



## Code of Practice on Disinformation – Meta Baseline Report



## Executive Summary

Since 2018, Meta has been a prominent participant of the initial European Union (EU) Code of Practice on Disinformation. We were deeply involved in discussions surrounding the strengthened version of the Code (2022), in addition to being an active member of the Taskforce. We are now proud to share our baseline report under the 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, and committed to working closely with the Taskforce to ensure that we continue to improve together. We are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Our general approach to content moderation seeks to strike a balance between expression and safety. Misinformation and disinformation are complex and constantly evolving societal challenges, involving a range of offline and online behaviors that go beyond any single platform. For this reason, we embrace the whole-of-society, multi-stakeholder approach outlined in the 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation. As a company, we're using research, expert teams and technology to combat the spread of harmful content, including disinformation and misinformation. We have refined our policies over several years, partnering with academics, civil society, and third-party fact-checkers to find the appropriate balance between protecting people and protecting freedom of expression. We've seen the value of multi-stakeholder work first-hand, and support the European Commission's determination to ensure the EU Code of Practice brings all actors together to build whole-of-society solutions. We are also particularly proud to include Messenger and Whatsapp in our report, and encourage other messaging service providers to join this Code as well.

Defining what constitutes misinformation is challenging — governments, policymakers, civil society, academics, journalists, and people in general do not agree on what misinformation is. What one person considers to be false or misinformation, others may consider simply to be opinion. Adding to that challenge is determining who decides if something is untruthful — who or what is the source of truth — which often comes with differing views. Considering these complexities, our policies aim to differentiate categories of misinformation and provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it. Furthermore, It is important to note that misinformation can cut across different types of abuse areas. For example, a racial slur could be coupled with a false claim about a group of people and we'd remove it for violating our hate speech policy. Our misinformation policies and product interventions work together with several other policies and solutions which are out of this report's scope.

The aim of this report is to provide baseline information and understanding of how Meta approaches misinformation and disinformation. It gives an overview of the various policies, enforcement techniques, tools, products, resources, and partnerships we have developed to address these issues on our platform in relation to our commitments under the Code. In doing so, we've also included policies and practices which pre-date the signature of the Strengthened Code to ensure that every report going forward can be compared back to this baseline.

- **Ad Placement:** We have policies in place to prevent the monetization of disinformation and misinformation via monetized content and advertising. From October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022, we removed **over 2.9 million ads** from Facebook and Instagram in EU member states, of which **over 8.800 ads** were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation policy.
- **Political Ads:** We developed policies and processes that require any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections, or politics to go through the authorization process and have a "paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to

detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer. From November 15 to December 31, 2022, we labeled **over 170.000 such ads** on both Facebook and Instagram with “paid for by” disclaimers in the EU.

- **Integrity of Services:** We focused this chapter on our policies and practices to combat inauthentic behavior and covert influence operations, where our approach is grounded in behavior- and actor-based enforcement, rather than content. **We removed 3 networks in Q3 2022 and 1 network in Q4 2022** for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy which targeted one or more European countries. We also take proactive steps to remove fake accounts, prioritizing the removal of fake accounts that seek to cause harm. In Q3 2022, we took action against **1.5 billion fake accounts (99.6% of which proactively)** on Facebook globally, which we estimate represented **approximately 5% of our worldwide monthly active users**.
- **Users’ Empowerment:** We focused this chapter on our policies and practices to combat misinformation, and in particular our cooperation with independent third-party fact-checkers and our media literacy efforts. Between October 1 and December 31, 2022, **over 150.000 distinct fact-checking articles** on Facebook globally were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 28 million pieces of content in the EU**. As for Instagram, **over 40.000 distinct articles globally** were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 1.7 million pieces of content in the EU**. These numbers demonstrate the powers of our tools to scale the work of independent fact-checkers. We also ran media literacy campaigns in Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and Bulgaria - designed in partnership with local fact-checkers and NGOs - which reached **16 million users and made 72 million impressions across the region**.
- **Researchers’ Empowerment:** We offer researchers a number of privacy-protective methods to collect and analyze data. We welcome research that holds us accountable, and doesn’t compromise the security of our platform or the privacy of the people who use it. Every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. We also look for research that will help develop a foundational understanding of how best to serve our community and contribute to our understanding of societal trends. This is demonstrated by **the 1.000+ academic accounts (accounting for over 5.000 individual users) with access to CrowdTangle globally as of January 2023**.
- **Fact-checkers’ Empowerment:** We partner with **26 fact-checking organizations** covering **22 different languages** in the EU. We previously shared that when a fact-checking warning screen is placed on a post, **95% of the time people don’t click to view it**. This describes the behavior of people who are scrolling through their Feeds. While this data point is illustrative, it is possible that some people never intended to view the fact-checked content. We are now able to share an even stronger measure of the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content. **On average 38% of people on Instagram and 25% of people on Facebook in the EU who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning that the content has been fact-checked**.

Wherever possible, we provided our metrics for Q4 2022 (i.e., 1 October to 31 December 2022). There are a few instances where we were not able to provide Q4 2022 data, and therefore either focused on a subset of Q4 2022, or on Q3 2022. The time-period of each SLI is described in its methodology section.

This baseline report is the first of its kind - and as such, it presents the first step of what will be an iterative process. We are looking forward to continuing engagement and dialogue with the European Commission, ERGA, EDMO, our co-signatories, and the rest of the Taskforce to strengthen both our practices and our transparency.

## Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
<b>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b>					
1	<u>Measure 1.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<u>Measure 2.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 2.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 2.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 2.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<u>Measure 3.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 3.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 3.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>III. Political advertising</b>					
4	<u>Measure 4.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 4.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<u>Measure 5.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	<u>Measure 6.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	<u>Measure 7.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
	<u>Measure 7.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	<u>Measure 8.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 8.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	<u>Measure 9.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 9.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	<u>Measure 10.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 10.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	<u>Measure 11.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	<u>Measure 12.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 12.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 12.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	<u>Measure 13.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 13.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 13.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>IV. Integrity of services</b>					
14	<u>Measure 14.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 14.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 14.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	<u>Measure 15.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 15.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	<u>Measure 16.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 16.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>V. Empowering users</b>					

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
17	<u>Measure 17.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 17.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 17.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	<u>Measure 18.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 18.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 18.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	<u>Measure 19.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 19.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	<u>Measure 20.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 20.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	<u>Measure 21.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 21.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 21.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22	<u>Measure 22.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.6</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.7</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	<u>Measure 23.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 23.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	<u>Measure 24.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25	<u>Measure 25.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 25.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>VI. Empowering the research community</b>					
26	<u>Measure 26.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
	<u>Measure 26.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 26.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27	<u>Measure 27.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	<u>Measure 28.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29	<u>Measure 29.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 29.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 29.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b>					
30	<u>Measure 30.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31	<u>Measure 31.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32	<u>Measure 32.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 32.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 32.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33	<u>Measure 33.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>VIII. Transparency center</b>					

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
34	<u>Measure 34.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
35	<u>Measure 35.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
36	<u>Measure 36.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 36.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 36.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>IX. Permanent Task-Force</b>					
37	<u>Measure 37.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>					
38	<u>Measure 38.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
39	-	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
40	<u>Measure 40.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>



Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
	<u>Measure 40.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
41	<u>Measure 41.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 41.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 41.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
42	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

### Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetized, the controls for monetization and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>			<b>Service B - Instagram</b>			
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new	Yes			Yes			

policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<p>Users are only eligible to utilize monetization tools on Facebook if they are compliant with a set of rules, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Partner Monetization Policies</u> that sets the rules for Pages and profiles, payments and behavior.</li> <li>- <u>Content Monetization Policies</u> that sets the rules against unnecessary levels of graphic, sexual, violent or profane content</li> <li>- <u>Page and professional mode demonetization rules</u> that sets the rules when Pages and profiles' access to business and commercial products are restricted</li> <li>- <u>Terms of Service</u> for users in general</li> <li>- <u>Commercial Terms</u> that apply to the access or use of Meta products for a business or commercial purpose</li> <li>- <u>Community Standards</u> that sets the rules against unsafe content</li> </ul> <p><i>(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)</i></p>	<p>Users are only eligible to utilize monetization tools on Instagram if they comply with a set of rules, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Instagram Partner Monetization Policies</u> that sets the rules for profiles, payments and behavior.</li> <li>- <u>Instagram Content Monetization Policies</u> that sets the rules against unnecessary levels of graphic, sexual, violent or profane content</li> <li>- <u>Terms of Service</u> for users in general</li> <li>- <u>Commercial Terms</u> that apply to the access or use of Meta products for a business or commercial purpose</li> <li>- <u>Community Guidelines</u> that sets the rules against unsafe content</li> </ul> <p><i>(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)</i></p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We are working with third-party partners to develop brand suitability verification for Feed. We are also building content-based suitability controls to give advertisers control over where their ads are shown. We've selected Zefr as the initial partner for providing independent reporting on the context in which ads appear on Facebook Feed. We have developed a solution to measure and verify the suitability of adjacent content to ads in Feed and began	<p>We are building content-based suitability controls to give advertisers control over where their ads are shown. We began testing in late 2022 and expect to reach general availability by the end of Q1 2023.</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies,</p>

	<p>testing in late 2022. We expect to reach general availability by the end of Q1 2023.</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Monetization policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	<p>we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Monetization policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>
<b>Measure 1.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 1.1.1</b>	<p>We share broadly with users our policies and tools on monetized content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Partner Monetization Policies</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Content Monetization Policies</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Branded Content Policies</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">About Page and professional mode demonetization</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Brand safety controls</a></li> </ul> <p>The <a href="#">Content Monetization Policies</a> in particular outline restricted categories which our users cannot make money from. This includes misinformation. Content that has been rated false by a third-party fact-checker is prohibited from being monetized.</p> <p>The <a href="#">Partner Monetization Policies</a> request most relevantly that (a) the content shared is authentic and (b) the engagement monetized is authentic.</p>	<p>We share broadly with users our policies and tools on monetized content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Instagram Partner Monetization Policies</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Instagram Content Monetization Policies</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Instagram Branded Content Policies</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Brand safety controls</a></li> </ul> <p>The <a href="#">Instagram Content Monetization Policies</a> in particular outline restricted categories which our users cannot make money from. This includes misinformation: content that has been rated false by a third-party fact-checker is prohibited from being monetized.</p> <p>The <a href="#">Instagram Partner Monetization Policies</a> request most relevantly that (a) the content shared is authentic and (b) the engagement monetized is authentic.</p>
<b>SLI 1.1.1</b>	<p>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January-June 2023.</p>	
<p><b>This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetize disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid<sup>1</sup> or impression<sup>2</sup>) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third-party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).</b></p>		

<sup>1</sup> Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

<sup>2</sup> Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

<p>SLI 1.1.2 – Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation</p>	<p>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January–June 2023.</p>	
<p><b>Measure 1.2</b></p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p>QRE 1.2.1</p>	<p>In our <a href="#">Policy Forum meeting</a>, we discuss potential changes to our Community Standards, Advertising Policies or Product Policies.</p> <p>Subject matter experts from the relevant team propose adding new policies or amending existing ones factoring in cultural differences, safety concerns, and the impact of our policies on communities globally. Our policies evolve over time based on feedback from these meetings, as well as changes in social norms, language, and product updates.</p> <p>We publish meeting minutes from the Policy Forum and note these changes in our standards in the <a href="#">Change log</a>.</p>	<p>In our <a href="#">Policy forum meeting</a>, we discuss potential changes to our Community Guidelines, Advertising Policies or Product Policies.</p> <p>Subject matter experts from the relevant team propose adding new policies or amending existing ones factoring in cultural differences, safety concerns, and the impact of our policies on communities globally. Our policies evolve over time based on feedback from these meetings, as well as changes in social norms, language, and product updates.</p> <p>We publish meeting minutes from the Policy Forum and note these changes in our standards in the <a href="#">Change log</a>.</p>
<p>SLI 1.2.1</p>	<p>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January–June 2023.</p>	
<p><b>Measure 1.3</b></p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p>QRE 1.3.1</p>	<p>We offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook.</p> <p>Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [<a href="#">see for details</a>]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Placement Opt-Out</li> <li>● Inventory Filter</li> <li>● Topic Exclusions for Facebook In-Stream Videos</li> <li>● Content Type Exclusions</li> <li>● Block Lists</li> <li>● Content Allow Lists</li> </ul>	<p>We offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram.</p> <p>Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [<a href="#">see for details</a>]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Placement Opt-Out</li> <li>● Inventory Filter</li> <li>● Block Lists</li> <li>● Publisher Lists</li> <li>● Delivery Reports</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Publisher Allow Lists</li> <li>● Publisher Lists</li> <li>● Delivery Reports</li> </ul> <p>You can find details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a>.</p>	You can find details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a> .
<b>Measure 1.4</b>	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.4.1	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.	
<b>Measure 1.5</b>	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.5.1	<p>In November 2022, Facebook received <a href="#">accreditation</a> from the Media Rating Council (MRC) for content-level Brand Safety on Facebook covering Meta's Partner Monetization Policies, Content Monetization Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app.</p> <p>We are currently scoping the next round of the audit and which placements will be in scope (e.g., FB Feed). As GARM has added misinformation as the 12th category into their floor/framework, how Meta enforces on misinformation may be in scope.</p>	Instagram is in scope for accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) in 2023. As GARM has added misinformation as the 12th category into their floor/framework, how Meta enforces on misinformation may be in scope.
QRE 1.5.2	The areas covered by the MRC accreditation are Meta's Partner Monetization Policies, Content Monetization Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile, web and mobile in-app.	
<b>Measure 1.6</b>	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.6.1	<p>We offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook.</p> <p>Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [<a href="#">see for details</a>]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Placement Opt-Out</li> <li>● Inventory Filter</li> <li>● Topic Exclusions for Facebook In-Stream Videos</li> </ul>	<p>We offer several <a href="#">brand safety controls</a> for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram.</p> <p>Advertisers can <a href="#">see and update brand safety settings</a> directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [<a href="#">see for details</a>]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Placement Opt-Out</li> <li>● Inventory Filter</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Content Type Exclusions</li> <li>● Block Lists</li> <li>● Content Allow Lists</li> <li>● Publisher Allow Lists</li> <li>● Publisher Lists</li> <li>● Delivery Reports</li> </ul> <p>You can find details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a>.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Block Lists</li> <li>● Publisher Lists</li> <li>● Delivery Reports</li> </ul> <p>You can find details about <a href="#">Meta's brand safety description of methodology</a>.</p>
<b>QRE 1.6.2</b>	When advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.	When advertising on our platforms, we respect our own policies and principles, including brand safety tools outlined above.
<b>QRE 1.6.3</b>	<p>We provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Facebook and provide resources to use appropriately:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Brand safety controls</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Manage settings in brand safety controls</a></li> <li>- Manage how and where an ads appear across Facebook through <a href="#">Advertiser controls</a></li> </ul>	<p>We provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Instagram and provide resources to use appropriately:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Brand safety controls</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Manage settings in brand safety controls</a></li> <li>- Manage how and where an ads appear across Instagram through <a href="#">Advertiser controls</a></li> </ul>
<b>QRE 1.6.4</b>	N/A	N/A
<b>SLI 1.6.1</b>	N/A	N/A

## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

### Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We enforce <u>Advertising Standards</u> on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our <u>Community Standards</u>.</p> <p>You can find all our key sources regarding advertising policies below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Introduction to the Advertising Standards</u></li> <li>- <u>About ads in review</u></li> <li>- <u>Misinformation</u></li> <li>- <u>Brand safety controls</u></li> <li>- <u>Meta's brand safety description of methodology</u></li> </ul> <p><i>(For monetization policies, see Commitment 1)</i></p>		<p>We enforce <u>Advertising Standards</u> on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our <u>Community Guidelines</u>.</p> <p>You can find all our key sources regarding advertising policies below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Introduction to the Advertising Standards</u></li> <li>- <u>About ads in review</u></li> <li>- <u>Misinformation</u></li> <li>- <u>Brand safety controls</u></li> <li>- <u>Meta's brand safety description of methodology</u></li> </ul> <p><i>(For monetization policies, see Commitment 1)</i></p>	

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 2.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 2.1.1</b>	<p>Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of service, our <a href="#">Community Standards</a> and our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a>.</p> <p>Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta prohibits ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers.</li> <li>- Meta also prohibits ads that include misinformation that violates our Community Standards.</li> <li>- Misleading medical information is also ineligible to monetize (such as anti-vaccination claims)</li> <li>- More broadly, our policies prohibit deceptive content, dangerous content, and sensationalist content. See <a href="#">more</a>.</li> </ul>	<p>Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of service, our <a href="#">Community Guidelines</a> and our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a>.</p> <p>Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta prohibits ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers.</li> <li>- Meta also prohibits ads that include misinformation that violates our Community Guidelines.</li> <li>- Misleading medical information is also ineligible to monetize (such as anti-vaccination claims)</li> <li>- More broadly, our policies prohibit deceptive content, dangerous content, and sensationalist content. See <a href="#">more</a>.</li> </ul>



<b>SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022.</li> <li>2. Overall ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022.</li> <li>2. Overall ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022</li> </ol>
<b>Total EU (Misinformation policy)</b>	<b>Over 8.800</b>	<b>Over 8.800</b>
<b>Total EU (overall)</b>	<b>Over 2.900.000</b>	<b>Over 2.900.000</b>
<b>Measure 2.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 2.2.1</b>	<p>Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetize:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta prohibits ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be false may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta’s platforms. You can find more details on our fact-checking partnerships and programs in the fact-checking section of this report as well as on our <a href="#">help center</a>.</li> <li>- Meta also prohibits ads that include misinformation that violates our Community Standards.</li> <li>- Misleading medical information is also ineligible to monetize (such as anti-vaccination claims)</li> </ul> <p>Besides, more broadly, our policies prohibit deceptive content, dangerous content, sensationalist content. See our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> for more information.</p>	<p>Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetize:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meta prohibits ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be false may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta’s platforms. You can find more details on our fact-checking partnerships and programs in the fact-checking section of this report as well as on our <a href="#">help center</a>.</li> <li>- Meta also prohibits ads that include misinformation that violates our Community Guidelines.</li> <li>- Misleading medical information is also ineligible to monetize (such as anti-vaccination claims)</li> </ul> <p>Besides, more broadly, our policies prohibit deceptive content, dangerous content, sensationalist content. See our <a href="#">Advertising Standards</a> for more information.</p>
<b>Measure 2.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 2.3.1</b>	The ad review system reviews ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information.	The ad review system reviews ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information.

	<p>If a violation is found at any point in the review process, the ad will be rejected, and the business account or its assets may be restricted. If a business account or its assets (ad account, Page or user account) is restricted, that account or asset can't be used to advertise across our technologies. Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time. It is the responsibility of the advertiser to understand and comply with our policies.</p> <p>We also review and take action, such as restricting the ability to advertise, on an advertiser's business account or its assets (ad accounts, Pages and user accounts) for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Violating content</u>: If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account has violated our policies, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions depending on the type and severity of the violation.</li> <li>- <u>Evading enforcement</u>: If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.</li> <li>- <u>Account authenticity</u>: If we find that an inauthentic user account set up an ad account, Page or business account to run ads, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. As per Facebook's Community Standards, we may restrict or remove inauthentic user accounts.</li> <li>- <u>Violating networks or associations</u>: Advertisers that manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down may face advertising restrictions on their associated ad account, Page, user account or business account.</li> </ul>	<p>If a violation is found at any point in the review process, the ad will be rejected, and the business account or its assets may be restricted. If a business account or its assets (ad account or user account) is restricted, that account or asset can't be used to advertise across our technologies. Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time. It is the responsibility of the advertiser to understand and comply with our policies.</p> <p>We also review and take action, such as restricting the ability to advertise, on an advertiser's business account or its assets (ad accounts and user accounts) for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Violating content</u>: If we find that an ad account, user account or business account has violated our policies, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions depending on the type and severity of the violation.</li> <li>- <u>Evading enforcement</u>: If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.</li> <li>- <u>Account authenticity</u>: If we find that an inauthentic user account set up an ad account or business account to run ads, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. As per Instagram's Community Guidelines, we may restrict or remove inauthentic user accounts.</li> <li>- <u>Violating networks or associations</u>: Advertisers that manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down may face advertising restrictions on their associated ad account, user account, or business account.</li> </ul>
SLI 2.3.1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022.</li> <li>2. Overall ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022</li> </ol>

	2. Overall ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined from October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022	
<b>Total EU (Misinformation policy)</b>	<b>Over 8.800</b>	<b>Over 8.800</b>
<b>Total EU (overall)</b>	<b>Over 2.900.000</b>	<b>Over 2.900.000</b>
<b>Measure 2.4</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 2.4.1</b>	<p>Our ad review system relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running, and is typically completed within 24 hours, although it may take longer in some cases. During this review, the status of the ad will be "In review". Additionally, ads may be reviewed again, including after they are live. You can find more information in our <a href="#">Business Help Center</a>.</p> <p>Our ad review system focuses on violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text, and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. We also review and take action on an advertiser's business account or its assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts). As part of our review, we assess whether the account or its assets have violated our policies.</p> <p>If a violation is found at any point in the review process, the ad will be rejected, and the business account or its assets may be restricted. Lower-quality ads that do not necessarily violate our policies may experience affected performance. You can find more information about how quality may affect your ad in our <a href="#">Business Help Center</a>.</p> <p>If a business account or its assets (ad account, Page, or user account) is restricted, that account or asset can't be used to advertise across our technologies. If a user account is restricted from advertising on a business account or ad</p>	<p>Our ad review system relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running, and is typically completed within 24 hours, although it may take longer in some cases. During this review, the status of the ad will be "In review". Additionally, ads may be reviewed again, including after they are live. You can find more information in our <a href="#">Business Help Center</a>.</p> <p>Our ad review system focuses on violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text, and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. We also review and take action on an advertiser's business account or its assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts). As part of our review, we assess whether the account or its assets have violated our policies.</p> <p>If a violation is found at any point in the review process, the ad will be rejected, and the business account or its assets may be restricted. Lower-quality ads that do not necessarily violate our policies may experience affected performance. You can find more information about how quality may affect your ad in our <a href="#">Business Help Center</a>.</p> <p>If a business account or its assets (ad account or user account) is restricted, that account or asset can't be used to advertise across our technologies. If a user account is restricted from advertising on a business account or ad account, other members of those accounts may still be able to advertise.</p> <p>Re-review of ads: Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time.</p>

	<p>account, other members of those accounts may still be able to advertise.</p> <p>Re-review of ads: Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time.</p> <p>If an ad or business asset is restricted, advertisers may create a new ad or edit the ad to comply with our policies. These ads will be treated as new ads and reviewed by our ad review system. <a href="#">Editing steps can be found here.</a></p> <p>Information and appeals process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In case of violations: Advertisers will be notified directly if the Page or profile is facing restricted or disabled access to monetization tools. Status of monetization is available in Creator Studio.</li> <li>- Appeals: Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review If they believe that the ad, ad account, user account, Page or business account was incorrectly rejected or restricted, through <a href="#">Account Quality</a>. An appeal can only be submitted once. Appeals are typically answered in seven days or less.</li> </ul>	<p>If an ad or business asset is restricted, advertisers may create a new ad or edit the ad to comply with our policies. These ads will be treated as new ads and reviewed by our ad review system. <a href="#">Editing steps can be found here.</a></p> <p>Information and appeals process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In case of violations: Advertisers will be notified directly if the account is restricted or disabled access to monetization tools. Status of monetization is available in Creator Studio.</li> <li>- Appeals: Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review If they believe that the ad, ad account, user account, or business account was incorrectly rejected or restricted, through <a href="#">Account Quality</a>. An appeal can only be submitted once. Appeals are typically answered in seven days or less.</li> </ul>
SLI 2.4.1	We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January-June 2023.	

<h2>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</h2>
<p><b>Commitment 3</b></p> <p>Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organizations active in the online monetization value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.</p>

	<b>C.3</b>	<b>M 3.1</b>	<b>M 3.2</b>	<b>M 3.3</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We engaged closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetization and will continue working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.		We engaged closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetization and will continue working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<p>As mentioned under Commitment 1, we are also cooperating with Zefr for independent reporting on the context in which ads appear on Facebook Feed.</p> <p>We will also continue our close engagement with the Taskforce, GARM, and IAB.</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards, tools, or processes. As part of this continuous</p>		<p>We will continue our close engagement with the Taskforce, GARM, and IAB.</p> <p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Advertising standards, tools, or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	

	improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	
<b>Measure 3.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 3.1.1</b>	We are working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.  We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetization and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.	We are working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.  We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetization and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.
<b>Measure 3.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 3.2.1</b>	We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetization and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.	We are engaging closely with the Taskforce on the topic of demonetization and working closely with both GARM and IAB Europe.
<b>Measure 3.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 3.3.1</b>	We are working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above. As mentioned above, we are also cooperating with Zefr for independent reporting on the context in which ads appear on Facebook Feed.	We are working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.

