Code of Practice.	We want to work with partners in government, industry, civil society and academia in Europe and around the world, to ensure that we can develop robust, sustainable solutions to tackling AI-generated misinformation. We will participate in the newly formed working group on AI-generated disinformation under the EU Code of Practice.

Measure 15.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.1.1	We currently address potential abuses from AI-generated content in three ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; (2) we remove, under our Manipulated Media policy, videos produced by AI that are likely to mislead the average person to believe someone said words they did not say; and (3) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated.	We currently address potential abuses from AI-generated content in three ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; (2) we remove, under our Manipulated Media policy, videos produced by AI that are likely to mislead the average person to believe someone said words they did not say; and (3) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated.
Measure 15.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 15.2.1	<p>Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Privacy: AI will continue to be addressed in Meta’s robust privacy review process with privacy risks identified, mitigated, evidenced and monitored. • Fairness : Meta commits to continue to address AI fairness through research, specifically through the creation and distribution of more diverse datasets, identifying new privacy-protective approaches to help Meta access data with the potential to meaningfully measure the fairness of the AI models on our platform, and responsibly scaling our fairness tools and solutions. • Accountability: Meta is developing an end-to-end AI risk management solution informed by the NIST risk management framework and playbook. • Transparency: Meta is committed to AI transparency and explainability through tools like Why Am I Seeing This, AI System Cards, and additional user-transparency initiatives that explain how Generative AI tools work from prompt to output. 	<p>Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Privacy: AI will continue to be addressed in Meta’s robust privacy review process with privacy risks identified, mitigated, evidenced and monitored. • Fairness : Meta commits to continue to address AI fairness through research, specifically through the creation and distribution of more diverse datasets, identifying new privacy-protective approaches to help Meta access data with the potential to meaningfully measure the fairness of the AI models on our platform, and responsibly scaling our fairness tools and solutions. • Accountability: Meta is developing an end-to-end AI risk management solution informed by the NIST risk management framework and playbook. • Transparency: Meta is committed to AI transparency and explainability through tools like Why Am I Seeing This, AI System Cards, and additional user-transparency initiatives that explain how Generative AI tools work from prompt to output.
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IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

	C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	No	No

implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.	As mentioned in our baseline report a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p> <p>In May 2023, we shared our <u>Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (Q1 2023)</u> with information on six covert influence operations that we removed for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. They originated in the United States, Venezuela, Iran, China, Georgia, Burkina Faso and Togo.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p> <p>In May 2023, we shared our <u>Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (Q1 2023)</u> with information on six covert influence operations that we removed for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. They originated in the United States, Venezuela, Iran, China, Georgia, Burkina Faso and Togo.</p> <p>In August 2023, we shared our <u>Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (Q2 2023)</u> with information on five covert influence operations that we removed for</p>

	<p>In August 2023, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report (Q2 2023) with information on five covert influence operations that we removed for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. They originated from Türkiye, Iran, China, and Russia.</p> <p>Besides, we've published in February 2023 some key insights from our recent Adversarial Threat Report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While Russian-origin attempts at covert activity (CIB) related to Russia's war in Ukraine have sharply increased, overt efforts by Russian state-controlled media have reportedly decreased over the last 12 months on our platform. We saw state-controlled media shifting to other platforms and using new domains to try to escape the additional transparency on (and demotions against) links to their websites. During the same period, covert influence operations have adopted a brute-force, "smash-and-grab" approach of high-volume but very low-quality campaigns across the internet. Notably, the two largest covert operations focused on the war in Ukraine that we disrupted were linked to private actors, including those associated with the sanctioned Russian individual Yevgeny Prigozhin, continuing a number of global trends we've called out in our threat reporting. More details can be found here. 	<p>violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. They originated from Türkiye, Iran, China, and Russia.</p> <p>Besides, we've published in February 2023 some key insights from our recent Adversarial Threat Report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While Russian-origin attempts at covert activity (CIB) related to Russia's war in Ukraine have sharply increased, overt efforts by Russian state-controlled media have reportedly decreased over the last 12 months on our platform. We saw state-controlled media shifting to other platforms and using new domains to try to escape the additional transparency on (and demotions against) links to their websites. During the same period, covert influence operations have adopted a brute-force, "smash-and-grab" approach of high-volume but very low-quality campaigns across the internet. Notably, the two largest covert operations focused on the war in Ukraine that we disrupted were linked to private actors, including those associated with the sanctioned Russian individual Yevgeny Prigozhin, continuing a number of global trends we've called out in our threat reporting. More details can be found here.
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	We removed 1 CIB network after reviewing information from Microsoft. The network originated in Iran and targeted primarily Israel and also Bahrain and France.	
Measure 16.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.2.1	We publish quarterly our Adversarial Treat reports, to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see. In our Q1 2023 report , in addition to sharing our analysis and threat research, we're also publishing threat indicators to contribute to the efforts by the security community to detect and counter malicious activity elsewhere on the internet.	We publish quarterly our Adversarial Treat reports, to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see. In our Q1 2023 report , in addition to sharing our analysis and threat research, we're also publishing threat indicators to contribute to the efforts by the security community to detect and counter malicious activity elsewhere on the internet.

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 – 25

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information.</p> <p>Our teams worked on developing campaigns to help citizens in Slovakia to better identify and assess misinformation which have been launched during summer 2023 [See details below].</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information.</p> <p>Youth: Meta launched an on-platform campaign on Instagram created in consultation with young people to remind them of the tools they can use to control their experience and help keep them safe. In May 2023 this campaign helped educate policymakers and parents about the family tools and other relevant resources available to support teens' well being on Instagram.</p> <p>Our teams worked on developing campaigns to help citizens in Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria to better identify and assess misinformation which have been launched during summer 2023 [See details below].</p>

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<p>Slovakia: As part of the preparation for the Slovakian elections, we launched different media literacy campaigns ahead of the elections for citizens to better identify and assess misinformation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The first campaign “Facts in Focus campaign” focused on how to critically assess information in Feed. It was launched in July, with the aim to work with local artists and creators to create content designed to show how to spot fake news and how to respond to it. - Our second campaign, launched in August was run together with DigQ, a key digital literacy Slovak NGO. This campaign includes a short video on how to spot and react to fake news. This campaign will run until the 30th of September. - Our third campaign’s goal will be to dispel misconceptions people in Slovakia may have about content management or misinformation. <p>And with the understanding that media literacy and education can also be driven on our platform through cooperation with experts, we worked with the Slovak Media Council to organise a workshop for local civil society organisations about best practices in delivering media literacy campaigns.</p>	<p>In November 2023, Meta will hold a Youth Summit that focuses on youth safety and well-being by further educating teens, families and policymakers about the tools we’ve created to promote wellbeing.</p> <p>Slovakia: As part of the preparation for the Slovakian elections, we launched different media literacy campaigns ahead of the elections for citizens to better identify and assess misinformation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The first campaign “Facts in Focus campaign” focused on how to critically assess information in Feed. It was launched in July, with the aim to work with local artists and creators to create content designed to show how to spot fake news and how to respond to it. - Our second campaign, launched in August was run together with DigQ, a key digital literacy Slovak NGO. This campaign includes a short video on how to spot and react to fake news. This campaign will run until the 30th of September. - Our third campaign’s goal will be to dispel misconceptions people in Slovakia may have about content management or misinformation. <p>The Facts in Focus campaign mentioned was launched in Lithuania and Bulgaria in July 2023. As part of the campaign, creators used their own creative storytelling to share tips on their IG accounts reminding people to do things like always check the source of the story, watch out for obvious spelling or formatting errors, make sure the link looks correct, and check visual content for signs of manipulation. This campaign will continue in the 2nd half of 2023. See here for more details.</p>

