

Code of Conduct on
Disinformation – Report of
Meta for the period 01
January 2026 to 30 June
2026

Executive summary

This is the eighth report we share under the 2022 Code of Conduct on Disinformation, which also draws from our work with the Code's Taskforce. In accordance with the [subscription form](#) submitted by Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Meta) in January 2025, this report is being submitted by Meta in respect of the Facebook, Messenger, and Instagram services, and on behalf of WhatsApp Ireland Limited in respect of the WhatsApp messaging service.

The aim of this report is to provide an update on how Meta approached misinformation and disinformation in the European Union (the EU) and, where relevant, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland (together the EEA) between 01 January 2026 and 30 June 2026. We have additionally included any pertinent updates which occurred after the reporting period, where relevant in the report. Highlights include:

1. **Elections:** Meta's Approach to Elections section provides an overview of our work on elections within the EEA, detailing our core policies, processes, and implementation strategies. It outlines our comprehensive approach to those elections, which continued for elections held in the first half of 2026. The election responses covered in this report include Portugal, Slovenia, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Malta elections.
2. **Expanding generative AI Transparency for Meta's ads products:** In addition to labelling images and videos that were created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, we announced that we began automatically detecting ads created or edited using third-party AI tools through industry-standard signals. When detected, we'll apply an "AI info" label. We will continue to evolve our approach to labelling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders, and industry partners as people's expectations and the technology change.
3. **Media literacy:** Meta published its [second Media Literacy Annual Plan](#) on 21 July 2026. The plan sets out Meta's multifaceted strategy for media literacy in the EU, outlining how products, features, and initiatives help users on Facebook and Instagram critically assess the credibility and context of online content. It also provides details on specific media literacy initiatives run by Meta, including its work on digital citizenship, its media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital, and its election literacy programmes.
4. **Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour trends:** In the first half of 2026, we [disrupted multiple covert influence operations](#), several of which targeted one or more EEA countries (including Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Latvia). We observed the actors behind Russia's most persistent influence operation - Doppelganger - diversify from a single high-volume campaign into a broader portfolio of tactically distinct offshoot efforts, run by the Social Design Agency (SDA) and the state-linked Autonomous Non-Profit organisation (ANO) "Dialog". While the core "brute force" campaign continued to target Germany and France, we now saw offshoot efforts targeting Hungary, Armenia, Moldova, and the United States. As in previous periods, our automated defences detected and blocked much of this activity, including the network's ads. Throughout, we have continued to refine our automated detection based on the behaviours we observe and to engineer campaign-specific defences designed to help block these operators from returning to our platforms.

Here are a few of the figures which can be found throughout the report:

- In [Q1 2026](#), we took action against 1.2 billion fake accounts and in [Q2 2026](#), we took action against 822 million fake accounts on Facebook globally. We estimate that fake accounts represented less than 5% of our worldwide daily active people (DAP) across our family of apps during [Q1 2026 and Q2 2026](#).
- From 01 January 2026 to 30 June 2026, we removed 5,455,002 ads from Facebook and Instagram, of which 67,225 ads were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation or inauthentic behaviour policies.

This report addresses the practices implemented for Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp within the EEA during the reporting period from 01 January 2026 to 30 June 2026. In alignment with [Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025](#), we continue to evaluate the applicability of these practices to Meta

products. We also regularly review the appropriateness of making adjustments in response to changes in our practices, such as the deployment of [Community Notes](#) (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
1	Measure 1.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 1.2	Not subscribed			
	<u>Measure 1.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	Not subscribed			
	<u>Measure 1.5</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	Not subscribed			
2	<u>Measure 2.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 2.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 2.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	Not subscribed			
3	<u>Measure 3.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 3.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 3.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
III. Political Advertising					
4	Measure 4.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 4.2	Not subscribed			
5	Measure 5.1	Not subscribed			
6	<u>Measure 6.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 6.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 6.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 6.4</u>	☐	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 6.5</u>	☐	☐	☒	☐
7	<u>Measure 7.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 7.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐

	<u>Measure 7.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 7.4</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
8	<u>Measure 8.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 8.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
9	<u>Measure 9.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 9.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
10	<u>Measure 10.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 10.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
11	<u>Measure 11.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 11.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 11.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 11.4</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
12	-	Not subscribed			
13	<u>Measure 13.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 13.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 13.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
IV. Integrity of Services					
14	<u>Measure 14.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 14.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 14.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
15	<u>Measure 15.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 15.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
16	<u>Measure 16.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 16.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
V. Empowering Users					
17	<u>Measure 17.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 17.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 17.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
18	Measure 18.1	Not subscribed			
	<u>Measure 18.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 18.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐

19	<u>Measure 19.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 19.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
20	–	Not subscribed			
21	Measure 21.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 21.2	Not subscribed			
	<u>Measure 21.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
22	–	Not subscribed			
23	<u>Measure 23.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 23.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
24	<u>Measure 24.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
25	<u>Measure 25.1</u>	☐	☐	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 25.2</u>	☐	☐	☒	☒
VI. Empowering the Research Community					
26	<u>Measure 26.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 26.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 26.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
27	Measure 27.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.4	Not subscribed			
28	<u>Measure 28.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 28.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 28.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 28.4</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
29	–	Not subscribed			
VII. Empowering the Fact-checking Community					
30	<u>Measure 30.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 30.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 30.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 30.4</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
31	<u>Measure 31.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐

	<u>Measure 31.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 31.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.4	Not subscribed			
32	<u>Measure 32.1</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 32.2</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
	<u>Measure 32.3</u>	☒	☒	☐	☐
33	-	Not subscribed			
VIII. Transparency Centre					
34	<u>Measure 34.1</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 34.2</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 34.3</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 34.4</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 34.5</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
35	<u>Measure 35.1</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 35.2</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 35.3</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 35.4</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 35.5</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 35.6</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
36	<u>Measure 36.1</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 36.2</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 36.3</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
IX. Permanent Taskforce					
37	<u>Measure 37.1</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 37.2</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 37.3</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 37.4</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 37.5</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
	<u>Measure 37.6</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	<u>Measure 38.1</u>	☒	☒	☒	☒

39	—	☒	☒	☒	☒
40	Measure 40.1	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 40.2	☐	☐	☒	☒
	Measure 40.3	☒	☒	☒	☒
	Measure 40.4	☒	☒	☒	☒
	Measure 40.5	☒	☒	☒	☒
	Measure 40.6	☒	☒	☒	☒
41	Measure 41.1	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 41.2	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 41.3	☒	☒	☐	☐
42	—	☒	☒	☐	☐
43	—	☒	☒	☒	☒

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1-3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements							
Commitment 1							
Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements							
	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	Facebook, Instagram	<i>Not subscribed</i>	Facebook, Instagram	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	- We are in the process of expanding advertiser delivery reports to more Facebook ad placements. - We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.	- We are in the process of expanding advertiser delivery reports to more Instagram ad placements. - We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.

Measure 1.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.3.1	We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own. See here for details. These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.	We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own. See here for details. These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.
Measure 1.5	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.5.1	The Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG) audits Meta as part of its Certified Against Fraud and Brand Safety Certified accreditations. This audit supports the documentation of Meta's Content Monetisation Policies and Advertising Standards which both prohibit the monetisation and advertisement of misinformation. Please see the link to the most recent publicly available TAG Impact & Compliance Report here. Please see the link to the MRC accreditation for Measurement here.	The Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG) audits Meta as part of its Certified Against Fraud and Brand Safety Certified accreditations. This audit supports the documentation of Meta's Content Monetisation Policies and Advertising Standards which both prohibit the monetisation and advertisement of misinformation. Please see the link to the most recent publicly available TAG Impact & Compliance Report here. Please see the link to the MRC accreditation for Measurement here.
QRE 1.5.2	While Meta is not seeking first-party Media Rating Council (MRC) accreditation for Brand Safety, we are actively pursuing MRC accreditation for Measurement and remain committed to supporting the auditing efforts of our third-party partners. Please see the link to the MRC accreditation for Measurement here. In terms of updates as a result of the audits and accreditations, please see information on the areas of Facebook here.	While Meta is not seeking first-party Media Rating Council (MRC) accreditation for Brand Safety, we are actively pursuing MRC accreditation for Measurement and remain committed to supporting the auditing efforts of our third-party partners. Please see the link to the MRC accreditation for Measurement here. In terms of updates as a result of the audits and accreditations, please see information on the areas of Instagram here.

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements
Commitment 2
Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 2.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.1.1	Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Service, our Community Standards and our Advertising Standards. Meta Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Community Standards on misinformation or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. See more information here.	Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Service, our Community Standards and our Advertising Standards. Meta Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Community Standards on misinformation or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. See more information here.

SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	1. Number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. 2. Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.		1. Number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. 2. Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	
	Number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Overall number of ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.
Country				
Austria	517	42,924	517	42,924
Belgium	958	72,391	958	72,391
Bulgaria	1,427	85,695	1,427	85,695
Croatia	413	35,377	413	35,377
Cyprus	4,791	220,785	4,791	220,785
Czech Republic	1,555	304,288	1,555	304,288
Denmark	866	60,849	866	60,849
Estonia	1,897	226,220	1,897	226,220
Finland	294	40,752	294	40,752
France	7,276	546,367	7,276	546,367
Germany	5,009	511,212	5,009	511,212
Greece	764	59,354	764	59,354
Hungary	2,721	100,005	2,721	100,005
Iceland	4,248	644,011	4,248	644,011

Ireland	283	41,744	283	41,744
Italy	7,247	665,960	7,247	665,960
Latvia	737	39,021	737	39,021
Liechtenstein	2	2,723	2	2,723
Lithuania	1,211	68,739	1,211	68,739
Luxembourg	163	5,070	163	5,070
Malta	514	22,303	514	22,303
Netherlands	2,755	252,413	2,755	252,413
Norway	3,403	227,174	3,403	227,174
Poland	4,808	377,952	4,808	377,952
Portugal	3,191	157,484	3,191	157,484
Romania	2,066	139,260	2,066	139,260
Slovakia	526	54,304	526	54,304
Slovenia	602	18,811	602	18,811
Spain	5,136	343,020	5,136	343,020
Sweden	1,845	88,794	1,845	88,794
Total	67,225	5,455,002	67,225	5,455,002

Measure 2.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.2.1	Meta Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Community Standards on misinformation or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta technologies. See our Advertising Standards for more information.	Meta Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Community Standards on misinformation or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta technologies. See our Advertising Standards for more information.

	To identify ads and promoted content that may contravene policies and assess whether or not they are in fact violating before taking enforcement action, Meta uses the following tools, methods, and partnerships: • Automated tools and human review: Meta proactively reviews all advertisements before publication, implementing an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. This process uses automated detection systems combined with human review to identify policy-violating ads. The review covers ad components (images, video, text and targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations. • Fact-checker review: In the EU, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations (3PFCs) certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). 3PFCs assess the accuracy of content and rate it as False, Partly False, Altered, or Missing Context. Any ad containing content rated as such by these fact-checkers is prohibited and advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may face restrictions on their ability to advertise, including reduced reach or loss of monetisation. • Influence Operations Research Archive: Meta shares information with qualified external researchers to enable research on influence operations. Data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy is made available through the IO Research Archive, housed in the Meta Content Library.	To identify ads and promoted content that may contravene policies and assess whether or not they are in fact violating before taking enforcement action, Meta uses the following tools, methods, and partnerships: • Automated tools and human review: Meta proactively reviews all advertisements before publication, implementing an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. This process uses automated detection systems combined with human review to identify policy-violating ads. The review covers ad components (images, video, text and targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations. • Fact-checker review: In the EU, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations (3PFCs) certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). 3PFCs assess the accuracy of content and rate it as False, Partly False, Altered, or Missing Context. Any ad containing content rated as such by these fact-checkers is prohibited and advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may face restrictions on their ability to advertise, including reduced reach or loss of monetisation. • Influence Operations Research Archive: Meta shares information with qualified external researchers to enable research on influence operations. Data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy is made available through the IO Research Archive, housed in the Meta Content Library.
Measure 2.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.3.1	Meta's ad review system is designed to ensure that ads on Facebook comply with our Advertising Standards, Community Standards, and other Meta policies. The system operates through the following procedures: • Proactive and Reactive Review: All advertisements are proactively reviewed before publication, with an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. During this process, automated tools evaluate the ad's content, including images, text, titles, and landing pages, against our policies. We also monitor and investigate advertiser behaviour, reviewing Business Accounts and their assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts) for policy violations. Once an ad is live, it continues to be monitored and may be rejected for policy violations at any point. • Fact-checker review: Any ad containing content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by independent third-party	Meta's ad review system is designed to ensure that ads on Instagram comply with our Advertising Standards, Community Standards, and other Meta policies. The system operates through the following procedures: • Proactive and Reactive Review: All advertisements are proactively reviewed before publication, with an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. During this process, automated tools evaluate the ad's content, including images, text, titles, and landing pages, against our policies. We also monitor and investigate advertiser behaviour, reviewing Business Accounts and their assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts) for policy violations. Once an ad is live, it continues to be monitored and may be rejected for policy violations at any point. • Fact-checker review: Any ad containing content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by independent third-party

	fact-checkers is prohibited. Where fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, Meta uses technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook and Instagram. If ads are found to be identical or near-identical to content that fact-checkers have rated, they are rejected.		fact-checkers is prohibited. Where fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, Meta uses technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook and Instagram. If ads are found to be identical or near-identical to content that fact-checkers have rated, they are rejected.	
SLI 2.3.1	- Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. - Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.		- Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. - Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.
Country				
Austria	517	42,924	517	42,924
Belgium	958	72,391	958	72,391
Bulgaria	1,427	85,695	1,427	85,695
Croatia	413	35,377	413	35,377
Cyprus	4,791	220,785	4,791	220,785
Czech Republic	1,555	304,288	1,555	304,288
Denmark	866	60,849	866	60,849
Estonia	1,897	226,220	1,897	226,220
Finland	294	40,752	294	40,752
France	7,276	546,367	7,276	546,367

Germany	5,009	511,212	5,009	511,212
Greece	764	59,354	764	59,354
Hungary	2,721	100,005	2,721	100,005
Iceland	4,248	644,011	4,248	644,011
Ireland	283	41,744	283	41,744
Italy	7,247	665,960	7,247	665,960
Latvia	737	39,021	737	39,021
Liechtenstein	2	2,723	2	2,723
Lithuania	1,211	68,739	1,211	68,739
Luxembourg	163	5,070	163	5,070
Malta	514	22,303	514	22,303
Netherlands	2,755	252,413	2,755	252,413
Norway	3,403	227,174	3,403	227,174
Poland	4,808	377,952	4,808	377,952
Portugal	3,191	157,484	3,191	157,484
Romania	2,066	139,260	2,066	139,260
Slovakia	526	54,304	526	54,304
Slovenia	602	18,811	602	18,811
Spain	5,136	343,020	5,136	343,020
Sweden	1,845	88,794	1,845	88,794
Total	67,225	5,455,002	67,225	5,455,002

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements				
Commitment 3				
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.				
	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 3.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.1.1	Meta actively cooperates with partners to facilitate the integration and flow of information relevant to tackling harmful disinformation, via modes such as:	Meta actively cooperates with partners to facilitate the integration and flow of information relevant to tackling harmful disinformation, via modes such as:

Measure 3.1	Facebook	Instagram
	Cooperation across industry and civil society: Meta works collaboratively across the broader information and monetisation ecosystem to enable signal-sharing and partnerships that help identify and disrupt sources of harmful misinformation and disinformation. 3PFC/EFCSN: In the EU, Meta integrates independent assessments of content quality through its cooperation with third-party fact-checkers (3PFC) certified under the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to address misinformation on Facebook and Instagram. Fact-checkers will review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Global security research community support: Meta shares threat indicators related to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks in our dedicated GitHub repository. European Commission (EC): Meta collaborates with representatives of the EC as requested, to share disinformation threats.	Cooperation across industry and civil society: Meta works collaboratively across the broader information and monetisation ecosystem to enable signal-sharing and partnerships that help identify and disrupt sources of harmful misinformation and disinformation. 3PFC/EFCSN: In the EU, Meta integrates independent assessments of content quality through its cooperation with third-party fact-checkers (3PFC) certified under the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to address misinformation on Facebook and Instagram. Fact-checkers will review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Global security research community support: Meta shares threat indicators related to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks in our dedicated GitHub repository. European Commission (EC): Meta collaborates with representatives of the EC as requested, to share disinformation threats.
Measure 3.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.2.1	Information exchange: Meta shares information on disinformation trends and TTPs ("Tactics, Techniques and Procedures") with other CoCD Signatories and relevant fora via the CoCD Taskforce through Transparency Reports. IO/CIB Bilateral Information Sharing with Industry Peers: Meta exchanges relevant information about influence operations, including foreign interference, with selected industry peers through established partnerships. Meta ensures that threat intelligence and technical indicators are shared through secure channels and legal agreements with the partners. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive is a secure repository established and operated by Meta's Security Policy and Data Sharing Insights and Platform team. Its goal is to provide qualified external researchers with access to previously public content and data from networks that have been disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy.	Information exchange: Meta shares information on disinformation trends and TTPs ("Tactics, Techniques and Procedures") with other CoCD Signatories and relevant fora via the CoCD Taskforce through Transparency Reports. IO/CIB Bilateral Information Sharing with Industry Peers: Meta exchanges relevant information about influence operations, including foreign interference, with selected industry peers through established partnerships. Meta ensures that threat intelligence and technical indicators are shared through secure channels and legal agreements with the partners. The Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive is a secure repository established and operated by Meta's Security Policy and Data Sharing Insights and Platform team. Its goal is to provide qualified external researchers with access to previously public content and data from networks that have been disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy.