<b>III. Political Advertising</b>			
<b>Commitment 4</b>			
Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of “political and issue advertising”.			
	<b>C.4</b>	<b>M 4.1</b>	<b>M 4.2</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation	Yes		Yes

measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continued to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”).	We continued to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will work to ensure harmonization and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.	We will work towards harmonization and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.
<b>Measure 4.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 4.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram

<p><b>QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)</b></p>	<p>We continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), which covers advertising that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns</li> <li>• Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run (we define <u>social issues</u> as sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result in/relate to existing or proposed legislation. In the EU, those social issues include civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy)</li> <li>• is regulated by law as political advertising.</li> </ul> <p>Further details of our policies may also be found online.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Advertising Standards</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> <li>• <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined</u></li> <li>• <u>About social issues</u></li> <li>• <u>Examples</u> of ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> </ul>	<p>We continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), which covers advertising that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns</li> <li>• Is about any social issue in any place across the EU where the ad is being run,(we define <u>social issues</u> as sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result in/relate to existing or proposed legislation. In the EU, those social issues include civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy)</li> <li>• is regulated by law as political advertising.</li> </ul> <p>Further details of our policies may also be found online.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Advertising Standards</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> <li>• <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined on Instagram</u></li> <li>• <u>About social issues</u></li> <li>• <u>Examples</u> of ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> </ul>
<p><b>QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)</b></p>	<p>As specified in 4.1.2 of the Code, this requirement is only applicable after the first year of the Code's operation.</p>	<p>As specified in 4.1.2 of the Code, this requirement is only applicable after the first year of the Code's operation.</p>

### III. Political Advertising

#### Commitment 5

Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.



	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>	<b>Service B - Instagram</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>Facebook's policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer.</p> <p>We've established <u>measures</u> where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies. This prohibition includes ads that call into question the legitimacy of the methods and processes of elections as well as their outcomes.</p>	<p>Instagram's policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer.</p> <p>We've established <u>measures</u> where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies. This prohibition includes ads that call into question the legitimacy of the methods and processes of elections as well as their outcomes.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan	We will work to ensure harmonization and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.	We will work to ensure harmonization and coordination of this chapter with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising.

to put in place in the next 6 months?		
<b>Measure 5.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 5.1.1</b>	<p>Any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the <u>authorization process required by Meta</u>. This applies to any ad that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns</li> <li>• Is about any <u>social issue</u> in any place where the ad is being run</li> <li>• is regulated as political advertising</li> </ul> <p>Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disclaimer, disclosure and ad labeling</li> <li>• Blackout periods</li> <li>• Foreign interference</li> <li>• Spending limits and reporting requirements</li> </ul> <p>If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library.</p> <p>We publicly share resources on this topics to explain our policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advertising standards covering <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u></li> </ul>	<p>Any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the <u>authorization process required by Meta</u>. This applies to any ad that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office</li> <li>• Is about any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns</li> <li>• Is about any <u>social issue</u> in any place where the ad is being run</li> <li>• is regulated as political advertising</li> </ul> <p>Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disclaimer, disclosure and ad labeling</li> <li>• Blackout periods</li> <li>• Foreign interference</li> <li>• Spending limits and reporting requirements</li> </ul> <p>If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library.</p> <p>We publicly share resources on this topics to explain our policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advertising standards covering <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Dedicated public website</u> on election integrity</li> <li>- <u>Dedicated public website</u> on the requirements for ads about social issues, elections or politics within the European Union</li> <li>- Details on what we consider as <u>issue ads within the EU</u></li> <li>- <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are reviewed</u> (with examples specifics to the European Union)</li> <li>- <u>Availability for ads about social issues, elections or politics</u></li> <li>- <u>Information on prohibited ads related to voting and ads about social issues, elections or politics</u></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Dedicated public website</u> on election integrity</li> <li>- <u>Dedicated public website</u> on the requirements for ads about social issues, elections or politics within the European Union</li> <li>- Details on what we consider as <u>issue ads within the EU</u></li> <li>- <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are reviewed</u> (with examples specifics to the European Union)</li> <li>- <u>Availability for ads about social issues, elections or politics</u></li> <li>- <u>Information on prohibited ads related to voting and ads about social issues, elections or politics</u></li> </ul>
--	---	---

### III. Political Advertising

#### Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labeled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising

	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Messenger
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>			<b>Service B - Instagram</b>		<b>Service C - Messenger</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes			Yes		No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook’s policy requires advertisers include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”) to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad.	Instagram’s policy requires advertisers include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> (“SIEP ads”) to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 6.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram	

<p><b>QRE 6.1.1</b></p>	<p><u>Meta uses disclaimers</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics. A disclaimer should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accurately represent the name of the entity or person responsible for the ad.</li> <li>- Have accurate, valid information at all times.</li> <li>- Not include profanity, objectionable language or unrecognizable words or phrases.</li> <li>- Not include URLs or acronyms, unless URLs or acronyms make up the name of the organization, which must also be accurately reflected on the website provided.</li> <li>- Not wrongfully imply that your ads are paid for by, with or on behalf of Facebook.</li> <li>- Not wrongfully imply that a foreign leader has paid for the ad.</li> <li>- Not include "Paid for by" language that duplicates the same language provided by Facebook.</li> </ul> <p><u>Not all placement nor formats</u> can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics on such supports' The following placements aren't available at this time: Messenger, WhatsApp, right-hand column, Marketplace, search, Facebook Stories, Instant Articles, Instagram and Facebook Reel ads, suggested videos, Watch Feed, Audience Network, in-stream reserve and in-stream video on desktop (In-stream video is only supported on iOS and Android). The only unsupported formats are dynamic product ads (DPA), boosted ambient live video and AR ads.</p>	<p><u>Meta uses disclaimers</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics. A disclaimer should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accurately represent the name of the entity or person responsible for the ad.</li> <li>- Have accurate, valid information at all times.</li> <li>- Not include profanity, objectionable language or unrecognizable words or phrases.</li> <li>- Not include URLs or acronyms, unless URLs or acronyms make up the name of the organization, which must also be accurately reflected on the website provided.</li> <li>- Not wrongfully imply that your ads are paid for by, with or on behalf of Instagram.</li> <li>- Not wrongfully imply that a foreign leader has paid for the ad.</li> <li>- Not include "Paid for by" language that duplicates the same language provided by Instagram.</li> </ul> <p><u>Not all placement nor formats</u> can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics on such supports' The following placements aren't available at this time: Messenger, WhatsApp, right-hand column, Marketplace, search, Facebook Stories, Instant Articles, Instagram and Facebook Reel ads, suggested videos, Watch Feed, Audience Network, in-stream reserve and in-stream video on desktop (In-stream video is only supported on iOS and Android). The only unsupported formats are dynamic product ads (DPA), boosted ambient live video and AR ads.</p>	
<p><b>Measure 6.2</b></p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>	

QRE 6.2.1	<p><u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> require authorizations and a “Paid for by” disclaimer if the ad content includes any of the following examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy for a politician, candidate or a political party.</li> <li>• The name of a political figure, politician or candidate for public office; or their image or mentions the title of a political figure (ex: "Governor," "MP" or "Minister"). Political figures include officials appointed by politicians.</li> <li>• The Page name includes the name of a political figure (ex: the Page name is Governor Elisabeth Jones).</li> <li>• Advocacy for a change to law or policy.</li> <li>• Advocacy for or against legislation such as regulations, decrees, executive orders and proclamations such as "shelter-in-place" and "restricted travel."</li> <li>• Grassroots advocacy where there is a call to action to a person to contact an elected official or governing body to take a specific step or to sign a petition aimed at an elected official or governing body.</li> <li>• Information about voting, such as when and where to vote, methods for voting and more.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> require authorizations and a “Paid for by” disclaimer if the ad content includes any of the following examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy for a politician, candidate or a political party.</li> <li>• The name of a political figure, politician or candidate for public office; or their image or mentions the title of a political figure (ex: "Governor," "MP" or "Minister"). Political figures include officials appointed by politicians.</li> <li>• Advocacy for a change to law or policy.</li> <li>• Advocacy for or against legislation such as regulations, decrees, executive orders and proclamations such as "shelter-in-place" and "restricted travel."</li> <li>• Grassroots advocacy where there is a call to action to a person to contact an elected official or governing body to take a specific step or to sign a petition aimed at an elected official or governing body.</li> <li>• Information about voting, such as when and where to vote, methods for voting and more.</li> </ul>	
QRE 6.2.2	<p>Examples of political ad labeling <u>may be found in the Ad Library</u>. The Ad Library is Meta’s most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.</p>	<p>Examples of political ad labeling <u>may be found in the Ad Library</u>. The Ad Library is Meta’s most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.</p>	
SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	<p>Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined with “paid for by” disclaimers from November 15 to December 31, 2022 in EU member states in Q4 2022 in EU member states.</p>	<p>Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined with “paid for by” disclaimers from November 15 to December 31, 2022 in EU member states in Q4 2022 in EU member states.</p>	

	Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	
	Number of ads accepted and labeled with SIEP disclaimers on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of ads accepted and labeled with SIEP disclaimers on Facebook and Instagram combined	
<b>Member States</b>			
Austria	Over 8.800	Over 8.800	
Belgium	Over 8.600	Over 8.600	
Bulgaria	Over 1.100	Over 1.100	
Croatia	Over 4.800	Over 4.800	
Cyprus	Over 1.600	Over 1.600	
Czechia	Over 6.600	Over 6.600	
Denmark	Over 5.900	Over 5.900	
Estonia	Over 1.500	Over 1.500	
Finland	Over 4.800	Over 4.800	
France	Over 14.000	Over 14.000	
Germany	Over 18.000	Over 18.000	
Greece	Over 6.600	Over 6.600	
Hungary	Over 9.100	Over 9.100	
Ireland	Over 2.000	Over 2.000	
Italy	Over 23.000	Over 23.000	
Latvia	Over 2.500	Over 2.500	
Lithuania	Over 1.000	Over 1.000	
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 500	
Malta	Less than 500	Less than 500	
Netherlands	Over 7.600	Over 7.600	
Poland	Over 10.000	Over 10.000	

Portugal	Over 1.200	Over 1.200	
Romania	Over 7.200	Over 7.200	
Slovakia	Over 6.600	Over 6.600	
Slovenia	Over 3.000	Over 3.000	
Spain	Over 9.900	Over 9.900	
Sweden	Over 9.600	Over 9.600	
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>Over 150.000</b>	<b>Over 150.000</b>	
<b>Measure 6.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram	
<b>QRE 6.3.1</b>	<p>We developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Facebook so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share.</p> <p>We <a href="#">started</a> by announcing that only authorized advertisers will be able to run electoral ads on Facebook. We then <a href="#">extended</a> this requirement to anyone that wants to show “issue ads” – like political topics that are being debated across the country. To do so, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time. We started by testing this authorization process in the US before extending it to further markets.</p> <p>We’re also investing in artificial intelligence and adding more people to help find advertisers that should have gone through the authorization process but did not. We realize we won’t catch every ad that should be labeled, and we encourage anyone who sees an unlabeled political ad to report it. People can do this by tapping the three dots at the top right corner of the ad and selecting “Report Ad.”</p>	<p>We developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Instagram so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share.</p> <p>We <a href="#">started</a> by announcing that only authorized advertisers will be able to run electoral ads on Instagram. We then <a href="#">extended</a> this requirement to anyone that wants to show “issue ads” – like political topics that are being debated across the country. To do so, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time. We started by testing this authorization process in the US before extending it to further markets.</p> <p>We’re also investing in artificial intelligence and adding more people to help find advertisers that should have gone through the authorization process but did not. We realize we won’t catch every ad that should be labeled, and we encourage anyone who sees an unlabeled political ad to report it. People can do this by tapping the three dots at the top right corner of the ad and selecting “Report Ad.”</p>	
<b>Measure 6.4</b>	Facebook	Instagram	
<b>QRE 6.4.1</b>	We’re committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees	We’re committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees	



	and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	
<b>Measure 6.5</b>	N/A	N/A	Messenger
<b>QRE 6.5.1</b>	N/A	N/A	When an ad, labeled as SIEP on Facebook app, is shared via Messenger, the link redirects the user to the ad where the label is visible.  The Messenger teams are currently working on solutions to continue to improve the visibility of the SIEP label further in the Messenger conversation.

<b>III. Political Advertising</b>					
<b>Commitment 7</b>					
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labeling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.					
	<b>C.7</b>	<b>M 7.1</b>	<b>M 7.2</b>	<b>M 7.3</b>	<b>M 7.4</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>			<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	

<p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>We have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a <u>policy</u> that applies to all “ads about social issues, elections or politics” so that transparency obligations and other requirements can be imposed on a wide category of ads that could influence political discourse. Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties, elections (including "get out the vote" campaigns) or social issues (civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, immigration, health, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy) will be required to confirm their identity by submitting identification document(s) issued by the country where they want to run the ad.</p>	<p>We have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a <u>policy</u> that applies to all “ads about social issues, elections or politics” so that transparency obligations and other requirements can be imposed on a wide category of ads that could influence political discourse. Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties, elections (including "get out the vote" campaigns) or social issues (civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, immigration, health, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy) will be required to confirm their identity by submitting identification document(s) issued by the country where they want to run the ad.</p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>

Measure 7.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.1.1	<p>Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management.</p> <p>Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Turning on <u>two-factor authentication</u></li> <li>- Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Valid photo ID</li> <li>- Two official documents</li> <li>- A notarized form that you download from <a href="https://facebook.com/id">facebook.com/id</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>An ID or official document will be used by our services to confirm your identity. We'll also use it to help detect and prevent risks such as impersonation or ID theft, which helps to keep our community safe. It won't be shared on your profile, in ads or with other admins of users' Pages or ad accounts. After we've confirmed the user's identity and run compliance checks, we delete the ID or document within 30 days. When required by law, we'll securely store the user's name and date of birth for longer.</p> <p>To help guard against foreign interference, all advertisers (including political organizations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorized in the EU country that they're targeting. However, advertisers will be able to run ads about social issues, elections or politics in multiple countries if a local representative in each country completes authorizations for that country, and only runs ads targeted to that country.</p>	<p>Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management.</p> <p>Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Turning on <u>two-factor authentication</u></li> <li>- Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Valid photo ID</li> <li>- Two official documents</li> <li>- A notarized form that you download from <a href="https://facebook.com/id">facebook.com/id</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>An ID or official document will be used by our services to confirm your identity. We'll also use it to help detect and prevent risks such as impersonation or ID theft, which helps to keep our community safe. It won't be shared on your profile, in ads or with other admins of users' ad accounts. After we've confirmed the user's identity and run compliance checks, we delete the ID or document within 30 days. When required by law, we'll securely store the user's name and date of birth for longer.</p> <p>To help guard against foreign interference, all advertisers (including political organizations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorized in the EU country that they're targeting. However, advertisers will be able to run ads about social issues, elections or politics in multiple countries if a local representative in each country completes authorizations for that country, and only runs ads targeted to that country.</p>

	<p>Intergovernmental organizations (defined as having a membership of three or more sovereign states bound together by a treaty) qualify to run ads about social issues in member states unless otherwise prohibited to do so. Qualifying charitable and humanitarian organizations can run specific social issue ads across the European Union. Ads will continue to require disclaimers and must not include electoral, political or legislative content. Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions.</p> <p>After confirming a user's identity, the user must link their ad accounts to their Page and provide a valid disclaimer. The linked ad account must have a payment source with an address based in the country the user plans to target and the ad account's currency must be local. A Page admin who has completed the ID confirmation step can go to the Issue, electoral or political ads tab in a Page's settings to manage their disclaimers. This disclaimer has several components including "Paid for by" and the name of the person or entity associated. Users can choose between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The name of the individual as it appears in official documents</li> <li>- Page name</li> <li>- A different name</li> </ul> <p>To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.</p>	<p>Intergovernmental organizations (defined as having a membership of three or more sovereign states bound together by a treaty) qualify to run ads about social issues in member states unless otherwise prohibited to do so. Qualifying charitable and humanitarian organizations can run specific social issue ads across the European Union. Ads will continue to require disclaimers and must not include electoral, political or legislative content. Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions.</p> <p>After confirming a user's identity, the user must link their ad accounts and provide a valid disclaimer. The linked ad account must have a payment source with an address based in the country the user plans to target and the ad account's currency must be local. A user who has completed the ID confirmation step can manage their disclaimers. This disclaimer has several components including "Paid for by" and the name of the person or entity associated. Users can choose between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The name of the individual as it appears in official documents</li> <li>- Account name</li> <li>- A different name</li> </ul> <p>To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.</p>
<p><b>SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)</b></p>	<p>Number of unique ads rejected for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from October 1 to December 31 2022 in EU member states.</p> <p>Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.</p> <p>Number of ads rejected for non compliance with our SIEP policy on Facebook and Instagram</p>	<p>Number of unique ads rejected for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from October 1 to December 31 2022 in EU member states.</p> <p>Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.</p> <p>Number of ads rejected non compliance with our SIEP policy on Facebook and Instagram</p>
<p><b>Member States</b></p>		
<p>Austria</p>	<p>Over 7.300</p>	<p>Over 7.300</p>
<p>Belgium</p>	<p>Over 7.900</p>	<p>Over 7.900</p>

Bulgaria	Over 3.600	Over 3.600
Croatia	Over 1.800	Over 1.800
Cyprus	Over 2.000	Over 2.000
Czechia	Over 6.100	Over 6.100
Denmark	Over 9.100	Over 9.100
Estonia	Over 2.000	Over 2.000
Finland	Over 5.400	Over 5.400
France	Over 29.000	Over 29.000
Germany	Over 34.000	Over 34.000
Greece	Over 7.200	Over 7.200
Hungary	Over 7.200	Over 7.200
Ireland	Over 2.600	Over 2.600
Italy	Over 33.000	Over 33.000
Latvia	Over 1.600	Over 1.600
Lithuania	Over 2.700	Over 2.700
Luxembourg	Less than 1,000	Less than 1,000
Malta	Less than 1,000	Less than 1,000
Netherlands	Over 13.000	Over 13.000
Poland	Over 19.000	Over 19.000
Portugal	Over 7.900	Over 7.900
Romania	Over 9.700	Over 9.700
Slovakia	Over 7.700	Over 7.700
Slovenia	Over 3.500	Over 3.500
Spain	Over 26.000	Over 26.000
Sweden	Over 10.000	Over 10.000

Total EU	Over 260.000	Over 260.000
<b>Measure 7.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 7.2.1</b>	<p>Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>.</p> <p>As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorized</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p>	<p>Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>.</p> <p>As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorized</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p>
<b>QRE 7.2.2</b>	<p>Details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <u>Business Help Center</u>.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page <u>using a valid disclaimer</u> to complete authorization. The review process takes usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.</p>	<p>Details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <u>Business Help Center</u>.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account <u>using a valid disclaimer</u> to complete authorization. The review process takes usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.</p>
<b>Measure 7.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram

<p><b>QRE 7.3.1</b></p>	<p>We require advertisers to know how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.</p> <p>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook, which relies primarily on automated review (artificial intelligence) to check ads against our Advertising Policies. <u>Ad review</u> can take up to 72 hours to determine if an ad falls under our ads about social issues, elections or politics policy or if the ad is primarily focused on selling a product or promoting a service.</p> <p>Advertisers can request another review if they believe the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service and doesn't require a disclaimer. Upon review, if we determine the ads aren't in scope of our social issues, elections, or politics policy, then the ad will be permitted to run without a disclaimer. However, if ads are determined to fall under this policy, advertisers won't be able to run these ads unless they include a disclaimer on them.</p> <p>In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</p> <p>Facebook's <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences</li> <li>• Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials' activity using militaristic</li> </ul>	<p>We require advertisers to know how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.</p> <p>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Instagram, which relies primarily on automated review (artificial intelligence) to check ads against our Advertising Policies. <u>Ad review</u> can take up to 72 hours to determine if an ad falls under our ads about social issues, elections or politics policy or if the ad is primarily focused on selling a product or promoting a service.</p> <p>Advertisers can request another review if they believe the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service and doesn't require a disclaimer. Upon review, if we determine the ads aren't in scope of our social issues, elections, or politics policy, then the ad will be permitted to run without a disclaimer. However, if ads are determined to fall under this policy, advertisers won't be able to run these ads unless they include a disclaimer on them.</p> <p>In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</p> <p>Instagram's <u>Community Guidelines</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences</li> <li>• Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials' activity using militaristic</li> </ul>
-------------------------	---	--

	language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power.	language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power.
<b>QRE 7.3.2</b>	<p>As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorized</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p>	<p>As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorized</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p>
<b>Measure 7.4</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 7.4.1</b>	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.

<b>III. Political Advertising</b>			
<b>Commitment 8</b>			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
	<b>C.8</b>	<b>M 8.1</b>	<b>M 8.2</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>
In line with this commitment, did you	Yes		Yes



<p>deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>		
<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>We believe increased transparency leads to increased accountability. We provide an industry-leading level of transparency around political advertising and pages so people can see who is trying to influence them. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verifying Political Advertisers: To run a political or social issue ad, advertisers must go through our <u>authorization process</u>, which includes proving who they are and where they live.</li> <li>• Political and Issue Ads: Ads about social issues, elections or politics include “Paid for by” disclaimers to show who’s behind the ad. These ads are then housed in a public searchable <u>Ad Library</u>.</li> <li>• Page Transparency: On Facebook, we show information about a Page, such as when it was created, name changes, and the location(s) of the Page admins. We also label media outlets that we believe are wholly or partially under the editorial control of their government as <u>state-controlled media</u>.</li> <li>• News Feed Ranking: People can click on “<u>Why Am I Seeing This</u>” in posts and ads to understand why they are seeing them and control what they see from friends, Pages and Groups in the News Feed.</li> </ul> <p>Since July 2022, information about the targeting selections made by advertisers are now included in the Ad Library for all ads about social issues, elections and politics, with the data aggregated at the Page level.</p>	<p>We believe increased transparency leads to increased accountability. We provide an industry-leading level of transparency around political advertising so people can see who is trying to influence them. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verifying Political Advertisers: To run a political or social issue ad, advertisers must go through our <u>authorization process</u>, which includes proving who they are and where they live.</li> <li>• Political and Issue Ads: Ads about social issues, elections or politics include “Paid for by” disclaimers to show who’s behind the ad. These ads are then housed in a public searchable <u>Ad Library</u>.</li> <li>• Account Transparency: On Instagram, we show information about accounts, such as when it was created, name changes, and the location(s) of the account owner. We also label media outlets that we believe are wholly or partially under the editorial control of their government as <u>state-controlled media</u>.</li> <li>• News Feed Ranking: People can click on “<u>Why Am I Seeing This</u>” in posts and ads to understand why they are seeing them and control what they see from other accounts.</li> </ul> <p>Since July 2022, information about the targeting selections made by advertisers are now included in the Ad Library for all ads about social issues, elections and politics, with the data aggregated at the Page level.</p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will engage with the Taskforce work streams as outlined in Measure 8.2.	We will engage with the Taskforce work streams as outlined in Measure 8.2.
<b>Measure 8.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 8.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 8.1.1 (for measures 8.1 &amp; 8.2)</b>	The relevant Taskforce workstream on common transparency obligations has not yet begun. Our current transparency measures are outlined under Commitments 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.	The relevant Taskforce workstream on common transparency obligations has not yet begun. Our current transparency measures are outlined under Commitments 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.