Measure 17.1	Facebook	Instagram
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<p>QRE 17.1.1</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.</p> <p>A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent or graphic imagery. - Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness. - Some forms of nudity. - Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts - Verified badges on Facebook: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with. - To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents. - Notification screens on outdated articles on the Facebook app: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Our goal is to make it easier for people to identify content that's timely, reliable and most valuable to them. - To give people more context about a news article before they share it on Facebook, Meta includes a notification screen if the article is more than 90 days old. After which, we allow people to continue sharing it if they desire. This notification helps people understand how old a given news article is and its source. - To ensure that we don't slow the spread of credible information, especially in the health space, content posted by government health authorities and recognised global health organisations does not have this notification screen. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.</p> <p>A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Warning screens on sensitive content on Instagram: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To help people avoid coming across content that they'd rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile. - Verified badges on Instagram: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with. - To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents.
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SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>
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Measure 17.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.2.1	<p>Slovakia: As part of the preparation for the Slovakian elections, we launched different media literacy campaigns ahead of the elections for citizens to better identify and assess misinformation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The first campaign “Facts in Focus campaign” focused on how to critically assess information in Feed. It was launched in July, with the aim to work with local artists and creators to create content designed to show how to spot fake news and how to respond to it. - Our second campaign, launched in August was run together with DigQ, a key digital literacy Slovak NGO. This campaign includes a short video on how to spot and react to fake news. This campaign will run until the 30th of September. - Our third campaign’s goal will be to dispel misconceptions people in Slovakia may have about content management or misinformation. 	<p>Slovakia: As part of the preparation for the Slovakian elections, we launched different media literacy campaigns ahead of the elections for citizens to better identify and assess misinformation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The first campaign “Facts in Focus campaign” focused on how to critically assess information in Feed. It was launched in July, with the aim to work with local artists and creators to create content designed to show how to spot fake news and how to respond to it. - Our second campaign, launched in August was run together with DigQ, a key digital literacy Slovak NGO. This campaign includes a short video on how to spot and react to fake news. This campaign will run until the 30th of September. - Our third campaign’s goal will be to dispel misconceptions people in Slovakia may have about content management or misinformation. <p>The Facts in Focus campaign mentioned was launched in Lithuania and Bulgaria in July 2023.: As part of the campaign, creators used their own creative storytelling to share tips on their IG accounts reminding people to do things like always check the source of the story, watch out for obvious spelling or formatting errors, make sure the link looks correct, and check visual content for signs of manipulation. This campaign will continue in the 2nd half of 2023. See here for more details.</p>
SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>We do not yet have figures of the engagement of our ongoing media literacy campaigns in CEE. We will endeavour to provide more detail on those in our next report.</i>	<i>We do not yet have figures of the engagement of our ongoing media literacy campaigns in CEE. We will endeavour to provide more detail on those in our next report.</i>

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society, and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various

	<p>various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party fact-checkers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more.</p> <p>Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the EU Digital Citizenship Working Group, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship.</p>	<p>government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party factcheckers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, the Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more.</p> <p>Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the EU Digital Citizenship Working Group, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship.</p>
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V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of <u>misinformation</u>.</p> <p>In February 2023, we gave more information on our policy to <u>restrict accounts</u> on the platform.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of <u>misinformation</u>.</p> <p>In May 2023, we've provided more information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - on how <u>ranking</u> works across Instagram to help people maximise their experience and help creators understand how their content might be surfaced.

	<p>In June 2023, we launched Facebook system cards to help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook.</p> <p>We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level reshare friction metrics, instead of EU level metrics.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Our guidelines for content lowered in feed and stories on Instagram <p>In June 2023, we launched Instagram System Cards to help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram.</p> <p>We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level reshare friction metrics, instead of EU level metrics.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 18.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through: Meta's technologies, as well as through human review teams.</p> <p>In our baseline report we mentioned our Content Distribution Guidelines outline some of the most significant reasons why content receives reduced distribution in Feed. In March 2023 we summarised the changes that we've made to the Content Distribution Guidelines and detailed any specific adjustments to the types of content we demote. For example by removing the guideline for posts from broadly untrusted news publishers, because we no longer use it as a ranking signal.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through: Meta's technologies as well as through human review teams .</p> <p>In May 2023, we published our Content distribution guidelines for Instagram. We have guidelines for content lowered in feed and stories, which outline types of content that may be shown lower in feed and stories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We remove posts that go against our Community Guidelines. We also take action against posts that we predict likely go against our Community Guidelines, but that we have not yet confirmed to be a violation, to show those posts lower in feed and stories. This includes, but is not limited to, content that we predict may go

		<p>against our guidelines on: Hate speech, Bullying and harassment, Adult nudity and sexual solicitation, Violence and incitement, Buying, selling or trading regulated products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fact-checked misinformation: we're committed to reducing the spread of misinformation, particularly clear hoaxes that have no basis in fact. When one of our fact-checking partners rates a post as false, altered or partly false, it will be shown lower in feed and stories, so fewer people see it. On feed and stories, content from accounts may also be shown lower if they repeatedly post content rated as false information by one of our independent third-party fact-checking partners. - We remove misinformation and unverifiable rumours under our Community Guidelines when they are likely to directly contribute to a risk of imminent violence or physical harm. - Content based on what a user previously reported.
<p>QRE 18.1.2</p>	<p><u>Facebook system cards</u> help people understand <u>how AI shapes</u> their product experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook.</p> <p>These cards provide detail on how our systems work in a way that is accessible for those who don't have deep technical knowledge. In June, we released 14 system cards for Facebook. They give information about how our AI systems rank content, some of the predictions each system makes to determine what content might be most relevant, as well as the controls users can use to help customise users' experience. They cover Feed, Stories, Reels and other surfaces where people go to find content from the accounts or people they follow. The system cards also cover AI systems that recommend "unconnected" content from people, groups, or accounts they don't follow. A more detailed explanation of the AI behind content recommendations is available here.</p> <p>To give a further level of detail beyond what's published in the system cards, we have shared the types of inputs – known as signals – as well as the predictive models these signals inform that help determine what content users may find most relevant from their network on Facebook. The categories of signals we're releasing represent the vast majority of signals currently used in Facebook Feed ranking for this content. Users can find these signals and</p>	<p><u>Instagram System Cards</u> help people <u>understand how AI shapes</u> their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram.</p> <p>These cards provide detail on how our systems work in a way that is accessible for those who don't have deep technical knowledge. In June, we released 8 system cards for Instagram. They give information about how our AI systems rank content, some of the predictions each system makes to determine what content might be most relevant, as well as the controls users can use to help customise users' experience. They cover Feed, Stories, Reels and other surfaces where people go to find content from the accounts or people they follow. The system cards also cover AI systems that recommend "unconnected" content from people, groups, or accounts they don't follow. A more detailed explanation of the AI behind content recommendations is available here.</p> <p>To give a further level of detail beyond what's published in the system cards, we have shared the types of inputs – known as signals – as well as the predictive models these signals inform that help determine what content users may find most relevant from their network on Instagram. The categories of signals we're releasing represent the vast majority of signals currently used in Instagram Feed ranking for this content. Users can find these signals and predictions in the Transparency Center, along with how frequently they tend to be used in the overall ranking process.</p> <p>We also use signals to help identify harmful content, which we remove as we become aware of it, as well as to help reduce the distribution of other</p>

	<p>predictions in the Transparency Center, along with how frequently they tend to be used in the overall ranking process.</p> <p>We also use signals to help identify harmful content, which we remove as we become aware of it, as well as to help reduce the distribution of other types of problematic or low-quality content in line with our Content Distribution Guidelines.</p>	types of problematic or low-quality content in line with our Content Distribution Guidelines.
QRE 18.1.3	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes and certain highly deceptive manipulated media. - For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organisations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves. <p>To contextualise the data shared below, we previously shared that when a fact-checking warning screen is placed on a post, 95% of the time people don't click to view it. This describes the behaviour of people who are scrolling through their Feeds. While this data point was illustrative, it is possible that some people never intended to view the fact-checked content.</p> <p>Regarding the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content. On average 37% of people on Facebook do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes and certain highly deceptive manipulated media. - For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organisations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves. <p>To contextualise the data shared below, we previously shared that when a fact-checking warning screen is placed on a post, 95% of the time people don't click to view it. This describes the behaviour of people who are scrolling through their Feeds. While this data point was illustrative, it is possible that some people never intended to view the fact-checked content.</p> <p>Regarding the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content. On average 38% of people on Instagram who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.</p>
SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023 .

	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Facebook between 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Instagram between 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Member States		
Austria	37%	37%
Belgium	44%	36%
Bulgaria	40%	40%
Cyprus	43%	43%
Croatia	33%	35%
Czech Republic	21%	36%
Denmark	48%	36%
Estonia	37%	37%
Finland	37%	33%
France	44%	40%
Germany	30%	36%
Greece	46%	44%
Hungary	49%	38%
Ireland	37%	32%
Italy	36%	45%
Latvia	37%	37%
Lithuania	40%	38%
Luxembourg	43%	41%
Malta	50%	38%
Netherlands	39%	34%
Poland	38%	38%
Portugal	45%	40%
Romania	41%	37%
Slovakia	31%	36%

Slovenia	29%	37%
Spain	33%	43%
Sweden	57%	35%
Total EU	37%	38%
Measure 18.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.2.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our policies and approach to tackle misinformation - which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 - are published in our Transparency Center:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meta Community Standards - Misinformation • Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') - Misinformation <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly violate our policies</u>. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policies on COVID and vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.</p> <p>In February 2023, we gave more information on our policy to <u>restrict accounts</u> on the platform. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Facebook Community Standards or Instagram Community Guidelines in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.</p> <p>These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, these restrictions only apply to Facebook accounts).</p> <p>For most violations on Facebook, strikes will lead to the following restrictions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One strike: Users will get a warning as this is their first strike. - Two to six strikes: Users will be restricted from some features, such as posting in groups, for a limited amount of time. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our policies and approach to tackle misinformation - which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 - are published in our Transparency Center:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meta Community Guidelines - Misinformation • Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') - Misinformation <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly violate our policies</u>. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policies on COVID and vaccine misinformation. If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seven strikes: Users will get a 1-day restriction from creating content, which includes posting, commenting, creating a Page and more. - Eight strikes: Users will get a 3-day restriction from creating content. - Nine strikes: Users will get a 7-day restriction from creating content. - Ten or more strikes: Users will get a 30-day restriction from creating content. <p>If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features, on top of the standard restrictions above.</p> <p>For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Facebook Community Standards or Instagram Community Guidelines after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p>	
SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Member States		
Austria	Over 3,000	Less than 500
Belgium	Over 4,600	Less than 500
Bulgaria	Less than 500	Less than 500
Croatia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Cyprus	Less than 500	Less than 500
Czechia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Denmark	Over 560	Less than 500
Estonia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Finland	Less than 500	Less than 500
France	Over 12,000	Less than 500