Measure 3.1	Facebook	Instagram
	CIB refers to networks managed by adversarial threat actors who engage in sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour, where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. Meta has publicly reported on adversarial threats since 2017. Ongoing Evaluation: Meta is evaluating further partnership opportunities and will provide updates as new collaborations are formalised.	CIB refers to networks managed by adversarial threat actors who engage in sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour, where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. Meta has publicly reported on adversarial threats since 2017. Ongoing Evaluation: Meta is evaluating further partnership opportunities and will provide updates as new collaborations are formalised.
Measure 3.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.3.1	Meta is working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above. Meta collaborates with third parties creating a bidirectional flow of information and actions that help tackle purveyors of harmful disinformation. These collaborations support earlier detection, faster mitigation, and helps prevent the dissemination of advertising containing misinformation or disinformation. In line with Meta Advertising Standards, ads must not contain content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by third-party fact-checkers or otherwise violate our Community Standards. When such content is identified and flagged, Meta rejects these ads, thereby reducing the monetisation of disinformation. Additionally, Meta shares information with qualified external researchers which enables them to conduct research on influence operations. The information is shared through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. The IO Research Archive is housed in the Meta Content Library.	Meta is working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above. Meta collaborates with third parties creating a bidirectional flow of information and actions that help tackle purveyors of harmful disinformation. These collaborations support earlier detection, faster mitigation, and helps prevent the dissemination of advertising containing misinformation or disinformation. In line with Meta Advertising Standards, ads must not contain content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by third-party fact-checkers or otherwise violate our Community Standards. When such content is identified and flagged, Meta rejects these ads, thereby reducing the monetisation of disinformation. Additionally, Meta shares information with qualified external researchers which enables them to conduct research on influence operations. The information is shared through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. The IO Research Archive is housed in the Meta Content Library.

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4-13

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 4			
Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".			
	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5		
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

III. Political Advertising						
Commitment 6						
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising						
	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Messenger	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Messenger

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway,	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway,	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway,

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram	Service C – Messenger
terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A	N/A

Measure 6.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 6.1.1	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
Measure 6.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 6.2.1	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.

QRE 6.2.2	Examples of EU political ad labelling from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU may be found in the Ad Library . The Ad Library is Meta's most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.	Examples of EU political ad labelling from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU may be found in the Ad Library . The Ad Library is Meta's most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.
SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.
	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined
Country	Facebook	Instagram
Iceland	4,880	4,880
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	5,704	5,704
Total	10,584	10,584

Measure 6.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 6.3.1	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
Measure 6.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 6.4.1	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries,	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries,

	namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
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Measure 6.5	Messenger
QRE 6.5.1	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 7					
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.					
	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 7.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.1.1	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in EEA Member States. - Removed in the EU and associated territories as SIEP ads are no longer permitted (since 6 October 2025). *In Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, SIEP ads that ran without the required “paid for by” disclaimer and were later removed.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in EEA Member States. - Removed in the EU and associated territories as SIEP ads are no longer permitted (since 6 October 2025). *In Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, SIEP ads that ran without the required “paid for by” disclaimer and were later removed.
	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in EEA Member States.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 in EEA Member States.
Country	Facebook	Instagram
Austria	8,839	8,839
Belgium	11,724	11,724
Bulgaria	5,377	5,377

Croatia	2,816	2,816
Cyprus	8,382	8,382
Czech Republic	13,088	13,088
Denmark	11,170	11,170
Estonia	2,795	2,795
Finland	9,943	9,943
France	42,901	42,901
Germany	51,851	51,851
Greece	9,047	9,047
Hungary	26,433	26,433
Iceland*	5,495	5,495
Ireland	3,657	3,657
Italy	60,215	60,215
Latvia	3,500	3,500
Liechtenstein*	45	45
Lithuania	3,762	3,762
Luxembourg	1,259	1,259
Malta	2,711	2,711
Netherlands	26,439	26,439
Norway*	9,759	9,759
Poland	27,144	27,144

Portugal	9,845	9,845
Romania	12,005	12,005
Slovakia	8,785	8,785
Slovenia	2,825	2,825
Spain	31,197	31,197
Sweden	14,434	14,434
Total	427,443	427,443

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.2.1	As mentioned in our Advertising Standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	As mentioned in our Advertising Standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
QRE 7.2.2	Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
Measure 7.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.3.1	All ads are subject to our ad review system before they’re shown on Facebook against our Advertising Standards. In certain cases, a post or ad that’s already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies, we reject it.	All ads are subject to our ad review system before they’re shown on Instagram against our Advertising Standards. In certain cases, a post or ad that’s already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies, we reject it.

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
	Our Community Standards prohibit ads that promote voter interference: • Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences. • Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials' activity using militaristic language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power. Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Our Community Standards prohibit ads that promote voter interference: • Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences. • Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials' activity using militaristic language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power. Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
QRE 7.3.2	Our Advertising Standards make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions, including permanent restrictions of their ability to advertise. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behaviour similar to business assets that we've already taken down. Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Our Advertising Standards make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions, including permanent restrictions of their ability to advertise. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behaviour similar to business assets that we've already taken down. Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
Measure 7.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.4.1	Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries,	Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries,

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
	namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 8			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan	N/A	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
to put in place in the next 6 months?		

Measure 8.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 8.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 8.1.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 9.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 9.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 9.1.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 10.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 10.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	The Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of ads from across Meta technologies. The Ad Library makes available all the ads currently running across Meta technologies, as well as: • Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years (including from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU) • Ads that have run anywhere in the EU in the past year	The Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of ads from across Meta technologies. The Ad Library makes available all the ads currently running across Meta technologies, as well as: • Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years (including from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU) • Ads that have run anywhere in the EU in the past year

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 11					
Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces."					
	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 11.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.2	Facebook	Instagram

Measure 11.3	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1–11.4)	The Ad Library API provides access data about ads from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include: • Ad creatives • Ad performance data including total amount spent (range) • Total impressions an ad received (range) • Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%) • The dates the ad started and stopped delivering The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Ad Library. You can search for all ads about social issues, elections or politics that were delivered anywhere in the world during the past 7 years, including ads from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU, as well as ads of any type that were delivered to the European Union during the past year. In the EU, anyone who completes the sign-up steps listed here can access the API. Anyone can explore the Ad Library, with or without a Facebook account. Reporting illegal content does not require an account and can be done without logging in. However, reporting ads for any other reason and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.	The Ad Library API provides access data about ads from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include: • Ad creatives • Ad performance data including total amount spent (range) • Total impressions an ad received (range) • Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%) • The dates the ad started and stopped delivering The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Ad Library. You can search for all ads about social issues, elections or politics that were delivered anywhere in the world during the past 7 years, including ads from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU, as well as ads of any type that were delivered to the European Union during the past year. In the EU, anyone who completes the sign-up steps listed here can access the API. Anyone can explore the Ad Library, with or without an Instagram account. Reporting illegal content does not require an account and can be done without logging in. However, reporting ads for any other reason and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.
QRE 11.4.1	Meta engages with researchers to understand their experience with the functionalities of its ads transparency and research tools, including the Ad Library API and related datasets. Research Partnerships Team: Meta maintains a dedicated team that serves as the primary point of contact for qualified academic researchers, supporting partner onboarding, data access setup, and product training for different research tools and datasets. Through these activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs. Stakeholder Engagement: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research.	Meta engages with researchers to understand their experience with the functionalities of its ads transparency and research tools, including the Ad Library API and related datasets. Research Partnerships Team: Meta maintains a dedicated team that serves as the primary point of contact for qualified academic researchers, supporting partner onboarding, data access setup, and product training for different research tools and datasets. Through these activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs. Stakeholder Engagement: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research.

	Expanded Data Access: As of June 2026, targeting information for over 96.2 million social issues, elections, and politics ('SIEP') Facebook and Instagram ads, including ads from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU, has been made available globally to academic researchers, an expansion informed by researcher demand for more comprehensive geographic coverage. Taskforce Collaboration: Dependent on the Taskforce priorities during each period, Meta works with the Taskforce on essential tasks including considering research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments.	Expanded Data Access: As of June 2026, targeting information for over 96.2 million social issues, elections, and politics ('SIEP') Facebook and Instagram ads, including ads from when we allowed SIEP ads on our platforms in the EU, has been made available globally to academic researchers, an expansion informed by researcher demand for more comprehensive geographic coverage. Taskforce Collaboration: Dependent on the Taskforce priorities during each period, Meta works with the Taskforce on essential tasks including considering research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments.
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III. Political Advertising
Commitment 12
Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.
<i>This commitment is not relevant to Meta as it applies to civil society organisations.</i>

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 13				
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.				
	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 13.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.	Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories. SIEP ads are still permitted in the remaining EEA countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, subject to the applicable policy and authorisation requirements.

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14–16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework*, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes")
8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

*AMIIT Framework has since been renamed to DISARM Framework.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.

service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. Our approach to Inauthentic Behaviour and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behaviour-and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Fake accounts: In order to maintain a safe environment, we restrict or remove fake accounts that violate our Terms of Service. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can, and we prioritise proactive detection and enforcement against accounts that seek to cause harm. Many of these accounts are financially motivated. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. On Facebook, we actioned 1.2 billion accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q1 2026 and 822 million in Q2 2026. Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to investigate and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that attempt to deceive Meta or our community or to evade enforcement under the Community Standards. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down. <u>Cybersecurity:</u> We know that bad actors often target people's accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures. We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people's accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. Most recently, we introduced AI-guided chat support to help people recover Facebook accounts they can no longer access, walking them through recovery in real time. We're also running global in-app prompts across Facebook reminding people to confirm their contact points.	We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. Our approach to Inauthentic Behaviour, and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behaviour-and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Fake accounts: In order to maintain a safe environment, we restrict or remove fake accounts that violate our Terms of Service. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Instagram as we can, and we prioritise proactive detection and enforcement against accounts that seek to cause harm. Many of these accounts are financially motivated. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to investigate and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Instagram that attempt to deceive Meta or our community or to evade enforcement under the Community Standards. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down. <u>Cybersecurity:</u> We know that bad actors often target people's accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures. We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people's accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. Most recently, we introduced AI-guided chat support to help people recover Instagram accounts they can no longer access, walking them through recovery in real time. We're also running global in-app prompts across Instagram reminding people to confirm their contact points.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 14.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.1.1	Depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below: Inauthentic Behaviour – Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts. CIB Policy – Our policy on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as “particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial tactics to evade detection or appear authentic,” the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms. CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on false identities. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behaviour policies, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here. We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviours, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviours. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil	Depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below: Inauthentic Behaviour – Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram. CIB Policy – Our policy on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as “particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour where false identities are central to the operation, and operators use adversarial tactics to evade detection or appear authentic,” the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms. CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on false identities. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behaviour policies, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here. We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviours, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviours. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil

	society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defences. CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, and domains; (3) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (4) account hijacking or impersonation; and (5) inauthentic coordination. We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on Account Integrity and Authentic Identity. However, no enforcement framework can guarantee complete elimination of inauthentic behaviour in real time, precisely because adversarial actors are incentivised to find and exploit gaps in any system. This necessitates continuous investment in both proactive and reactive enforcement capabilities. Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or engage in unauthorised access by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services. Spam - We work hard to limit the spread of spam because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic Pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices. Branded Content Policies - Branded content may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages. Privacy - We remove content that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to	society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defences. CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, and domains; (3) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (4) account hijacking or impersonation; and (5) inauthentic coordination. We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on Account Integrity and Authentic Identity. However, no enforcement framework can guarantee complete elimination of inauthentic behaviour in real time, precisely because adversarial actors are incentivised to find and exploit gaps in any system. This necessitates continuous investment in both proactive and reactive enforcement capabilities. Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or engage in unauthorised access by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services. Spam - We work hard to limit the spread of spam because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices. Branded Content Policies - Branded content may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages. Privacy - We remove content that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to
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	physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.	physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.
QRE 14.1.2	Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways: • Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can't access our systems and thus can't create accounts. • Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behaviour through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we've removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm. • Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defences and still make it onto the platform. Often, this is because they don't readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behaviour or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are. When Pages and Groups that violate our CIB policy are removed, posts published by these accounts automatically go down as well once enforcement happens. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source. We monitor efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed for CIB violations. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block the	Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways: • Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can't access our systems and thus can't create accounts. • Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behaviour through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we've removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm. • Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defences and still make it onto the platform. Often, this is because they don't readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behaviour or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are. When accounts that violate our CIB policy are removed, content published by these accounts automatically goes down as well once enforcement happens. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source. We monitor efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed for CIB violations. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block

	network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts, Pages and Groups connected to networks we took down in the past. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see Meta's threat disruptions public reporting.	the network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts, Pages and Groups connected to networks we took down in the past. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see Meta's threat disruptions public reporting.
Measure 14.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.2.1	We report on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment: Fake Accounts Policy: In Q1 2026, we took action against 1.2 billion fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented less than 5% of our worldwide daily active people (DAP) across our family of apps during Q1 2026. In Q2 2026, we took action against 822 million fake accounts, representing less than 5% of worldwide DAP during Q2 2026. These enforcement actions address TTPs related to the creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets, and the use of fake/inauthentic reactions, followers, and subscribers. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) Policy: During the reporting period, we disrupted the following CIB networks targeting EEA Member States: - Russia-origin operation (Doppelganger): targeted Germany and France, with an offshoot targeting Hungary ahead of its election; violating assets removed via a combination of specialised manual investigations and our automated defences. - Russia-linked ANO "Dialog" network: targeted the Armenian diaspora in Germany and France (alongside Armenia and the US). We removed 25 Facebook accounts, 13 Pages, and 13 Instagram accounts. - France- and Spain-origin network: targeted France (among several West/Central African countries). We removed 8 Facebook accounts, 24 Pages, and 6 Instagram accounts. - Israel-origin influence-for-hire network: targeted France (among the UK, Australia and others), including narratives around France's 2026 municipal elections. We removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts. - Russia-origin "International Burke Institute" network: targeted Western audiences with France as a primary focus. We removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts.	We report on enforcement actions taken under the policy most relevant to this Commitment: Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) Policy: During the reporting period, we disrupted the following CIB networks targeting EEA Member States: - Russia-origin operation (Doppelganger): targeted Germany and France, with an offshoot targeting Hungary ahead of its election; violating assets removed via a combination of specialised manual investigations and by automated defences. - Russia-linked ANO "Dialog" network: targeted the Armenian diaspora in Germany and France (alongside Armenia and the US). We removed 25 Facebook accounts, 13 Pages, and 13 Instagram accounts. - France- and Spain-origin network: targeted France (among several West/Central African countries). We removed 8 Facebook accounts, 24 Pages, and 6 Instagram accounts. - Israel-origin influence-for-hire network: targeted France (among the UK, Australia and others), including narratives around France's 2026 municipal elections. We removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts. - Russia-origin "International Burke Institute" network: targeted Western audiences with France as a primary focus; we removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts. - Russia-origin network (Hungary): targeted Hungary ahead of its election; we removed 6 Facebook accounts and 4 Pages. - Ukraine- and Bulgaria-origin network: targeted Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Latvia (among others). We removed 72 Facebook accounts and 16 Instagram accounts. Full details, including threat indicators for CIB networks, are published on Meta's dedicated GitHub repository.