<b>III. Political Advertising</b>			
<b>Commitment 9</b>			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	<b>C.9</b>	<b>M 9.1</b>	<b>M 9.2</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service,	Yes		Yes

new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	The “Why am I seeing this ad?” feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. There are also additional details about when information on an advertiser’s audience list matches a person’s profile.	The “Why am I seeing this ad?” feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. There are also additional details about when information on an advertiser’s audience list matches a person’s profile.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 9.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 9.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 &amp; 9.2)</b>	<p>To better match people’s evolving expectations of how advertisers may reach them on our platform, we’ve removed Detailed Targeting options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organizations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation.</p> <p>Starting in July 2022, information about the targeting selections made by advertisers is included in the Ad Library for all ads about social issues, elections and politics, with the data aggregated at the Page level. This is in addition to information already available in our Ad Library, which includes ad creative,</p>	<p>To better match people’s evolving expectations of how advertisers may reach them on our platform, we’ve removed Detailed Targeting options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organizations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation.</p> <p>Starting in July 2022, information about the targeting selections made by advertisers is included in the Ad Library for all ads about social issues, elections and politics. This is in addition to information already available in our Ad Library, which includes ad creative, who paid for the ad and who that ad reached. This allows</p>

	<p>who paid for the ad and who that ad reached. This allows people to gain more information on the impact of digital advertising on elections by providing information on advertisers' selections for targeting their ads to people based on criteria such as location, demographics and/or interests.</p> <p>Furthermore, in order to empower our users, we develop ads controls which can allow people to choose to see fewer ads about certain types of content. Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organizations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them.</p>	<p>people to gain more information on the impact of digital advertising on elections by providing information on advertisers' selections for targeting their ads to people based on criteria such as location, demographics and/or interests.</p> <p>Furthermore, in order to empower our users, we develop ads controls which can allow people to choose to see fewer ads about certain types of content. Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organizations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them.</p>
--	---	--

<h3>III. Political Advertising</h3>			
<h4>Commitment 10</h4> <p>Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.</p>			
	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Our <u>Ad Library</u> provides a public, searchable ad database that allows journalists, regulators, watchdog groups, researchers, academics, and people in general to hold advertisers accountable.		Our <u>Ad Library</u> provides a public, searchable ad database that allows journalists, regulators, watchdog groups, researchers, academics, and people in general to hold advertisers

	<p>To help people scrutinize the ads in the advertising ecosystem, the Ad Library provides a comprehensive, searchable collection of all currently active ads (political and non-political) running across Facebook; an archive of political ads that remain in the library for 7 years; and aggregated insights.</p> <p>Since July 2022, information about the targeting selections made by advertisers are now included in the Ad Library for all ads about social issues, elections and politics, with the data aggregated at the Page level. This will be in addition to information already available in our Ad Library, which includes the ad creative, who paid for the ad and who that ad reached. This will allow people to gain more information on the impact of digital advertising on elections by providing information on advertisers' selections for targeting their ads to people based on criteria such as location, demographics and/or interests.</p> <p>We include a pop-up on the homepage to describe all the new features we add to the Ads Library website "See what's new". The most recent updates are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ad Library email subscription update: Get daily or weekly summaries on the amount spent and number of ads from up to 10 advertisers of social issue, electoral or political ads.</li> <li>- Visualizations: You can toggle between data tables and visualizations of advertiser audience selection data for ads about social issues, elections and politics.</li> </ul>	<p>accountable. To help people scrutinize the ads in the advertising ecosystem, the Ad Library provides a comprehensive, searchable collection of all currently active ads (political and non-political) running across Instagram; an archive of political ads that remain in the library for 7 years; and aggregated insights.</p> <p>Since July 2022, information about the targeting selections made by advertisers are now included in the Ad Library for all ads about social issues, elections and politics. This will be in addition to information already available in our Ad Library, which includes the ad creative, who paid for the ad and who that ad reached. This will allow people to gain more information on the impact of digital advertising on elections by providing information on advertisers' selections for targeting their ads to people based on criteria such as location, demographics and/or interests.</p> <p>We include a pop-up on the homepage to describe all the new features we add to the Ads Library website "See what's new". The most recent updates are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ad Library email subscription update: Get daily or weekly summaries on the amount spent and number of ads from up to 10 advertisers of social issue, electoral or political ads.</li> <li>- Visualizations: You can toggle between data tables and visualizations of advertiser audience selection data for ads about social issues, elections and politics.</li> </ul>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks</p>

	platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising policies, tools, and processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 10.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 10.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 &amp; 10.2)</b>	<p>The Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years.</p> <p>The public can view and use the Ad Library at <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ads/library">https://www.facebook.com/ads/library</a>.</p> <p>The Ad Library shows additional information about these ads, such as who funded the ad, a range of how much they spent, and the reach of the ad across multiple demographics, and the most frequently searched for keyword phrases on the Ad Library.</p> <p>For all ads, users can search for ads that are currently active on Facebook. For ads that are about issues, elections or politics, users can search ads that are inactive (no longer running across Facebook). An ad will appear in the Ad Library within 24 hours from the time it gets its first impression. Any changes or updates made to an ad will also be reflected in the Ad Library within 24 hours.</p>	<p>The Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years.</p> <p>The public can view and use the Ad Library at <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ads/library">https://www.facebook.com/ads/library</a>.</p> <p>The Ad Library shows additional information about these ads, such as who funded the ad, a range of how much they spent, and the reach of the ad across multiple demographics, and the most frequently searched for keyword phrases on the Ad Library.</p> <p>For all ads, users can search for ads that are currently active on Instagram. For ads that are about issues, elections or politics, users can search ads that are inactive (no longer running across Instagram). An ad will appear in the Ad Library within 24 hours from the time it gets its first impression. Any changes or updates made to an ad will also be reflected in the Ad Library within 24 hours.</p>

<b>III. Political Advertising</b>
Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customized searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.”					
	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>		
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	The Ad Library application programming interface (API) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.		The Ad Library application programming interface (API) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.		
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No		No		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising repositories. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.		Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Political advertising repositories. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.		
<b>Measure 11.1</b>	Facebook		Instagram		

<b>Measure 11.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 11.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 11.4</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)</b>	<p>The Ad Library <a href="#">API</a> provides access data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ad creatives</li> <li>● Ad performance data including total amount spent (range)</li> <li>● Total impressions an ad received (range)</li> <li>● Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%)</li> <li>● Dates the ad ran</li> </ul> <p>The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. <a href="#">You can search data</a> for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete <a href="#">these steps</a> to access the API.</p> <p>Anyone can explore the ad library, with or without a Facebook account. However, reporting ads and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.</p>	<p>The Ad Library <a href="#">API</a> provides access data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ad creatives</li> <li>● Ad performance data including total amount spent (range)</li> <li>● Total impressions an ad received (range)</li> <li>● Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%)</li> <li>● Dates the ad ran</li> </ul> <p>The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. <a href="#">You can search data</a> for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term, name or Page in the Ad Library. For Instagram accounts that don't have a linked Facebook Page, people will be able to search for an advertiser's ad using their Instagram handle name.</p> <p>Anyone can explore the ad library, with or without a Facebook account. However, reporting ads and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.</p>
<b>QRE 11.4.1</b>	<p>In early 2021 we started making targeting information for more than 1.65 million social issues, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads available to academic researchers for the first time. This data package includes ads that ran during the three-month period prior to Election Day in the United States, from August 3 to November 3, 2020, and is accessible through the Facebook Open Research and Transparency (FORT) platform.</p> <p>As part of this <a href="#">launch</a>, we share access to two new data sets:</p>	<p>In early 2021 we started making targeting information for more than 1.65 million social issues, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads available to academic researchers for the first time. This data package includes ads that ran during the three-month period prior to Election Day in the United States, from August 3 to November 3, 2020, and is accessible through the Facebook Open Research and Transparency (FORT) platform.</p> <p>As part of this <a href="#">launch</a>, we share access to two new data sets:</p>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ad Targeting data set: Includes the targeting information selected by advertisers running social issues, election, and political ads that ran between August 3, 2020, and November 3, 2020. We exclude ads with fewer than 100 impressions, which is one of several steps we have taken to protect users' privacy.</li> <li>- Ad Library data set: Includes social issues, election, and political ads that are part of the Ad Library product. It is included so that researchers can analyze the ads and targeting information in the same environment. In other words, this data set is a copy of corresponding Ad Library data made available in the FORT platform and is different from the Ad Library API product.</li> </ul> <p>In 2022, we extended this pilot program and announced that academic researchers would be eligible to apply for access to a new dataset that included granular, ad-level targeting information for all ads about social issues, elections and politics run globally (more than 120 countries) since August 2022.</p> <p>Researchers who had access to the pilot dataset automatically received access to this expanded dataset, and as of September 2022, new researchers interested in Meta's Ad Targeting Dataset may request access by submitting a data access request, completing the required, self-serve onboarding process, and agreeing to the Researcher Platform Addendum.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ad Targeting data set: Includes the targeting information selected by advertisers running social issues, election, and political ads that ran between August 3, 2020, and November 3, 2020. We exclude ads with fewer than 100 impressions, which is one of several steps we have taken to protect users' privacy.</li> <li>- Ad Library data set: Includes social issues, election, and political ads that are part of the Ad Library product. It is included so that researchers can analyze the ads and targeting information in the same environment. In other words, this data set is a copy of corresponding Ad Library data made available in the FORT platform and is different from the Ad Library API product.</li> </ul> <p>In 2022, we extended this pilot program and announced that academic researchers would be eligible to apply for access to a new dataset that included granular, ad-level targeting information for all ads about social issues, elections and politics run globally (more than 120 countries) since August 2022.</p> <p>Researchers who had access to the pilot dataset automatically received access to this expanded dataset, and as of September 2022, new researchers interested in Meta's Ad Targeting Dataset may request access by submitting a data access request, completing the required, self-serve onboarding process, and agreeing to the Researcher Platform Addendum.</p>
--	--	--

<h3>III. Political Advertising</h3> <h4>Commitment 12</h4> <p>Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.</p>
---

This commitment applies to civil society organizations

<b>III. Political Advertising</b>				
<b>Commitment 13</b>				
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.				
	<b>C.13</b>	<b>M 13.1</b>	<b>M 13.2</b>	<b>M 13.3</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.		We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.		We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.	

<b>Measure 13.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 13.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>Measure 13.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)</b>	We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.	We are active members of the Taskforce and will bring our learnings on SIEP ads to upcoming discussions on this topic.

## IV. Integrity of Services

### Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviors and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviors, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviors and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g., via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g., “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g., keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers

● 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts				
	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behavior. Our approach to Inauthentic Behavior, and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behavior- and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech).</p> <p><b>Fake accounts:</b> Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We prioritize enforcement against fake accounts that seek to cause harm. Many of these accounts are used in spam campaigns and are financially motivated. In Q3 2022, we took action against 1.5 billion fake accounts (99.6% of which were found proactively). We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 5% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q3 2022.</p> <p><b>Inauthentic behavior:</b> We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that seek to mislead people about who's behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from</p>		<p>We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behavior. Our approach to Inauthentic Behavior, and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behavior- and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Guidelines, such as misinformation and hate speech).</p> <p><b>Inauthentic behavior:</b> We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts on Instagram that seek to mislead people about who's behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally to help us automatically detect bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviors, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.</p> <p>2022 marked a major milestone in our enforcement against covert influence operations as <u>we've now disrupted more than 200 networks</u> worldwide since 2017 for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy. These networks came from 68 countries and operated in at least 42 languages.</p> <p>We also continue to update our <u>inauthentic behavior policy</u> to improve our ability to counter new tactics and more quickly act</p>	

	<p>investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviors, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.</p> <p>2022 marked a major milestone in our enforcement against covert influence operations as <u>we've now disrupted more than 200 networks</u> worldwide since 2017 for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy. These networks came from 68 countries and operated in at least 42 languages.</p> <p>We also continue to update our <u>inauthentic behavior policy</u> to improve our ability to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior and other inauthentic tactics (often use by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p> <p><b>Cybersecurity:</b> We know that bad actors often target people’s accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures and we deployed the following measures in the last half of 2022.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people’s accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. This year, we’ve added new ways to recover an account. As a result, we’ve helped eight times more people a day on average get back into their Facebook account than last year when they didn’t have access to their listed contact points. We’re also running global in-app prompts across Facebook reminding people to confirm their contact points.</li> </ul>	<p>against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior and other inauthentic tactics (often use by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p> <p><b>Cybersecurity:</b> We know that bad actors often target people’s accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures and we deployed the following measures in the last half of 2022.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people’s accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. This year, we’ve added new ways to recover an account. We’re also exploring alternative ways to confirm people’s identity during the account recovery process on Instagram, including using their friend network.</li> <li>- We’ve rolled out new tools and education initiatives on Instagram to keep people safe from phishing and malware.</li> </ul>
--	--	---

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 14.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 14.1.1</b>	<p><b>Inauthentic Behavior</b> - Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviors. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts.</p> <p><b>CIB Policies</b> - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behavior (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation", the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> <p>CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on fake accounts. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behavior policies, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>	<p><b>Inauthentic Behavior</b> - Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviors. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram.</p> <p><b>CIB Policies</b> - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behavior (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation", the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> <p>CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on fake accounts. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behavior policies, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>

	<p>We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviors, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviors. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defenses.</p> <p>Working alongside the CIB policy is our policy on <a href="#">Account Integrity and Authentic Identity</a>, which allows us to remove millions of fake accounts every day. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can to minimize opportunities for IO threat actors to operate on our platforms.</p> <p><b>Cybersecurity</b> - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <a href="#">engage in unauthorized access</a> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorized access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p><b>Deep Fakes</b> - We remove videos <a href="#">under this policy</a> if specific criteria are met: (1) the video has been edited or synthesized, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say; and (2) the video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning.</p> <p><b>Spam</b> - We work hard to <a href="#">limit the spread of spam</a> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain.</p> <p><b>Branded Content Policies</b> - <a href="#">Branded content</a> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators</p>	<p>We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviors, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviors. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defenses.</p> <p>Working alongside the CIB policy is our policy on <a href="#">Account Integrity</a> which allows us to remove millions of fake accounts every day. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Instagram as we can to minimize opportunities for IO threat actors to operate on our platforms.</p> <p><b>Cybersecurity</b> - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <a href="#">engage in unauthorized access</a> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorized access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p><b>Deep Fakes</b> - We remove videos <a href="#">under this policy</a> if specific criteria are met: (1) the video has been edited or synthesized, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say; and (2) the video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning.</p> <p><b>Spam</b> - We work hard to <a href="#">limit the spread of spam</a> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain.</p> <p><b>Branded Content Policies</b> - <a href="#">Branded content</a> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool.</p>
--	---	---

	<p>must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles and Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool.</p> <p><b>Privacy</b> - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>	<p><b>Privacy</b> - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>
<p><b>QRE 14.1.2</b></p>	<p>Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behavior-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted.</p> <p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behavior by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can't access our systems and thus can't create accounts.</li> <li>• Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behavior through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we've removed. Most of the accounts we</li> </ul>	<p>Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behavior-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Guidelines, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted.</p> <p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behavior by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can't access our systems and thus can't create accounts.</li> <li>• Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behavior through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we've removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm.</li> <li>• Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defenses and still make it onto the platform. Often,</li> </ul>



	<p>currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defenses and still make it onto the platform. Often, this is because they don't readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behavior or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are.</li> </ul> <p>Pages and Groups directly involved in CIB activity may also be removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behavior-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block the network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts, Pages and Groups connected to networks we took down in the past.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>	<p>this is because they don't readily show signals of being malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behavior or if users report them to us.</p> <p>Accounts directly involved in CIB activity may also be removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behavior-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block the network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts connected to networks we took down in the past.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>
<b>Measure 14.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.2.1	<p>We report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Our fake accounts policies: in <a href="#">Q3 2022</a>, we took action against 1.5 billion fake accounts (99.6% of</li> </ul>	<p>We report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the policy most relevant to this Commitment:</p>

	<p>which were found proactively). We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 5% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q3 2022.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our coordinated inauthentic behavior policies: In <u>Q3 2022</u>, we took down three networks which targeted at least one country in Europe, which originated in the United States, China and Russia. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ United States: We removed 39 accounts, 16 Pages, and two Groups on Facebook for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in the United States and focused on a number of countries including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. About 22.000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and about 400 accounts joined at least one of these Groups.</li> <li>○ China: We took down 81 accounts, 8 Pages, and 1 Group on Facebook for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in China and targeted the United States, the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, Chinese- and French-speaking audiences around the world. About 20 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and around 250 accounts joined this Group.</li> <li>○ Russia: We took down 1.633 accounts, 703 Pages, and one Group on Facebook for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Germany, and also France, Italy, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The operation centered around a large network of websites carefully impersonating legitimate news organizations in Europe. About 4.000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and less than 10 accounts joined this Group</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our coordinated inauthentic behavior policies: In <u>Q3 2022</u>, we took down three networks which targeted at least one country in Europe, in the United States, China and Russia. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ United States: We removed 26 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in the United States and focused on a number of countries including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Around 12.000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.</li> <li>○ China: We took down two accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in China and targeted the United States, the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, Chinese- and French-speaking audiences around the world. Less than 100 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.</li> <li>○ Russia: We took down 29 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Germany, and also France, Italy, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The operation centered around a large network of websites carefully impersonating legitimate news organizations in Europe. About 1.500 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.</li> <li>○ In Q4 2022, we took down one network targeting at least one country in Europe, which originated in Serbia. We removed 100 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in, and primarily targeted, Serbia. At least 26.000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
--	--	--

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Q4 2022, we took down one network targeting at least one country in Europe: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Serbia: We removed 5.374 accounts and 12 Groups on Facebook for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in, and primarily targeted, Serbia. At least 350 accounts joined one or more of these Groups.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>					
<b>SLI 14.2.1 – Numbers of instances and actions related to each TTP listed, enforcing policies above</b>	Methodology of data measurement: <b>See the 2 tables below</b>			Methodology of data measurement: <b>See the 2 tables below</b>		
	Number of instances of identified TTP	Type of action taken addressing identified TTP	Other relevant metrics/information on type of content	Number of instances of identified TTP	Type of actions taken addressing identified TTP	Other relevant metrics
<b>Member States</b>						
List actions per member states (see example table above)	<b>See the 2 tables below</b>			<b>See the 2 tables below</b>		

<b>FACEBOOK</b>	
<b>SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4</b>	
<b>TTP OR ACTION: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR</b>	<p><b>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:</b> This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behavior:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> <li>- Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification</li> </ul> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b> CIB covers coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal, in which fake accounts are central to the operation. In each case, people coordinate with one another and use fake accounts to mislead others about who they are and what they are doing. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behavior rather than content – no matter who’s behind them, what they post or whether they’re foreign or domestic. <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country, removed from 1 April to 31 December 2022 (Q3 and Q4 2022). We categorized them based on their originating country in the table below.</u></p>

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/ impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)
<b>Member States</b>												
<b>United States</b>	39 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, 2 Groups	Removal of 39 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, 2 Groups		About 22.000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 400 accounts joined at least one of these Groups	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Focused on a number of countries including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen				
<b>China</b>	81 Facebook accounts, 8 Pages, 1 Group	Removal of 81 Facebook accounts, 8 Pages, 1 Group		About 20 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, around 250 accounts joined this Group	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted the United States, the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, Chinese- and French-speaking audiences around the world.				
<b>Russia</b>	1.633 accounts, 703 Pages, 1 Group	Removal of 1.633 accounts, 703 Pages, 1 Group		About 4.000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, less than	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted primarily Germany, and also France, Italy, Ukraine				

				10 accounts joined this Group					and the United Kingdom.			
<b>Serbia</b>	5,374 Facebook accounts, 12 Groups	Removal of 5,374 Facebook accounts, 12 Groups		At least 350 accounts joined one or more of these Group	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)			Targeted primarily Serbia			
<b>TTP OR ACTION 2</b>	<p><b>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:</b> This action covers the following TTPs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> </ul> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b> Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 1 April to 30 June 2022 (Q3 2022) globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information <a href="#">here</a>.</p>											
	<b>SLI 14.2.1</b>	<b>SLI 14.2.2</b>					<b>SLI 14.2.3</b>			<b>SLI 14.2.4</b>		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/ impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)
<b>Member States</b>												
<b>GLOBAL Q3 2022</b>	1.5 bn accounts	Removal of 1.5 bn accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)	Approximately 5% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q3 2022					

<b>INSTAGRAM</b>
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

<b>TTP OR ACTION 1</b>	<b>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:</b> This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behavior</u> :											
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> <li>- Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification</li> </ul>											
	Methodology of data measurement: <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European countries, removed from 1 April to 31 December 2022 (Q3 and Q4 2022). We categorized them based on their originating country in the table below.</u>											
	<b>SLI 14.2.1</b>		<b>SLI 14.2.2</b>				<b>SLI 14.2.3</b>			<b>SLI 14.2.4</b>		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
<b>Member States</b>												
<b>United States</b>	26 accounts	Removal of 26 accounts		12.000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted a number of countries including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen.				
<b>China</b>	2 accounts	Removal of 2 accounts		Less than 100 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted the United States, the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, Chinese- and French-speaking audiences around the world.				
<b>Russia</b>	29 accounts	Removal of 29 accounts		About 1.500 accounts	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted primarily				

				followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.				Germany, and also France, Italy, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.				
Serbia	100 accounts	Removal of 100 accounts		At least 26,000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Targeted primarily Serbia.				

Measure 14.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.3.1	<p>The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs has done so during Q4 2022. It can be summarized as follows:</p> <p>1. Establishing Online Assets And Legitimacy: The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)</li> <li>- Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains</li> <li>- Account hijacking or impersonation</li> </ul> <p>2. Disseminating Content: The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:</p>	<p>The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs has done so during Q4 2022. It can be summarized as follows:</p> <p>1. Establishing Online Assets And Legitimacy: The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)</li> <li>- Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)</li> <li>- Use of fake followers or subscribers</li> <li>- Creation of inauthentic accounts</li> <li>- Account hijacking or impersonation</li> </ul> <p>2. Disseminating Content: The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g., via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g., via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)</li> <li>- Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g., “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)</li> <li>- Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)</li> <li>- Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g., keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)</li> <li>- Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers</li> <li>- Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers</li> <li>- Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)</li> <li>- Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)</li> <li>- Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)</li> <li>- Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers</li> <li>- Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers</li> <li>- Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts</li> </ul>
--	--	---

## IV. Integrity of Services

### Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g., deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service,	Yes		Yes



new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We have dedicated AI models and systems to identify manipulated media, including deep fakes. We take down the most sophisticated of these videos. For other manipulated media, we treat it as misinformation.	We have dedicated AI models and systems to identify manipulated media, including deep fakes. We take down the most sophisticated of these videos. For other manipulated media, we treat it as misinformation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 15.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 15.1.1</b>	Media can be edited in a variety of ways. In many cases, these changes are benign, such as content being cropped or shortened for artistic reasons or music being added. In other cases, the manipulation is not apparent and could mislead, particularly in the case of video content. <u>We remove this content</u> because it can go viral quickly and experts advise that false beliefs regarding manipulated media often cannot be corrected through further discourse, if specific criteria are met: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The video has been edited or synthesized, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead</li> </ol>	Media can be edited in a variety of ways. In many cases, these changes are benign, such as content being cropped or shortened for artistic reasons or music being added. In other cases, the manipulation is not apparent and could mislead, particularly in the case of video content. <u>We remove this content</u> because it can go viral quickly and experts advise that false beliefs regarding manipulated media often cannot be corrected through further discourse, if specific criteria are met: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The video has been edited or synthesized, beyond adjustments for clarity or quality, in ways that are not apparent to an average person, and would likely mislead</li> </ol>

	<p>an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say</p> <p>2. The video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g., a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, replaces, and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears authentic.</p> <p>In <u>partnership with Michigan State University (MSU)</u>, we've shared a research method of detecting and attributing deepfakes that relies on reverse engineering from a single AI-generated image to the generative model used to produce it. Our research pushes the boundaries of understanding in deepfake detection, introducing the concept of model parsing that is more suited to real-world deployment. This work will give researchers and practitioners tools to better investigate incidents of coordinated disinformation using deepfakes, as well as open up new directions for future research.</p>	<p>an average person to believe a subject of the video said words that they did not say</p> <p>2. The video is the product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g., a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, replaces, and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears authentic.</p> <p>In <u>partnership with Michigan State University (MSU)</u>, we've shared a research method of detecting and attributing deepfakes that relies on reverse engineering from a single AI-generated image to the generative model used to produce it. Our research pushes the boundaries of understanding in deepfake detection, introducing the concept of model parsing that is more suited to real-world deployment. This work will give researchers and practitioners tools to better investigate incidents of coordinated disinformation using deepfakes, as well as open up new directions for future research.</p>
<b>Measure 15.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 15.2.1</b>	<p>We have teams working across the company's different product organizations, to build and test approaches to help ensure that our machine learning (ML) systems are designed and used responsibly.</p> <p>Their work is focused around five pillars that have been derived from consensus principles statements like those from the Commission and the OECD, to better guide our development of innovative new tools, frameworks, and processes to advance responsible AI. These five pillars are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Privacy &amp; Security: We are building new privacy-protective infrastructure to make it easier to enforce our privacy commitments across all our AI-driven products and services.</li> <li>• Robustness &amp; Safety: We are building processes to help review and test some of our key AI systems prior to use in products and help ensure those systems behave safely</li> </ul>	<p>We have teams working across the company's different product organizations, to build and test approaches to help ensure that our machine learning (ML) systems are designed and used responsibly.</p> <p>Their work is focused around five pillars that have been derived from consensus principles statements like those from the Commission and the OECD, to better guide our development of innovative new tools, frameworks, and processes to advance responsible AI. These five pillars are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Privacy &amp; Security: We are building new privacy-protective infrastructure to make it easier to enforce our privacy commitments across all our AI-driven products and services.</li> <li>• Robustness &amp; Safety: We are building processes to help review and test some of our key AI systems prior to use in products and help ensure those systems behave safely</li> </ul>