Germany	Over 22,000	Over 1,100
Greece	Less than 500	Less than 500
Hungary	Less than 500	Less than 500
Ireland	Over 960	Less than 500
Italy	Over 45,000	Over 1,900
Latvia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Lithuania	Less than 500	Less than 500
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 500
Malta	Less than 500	Less than 500
Netherlands	Over 13,000	Over 750
Poland	Over 9,700	Less than 500
Portugal	Over 4,500	Less than 500
Romania	Over 910	Less than 500
Slovakia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Slovenia	Over 830	Less than 500
Spain	Over 16,000	Over 1,200
Sweden	Over 980	Less than 500
Total EU	Over 140,000	Over 6,900
Measure 18.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.3.1	<p>As noted in our baseline report the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as Social Science Research, data for Good, the Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions</p> <p>Research Grants & Awards. In our baseline report we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. For example, the Foundational Integrity Research on Misinformation and Polarisation aims to support the growth of scientific knowledge in the areas of misinformation, polarisation,</p>	<p>As noted in our baseline report the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as Social Science Research, data for Good, the Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions</p> <p>Research Grants & Awards. In our baseline report we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. For example, the Foundational Integrity Research on Misinformation and Polarisation aims to support the growth of scientific knowledge in the areas of misinformation, polarisation, information quality, and social conflict on social media and social technology platforms.</p>

	information quality, and social conflict on social media and social technology platforms. In March 2023 we announced the winners of the 2022 Foundational Integrity Research request for proposals including “Investigating persuasiveness of contextualised disinformation across media” (Denmark).	In March 2023 we announced the winners of the 2022 Foundational Integrity Research request for proposals including “Investigating persuasiveness of contextualised disinformation across media” (Denmark).
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V. Empowering Users

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>In June 2023, we launched Facebook system cards to help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook.</p> <p>In June 2023, we've also expanding tools to personalise users' experience:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We've created centralised places on Facebook where users can customise controls that influence the content they see 	<p>In June 2023, we launched Instagram System Cards to help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram.</p> <p>In June 2023, we've also expanding tools to personalise users' experience:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We've created centralised places on Instagram where users can customise controls that influence the content they see on each app.

	<p>on each app. Users can visit their Feed Preferences on Facebook through the three-dot menu on relevant posts, as well as through Settings.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We're working on ways to make the "Show more, Show less" <u>feature</u> on Facebook, which is available on all posts in Feed, Video, and Reels even more prominent via the three-dot-menu. - If a user doesn't want an algorithmically-ranked Feed, the user can use the <u>Feeds tab</u> on Facebook. There is also an option to add people to the Favourites list on <u>Facebook</u>. 	<p>Users can visit the Suggested Content Control Center on Instagram through the three-dot menu on relevant posts, as well as through Settings.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - we're testing a new feature that makes it possible for users to indicate that they're "Interested" in a recommended reel in the Reels tab, so we can show more of what they like. The "Not Interested" <u>feature</u> has been available since 2021. - If a user doesn't want an algorithmically-ranked Feed they can select <u>Following</u> on Instagram to switch to a chronological Feed. There is also an option to add people to the Favourites list on <u>Instagram</u>.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 19.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.1.1	<p>We outlined our transparency tools regarding the main parameters of our recommender systems under measure 18.1 above.</p> <p><u>Facebook system cards</u> help people understand <u>how AI shapes</u> their product experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook.</p> <p>This information is also centralised <u>in our transparency centre</u>, and the policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.</p>	<p>We outlined our transparency tools regarding the main parameters of our recommender systems under measure 18.1 above.</p> <p><u>Instagram System Cards</u> help people <u>understand how AI shapes</u> their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram.</p> <p>In May 2023, we've also provided more information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - on how <u>ranking</u> works across Instagram to help people maximise their experience and help creators understand how their content

		<p>might be surfaced.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Our guidelines for content lowered in feed and stories on Instagram <p>This information is also centralised in our transparency centre, and the policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.</p>
Measure 19.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.2.1.	<p>When a user engages with content in Feed, the user gives us a combination of explicit signals (e.g. liking, commenting or resharing content etc.), and implicit signals (e.g. viewing posts) that help us predict what's meaningful to the user. And because we believe it's important that the users have even more control over their Feed experience, we've built tools to help further customise what users see. These controls include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feed preferences: provides options to fine-tune the way that content is ranked in Feed, including the ability to prioritise posts from users' Favourites; Snooze or unfollow people, Pages and groups to stop seeing their posts; and reconnect with anyone users may have unfollowed. • Show more and show less: lets users directly tell us what they want to see more or less of by selecting "Show more" or "Show less" on the posts that they see. Selecting "Show more" will temporarily increase the ranking score for that post and posts like it, and selecting "Show less" will temporarily decrease its ranking score. • Reduce: allows users to adjust the degree to which we demote problematic or low-quality content in their Feed. (Our Content Distribution Guidelines outline some of the most significant reasons why problematic or low-quality content may receive reduced distribution in Feed). • Feeds tab: allows users to see the newest posts first; content is sorted in reverse chronological order (alongside ads). <p>For more information, see here.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we created several ways for people to shape their experience on Instagram and see more of what they want on their Instagram feed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitive Content Control - Following & Favourites Feeds - 'Not Interested' control - Snooze recommendations - Mute - Hidden Words
SLI 19.2.1 - User Settings	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

As mentioned in our baseline report, the tools assessing provenance and edit history of digital content are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. Other tools to achieve this objective, including as set forth in Commitment 21 are relevant and pertinent to our subscribed products at this time.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report to fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta <u>partners with independent third-party fact-checkers</u> . We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level reshare friction metrics, instead of EU level metrics.	As mentioned in our baseline report to fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta <u>partners with independent third-party fact-checkers</u> . We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level reshare friction metrics, instead of EU level metrics.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to	No	No

substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Fact-checking program or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Fact-checking program or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 21.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report Meta partners with over 26 independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), covering 22 languages, in the EU. The work of these fact-checkers has a global impact, as the treatment of their false-rated posts (i.e. demotion, notification, and warning) are applied globally. Our third-party fact-checking program includes more than 90 organisations working in more than 60 languages globally to help us fight viral misinformation.</p> <p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. Further details are shared on our Transparency Center on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings.</p> <p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> <p>There is more detail on all the actions taken under QRE 31.1 as well as in our baseline report.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report Meta partners with over 26 independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), covering 22 languages, in the EU. The work of these fact-checkers has a global impact, as the treatment of their false-rated posts (i.e. demotion, notification, and warning) are applied globally. Our third-party fact-checking program includes more than 90 organisations working in more than 60 languages globally to help us fight viral misinformation.</p> <p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. Further details are shared on our Transparency Center on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings.</p> <p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> <p>There is more detail on all the actions taken under QRE 31.1 as well as in our baseline report.</p>

SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1	See SLI 21.1.2 below
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SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	<p>1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an informed treatment to a content from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 2. Number of distinct contents posted on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFCs from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.</p>			<p>1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an informed treatment to a content from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 2. Number of distinct contents posted on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFCs from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.</p>		
	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Content treated with fact checks on Facebook due to violating assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Content treated with fact checks on Instagram due to violating assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Global	190,000			52,000		
Member States						
Austria		Over 1,200,000	37%		Over 76,000 37%	
Belgium		Over 1,800,000	44%		Over 910,00 36%	
Bulgaria		Over 900,000	40%		Over 34,000 40%	
Cyprus		Over 380,000	43%		Over 37,000 43%	
Croatia		Over 670,000	33%		Over 370,00 35%	
Czech Republic		Over 1,000,000	21%		Over 53,000 36%	
Denmark		Over 800,000	48%		Over 52,000 36%	
Estonia		Over 140,000	37%		Over 17,000 37%	