	○ Russia-origin network (Hungary): targeted Hungary ahead of its election; we removed 6 Facebook accounts and 4 Pages. ○ Ukraine- and Bulgaria-origin network: targeted Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Latvia (among others). We removed 72 Facebook accounts and 16 Instagram accounts. Full details, including threat indicators for CIB networks, are published on Meta's dedicated GitHub repository. For the Member State level breakdown, please see SLI 14.2.1.	For the Member State level breakdown, please see SLI 14.2.1.
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FACEBOOK												
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4												
TTP OR ACTION 1: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR	TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour: ● Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, upvotes, comments) ● Use of fake followers or subscribers ● Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains ● Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification ● Account hijacking or impersonation Methodology of data measurement: Identified TTPs are any users, profiles, pages, or groups applicable to that service that are removed for inauthentic behaviour, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, impersonation, or otherwise fake or scripted accounts originating in Europe. The remainder of the metrics in this section are based on the views and engagement between the identified TTPs and other users between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Origin of network	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/ impressions on the service)
Austria	4,558,382	All actions against TTPs are removals of	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution	Entities removed from the platform cannot gain additional views/impressions or	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.							
Belgium	1,821,278											

Bulgaria	5,546,143	the entity from the platform	and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	interactions/engagement after action unless the original decision is reversed at which time we wouldn't consider the entity violating.	
Croatia	3,295,476				
Cyprus	593,889				
Czech Republic	2,400,083				
Denmark	511,553				
Estonia	402,256				
Finland	575,957				
France	14,523,916				
Germany	14,748,459				
Greece	4,710,867				
Hungary	1,253,272				
Iceland	290,064				
Ireland	2,293,604				
Italy	13,277,956				
Latvia	597,297				
Liechtenstein	60,220				
Lithuania	1,744,050				
Luxembourg	365,182				
Malta	273,211				
Netherlands	5,510,188				
Norway	722,474				
Poland	4,162,546				
Portugal	4,770,267				
Romania	1,417,503				

Slovakia	674,313				
Slovenia	347,124				
Spain	18,437,923				
Sweden	3,318,460				
EEA Total	113,203,913				
Global Total	1,891,995,644				

INSTAGRAM												
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4												
TTP OR ACTION 1	TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour</u>: • Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, upvotes, comments) • Use of fake followers or subscribers • Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains • Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification Methodology of data measurement: We included below any network originating in Europe or targeting one or more European countries (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Origin of network	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/ impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)

Austria	429,282	All actions against TTPs are removals of the entity from the platform	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	Entities removed from the platform cannot gain additional views/impressions or interactions/engagement after action unless the original decision is reversed at which time we wouldn't consider the entity violating.	These metrics are not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.
Belgium	605,439				
Bulgaria	294,728				
Croatia	164,478				
Cyprus	483,842				
Czech Republic	376,984				
Denmark	294,627				
Estonia	169,335				
Finland	426,402				
France	4,013,659				
Germany	3,376,747				
Greece	344,480				
Hungary	250,414				
Iceland	104,046				
Ireland	448,291				
Italy	1,552,406				
Latvia	206,392				
Liechtenstein	34,551				
Lithuania	244,139				
Luxembourg	153,394				
Malta	86,872				
Netherlands	1,936,220				
Norway	287,080				
Poland	1,090,424				

Portugal	604,758				
Romania	552,476				
Slovakia	171,563				
Slovenia	193,625				
Spain	1,538,486				
Sweden	535,016				
EEA Total	20,970,156				
Global Total	255,839,859				

Measure 14.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.3.1	The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs did so during Q4 2022. Ongoing TTP Identification and Public Disclosure: Independent of the collective Taskforce process, Meta continuously identifies, analyses, and publicly discloses emerging TTPs through its Adversarial Threat Report, published on a regular basis. The Adversarial Threat Report details the disruption of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, including narrative deep-dives on specific TTPs employed by threat actors. For every CIB network we report, Meta publishes threat indicators (including domains, behavioural signatures, and associated TTPs) through its dedicated GitHub repository, enabling external research communities to investigate and build upon these findings.	The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs did so during Q4 2022. Ongoing TTP Identification and Public Disclosure: Independent of the collective Taskforce process, Meta continuously identifies, analyses, and publicly discloses emerging TTPs through its Adversarial Threat Report, published on a regular basis. The Adversarial Threat Report details the disruption of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, including narrative deep-dives on specific TTPs employed by threat actors. For every CIB network we report, Meta publishes threat indicators (including domains, behavioural signatures, and associated TTPs) through its dedicated GitHub repository, enabling external research communities to investigate and build upon these findings.

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 15
Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As announced in June 2026 , we began automatically detecting ads created or edited using third-party AI tools through industry-standard signals. When detected, we'll apply an "AI info" label.	As announced in June 2026 , we began automatically detecting ads created or edited using third-party AI tools through industry-standard signals. When detected, we'll apply an "AI info" label.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 15.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.1.1	Our Community Standards and enforcement actions are designed to address the risk that content may be used to manipulate people. Our approach includes proactive detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content, warning users through visible labels, and removing or restricting content that violates our policies. These measures are kept under regular review and updated as appropriate to ensure continued compliance with evolving regulatory requirements and industry best practices. Labelling content that has been created or edited using our generative AI features is one part of Meta’s broader efforts to provide transparency about the use of AI in content creation, particularly in advertisements and organic content across Facebook and Instagram. The rollout of AI labelling began in 2024, with updates and expansions planned as new generative AI features are introduced, and as technology continues to evolve. Meta has processes/technology in place to help support automatic detection of AI-generated content. Once content is generated via Meta AI and it is uploaded or shared across the relevant, in-scope posting surfaces, that content is labelled. Where Meta attributes organic image or video content on Facebook and Instagram as fully generated by Meta AI, a label is applied. For ads, the label is surfaced in the ad’s transparency hub, “About this Ad”, which people can access via the three dot menu on the ad. In addition, as we announced in June 2026, we began automatically detecting ads created or edited using third-party AI tools through industry-standard signals. When detected, we’ll apply an “AI info” label.	Our Community Standards and enforcement actions are designed to address the risk that content may be used to manipulate people. Our approach includes proactive detection and labelling of AI-generated content, warning users through visible labels, and removing or restricting content that violates our policies. These measures are kept under regular review and updated to ensure continued compliance with evolving regulatory requirements and industry best practices. Labelling content that has been created or edited using our generative AI features is one part of Meta’s broader efforts to provide transparency about the use of AI in content creation, particularly in advertisements and organic content across Facebook and Instagram. The rollout of AI labelling began in 2024, with updates and expansions planned as new generative AI features are introduced, and as technology continues to evolve. Meta has processes/technology in place to help support automatic detection of AI-generated content. Once content is generated via Meta AI and it is uploaded or shared across the relevant, in-scope posting surfaces, that content is labelled. Where Meta attributes organic image or video content Instagram as fully generated by Meta AI, a label is applied. For ads, the label is surfaced in the ad’s transparency hub, “About this Ad”, which people can access via the three dot menu on the ad. In addition, as we announced in June 2026, we began automatically detecting ads created or edited using third-party AI tools through industry-standard signals. When detected, we’ll apply an “AI info” label.
Measure 15.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.2.1	Meta applies established governance frameworks and oversight, including regular cross-functional reviews and alignment with industry standards such as C2PA and IPTC metadata protocols to ensure that algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content are trustworthy, respect end-user rights, and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices. Detection and moderation systems are periodically assessed for effectiveness, fairness, and compliance with applicable laws. AI-generated content is labelled to inform users, not restrict access, and labelling is based on objective signals (e.g. metadata, self-disclosure) rather than subjective or manipulative criteria. Meta is committed to transparency and will continue to update disclosures as practices and regulatory expectations evolve.	Meta applies established governance frameworks and oversight, including regular cross-functional reviews and alignment with industry standards such as C2PA and IPTC metadata protocols to ensure that algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content are trustworthy, respect end-user rights, and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices. Detection and moderation systems are periodically assessed for effectiveness, fairness, and compliance with applicable laws. AI-generated content is labelled to inform users, not restrict access, and labelling is based on objective signals (e.g. metadata, self-disclosure) rather than subjective or manipulative criteria. Meta is committed to transparency and will continue to update disclosures as practices and regulatory expectations evolve.

IV. Integrity of Services				
Commitment 16				
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.				
		C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:		Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.1.1	Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action to stop emerging threats .	Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action to stop emerging threats .

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
	We publish Adversarial Threat Reports to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. In support of the global security research community, we also share threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository. This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms. Collaboration and Disruption • We work closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. While Meta is able to proactively detect and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks from our platforms, our efforts are enhanced by information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement. • In the August 2026 Adversarial Threat Report, we detail how collaboration with industry peers, government agencies, and law enforcement enhances Meta's ability to detect, investigate, and disrupt CIB networks. This includes investigating leads shared by other technology companies. For example, a covert influence network Meta identified after reviewing information shared by its peers at OpenAI, taking any appropriate action consistent with Meta's policies, and publishing threat indicators through Meta's dedicated GitHub repository to enable cross-platform action (see Adversarial Threat Report p. 39–40). More broadly, Meta applies the same "whole-of-society" model to adjacent threats: its third and largest Joint Disruption Week, convened with the US Department of Justice, the FBI, the Royal Thai Police, and cross-industry partners, removed more than 1.4 million assets and contributed to 63 arrests. Examples of Case Studies: • Russia-linked covert influence operations (Doppelganger / ANO "Dialog"): We disrupted multiple operations under the Doppelganger umbrella, which maintained a cross-platform presence, operating on our platforms as well as on TikTok and YouTube. We published the associated threat indicators to our GitHub repository so industry partners and the broader security research community could detect the same activity across platforms. • Israel-origin CIB network: targeted audiences in France, the United Kingdom, Australia and others through an influence-for-hire	We publish Adversarial Threat Reports to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. In support of the global security research community, we also share threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository. This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms. Collaboration and Disruption • Meta works closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. While Meta is able to proactively detect and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks from our platforms, our efforts are enhanced by information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement. • In the August 2026 Adversarial Threat Report, we detail how collaboration with industry peers, government agencies, and law enforcement enhances Meta's ability to detect, investigate, and disrupt CIB networks. This includes investigating leads shared by other technology companies. For example, a covert influence network Meta identified after reviewing information shared by its peers at OpenAI, taking any appropriate action consistent with Meta's policies, and publishing threat indicators through Meta's dedicated GitHub repository to enable cross-platform action (see Adversarial Threat Report, p. 39–40). More broadly, Meta applies the same "whole-of-society" model to adjacent threats: its third and largest Joint Disruption Week, convened with the US Department of Justice, the FBI, the Royal Thai Police, and cross-industry partners, removed more than 1.4 million assets and contributed to 63 arrests. Examples of Case Studies: • Russia-linked covert influence operations (Doppelganger / ANO "Dialog"): We disrupted multiple operations under the Doppelganger umbrella, which maintained a cross-platform presence, operating on our platforms as well as on TikTok and YouTube. We published the associated threat indicators to our GitHub repository so industry partners and the broader security research community could detect the same activity across platforms. • Israel-origin CIB network: targeted audiences in France, the United Kingdom, Australia and others through an influence-for-hire

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
	operation with a cross-platform presence on TikTok, X, and its own websites; we removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found it through our own investigation into suspected CIB in the region, an example of behaviour-based enforcement. • Russia-origin "International Burke Institute" network: targeted Western audiences, with France as a primary focus, through a fabricated think tank with a cross-platform presence on Telegram, TikTok, YouTube and X; we removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found this network after reviewing information shared with us by our peers at OpenAI, an example of cross-industry cooperation.	operation with a cross-platform presence on TikTok, X, and its own websites; we removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, and 1,044 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found it through our own investigation into suspected CIB in the region, an example of behaviour-based enforcement. • Russia-origin "International Burke Institute" network: targeted Western audiences, with France as a primary focus, through a fabricated think tank with a cross-platform presence on Telegram, TikTok, YouTube and X; we removed 7 Facebook accounts, 9 Pages, and 8 Instagram accounts for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic behaviour policy. We found this network after reviewing information shared with us by our peers at OpenAI, an example of cross-industry cooperation.
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	
Measure 16.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.2.1	Meta is committed to sharing qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed by disinformation actors, as observed by our moderation teams and external partners. For example: • We regularly publish Adversarial Threat Reports to share notable trends, case studies, and investigations on evolving security threats, including the migration of disinformation actors across platforms. • To effectively counter these cross-platform threats, we actively collaborate with other technology companies by sharing investigative leads when appropriate. We mutually share information with industry peers to help both Meta and our peers independently investigate and remove violating activity from our respective platforms. • We provide qualified researchers with access to the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which contains public information on disrupted networks, supporting independent analysis of migration tactics and cross-platform activity. • We also share information with law enforcement where appropriate.	Meta is committed to sharing qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed by disinformation actors, as observed by our moderation teams and external partners. For example: • We regularly publish Adversarial Threat Reports to share notable trends, case studies, and investigations on evolving security threats, including the migration of disinformation actors across platforms. • To effectively counter these cross-platform threats, we actively collaborate with other technology companies by sharing investigative leads when appropriate. We mutually share information with industry peers to help both Meta and our peers independently investigate and remove violating activity from our respective platforms. • We provide qualified researchers with access to the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which contains public information on disrupted networks, supporting independent analysis of migration tactics and cross-platform activity. • We also share information with law enforcement where appropriate.