	<p>and as intended even when they are subjected to malicious attack.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Fairness &amp; Inclusion:</b> We are building new tools and frameworks for testing the statistical fairness and fairness maturity of some of our key AI systems.</li> <li>• <b>Transparency &amp; Control:</b> We are continuing to expand our industry-leading set of tools for explaining how our systems decide which feed content and ads to show you and are developing tools like “Model Cards”—which can provide simple, standardized documentation for many kinds of AI models.</li> <li>• <b>Accountability &amp; Governance:</b> We have created a Responsible Innovation team that runs workshops with product teams during the development phase to raise awareness around individual and societal risks, and we are developing an AI- specific risk assessment framework.</li> </ul>	<p>and as intended even when they are subjected to malicious attack.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Fairness &amp; Inclusion:</b> We are building new tools and frameworks for testing the statistical fairness and fairness maturity of some of our key AI systems.</li> <li>• <b>Transparency &amp; Control:</b> We are continuing to expand our industry-leading set of tools for explaining how our systems decide which feed content and ads to show you and are developing tools like “Model Cards”—which can provide simple, standardized documentation for many kinds of AI models.</li> <li>• <b>Accountability &amp; Governance:</b> We have created a Responsible Innovation team that runs workshops with product teams during the development phase to raise awareness around individual and societal risks, and we are developing an AI- specific risk assessment framework.</li> </ul>
--	--	--

<b>IV. Integrity of Services</b>			
<b>Commitment 16</b>			
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.			
	<b>C.16</b>	<b>M 16.1</b>	<b>M 16.2</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes	Yes		Yes

to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	A key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration. We have advanced our security operations to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats. Our teams of expert investigators actively look for and take down coordinated networks of inauthentic accounts that seek to manipulate public debate.	A key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration. We have advanced our security operations to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats. Our teams of expert investigators actively look for and take down coordinated networks of inauthentic accounts that seek to manipulate public debate.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 16.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 16.1.1</b>	<p>A key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p> <p>We have worked closely with our counterparts at tech companies and across civil society, and this effort should continue to expand going forward to study these networks' cross-platform behaviors.</p>	<p>A key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to <u>stop emerging threats</u> by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration.</p> <p>We have worked closely with our counterparts at tech companies and across civil society, and this effort should continue to expand going forward to study these networks' cross-platform behaviors.</p>

	<p>We've seen a number of operations disrupted often and early due to collaboration among our industry peers and researchers. Many of our CIB takedowns involve information sharing with our peers at technology companies, as well as with security researchers, investigative journalists and law enforcement. These partnerships serve as force multipliers, helping us ensure that when one of us detects an IO threat emerges, each of us can investigate it across many platforms. While each platform only has visibility into activity on its respective platform, external researchers and reporters can help connect the dots across platforms, as well as smaller services that don't yet have dedicated teams looking for these threats. Together, we play a critical role in helping defenders understand the full scope of IO, including its off-platform activity and even presence in the real world.</p> <p>We <u>share</u> detailed information about our takedowns publicly. Sharing this information has enabled our teams, investigative journalists, government officials and industry peers to better understand and expose internet-wide security risks, including ahead of critical elections.</p> <p>Facebook <u>shares information</u> with other Meta Companies to promote safety, security and integrity and comply with applicable laws.</p> <p>In addition, Meta shares information on removed CIB networks through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive. The IO Research Archive is a dedicated research platform for analyzing information relating to networks we've disrupted for violating our policy on CIB. The Archive contains previously public information associated with Groups, Pages, Facebook accounts, and Instagram accounts. The archive dates back to July 2020 and contains information about more than 100 CIB networks globally. To date, researchers have produced over 100 independent reports on the networks we've removed for CIB.</p>	<p>We've seen a number of operations disrupted often and early due to collaboration among our industry peers and researchers. Many of our CIB takedowns involve information sharing with our peers at technology companies, as well as with security researchers, investigative journalists and law enforcement. These partnerships serve as force multipliers, helping us ensure that when one of us detects an IO threat emerges, each of us can investigate it across many platforms. While each platform only has visibility into activity on its respective platform, external researchers and reporters can help connect the dots across platforms, as well as smaller services that don't yet have dedicated teams looking for these threats. Together, we play a critical role in helping defenders understand the full scope of IO, including its off-platform activity and even presence in the real world.</p> <p>We <u>share</u> detailed information about our takedowns publicly. Sharing this information has enabled our teams, investigative journalists, government officials and industry peers to better understand and expose internet-wide security risks, including ahead of critical elections.</p> <p>Instagram <u>shares information</u> with other Meta Companies to promote safety, security and integrity and comply with applicable laws.</p> <p>In addition, Meta shares information on removed CIB networks through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive. The IO Research Archive is a dedicated research platform for analyzing information relating to networks we've disrupted for violating our policy on CIB. The Archive contains previously public information associated with Groups, Pages, Facebook accounts, and Instagram accounts. The archive dates back to July 2020 and contains information about more than 100 CIB networks globally. To date, researchers have produced over 100 independent reports on the networks we've removed for CIB.</p>
<p><b>SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing</b></p>	<p>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January–June 2023.</p>	

<b>Measure 16.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 16.2.1</b>	<p>Security is a highly adversarial space where we are constantly thinking about how our products, our policies and our enforcement may get abused. We have to <u>keep evolving our defenses and processes</u> in response to malicious actors trying to work around them. The stronger our defenses become, the more threat actors try to exploit even the smallest gaps in enforcement and expand their targeting across different services. This means that our industry must continue collaborating through information-sharing with each other and security researchers to raise the bar across the board.</p> <p>Detailed examples of our efforts to disrupt coordinated inauthentic behavior can be found <u>online</u>.</p>	<p>Security is a highly adversarial space where we are constantly thinking about how our products, our policies and our enforcement may get abused. We have to <u>keep evolving our defenses and processes</u> in response to malicious actors trying to work around them. The stronger our defenses become, the more threat actors try to exploit even the smallest gaps in enforcement and expand their targeting across different services. This means that our industry must continue collaborating through information-sharing with each other and security researchers to raise the bar across the board.</p> <p>Detailed examples of our efforts to disrupt coordinated inauthentic behavior can be found <u>online</u>.</p>

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>				
<b>Commitment 17</b>				
In light of the European Commission’s initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.				
	<b>C.17</b>	<b>M 17.1</b>	<b>M 17.2</b>	<b>M 17.3</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service,	Yes		Yes	

new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>A key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information.</p> <p><b>Ukraine:</b> Since the invasion of Ukraine we launched educational media literacy campaigns across Central Eastern Europe. We are looking at launching similar campaigns in 2023.</p> <p><b>Climate:</b> We expanded the <a href="#">Climate Science Center</a> and Climate Inform Labels, a tool that adds links to Facebook posts about climate change and connects people with expert-backed information in the Climate Science Center. We've launched a <a href="#">Climate InfoFinder tool</a> and worked with partners to help launch our first <a href="#">Climate Science Literacy Initiative</a>, to pre-bunk climate misinformation by running ads across our products and apps.</p> <p><b>Youth:</b> Meta launched an on-platform campaign on Facebook created in consultation with young people to drive awareness of the tools we provide which they can use.</p>	<p>A key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information.</p> <p><b>Youth:</b> Meta launched an on-platform campaign on Instagram created in consultation with young people to remind them of the tools they can use to control their experience and help keep them safe.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world.

measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously improving and evolving our media literacy campaigns.	While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously improving and evolving our media literacy campaigns.
<b>Measure 17.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 17.1.1</b>	<p><b>Ukraine:</b> Since the invasion of Ukraine we launched educational media literacy campaigns to raise awareness of how to spot misinformation for our users in Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Bulgaria. All of these campaigns were designed in partnerships with our local fact-checking partners as well as expert safety NGOs. We reached 16 million users and had 72 million impressions with our campaign in all countries. We are looking at launching similar campaigns in 2023.</p> <p><b>Climate:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Our investment in the <a href="#">Climate Misinformation Grant Program</a> is forging new partnerships and initiatives with organizations working to combat climate misinformation, and our <a href="#">Public Ad Library</a> gives an extra layer of transparency into all climate ads.</li> <li>- We've expanded the <a href="#">Climate Science Center</a> and it's now available in 165 countries. We're also expanding Climate Inform Labels, a tool that adds links to Facebook posts about climate change and connects people with expert-backed information in the Climate Science Center.</li> <li>- We've launched a <a href="#">Climate InfoFinder tool</a> that enables people to search for trusted information about climate change and link to this content directly in comment threads.</li> <li>- We worked with partners to help launch our first <a href="#">Climate Science Literacy Initiative</a>. Its goal is to pre-bunk climate misinformation by running ads across our products and apps that feature five of the most common techniques used to misrepresent climate change.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Youth:</b> Meta launched an on-platform campaign on Instagram created in consultation with young people to remind them of the tools they can use to control their experience and help keep them safe. We designed and activated this campaign in collaboration with young people, which is why we chose to partner with a young designer, Loulou João, to create a series of engaging videos that bring 6 of Instagram's safety tools to life. We also collaborated with content creators to produce Reels that showcase how they use the tools, and consulted young adults across Europe to get feedback on the creatives throughout the development of the campaign. The campaign was launched in the UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Poland, Czechia, Romania, Italy, Israel, Portugal and Spain.</p>



	<p><b>Youth:</b> Meta launched an on-platform campaign on Facebook created in consultation with young people to drive awareness of the tools we provide which they can use to control their experience and help keep them safe. We designed and activated this campaign in collaboration with young people, which is why we chose to partner with a young designer, Loulou João, to create a series of engaging videos that bring 6 of Facebook's safety tools to life. We also collaborated with content creators to produce Reels that showcase how they use the tools, and consulted young adults across Europe to get feedback on the creatives throughout the development of the campaign. The campaign was launched in the UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Poland, Czechia, Romania, Italy, Israel, Portugal and Spain.</p>							
<b>SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Total count of impressions in the relevant countries</li> <li>Total users reached in the relevant countries</li> <li>Total views in the relevant countries</li> </ol>				<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Total users reached in the relevant countries, FB and IG combined</li> <li>Total views in the relevant countries, FB and IG combined</li> </ol>			
	Total count of the tool's impressions	Interactions/engagement with the tool	Other relevant metrics	Other relevant metrics	Total count of the tool's impressions	Interactions/engagement with the tool	Other relevant metrics	Other relevant metrics
<b>Member States</b>								
Campaigns in Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Bulgaria  (FB only)	72.000.000		16.000.000 users reached					
Youth Campaign (Figures are FB and IG combined)  Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the UK and Israel			50.000.000 users reached	15.000.000 views			50.000.000 users reached	15.000.000 views

<b>Measure 17.2</b>	Facebook					Instagram				
QRE 17.2.1	<p>Meta <u>partners</u> with Poynter on a Media Literacy Program to Help Seniors Detect Misinformation, currently live in Spain (in partnership with <u>Newtral</u>) and France (in partnership with <u>France 24</u>). This included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A media literacy course delivered over Whatsapp (see Whatsapp section below)</li> <li>- Educational videos run on Meta platforms – SLI 17.2.1 below provides further detail of the reach of those videos.</li> </ul> <p>A <u>study</u> by Universidad de Navarra found that the media literacy course that was delivered in Spain has “proven to be an efficient tool in helping participants both improve their ability to correctly assess the veracity of headlines and acquire new knowledge in the process of fighting disinformation.”</p> <p>Meta belongs to the Steering Committee of the <u>EU Digital Citizenship Working Group</u>, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship. The Working Group published its non-paper, “Europeans Fit for a Digital Age”, in October 2022. Finally, Meta participated in the European Commission’s <u>media literacy expert group</u>.</p>					<p>Meta <u>partners</u> with Poynter on a Media Literacy Program to Help Seniors Detect Misinformation, currently live in Spain (in partnership with <u>Newtral</u>) and France (in partnership with <u>France 24</u>). This included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A media literacy course delivered over Whatsapp (see Whatsapp section below)</li> <li>- Educational videos run on Meta platforms – SLI 17.2.1 below provides further detail of the reach of those videos.</li> </ul> <p>A <u>study</u> by Universidad de Navarra found that the media literacy course that was delivered in Spain has “proven to be an efficient tool in helping participants both improve their ability to correctly assess the veracity of headlines and acquire new knowledge in the process of fighting disinformation.”</p> <p>Meta belongs to the Steering Committee of the <u>EU Digital Citizenship Working Group</u>, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship. The Working Group published its non-paper, “Europeans Fit for a Digital Age”, in October 2022. Finally, Meta participated in the European Commission’s <u>media literacy expert group</u>.</p>				
SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total people reached by the Media Literacy Program in France via Meta platforms</li> <li>2. Total people reached by the Media Literacy Program in Spain via Meta platforms</li> </ol>					<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total people reached by the Media Literacy Program in France via Meta platforms</li> <li>2. Total people reached by the Media Literacy Program in Spain via Meta platforms</li> </ol>				
	Number of media literacy/ awareness raising activities organized/ participated in	Reach of campaigns	Number of participants	Number of interactions with online assets	Number of participants (etc)	Number of media literacy/ awareness raising activities organized/ participated in	Reach of campaigns	Number of participants	Number of interactions with online assets	Number of participants (etc)
Member States										

France		11.000.000 people reached					11.000.000 people reached			
Spain		440.000 people reached					440.000 people reached			
<b>Measure 17.3</b>	Facebook					Instagram				
<b>QRE 17.3.1</b>	<p>At Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society, and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party fact-checkers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more.</p> <p>Facebook developed the media literacy campaigns in the CEE region outlined above with local experts. Specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Slovakia - DigiQ</li> <li>- Romania-Funky Citizens</li> <li>- Poland-Demagog</li> <li>- Lithuania-National NGO Coalition</li> <li>- Latvia-Re:Baltica</li> <li>- Estonia-Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association (EATA).</li> </ul>					<p>At Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. We have developed a series of tools and resources - such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns - to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party factcheckers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, the Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more.</p>				

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>			
<b>Commitment 18</b>			
Relevant Signatories commit to minimize the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.			
C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>We continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of misinformation: we (1) remove misinformation that expert partners have determined is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm or interference with the functioning of political processes, and (2) reduce the prevalence of all other misinformation by partnering with third-party fact-checkers.</p> <p>(Note this chapter is focused on <i>misinformation</i> – for our work against <i>disinformation</i>, refer to the Integrity of Services chapter).</p>		<p>We continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of misinformation: we (1) remove misinformation that expert partners have determined is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm or interference with the functioning of political processes, (2) reduce the prevalence of all other misinformation by partnering with third-party fact-checkers.</p> <p>(Note this chapter is focused on <i>misinformation</i> – for our work against <i>disinformation</i>, refer to the Integrity of Services chapter).</p>	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No		No	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.		Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting policies, tools, and processes to combat misinformation. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	
<b>Measure 18.1</b>	Facebook		Instagram	

<p><b>QRE 18.1.1</b></p>	<p>We work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The steps we take to detect and remove content violating our Community Standards. Meta's <a href="#">technologies</a> detect and remove the majority of violating content before it's ever reported. In most cases, identification is a simple matter. The post either clearly violates our policies or it doesn't. Other times, identification is more difficult, so we conduct further review using people. Because we want to prevent as much harm as possible, our review systems use technology to prioritize high-severity content with the potential for offline harm and viral content which is spreading quickly.</li> <li>- The steps we take to determine what content we can show, what we know about the post, and how relevant it will be to people are described in QRE 18.1.2 below.</li> <li>- Our <a href="#">Content Distribution Guidelines</a> outline some of the most significant reasons why content receives reduced distribution in Feed. The reduced distribution may vary depending on the severity of the content, the number of times the poster or commenter has violated our rules previously, and the degree of confidence of our artificial intelligence systems' predictions, among other things. In certain cases, in addition to reducing the distribution of content, there may be additional consequences, such as a Page losing access to certain features (e.g., the ability to run ads). While the majority of our reduced distribution efforts are applied around the world equally, we also recognize that in certain situations we cannot always take a one-size-fits-all approach to enforcement. We may also temporarily adjust our enforcement efforts in a specific region or during a critical event. For instance, we might adjust our enforcements in countries in conflict in order to keep people safe when offline harm may be involved, or during election periods, in periods of social unrest or as we did to help combat the COVID-19 pandemic.</li> </ul> <p>To see how our ranking is designed to prevent the spread of misinformation specifically, please see QRE 18.1.3 below.</p>	<p>We work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The steps we take to detect and remove content violating our Community Guidelines. Meta's <a href="#">technologies</a> detect and remove the majority of violating content before it's ever reported. In most cases, identification is a simple matter. The post either clearly violates our policies or it doesn't. Other times, identification is more difficult, so we conduct further review using people. Because we want to prevent as much harm as possible, our review systems use technology to prioritize high-severity content with the potential for offline harm and viral content which is spreading quickly.</li> <li>- The steps we take to determine what content we can show, what we know about the post, and how relevant it will be to people are described in QRE 18.1.2 below.</li> </ul> <p>To see how our ranking is designed to prevent the spread of misinformation specifically, please see QRE 18.1.3 below.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p>
--------------------------	---	---

	<p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p>	
<p><b>QRE 18.1.2</b></p>	<p>Every time a user opens Facebook, <u>our algorithm</u> goes through a set of four steps to determine what content we can show, what we know about the post, and how relevant it will be to people. These questions at each step help decide the best content to display to each individual on Facebook.</p> <p>1. Inventory: The first item the algorithm considers is your inventory, or the total set of posts you could see when you open Facebook. This includes all of the posts shared by the people you have connected to as “friends”, the Pages that you follow and the groups that you have joined, interspersed with ads and recommended content that we think will be relevant to you based on your Facebook activity.</p> <p>2. Signals: Then, for each of these posts, the algorithm considers multiple factors such as who posted it, how you have previously interacted with that person, whether it's a photo, a video or a link, and how popular the post is based on things such as how many of your Friends liked it and Pages that re-shared it. All of these factors are called signals.</p> <p>3. Predictions: From there, the algorithm uses these signals to make a series of personalized predictions about each post based on how likely it is to be relevant to you: for example, whether it's from your friends or family, how likely you might be to comment on it, how likely it is to foster a meaningful interaction, how likely you might be to find it on your own or if it contains a quality indicator (if a piece of news is original content, the algorithm assigns it a higher personalized relevance score, and it will often appear closer to the top of your Feed). We also run a number of surveys asking people whether a post was “worth your time”, and based on those survey responses, we predict how likely people are to find a post worthwhile. Posts that are predicted to be more worthwhile are shown higher up in Feed.</p> <p>4. Relevance score: Lastly, the algorithm calculates a relevance score for each post in your inventory based on these signals and predictions. Posts with higher scores are more likely to be</p>	<p>Each part of the Instagram app – Feed, Explore, Reels – uses its own algorithm.</p> <p>Feed and Stories are places where people want to see content from their friends, family, and those they are closest to. How we rank Feed and Stories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We define the set of things we plan to rank in the first place, all the recent posts shared by the people the user follows. Then we take the information we have about what the user posted, the people who made those posts, and user’s preferences (“signals”). The most important signals, roughly in order of importance, are: information about the post; information about the person who posted, user’s activity. This helps us understand what you might be interested in, the history of the user’s interaction with someone.</li> <li>- We then make a set of predictions. The more likely a user is to take an action, and the more heavily we weigh that action, the higher up the user will see the post. We add and remove signals and predictions over time, working to get better at surfacing what the user is interested in.</li> </ul> <p>Explore was designed to help users discover new things through recommendations. How we rank Explore:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The first step we take is defining a set of posts to rank. To find photos and videos a user might be interested in, we look at signals like what posts the user has liked, saved, and commented on in the past.</li> <li>- Once we’ve found a group of photos and videos the user might be interested in, we order them by how interested we think the user is in each one. The best way to guess how interested you are in something is to predict how likely you are to do something with the post. The most important actions we predict in Explore include likes, saves, and shares. The most important signals we look at, in rough order of importance, are: information about the post, the user’s history of interacting with the person who</li> </ul>

	<p>interesting to you, so they'll be placed closer to the top of your Feed, and posts with lower scores will be closer to the bottom.</p> <p>For public sources for this information, see QRE 19.1.1.</p>	<p>posted, the user's activity, information about the person who posted.</p> <p>With Reels, we're specifically focused on what might entertain you. We survey people and ask whether they find a particular reel entertaining or funny, and learn from the feedback to get better at working out what will entertain people. The most important predictions we make are how likely a user is to watch a reel all the way through, like it, say it was entertaining or funny, and go to the audio page The most important signals, roughly in order of importance, are: user's activity, user's history of interacting with the person who posted, information about the reel, information about the person who posted.</p> <p>For public sources for this information, see QRE 19.1.1.</p>
<p><b>QRE 18.1.3</b></p>	<p>Our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it. For each category, our approach reflects our attempt to balance our values of expression, safety, dignity, authenticity, and privacy.</p> <p>We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes and certain highly deceptive manipulated media. In determining what constitutes misinformation in these categories, we partner with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to assess the truth of the content and whether it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent harm. This includes, for instance, partnering with human rights organizations with a presence on the ground in a country to determine the truth of a rumor about civil conflict, and partnering with health organizations during the global COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. We know that people often use misinformation in harmless ways, such as to exaggerate a point ("This team has the worst record in the history of the sport!") or in humor or satire ("My husband just</p>	<p>Our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it. For each category, our approach reflects our attempt to balance our values of expression, safety, dignity, authenticity, and privacy.</p> <p>We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes and certain highly deceptive manipulated media. In determining what constitutes misinformation in these categories, we partner with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to assess the truth of the content and whether it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent harm. This includes, for instance, partnering with human rights organizations with a presence on the ground in a country to determine the truth of a rumor about civil conflict, and partnering with health organizations during the global COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. We know that people often use misinformation in harmless ways, such as to exaggerate a point ("This team has the worst record in the history of the sport!") or in humor or satire ("My husband just won</p>

	<p>won Husband of the Year.") They also may share their experience through stories that contain inaccuracies. In some cases, people share deeply held personal opinions that others consider false or share information that they believe to be true but others consider incomplete or misleading.</p> <p>Recognizing how common such speech is, we focus on slowing the spread of hoaxes and viral misinformation, and directing users to authoritative information. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organizations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves.</p> <p>As online and offline environments change and evolve, we will continue to evolve these policies. Pages, groups, profiles and Instagram accounts that repeatedly share the misinformation listed below may, in addition to having their content removed, receive decreased distribution, limitations on their ability to advertise or be removed from our platforms.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p> <p>To contextualize the data shared below, we previously shared that when a fact-checking warning screen is placed on a post, 95% of the time people don't click to view it. This describes the behavior of people who are scrolling through their Feeds. While this data point was illustrative, it is possible that some people never intended to view the fact-checked content. We are now able to share an even stronger measure of the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content. On average 25% of people on Facebook do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.</p>	<p>Husband of the Year.") They also may share their experience through stories that contain inaccuracies. In some cases, people share deeply held personal opinions that others consider false or share information that they believe to be true but others consider incomplete or misleading.</p> <p>Recognizing how common such speech is, we focus on slowing the spread of hoaxes and viral misinformation, and directing users to authoritative information. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organizations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves.</p> <p>As online and offline environments change and evolve, we will continue to evolve these policies. Instagram accounts that repeatedly share the misinformation listed below may, in addition to having their content removed, receive decreased distribution, limitations on their ability to advertise or be removed from our platforms.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p> <p>To contextualize the data shared below, we previously shared that when a fact-checking warning screen is placed on a post, 95% of the time people don't click to view it. This describes the behavior of people who are scrolling through their Feeds. While this data point was illustrative, it is possible that some people never intended to view the fact-checked content. We are now able to share an even stronger measure of the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content. On average 38% of people on Instagram who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.</p>
<p><b>SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies</b></p>	<p>Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from December 1 to December 31 2022</p>	<p>Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from December 1 to December 31 2022</p>



	Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible	Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible
	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content
<b>Member States</b>		
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>38%</b>
<b>Measure 18.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 18.2.1</b>	<p>Our policies and approach to tackle misinformation - which are summarized in QRE 18.1.3 - are published in our Transparency Center:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meta Community Standards - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> <li>• Content Distribution Guidelines - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> </ul> <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that repeatedly violate our policies. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policies on COVID and vaccine misinformation.</p> <p>If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced. They will also face other penalties that could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Removal from recommendations surfaces</li> <li>• The ability to monetize and advertise removed</li> <li>• The ability to register as a news Page on Facebook removed</li> <li>• Pop-ups that inform users the Page, group or account repeatedly shares misinformation before users follow or share content.</li> </ul> <p>Details on this enforcement are also available in our <a href="#">Business Help Center</a> for completeness.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p>	<p>Our policies and approach to tackle misinformation - which are summarized in QRE 18.1.3, - are published in our Transparency Center:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meta Community Standards - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> <li>• Content Distribution Guidelines - <a href="#">Misinformation</a></li> </ul> <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that repeatedly violate our policies. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policies on COVID and vaccine misinformation.</p> <p>If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced. They will also face other penalties that could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Removal from recommendations surfaces</li> <li>• The ability to monetize and advertise removed</li> <li>• Pop-ups that inform users the account repeatedly shares misinformation before users follow or share content.</li> </ul> <p>Details on this enforcement are also available in our <a href="#">Business Help Center</a> for completeness.</p> <p>These policies apply across all EU Member States.</p>

SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 1 October to 31 December 2022.  Country determined based on country of content creator, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 1 October to 31 December 2022.  Country determined based on country of content creator, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.
	Contents removed for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies	Contents removed for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies
<b>Member States</b>		
Austria	Over 3.400	Less than 500
Belgium	Over 3.200	Less than 100
Bulgaria	Less than 500	Less than 100
Croatia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Cyprus	Less than 500	Less than 100
Czechia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Denmark	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Estonia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Finland	Less than 500	Less than 100
France	Over 9.300	Less than 500
Germany	Over 27.000	Over 1.200
Greece	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Hungary	Less than 500	Less than 100
Ireland	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Italy	Over 23.500	Over 1.100
Latvia	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Lithuania	Less than 500	Less than 100

Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 100
Malta	Less than 100	Less than 100
Netherlands	Over 9.400	Less than 500
Poland	Over 5.900	Less than 100
Portugal	Over 3.200	Less than 500
Romania	Over 1.000	Less than 100
Slovakia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Slovenia	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Spain	Over 12.000	Over 1.500
Sweden	Less than 1.000	Less than 500
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>Over 106.000</b>	<b>Over 5.900</b>
<b>Measure 18.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 18.3.1</b>	<p>The following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Social Science Research:</b> Meta collaborates with academics and independent researchers around the world and works to provide them with the tools and data they need to study Meta’s impact on the world, with a focus on elections, democracy, and well-being.</li> <li>- <b>Data for Good:</b> The program builds <u>maps, surveys, and insights</u> (with the use of privacy-preserving data) to help strengthen communities and advance social issues.</li> <li>- <b>Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions.</b> We share information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB), and our <u>beta research platform</u> – with about 100 data sets – to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide.</li> <li>- <b>Research Grants &amp; Awards.</b> Every year, we invest in</li> </ul>	<p>The following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Social Science Research:</b> Meta collaborates with academics and independent researchers around the world and works to provide them with the tools and data they need to study Meta’s impact on the world, with a focus on elections, democracy, and well-being.</li> <li>- <b>Data for Good:</b> The program builds <u>maps, surveys, and insights</u> (with the use of privacy-preserving data) to help strengthen communities and advance social issues.</li> <li>- <b>Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions.</b> We share information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB), and our <u>beta research platform</u> – with about 100 data sets – to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide.</li> </ul>

	<p>numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. For example, the <b>Foundational Integrity Research on Misinformation and Polarisation</b> aims to support the growth of scientific knowledge in the areas of misinformation, polarization, information quality, and social conflict on social media and social technology platforms. Latest <a href="#">call for applications</a> has launched in September 2022 and winners will be announced soon.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Research Grants &amp; Awards.</b> Every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. For example, the <b>Foundational Integrity Research on Misinformation and Polarisation</b> aims to support the growth of scientific knowledge in the areas of misinformation, polarization, information quality, and social conflict on social media and social technology platforms. Latest <a href="#">call for applications</a> has launched in September 2022 and winners will be announced soon.</li> </ul>
--	--	---

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>			
<b>Commitment 19</b>			
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritizing or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.			
	<b>C.19</b>	<b>M 19.1</b>	<b>M 19.2</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>		<b>Service B - Instagram</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>The goal of Feed is to show people the posts that are most relevant to them. During our research on “Why am I seeing this post?”, people told us that transparency into Feed algorithms wasn’t enough without corresponding controls. People wanted to be able to take action, so we’ve built tools to make it easy to manage what people see in their Feed.</p>		<p><u>Beginning in June 2022</u>, the Sensitive Content Control for Instagram covers all surfaces where we make recommendations.</p> <p><u>In January 2023</u>, we announced new features to give people more control over the content they see on Instagram:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People can now choose to hide multiple pieces of content in Explore that they aren’t interested in at one time.</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Users can select “Not interested” on a post seen in Explore not to see it in other places where we make recommendations.</li> <li>- While users could already hide comments and DMs containing specific words, we’re now expanding this feature to apply to recommended posts they might see across Instagram.</li> </ul>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	While we don’t foresee “substantial” changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 19.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 19.1.1</b>	<p>We outlined the main parameters of our recommender systems under QRE 18.1.3 above.</p> <p>We shared details about how our ranking system works in further detail on several occasions and in several digestible formats to capture the challenges of building a system to personalize the content for more than 2 billion people and show each of them content that is relevant and meaningful for them, every time they come to Facebook:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">News Feed Ranking in 3 minutes flat</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">How Does News Feed Predict What You Want to See?</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Meta Business Help Center article</a></li> </ul> <p>This information is also centralized <a href="#">in our transparency center</a>, and the policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.</p>	<p>We outlined the main parameters of our recommender systems under QRE 18.1.3 above.</p> <p>We shared details about how our ranking system works in further detail on several occasions and in several digestible formats to capture the challenges of building a system to personalize the content for more than 2 billion people and show each of them content that is relevant and meaningful for them, every time they come to Instagram:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Instagram Feed ranking system card</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Shedding More Light on How Instagram Works</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">How Instagram Feed works</a></li> </ul> <p>This information is also centralized <a href="#">in our transparency center</a>, and the policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.</p>

Measure 19.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.2.1.	<p>We created the following tools to give our users both information about our recommender systems and control over their experience:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Show More / Show Less</b> allows users to give us feedback on the types of post they want to see more or see less of. Their selection temporarily increases or decreases the ranking score for that posts and posts like it.</li> <li>- <b>Favourites Feed</b> allows users to control and prioritise posts from friends and Pages they care about most. By selecting up to 30 friends and Pages to include in Favourites, their posts will appear higher in their Feed and can also be viewed in a separate feed populated exclusively with posts from a person’s “Favourites”.</li> <li>- <b>Most Recent Feed</b> allows users to see content sorted in their Feed by chronological order with the newest post first.</li> <li>- <b>Feed Filter Bar</b> allows users to alternate between different Feed experiences – the algorithmically-ranked Top Posts Feed, the chronological Most Recent Feed, or the Favourites Feed.</li> <li>- <b>Feed Preferences</b> provides a suite of tools that allow people to manage what they see in their Facebook Feed, including the ability to unfollow people, snooze a particular account, or prioritise Favourites.</li> <li>- We provide options for users to decide who is allowed to comment on their <u>public posts</u>, as well as <u>profanity</u> and <u>keyword</u> filters.</li> <li>- In our Off-Facebook Activity tool, people can easily access a summary of third-parties (apps, websites) that send Facebook information about their activity. People can clear this information if they wish to at any point, and we won’t use it anymore. They can also manage the future use of off-Facebook activity.</li> <li>- “Why Am I Seeing This?” gives users information about why a particular post is appearing in their News Feed. By clicking on the three dots in the top right</li> </ul>	<p><u>Instagram System Cards</u> help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalized experience on Instagram. Users can test to rank hypothetical users’ Feed to see how it compares with what the feed system might predict. Information on the research that led to the development of the System Cards can be found <u>here</u>.</p> <p>We also created several ways for people to shape their experience on Instagram and see more of what they want on their feed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Sensitive Content Control:</b> When it comes to content that doesn’t break the rules, but could be upsetting to some, we recognize that everybody has different preferences. So we let people decide to leave things as they are, assuming they’re satisfied with your experience today, or adjust the Sensitive Content Control to see more or less of some types of sensitive content. For people under the age of 18, the “More” option is unavailable. To view the Sensitive Content Control, users can go to their profile, tap the Settings menu, tap Account and tap Sensitive Content control. <u>Beginning in June 2022</u>, the Sensitive Content Control for Instagram covers all surfaces where we make recommendations. In addition to Explore, users are able to control the amount of sensitive content and accounts they see in Search, Reels, Accounts You Might Follow, Hashtag Pages, and In-Feed Recommendations. With this update, we’re also applying the technology we use to enforce our Recommendation Guidelines to Instagram’s recommendations on Search and Hashtag pages.</li> <li>- <b>Following &amp; Favorites Feeds:</b> People on Instagram can add an account to their Favorites, to see their posts higher and more often. Instagram also allows users to see a dedicated feed of just their favorites to quickly catch up on their posts. There are no suggested posts in this view, and we never share people’s Favorites list. To choose Favorites, users simply needs to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- tap the Instagram logo at the top left</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<p>corner of a post, they can see key factors that determine how that post is ranked in their News Feed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. There are also additional details about when information on an advertiser's audience list matches a person's profile.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- add up to 50 friends, family members, creators, or businesses</li> <li>- or tap the three-dot menu on any post and then select 'Add to favorites' directly from their feed.</li> <li>- <b>'Not Interested' control:</b> The Instagram feed is personalized and includes a mix of posts from accounts one follows, and suggested posts from accounts they don't follow but may be interested in. We also show suggested posts in places like Explore, as well as the Shop and Reels tabs. Suggested posts in feed are one way people discover new creator accounts on Instagram and how creators reach new audiences. Suggested posts are personalized based on what people interact with on Instagram, and people can provide feedback so that suggested posts are more relevant to their interests: Tapping 'Not Interested' removes the post from their feed immediately, we'll suggest fewer posts like it in the future, and we will aim to avoid showing them this kind of content going forward in other places where we make recommendations, like Reels, Search and more.</li> <li>- <b>Snooze recommendations:</b> Suggested posts in one's feed are posts from accounts they don't follow but may be interested in. If a user wants to take a break from suggested posts in their feed, they can easily snooze them for 30 days. To snooze suggested posts, they simply need to tap the X on the top right corner, and then tap 'snooze all suggested posts for 30 days'. This is also accessible via the three-dot menu and the 'Not Interested' option on a specific post so that we can improve the quality of your suggested posts.</li> <li>- <b>Mute:</b> Users can mute an account if they'd like to stop seeing what it shares, but are hesitant about unfollowing entirely.</li> <li>- <b>Hidden Words:</b> Content that doesn't go against our Community Guidelines, but may be inappropriate, disrespectful or offensive (example: racial slurs, swear words or scams) can be hidden using the Hidden words setting. Users can also create a custom list of words, phrases, numbers, and emojis that they want to hide. In January 2023, we expanded this Hidden Words feature from comments and messages to also apply to recommended posts they might see across Instagram. People can add a word or list of words, emojis or hashtags that they want to</li> </ul>
--	---	---

		avoid – like “fitness” or “recipes” – and we’ll work to no longer recommend content with those words in the caption or the hashtag. This is available in the Hidden Words section of Privacy settings.
<b>SLI 19.2.1 – user settings</b>	We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January-June 2023.	We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January-June 2023.
<b>Member States</b>		

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>
<b>Commitment 20</b>
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.
Tools assessing provenance and edit history of digital content are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. Other tools to achieve this objective, including as set forth in Commitment 21 are relevant and pertinent to our subscribed products at this time.

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>				
<b>Commitment 21</b>				
Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organizations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.				
	<b>C.21</b>	<b>M 21.1</b>	<b>M 21.2</b>	<b>M 21.3</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>	



<p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>To fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checkers. Each time a fact-checker rates a piece of content as false on our platforms, we significantly reduce that content's distribution so that fewer people see it, label it accordingly, and notify people who try to share it.</p> <p>In <u>November 2022</u>, we added Climate InfoFinder and Climate Science Literacy Campaign to our suite of tools, such as fact-checking and labels, to help <u>combat climate misinformation</u>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We've expanded the <u>Climate Science Center</u> and it's now available in 165 countries including most EU countries. We're also expanding Climate Inform Labels, a tool that adds links to Facebook posts about climate change and connects people with expert-backed information in the Climate Science Center.</li> <li>• We've launched a <u>Climate InfoFinder tool</u> that enables people to search for trusted information about climate change and link to this content directly in comment threads.</li> <li>• We worked with partners to help launch our first <u>Climate Science Literacy Initiative</u>. Its goal is to pre-bunk climate misinformation by running ads across our products and apps that feature five of the most common techniques used to misrepresent climate change.</li> <li>• We're also testing <u>Climate Pledges in Facebook Groups</u> to empower communities to take action against climate change with the help of expert-backed solutions.</li> </ul>	<p>To fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checkers. Each time a fact-checker rates a piece of content as false on our platforms, we significantly reduce that content's distribution so that fewer people see it, label it accordingly, and notify people who try to share it.</p> <p>In <u>November 2022</u>, we added Climate InfoFinder and Climate Science Literacy Campaign to our suite of tools, such as fact-checking and labels, to help <u>combat climate misinformation</u>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We worked with partners to help launch our first <u>Climate Science Literacy Initiative</u>. Its goal is to pre-bunk climate misinformation by running ads across our products and apps that feature five of the most common techniques used to misrepresent climate change.</li> </ul>

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Fact-checking program or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our Fact-checking program or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 21.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 21.1.1</b>	<p>Meta partners with over 26 independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), covering 22 languages, in the EU. The work of these fact-checkers has a global impact, as the treatment of their false-rated posts (i.e. demotion, notification, and warning) are applied globally.</p> <p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. We <u>updated our Transparency Center</u> with further detail on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings.</p>	<p>Meta partners with over 26 independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the IFCN, covering 22 languages, in the EU. The work of these fact-checkers has a global impact, as the treatment of their false-rated posts (i.e. demotion, notification, and warning) are applied globally.</p> <p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. We <u>updated our Transparency Center</u> with further detail on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings.</p> <p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p>

	<p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Labeling.</b> When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context.</li> <li>- <b>Ensuring less people see misinformation.</b> Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent.</li> <li>- <b>Repeat offenders.</b> Pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period.</li> </ul> <p>There is more detail on all three actions under QRE 31.1.1.</p> <p>The fact-checking program works together with other tools and products to empower users on Facebook:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We launched tools and products, such as Voter Registration and Election Day Reminders, to connect people with accurate information about when and how to vote.</li> <li>- We build resources to access authoritative information, such as the <a href="#">Covid-19 Info Center</a> or the <a href="#">Climate Science Center</a>.</li> <li>- A notification screen lets people know when news articles they are about to share are more than 90 days old.</li> <li>- The context button allows people to get contextual information pulled from across Facebook and other sources, such as information from the publisher's Wikipedia entry, a button to follow their Page, <a href="#">more articles</a> from the publisher,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Labeling.</b> When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context.</li> <li>- <b>Ensuring less people see misinformation.</b> Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Instagram. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent.</li> <li>- <b>Repeat offenders.</b> Accounts that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period.</li> </ul> <p>There is more detail on all three actions under QRE 31.1.1.</p> <p>The fact-checking program works together with other tools and products to empower users on Instagram:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We launched tools and products, such as Voter Registration and Election Day Reminders, to connect people with accurate information about when and how to vote.</li> <li>- A notification screen lets people know when news articles they are about to share are more than 90 days old.</li> <li>- The context button allows people to get contextual information pulled from across Instagram and other sources, such as information from the publisher's Wikipedia entry, a button to follow their account, <a href="#">more articles</a> from the publisher, and information about how the article is being shared by people on Instagram.</li> </ul>
--	---	--

	and information about how the article is being shared by people on Facebook.					
<b>SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1</b>	<i>See SLI 21.1.2 below</i>					
<b>SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1</b>	Filtered to content created on Facebook in EU member state countries 1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an informed treatment to a content from 1 October to 31 December 2022: 2. Number of distinct contents posted on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFC from 1 October to 31 December 2022: 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label from 1 December to 31 December 2022.  Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.			Filtered to content created on Instagram in EU member state countries 1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an informed treatment to a content from 1 October to 31 December 2022 2. Number of distinct contents posted on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFC from 1 October to 31 December 2022: 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label from 1 December to 31 December 2022.  Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.		
	Number of articles published by independent fact-checkers	Number of labels applied to content	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content	Number of articles published by independent fact-checkers	Number of labels applied to content	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content
<b>Global</b>	<b>Over 150.000</b>			<b>Over 40.000</b>		
<b>Member States</b>						
Austria		Over 660.000			Over 46.000	
Belgium		Over 990.000			Over 66.000	
Bulgaria		Over 510.000			Over 18.000	
Cyprus		Over 189.000			Over 21.000	
Czechia		Over 600.000			Over 30.000	
Germany		Over 3.700.000			Over 210.000	

Denmark		Over 410.000			Over 33.000	
Estonia		Over 77.000			Over 9.900	
Spain		Over 3.500.000			Over 200.000	
Finland		Over 180.000			Over 30.000	
France		Over 4.000.000			Over 150.000	
Greece		Over 860.000			Over 42.000	
Croatia		Over 410.000			Over 21.000	
Hungary		Over 450.000			Over 21.000	
Ireland		Over 580.000			Over 80.000	
Italy		Over 4.000.000			Over 170.000	
Lithuania		Over 210.000			Over 11.000	
Luxembourg		Over 97.000			Over 12.000	
Latvia		Over 180.000			Over 10.000	
Malta		Over 81.000			Over 9.200	
Netherlands		Over 1.000.000			Over 104.000	
Poland		Over 1.700.000			Over 52.000	
Portugal		Over 1.600.000			Over 240.000	
Romania		Over 1.100.000			Over 34.000	
Sweden		Over 620.000			Over 69.000	
Slovenia		Over 220.000			Over 12.000	
Slovakia		Over 360.000			Over 17.000	
<b>Total EU</b>		<b>Over 28.000.000</b>	<b>25%</b>		<b>Over 1.700.000</b>	<b>38%</b>
<b>Measure 21.2</b>	Facebook			Instagram		

QRE 21.2.1	<p>We know this program is working and people find value in the warning screens we apply to content after a fact-checking partner has rated it. In the first half of 2020, we saw that the warning labels on pieces of Covid-19 content on Facebook stopped people clicking through to read the content 95% of the time.</p> <p>In Q2 2022, we displayed warnings on over 200 million distinct pieces of content on Facebook (including re-shares) globally based on over 130,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners.</p>	For information on the testing and feedback on this program, please refer to the corresponding QRE 21.2.1 Facebook answer.
Measure 21.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.3.1	<p>The fact-checking program's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. We continue to engage with fact-checkers and content moderation experts across our policies, including for instance by consulting the Oversight Board on our approach to COVID-19 misinformation.</p> <p>Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm. This includes, for instance, partnering with health organizations during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>	<p>The fact-checking program's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. We continue to engage with fact-checkers and content moderation experts across our policies, including for instance by consulting the Oversight Board on our approach to COVID-19 misinformation.</p> <p>Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm. This includes, for instance, partnering with health organizations during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

Trustworthiness indicators are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. This is

acknowledged by the Commission’s 2021 Guidance, which describes them as a tool signatories “could” explore, and negotiations of the updated Code which confirmed this to be a direction signatories are encouraged but not expected to follow. Other tools to achieve this objective covered elsewhere in this section – Commitment 21 in particular – are relevant and pertinent for our subscribed products at this time.

We note however that we use several of the products and features listed under Measure 22.7 (in particular information panels, banners, pop-ups, and prompts) as already outlined under Commitment 21 above, as well as in our crisis monitoring reports on both Covid-19 and Ukraine below.

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>			
<b>Commitment 23</b>			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.			
	<b>C.23</b>	<b>M 23.1</b>	<b>M 23.2</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information. People can and do also report content to us that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards, including fake accounts or fraud.		We maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information. People can and do also report content to us that they believe violates any of our other Community Guidelines, including fake accounts or fraud.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 23.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 23.1.1</b>	<p>We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Standards when we're made aware, including fake accounts and accounts engaged in inauthentic behavior and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm.</p> <p>We invest significantly in technology and people to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behavior. Our enforcement practices consist of three pillars - artificial intelligence (AI), human review, and user reports. As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.</p> <p>Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <a href="#">outlined on our website</a>:</p>	<p>We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Guidelines when we're made aware, including accounts engaged in inauthentic behavior and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm.</p> <p>We invest significantly in technology and people to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behavior. Our enforcement practices consist of three pillars - artificial intelligence (AI), human review, and user reports. As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.</p> <p>Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <a href="#">outlined on our website</a>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Click *** above the post.</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Click *** next to the post you'd like to mark as false.</li> <li>● Click Report post.</li> <li>● Click False information, then select the kind of false information.</li> <li>● Click Submit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Click Report.</li> <li>● Scroll down and click False information.</li> <li>● Select an option, then click Submit report.</li> </ul>
<b>Measure 23.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 23.2.1</b>	<p><b>Community Standard violations:</b> If someone publishes a post which we decide to remove from Facebook for going against our policies, the person who posted it is notified, and <u>given the option to accept the decision or disagree and request another review</u>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If they choose to disagree with the decision, the content is resubmitted for another review. The content is not visible to other people on Facebook while we review it again.</li> <li>- If the reviewer accepts the original decision, the content remains off Facebook. However, if the reviewer disagrees with the initial review and decides it should not have been removed, the content will go to another reviewer. This reviewer's decision will determine whether the content should be on Facebook or not.</li> <li>- If users disagree with a content appeal decision on Facebook, they can further <u>appeal the decision to the Oversight Board</u>.</li> </ul> <p><b>Fact-check:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Publishers are also able to <u>dispute a fact-check rating</u> issued by a third-party fact-checker. They can do this by reaching out directly to the third-party fact-checking organization. Fact-checkers are responsible for evaluating the validity of each correction. If a fact-checking partner decides to change a rating based on a dispute, the demotion on the content will be lifted, associated ad disapprovals may be lifted, and the strike toward the Page or domain becoming a misinformation repeat offender will be removed.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Community Guidelines violations:</b> If someone publishes a post which we decide to remove from Instagram for going against our policies, the person who posted it is notified, and <u>given the option to accept the decision or disagree and request another review</u>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If they choose to disagree with the decision, the content is resubmitted for another review. The content is not visible to other people on Instagram while we review it again.</li> <li>- If the reviewer accepts the original decision, the content remains off Instagram. However, if the reviewer disagrees with the initial review and decides it should not have been removed, the content will go to another reviewer. This reviewer's decision will determine whether the content should be on Instagram or not.</li> <li>- If users disagree with a content appeal decision on Instagram, they can further <u>appeal the decision to the Oversight Board</u>.</li> </ul> <p><b>Fact-check:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Publishers are also able to <u>dispute a fact-check rating</u> issued by a third-party fact-checker. They can do this by reaching out directly to the third-party fact-checking organization. Fact-checkers are responsible for evaluating the validity of each correction. If a fact-checking partner decides to change a rating based on a dispute, the demotion on the content will be lifted, associated ad disapprovals may be lifted, and the strike toward the account becoming a misinformation repeat offender will be removed.</li> <li>- Users can appeal directly to the fact-checker about content they shared if they corrected the content or think that a fact-check got something wrong. Appeals are generally processed within three working days.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Page manager or group admin can appeal directly to the fact-checker about content that the Page or group shared if they corrected the content or think that a fact-check got something wrong. Appeals are generally processed within three working days.</li> </ul>	
--	--	--

<b>V. Empowering Users</b>		
<b>Commitment 24</b>		
<p>Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labeled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.</p>		
	<b>C.24</b>	<b>M 24.1</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>	<b>Service B</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content.	We're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Guidelines or when a fact-checker rated their content.
Do you plan to put further implementation	No	No