Finland		Over 340,000	37%		Over 49,000	33%
France		Over 7,400,000	44%		Over 200,000	40%
Germany		Over 6,800,000	30%		Over 320,000	36%
Greece		Over 1,500,000	46%		Over 72,000	44%
Hungary		Over 840,000	49%		Over 36,000	38%
Ireland		Over 1,100,000	37%		Over 92,000	32%
Italy		Over 7,000,000	36%		Over 230,000	45%
Latvia		Over 290,000	37%		Over 18,000	37%
Lithuania		Over 370,000	40%		Over 20,000	38%
Luxembourg		Over 180,000	43%		Over 17,000	41%
Malta		Over 160,000	50%		Over 15,000	38%
Netherlands		Over 1,900,000	39%		Over 150,000	34%
Poland		Over 2,900,000	38%		Over 90,000	38%
Portugal		Over 2,200,000	45%		Over 160,000	40%
Romania		Over 1,900,000	41%		Over 63,000	37%
Slovakia		Over 690,000	31%		Over 33,000	36%
Slovenia		Over 380,000	29%		Over 23,000	37%
Spain		Over 6,100,000	33%		Over 270,000	43%
Sweden		Over 1,100,000	57%		Over 100,000	35%
Total EU		Over 40,000,000	37%		Over 1,100,000	38%

Measure 21.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.2.1	<p>In H1 2023, we displayed warnings on over 40 million distinct pieces of content on Facebook (including re-shares) globally based on over 190,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners.</p> <p>The impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 between January 5, 2023 and June 30 2023, meant that 37% of reshares</p>	<p>In H1 2023, we displayed warnings on over 1.1 million distinct pieces of content on Instagram (including re-shares) globally based on over 52,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners.</p> <p>The impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 between January 5, 2023 and June 30 2023, meant that 38% of reshares</p>

	attempted on Fact-Checked content on Facebook in EU Member States were not completed.	attempted on Fact-Checked content on Instagram in EU Member States were not completed.
Measure 21.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.3.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the fact-checking program's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. We continue to engage with fact-checkers and content moderation experts across our policies and consulted the Oversight Board on our approach to COVID-19 misinformation.</p> <p>Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the fact-checking program's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. We continue to engage with fact-checkers and content moderation experts across our policies and consulted the Oversight Board on our approach to COVID-19 misinformation.</p> <p>Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.</p>

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

As mentioned in our baseline report, trustworthiness indicators are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. This is acknowledged by the Commission's 2021 Guidance, which describes them as a tool signatories "could" explore, and negotiations of the updated Code which confirmed this to be a direction signatories are encouraged but not expected to follow. Other tools to achieve this objective covered elsewhere in this section - Commitment 21 in particular - are relevant and pertinent for our subscribed products at this time.

We note however that we use several of the products and features listed under Measure 22.7 (in particular information panels, banners, pop-ups, and prompts) as already outlined under Commitment 21 above, as well as in our crisis monitoring reports on both Covid-19 and Ukraine below.

V. Empowering users

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report we maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information. People can also report content to us that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards, including fake accounts or fraud.	As mentioned in our baseline report we maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information. People can also report content to us that they believe violates any of our other Community Guidelines, including fake accounts or fraud.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 23.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <u>outlined on our website</u>.</p> <p>For more context, our enforcement practices rely on three pillars – artificial intelligence (AI), human review, and user reports. As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.</p> <p>We also provide an appeal system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community Standard violations: If someone publishes a post which we decide to remove from Facebook for going against our policies, the person who posted it is notified, and <u>given the option to accept the decision or disagree and request another review</u>. - Fact-check: users are also able to request review of a fact-check rating issued by a third-party fact-checker or matched by Meta’s technology. They can do this by appealing in-product. In addition, they can reach out directly to the third-party fact-checking organisation via email. Fact-checkers are responsible for evaluating the validity of each correction. 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <u>outlined on our website</u>.</p> <p>For more context, our enforcement practices rely on three pillars – artificial intelligence (AI), human review, and user reports. As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.</p> <p>We also provide an appeal system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community Guidelines violations: If someone publishes a post which we decide to remove from Instagram for going against our policies, the person who posted it is notified, and <u>given the option to accept the decision or disagree and request another review</u>. - Fact-check: users are also able to request review of a fact-check rating issued by a third-party fact-checker or matched by Meta’s technology. They can do this by appealing in-product. In addition, they can reach out directly to the third-party fact-checking organisation via email. Fact-checkers are responsible for evaluating the validity of each correction.
Measure 23.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.2.1	<p>Meta’s processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.</p> <p>Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.</p> <p>Brigading: We will remove any adversarial networks we find where people work together to mass comment, mass post or engage in other types of repetitive mass behaviours to harass others or silence them.</p>	<p>Meta’s processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.</p> <p>Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Guidelines, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Guidelines, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.</p> <p>Brigading: We will remove any adversarial networks we find where people work together to mass comment, mass post or engage in other types of repetitive mass behaviours to harass others or silence them.</p>

	<p>Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.</p>	<p>Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Instagram, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Guidelines. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.</p>
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V. Empowering users		
Commitment 24		
<p>Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.</p>		
	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content.</p> <p>In June 2023, we <u>improved our penalty system</u> to make it fairer and more effective and we increased transparency about our content enforcement processes and developed new ways to inform people about potential restrictions that may affect their account status or content distribution.</p> <p>Additionally, in line with DSA requirements, we made relevant updates to our existing user notice and appeal processes.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Guidelines or when a fact-checker rated their content.</p> <p>Additionally, in line with DSA requirements, we made relevant updates to our existing user notice and appeal processes.</p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>

<p>Measure 24.1</p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p>QRE 24.1.1</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, <u>when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, <u>when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Guidelines. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.</p> <p>In June 2023, we also made changes to <u>Account Status on Instagram</u> to give people more information about our policies and how their account may be impacted. Now, in addition to seeing if their content may be eligible to be</p>

	<p>In June 2023, we launched the following new features:</p> <p>Account Transparency: Account Status on Facebook allows people who have restrictions on their individual accounts to see what those restrictions are, when they occurred, and how long they'll last. This is covering Profile, Page, Group and Recommendation surfaces. Users have a central place to get a more complete picture of their violation history and the standing of their account against our policies, including potential restrictions that apply to their personal profile or Pages they manage, and how to appeal.</p> <p>New Notifications When People Share Potentially Violating Content</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We launched a new pop-up notification feature on Facebook that will alert users if the content they are about to post may violate some of our Community Standards so they can choose the option to delete the post. - We rolled out pop-ups to inform users after a potential violation so that people understand why we have removed their content. That way we are helping users better understand our policies both before and after a potential violation, which is shown to be more effective at preventing someone from violating again. - We have worked for years to add friction to our products so that people have additional context to make an informed decision about what to read, trust, and share. For example, we launched a pop-up notifications that inform users if they try to follow or share content from Pages, groups or accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. <p>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.</p>	<p>recommended to non-followers in places like Explore, Reels and Feed Recommendations, users can now also see if their account is eligible to be recommended in places like Search or as a suggested account under Accounts You May Follow.</p> <p>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.</p>
SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Member States		
Austria	Over 3,000	Less than 500
Belgium	Over 4,600	Less than 500
Bulgaria	Less than 500	Less than 500

Croatia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Cyprus	Less than 500	Less than 500
Czechia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Denmark	Over 560	Less than 500
Estonia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Finland	Less than 500	Less than 500
France	Over 12,000	Less than 500
Germany	Over 22,000	Over 1,100
Greece	Less than 500	Less than 500
Hungary	Less than 500	Less than 500
Ireland	Over 960	Less than 500
Italy	Over 45,000	Over 1,900
Latvia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Lithuania	Less than 500	Less than 500
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 500
Malta	Less than 500	Less than 500
Netherlands	Over 13,000	Over 750
Poland	Over 9,700	Less than 500
Portugal	Over 4,500	Less than 500
Romania	Over 910	Less than 500
Slovakia	Less than 500	Less than 500
Slovenia	Over 830	Less than 500
Spain	Over 16,000	Over 1,200
Sweden	Over 980	Less than 500
Total EU	Over 140,000	Over 6,900

V. Empowering users

Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].			As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to regularly review the measures we have in place in Messenger, in conjunction with the measures on the linked social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram). We will continue to actively review measures, including as we launch new products and disinformation trends change.	As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp is deeply committed to addressing misinformation while protecting people's privacy – without weakening encryption. Our approach is centred around limiting virality, preventing coordinated misuse, and empowering users. New implementation measures in the period of January 2023 - June 2023 include: Group join request system: A simple tool that gives admins the ability to decide who is able to join a group. When an admin chooses to share their group's invite link, or make their group joinable in a community, they now have more control over who can join.

				Device Verification: Mobile device malware is one of the biggest threats to people's privacy and security today because it can take advantage of users' phones without their permission and use their WhatsApp to send unwanted messages. To help prevent this, we have added checks to help authenticate users' accounts - with no action needed from users - and better protect users if their devices are compromised.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]			No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?			As mentioned in our baseline report we are constantly analysing and working to improve our tools to combat misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation.