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
	We also share threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository . This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.	We also share threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository . This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17-25

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 17				
In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.				
	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	The key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union. - Meta published its second Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2026. The plan establishes Meta's multifaceted strategy for media literacy in the EU, outlining how products, features, and initiatives help users on Facebook and Instagram critically assess the credibility and context of online content. It also provides details on specific media literacy initiatives run by Meta, including its work on digital citizenship, its media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital, and its election literacy programmes. - In the first half of 2026, Meta continued to expand its "AI info" labelling system across additional content formats and surfaces, helping users	The key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union. - Meta published its second Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2026. The plan establishes Meta's multifaceted strategy for media literacy in the EU, outlining how products, features, and initiatives help users on Facebook and Instagram critically assess the credibility and context of online content. It also provides details on specific media literacy initiatives run by Meta, including its work on digital citizenship, its media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital, and its election literacy programmes. - In the first half of 2026, Meta continued to expand its "AI info" labelling system across additional content formats and surfaces, helping users identify AI-generated content. This includes

	identify AI-generated content. This includes detecting industry-standard C2PA and IPTC metadata from tools by Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney, and Shutterstock, and the open-sourcing of Content Seal, Meta's watermarking framework for images, video, audio, and text. Meta continued providing a series of media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital. These research-informed lessons are free worldwide and are designed for teachers at secondary level. Topics range from assessing the quality of the information online to more technical skills like reverse image search.	detecting industry-standard C2PA and IPTC metadata from tools by Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney, and Shutterstock, and the open-sourcing of Content Seal, Meta's watermarking framework for images, video, audio, and text. Meta continued providing a series of media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital. These research-informed lessons are free worldwide and are designed for teachers at secondary level. Topics range from assessing the quality of the information online to more technical skills like reverse image search.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 17.1	Facebook				Instagram			
QRE 17.1.1	Meta has developed a series of tools over the years to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading: Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook: • People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as: ○ Violent or graphic imagery. ○ Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness. ○ Some forms of nudity. ○ Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts. Fact-checking notices: • When content has been rated by fact-checkers as False, Altered, Partly False, or Missing Context, we add a notice to it so that people can read additional context. • Meta also notifies users before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. • Meta uses its technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well. For the Member State where these tools are maintained, please see SLI 17.1.1.				Meta has developed a series of tools over the years to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading: Warning screens on sensitive content on Instagram: • To help people avoid coming across content that they'd rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile. Fact-checking notices: • When content has been rated by fact-checkers as False, Altered, Partly False, or Missing Context, we add a notice to it so that people can read additional context. • Meta also notifies users before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. • Meta uses its technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well. For the Member State where these tools are maintained, please see SLI 17.1.1.			
SLI 17.1.1 – actions enforcing policies above	Country	Content on Facebook treated with a warning screen for sensitive content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	Country	Content on Instagram treated with a warning screen for sensitive content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with factchecks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers from 01/01/202 to 30/06/2026	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026

Measure 17.1	Facebook				Instagram			
	Austria	11,695	319,316	49.64%	Austria	9,028	22,762	62.13%
	Belgium	19,946	483,671	48.55%	Belgium	10,857	25,473	61.67%
	Bulgaria	13,168	380,233	55.22%	Bulgaria	3,016	9,350	64.36%
	Croatia	6,065	228,450	51.75%	Croatia	1,264	8,737	59.15%
	Cyprus	3,919	103,585	57.47%	Cyprus	3,487	11,011	61.02%
	Czech Republic	14,097	344,103	38.17%	Czech Republic	5,350	13,270	55.71%
	Denmark	11,565	243,127	50.26%	Denmark	6,297	13,298	60.53%
	Estonia	1,583	51,001	42.36%	Estonia	483	3,408	57.76%
	Finland	6,956	115,933	49.94%	Finland	3,033	11,332	61.81%
	France	85,159	2,052,817	54.37%	France	51,882	62,427	61.47%
	Germany	109,534	1,768,156	47.66%	Germany	87,687	95,585	62.85%
	Greece	19,238	490,180	55.44%	Greece	5,827	18,316	68.09%
	Hungary	8,173	207,426	54.75%	Hungary	2,242	9,363	58.62%
	Iceland	708	24,582	52.94%	Iceland	392	2,259	85.11%
	Ireland	7,885	283,788	48.42%	Ireland	5,155	17,697	63.33%
	Italy	103,672	1,914,646	56.50%	Italy	65,683	71,244	62.48%
	Latvia	1,663	94,304	43.87%	Latvia	607	3,925	60.25%
	Liechtenstein	24	1,923	100.00%	Liechtenstein	15	329	75.00%
	Lithuania	3,555	129,645	47.34%	Lithuania	1,391	4,966	57.58%
	Luxembourg	948	47,660	54.14%	Luxembourg	588	4,265	60.24%

Measure 17.1	Facebook				Instagram			
	Malta	813	45,725	61.20%	Malta	280	3,890	65.19%
	Netherlands	29,587	522,005	44.34%	Netherlands	17,679	34,844	61.27%
	Norway	10,510	190,101	50.42%	Norway	5,972	12,859	56.94%
	Poland	47,646	923,593	47.05%	Poland	15,004	22,764	60.27%
	Portugal	20,136	555,898	58.36%	Portugal	18,915	34,253	63.39%
	Romania	27,988	520,618	26.14%	Romania	13,316	14,839	60.92%
	Slovakia	6,262	208,303	40.90%	Slovakia	2,540	8,288	61.42%
	Slovenia	2,936	113,746	38.73%	Slovenia	793	5,280	59.85%
	Spain	64,758	1,720,888	59.89%	Spain	86,919	85,359	64.33%
	Sweden	24,338	334,630	52.28%	Sweden	16,074	24,163	59.24%
	Total	664,527	14,420,053		Total	441,776	655,556	

Measure 17.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.2.1	Meta invests in user education programmes and resources to improve media literacy and critical thinking skills. Below are examples of Media Literacy activities Meta has undertaken in the European Union in the first half of 2026: <u>National Elections:</u> We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. For more information, please refer to the Elections chapter. <u>Media Literacy Annual Plan:</u> This plan establishes Meta's strategic framework for media literacy, outlining how its products, features, and initiatives help users build the skills to	Meta invests in user education programmes and resources to improve media literacy and critical thinking skills. Below are examples of Media Literacy activities Meta has undertaken in the European Union in the first half of 2026: <u>National Elections:</u> We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. For more information, please refer to the Elections chapter. <u>Media Literacy Annual Plan:</u> This plan establishes Meta's strategic framework for media literacy, outlining how its products, features, and initiatives help users build the skills to

	critically assess the credibility and context of content they encounter online. Meta published its second Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2026 in compliance with the Irish Online Safety Code, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features it makes available to Facebook and Instagram users. See the publicly available report here. <u>Meta Safety Centre:</u> The Safety Centre provides a variety of resources for educators, parents, and community leaders to promote digital literacy, which are updated as needed to reflect new developments and initiatives. The Digital Literacy section of the Safety Centre features resources designed to help people develop practical skills for navigating the digital world safely. <u>Global awareness campaigns:</u> These campaigns equip users with the knowledge to help identify misleading or manipulative content, which is a core component of media literacy. For example, as part of Meta's global anti-scam awareness campaign for Valentine's Day (February 2026), Meta published guidance helping users recognise the deceptive tactics used in romance scams, such as fake profiles and impersonation, so they can question the authenticity of the accounts and content they encounter online. See the campaign blog post here.			critically assess the credibility and context of content they encounter online. Meta published its second Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2026 in compliance with the Irish Online Safety Code, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features it makes available to Facebook and Instagram users. See the publicly available report here. <u>Meta Safety Centre:</u> The Safety Centre provides a variety of resources for educators, parents, and community leaders to promote digital literacy, which are updated as needed to reflect new developments and initiatives. The Digital Literacy section of the Safety Centre features resources designed to help people develop practical skills for navigating the digital world safely. <u>Global awareness campaigns:</u> These campaigns equip users with the knowledge to help identify misleading or manipulative content, which is a core component of media literacy. For example, as part of Meta's global anti-scam awareness campaign for Valentine's Day (February 2026), Meta published guidance helping users recognise the deceptive tactics used in romance scams, such as fake profiles and impersonation, so they can question the authenticity of the accounts and content they encounter online. See the campaign blog post here.		
SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above	Country	Number of distinct sessions on the transparency reporting page hosting the Media Literacy Annual Plan between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	Number of distinct sessions on pages within the Meta Safety Centre between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	Country	Number of distinct sessions on the transparency reporting page hosting the Media Literacy Annual Plan between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026	Number of distinct sessions on pages within the Meta Safety Centre between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026
	Austria	362	3,516	Austria	362	3,516
	Belgium	771	5,391	Belgium	771	5,391
	Bulgaria	307	2,330	Bulgaria	307	2,330
	Croatia	76	1,516	Croatia	76	1,516
	Cyprus	72	950	Cyprus	72	950
	Czech Republic	861	4,261	Czech Republic	861	4,261
	Denmark	256	1,970	Denmark	256	1,970
	Estonia	25	395	Estonia	25	395
	Finland	151	1,522	Finland	151	1,522

	France	1,636	70,105	France	1,636	70,105
	Germany	2,204	69,638	Germany	2,204	69,638
	Greece	407	3,434	Greece	407	3,434
	Hungary	824	3,516	Hungary	824	3,516
	Iceland	11	225	Iceland	11	225
	Ireland	1,218	22,548	Ireland	1,218	22,548
	Italy	1,110	66,152	Italy	1,110	66,152
	Latvia	42	596	Latvia	42	596
	Liechtenstein	0	12	Liechtenstein	0	12
	Lithuania	112	926	Lithuania	112	926
	Luxembourg	40	398	Luxembourg	40	398
	Malta	35	392	Malta	35	392
	Netherlands	1,161	6,602	Netherlands	1,161	6,602
	Norway	159	2,946	Norway	159	2,946
	Poland	628	13,877	Poland	628	13,877
	Portugal	399	6,806	Portugal	399	6,806
	Romania	856	5,953	Romania	856	5,953
	Slovakia	344	1,730	Slovakia	344	1,730
	Slovenia	60	534	Slovenia	60	534
	Spain	1,085	137,802	Spain	1,085	137,802
	Sweden	278	4,312	Sweden	278	4,312
	Total	15,490	440,355	Total	15,490	440,355

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.3.1	Meta cooperates with media literacy experts to improve media literacy and critical thinking across its platforms, engaging through direct partnerships, institutional frameworks, and research infrastructure collaboration.	Meta cooperates with media literacy experts to improve media literacy and critical thinking across its platforms, engaging through direct partnerships, institutional frameworks, and research infrastructure collaboration.

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
	Fact-Checking and Media Literacy Expertise: Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the programme, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms. EDMO and the Research Community: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting research on Meta's platforms. Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative in September 2025, Meta started collaboration with GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Information Literacy Programmes: Meta works with leading stakeholders and academics to facilitate the discussion and debate around digital citizenship and deepen the knowledge around it. Digital citizenship encompasses digital skills in the broad sense, media literacy, digital engagement, online well-being, safety and democracy. As part of that effort, Meta has launched information literacy initiatives to help people become responsible digital citizens and to identify misinformation when they see it. Globally, Meta has a series of media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital. These research-informed lessons are free worldwide and are designed for teachers at secondary level. Topics range from assessing the quality of the information online to more technical skills like reverse image search. Election Literacy Programmes: As part of its work on elections and to combat misinformation, Meta engages with a range of external stakeholders across EU election cycles, including electoral authorities, national bodies and civil society organisations. Meta runs targeted media literacy campaigns to raise awareness of its election integrity tools and available features, deploys tools to support civic engagement, and conducts training sessions. For example, Meta proactively points users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Voter Information Units' and 'Election Day Information' on Facebook and Instagram. These notices appear at the top of a user's feed, remind them of the day they can vote in their Member State, and re-direct them to local authoritative sources on how and where to vote.	Fact-Checking and Media Literacy Expertise: Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the programme, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms. EDMO and the Research Community: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting research on Meta's platforms. Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative in September 2025, Meta started collaboration with GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Information Literacy Programmes: Meta works with leading stakeholders and academics to facilitate the discussion and debate around digital citizenship and deepen the knowledge around it. Digital citizenship encompasses digital skills in the broad sense, media literacy, digital engagement, online well-being, safety and democracy. As part of that effort, Meta has launched information literacy initiatives to help people become responsible digital citizens and to identify misinformation when they see it. Globally, Meta has a series of media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital. These research-informed lessons are free worldwide and are designed for teachers at secondary level. Topics range from assessing the quality of the information online to more technical skills like reverse image search. Election Literacy Programmes: As part of its work on elections and to combat misinformation, Meta engages with a range of external stakeholders across EU election cycles, including electoral authorities, national bodies and civil society organisations. Meta runs targeted media literacy campaigns to raise awareness of its election integrity tools and available features, deploys tools to support civic engagement, and conducts training sessions. For example, Meta proactively points users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Voter Information Units' and 'Election Day Information' on Facebook and Instagram. These notices appear at the top of a user's feed, remind them of the day they can vote in their Member State, and re-direct them to local authoritative sources on how and where to vote.

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
	Ahead of elections, Meta also onboards these stakeholder partners to its direct reporting channels so they can flag time-sensitive content, accounts or trends that could threaten the integrity of the electoral process, as part of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation's Rapid Response System. Meta maintains the capability to onboard electoral authorities and civil society partners to these channels and has done so repeatedly across EU election cycles. AI Generated Content Transparency: Meta works with other companies and institutions to develop common standards for identifying AI-generated content, including through forums such as the Partnership on AI. Building on the shared C2PA and IPTC technical standards, Meta applies "AI info" labels to images from Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney and Shutterstock, and has open-sourced Content Seal, a watermarking framework for images, video, audio and text, along with Content Seal Bench, a public leaderboard for comparing watermarking methods across the industry, to support shared progress on content authenticity.	Ahead of elections, Meta also onboards these stakeholder partners to its direct reporting channels so they can flag time-sensitive content, accounts or trends that could threaten the integrity of the electoral process, as part of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation's Rapid Response System. Meta maintains the capability to onboard electoral authorities and civil society partners to these channels and has done so repeatedly across EU election cycles. AI Generated Content Transparency: Meta works with other companies and institutions to develop common standards for identifying AI-generated content, including through forums such as the Partnership on AI. Building on the shared C2PA and IPTC technical standards, Meta applies "AI info" labels to images from Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney and Shutterstock, and has open-sourced Content Seal, a watermarking framework for images, video, audio and text, along with Content Seal Bench, a public leaderboard for comparing watermarking methods across the industry, to support shared progress on content authenticity.