<p>measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>		
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our processes. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>
<p><b>Measure 24.1</b></p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p><b>QRE 24.1.1</b></p>	<p><b>Community Standard violations:</b> <u>When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Usually, this appears in their Feed. It can also be found in the <u>Support Inbox</u>. As much as we can, we'll reference which part of the Community Standards the user didn't follow, as well as a brief description of why the content isn't allowed, so the user can avoid having content removed in the future.</p> <p><b>Fact-checks:</b> We are transparent with publishers when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for publishers who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.</p> <p>Page Managers and Group Admins can also check their Page quality or Group Quality pages to see whether any fact-checks have been applied to the content and if any penalties have been applied to the Page or group.</p> <p>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1 and 23.2.1.</p>	<p><b>Community Guidelines violations:</b> <u>When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Guidelines. Usually, this appears in their Feed. It can also be found in the Support Requests. As much as we can, we'll reference which part of the Community Guidelines the user didn't follow, as well as a brief description of why the content isn't allowed, so the user can avoid having content removed in the future.</p> <p><b>Fact-checks:</b> We are transparent with publishers when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for publishers who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.</p> <p>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1 and 23.2.1.</p>

<b>SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions</b>	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 1 October to 31 December 2022	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 1 October to 31 December 2022
	Country determined based on country of content creator, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible	Country determined based on country of content creator, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible
	Contents removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies	Contents removed from Instagram for violating harmful health misinformation and voter interference policies
<b>Member States</b>		
Austria	Over 3.400	Less than 500
Belgium	Over 3.200	Less than 100
Bulgaria	Less than 500	Less than 100
Croatia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Cyprus	Less than 500	Less than 100
Czechia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Denmark	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Estonia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Finland	Less than 500	Less than 100
France	Over 9.300	Less than 500
Germany	Over 27.000	Over 1.200
Greece	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Hungary	Less than 500	Less than 100
Ireland	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Italy	Over 23.000	Over 1.100
Latvia	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Lithuania	Less than 500	Less than 100

Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 100
Malta	Less than 100	Less than 100
Netherlands	Over 9.400	Less than 500
Poland	Over 5.900	Less than 100
Portugal	Over 3.200	Less than 500
Romania	Over 1.000	Less than 100
Slovakia	Less than 500	Less than 100
Slovenia	Less than 1.000	Less than 100
Spain	Over 12.000	Over 1.500
Sweden	Less than 1.000	Less than 500
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>Over 106.000</b>	<b>Over 5.900</b>

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	<b>C.25</b>	<b>M 25.1</b>	<b>M 25.2</b>	
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Messenger WhatsApp	Messenger WhatsApp	Messenger WhatsApp	
	<b>Service A - Facebook</b>	<b>Service B - Instagram</b>	<b>Service C - Messenger</b>	<b>Service D - WhatsApp</b>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes

<p>implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>				
<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>			<p>We continue to regularly review the measures we have in place in Messenger, in conjunction with the measures on the linked social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram), and believe that the measures we had in place in 2022 met user expectations and the commitments in this code of practice. We will continue to actively review measures, including as we launch new products and disinformation trends change.</p>	<p>As a private messaging service dedicated to helping people speak freely, WhatsApp is deeply committed to addressing misinformation while protecting people's privacy – without weakening encryption. Our approach is centered around limiting virality, preventing coordinated misuse, and empowering users.</p> <p>New implementation measures in the period of June 2022 – January 2023 include:</p> <p><b>New forward limit:</b> With the introduction of <u>Communities</u> in 2022, WhatsApp has implemented a new limit to message forwarding (applicable to any WhatsApp chat). In addition to the other <u>constraints</u> in place (see Measure 25.2 below), messages that have already been forwarded can only be forwarded up to one group at a time.</p> <p><b>Admin delete:</b> In <u>November</u> 2022, we released the ability for group admins to delete inappropriate or untrustworthy messages for all members of a group, by long-pressing on those messages. This tool empowers admins to manage their group conversations.</p> <p><b>Grant to support fact-checking:</b> in September 2022, WhatsApp awarded \$450,000 in grants to organizations working to fight misinformation on WhatsApp, as part of the <u>Spread the Facts Grant Program</u> in partnership with the IFCN.</p>

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]			Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?			We are constantly assessing and working to improve our tools to combat misinformation.	Misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We are constantly working to improve our efforts against misinformation.
<b>Measure 25.1</b>			Messenger	WhatsApp
<b>QRE 25.1.1</b>			<p>We have measures in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger.</p> <p>Content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false or partly false by our fact-checkers are prominently labeled within Messenger so people can better decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Misinformation Labels: We apply a clear, visual label to content that has been debunked by fact-checkers, and surface their</li> </ul>	<p>We work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with accurate information:</p> <p><b>WhatsApp partners with organizations certified by the IFCN</b> around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Those organizations abide by IFCN's code of principles to promote excellence in nonpartisan and transparent fact-checking. Because WhatsApp is end-to-end encrypted and text messages, voice messages, and calls are secured, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated</p>

			<p>fact-checking articles for additional context.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sharing Warning: When someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share.</li> </ul>	<p>reporting. Users can flag potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organizations in the country where the message originated by sending them a message, and fact-checking organizations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article.</p> <p><b>WhatsApp also partners with government agencies and nonprofit organizations</b> to help make authoritative information, such as about COVID-19 and vaccines, available to users on WhatsApp</p> <p><b>WhatsApp also works to empower users by supporting fact-checking through grants.</b> In September 2022, as part of the <a href="#">Spread the Facts Grant Program</a> in partnership with IFCN, WhatsApp awarded \$450,000 in grants to organizations working to lessen the impact of misinformation on WhatsApp. The grant supports eleven projects in eight countries, including in Europe.</p>
SLI 25.1.1				<p>Number of partners active/using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform), in the period between June 2022 and January 2023, to help connect people with authoritative information in the EU; the amount awarded in grant support to fact-checking organizations in the EU.</p>
			<p>Please see section 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers.</p>	<p>Our company would like to provide the following data:</p> <p><b>Partnerships with fact-checkers:</b> 16 fact-checking organizations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business App and/or the WhatsApp Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information (between June 2022 and January 2023 - list below).</p> <p><b>Partnerships with government entities and civil society organizations:</b> In the area of public health,</p>



				<p>since the beginning of the pandemic WhatsApp has partnered with more than 150 health authorities across the world to connect people to authoritative information about COVID-19, including about vaccines. WhatsApp also partners with nonpartisan organizations to use WhatsApp to help people access reliable voting information. In Europe, this includes our <a href="#">work with A Voté</a>, in partnership with Ouest France and 20 Minutes.</p> <p><b>Spread the Facts Grant:</b> \$150.000 in grant support to 3 organizations in 2 EU Member States:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <a href="#">Maldita.es</a> (Spain): \$50.000 to support the project <i>Enhancing interactive media literacy on Maldita.es' WhatsApp Chatbot</i></li> <li>● <a href="#">EFE Verifica</a> (Spain): \$50.000 to support the project <i>Con check</i></li> <li>● <a href="#">Facta.news</a> (Italy): \$50.000 to support the project <i>Infogamic: The Disinformation Game</i></li> </ul>
<p><b>Member States</b></p>				
<p>List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)</p>				<p><u>Directory</u> of fact-checking organizations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) between June 2022 and January 2023:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Croatia: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">Faktograf.hr</a> (Croatian)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">20 Minutes</a> (French)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">AFP France</a> (French)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">AFP Africa</a> (English)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">France24</a> (French)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Germany <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">CORRECTIV</a> (German)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">AFP Faktencheck</a> (German)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">dpa Faktencheck</a> (German)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Greece</li> </ul>

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">Ellinika Hoaxes</a> (Greek)</li> <li>● Ireland <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">TheJournal.ie</a> (Irish)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Italy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">Pagella Politica / Facta</a> (Italian)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Portugal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">Polígrafo</a> (Portuguese)</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Spain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#">AFP Factual</a> (Spanish)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">EFE Verifica</a> (Spanish)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">Maldita</a> (Spanish)</li> <li>○ <a href="#">Newtral</a> (Spanish)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Measure 25.2</b>			Messenger	WhatsApp
<b>QRE 25.2.1</b>			To <u>help</u> reduce the spread of viral misinformation and harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger.	<p>WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default, so that nobody – not even WhatsApp – can read or listen to people's messages. In this context, one of our key lines of effort to counter misinformation is to limit virality and to help users think about the messages they receive:</p> <p><b>Forwarding labels:</b> WhatsApp displays labels to forwarded messages so that users can easily know when a message has been forwarded once (an arrow icon and a "Forwarded" label are displayed), or forwarded many times, that is, forwarded through a chain of five or more chats (a double arrow icon and the "Forwarded many times" label are displayed). These labels help people recognize viral information, and potential disinformation.</p> <p><b>Limits to messaging forwarding:</b> We have set limits on message forwarding, making WhatsApp one of the few technology companies to intentionally constrain sharing. These limits help contain virality and maintain the private nature of the service. A message on WhatsApp can only be forwarded to up to five chats at one time. And as of 2022, if a message has already been forwarded, it can only be</p>

				<p>forwarded to up to five chats, including a maximum of one group. Additionally, if a message has been forwarded many times, it can only be forwarded to one chat at a time. To learn more about forwarding limits, refer to this <a href="#">this article</a>.</p> <p><b>Search the web tool:</b> WhatsApp provides an <a href="#">easy way for users to search</a> the web for more information on viral messages. If a person receives a message that's been forwarded from one user to another user many times, they can initiate an internet search from within the WhatsApp chat for information relating to the message content. These messages are indicated with a double arrow icon.</p>
<b>SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools</b>				<p>When we introduced additional forwarding limits in April 2020 we immediately saw a 70% reduction on virality. When we introduced the new group chat forwarding limit in 2022, we saw a reduction of approximately 20% in the number of highly forwarded messages per user sent to groups on WhatsApp globally.</p>
<b>Member States</b>	Features available per country			
List actions per member states (see example table above)				
Austria				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Belgium				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Bulgaria				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Croatia				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Cyprus				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Czechia				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding

Denmark				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Estonia				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Finland				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
France				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding Search the web tool
Germany				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding Search the web tool
Greece				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Hungary				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Ireland				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding Search the web tool
Italy				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding Search the web tool
Latvia				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Lithuania				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Luxembourg				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Malta				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Netherlands				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Poland				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Portugal				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Romania				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Slovakia				Forward labels

				Limits to messaging forwarding
Slovenia				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding
Spain				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding Search the web tool
Sweden				Forward labels Limits to messaging forwarding

<b>VI. Empowering the research community</b>				
<b>Commitment 26</b>				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.				
	<b>C.26</b>	<b>M 26.1</b>	<b>M 26.2</b>	<b>M 26.3</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>		<b>Service B</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes		Yes	

<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>Meta is committed to supporting independent research that will enhance our understanding of the impact platforms like Meta have on society. We are also deeply committed to protecting our users' privacy and maintaining a safe and secure community. We have worked to promote research - while preserving privacy - through multiple initiatives. Our investments in independent research is an inherent part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms more secure. It helps us develop a foundational understanding of how best to serve our community – by building better products and offering valuable services – and deepens our understanding of the impact our products and services may have on society.</p> <p>In November 2022, we shared our quarterly reports for the third quarter of 2022 :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <a href="#">Community Guidelines Enforcement Report</a></li> <li>• The <a href="#">Adversarial Threat Report</a></li> <li>• The <a href="#">Widely Viewed Content Report</a></li> </ul> <p>These reports are all available in the <a href="#">Transparency Center</a>.</p>	<p>Meta is committed to supporting independent research that will enhance our understanding of the impact platforms like Meta have on society. We are also deeply committed to protecting our users' privacy and maintaining a safe and secure community. We have worked to promote research - while preserving privacy - through multiple initiatives. Our investments in independent research is an inherent part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms more secure. It helps us develop a foundational understanding of how best to serve our community – by building better products and offering valuable services – and deepens our understanding of the impact our products and services may have on society.</p> <p>In November 2022, we shared our quarterly reports for the third quarter of 2022 :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <a href="#">Community Standards Enforcement Report</a></li> <li>• The <a href="#">Adversarial Threat Report</a></li> </ul> <p>These reports are all available in the <a href="#">Transparency Center</a>.</p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>	<p>Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.</p>

<b>Measure 26.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 26.1.1</b>	<p>We publish on our Transparency Center on quarterly basis our integrity reports:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Community Standards Enforcement Report</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Widely Viewed Content Report</a></li> </ul> <p>We publish public extensive reports on our findings about coordinated behavior on our newsroom:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report:</a></li> </ul> <p>We have a dedicated public website hosting our <a href="#">Ad Library tools</a>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ad library</li> <li>- The Ad Library report on ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> <li>- Ad Library API</li> </ul>	<p>We publish on our Transparency Center on quarterly basis our integrity reports:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Community Standards Enforcement Report</a></li> </ul> <p>We publish public extensive reports on our findings about coordinated behavior on our newsroom:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report:</a></li> </ul> <p>We have a dedicated public website hosting our <a href="#">Ad Library tools</a>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ad library</li> <li>- The Ad Library report on ads about social issues, elections or politics</li> <li>- Ad Library API</li> </ul>
<b>QRE 26.1.2</b>	<p><a href="#">Community Standards Enforcement Report</a> : We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Center on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 14 policies on Facebook).</p> <p><a href="#">Widely Viewed Content Report</a> : We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Center to both provide more transparency about the most-viewed organic content in Feed on Facebook in the US and to hold ourselves accountable to improve the quality of content on Facebook.</p> <p><a href="#">Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report</a>: We share publicly in our newsroom our findings about coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we're sharing information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.</p>	<p><a href="#">Community Standards Enforcement Report</a> : We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Center on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Guidelines.</p> <p><a href="#">Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report</a>: We share publicly in our newsroom our findings about coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we're sharing information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.</p> <p><a href="#">Ad Library Tools</a>: The dedicated website for the Ad Library provides a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta Products. The Ad Library Report allows users to explore, filter and download data for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Users can see overall spending totals, spending by specific advertisers and spend data by geographic location. The Ad Library API</p>

	<p><u>Ad Library Tools</u>: The dedicated website for the Ad Library provides a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta Products. The Ad Library Report allows users to explore, filter and download data for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Users can see overall spending totals, spending by specific advertisers and spend data by geographic location. The Ad Library API allows you to perform customized keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics.</p>			<p>allows you to perform customized keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics.</p>		
<b>SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1</b>	<p>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January-June 2023.</p>			<p>We were not able to deliver this SLI in the time provided for this baseline report. We are working to improve our SLIs across chapters in our next report in January-June 2023.</p>		
	<p>Number of users of public access</p>	<p>Other quantitative information on public access</p>	<p>Other quantitative information on public access</p>	<p>Number of users of public access</p>	<p>Other quantitative information on public access</p>	<p>Other quantitative information on public access</p>
<b>Measure 26.2</b>	<p>Facebook</p>			<p>Instagram</p>		
<b>QRE 26.2.1</b>	<p>CrowdTangle is a content discovery and social monitoring platform that provides access to a small subset of public data on Facebook. 1.000+ academic accounts have access to CrowdTangle as of January 2023 (accounting for 5.000+ individual users), including accounts by universities. Researchers use CrowdTangle to study a variety of key topics of social interest, including misinformation, elections and Covid-19.</p>			<p>CrowdTangle is a content discovery and social monitoring platform that provides access to a small subset of public data on Instagram. 1.000+ academic accounts have access to CrowdTangle as of January 2023 (accounting for 5.000+ individual users), including accounts by universities. Researchers use CrowdTangle to study a variety of key topics of social interest, including misinformation, elections and Covid-19.</p>		
<b>QRE 26.2.2</b>	<p><u>CrowdTangle</u> provides engagement metrics and analytics for public pages, public groups, and verified profiles.</p> <p>The CrowdTangle core products are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>CrowdTangle Search</b>. Search helps users find and discover content across social media.</li> <li>● <b>Live Displays</b>. Real-time streams of public posts, filtered to show only the most relevant content around important topics and events. CrowdTangle publishes public Live</li> </ul>			<p><u>CrowdTangle</u> provides engagement metrics and analytics for public Instagram accounts.</p> <p>The CrowdTangle core products are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>CrowdTangle Search</b>. Search helps users find and discover content across social media.</li> <li>● <b>Live Displays</b>. Real-time streams of public posts, filtered to show only the most relevant content around important topics and events. CrowdTangle publishes public Live</li> </ul>		



	<p>Displays, available to anyone, around major news events so that organizations can keep track of what’s happening across social platforms moment to moment. CrowdTangle users can also build their own Live Displays to make available to their teams.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Intelligence.</b> It lets users compare multiple public Pages, accounts, or subreddits against each other.</li> <li>● <b>Notifications.</b> Organizations can streamline their social monitoring by getting notified immediately when posts from certain accounts are going viral, get weekly emails of top posts among a group or pages, or get notified daily of all new posts relevant to their team.</li> </ul>						<p>Displays, available to anyone, around major news events so that organizations can keep track of what’s happening across social platforms moment to moment. CrowdTangle users can also build their own Live Displays to make available to their teams.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Intelligence.</b> It lets users compare multiple accounts, or subreddits against each other.</li> <li>● <b>Notifications.</b> Organizations can streamline their social monitoring by getting notified immediately when posts from certain accounts are going viral, get weekly emails of top posts among a group or accounts or get notified daily of all new posts relevant to their team.</li> </ul>					
QRE 26.2.3	<p>Anyone can immediately access our popular public features, the <a href="#">Link Checker Chrome Extension</a>, which allows users to see who has shared a link across social media, as well as our <a href="#">public hub of Live Displays</a>, which give a real-time view of what’s happening across <a href="#">Facebook</a> on specific topics.</p> <p>Researchers can <a href="#">apply for access</a> to CrowdTangle.</p>						<p>Anyone can immediately access our popular public features, the <a href="#">Link Checker Chrome Extension</a>, which allows users to see who has shared a link across social media, as well as our <a href="#">public hub of Live Displays</a>, which give a real-time view of what’s happening across <a href="#">Instagram</a> on specific topics.</p> <p>Researchers can <a href="#">apply for access</a> to CrowdTangle.</p>					
SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	Methodology of data measurement: Number of academic accounts with access to CrowdTangle as of January 2023						Methodology of data measurement: Number of academic accounts with access to CrowdTangle as of January 2023					
	Number of monthly users	Number of applications received	Number of applications rejected	Number of applications accepted	Average response time	Other metrics	Number of monthly users	Number of applications received	Number of applications rejected	Number of applications accepted	Average response time	Other metrics
CrowdTangle						1.000+ academic accounts globally, accounting for 5.000+						1.000+ academic accounts globally, accounting for 5.000+

						individual users						individual users
<b>Measure 26.3</b>	Facebook						Instagram					
<b>QRE 26.3.1</b>	CrowdTangle users can receive direct support through submitting requests via help.crowdtangle.com and/or accessing our library of available resources.						CrowdTangle users can receive direct support through submitting requests via help.crowdtangle.com and/or accessing our library of available resources.					

<b>VI. Empowering the research community</b>					
<b>Commitment 27</b>					
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.					
	<b>C.27</b>	<b>M 27.1</b>	<b>M 27.2</b>	<b>M 27.3</b>	<b>M 27.4</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>			<b>Service B</b>	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes			Yes	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We have actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to <u>develop standardized processes for sharing data with researchers</u> , and agree with the recommendation in the report that these processes are best implemented by an independent body. We believe a clear code of			We have actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to <u>develop standardized processes for sharing data with researchers</u> , and agree with the recommendation in the report that these processes are best implemented by an independent body. We believe a clear code of	

	conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data.	conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will continue to engage in discussions with EDMO on the Working Group's report on a code of conduct for Platform to Researcher data sharing. We will also contribute to EDMO's work on developing an independent body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing.	We will continue to engage in discussions with EDMO on the Working Group's report on a code of conduct for Platform to Researcher data sharing. We will also contribute to EDMO's work on developing an independent body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing.
<b>Measure 27.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 27.1.1</b>	<p>We've been actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardized processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we've shared <a href="#">extensive comments</a> in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research.</p> <p>We've joined the EDMO Working Group to build a GDPR Art.40 Code of Conduct. We need to answer some complex questions: standards for the researchers to be eligible, technical standards for data to be anonymized, technical safeguards on data access, organizational and research safeguards (permitted uses, retention, transfers), but also governance, enforcement and oversight. These questions can only be answered in multi-stakeholder discussions with privacy experts, researchers, regulators, and platforms.</p> <p>In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the Working Group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40</p>	<p>We've been actively engaged in the EDMO Working Group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardized processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we've shared <a href="#">extensive comments</a> in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research.</p> <p>We've joined the EDMO Working Group to build a GDPR Art.40 Code of Conduct. We need to answer some complex questions: standards for the researchers to be eligible, technical standards for data to be anonymized, technical safeguards on data access, organizational and research safeguards (permitted uses, retention, transfers), but also governance, enforcement and oversight. These questions can only be answered in multi-stakeholder discussions with privacy experts, researchers, regulators, and platforms.</p> <p>In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the Working Group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40</p>

	<p>Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners.</p> <p>The report contains a few key innovations that have not been a part of academic or regulator discussions before:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The value of an Ex Ante and independent review of both data that is shared and research proposals themselves</li> <li>- Defining the responsibilities of researchers, including their role as Controllers, in protecting data when they conduct research</li> <li>- Highlighting that consent is not an appropriate legal basis for most of the research that social scientists want to do, leaving Legitimate Interests as the likely path forward</li> <li>- A methodology for assessing risk and assigning safeguards that is appropriate for a research context, which recognizes data sharing is not all-or-nothing and instead can be tailored to each research project to reduce risk.</li> </ul> <p>We are hoping to make important progress in the coming year as we believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data.</p>	<p>Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners.</p> <p>The report contains a few key innovations that have not been a part of academic or regulator discussions before:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The value of an Ex Ante and independent review of both data that is shared and research proposals themselves</li> <li>- Defining the responsibilities of researchers, including their role as Controllers, in protecting data when they conduct research</li> <li>- Highlighting that consent is not an appropriate legal basis for most of the research that social scientists want to do, leaving Legitimate Interests as the likely path forward</li> <li>- A methodology for assessing risk and assigning safeguards that is appropriate for a research context, which recognizes data sharing is not all-or-nothing and instead can be tailored to each research project to reduce risk.</li> </ul> <p>We are hoping to make important progress in the coming year as we believe a clear code of conduct for both platforms and researchers to follow is essential to effectively balance a desire for more transparency and research with protection of personal data.</p>
<b>Measure 27.2</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 27.2.1</b>	While the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills based sponsorship.	While the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills based sponsorship.
<b>Measure 27.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 27.3.1</b>	N/A at this stage	N/A at this stage
<b>SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body</b>	At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another third-party, ICPSR, who will be taking on <u>hosting and researcher vetting responsibilities for access to datasets about the US 2020 election.</u>	At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another third-party, ICPSR, who will be taking on <u>hosting and researcher vetting responsibilities for access to datasets about the US 2020 election.</u>
<b>Member States</b>		

List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)		
<b>Measure 27.4</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 27.4.1</b>	<p>Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions. Since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB). In 2021, we expanded our <a href="#">beta research platform</a> – with about 100 data sets – to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide. This dataset provides access to raw data where researchers can visualize and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis.</p> <p>We launched an early access version of the <a href="#">Researcher API</a>, which provides billions of historical and near-real time data points from U.S. and EU public Pages, Groups, Events, and Post-level Facebook App data. It equips researchers to study a range of societal issues, such as the spread of misinformation, public health (COVID-19, vaccinations), climate change, and elections, as well as other emerging topics of interest. More information can be found <a href="#">here</a>.</p>	<p>Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions. Since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB). In 2021, we expanded the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive – which contains information on about 100 removed CIB networks – to more researchers studying influence operations around the world. This research platform allows researchers to visualize and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis.</p>

<b>VI. Empowering the research community</b>					
<b>Commitment 28</b>					
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	<b>C.28</b>	<b>M 28.1</b>	<b>M 28.2</b>	<b>M 28.3</b>	<b>M 28.4</b>
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram
	<b>Service A</b>			<b>Service B</b>	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We <u>offer researchers</u> a number of <u>privacy-protective methods</u> to collect and analyze data. We welcome research that holds us accountable, and doesn't compromise the security of our platform or the privacy of the people who use it. Every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. We also look for research that will help develop a foundational understanding of how best to serve our community and contribute to our understanding of societal trends.	We <u>offer researchers</u> a number of <u>privacy-protective methods</u> to collect and analyze data. We welcome research that holds us accountable, and doesn't compromise the security of our platform or the privacy of the people who use it. Every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. We also look for research that will help develop a foundational understanding of how best to serve our community and contribute to our understanding of societal trends.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.	Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in trust and safety combined with external input from experts around the world. While we don't foresee "substantial" changes to our policies, we are continuously assessing the integrity risks on our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes for researchers' empowerment. As part of this continuous improvement process, we also look to improve related reporting.
<b>Measure 28.1</b>	Facebook	Instagram

<p><b>QRE 28.1.1</b></p>	<p>Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta’s impact on the world.</p> <p>The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for external academics, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners</p> <p>Current models to support independent external research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Onboarding Support</li> <li>● Training and Education for researcher products and datasets</li> <li>● Community meet-ups and Office Hours</li> <li>● Promotion of research opportunities through newsletters and educational materials</li> </ul> <p>All details are available on our dedicated <a href="#">Research website</a>.</p>	<p>Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta’s impact on the world.</p> <p>The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for external academics, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners</p> <p>Current models to support independent external research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Onboarding Support</li> <li>● Training and Education for researcher products and datasets</li> <li>● Community meet-ups and Office Hours</li> <li>● Promotion of research opportunities through newsletters and educational materials</li> </ul> <p>All details are available on our dedicated <a href="#">Research website</a>.</p>
<p><b>Measure 28.2</b></p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p><b>QRE 28.2.1</b></p>	<p>Meta provides a variety of data sets for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <a href="#">one place</a>.</p> <p>The main data available only to researchers are :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Ad Targeting Data Set</b>, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. <b>70+ researchers globally have access to Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.</b></li> <li>- <b>URL Shares Data Set</b>, which includes differentially private individual-level counts of the number of people who viewed, clicked, liked, commented,</li> </ul>	<p>Meta provides a variety of data sets for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <a href="#">one place</a>.</p> <p>The main data available only to researchers are :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Ad Targeting Data Set</b>, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. <b>70+ researchers globally have access to Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.</b></li> <li>- <b>Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions</b>, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.</li> </ul>

	<p>shared, or reacted to any URL on Facebook between January 2017 and September 2022. Counts are aggregated at the level of country, year-month, age bracket, gender. The URL Shares data set is regularly updated to add additional year-months and countries. In order to maintain the independence of researchers who use these data, access to the URL Shares is granted by <a href="#">Social Science One</a>. New researchers are onboarded once per quarter and access is governed by a <a href="#">Research Data Agreement</a>. <b>250+ researchers globally have access to the URL Shares dataset since its release in February 2020.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Researcher API.</b> In 2021, we piloted the <a href="#">Researcher API</a> that gives qualifying academics access to near real-time data, as well as billions of historical data points. The API was specifically designed for academic needs and allows them to conduct longitudinal research across all public Facebook Pages, Groups, Posts and Events in the US and select EU countries. Researchers can use the API to understand how public discussions on Facebook influence the social issues of the day. We have invited a small group of qualified academics to test this product and provide feedback before launching to a broader group of researchers. <b>30+ researchers in Europe have access to the Researcher API Beta since it opened in November 2021.</b></li> <li>- <b>Research Platform for CIB Network Disruptions</b>, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.</li> </ul>	
<b>Measure 28.3</b>	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.3.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage



<b>Measure 28.4</b>	Facebook	Instagram
<b>QRE 28.4.1</b>	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage

## VI. Empowering the research community

### Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

Commitment 29 applies to research organizations.