Measure 25.1			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.1.1			<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false or partly false by our fact-checkers are prominently labelled when re-shared in Messenger:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - misinformation labels (clear, visual label to content that has been debunked by fact-checkers, and surface their fact-checking articles for additional context) - warning screen (when someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with accurate information, to this purpose, Whatsapp partners with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - organisations certified by the IFCN around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Because private messages and calls on WhatsApp are secured with end-to-end encryption, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated reporting. Users can flag

			<p>can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share)</p>	<p>potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organisations by sending them a message, and fact-checking organisations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - government agencies and nonprofit organisations to help make authoritative information available to users on WhatsApp <p>WhatsApp also works to empower users by supporting fact-checking through grants. In September 2022, as part of the <u>Spread the Facts Grant Program</u> in partnership with IFCN, WhatsApp awarded \$450.000 in grants to organisations working to lessen the impact of misinformation on WhatsApp. The grant supports eleven projects in eight countries, including in Europe. Work supported by the grant is ongoing and continued throughout Q1 and Q2 2023.</p>
<p>SLI 25.1.1</p>			<p>Please see section 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers.</p>	<p>Partnerships with fact-checkers: 13 fact-checking organisations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business App and/or the WhatsApp Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information (between January 2023 and June 2023 - list below).</p> <p>Spread the Facts Grant: \$150.000 in grant support to 3 organisations in 2 EU Member States:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maldita.es (Spain): \$50.000 to support the project <i>Enhancing interactive media literacy on Maldita.es' WhatsApp Chatbot</i> • EFE Verifica (Spain): \$50.000 to support the project <i>Con check</i> • Facta.news (Italy): \$50.000 to support the project <i>Infogamic: The Disinformation Game</i> <p>Work supported by the grant is ongoing and continued throughout Q1 and Q2 2023.</p>
<p>Member States</p>				

List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)				<p>Directory of fact-checking organisations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) between the duration of this report]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 20 Minutes (French) ○ AFP France (French) ○ AFP Africa (English) ○ France24 (French) ● Germany <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ CORRECTIV (German) ○ AFP Faktencheck (German) ○ dpa Faktencheck (German) ● Greece <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ellinika Hoaxes (Greek) ● Italy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Pagella Politica / Facta (Italian) ● Portugal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Polígrafo (Portuguese) ● Spain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EFE Verifica (Spanish) ○ Maldita (Spanish) ○ Newtral (Spanish)
Measure 25.2			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.2.1			As mentioned in our baseline report to help reduce the spread of viral misinformation and harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger.	As mentioned in our baseline report WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default for all private messages and calls. In this context, one of our key lines of effort to counter misinformation is to limit virality and to help users think about the messages they receive: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forwarding labels - Limits to messaging forwarding - Search the web tool
SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools				As mentioned in our baseline report, the introduction of the additional forwarding limits in April 2020 reduced immediately by 70% the virality. When we introduced the new group chat forwarding limit in 2022, we saw a reduction of

				approximately 20% in the number of forwarded messages sent to groups on WhatsApp globally.
			<i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i>	<i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i>

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 – 29

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We announced in June 2023 that we've started rolling out a new suite of tools for researchers: Meta Content Library and API. These tools will provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-available content across Facebook of any research tool we have built to date.</p> <p>We shared our quarterly reports for the last quarter of 2022 and first and second quarter of 2023 :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Community Guidelines Enforcement Report • The Adversarial Threat Report • The Widely Viewed Content Report <p>These reports are all available in the Transparency Center.</p>	<p>We announced in June 2023 that we've started rolling out a new suite of tools for researchers: Meta Content Library and API. These tools will provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-available content across Instagram of any research tool we have built to date.</p> <p>We shared our quarterly reports for the last quarter of 2022, first and second quarter of 2023 :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Community Guidelines Enforcement Report • The Adversarial Threat Report • The Widely Viewed Content Report <p>These reports are all available in the Transparency Center.</p>
Do you plan to put further	No	No

<p>implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>		
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p> <p>Regarding the Meta Content Library and API launch, we hope by introducing these products to researchers early in the development process, we can receive constructive feedback to ensure we're building the best possible tools to meet their needs.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety, combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p> <p>Regarding the Meta Content Library and API launch, we hope by introducing these products to researchers early in the development process, we can receive constructive feedback to ensure we're building the best possible tools to meet their needs.</p>

<p>Measure 26.1</p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p>QRE 26.1.1</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Center including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: https://transparency.fb.com/data/. We also publish public extensive reports on our findings about coordinated behaviour on our newsroom: Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, and we have a dedicated public website hosting our Ad Library tools</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Center including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: https://transparency.fb.com/data/. We also publish public extensive reports on our findings about coordinated behaviour on our newsroom: Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, and we have a dedicated public website hosting our Ad Library tools</p>
<p>QRE 26.1.2</p>	<p>Ad Library Tools: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad</p>	<p>Ad Library Tools: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started</p>

	<p>started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Center numerous reports :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Community Standards Enforcement Report</u>: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Center on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 14 policies on Facebook). - <u>Widely Viewed Content Report</u>: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Center to both provide more transparency about the most-viewed organic content in Feed on Facebook in the US and to hold ourselves accountable to improve the quality of content on Facebook. - <u>Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report</u>: We share publicly in our newsroom our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we're sharing information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place. 	<p>running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Center numerous reports :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Community Standards Enforcement Report</u>: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Center on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 12 policies on Instagram). - <u>Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report</u>: We share publicly in our newsroom our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we're sharing information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.
SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>	<i>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next reports.</i>
Measure 26.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.2.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, CrowdTangle is a content discovery and social monitoring platform that provides access to a subset of public data on Facebook.</p> <p>In June, we started rolling out a new suite of tools for researchers: Meta Content Library and API. The Library includes data from public posts, pages, groups, and events on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in Researcher Platform:</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, CrowdTangle is a content discovery and social monitoring platform that provides access to a subset of public data on Instagram.</p> <p>In June, we started rolling out a new suite of tools for researchers: Meta Content Library and API. The Library includes public posts and data from creator and business accounts for Instagram. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in Researcher Platform:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - searching and filtering: searching all public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. - Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. - Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. - API Code generation: researchers can generate an API query in either Python or R directly from their search query. The code can be pasted into the Content Library API to retrieve search results and perform deeper analysis. <p>Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers familiar with R or Python. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in Research Platform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Endpoints and data fields: With 6 dedicated endpoints, Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Instagram accounts and posts and Facebook Pages, posts, groups and events. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: it allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. <p>For more details - see here.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - searching and filtering: searching all public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. - Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. - Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. - API Code generation: researchers can generate an API query in either Python or R directly from their search query. The code can be pasted into the Content Library API to retrieve search results and perform deeper analysis. <p>Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers familiar with R or Python. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in Research Platform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Endpoints and data fields: With 6 dedicated endpoints, Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Instagram accounts and posts and Facebook Pages, posts, groups and events. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: it allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. <p>For more details - see here.</p>
<p>QRE 26.2.2</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report CrowdTangle provides engagement metrics and analytics for public pages, public groups, and verified profiles.</p> <p>The new Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups and events - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen <p>Fore more details - see here.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report CrowdTangle provides engagement metrics and analytics for public pages, public groups, and verified profiles.</p> <p>The new Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Posts shared by and information about business and creator accounts - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen <p>Fore more details - see here.</p>

QRE 26.2.3	Researchers from qualified academic and research institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics will be able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. For more details on the application process - see here .	Researchers from qualified academic and research institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics will be able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. For more details on the application process - see here .
SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	<i>We cannot provide metrics regarding the use of our new Content Library and Content Library API for this reporting period as the tools are being progressively rolled out since the end of June 2023.</i>	
Measure 26.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.3.1	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website , which also include a dedicated help centre .	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website , which also include a dedicated help centre .

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your	Yes	Yes

terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we are actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers.</p> <p>We believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data. We have commenced a pilot with EDMO researchers to test data sharing processes proposed in the EDMO General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Code of Conduct for data sharing.</p> <p>We are also expanding our partnership with ICPSR, who are now vetting and providing researchers with access to the US2020 Facebook and Instagram election study.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we are actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers.</p> <p>We believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data. We have commenced a pilot with EDMO researchers to test data sharing processes proposed in the EDMO General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Code of Conduct for data sharing.</p> <p>We are also expanding our partnership with ICPSR, who are now vetting and providing researchers with access to the US2020 Facebook and Instagram election study.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<p>We will continue to participate in the EDMO Working Group to develop an independent body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing.</p> <p>We will continue to collaborate with EDMO to complete the data sharing pilot and report on learnings.</p> <p>We are collaborating with ICPSR who will vet researchers and provide access to the Meta Content library dataset. ICPSR will review applications on a rolling basis.</p>	<p>We will continue to participate in the EDMO Working Group to develop an independent body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing.</p> <p>We will continue to collaborate with EDMO to complete the data sharing pilot and report on learnings.</p> <p>We are collaborating with ICPSR who will vet researchers and provide access to the Meta Content library dataset. ICPSR will review applications on a rolling basis.</p>

Measure 27.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 27.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report we've been actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to	As mentioned in our baseline report we've been actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop