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 18				
Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.				
	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	<i>Not subscribed</i>	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 18.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.2.1	Our policies and approach to tackle harmful false or misleading information, which Meta interprets as misinformation, are published in our Transparency Centre: • Community Standards – Misinformation • Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') – Misinformation These include specific actions taken against actors that repeatedly share misinformation. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have rated as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced. Our penalty system to restrict accounts that violate our Community Standards on the platform can be found here. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we will apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time. These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, these restrictions only apply to Facebook accounts). If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult	Our policies and approach to tackle harmful false or misleading information, which Meta interprets as misinformation, are published in our Transparency Centre: • Community Standards – Misinformation • Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') – Misinformation These include specific actions taken against actors that repeatedly violate our policies. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have rated as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If we remove additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we will apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time. If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features. For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.

	sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features. For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.			
SLI 18.2.1 - removal actions taken in response to policy violations	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Instagram for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.
Country				
Austria	72,135	63,973	1,835	499
Belgium	99,551	97,006	2,401	742
Bulgaria	227,516	270,254	817	316
Croatia	47,341	58,035	465	212
Cyprus	20,445	17,851	590	260
Czech Republic	297,152	356,005	1,087	420
Denmark	41,705	27,565	1,352	449
Estonia	11,564	14,607	149	61
Finland	19,364	17,206	869	286
France	466,920	724,227	11,898	3,379
Germany	646,026	542,799	19,417	5,304

Greece	237,423	215,750	2,076	888
Hungary	99,610	80,736	617	295
Iceland	2,838	2,671	149	27
Ireland	55,354	53,913	1,477	381
Italy	981,547	945,993	16,058	6,733
Latvia	42,130	55,873	197	122
Liechtenstein	156	152	3	1
Lithuania	45,941	54,927	250	130
Luxembourg	7,485	6,921	176	61
Malta	5,707	4,691	173	47
Netherlands	103,818	85,535	4,173	1,364
Norway	37,215	26,846	1,162	340
Poland	451,940	465,835	2,619	1,155
Portugal	189,930	161,430	5,014	1,472
Romania	560,587	460,255	1,671	621
Slovakia	154,832	145,294	469	197
Slovenia	19,409	20,745	333	175
Spain	685,603	699,864	28,676	5,337
Sweden	72,614	56,711	2,971	1,061
Total	5,703,858	5,733,670	109,144	32,335
Measure 18.3	Facebook		Instagram	

QRE 18.3.1	Meta supports a number of initiatives to empower the independent research community, including the Influence Operations Research Archive. Meta's cross-functional teams also conduct regular in-house research and analysis of adversarial threats and Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks. The identification and disruption of CIB networks, which underpin the Influence Operations Research Archive, are the product of internal investigations conducted by highly specialised experts. This in-house research helps mitigate disinformation risk by informing improvements to Meta's detection systems and enforcement policies. Some of these findings are shared publicly via Meta Adversarial Threat Reports on the Transparency Centre. Meta's approach to translating research into platform actions is holistic with findings integrated into Meta's broader integrity and product development ecosystem, informing ongoing improvements to policies, systems, and features across Facebook and Instagram. For example, insights from CIB network disruptions continuously refine Meta's CIB detection and enforcement capabilities.	Meta supports a number of initiatives to empower the independent research community, including the Influence Operations Research Archive. Meta's cross-functional teams also conduct regular in-house research and analysis of adversarial threats and Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks. The identification and disruption of CIB networks, which underpin the Influence Operations Research Archive, are the product of internal investigations conducted by highly specialised experts. This in-house research helps mitigate disinformation risk by informing improvements to Meta's detection systems and enforcement policies. Some of these findings are shared publicly via Meta Adversarial Threat Reports on the Transparency Centre. Meta's approach to translating research into platform actions is holistic with findings integrated into Meta's broader integrity and product development ecosystem, informing ongoing improvements to policies, systems, and features across Facebook and Instagram. For example, insights from CIB network disruptions continuously refine Meta's CIB detection and enforcement capabilities.
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V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 19			
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.			
	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 19.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.1.1	Meta publishes AI System Cards on the Transparency Centre providing an in-depth view into how AI systems in Meta's products work, including prediction models, input signals, and how they evolve over time. System Cards are written for both expert and non-expert audiences. Meta provides users with the following tools to understand and control their Facebook experience: Transparency tools: • "Why Am I Seeing This Ad?" – shows how demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to ads shown in Feed. Feed control tools: • Interested / Not Interested – users give feedback on post types they want to see more or less of, temporarily adjusting ranking scores. • Favourites Feed – users select up to 30 friends/Pages whose posts appear higher in Feed and in a dedicated Favourites feed. • Most Recent Feed – content sorted in chronological order. • Feeds Tab – users alternate between Top Posts, Most Recent, or Favourites feeds.	Meta publishes AI System Cards on the Transparency Centre explaining how the Feed ranking system dynamically delivers a personalised experience. Users can interact with a simulation tool to test how ranking predictions work for hypothetical users. Meta provides users with the following tools to control their Instagram experience: Content controls: • Sensitive Content Control – users adjust how much sensitive content they see across Feed, Explore, Search, Reels, and Accounts You Might Follow. The "More" option is unavailable for users under 18. • "Not Interested" – removes a post immediately and reduces similar suggestions across Reels, Search, and other recommendation surfaces. • Snooze Recommendations – pauses suggested posts in Feed for 30 days. • Hidden Words – hides content with specified words, phrases, emojis, or hashtags from recommendations in captions and hashtags. • Mute – stops seeing an account's content without unfollowing.

	• Feed Preferences — suite of tools to manage Feed: unfollow, snooze accounts, or prioritise Favourites. Content controls: • Comment permissions — users decide who can comment on public posts. • Profanity and keyword filters. Meta continuously analyses integrity risks on its platforms and adjusts transparency and recommender tools as part of an ongoing improvement process.	• Your Algo — users can request to see more or less of their interests in their suggested content on Reels, Feed and Explore. Feed controls: • Following & Favourites Feeds — users add up to 50 accounts to Favourites; posts appear higher and can be viewed in a dedicated feed with no suggested posts. Meta continuously analyses integrity risks on its platforms and adjusts transparency and recommender tools as part of an ongoing improvement process.
Measure 19.2	Facebook	Instagram
SLI 19.2.1. – User Settings	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 20	
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.	
Not subscribed	

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 21				
Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.				
	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 21.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.3.1	Development and Stakeholder Engagement Meta's fact-checking programme's rating types and labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts, and may be refined through ongoing engagement with these stakeholders. Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations, certified through the IFCN or EFCSN, who review and rate content based on their independent research and reporting. Meta provides guidance to partners through dedicated Partner Managers who regularly communicate product and policy changes and share related training resources. Partners may communicate feedback or raise questions about the programme to Meta's Partner Managers. Evidence-Based Monitoring and Improvement Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also gives Partners the ability to report any issues	Development and Stakeholder Engagement Meta's fact-checking programme's rating types and labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts, and may be refined through ongoing engagement with these stakeholders. Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations, certified through the IFCN or EFCSN, who review and rate content based on their independent research and reporting. Meta provides guidance to partners through dedicated Partner Managers who regularly communicate product and policy changes and share related training resources. Partners may communicate feedback or raise questions about the programme to Meta's Partner Managers. Evidence-Based Monitoring and Improvement Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also gives Partners the ability to report any issues

	they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta's teams. User Needs and Effectiveness By engaging with fact-checkers, content moderation experts, and independent organisations, Meta ensures its labelling and warning systems are responsive to evolving user needs and informed by evidence on label effectiveness.	they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta's teams. User Needs and Effectiveness By engaging with fact-checkers, content moderation experts, and independent organisations, Meta ensures its labelling and warning systems are responsive to evolving user needs and informed by evidence on label effectiveness.
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V. Empowering Users
Commitment 22
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.
<i>Not subscribed</i>

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 23			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.			
	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 23.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.1.1	We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Standards when we're made aware, including fake accounts and accounts engaged in inauthentic behaviour and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm. We use a combination of automated and human review for enforcement actions taken on the platform and invest in technology and people resources to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behaviour. Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on the Help Centre: • Click *** Options next to the post that you'd like to mark as false. • Click Report post. • Click Scam, fraud or false information. • Click Sharing false information • Click Done.	We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Standards when we're made aware, including fake accounts and accounts engaged in inauthentic behaviour and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm. We use a combination of automated and human review for enforcement actions taken on the platform and invest in technology and people resources to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behaviour. Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on the Help Centre: • Click *** Options next to the post that you'd like to mark as false. • Click Report. • Click Scam, fraud or spam. • Click Fraud or scam, then click "Submit Report" • Click Done
Measure 23.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.2.1	Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.	Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.

Measure 23.1	Facebook	Instagram
	Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The number of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions. Protection against misuse: We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded. Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.	Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The number of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions. Protection against misuse: We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded. Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Instagram, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.

V. Empowering Users		
Commitment 24		
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.		
	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 24.1	Facebook				Instagram			
QRE 24.1.1	When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. In each such case, users have 180 days to submit an appeal. The appeal system combines both automated and human review to ensure a holistic assessment of the content and of Meta's original decision against our policies. We aim to provide an appeal outcome within 48 hours, and we always notify users of the outcome, both by notice and in their Accounts Centre. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.				When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. In each such case, users have 180 days to submit an appeal. The appeal system combines both automated and human review to ensure a holistic assessment of the content and of Meta's original decision against our policies. We aim to provide an appeal outcome within 48 hours, and we always notify users of the outcome, both by notice and in their Accounts Centre. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.			
SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	Number of unique contents that were removed from	Number of unique contents that were removed from	Number of unique contents that were removed from	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents	Number of unique contents that were removed from	Number of unique contents that were removed from	Number of unique contents that were removed from	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents

Measure 24.1	Facebook				Instagram			
	Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 that were later appealed.	Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 that were restored after appeal	that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.	Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 that were later appealed.	Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026 that were restored after appeal.	that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behaviour or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026.
Country								
Austria	72,135	473	15	0.16	1,835	12	2	0.12
Belgium	99,551	58	13	0.10	2,401	7	3	0.19
Bulgaria	227,516	69	18	0.27	817	4	1	0.54
Croatia	47,341	47	8	0.16	465	1	1	0.06
Cyprus	20,445	23	12	0.09	590	2	1	4.07
Czech Republic	297,152	136	11	0.17	1,087	13	7	0.32
Denmark	41,705	70	24	0.10	1,352	9	5	0.15
Estonia	11,564	24	1	0.22	149	2	0	256.43
Finland	19,364	81	23	0.09	869	2	0	0.31
France	466,920	205	71	0.11	11,898	36	19	0.19
Germany	646,026	5,637	166	0.13	19,417	115	75	0.07
Greece	237,423	92	12	0.13	2,076	3	0	0.04
Hungary	99,610	469	11	0.08	617	6	2	0.16

Measure 24.1	Facebook				Instagram			
Iceland	2,838	2	2	0.02	149	0	0	N/A
Ireland	55,354	16	6	0.07	1,477	7	4	0.28
Italy	981,547	386	90	0.08	16,058	31	11	0.05
Latvia	42,130	23	1	13.13	197	2	2	3.31
Liechtenstein	156	0	0	N/A	3	0	0	0.00
Lithuania	45,941	18	1	1.80	250	2	1	260.99
Luxembourg	7,485	22	6	0.11	176	2	2	0.12
Malta	5,707	1	1	0.01	173	0	0	N/A
Netherlands	103,818	165	46	0.14	4,173	29	16	0.35
Norway	37,215	57	18	0.11	1,162	6	2	0.05
Poland	451,940	133	53	0.16	2,619	15	8	0.06
Portugal	189,930	121	79	0.06	5,014	38	29	0.07
Romania	560,587	125	27	0.15	1,671	9	5	1.54
Slovakia	154,832	135	7	0.16	469	6	3	8.09
Slovenia	19,409	24	1	0.24	333	1	1	20.87
Spain	685,603	133	44	0.08	28,676	70	35	0.08
Sweden	72,614	109	33	0.21	2,971	10	4	0.08
Total	5,703,858	8,854	800		109,144	440	239	

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 25			
In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.			
	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Messenger WhatsApp	Messenger WhatsApp	Messenger WhatsApp

	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 25.1	Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.1.1	Content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false by our fact-checkers are prominently labelled when re-shared on Messenger, this includes: • Misinformation labels (clear, visual labels to content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, by fact-checkers, and surfaces their fact-checking articles for additional context). • Warning screens (when someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share).	We work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with accurate information. To this purpose, WhatsApp partners with: • Organisations certified by the IFCN around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Because personal messages and calls on WhatsApp are secured with end-to-end encryption, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated reporting. Users can flag potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organisations by sending them a message, and fact-checking organisations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article. • Government agencies and nonprofit organisations to help make authoritative information available to users on WhatsApp.
SLI 25.1.1	Please see Commitment 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers.	Partnerships with fact-checkers: 11 fact-checking organisations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business app and/or the WhatsApp Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information. The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. A reduction in the number of partners using the tool does not necessarily reflect a change in the number of fact-checking partners WhatsApp has in its WhatsApp fact-checking programme. WhatsApp has a formal fact-checking programme which utilises the WhatsApp Business Platform and has not seen a reduction during this reporting period in the number of partners.
Data	N/A	The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. Directory of fact-checking organisations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business app and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) during the period of this report: • France: ○ 20 Minutes (French)

Measure 25.1	Messenger	WhatsApp
		○ AFP France (French) ○ France24 (French) ● Germany ○ CORRECTIV (German) ○ AFP Faktencheck (German) ○ dpa Faktencheck (German) ● Italy ○ Pagella Politica / Facta (Italian) ● Portugal ○ Poligrafo (Portuguese) ● Spain ○ EFE Verifica (Spanish) ○ Maldita (Spanish) ○ Newtral (Spanish)
Measure 25.2	Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.2.1	To help reduce the spread of viral misinformation and harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly on Messenger. For example, when a user shares content from their feed into a private chat, and that content has been rated by a 3pfc, we continue to show the label on the content.	WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default for all personal messages and calls. In this context, we work to counter misinformation both by limiting virality on our platform, and by encouraging users to think about the messages that are forwarded to them. We do this by using: ● Forwarding labels ● Limits to messaging forwarding WhatsApp provides a simple way to double check messages that have been forwarded many times: using the “Search on web” tool. This tool helps our users find news results or other sources of information about content they have received. This feature works by allowing users to tap a link that enables them to upload the message or image via their browser. We continue to evolve our efforts and approaches to tackling misinformation on WhatsApp. This ongoing work is focused on making sure we have the most efficient surface impact and consistently improving reach of our partners.
SLI 25.2.1 – use of select tools	<i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i>	<i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i>

VI. Empowering the Research Community

Commitments 26–29

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 26				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.				
	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports . As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. In the first half of 2026, we've also added data from public Facebook channels and Facebook channel messages.	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports .
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to

	this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.	this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.
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Measure 26.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.1.1	Meta provides public access to public data that can support research through several tools and processes: • Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualified researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment. • Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API, publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies. • Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports. Safeguards to address risks of abuse: The Meta Content Library and API implement multiple, layered safeguards, such as controlled access, prohibition of misuse, privacy protection and ongoing oversight. The Ad Library is a public transparency tool. The Ad Library API implements safeguards including verified access, policy-based restrictions, and technical abuse prevention.	Meta provides public access to public data that can support research through several tools and processes: • Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualified researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment. • Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API, publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies. • Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports. Safeguards to address risks of abuse: The Meta Content Library and API implement multiple, layered safeguards, such as controlled access, prohibition of misuse, privacy protection and ongoing oversight. The Ad Library is a public transparency tool. The Ad Library API implements safeguards including verified access, policy-based restrictions, and technical abuse prevention.