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

### Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	Service A			Service B	

<p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>We continued to strengthen our fact-checking program - which is the largest global fact-checking network of any platform - and contributed more than \$100 million to programs supporting our fact-checking efforts since 2016. We are committed to supporting the long-term strength of the fact-checking industry by helping fact-checkers develop new skills, pursue innovation and scale their efforts to better address misinformation online.</p> <p>We've increased our coverage by on-boarding new third-party fact-checkers - Express Meedia in Estonia, Factual.ro in Romania, and Oštro in Slovenia.</p>	<p>We continued to strengthen our fact-checking program - which is the largest global fact-checking network of any platform - and contributed more than \$100 million to programs supporting our fact-checking efforts since 2016. We are committed to supporting the long-term strength of the fact-checking industry by helping fact-checkers develop new skills, pursue innovation and scale their efforts to better address misinformation online.</p> <p>We've increased our coverage by on boarding new third-party fact-checkers Express Meedia in Estonia, Factual.ro in Romania, and Oštro in Slovenia.</p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>

<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Building on the success of the Accelerator Challenge for Fact-Checkers, we launched on the 10th of October a European edition of the Accelerator. The program will bring fact-checkers together to learn from one another and collaboratively develop strategies to improve their businesses (both on and off Meta platforms) with the help of experts at Blue Engine Collaborative. 12 organizations in Europe are participating in this program, 7 of which are EU organisations. The full 8-week program will then begin in January 2023.</p> <p>We are constantly assessing and working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.</p>		<p>Building on the success of the Accelerator Challenge for Fact-Checkers, we launched on the 10th of October a European edition of the Accelerator. The program will bring fact-checkers together to learn from one another and collaboratively develop strategies to improve their businesses (both on and off Meta platforms) with the help of experts at Blue Engine Collaborative. 12 organizations in Europe are participating in this program, 7 of which are EU organisations. The full 8-week program will then begin in January 2023.</p> <p>We are constantly assessing and working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.</p>	
<p>Measure 30.1</p>	<p>Facebook</p>		<p>Instagram</p>	
<p>QRE 30.1.1</p>	<p>Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organization Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.</p> <p>All fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Nonpartisanship and Fairness</li> <li>● Transparency of Sources</li> <li>● Transparency of Funding and Organization</li> <li>● Transparency of Methodology</li> <li>● Open and Honest Corrections Policy</li> </ul> <p>The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e. how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and <a href="#">here</a>.</p>		<p>Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organization Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.</p> <p>All fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Nonpartisanship and Fairness</li> <li>● Transparency of Sources</li> <li>● Transparency of Funding and Organization</li> <li>● Transparency of Methodology</li> <li>● Open and Honest Corrections Policy</li> </ul> <p>The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e. how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and <a href="#">here</a>.</p>	
<p>QRE 30.1.2</p>	<p>Austria (German, Dutch, French)</p>	<p><a href="#">AFP dpa-Faktencheck</a></p>	<p>Austria (German, Dutch, French)</p>	<p><a href="#">AFP dpa-Faktencheck</a></p>

Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a> <a href="#">Knack</a>	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a> <a href="#">Knack</a>
Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	<a href="#">AFP</a>	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	<a href="#">AFP</a>
Croatia (Croatian)	<a href="#">Faktograf.hr</a>	Croatia (Croatian)	<a href="#">Faktograf.hr</a>
Cyprus (Greek)	<a href="#">AFP</a>	Cyprus (Greek)	<a href="#">AFP</a>
Czechia (Czech)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Demagog.cz</a>	Czechia (Czech)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Demagog.cz</a>
Denmark (Danish)	<a href="#">TjekDet</a>	Denmark (Danish)	<a href="#">TjekDet</a>
Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<a href="#">Delfi</a> <a href="#">Re:Baltica</a>	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<a href="#">Delfi</a> <a href="#">Re:Baltica</a>
Finland (Finnish)	<a href="#">AFP</a>	Finland (Finnish)	<a href="#">AFP</a>
France (French, English)	<a href="#">20 Minutes</a> <a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Les Observateurs de France 24</a>	France (French, English)	<a href="#">20 Minutes</a> <a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Les Observateurs de France 24</a>
Germany (German, Dutch, French)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Correctiv</a> <a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Correctiv</a> <a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>
Greece (Greek)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Ellinika Hoaxes</a>	Greece (Greek)	<a href="#">AFP</a> <a href="#">Ellinika Hoaxes</a>
Hungary (Hungarian)	<a href="#">AFP</a>	Hungary (Hungarian)	<a href="#">AFP</a>
Ireland (English)	<a href="#">TheJournal.ie</a>	Ireland (English)	<a href="#">TheJournal.ie</a>
Italy (Italian)	<a href="#">Open</a> <a href="#">Pagella Politica</a>	Italy (Italian)	<a href="#">Open</a> <a href="#">Pagella Politica</a>
Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<a href="#">Delfi</a> <a href="#">Re:Baltica</a>	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<a href="#">Delfi</a> <a href="#">Re:Baltica</a>

	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<a href="#">Delfi Patikrinta 15min</a>	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<a href="#">Delfi Patikrinta 15min</a>
	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	<a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	<a href="#">dpa-Faktencheck</a>
	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	<a href="#">AFP dpa-Faktencheck</a>	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	<a href="#">AFP dpa-Faktencheck</a>
	Poland (Polish)	<a href="#">AFP Demagog</a>	Poland (Polish)	<a href="#">AFP Demagog</a>
	Portugal (Portuguese)	<a href="#">Poligrafo Observador</a>	Portugal (Portuguese)	<a href="#">Poligrafo Observador</a>
	Romania (Romanian)	<a href="#">AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro</a>	Romania (Romanian)	<a href="#">AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro</a>
	Slovakia (Slovak)	<a href="#">AFP</a>	Slovakia (Slovak)	<a href="#">AFP</a>
	Slovenia (Slovene)	<a href="#">Ostro</a>	Slovenia (Slovene)	<a href="#">Ostro</a>
	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	<a href="#">AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral</a>	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	<a href="#">AFP España EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral</a>
	Sweden (Swedish, English)	<a href="#">Kallkritikbyran</a>	Sweden (Swedish, English)	<a href="#">Kallkritikbyran</a>
QRE 30.1.3	<p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>In addition to the remuneration of our fact-checking partners for their work on our platforms, Meta also contributes to programs such as industry initiatives, sponsorships, fellowships, and grant programs. Most recently we:</p>		<p>The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.</p> <p>In addition to the remuneration of our fact-checking partners for their work on our platforms, Meta also contributes to programs such as industry initiatives, sponsorships, fellowships, and grant programs. Most recently we:</p>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provided Ukrainian fact-checking partners StopFake &amp; Vox with emergency funding to help protect their teams' safety and enable them to continue their work amidst the war</li> <li>- Expanded our support for fact-checking partners across the region to help them increase capacity and strengthen their operations in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine</li> <li>- Announced nine grant recipients for the <u>Climate Misinformation Grant program</u>, in cooperation with the IFCN</li> <li>- Partnered with France 24 and AFP to share media literacy resources to help people identify reliable information in the lead up to the 2022 election.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provided Ukrainian fact-checking partners StopFake &amp; Vox with emergency funding to help enable them to continue their work amidst the war</li> <li>- Expanded our support for fact-checking partners across the Central Eastern Europe region to help them increase capacity and strengthen their operations in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine</li> <li>- Announced nine grant recipients for the <u>Climate Misinformation Grant program</u>, in cooperation with the IFCN</li> <li>- Partnership with France 24 and AFP to share media literacy resources to help people identify reliable information in the lead up to the 2022 election.</li> </ul>
SLI 30.1.1 – Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organizations	Methodology of data measurement: This covers the number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organizations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram. Number of agreements with fact-checking organizations	Methodology of data measurement: This covers the number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organizations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram. Number of agreements with fact-checking organizations
Member State Languages	<i>See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2.</i>	<i>See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2.</i>
<b>TOTAL EU</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>
Measure 30.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.2.1	<p>Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organization Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.</p> <p>All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Nonpartisanship and Fairness</li> <li>● Transparency of Sources</li> <li>● Transparency of Funding and Organization</li> <li>● Transparency of Methodology</li> <li>● Open and Honest Corrections Policy</li> </ul>	<p>Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organization Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.</p> <p>All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Nonpartisanship and Fairness</li> <li>● Transparency of Sources</li> <li>● Transparency of Funding and Organization</li> <li>● Transparency of Methodology</li> <li>● Open and Honest Corrections Policy</li> </ul>

QRE 30.2.2	Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular initiatives to collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools.  Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.	Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together.  Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.
QRE 30.2.3	QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organizations	QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organizations
Measure 30.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.3.1	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.
Measure 30.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.4.1	Facebook is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.	Instagram is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.

<b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b>					
Commitment 31					
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.					
	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	Service A			Service B	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new	Yes			Yes	

tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	To fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checkers who review and rate the accuracy of stories through original reporting, which may include interviewing primary sources, consulting public data and conducting analyses of media, including photos and video.	To fight the spread of misinformation and provide people with more reliable information, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checkers who review and rate the accuracy of stories through original reporting, which may include interviewing primary sources, consulting public data and conducting analyses of media, including photos and video.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.	We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.
Measure 31.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 31.2	Facebook	Instagram



<p>QRE 31.1.1</p>	<p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> <p><b>Labeling.</b> When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. We apply our strongest warning labels for content rated False or Altered and lighter labels for Partly false and Missing context. Content rated Satire or True won't be labeled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Facebook. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well.</li> <li>- We generally do not add notices to content that makes a similar claim rated by fact-checkers, if the content is not identical. This is because small differences in how a claim is phrased might change whether it is true or false.</li> </ul> <p><b>Ensuring fewer people see misinformation.</b> Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly false, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent.</p> <p><b>Repeat offenders.</b> Pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetize and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news Page.</p>	<p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.</p> <p><b>Labeling.</b> When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. We apply our strongest warning labels for content rated False or Altered and lighter labels for Partly false and Missing context. Content rated Satire or True won't be labeled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Instagram. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well.</li> <li>- We generally do not add notices to content that makes a similar claim rated by fact-checkers, if the content is not identical. This is because small differences in how a claim is phrased might change whether it is true or false.</li> </ul> <p><b>Ensuring fewer people see misinformation.</b> Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly false, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Instagram. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent.</p> <p><b>Repeat offenders.</b> Accounts that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetize and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news account.</p>
<p>SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks</p>	<p>Filtered to content created on Facebook in EU member state countries from 1 October to 31 December 2022:</p>	<p>Filtered to content created on Instagram in EU member state countries from 1 October to 31 December 2022:</p>

	1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an informed treatment to a content. 2. Number of distinct contents posted on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFC.  Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.		1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an informed treatment to a content. 2. Number of distinct contents posted on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFC.  Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.	
	Number of fact-check labeled content	Number of Articles written by third-party fact-checkers	Number of fact-check labeled content	Number of Articles written by third-party fact-checkers
<b>Global</b>		<b>150.000</b>		<b>40.000</b>
Member States				
Austria	Over 660.000		Over 46.000	
Belgium	Over 990.000		Over 66.000	
Bulgaria	Over 510.000		Over 18.000	
Cyprus	Over 189.000		Over 21.000	
Czechia	Over 600.000		Over 30.000	
Germany	Over 3.700.000		Over 210.000	
Denmark	Over 410.000		Over 33.000	
Estonia	Over 77.000		Over 9.900	
Spain	Over 3.500.000		Over 200.000	
Finland	Over 180.000		Over 30.000	
France	Over 4.000.000		Over 150.000	
Greece	Over 860.000		Over 42.000	
Croatia	Over 410.000		Over 21.000	
Hungary	Over 450.000		Over 21.000	
Ireland	Over 580.000		Over 80.000	

Italy	Over 4.000.000		Over 170.000	
Lithuania	Over 210.000		Over 11.000	
Luxembourg	Over 97.000		Over 12.000	
Latvia	Over 180.000		Over 10.000	
Malta	Over 81.000		Over 9.200	
Netherlands	Over 1.000.000		Over 104.000	
Poland	Over 1.700.000		Over 52.000	
Portugal	Over 1.600.000		Over 240.000	
Romania	Over 1.100.000		Over 34.000	
Sweden	Over 620.000		Over 69.000	
Slovenia	Over 220.000		Over 12.000	
Slovakia	Over 360.000		Over 17.000	
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>Over 28.000.000</b>		<b>Over 1.700.000</b>	
SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	1. Number of distinct contents posted on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFC from 1 October to 31 December 2022 in EU member state countries. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from December 1 to December 31 2022.  Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.		1. Number of distinct contents posted on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label as a result of a falsity assessment by 3PFC from 1 October to 31 December 2022 in EU member state countries. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram to feed/groups that is treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from December 1 to December 31 2022.  Country determined based on country of viewership, inferred via proxies or predictive models when needed and possible.	
	Number of fact-check labeled content on Facebook	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Facebook	Number of fact-check labeled content on Instagram	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Instagram
Member States				

Austria	Over 660.000		Over 46.000	
Belgium	Over 990.000		Over 66.000	
Bulgaria	Over 510.000		Over 18.000	
Cyprus	Over 189.000		Over 21.000	
Czechia	Over 600.000		Over 30.000	
Germany	Over 3.700.000		Over 210.000	
Denmark	Over 410.000		Over 33.000	
Estonia	Over 77.000		Over 9.900	
Spain	Over 3.500.000		Over 200.000	
Finland	Over 180.000		Over 30.000	
France	Over 4.000.000		Over 150.000	
Greece	Over 860.000		Over 42.000	
Croatia	Over 410.000		Over 21.000	
Hungary	Over 450.000		Over 21.000	
Ireland	Over 580.000		Over 80.000	
Italy	Over 4.000.000		Over 170.000	
Lithuania	Over 210.000		Over 11.000	
Luxembourg	Over 97.000		Over 12.000	
Latvia	Over 180.000		Over 10.000	
Malta	Over 81.000		Over 9.200	
Netherlands	Over 1.000.000		Over 104.000	
Poland	Over 1.700.000		Over 52.000	
Portugal	Over 1.600.000		Over 240.000	
Romania	Over 1.100.000		Over 34.000	
Sweden	Over 620.000		Over 69.000	

Slovenia	Over 220.000		Over 12.000	
Slovakia	Over 360.000		Over 17.000	
<b>Total EU</b>	<b>Over 28.000.000</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>Over 1.700.000</b>	<b>38%</b>
SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Methodology of data measurement:  1. Estimate of the daily amount of content reviewed by our content reviewers globally 2. Monthly active users on Facebook from 1 April to 30 June 2022 (Q3 2022)		Methodology of data measurement:  1. Estimate of the daily amount of content reviewed by our content reviewers globally 2. Monthly active users on Instagram from 1 April to 30 June 2022 (Q3 2022)	
	Denominator to be decided within the TF ahead of the baseline report: <i>Pending further TF discussions</i>		Denominator to be decided within the TF ahead of the baseline report: <i>Pending further TF discussions</i>	
<b>Total Global</b>	<b>Over 2 million pieces of content on Facebook and Instagram combined reviewed by content reviewers every day globally</b>		<b>Over 2 million pieces of content on Facebook and Instagram combined reviewed by content reviewers every day globally</b>	
<b>Total Global</b>	<b>2.96 billion monthly active users on Facebook</b>		<b>Over 2 billion monthly active users on Instagram</b>	
List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)				
Measure 31.3	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 31.3.1	Meta will be an active member of the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023.		Meta will be an active member of the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023.	
Measure 31.4	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 31.4.1	Meta will join the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023.		Meta will join the Taskforce sub-group in charge of setting up this repository during 2023.	

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 32				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximize the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organizations.				
	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
	Service A			Service B
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes			Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading.			Fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes			Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan	We will work as outlined in Commitment 32 with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organizations.			We will work as outlined in Commitment 32 with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organizations.

to put in place in the next 6 months?	We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.	We are constantly working to further strengthen our relationship with the fact-checking community.
Measure 32.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 32.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.1.1	<p>All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program, and we continue to improve it. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritize what content to review.</p> <p>Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review themselves.</p> <p>Fact-checkers then review the stories, check their facts, and rate their accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. On Instagram, this content is filtered out of Explore and is featured less prominently in Feed and Stories.</p> <p>During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to</p>	<p>All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program, and we continue to improve it. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Instagram, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritize what content to review.</p> <p>Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review themselves.</p> <p>Fact-checkers then review the stories, check their facts, and rate their accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Instagram. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. On Instagram, this content is filtered out of Explore and is featured less prominently in Feed and Stories</p> <p>During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to</p>

	find. For example, we've used this feature to group content about COVID-19, global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.	find. For example, we've used this feature to group content about COVID-19, global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.
SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	Methodology of data measurement Monthly users    Other    Other	Methodology of data measurement Monthly users    Other    Other
Member States		
List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)	See list in QRE 30.1.2 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.	See list in QRE 30.1.2 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.
Measure 32.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.3.1	<p>As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular conversations to collect feedback on the information, tools and interface we make available to our fact-checkers in an effort to improve them.</p> <p>For example, we added new labels "missing context" and "altered" as a result of feedback from fact-checkers who felt that "false" or "partly false" were not sufficient.</p> <p>Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.</p>	<p>As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular conversations to collect feedback on the information, tools and interface we make available to our fact-checkers in an effort to improve them.</p> <p>For example, we added new labels "missing context" and "altered" as a result of feedback from fact-checkers who felt that "false" or "partly false" were not sufficient.</p> <p>Meta is also dedicating the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.</p>

## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

### Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organizations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

Commitment 33 applies to fact-checking organizations.



## VIII. Transparency Center

### Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Center website

	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes			Yes		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) co-chairs the Transparency Center Working Group and co-funds the Transparency Center website's development, to ensure the transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code.					
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this	Yes					

commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) plans to continue to co-chair the Transparency Center working group, notably through the review of the launched product to oversee any key necessary improvements.
Measure 34.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

<b>VIII. Transparency Center</b>							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Center contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service,	Yes						

new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Center in due course. In addition, Meta will continue to take on its role as chair of the Transparency Center Working Group to assist the other signatories in their upload.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will continue to serve as co-chair of the Transparency Center Working Group.
Measure 35.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

## VIII. Transparency Center

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Center in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes			
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload this baseline report in due course and support other signatories, as co-chair of the Transparency Working Group, in their efforts to upload their own baseline reports.			
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes			
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload all future reports in due course and support other signatories, as co-chair of the Transparency Working Group, in their efforts to upload their own reports.			

Measure 36.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	
Measure 36.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	
Measure 36.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	We are pleased to confirm that we have been an active participant in the subgroup that has successfully launched the common Transparency Center this year. We have assisted with establishing the website's requirements, selecting a vendor to build the website, and overseeing the development of the website's key functionalities and interface. We have ensured that the Center will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Center to be navigated both by commitment and signatory). Each signatory will be responsible for ensuring that the information they upload to the website is correct and accurate. Entities interested in joining the Code's task-force will be able to sign up through a dedicated online application form on the website.	
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	The Transparency Center is expected to be launched in the first week of February 2023. We will update this over time with adjustments and updates.	
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Center, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	The Transparency Center is expected to be launched in the first week of February 2023. We will update this over time with adjustments and updates.	
Member States		
List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)		

## IX. Permanent Taskforce

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6	M 37.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes							
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) is an active member of the Taskforce and its varied working groups, particularly on integrity of services, ad placement, crisis monitoring, the Transparency Center, and reporting.							
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes							

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will continue its involvement in the working groups listed above, and join new working groups on fact-checking and political ads most notably.
Measure 37.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 37.6.1	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Messenger) engaged in the working groups on ad scrutiny, integrity of services, crisis monitoring, transparency centre, and monitoring/reporting by attending bi-weekly meetings on each of those workstreams and co-chairing the transparency center working group.

<b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>		
Commitment 38		
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.		
	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Globally we have more than 40.000 people working on safety and security including around 15.000 content reviewers.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Our policies benefit from our experience and expertise. While we don't foresee substantial changes, we are constantly assessing how to best ensure the implementation of this Code and improve our reporting.
Measure 38.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 38.1.1	<p>Globally we have more than 40.000 people working on safety and security including around 15.000 content reviewers. In 2021 alone, we spent approximately USD 5 billion on safety and security. All of these investments work to combat the spread of harmful content, including disinformation and misinformation, and thereby contribute to our implementation of the Code.</p> <p>Teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, trust and safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development all work on these challenges. These teams are distributed globally, and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners.</p>



## X. Monitoring of the Code

### Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	This report was submitted within the required timeline.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Meta will continue to honor its reporting obligations under the Code.
---	---

<b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>							
Commitment 40							
Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.							
	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes						
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In this baseline report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters at a level of granularity that goes beyond any previous transparency efforts.						
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	Yes						

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to work to improve the information they provide in their QREs and to strengthen their SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

<b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>				
Commitment 41  Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.				
	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes			

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook and Instagram are actively participating in the Taskforce Working Group on monitoring and reporting which is focused on this development of structural level indicators, by attending bi-weekly meetings and providing regular substantial input on feasibility of different explored avenues.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook and Instagram will continue to participate in this Working Group to work with the other signatories towards the deadline outlined in Commitment 41.

<b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>	
Commitment 42 Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.	
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	C.42 Facebook, Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation	Yes

measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook and Instagram engaged on a regular basis with both the European Commission and the wider Taskforce Working Group on crisis monitoring to share information on the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, notably through the Covid-19 reports requested on a monthly basis, as well as with regard to the war in Ukraine. This included regular updates on network take-downs as well as tailored responses to questions on measures put in place in specific areas of the European Union.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook and Instagram will continue their active participation in the Taskforce's crisis monitoring working group as well as their engagement with the European Commission on this topic.