	<p>develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we shared extensive comments in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research.</p> <p>We are participating in the EDMO Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms. In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the Working Group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40 Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners.</p> <p>We are now working with EDMO to test the process outlined in the code report, by undertaking a data sharing pilot. We will follow all steps outlined in the code, and plan to share a dataset with EDMO researchers via a third-party, so that we can report on the code process and identify any areas for amendments.</p> <p>We are hoping to continue to make important progress in the coming year as we believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data.</p>	<p>standardised processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we shared extensive comments in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research.</p> <p>We are participating in the EDMO Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms. In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the Working Group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40 Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners.</p> <p>We are now working with EDMO to test the process outlined in the code report, by undertaking a data sharing pilot. We will follow all steps outlined in the code, and plan to share a dataset with EDMO researchers via a third-party, so that we can report on the code process and identify any areas for amendments.</p> <p>We are hoping to continue to make important progress in the coming year as we believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data.</p>
Measure 27.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 27.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, while the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills-based sponsorship and participation in the EDMO pilot.	As mentioned in our baseline report, while the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills-based sponsorship and participation in the EDMO pilot.
Measure 27.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 27.3.1	N/A at this stage	N/A at this stage
SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another third-party, ICPSR, who are hosting and researcher vetting responsibilities for access to datasets about the US 2020 election, and will be taking on vetting researchers for access to the Meta Content Library data.	At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another third-party, ICPSR, who are hosting and researcher vetting responsibilities for access to datasets about the US 2020 election, and will be taking on vetting researchers for access to the Meta Content Library data.
Measure 27.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 27.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network	As mentioned in our baseline report, since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions

	<p>disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). In 2021, we expanded our beta research platform – with about 100 data sets – to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide. This dataset provides access to raw data where researchers can visualise and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis.</p>	<p>relating to coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). In 2021, we expanded the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive – which contains information on about 100 removed CIB networks – to more researchers studying influence operations around the world. This research platform allows researchers to visualise and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis.</p>
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VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28					
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>In March 2023, Meta hosted the Security Policy Researcher Summit in Washington, DC, bringing together over 50 researchers from 15 countries around the world to share learnings about online adversarial threats. We expect to continue to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports.</p>	<p>In March 2023, Meta hosted the Security Policy Researcher Summit in Washington, DC, bringing together over 50 researchers from 15 countries around the world to share learnings about online adversarial threats. We expect to continue to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to	No	No

substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	As mentioned in our baseline report our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously analysing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.

Measure 28.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. All details are available on our dedicated Research website .	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. All details are available on our dedicated Research website .
Measure 28.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.2.1	In June, we started rolling out a new suite of tools for researchers: Meta Content Library and API. The Library includes data from public posts, pages, groups, and events on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. As mentioned in our baseline report Meta provides a variety of data sets for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in one place . The main data available only to researchers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ad Targeting Data Set, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. 70+ researchers globally have access to Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022. - URL Shares Data Set, which includes differentially private individual-level counts of the number of people who viewed, clicked, liked, commented, shared, or reacted to any URL on Facebook between January 2017 and September 2022. Counts are aggregated at the level of country, year-month, age bracket, 	In June, we started rolling out a new suite of tools for researchers: Meta Content Library and API. For Instagram, it will include public posts and data from creator and business accounts. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. As mentioned in our baseline report Meta provides a variety of data sets for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in one place . The main data available only to researchers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ad Targeting Data Set, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. 70+ researchers globally have access to Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022. - Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.

	<p>gender. The URL Shares data set is regularly updated to add additional year-months and countries. In order to maintain the independence of researchers who use these data, access to the URL Shares is granted by Social Science One. New researchers are onboarded once per quarter and access is governed by a Research Data Agreement. 250+ researchers globally have access to the URL Shares dataset since its release in February 2020.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1. - CrowdTangle. Provides engagement metrics and analytics for public pages, public groups and verified profiles. - Data for Good. Provides a range of dashboards that make our data easier to understand. 	
Measure 28.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.3.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage
Measure 28.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.4.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

Commitment 29 applies to research organisations.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we continued to strengthen our fact-checking program - which is the largest global fact-checking network of any platform. We are committed to supporting the long-term strength of the fact-checking industry by helping fact-checkers develop new skills, pursue innovation and scale their efforts to better address misinformation online. We are also co-chair of the fact checking working group of the Code's Taskforce.</p> <p>We held our first in-person gathering for 3PFCs from Central and Eastern Europe, to brainstorm how neighbouring fact-checkers might collaborate in response to major events and trending misinformation. We also discussed further about the obstacles that are reducing the output and impact of 3PFCs and ideas around how to address those. Given the overwhelmingly positive response we now hope to repeat this roundtable format in other European regions.</p> <p>We funded licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we continued to strengthen our fact-checking program - which is the largest global fact-checking network of any platform. We are committed to supporting the long-term strength of the fact-checking industry by helping fact-checkers develop new skills, pursue innovation and scale their efforts to better address misinformation online. We are also co-chair of the fact checking working group of the Code's Taskforce.</p> <p>We held our first in-person gathering for 3PFCs from Central and Eastern Europe, to brainstorm how neighbouring fact-checkers might collaborate in response to major events and trending misinformation. We also discussed further about the obstacles that are reducing output and impact of 3PFCs and ideas around how to address those. Given the overwhelmingly positive response we now hope to repeat this roundtable format in other European regions.</p> <p>We funded licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.</p>

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We are constantly analysing and working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.	We are constantly analysing and working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.

Measure 30.1	Facebook	Instagram																												
QRE 30.1.1	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report Meta’s fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide. All fact-checking partners follow IFCN’s Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking</p> <p>The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e. how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and here.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report Meta’s fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide. All fact-checking partners follow IFCN’s Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.</p> <p>The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e. how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and here.</p>																												
QRE 30.1.2	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Austria (German, Dutch, French)</td> <td>AFP dpa-Faktencheck</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Belgium (Dutch, French, German)</td> <td>AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bulgaria (Bulgarian)</td> <td>AFP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Croatia (Croatian)</td> <td>Faktograf.hr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cyprus (Greek)</td> <td>AFP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Czechia (Czech)</td> <td>AFP Demagog.cz</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Denmark (Danish)</td> <td>TjekDet</td> </tr> </table>	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP	Czechia (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Austria (German, Dutch, French)</td> <td>AFP dpa-Faktencheck</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Belgium (Dutch, French, German)</td> <td>AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bulgaria (Bulgarian)</td> <td>AFP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Croatia (Croatian)</td> <td>Faktograf.hr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cyprus (Greek)</td> <td>AFP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Czechia (Czech)</td> <td>AFP Demagog.cz</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Denmark (Danish)</td> <td>TjekDet</td> </tr> </table>	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP	Czechia (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet
Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck																													
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Cyprus (Greek)	AFP																													
Czechia (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz																													
Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet																													

	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia Ekspreess M	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
	Finland (Finnish)	AFP	Finland (Finnish)	AFP
	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24
	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck
	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes
	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP
	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie
	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica
	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min
	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck
	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog
	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador
	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro
	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP
	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro
	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Buló Newtral	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP España EFE Verifica Maldito Buló Newtral
	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran
QRE 30.1.3	As mentioned in our baseline report the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.		As mentioned in our baseline report the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.	

	In addition to the remuneration of our fact-checking partners for their work on our platforms, Meta also contributes to programs such as industry initiatives, sponsorships, fellowships, and grant programs. Most recently we funded licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.	In addition to the remuneration of our fact-checking partners for their work on our platforms, Meta also contributes to programs such as industry initiatives, sponsorships, fellowships, and grant programs. Most recently we funded licences for NewsWhip, a social media monitoring product that helps fact-checkers surface content and follow trends on Facebook, Instagram and other platforms.
SLI 30.1.1 – Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.
	<i>See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2</i>	<i>See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2</i>

Measure 30.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta’s fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN’s <u>Code of Principles</u> , a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta’s fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN’s <u>Code of Principles</u> , a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.
QRE 30.2.2	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular initiatives to collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools. Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.
QRE 30.2.3	<i>QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations</i>	<i>QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations</i>
Measure 30.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.3.1	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.
Measure 30.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.	As mentioned in our baseline report Instagram is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report to fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta <u>partners with independent third-party fact-checkers</u> who review and rate the accuracy of stories through original reporting, which may include interviewing primary sources, consulting public data and conducting analyses of media, including photos and video. We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level reshare friction metrics, instead of EU level metrics.	As mentioned in our baseline report to fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta <u>partners with independent third-party fact-checkers</u> who review and rate the accuracy of stories through original reporting, which may include interviewing primary sources, consulting public data and conducting analyses of media, including photos and video. We have improved the granularity of our reporting for this section by sharing country level reshare friction metrics, instead of EU level metrics.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report we are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.	As mentioned in our baseline report we are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.
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Measure 31.1	Facebook	Instagram		
Measure 31.2	Facebook	Instagram		
QRE 31.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation." The current warning implies that any content flagged by a 3PFC counts toward Repeat Offender. Regarding rating AI-generated content. Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.	As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation." The current warning implies that any content flagged by a 3PFC counts toward Repeat Offender. Regarding rating AI-generated content. Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.		
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	Filtered to content created on Facebook in EU member state countries from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023: 1. Number of distinct contents posted on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by a 3PFC. 2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content.	Filtered to content created on Instagram in EU member state countries from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023: 1. Number of distinct contents posted on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by a 3PFC. 2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an inform treatment to a content.		
	Content treated with fact checks on Facebook due to violating assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Content treated with fact checks on Instagram due to violating assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Globally		190,000		52,000
Member States				
Austria	Over 1,200,000		Over 76,000	