QRE 26.1.2	Meta Content Library and API: Meta publishes comprehensive documentation about the data available through the Meta Content Library and API on Meta's Developer Documentation portal, which is reachable from the Meta Transparency Centre. This documentation includes definitions of available data points, the scope of the data (including eligibility criteria for content inclusion), technical protocols for accessing the data (including API documentation), and a changelog documenting product and data changes per release. Ad Library and API: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. Meta publishes information about ways-of-access and the data points available in the Ad Library and Ad Library API on Meta's Transparency Centre, the Ad Library Overview and FAQ page and the Ad Library API page.	Meta Content Library and API: Meta publishes comprehensive documentation about the data available through the Meta Content Library and API on Meta's Developer Documentation portal, which is reachable from the Meta Transparency Centre. This documentation includes definitions of available data points, the scope of the data (including eligibility criteria for content inclusion), technical protocols for accessing the data (including API documentation), and a changelog documenting product and data changes per release. Ad Library and API: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. Meta publishes information about ways-of-access and the data points available in the Ad Library and Ad Library API on Meta's Transparency Centre, the Ad Library Overview and FAQ page and the Ad Library API page.
SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	As of 30 June 2026, over 1,900 researchers globally and over 630 researchers in the EEA had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.	As of 30 June 2026, over 1,900 researchers globally and over 630 researchers in the EEA had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.
Measure 26.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.2.1	Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API. Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment: • Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. • Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. • Producer lists: customisable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.	Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Instagram. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API. Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment: • Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. • Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. • Producer lists: customisable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram.

	Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform: - Endpoints and data fields: The Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields. This includes Facebook Pages, posts, groups, events, and a subset of profiles. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. For more details, see here.	Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform: - Endpoints and data fields: The Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields. This includes Instagram posts from Instagram business and creator accounts, and a subset of personal Instagram accounts. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. For more details, see here.
QRE 26.2.2	Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available: - Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of profiles. - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen For more details, see here.	Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available: - Posts shared by and information about Instagram business and creator accounts, and a subset of personal accounts. - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen For more details, see here.
QRE 26.2.3	Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Centre (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to independently review research proposals to access Meta Content Library. Meta's comprehensive archive of public content on Facebook and Instagram. CASD continues to serve as the independent body reviewing researcher access requests.	Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Centre (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to independently review research proposals to access Meta Content Library. Meta's comprehensive archive of public content on Facebook and Instagram. CASD continues to serve as the independent body reviewing researcher access requests.

	Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave. In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform). For more details on the application process see here.	Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave. In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform). For more details on the application process see here.
SLI 26.2.1 – meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	Please refer to the tables below.	

TIMEFRAME	EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
01 January 2026 – 30 June 2026	Applications Received
	762
	Applications Approved
	399
	Under Review
	299
	Withdrawn
	35
	Rejected
	29

TIMEFRAME	EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
	Median Response Time (Days): Submission to CASD Approval
01 January 2026 – 30 June 2026	31.3
	Median Response Time (Days): CASD Approval to Access
	1.4

Measure 26.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.3.1	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website , which also include a dedicated help centre .	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website , which also include a dedicated help centre .

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 27					
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.					
	C.26	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M. 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28					
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
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	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports. As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. In the first half of 2026, we've also added data from public Facebook channels and Facebook channel messages.	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library , including streamlining application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library , including streamlining application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.

Measure 28.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.1.1	Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for academic researchers, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners. Current models to support independent external research: • Onboarding Support • Training and Education for researcher products and datasets • Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials Through these engagement activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs and help researchers identify the appropriate tools and contact points within Meta's research ecosystem. Relevant details about research tools are available on our Transparency Centre.	Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for academic researchers, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners. Current models to support independent external research: • Onboarding Support • Training and Education for researcher products and datasets • Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials Through these engagement activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs and help researchers identify the appropriate tools and contact points within Meta's research ecosystem. Relevant details about research tools are available on our Transparency Centre.
Measure 28.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 28.2.1	Meta provides data sets and tools for researchers and publicly discloses all data types currently available in the Meta Content Library and API. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged on Research tools and datasets. The main data available to researchers are: • Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram. • Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta's CIB policy.	Meta provides data sets and tools for researchers and publicly discloses all data types currently available in the Meta Content Library and API. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged on Research tools and datasets. The main data available to researchers are: • Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram. • Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta's CIB policy.
Measure 28.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.3.1	Meta engaged with EDMO stakeholders with expertise in data access to explore potential partnership opportunities aimed at strengthening EU research data infrastructure. This engagement included a joint workshop held by Meta with GESIS to learn more about GESIS's RIDLOP project which aims to build a robust infrastructure for researchers to access data from online platforms. The session surfaced several potential avenues of collaboration between Meta and GESIS towards facilitating responsible and secure data access for European researchers No reports of adversarial actions against researchers conducting good-faith disinformation research were identified during these engagements.	Meta engaged with EDMO stakeholders with expertise in data access to explore potential partnership opportunities aimed at strengthening EU research data infrastructure. This engagement included a joint workshop held by Meta with GESIS to learn more about GESIS's RIDLOP project which aims to build a robust infrastructure for researchers to access data from online platforms. The session surfaced several potential avenues of collaboration between Meta and GESIS towards facilitating responsible and secure data access for European researchers No reports of adversarial actions against researchers conducting good-faith disinformation research were identified during these engagements.
Measure 28.4	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 28.4.1	Up until September 2025, Meta coordinated with other platforms through EDMO working groups with the goal of establishing an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) intended to serve as an intermediary between researchers, platforms, search engines, and Digital Service Coordinators in order to facilitate data sharing and mitigate disputes among other things. Meta set aside \$100,000 to support this effort. Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative – a decision made in September 2025 for reasons outside Meta’s control – Meta began collaboration with GESIS–Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Meta has collaborated with GESIS to support their funding application for RIDLOP, which is intended to serve as an industry-wide initiative enabling structured data sharing between platforms and the European research community.	Up until September 2025, Meta coordinated with other platforms through EDMO working groups with the goal of establishing an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) intended to serve as an intermediary between researchers, platforms, search engines, and Digital Service Coordinators in order to facilitate data sharing and mitigate disputes among other things. Meta set aside \$100,000 to support this effort. Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative – a decision made in September 2025 for reasons outside Meta’s control – Meta began collaboration with GESIS–Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Meta has collaborated with GESIS to support their funding application for RIDLOP, which is intended to serve as an industry-wide initiative enabling structured data sharing between platforms and the European research community.
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VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 29 Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.
<i>This commitment is not relevant to Meta as it applies to research organisations.</i>

VII. Empowering the Fact-checking Community

Commitments 30–33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 30					
Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers					
	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we have not introduced new measures during the reporting period.	No, we have not introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 30.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.1.1	Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognised industry standards. Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes. Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes. Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed. Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at the Meta Transparency Centre: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.	Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognised industry standards. Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes. Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes. Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed. Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at the Meta Transparency Centre: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.
QRE 30.1.2	See list of countries and languages covered in SLI 30.1.1	See list of countries and languages covered in SLI 30.1.1
QRE 30.1.3	Meta allocates resources to achieve fact-checking coverage and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat disinformation. For example: Financial Resources: Meta has established an agreement framework that provides fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.	Meta allocates resources to achieve fact-checking coverage and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat disinformation. For example: Financial Resources: Meta has established an agreement framework that provides fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.

Measure 30.1	Facebook		Instagram	
	Tools and Technology: Meta provides fact-checking partners with access to the Meta Content Library, which grants comprehensive access to public content across Facebook and Instagram to support their investigative capabilities. Partners also have access to Meta's fact-checking tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Training and Capacity Building: Meta provides partners with comprehensive training materials and training sessions on any significant policy or product updates. Dedicated Relationship Management: Meta supports cooperation through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support that helps improve the fact-checking programme.		Tools and Technology: Meta provides fact-checking partners with access to the Meta Content Library, which grants comprehensive access to public content across Facebook and Instagram to support their investigative capabilities. Partners also have access to Meta's fact-checking tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Training and Capacity Building: Meta provides partners with comprehensive training materials and training sessions on any significant policy or product updates. Dedicated Relationship Management: Meta supports cooperation through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support that helps improve the fact-checking programme.	
SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack
	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg
	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP
	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP
	Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz	Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz
	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet
	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M
	Finland (Finnish)	AFP	Finland (Finnish)	AFP
	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs
	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck

Measure 30.1	Facebook		Instagram	
	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes
	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP
	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie
	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica
	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min
	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck AFP	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck AFP
	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog
	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador
	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro
	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk
	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro
	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Buló Newtral	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Buló Newtral
	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran AFP	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran AFP

Measure 30.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.2.1	Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognised industry standards.	Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognised industry standards.

	Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes. Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes. Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed. Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at the Meta Transparency Centre: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.	Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes. Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes. Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed. Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at the Meta Transparency Centre: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.
QRE 30.2.2	Meta has dedicated Partner Managers who engage with fact-checking partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support to improve the fact-checking programme. As part of this work, Partner Managers collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools. Meta also provides fact-checking partners with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also provides fact-checking partners the ability to report any issues they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta.	Meta has dedicated Partner Managers who engage with fact-checking partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support to improve the fact-checking programme. As part of this work, Partner Managers collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools. Meta also provides fact-checking partners with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity. Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also provides fact-checking partners the ability to report any issues they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta.
QRE 30.2.3	<i>This QRE is not relevant to Meta as it applies to fact-checking organisations.</i>	

Measure 30.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.3.1	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation. Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the programme, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms. Also, given the cross-border nature of content flows, Meta's fact-checking systems allow multiple partners – including from different countries – to rate the same content. Users, regardless of location within the region, are then able to see the articles of multiple fact-checking partners.	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation. Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the programme, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms. Also, given the cross-border nature of content flows, Meta's fact-checking systems allow multiple partners – including from different countries – to rate the same content. Users, regardless of location within the region, are then able to see the articles of multiple fact-checking partners.
Measure 30.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.4.1	The CoCD's Taskforce is composed of the Code's Signatories, including Meta, together with representatives of ERGA and EDMO. It is chaired by the European Commission and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and it may invite relevant experts as observers, with decisions taken by consensus. The Taskforce meets in organised meetings and through dedicated working groups (subgroups) on specific workstreams. Meta is an active participant in the Taskforce, attending EC-organised meetings and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. Through this participation, Meta engages directly with the European Commission, ERGA, EDMO and fellow Signatories.	The CoCD's Taskforce is composed of the Code's Signatories, including Meta, together with representatives of ERGA and EDMO. It is chaired by the European Commission and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and it may invite relevant experts as observers, with decisions taken by consensus. The Taskforce meets in organised meetings and through dedicated working groups (subgroups) on specific workstreams. Meta is an active participant in the Taskforce, attending EC-organised meetings and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. Through this participation, Meta engages directly with the European Commission, ERGA, EDMO and fellow Signatories.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 31					
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.					
	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).

Measure 31.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 31.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.1.1	When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure fewer people see it, and (3) penalise repeat offenders. Meta's technology is designed to detect content that is the same or nearly identical to content rated by fact-checkers, applying notices and reduced distribution automatically. This integration operates across all content formats relevant to the service, including public posts, ads, articles, photos, videos, Reels, and text-only posts on both Facebook and Instagram. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. Content rated Satire or True won't be labelled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Facebook. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well. Ensuring fewer people see misinformation. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent. Meta does not suggest content to users once it is rated by a fact-checker, which significantly reduces the number of people who see it. Repeat offenders. Facebook pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetise and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news Page. Detection. Meta's systems support fact-checkers' work through a signals-based detection approach, which uses various inputs – including user flags reporting “false information” – to identify and enqueue content for fact-checker review. Fact-checkers ultimately decide what to review and rate. Once content is rated, Meta applies automated enforcement actions (labelling, reduced distribution, ad rejection) and extends these actions to near-identical content detected through matching technology.	When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure fewer people see it, and (3) penalise repeat offenders. Meta's technology is designed to detect content that is the same or nearly identical to content rated by fact-checkers, applying notices and reduced distribution automatically. This integration operates across all content formats relevant to the service, including public posts, ads, articles, photos, videos, Reels, and text-only posts on both Facebook and Instagram. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well. Ensuring fewer people see misinformation. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed and Stories on Instagram. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. Meta does not suggest content to users once it is rated by a fact-checker, which significantly reduces the number of people who see it. Repeat offenders. Instagram accounts that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution and removing their ability to monetise and advertise. Detection. Meta's systems support fact-checkers' work through a signals-based detection approach, which uses various inputs – including user flags reporting “false information” – to identify and enqueue content for fact-checker review. Fact-checkers ultimately decide what to review and rate. Once content is rated, Meta applies automated enforcement actions (labelling, reduced distribution, ad rejection) and extends these actions to near-identical content detected through matching technology. In terms of AI-generated content, fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking programme policies. They often rely on AI experts and visual techniques to aid in the detection of this content.

	In terms of AI-generated content, fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking programme policies. They often rely on AI experts and visual techniques to aid in the detection of this content.			
SLI 31.1.1 – use of fact-checks	Filtered to content created on Facebook in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026: 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026: 2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.* These two metrics together show both the scale and impact of fact-checking. *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta’s 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EEA Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EEA (119,000). This is expected. **Owing to a number of technical issues, data was not captured for 53 days during this reporting period, primarily from 21 January to 6 March 2026. As a result, the affected metrics should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true volumes.		Filtered to content created on Instagram in EEA Member State countries between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026: 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026: 2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an inform treatment to a content between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.* These two metrics together show both the scale and impact of fact-checking. *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta’s 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EEA Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EEA (119,000). This is expected. **Owing to a number of technical issues, data was not captured for 53 days during this reporting period, primarily from 21 January to 6 March 2026. As a result, the affected metrics should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true volumes.	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:	Number of Articles written by third-party fact-checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:	Number of Articles written by third-party fact-checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026:
Country				
Austria	319,316	26,388	22,762	4,858
Belgium	483,671	31,844	25,473	5,213
Bulgaria	380,233	18,434	9,350	2,754
Croatia	228,450	18,198	8,737	2,799
Cyprus	103,585	14,211	11,011	2,803

Czech Republic	344,103	19,466	13,270	3,611
Denmark	243,127	19,306	13,298	3,407
Estonia	51,001	8,049	3,408	1,395
Finland	115,933	15,497	11,332	3,227
France	2,052,817	48,812	62,427	8,541
Germany	1,768,156	56,827	95,585	11,682
Greece	490,180	25,326	18,316	4,378
Hungary	207,426	17,368	9,363	2,735
Iceland	24,582	6,172	2,259	983
Ireland	283,788	25,055	17,697	4,474
Italy	1,914,646	51,765	71,244	9,739
Latvia	94,304	9,496	3,925	1,629
Liechtenstein	1,923	1,160	329	215
Lithuania	129,645	13,092	4,966	1,829
Luxembourg	47,660	10,839	4,265	1,677
Malta	45,725	9,818	3,890	1,506
Netherlands	522,005	33,500	34,844	6,296
Norway	190,101	20,734	12,859	3,466
Poland	923,593	30,380	22,764	5,180
Portugal	555,898	30,367	34,253	6,466
Romania	520,618	24,604	14,839	3,663
Slovakia	208,303	15,087	8,288	2,655
Slovenia	113,746	12,802	5,280	1,879
Spain	1,720,888	48,096	85,359	10,239
Sweden	334,630	27,202	24,163	5,059
Total	14,420,053	689,895	655,556	124,358

SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. *Owing to a number of technical issues, data was not captured for 53 days during this reporting period, primarily from 21 January to 6 March 2026. As a result, the affected metrics should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true volumes.		1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2026 to 30/06/2026. *Owing to a number of technical issues, data was not captured for 53 days during this reporting period, primarily from 21 January to 6 March 2026. As a result, the affected metrics should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true volumes.	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact-checks, due to a falsity assessment by third-party fact-checkers between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.
Country				
Austria	319,316	49.64%	22,762	62.13%
Belgium	483,671	48.55%	25,473	61.67%
Bulgaria	380,233	55.22%	9,350	64.36%
Croatia	228,450	51.75%	8,737	59.15%
Cyprus	103,585	57.47%	11,011	61.02%
Czech Republic	344,103	38.17%	13,270	55.71%
Denmark	243,127	50.26%	13,298	60.53%
Estonia	51,001	42.36%	3,408	57.76%
Finland	115,933	49.94%	11,332	61.81%
France	2,052,817	54.37%	62,427	61.47%
Germany	1,768,156	47.66%	95,585	62.85%
Greece	490,180	55.44%	18,316	68.09%
Hungary	207,426	54.75%	9,363	58.62%
Iceland	24,582	52.94%	2,259	85.11%
Ireland	283,788	48.42%	17,697	63.33%
Italy	1,914,646	56.50%	71,244	62.48%

Latvia	94,304	43.87%	3,925	60.25%
Liechtenstein	1,923	100%	329	75.00%
Lithuania	129,645	47.34%	4,966	57.58%
Luxembourg	47,660	54.14%	4,265	60.24%
Malta	45,725	61.20%	3,890	65.19%
Netherlands	522,005	44.34%	34,844	61.27%
Norway	190,101	50.42%	12,859	56.94%
Poland	923,593	47.05%	22,764	60.27%
Portugal	555,898	58.36%	34,253	63.39%
Romania	520,618	26.14%	14,839	60.92%
Slovakia	208,303	40.90%	8,288	61.42%
Slovenia	113,746	38.73%	5,280	59.85%
Spain	1,720,888	59.89%	85,359	64.33%
Sweden	334,630	52.28%	24,163	59.24%
Total	14,420,053		655,556	

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.	Average of monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026.
	There have been no significant updates in methodology since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates in methodology since the last submitted report.
Monthly Active Users	Between 1 January – 30 June 2026, there were a total of approximately 264 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report .	Between 1 January – 30 June 2026, there were a total of approximately 297 million average monthly active users on Instagram in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Instagram DSA transparency report .