<b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b>	
Commitment 43	
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonized reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.	
	C.43

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonized template provided.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide the required information in the template provided, and will seek to engage with the Taskforce Working Group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

## X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 44		
Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organizations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organizations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.		
	C.44	
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, Whasapp, Messenger	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.	We are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>We are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.</p>	<p>We are taking steps to ensure that, in line with the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.</p>
--	--	--



Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Covid-19 pandemic

Overview of the main threats observed, such as crisis related disinformation campaigns, spread of misinformation, coordinated manipulative behaviors, malicious use of advertising products, involvement of foreign state actors, etc.:

Misinformation related to COVID-19 has presented unique risks to public health and safety over the last three years. We know that people looking to mislead others – whether through phishing, scams, or influence operations – try to leverage crises in order to advance their goals, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no different. We are actively working to find and stop coordinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate across our platforms.

Executive summary of the company's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the crisis:

Our approach focused on:

- Debunking false claims about COVID-19 through our global fact-checking program and partnerships, including through a dedicated Coronavirus grant program with the IFCN
- Providing access to authoritative and reliable information about the pandemic, for example through the COVID-19 Information Center on Facebook
- Removing misinformation which could directly contribute to imminent harm to public health and security, as determined in consultation with leading health organizations
- Supporting media literacy across Europe
- Identifying, disrupting, and removing coordinated inauthentic behavior networks

Best practices identified for future crisis situations:

Several of our interventions are still in place, making it early to identify best practices with certainty. However, we drew some learnings over the last three years:

- Perhaps our most important learning was the need for a multi-pronged approach: no single intervention could act as a silver bullet.
- Our consultation with leading health organizations, including the World Health Organisation, played a key role in determining which false claims could contribute to a risk of imminent physical harm throughout the pandemic. These public health expert consultations informed the evolution of our approach to harmful health misinformation as new false claims emerged, for example surrounding vaccines.
- As we've found in other cases, actors who have sought to manipulate public debate around COVID-19 did not exclusively share false or misleading information. This is why we complement our content-based misinformation policies with behavior-based approaches, like our enforcements against Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior.
- We witnessed encouraging results from our fact-checking program: during the month of March 2020, we displayed warnings on about 40 million posts related to COVID-19 on Facebook, based on around 4,000 articles by our independent fact-checking partners. When people saw those warning labels, 95% of the time they did not go on to view the original content.
- Results from our campaigns based on partnerships with the Data for Good team on the COVID-19 vaccine suggest that filling gaps in basic information, developing messages that speak to relevant values and social norms, and leveraging techniques like testimonials and storytelling with effective messengers can all be powerful tools in combating vaccine hesitancy. More on these learnings [here](#).

Future measures planned within the next six months:

Now that the COVID-19 situation has evolved, we're seeking the Oversight Board's opinion on whether we should change the way we address this type of misinformation through other means, like labeling or demoting it.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

### Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	We have been removing misinformation that can contribute to imminent physical harm or violence since 2018. In January 2020, we began applying this policy to harmful misinformation about COVID-19 at global scale.	We consulted with the WHO and other health experts to determine which false claims could contribute to imminent physical harm in the context of the pandemic, i.e., if someone believes the information could cause physical harm to them by increasing the likelihood of them getting or spreading the disease. These claims include harmful false claims about cures or preventions, as well as about how COVID-19 is transmitted, or questioning the existence of the disease.  Meta's policy currently provides for removal of 80 distinct false claims about COVID-19 and vaccines. The list as it currently stands is available <a href="#">here</a> .
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	Organic content: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- This list of harmful misinformation claims referred to above is dynamic, and we adjusted our approach based on public health expert guidance and consultation during the pandemic.</li> </ul> <p>In the same effort to keep this policy up to date in the current context of COVID-19, we're <u>seeking</u> the Oversight Board's opinion on whether we should change the way we address this type of misinformation through other means, like labeling or demoting it.</p> <p>Advertising:</p>	As people around the world confront this unprecedented public health emergency, we want to make sure that our Community Guidelines protect people from harmful content and new types of abuse related to COVID-19.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The list of harmful misinformation claims referred to above are also prohibited in our advertising policies.</li> <li>- We made adjustments to the following advertising policies: Commercial Exploitation of Crises and Controversial Events, Unrealistic Outcomes, and Social Issues, Elections or Politics.</li> </ul>		
Actions to mitigate the crisis impact on the service			
Type of mitigation	Intervention or action (short summary)	Intervention or action (explanation and implementation)	Impact metrics
Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labeling, removal etc.)	<p>As outlined above, we updated our misinformation policy to apply it to harmful misinformation about Covid-19.</p> <p>We worked with fact-checkers to de-amplify content rated as false, as outlined in further detail below.</p> <p>We rolled out a variety of media literacy campaigns across the EU.</p>	<p><b>Removals:</b> Since the beginning of the pandemic, we've removed more than 24 million pieces of content globally for violating our COVID-19 misinformation policies across Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p><b>Media literacy:</b> By way of example, in 2021, we launched the Together Against Covid-19 Misinformation' campaign to educate people in the EU on how to spot false news relating to vaccines. Through on-platform advertisements developed through consultation with the WHO, as well as our fact-checking partners - Full Fact, Correctiv, Maldita and Pagella Politica, users were shown a series of creatives, and link out to a dedicated landing page with more information about Facebook's approach to combat misinformation.</p>	<p><b>Removals:</b></p> <p>During the month of March 2022, we removed over 36.000 pieces of content from Facebook and over 5.000 pieces from Instagram in the EU, for violating our COVID-19 and vaccine misinformation policies.</p> <p>During the month of April 2022, over 42.000 pieces of content from Facebook and over 4.800 from Instagram in the EU, for violating our COVID-19 and vaccine misinformation policies.</p> <p><b>Media literacy:</b> The Together Against Covid-19 Misinformation' campaign reached millions of EU residents. In European countries where we assessed the impact of the campaign, users reported changing their behaviors as a result of the campaign:</p> <p>In France, the media literacy campaign reached 12.9 million users generating a positive lift of 3.6% in ad recall (users actively remembering seeing the ads).</p>

			<p>In Poland, the media literacy campaign reached 5.7 million users generating a positive lift of 5.7% in ad recall.</p> <p>In Germany, the media literacy campaign reached 9.2 million users generating a positive lift of 7.3% in ad recall and a lift of 2.0% in reported behavior (users reporting they scrutinize COVID-19 related content which they see online before trusting it most of the time).</p>
<p>Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels</p>	<p>Connecting people with accurate, reliable and authoritative information is a core component of our strategy to combat misinformation because we want to be able to provide our users with the means to decide what to read, trust and share. We believe that informing people with accurate and authoritative information, as well as more context, is an approach that can be more impactful than the alternative of just removing content. If we simply removed all posts flagged by fact-checkers as false, for example, the content would still be available elsewhere on the internet, other social media platforms, or even discussed around the dinner table. By leaving this content up and surfacing research from fact-checkers or pointing people to reliable information, we're providing people with important information and context.</p>	<p>When people search for vaccine or COVID-19 related content on Facebook, we promote relevant, authoritative results and provide third-party resources to connect people to expert information about vaccines. On Instagram, in addition to surfacing authoritative results in Search, we're making it harder to find accounts in search that discourage people from getting vaccinated.</p> <p>We launched the Covid-19 Information Center in March 2020 and continuously update it. Our COVID-19 Information Center on Facebook provides people with the latest information from health authorities, news, resources, facts, and tips to stay healthy and safe. It is available globally, including all 27 EU Member States.</p> <p>We gave USD \$120 million in Ad Credits to help health ministries, NGOs, and UN agencies reach people with Covid-19 vaccine and preventive health information.</p> <p>See the row below on our cooperation with fact-checkers.</p>	<p>The Covid-19 Information Center on the Facebook app and Instagram connected over 2 billion people over 189 countries to helpful, authoritative information. By way of example,</p> <p>Over 3.1 million people in the EU visited the COVID-19 Information Center in March 2022.</p> <p>Over 2 million people in the EU visited the COVID-19 Information Center in April 2022.</p>

<p>Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU</p>	<p>For misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we continue to work with our growing network of independent third-party fact-checking partners. The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above.</p> <p>We also show messages in News Feed to people who have liked, reacted or commented on harmful misinformation about COVID-19 that we have since removed, and updated the format of those messages over time to reflect research.</p>	<p>Our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.</p> <p>We use keyword detection to gather content about the invasion of Ukraine in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find.</p> <p>To further support the work of our fact-checking partners, we also launched a \$1 million grant program in partnership with the International Fact-Checking Network.</p>	<p>In Europe, we partner with 42 fact-checking organizations, covering 36 languages. This includes 26 partners covering 22 different languages in the EU.</p> <p>By way of example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- During the month of March 2020, we displayed warnings on about 40 million posts related to COVID-19 on Facebook, based on around 4,000 articles by our independent fact-checking partners. When people saw those warning labels, 95% of the time they did not go on to view the original content.</li> <li>- During the month of April 2020, we put warning labels on about 50 million pieces of content related to COVID-19 on Facebook, based on around 7,500 articles by our independent fact-checking partners.</li> </ul>
<p>Measures taken to demonetize disinformation related to the crisis</p>	<p>We applied our Advertising Policies to new types of abuse that we're seeing on the platform. The claims prohibited under our harmful misinformation policy are also prohibited from ads.</p>	<p>We implemented a variety of measures to prevent ads from being used to spread misinformation; to prevent ads from promoting content that could contribute to physical harm; to prohibit exploitative or deceptive ads; and provide transparency on ads about health issues.</p> <p>For a full list of our Advertising Policies about COVID-19, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>Measures taken to prevent malicious advertising</p>	<p>We made adjustments to the following advertising policies: Commercial Exploitation of Crises and Controversial Events, Unrealistic Outcomes, and Social</p>	<p>For a full list of our Advertising Policies about COVID-19, see <a href="#">here</a>.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	<p>Issues, Elections or Politics. While most advertisers are allowed to promote products related to COVID-19, we've put some restrictions in place to help keep people safe across our technologies.</p>		
<p>Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviors/TTCs</p>	<p>We know that people looking to mislead others - whether through phishing, scams, or influence operations - try to leverage crises in order to advance their goals, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no different. As the situation evolves, we are actively working to find and stop coordinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate across our platforms.</p>	<p>The most egregious form of this type of deception is Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB): CIB is any coordinated network of accounts, Pages and Groups on our platforms that centrally relies on fake accounts to mislead Facebook and people using our services about who is behind the operation and what they are doing. Since 2017, Facebook's Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior policy has been a primary vehicle for enforcing against these covert deception campaigns.</p> <p>Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior, and Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded on behavior- and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted.</p>	<p>We publish quarterly reports on our enforcement of our CIB policies. Our latest reports are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Q2 2022</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Q3 2022</a></li> <li>- <a href="#">Recapping 2022</a></li> </ul> <p>Several networks touched on Covid-19, though did not necessarily share false information. The most pertinent network to mention here is a Chinese influence operation we disrupted in 2021 and which is covered in detail in our <a href="#">Q3 2021 Report</a>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- On July 24, 2021, someone posing as a Swiss biologist named Wilson Edwards claimed, on Facebook and Twitter, that the United States was putting pressure on World Health Organization scientists studying the origins of COVID-19 in an attempt to blame the virus on China. Within 48 hours, hundreds of social media accounts around the world had picked up on the story.</li> <li>- On August 10, the Swiss Embassy in Beijing announced that there was no record of any Swiss citizen by that name. The same day, we investigated and removed the Facebook account as fake.</li> </ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Almost the entire initial spread of the “Wilson Edwards” story on our platform was inauthentic.</li> <li>- We removed 524 Facebook accounts, 20 Pages, 4 Groups, and 86 accounts on Instagram. When the network was disrupted, about 72.000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 10 accounts followed one or more of these Groups, and about 2.000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.</li> </ul>
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation	Through our Data for Good program, we empower governments, universities and non-profits with privacy-preserving data supporting their COVID-19 response efforts and research projects. The Data for Good at Meta program offers organizations a range of privacy-preserving tools, including Movement Range Maps that contain information about how communities are responding to COVID-19 stay at home and physical distancing measures, the COVID-19 Trends and Impact Survey developed in collaboration with academic institutions, and analysis of public post information to improve the effectiveness of online campaigns. Data for Good’s maps, surveys, and insights are all built with the goal of achieving better research, outreach and service delivery in times of crisis.	By way of example, Data for Good made available the following:  <u>COVID-19 Trends and Impact Survey:</u> Conducted from 2020-2022, this survey covers topics related to COVID-19 vaccine acceptance, preventive behavior, and symptoms. This survey collected over 100 million responses in 200+ countries and territories in 55+ languages.  <u>COVID-19 Preventative Health Survey:</u> Conducted from 2020-2021, this survey covers COVID-19 knowledge, attitude and practices around the world.  More details on the different datasets available <a href="#">here</a> .	We provided data and tools to help 450+ organizations in 70 countries battle Covid-19.
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of	Changes to working practices	Actions carried out	N/A

the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis			
--	--	--	--

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
<p>Overview of the main threats observed, such as crisis related disinformation campaigns, spread of misinformation, coordinated manipulative behaviors, malicious use of advertising products, involvement of foreign state actors, etc.:</p> <p>We took a variety of actions with the objectives of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: We've added several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted.</li> <li>- Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared.</li> <li>- Reducing the spread of misinformation: We are taking extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and continuing to consult with outside experts.</li> <li>- Transparency around state-controlled media: We provide greater transparency into these publishers, including Russian-controlled RT and Sputnik, because they combine the influence of a media organization with the strategic backing of a state.</li> </ul>
<p>Executive summary of the company's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the crisis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We established a special operations center staffed by experts from across the company, including native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, who are monitoring the platform around the clock, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.</li> <li>- We've added several safety features in Ukraine and Russia, including the ability for people to lock their Facebook profile, removing the ability to view and search friends lists, and additional tools on Messenger.</li> <li>- We're taking extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation and implementing more transparency and restrictions around state-controlled media outlets.</li> <li>- We're providing tools to help our community access crucial resources and take action to support people in need.</li> </ul> <p>Further detail <a href="#">here</a>.</p>
<p>Best practices identified for future crisis situations:</p> <p><b>State-controlled media transparency:</b> We provide greater transparency on accounts from state-controlled media outlets, including Russian-based RT and Sputnik, because they combine the influence of a media organization with the strategic backing of a state, and we believe people should know if the news they read is coming from a publication that may be under the influence of a government.</p>



**Media literacy campaigns:** We ran targeted educational media literacy campaigns in Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and Bulgaria, which were designed in partnership with local fact-checkers and NGOs.

**Fake accounts detection:** We improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.

Future measures planned within the next six months:

We are constantly assessing how to strengthen and improve our approach to the invasion of Ukraine. In the next 6 months, we plan on:

- Continuing to monitor for coordinated inauthentic behavior and other adversarial networks
- Continue to enforce our Community Standards and Community Guidelines
- Maintain our fact-checking program
- Continue targeted media literacy campaigns in the CEE region
- Continue to strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the CEE region

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	N/A	N/A
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	<p><b>Hate speech:</b> We have adjusted the application of our hate speech policies in Ukraine, in order to protect people's rights to speech as an expression of self-defense in reaction to a military invasion of their country. This adjustment is limited to our users in Ukraine, and will only cover content about the Russian military. There is no change at all in our policies on hate speech as far as the Russian people are concerned. We will not tolerate Russophobia or any kind of discrimination, harassment or violence towards Russians on our platform.</p> <p><b>Dangerous organizations:</b> We made a narrow exception for praise of the Azov Regiment strictly in the context of defending Ukraine, or in their role as part of the Ukraine National Guard. It</p>	<p><b>Hate speech:</b> If we applied our standard content policies without any adjustments we would now be removing content from ordinary Ukrainians expressing their resistance and fury at the invading military forces, which would rightly be viewed as unacceptable.</p> <p><b>Dangerous organizations:</b> This was designed to ensure users had access to official information about the Azov Regiment's military activity as part of the national defense of Ukraine, including information essential to their safety, such as the location and severity of military operations. It was also</p>

	has subsequently become clear that the Azov Regiment does not meet our strict criteria for designation as a Dangerous Organization, so these exceptions are no longer relevant. The Azov Regiment is still subject to our Community Standards.	designed to help ensure that news coverage can be shared on our platform.	
Actions to mitigate the crisis impact on the service			
Type of mitigation	Intervention or action (short summary)	Intervention or action (explanation and implementation)	Impact metrics
Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labeling, removal etc.)	<p><b>State controlled media:</b> We're taking extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation and implementing more transparency and restrictions around state-controlled media outlets.</p> <p><b>Media literacy:</b> We ran targeted educational media literacy campaigns.</p> <p><b>Escalation channel:</b> When the war broke out, we created a direct and temporary escalation path for appropriate bodies to report war-related content to us. As of today, this escalation channel is active in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia.</p>	<p><b>State controlled media:</b> When the war broke out, we began applying restrictions on Russian state actors while providing heightened transparency for our users. In line with the European Commission's sanctions, we restricted access to RT and Sputnik across the EU, and took similar action across Ukraine and the UK following requests from those governments as well.</p> <p>We prohibited ads or monetization from all Russian state-controlled media. We took action so that their Pages, Profiles, and the content they post are harder to find on our platforms and demoted in Feeds globally. And we provide additional transparency to users by labeling Profiles, Posts, and any Posts or Stories with links to Russian state-controlled media websites. We also added interstitials that contain short warnings that nudge users to confirm whether they want to direct to a verified state media website or to reshare content from a labeled Page or an account. These actions apply to all Pages, accounts, and websites known to be</p>	<p><b>Media literacy:</b> The media literacy campaigns in the CEE region reached 16 million users and made 72 million impressions across the region.</p>

		<p>Russian state media, regardless of what language they are in.</p> <p><b>Media literacy:</b> We ran targeted educational media literacy campaigns in Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and Bulgaria, which were designed in partnership with local fact-checkers and NGOs.</p> <p><b>Escalation channel:</b> Content reported to us through this channel is removed if it violates our Community Standards or Community Guidelines. When appropriate, we also flag threat indicators with our internal teams to review for coordinated inauthentic behavior and other covert adversarial activity. Where the content does not violate our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, we conduct a legal and human rights assessment, after which the content may be restricted in the relevant jurisdiction if it is found to be clearly unlawful. Content eligible to be reviewed under our fact-checking program may also be enqueued to independent third-party fact-checkers. If fact-checkers assess it to be false, we reduce its distribution and label it globally.</p>	
<p>Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels</p>	<p>We're providing tools to help our community access crucial resources and take action to support people in need.</p>	<p>Last year, we had tools in place to connect people in Ukraine with high-quality, timely information to stay safe, find family and friends, and locate support services.</p> <p>We are also making it easier for people to find nonprofits supporting Ukraine on</p>	<p>N/A</p>

		<p>Facebook and Instagram: We've already seen more than \$40 million raised across Instagram and Facebook for nonprofits supporting humanitarian relief in Ukraine. Now, when someone searches for a nonprofit to fundraise for on Instagram, we'll start showing organizations like UNICEF and World Central Kitchen that are supporting humanitarian efforts in Ukraine first in many countries around the world.</p> <p>We supported the launch of an information helpline by Ukraine's State Emergency Services and a Health Alert Helpline by the WHO on WhatsApp.</p>	
<p>Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU</p>	<p>For misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we continue to work with our growing network of independent third-party fact-checking partners.</p> <p>The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above.</p>	<p>Our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.</p> <p>Specifically in Central-Eastern Europe, last year, we bolstered our fact-checking network and local engagement by onboarding new third-party fact-checkers in Estonia, Romania, Albania, Kosovo, and Slovenia, and expanded fact-checking capacity in Poland, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltics to allow for more coverage in Ukrainian and Russian.</p> <p>We use keyword detection to gather content about the invasion of Ukraine in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find.</p> <p>We also provided emergency grants to our Ukrainian third-party fact-checkers</p>	<p>In Europe, we partner with 42 fact-checking organizations, covering 36 languages. This includes 27 partners covering 22 different languages in the EU.</p>

		to help them with relocation and evacuation costs.	
Measures taken to demonetize disinformation related to the crisis	<p>Our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers. And advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.</p> <p>For the monetization of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetization Policies, any content that's labeled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetization, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetize their content, per our Partner Monetization Policies.</p>	<p>We prohibited ads or monetization from all Russian state-controlled media.</p> <p>Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.</p>	N/A
Measures taken to prevent malicious advertising	As above on demonetization	As above on demonetization	N/A
Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviors/TTCs	<p>We continue to expand our technical teams to build scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviors, and are partnering with civil society organizations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defenses.</p> <p>We improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.</p>	<p>Our security teams took down three distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war (announced <a href="#">here</a>, <a href="#">here</a>, and <a href="#">here</a>) and have continued to monitor and enforce against Russian threat actors engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB).</p> <p>We also took <a href="#">action</a> to secure accounts that we believe were targeted by Ghostwriter, a threat actor that has been tracked for some time by the security community. Ghostwriter typically targets people through email compromise and then uses that to gain access to their</p>	<p>We removed 3 distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- February 2022: A relatively small network of about 40 accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook and Instagram. They were operated from Russia and Ukraine and targeted people in Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and through their own websites. When we disrupted this network on our platform, it had fewer than 4,000 Facebook accounts</li> </ul>

		<p>social media accounts and post disinformation as if it's coming from legitimate account owners. We detected attempts to target people on Facebook to post YouTube videos portraying Ukrainian troops as weak and surrendering to Russia, including one video claiming to show Ukrainian soldiers coming out of a forest while flying a white flag of surrender. We also blocked phishing domains these hackers used to try to trick people in Ukraine into compromising their online accounts.</p>	<p>following one or more of its Pages and fewer than 500 accounts following one or more of its Instagram accounts. (More information <a href="#">here</a>).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- August 2022: Network of 45 Facebook accounts and 1.037 Instagram accounts operated by a troll farm in St. Petersburg which targeted global public discourse about the war in Ukraine. When we disrupted this network, about 49.000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts. (More information <a href="#">here</a>).</li> <li>- September 2022: We took down a large network (1.633 accounts, 703 Pages, one Group and 29 accounts on Instagram) that originated in Russia and targeted primarily Germany, and also France, Italy, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The operation began in May 2022 and centered around a sprawling network of over 60 websites carefully impersonating legitimate news organizations in Europe, including Spiegel, The Guardian, Bild and ANSA. This is the largest and most complex Russian-origin operation that we've disrupted since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. It presented an unusual combination of sophistication and brute force. The spoofed websites and the use of many languages demanded both</li> </ul>
--	--	---	---

			<p>technical and linguistic investment. The amplification on social media, on the other hand, relied primarily on crude ads and fake accounts. In fact, on our platforms, the majority of the accounts, Pages and ads were detected and removed by our automated systems before we even began our investigation. Together, these two approaches worked as an attempted smash-and-grab against the information environment, rather than a serious effort to occupy it long-term. Presence on Facebook and Instagram. When we disrupted this network, about 4,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, less than 10 accounts joined this Group and about 1,500 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts. (More information <a href="#">here</a>).</p> <p>In late December, we <a href="#">published a recap of our enforcement actions</a> on CIB through 2022. Since 2017, most of the CIB networks our teams have disrupted originated in Russia. Since 2017, we've disrupted networks run by people linked to the Russian military and military intelligence, marketing firms, and entities associated with a sanctioned Russian financier.</p>
Measures taken to support research into crisis related	The Data for Good program shares privacy-protecting data externally to	We provided <b>baseline population density maps</b> (the high resolution settlement	N/A

<p>misinformation and disinformation</p>	<p>help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty, and climate change. All three key areas of this program (maps, surveys, insights from public posts) have been activated to assist the Ukraine humanitarian response.</p>	<p>layer) of Ukraine and surrounding countries to humanitarian organizations for supply-chain planning and to aid demining efforts. These are the most accurate in the world with 30 meter resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e. no Facebook user data).</p> <p>Our <b>Social Connectedness Index</b> has been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission - Joint Research Center unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to quantify the rate at which Ukrainian refugees seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.</p> <p>We provided regular <b>Ukraine Displacement reports</b> to a small set of leading humanitarian organizations and agencies.</p> <p>We conducted a <b>survey</b> of all Facebook users we estimated were displaced from Ukraine in April 2022. The findings were used to plan a range of interventions.</p>	
<p>Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis.</p>	<p>Throughout the war, we have mobilized our teams, technologies, and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.</p>	<p>We've established a special operations center staffed by experts from across the company, including native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, who are monitoring the platform around the clock, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.</p>	<p>N/A</p>