Belgium	Over 1,800,000		Over 910,00	
Bulgaria	Over 900,000		Over 34,000	
Croatia	Over 380,000		Over 37,000	
Cyprus	Over 670,000		Over 37,000	
Czech Republic	Over 1,000,000		Over 53,000	
Denmark	Over 800,000		Over 52,000	
Estonia	Over 140,000		Over 17,000	
Finland	Over 340,000		Over 49,000	
France	Over 7,400,000		Over 200,000	
Germany	Over 6,800,000		Over 320,000	
Greece	Over 1,500,000		Over 72,000	
Hungary	Over 840,000		Over 36,000	
Ireland	Over 1,100,000		Over 92,000	
Italy	Over 7,000,000		Over 230,000	
Latvia	Over 290,000		Over 18,000	
Lithuania	Over 370,000		Over 20,000	
Luxembourg	Over 180,000		Over 17,000	
Malta	Over 160,000		Over 15,000	
Netherlands	Over 1,900,000		Over 150,000	
Poland	Over 2,900,000		Over 90,000	
Portugal	Over 2,200,000		Over 160,000	
Romania	Over 1,900,000		Over 63,000	
Slovakia	Over 690,000		Over 33,000	
Slovenia	Over 380,000		Over 23,000	
Spain	Over 6,100,000		Over 270,000	
Sweden	Over 1,100,000		Over 100,000	
Total EU	Over 40,000,000		Over 1,100,000	

SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	1. Number of distinct contents posted on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFCs from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label from 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.		1. Number of distinct contents posted on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFCs from 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label from 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	
	Content treated with fact checks on Facebook due to violating assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	Content treated with fact checks on Instagram due to violating assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 05/01/2023 to 30/06/2023.
Member States				
Austria	Over 1,200,000	37%	Over 76,000	37%
Belgium	Over 1,800,000	44%	Over 91,000	36%
Bulgaria	Over 900,000	40%	Over 34,000	40%
Croatia	Over 380,000	43%	Over 37,000	43%
Cyprus	Over 670,000	33%	Over 37,000	35%
Czech Republic	Over 1,000,000	21%	Over 53,000	36%
Denmark	Over 800,000	48%	Over 52,000	36%
Estonia	Over 140,000	37%	Over 17,000	37%
Finland	Over 340,000	37%	Over 49,000	33%
France	Over 7,400,000	44%	Over 200,000	40%
Germany	Over 6,800,000	30%	Over 320,000	36%
Greece	Over 1,500,000	46%	Over 72,000	44%
Hungary	Over 840,000	49%	Over 36,000	38%
Ireland	Over 1,100,000	37%	Over 92,000	32%
Italy	Over 7,000,000	36%	Over 230,000	45%
Latvia	Over 290,000	37%	Over 18,000	37%
Lithuania	Over 370,000	40%	Over 20,000	38%
Luxembourg	Over 180,000	43%	Over 17,000	41%
Malta	Over 160,000	50%	Over 15,000	38%

Netherlands	Over 1,900,000	39%	Over 150,000	34%
Poland	Over 2,900,000	38%	Over 90,000	38%
Portugal	Over 2,200,000	45%	Over 160,000	40%
Romania	Over 1,900,000	41%	Over 63,000	37%
Slovakia	Over 690,000	31%	Over 33,000	36%
Slovenia	Over 380,000	29%	Over 23,000	37%
Spain	Over 6,100,000	33%	Over 270,000	43%
Sweden	Over 1,100,000	57%	Over 100,000	35%
Total EU	Over 40,000,000	37%	Over 1,100,000	38%

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 1/01/2023 and 30/06/2023	Average of monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union between 1/01/2023 and 30/06/2023
	Denominator to be decided within the TF ahead of the baseline report – <i>Pending further taskforce discussions</i>	Denominator to be decided within the TF ahead of the baseline report – <i>Pending further taskforce discussions</i>
Total Global	258 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union	257 million average monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union

Measure 31.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.3.1	Meta is an active member of the Taskforce sub-group on fact-checking which will among other things work towards this repository.	Meta is an active member of the Taskforce sub-group on fact-checking which will among other things work towards this repository.
Measure 31.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta will join the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023.	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta will join the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community	
Commitment 32	
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.	

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report we will work as outlined in Commitment 32 with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations. We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.	As mentioned in our baseline report we will work as outlined in Commitment 32 with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations. We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.

Measure 32.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 32.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program, and we continue to improve it. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.	As mentioned in our baseline report all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program, and we continue to improve it. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Instagram, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.
SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	<i>See list in QRE 30.1.2 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.</i>	
Measure 32.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.3.1	As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular conversations to collect feedback on the information, tools and interface we make available to our fact-checkers in an effort to improve them. Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.	As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular conversations to collect feedback on the information, tools and interface we make available to our fact-checkers in an effort to improve them. Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

Commitment 33 applies to fact-checking organisations.

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 – 36

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website

	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) co-chairs the Transparency Center Working Group and co-funded the Transparency Center website's development, to ensure the transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) plans to continue to co-chair the Transparency Center working group, notably through the review of the launched product to oversee any key necessary improvements.
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Measure 34.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Center in due course. In addition, Meta will continue to take on its role as chair of the Transparency Center Working Group to assist the other signatories in their upload.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) will continue to serve as co-chair of the Transparency Center Working Group.

Measure 35.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36				
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes	Yes
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to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload this report in due course and support other signatories, as co-chair of the Transparency Working Group, in their efforts to upload their own reports.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload all future reports in due course and support other signatories, as co-chair of the Transparency Working Group, in their efforts to upload their own reports.

Measure 36.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	We are pleased to confirm that we have been an active participant and co-chair in the working group that has successfully launched the common Transparency Centre this year. We have assisted with establishing the website's requirements, selecting a vendor to build the website and overseeing the development of the website's key functionalities and interface. We have ensured that the Centre will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Centre to be navigated both by commitment and signatory). Each signatory will be responsible for ensuring that the information they upload to the website is correct and accurate. Entities interested in joining the Code's Task-force will be able to sign up through a dedicated online application form on the website. We have supported the working group in collecting feedback on the user experience of the website and will continue to seek such feedback from relevant stakeholders to better maintain and update the website.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	The Transparency Center was successfully launched in February 2023.
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative	The common Transparency Center has been visited by around 8,300 users globally between January 30th 2023 and June 30th 2023. The average engagement time on the website is 1m 22s.

information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	
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IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6	M 37.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) is an active member of the Taskforce and its varied working groups, particularly on integrity of services, ad placement, crisis monitoring, the Transparency Center (which Meta also co-chairs), reporting, fact-checking (which Meta also co-chairs), and elections. Looking ahead we will also participate in the working group focused on generative AI.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will continue its involvement in the working groups listed above, and join new working groups on generative AI most notably.
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Measure 37.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 37.6.1	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) is an active member of the Taskforce and its varied working groups, particularly on integrity of services, ad placement, crisis monitoring, the Transparency Center, reporting, fact-checking, and elections by attending regular meetings on each of those workstreams and co-chairing the transparency centre working group and the fact-checking working group. Looking ahead we will also participate in the working group focused on generative AI.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Globally we have more than 40 000 people working on safety and security
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies benefit from our experience and expertise. While we don't foresee substantial changes, we are constantly assessing how to best ensure the implementation of this Code and improve our reporting.

Measure 38.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 38.1.1	Globally we have about 40,000 people working on safety and security including around 15,000 content reviewers. All of these investments work to combat the spread of harmful content, including disinformation and misinformation, and thereby contribute to our implementation of the Code. Teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, trust and safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development all work on these challenges. These teams are distributed globally, and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners.

X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 39	
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.	
	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	This report was submitted within the required timeline.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	No

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	This report was submitted within the required timeline.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In this report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger continue to provide QREs and SLIs across the different chapters at a level of granularity that goes beyond any previous transparency efforts.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	Yes

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to work to improve the information they provide in their QREs and to strengthen their SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We have been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators. We supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through our collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation	Yes

measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Moving forward, we will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

C.42

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram
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In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook and Instagram engaged on a regular basis with both the European Commission and the wider Taskforce Working Group on crisis monitoring to share information on the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, notably through the Covid-19 reports and with regard to the war in Ukraine. This included regular updates on network take-downs as well as tailored responses to questions on measures put in place in specific areas of the European Union.
Do you plan to put further implementation	Yes

measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report Facebook and Instagram will continue their active participation in the Taskforce's crisis monitoring working group as well as their engagement with the European Commission on this topic, notably the harmonisation with the obligations under the Digital Services Act.