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community				
Commitment 32				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.				
	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce new measures during the implementation period.	No, we did not introduce new measures during the implementation period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes (which, for the avoidance of doubt, has not been rolled out in the EEA during the reporting period).

Measure 32.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 32.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 32.1.1	All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking programme. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting “false information”. Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review and rate themselves. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find. For example, we’ve used this feature to group content about global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.	All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking programme. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Instagram, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting “false information”. Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review and rate themselves. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find. For example, we’ve used this feature to group content about global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.
SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	See list in SLI 30.1.1 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.	
Measure 32.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.3.1	As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking programme together. Meta’s cooperation with fact-checking partners is conducted through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners to communicate product and policy changes and manage day-to-day support. Meta is an active participant in the CoCD Permanent Taskforce, attending EC-organised meetings and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. During this period, fact-checking has not been a dedicated working group focus within the Taskforce; however, Meta maintains its	As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking programme together. Meta’s cooperation with fact-checking partners is conducted through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners to communicate product and policy changes and manage day-to-day support. Meta is an active participant in the CoCD Permanent Taskforce, attending EC-organised meetings and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. During this period, fact-checking has not been a dedicated working group focus within the Taskforce; however, Meta maintains its

	direct cooperation with fact-checking partners through the channels described above.	direct cooperation with fact-checking partners through the channels described above.
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VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitment 33
Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.
<i>This commitment is not relevant to Meta as it applies to fact-checking organisations.</i>

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34–36

VIII. Transparency Centre						
Commitment 34						
To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website						
	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 34.1	Meta supported the establishment and maintenance of the Transparency Centre website, making it operational and available to the public as of 2023, within 6 months from the signature of the Code. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 34.2	Meta equally co-funds the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website alongside other signatories, providing funding sufficient for the website's maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. The website is managed by VOST Europe in the role of developer. Meta's funding contribution is commensurate with its activity as a signatory to the Code and proportional to its risk profile and economic capacity.

Measure 34.3	Meta continuously contributes to the Transparency Centre's information through the bi-annual submission of its Transparency Reports. These reports are uploaded to the Transparency Centre and made available to the public. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 34.4	Meta participates in EC CoCD Taskforce discussions regarding the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre. The financing arrangement is agreed upon within the Taskforce and reviewed on an annual basis in accordance with the Code's requirements. Meta engages in these periodic reviews to ensure the arrangement remains appropriate and sufficient for the TC's continued operation.
Measure 34.5	Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Taskforce, which regularly discusses the Transparency Centre and assesses whether adjustments or actions are necessary. During the reporting period, Meta participated in organised Taskforce-related meetings and working groups where applicable TC topics were discussed as applicable. Meta remains committed to implementing any actions or adjustments decided within the Taskforce within a reasonable timeline, consistent with the Code's requirements.

VIII. Transparency Centre							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures in the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 35.1	Meta publishes its Transparency Reports on a bi-annual basis in the EC's Transparency Centre. The Transparency Reports list all the relevant information, including the terms of service and policies applicable to Facebook and Instagram, per commitment and measure. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 35.2	Meta provides information on the implementation and enforcement of its policies, which is available in the published Transparency Reports. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 35.3	Meta's Transparency Reports, which assess the implementation of the Code's commitments, are maintained in the Transparency Centre repository. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 35.4	No formal crisis situation, as defined under Article 36 of the DSA or as declared by the European Commission, occurred during the current reporting period that would trigger the application of Measure 35.4. Meta maintains documented Crisis Response Protocols and Assessments that would be activated in the event a crisis is declared. These protocols enable Meta to identify and assess whether external events impacting the functioning and use of its services are significantly contributing to a serious threat, and to publish information regarding specific mitigation actions taken on the Transparency Centre as required.
Measure 35.5	Meta and other signatories equally co-fund the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website, which is managed by VOST Europe in the role of a developer, ensuring the Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology and user friendliness. The layout designed by the developer allows for easy searchability, as well as straightforward tracking of changes.
Measure 35.6	Meta's bi-annual Transparency Reports, published on the Transparency Centre , list Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) tied to each commitment and measure for Facebook and Instagram, including Member State breakdowns in a standardised and searchable format.

	In addition, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, produced in collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz, and the European Commission as part of the Rapid Response System (RRS). These Structural Indicators are accessible via the Transparency Centre, enabling users to understand compliance patterns across signatories. Meta continues to update Structural Indicator measurements aligned with its bi-annual reporting periods.
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VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36				
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we did not introduce any new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 36.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.2	Meta regularly updates Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators which are published by TrustLab on the EC's Transparency Centre. Additionally, Meta participates in EC CoCD Taskforce discussions regarding the operation of the Transparency Centre, which includes maintenance and regular updating of the Transparency Centre website.

Measure 36.3	Meta is involved in discussions with the EC Taskforce regarding the Code and monitoring framework. Consequently, any relevant decisions of the Taskforce are updated in the Transparency Centre through the bi-annual cadence of the publishing of Meta's Transparency Report.
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Commitments 34-36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	In the period between 01/01/2026 and 30/06/2026, our total report page was viewed 40,731 times, our signatory profile was visited 2,928 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 35,687 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 46,705 times. The report page was viewed an average of 5,819 times per month.

IX. Permanent Taskforce

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Taskforce							
Commitment 37							
Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Taskforce. The Taskforce includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Taskforce can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Taskforce are made by consensus.							
	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger	Facebook Instagram WhatsApp Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.						
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We deployed the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework which was developed within the Taskforce and activated it ahead of EU nationwide elections. We onboarded relevant Civil Society Organisations to our direct escalation channels and ensured timely review of escalations coming through the RRS.						
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No, we do not plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.						
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A						
Measure 37.1	Meta actively participates in and contributes to the work of the Taskforce, attending scheduled meetings and engaging in relevant subgroups dedicated to specific topics or workstreams.						

Measure 37.2	Meta agrees to and, when relevant, works with the Taskforce on all essential tasks if and as required, including but not limited to developing and refining harmonised reporting templates, Service Level and Structural Indicators, and TTP benchmarks; contributing to the development and refinement of the Rapid Response System and coordinating rapid response efforts during elections or crises; reviewing research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments; providing guidance on fact-checking reporting obligations; assessing whether the Code's commitments and measures require updates in light of evolving developments; and promoting the Code's adoption among new signatories.
Measure 37.3	Meta works with the EC and other signatories to define operating rules for the EC Taskforce, including third-party expert involvement.
Measure 37.4	Meta participates in the following working groups, contributing specialised knowledge and operational support to the implementation and, if needed, the revision of the Code: Elections Working Group and Crisis Protocol Working Group. These working groups are updated as needed to address any specific issues. These are the working groups that are currently active. However, Meta has agreed to participate in all working groups that are relevant and pertinent to our services.
Measure 37.5	Meta participates in annual and ad hoc EC Taskforce meetings with stakeholders and experts, providing updates via bi-annual Transparency Reports and discussing research outcomes.
Measure 37.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 37.6.1	Meta maintains its subscription document and actively participates in the EC CoCD Taskforce, through which any changes to commitments or measures are identified and discussed. Meta's subscription document remains unchanged from the prior reporting period. Meta's participation in Taskforce working groups during this period was as follows: • Elections Working Group: The most active working group during the reporting period; focused on novel threats including AI-generated content and rapid response mechanisms. • Crisis Protocol Working Group: Focused on the Rapid Response System for crisis situations. The EC is developing a Code-specific crisis protocol; industry signatories are engaging on alignment with existing DSA obligations. Meta remains an active participant in the Taskforce-related meetings and responds to meeting invitations as they are scheduled by the EC. Meta's engagement is aligned with the current Taskforce priorities of election integrity and associated disinformation challenges and agrees to its participation in all the working groups that are relevant and pertinent to our services.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitments 38–43

X. Monitoring of the Code		
Commitment 38		
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.		
	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• Maintained and enhanced dedicated cross-functional team structure to support CoCD implementation, including Meta's Public Policy & Global Affairs team), Regional Regulatory Readiness team, and Global Response Operations team. • Continued investment in teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development, all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation. • Active and ongoing participation in EC CoCD Taskforce-related meetings and working groups, with current engagement focused on the Elections and the Rapid Response System (RRS) and Plenary meetings when convened by the EC to ensure alignment with Code requirements and adaptation of internal processes as needed. • Maintained the Regulatory Information Response (RIR) process to proactively manage compliance deliverables and audit readiness across all signed-up commitments, including bi-annual Transparency Report production and submission within required deadlines.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will continue to participate in the Rapid Response System for elections in EU Member States during the next reporting period, and continue to engage in the Taskforce's Crisis Protocol Working Group on the development of a Code specific crisis and incident response mechanism.	

Measure 38.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 38.1.1	Meta dedicated adequate financial and human resources and maintained appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of its commitments under the Code, including but not limited to the following: Dedicated Teams Supporting CoCD Implementation: • Public Policy & Global Affairs Team: Alongside the Content Policy team responsible for maintaining Meta's Misinformation Policy, and EMEA Integrity Legal, it serves as the primary liaison with the European Commission CoCD Taskforce. This team regularly participates in EC Taskforce meetings and working groups, ensuring Meta's internal processes remain aligned with Code requirements. • Regional Regulatory Readiness (RRR) Team: This team maintains a regulatory information response process to proactively produce regulatory reports, including the CoCD bi-annual Transparency Report submissions. The team also coordinates the effective implementation of the Rapid Alert System ahead of each EU national election, which operates under the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework, supporting Meta's commitment to timely action on disinformation threats. The team is also responsible for coordinating the internal elections preparation work and ensures we have robust systems to respond to election specific risks, including misinformation and disinformation. RRR operates under a regional model, with dedicated Programme Managers organised regionally to deepen jurisdictional context and in-region expertise. • Meta also maintains specialised teams who manage the relationship with third-party fact-checkers and the overall fact-checking programme in the EEA. Cross-Functional Resource Allocation: • Meta maintains teams with expertise across content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development, all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation in support of the Code. • We have expert investigation teams to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats. • These teams are distributed globally and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners, including content reviewers located in the EU with specialist expertise in EU languages. Internal Processes: • A dedicated cross-functional team manages the day-to-day processes relating to the CoCD, including regulatory reporting, EC engagement, and coordination of compliance deliverables across all signed-up commitments. • Meta's DSA Head of Compliance communicates and shares relevant information with the EC in relation to Meta Platforms Ireland Limited's compliance with the DSA, which now includes the CoCD, engaging with the EC periodically and taking any necessary actions arising from those engagements.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 39
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	This commitment was fulfilled in January 2023 when Meta provided its baseline report.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code							
Commitment 40							
Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.							
	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Messenger WhatsApp	Facebook Instagram	Messenger WhatsApp	Facebook Instagram Messenger WhatsApp	Facebook Instagram Messenger WhatsApp	Facebook Instagram Messenger WhatsApp	Facebook Instagram Messenger WhatsApp

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	For this report, Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	For this report, Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp will continue to provide relevant QREs and SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

X. Monitoring of the Code				
Commitment 41				
Signatories commit to work within the Taskforce towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.				
	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Measures 41.1, 41.2 and 41.3 under this commitment were time-barred by one, seven, and six months of signing respectively, and were already fulfilled, having been performed in 2022 when Meta first became a signatory to the Code.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 42	
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.	
	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage in Taskforce meetings related to elections and crisis monitoring.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.

X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 43	
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Taskforce.	
	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes, we have introduced new measures during the reporting period.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes, we plan to put further implementation measures in the next 6 months.
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp continue to engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis	
U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon Conflict	
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the U.S./Israel-Iran/Lebanon conflict.	
We took a variety of actions with the objectives of: ● Helping to keep people in the region safe: we continue to provide user controls including Hidden Words, Limits, Comment Controls, Show More/Show Less and Sensitive Content Control to help people manage what they see and who can interact with them. ● Enforcing our policies: We continue to enforce our community standards, not only on content shared from within the affected countries, but globally wherever the content may be shared ● Reducing the spread of misinformation: we worked with our third-party fact-checking partners in the region and consulted outside experts. ● Monitoring for adversarial networks: we continue to monitor for and remove coordinated inauthentic behaviour targeting discourse about the conflict. Our main strategies focus on user safety controls in the affected markets, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation, and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour.	
Policies and Terms and Conditions	
We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people's safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta's technologies, tools, and processes. ● Crisis Policy Protocol: We assess the risks of imminent harm both on and off our platforms so we can respond with specific policy and product interventions during moments of heightened risk. Our response was guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, and the protection of the dignity of victims. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and international humanitarian law.	
Scrutiny of Ads Placements	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)	Our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.

	For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetisation Policies , any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our Partner Monetisation Policies .
	In line with applicable sanctions and legal restrictions, advertising and monetisation products are not available in Iran.
Political Advertising	
Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories.	
Integrity of Services	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs (Commitment 14)	We have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitments 14-16)	Throughout the conflict, we have mobilised our teams, technologies, and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.
	We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, who are monitoring the situation, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.
Empowering Users	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)	Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate. During this period we received and triaged escalations relating to the conflict and flagged emerging misinformation trends to our Misinformation Policy team. Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour networks.

	Warning labels: We add warning labels to content rated false by third-party fact-checkers, and we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender.
Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)	We continue to work through our AI for Good programme, which empowers humanitarian organisations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers to make more informed decisions on how to support refugees, including those displaced by this conflict to Lebanon.
Empowering the Research Community	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitments 17-25)	As we previously reported, Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and Content Library API tools to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date.
	Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.
	Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements.
Working with the Fact-Checking Community	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection (Commitment 30)	Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in Persian, Arabic and Hebrew, through Factnameh, AFP, and Reuters. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the conflict, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
	When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.