X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 43	
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.	
	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.
Do you plan to put further implementation	Yes

measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide the required information in the template provided, and will engage with the Taskforce Working Group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 44	
<p>Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.</p>	
	C.44
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, Whasapp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report we are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits under the DSA.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report we are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Covid-19 pandemic

Misinformation related to COVID-19 has presented unique risks to public health and safety over the last years. We know that people looking to mislead others – whether through phishing, scams, or influence operations – try to leverage crises in order to advance their goals, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no different. We are actively working to find and stop coordinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate across our platforms.

Our approach focused on:

- Debunking false claims about COVID-19 through our global fact-checking program and partnerships, including through a dedicated Coronavirus grant program with the IFCN
- Providing access to authoritative and reliable information about the pandemic
- Removing misinformation which could directly contribute to imminent harm to public health and security, as determined in consultation with leading health organisations
- Supporting media literacy across Europe
- Identifying, disrupting, and removing coordinated inauthentic behaviour networks

Moving forward, we will take a more tailored approach to our Covid-19 misinformation rules consistent with the Oversight Board's guidance and our existing policies. In countries that have a Covid-19 public health emergency declaration, we will continue to remove content for violating our Covid-19 misinformation policies given the risk of imminent physical harm. We are consulting with health experts to understand which claims and categories of misinformation could continue to pose this risk. Our Covid-19 misinformation rules will no longer be in effect globally as the global public health emergency declaration that triggered those rules has been lifted

Our most important learnings remain as outlined in our benchmark report. As mentioned above, we are also building on the Board's guidance to take a more tailored approach to our Covid-19 misinformation policies

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s).]

Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	As mentioned in our baseline report we have been removing misinformation that experts assess is likely to contribute directly to the risk of imminent physical harm or violence since 2018. In January 2020, we began applying this policy to harmful misinformation about COVID-19 at global scale.	As mentioned in our baseline report we consulted with the WHO and other health experts to determine which false claims could contribute directly to the risk of imminent physical harm in the context of the pandemic, i.e., if someone believes the information could cause physical harm to them by increasing the likelihood of them getting or spreading the disease. These claims include harmful false claims about cures or preventions, as well as about how COVID-19 is transmitted, or questioning the existence of the disease.

		<p>Moving forward, we will take a more tailored approach to our Covid-19 misinformation rules consistent with the Oversight Board's guidance and our existing policies. In countries that have a Covid-19 public health emergency declaration, we will continue to remove content for violating our Covid-19 misinformation policies given the risk of imminent physical harm. We are consulting with health experts to understand which claims and categories of misinformation could continue to pose this risk. Our Covid-19 misinformation rules will no longer be in effect globally as the global public health emergency declaration that triggered those rules has been lifted</p>
<p>Policies adapted for addressing the crisis</p>	<p>Organic content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This list of harmful misinformation claims referred to above is dynamic, and we adjusted our approach based on public health expert guidance and consultation during the pandemic. <p>In the same effort to keep this policy up to date in the current context of COVID-19, the Oversight Board has provided its opinion on the removal of COVID-19 misinformation.</p> <p>Advertising:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The list of harmful misinformation claims referred to above are also prohibited in our advertising policies. - We made adjustments to the following advertising policies: Commercial Exploitation of Crises and Controversial Events, Unrealistic Outcomes, and Social Issues, Elections or Politics. 	<p>As people around the world confront this unprecedented public health emergency, we want to make sure that our Community Standards and Community Guidelines protect people from harmful content and new types of abuse related to COVID-19. In order to keep the right balance, we will integrate changes to be consistent with the Oversight Board's guidance and our existing policies.</p>

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

As outlined in our benchmark report, we took a variety of actions with the objectives of:

- Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: We've added several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted.
- Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared.
- Reducing the spread of misinformation: We are taking extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and continuing to consult with outside experts.
- Transparency around state-controlled media: We provide greater transparency into these publishers, including Russian-controlled RT and Sputnik, because they combine the influence of a media organisation with the strategic backing of a state.

Our main strategies are in line with what we outlined in our benchmark report, with a focus on safety features in Ukraine and Russia, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation (including through media literacy campaigns), tools to help our community access crucial resources, transparency around state controlled media and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

As foreseen in our benchmark report, we will continue to:

- Monitor for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other adversarial networks
- Enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines
- Work closely with fact-checkers on the ground
- Run targeted media literacy campaigns in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region
- Strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the Central and Eastern Europe region

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	N/A	N/A
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	No further policy updates since our benchmark report	No further policy updates since our benchmark report

Actions to mitigate the crisis impact on the service

Type of mitigation	Intervention or action (short summary) [suggested character limit: 500 characters]	Intervention or action (explanation and implementation) [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]	Impact metrics
<p>Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.)</p>	<p>State controlled media: As mentioned in our baseline report we continue to take extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation and implement more transparency and restrictions around state-controlled media outlets.</p> <p>Media literacy: We ran targeted educational media literacy campaigns, particularly in Slovakia in the lead up to their election.</p> <p>Escalation channel:The escalation channel described in our benchmark report is still active in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia.</p> <p>Covert influence campaigns: monitoring for and taking action against coordinated inauthentic behaviour.</p>	<p>State controlled media: We continue to take the actions we outlined in our benchmark report. We have also published a paper on our state controlled media policy in Lawfare in an effort to continue to feed this discussion and improve our transparency on these complex areas.</p> <p>Media literacy: We ran targeted educational media literacy campaigns in Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria [See section on <i>empowerment of users</i>].</p> <p>Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate as outlined in our benchmark report.</p> <p>Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by CIB networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. Specifically, while we originally removed two Russian covert influence campaigns last year, we've seen thousands of recidivist attempts to create fake accounts. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.</p>	
<p>Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we're providing tools to help our community access crucial resources and take action to support people in need.</p> <p>We supported the Halo Trust and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to spread authoritative factual information about the risks in contaminated areas, risks related to the unexploded ordinances and life-saving information around shelters. Notably we sponsored the targeted ads campaigns of</p>	<p>We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine.</p> <p>We continue to work through our Data for Good program, and maintain our tools to connect people in Ukraine with high-quality, timely information to stay safe, find family and friends, and locate support services.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	Halo Trust and improved the WhatsApp chat bot run by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to ensure safe and secure infoline		
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report for misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we continue to work with our growing network of independent third-party fact-checking partners.</p> <p>The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.</p> <p>Since our last report which already documented an expansion in our network, we also expanded the coverage of Demagog to include Slovakia (in addition to Czechia).</p>	In Europe, we partner with 42 fact-checking organisations, covering 36 languages. This includes 26 partners covering 22 different languages in the EU.
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report our <u>Advertising Standards</u> prohibit ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers. And advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.</p> <p>For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our <u>Content Monetisation Policies</u>, any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our <u>Partner Monetisation Policies</u>.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we prohibited ads or monetisation from all Russian state-controlled media.</p> <p>Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.</p>	N/A
Measures taken to prevent malicious advertising	As above on demonetisation	As above on demonetisation	N/A
Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs	As mentioned in our baseline report we have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our	Since the invasion began, <u>we've provided updates on our response</u> , including the measures we've taken to help keep Ukrainians and Russians safe, our approach to misinformation, state-controlled media and	We saw state-controlled media shifting to other platforms and using new domains to try to escape the additional transparency on (and demotions against) links to their websites. We observed this behaviour around the world, not only in places where Russian state

	<p>detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.</p>	<p>ensuring reliable access to trusted information.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report our security teams took down three distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war (announced here, here, and here) and have continued to monitor and enforce against Russian threat actors engaged in coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). We also took action to secure accounts that we believe were targeted by Ghostwriter, a threat actor that has been tracked for some time by the security community. In August 2023, we provided updated analysis on the work we've done to remove efforts by a Russian CIB network, known in the security field as "Doppelganger," to return to our platforms. We also published recommendations on how to improve cross-Internet responses to the domain name abuse we've observed in this case.</p>	<p>media faced government restrictions. We have also published a paper on our state controlled media policy in Lawfare in an effort to continue to feed this discussion and improve our transparency on these complex areas.</p>
<p>Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report the Data for Good program shares privacy-protecting data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty, and climate change. All three key areas of this program (maps, surveys, insights from public posts) have been activated to assist the Ukraine humanitarian response.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report we provided baseline population density maps (the high resolution settlement layer) of Ukraine and surrounding countries to humanitarian organisations for supply-chain planning and to aid demining efforts. These are the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e. no Facebook user data).</p> <p>Our Social Connectedness Index has been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission - Joint Research Center unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to quantify the rate at which Ukrainian refugees seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.</p> <p>We provided regular Ukraine Displacement reports to a small set of leading humanitarian organisations and agencies.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<p>Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis</p>	<p>As mentioned in the baseline report throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies, and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.</p>	<p>We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the platform around the clock, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
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