Content Warning Labels Commitment 31)	Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.
	Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis	
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine	
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the war of aggression by Russia on Ukraine.	
We took a variety of actions with the objectives of: • Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: since the beginning of the full-scale invasions we have introduced several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted. • Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared. • Reducing the spread of misinformation: We took steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and consulted with outside experts. • Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetising and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites. • In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today (globally), Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others. • We added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included additional accounts or subdomains of Russian media outlets of various NTV programmes, Rodina magazine, TV Centre, Radio Mayak, Radio Rossii, Vladimir Solovyov (vrsoloviev), Moskva 24, MTRK Mir network channels, TASS, Channel One, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Vzglyad.ru.	
Our main strategies focus on safety features in Ukraine and Russia, extensive steps to combat the spread of misinformation, transparency around state-controlled media, and monitoring and taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This means (as outlined in previous reports) we continue to: • Monitor for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other adversarial networks (see Commitment 16 for more information)	

• Enforce our Community Standards • Work with fact-checkers • Strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the Central and Eastern Europe region.	
Policies and Terms and Conditions	
We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people's safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta's technologies, tools, and processes.	
Scrutiny of Ads Placements	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)	Our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.
	For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetisation Policies , any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our Partner Monetisation Policies .
	We prohibited ads or monetisation from Russian state-controlled media. Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.
Political Advertising	
Since 6 October 2025 , Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories.	
Integrity of Services	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	

Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs (Commitment 14)	We have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.
	We published an update on Doppelganger, the most persistent Russian-origin covert influence operation we track and first exposed in 2022, in our e 2026 Adversarial Threat Report. After years of sustained defensive pressure, the operation has shifted from a single high-volume campaign into a portfolio of smaller, tactically distinct efforts. Its “brute force” ad activity – minimal text over images, no audience-building, rapidly regenerating spoofed domains – continued to target France and Germany and expanded to Hungary ahead of that country’s election, while dropping Israel. Alongside it, we removed offshoot campaigns linked to the Social Design Agency (SDA) and to the state-linked ANO “Dialog”, targeting Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, the EU and the United States. Most Doppelganger ad attempts are detected and blocked automatically before anyone sees them. Throughout, we have continued to refine our automated detection based on the behaviours we observe and to engineer campaign-specific defences to help block these operators from returning to our platforms.
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitments 14-16)	Throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies, and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.
	We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the situation, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.
Empowering Users	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)	State controlled media: We have taken further action to limit the impact of state controlled media, described above. Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate. During this period we received and triaged escalations relating to the conflict and flagged emerging misinformation trends to our Misinformation Policy team. Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.
Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)	We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine. We continue to work through our AI for Good programme, which empowers humanitarian organisations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers to make more informed decisions on how to support refugees, including the people of Ukraine.

Empowering the Research Community	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitments 17-25)	The AI for Good programme shares privacy-protected data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty, and climate change. In support of the Ukraine humanitarian response, the programme's maps have been utilised to provide valuable assistance.
	We make baseline population density maps (the high resolution settlement layer) of countries surrounding Ukraine publicly available. These are among the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e. no Facebook user data). Our Social Connectedness Index has also been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission – Joint Research Centre unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to estimate the rate at which Ukrainian refugees might seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU (Commitments 30-33)	For misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we work with our network of independent third-party fact-checking partners. The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering fact-checkers chapter above. Our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the fact-checkers' Empowerment chapter above.
	In the European Union, we partner with 29 fact-checking organisations covering 26 countries and 24 different languages.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis
Israel – Hamas War
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the Israel – Hamas War.

Mitigations in place or planned – at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]:

In the wake of the 07/10/2023 terrorist attacks in Israel and Israel's response in Gaza, expert teams from across Meta took immediate crisis response measures, while protecting people's ability to use our apps to shed light on important developments happening on the ground. As we did so, we were guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, the protection of the dignity of victims, and the right to non-discrimination – as well as balancing those with the right to freedom of expression. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to prioritise and mitigate the most salient human rights risks: in this case, that people may use Meta platforms to further inflame an already violent conflict. We also looked to international humanitarian law (IHL) as an important source of reference for assessing online conduct. We have provided a [public overview](#) of our efforts related to the war in our Newsroom, as well as in our 2023 Annual Human Rights [report](#). We provided an update on our actions in our [2024 annual human rights report](#). The following are some examples of the specific steps we have taken:

Taking Action on Violating Content:

- We quickly established a dedicated crisis response staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. We explain how we deploy our Crisis Policy Protocol and manage crises in an infographic in our [2024 annual human rights report](#).
- We continue to enforce our policies around [Dangerous Organisations and Individuals](#), [Violent and Graphic Content](#), [Hateful Conduct](#), [Violence and Incitement](#), [Bullying and Harassment](#), and [Coordinating Harm](#).

Safety and Security:

- We [memorialise accounts](#) when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

Reducing the Spread of Misinformation:

- We're working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes Arabic- and Hebrew-language coverage for Israel and Palestine through AFP and Reuters. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
- We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
- We're also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers.
- We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

User Controls:

We continue to provide [tools](#) to help people control their experience on our apps and protect themselves from content they don't want to see. These include but aren't limited to:

- Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
- Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
- Comment controls: You can [control](#) who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post-by-post basis.
- Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook.
- Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed.
- Sensitive Content Control: Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations.

Policies and Terms and Conditions	
For the duration of the ongoing crisis, Meta has taken various actions to mitigate the possible content risks emerging from the crisis. This includes, inter alia, under the Dangerous Organisations and Individuals Policy, removes imagery depicting the moment an identifiable individual is abducted, unless such imagery is shared in the context of condemnation or a call to release, in which case we allow with a Mark as Disturbing (MAD) interstitial; and remove Hamas-produced imagery for hostages in captivity in all contexts. Meta has some further discretion policies which may be applied when content is escalated to us, including allowing content asking for, donating, or gifting pharmaceutical drugs in Israel and Gaza.	
Scrutiny of Ads Placements	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Political Advertising	
Since 6 October 2025, Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads ("SIEP ads") on our platforms in the EU and associated territories.	
Integrity of Services	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Empowering Users	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Warning Screens on sensitive content, Sensitive Content Control and Facebook Reduce: (Commitment 17)	The 07/10/2023 attack by Hamas was designated as a Terrorist Attack under Meta's Dangerous Organisation and Individuals Policy. Consistent with that designation, we removed all content showing identifiable victims at the moment of the attack. Following that, people began sharing this type of footage in order to raise awareness and condemn the attacks. Meta's goal is to allow people to express themselves while still removing harmful content. In turn, we began allowing people to post this type of footage within that context only, with the addition of a warning screen to inform users that it may be disturbing. We also allowed this type of content in professional news reporting settings and in pledges and calls for the release of hostages. If the user's intent in sharing the content is unclear, we err on the side of safety and remove it. However, there are additional protections in place to ensure people have choices when it comes to this content. Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. We try not to recommend sensitive content in these places by default, but people can also

	choose to see less, to further reduce the possibility of seeing this content from accounts they don't follow.
	We're continually testing how we deliver personalised experiences and have recently conducted testing around civic content. As a result, we started treating civic content from people and Pages users follow on Facebook more like any other content in their feed, and we started ranking and showing users that content based on explicit signals (for example, liking a piece of content) and implicit signals (like viewing posts) that help us predict what's meaningful to people. We also started recommending more political content based on these personalised signals and are expanding the options people have to control how much of this content they see.
	These actions ensure that we balance the protection of voice with removing harmful content. In this context, it has allowed for important discussion and condemnation of violence, while also empowering people to make choices in reaction to the content they see on Facebook and Instagram.
Hidden words Filter (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	When turned on, Hidden Words filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments, so people never have to see them. People can customise this list to make sure the terms they find offensive are hidden.
	Hidden Words help people choose offensive terms and phrases to hide, so they are protected from seeing them.
Limits (Commitment 18, Commitment 19,)	When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
	This tool gives people choice about DM and requests they receive, which may be important when engaging online around sensitive topics.
Comment Controls (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	People can control who can comment on their posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post-by-post basis.
	This tool gives people control over engagement with what they post on Facebook and Instagram.
Show more Show less: (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	Show More, Show Less gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. Selecting "Show more" will temporarily increase the amount of content that is like the post a user gave feedback on, while selecting "Show Less" means a user will temporarily see fewer posts like the one that feedback was given on.
	This tool provides people with more direct control over what they see, which is important for protecting people's well-being during high profile crisis events.
Empowering the Research Community	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	

Content Library and API tools (Commitment 26)	As we previously reported, Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and Content Library API tools to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. In the first half of 2026, we also added data from public Facebook channels and Facebook channel messages. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date. Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research. Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Centre (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to independently review research proposals to access Meta Content Library, Meta's comprehensive archive of public content on Facebook and Instagram. CASD continues to serve as the independent body reviewing researcher access requests. Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements. As of 30 June 2026, over 1,900 researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community	
Our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection (Commitment 30)	Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes Arabic- and Hebrew-language coverage for Israel and Palestine through AFP and Reuters. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
Content Warning Labels Commitment 31)	Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party. Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election
National Elections
Meta's Approach to Elections
Meta is committed to providing reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages on our platforms. Our policies and safeguards for elections have been developed over many years and informed by our experiences of working on numerous elections around the world. Those experiences have resulted in the development of a robust election programme, which uses mature policies, processes, and tools to both protect speech on our platform and safeguard the integrity of the elections. We continuously improve these measures to ensure they remain appropriate and responsive to emerging risks, and we have reinforced these efforts in light of the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act, the Election Guidelines, and our commitments under this Code. 1. Community Standards and Guidelines Relevant to Elections Our Community Standards set out strict rules for content that can and cannot be posted on Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger. These policies cover voter interference, voter fraud, electoral violence, and misinformation, among other categories, such as, hateful conduct, coordinating harm and promoting crime, bullying and harassment. Our policies have been refined over many years, by partnering with academics, civil society, and third-party fact-checkers to find the appropriate balance between protecting people and protecting freedom of expression and information. These policies are regularly reviewed, and they are made available to the public through our Transparency Centre. Our comprehensive approach to elections continued for European elections held between <u>1 January 2026 and 30 June 2026</u>. The election responses covered in this report include: 1. Portugal (Presidential) election, Round 1: 18 January 2026; Round 2: 8 February 2026 2. Slovenia (Parliamentary) election, 22 March 2026 3. Denmark (Parliamentary) election, 24 March 2026 4. Hungary (Parliamentary) election, 12 April 2026 5. Bulgaria (Parliamentary) election, 19 April 2026 6. Cyprus (Parliamentary) election, 24 May 2026 7. Malta (General) election, 30 May 2026 2. Our Election Risk Management Processes We have a dedicated team responsible for driving Meta's cross-company election integrity efforts, leveraging experts from a full range of business functions to foster a holistic approach to tackling election-related risks. Those functions include colleagues in Meta's intelligence, data science, product and engineering, research, operations, content and public policy, and legal teams. Over the years, Meta has developed a comprehensive approach to mitigate relevant user risks and respect the integrity of elections during an election period. This approach has been iterated and has matured over the course of hundreds of elections over the past years. We have processes, tools and policies in place all year round to address harmful or illegal content while protecting legitimate speech on our platforms, which have been further reinforced in light of the regulatory framework under the DSA including the Communication from the Commission (C/2024/3014) on Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes (the "Election Guidelines"). During the reporting period for this report, we continued to work closely with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures ahead of elections. This included collaboration with Member State Digital Service Coordinators (DSCs), national authorities, electoral bodies, as well as taking part in the EU Code of Practice

("CoP") [Rapid Response System](#). As part of the rapid response system framework, we onboarded designated civil society organisations and fact-checkers to our direct escalation channels to report time sensitive content, accounts or trends that could threaten the integrity of the electoral process.

Overview of Cooperation with External Stakeholders and Election Integrity Efforts

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of our day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation and integrity efforts for Portugal, Slovenia, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Malta. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

We remain focused on providing users with reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages. That is why we continue to connect people with details about the election for their Member State through in-app notifications, where legally permitted. We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Voter Information Units (VIU)' and 'Election Day Reminders (EDR)'.

Portugal Presidential Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, spanning electoral authorities, government, and the European Commission (DG CNECT). ANACOM, the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC), was already onboarded to Meta's escalation channels, and a refresher training session was held on the direct escalation channels. Meta also reached out to the National Election Commission (CNE) to offer onboarding.

Ahead of the election, Meta conducted outreach to political parties sharing key information on account security and best practices for organic content. We were also in regular contact with civil society organisations and partners, including Iberifier, the European Partnership for Democracy, and ISCTE.

The Rapid Response System was activated approximately 6 weeks prior to the election, with onboarding conducted from 22 December 2025.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (22 December 2025 to 13 February 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 2
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 2
- Number of reports received during the election period: 47

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

- VIU Reach: 4.6 million
- EDR Reach: 3.8 million

Instagram

- VIU Reach: 4.9 million
- EDR Reach: 3.9 million

Slovenia Parliamentary Election

Preparations for the Slovenian parliamentary election began well ahead of polling day, with early engagement across government, including the Minister of Digital Affairs. Meta took part in a roundtable hosted by the DSC, the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia, covering election preparedness.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period and onboarded the Adria Digital Media Observatory (ADMO) to its direct reporting channel. We also offered to onboard the National Election Commission (DVK) to our reporting channels.

Throughout the campaign, Meta stayed in regular contact with civil society organisations and partners, including ADMO and the European Diplomacy Exchange Forum. Political parties were engaged directly through workshops, ensuring candidates' teams understood Meta's policies, reporting channels, and election integrity measures.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (23 February to 29 March 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 3
- Number of reports received during the election period: 1

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook • VIU Reach: 876K • EDR Reach: 738K	Instagram • VIU Reach: 539K • EDR Reach: 448K
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Denmark Parliamentary Election

External engagement and election preparation for Denmark's Parliamentary Election began early, spanning the government ministries and DSC. Meta engaged with the Danish Government's election Taskforce, including the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, in Copenhagen to discuss election tools, reporting mechanisms, and foreign interference concerns, with further calls held ahead of the vote. Meta also held a webinar for parties on election tools and reporting mechanisms.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period, with direct escalation channels in place for the Danish Agency for Digitisation (DSC), the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior, the Danish Medicines Agency, and Danish Gambling Authority, all previously onboarded. The Rapid Response System (RRS) has been activated, with EDMO Central as the coordinating body, which was duly onboarded. Throughout the campaign, Meta cooperated with its fact-checking partner TjekDet, which could receive content escalations directly for rating.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (18 March to 7 April 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
- Number of reports received during the election period: 0

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook • VIU Reach: 3 million • EDR Reach: 2.5 million	Instagram • VIU Reach: 1.9 million • EDR Reach: 1.5 million
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Hungary Parliamentary Election

Preparations for the election began well ahead of the vote including early engagements with government and national election entities. Meta also engaged political parties through scaled training and education sessions starting in Budapest in July 2025, clarifying Meta's policies, establishing communication channels, and providing access to 'Meta Support Pro' for priority technical issues.

Meta partnered with the National Election Office to connect users with authoritative voting information, and provided the National Media and Infocomm Authority (DSC) and the National Election Commission with training on key content policies and a dedicated session on the content escalation channel.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period and onboarded Political Capital, Lakmusz, and the CEE Digital Democracy Watch (CEEDDW) to its direct reporting channel for civic-violating and unlawful content. Meta cooperated with its fact-checking partner AFP and launched a Trending Event using relevant keywords to help AFP identify and debunk election-related misinformation, and stayed in close contact with AFP throughout the campaign to ensure they were supported.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (13 March to 21 April 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 3
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 3
- Number of reports received during the election period: 148

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

- VIU Reach: 5.4 million
- EDR Reach: 4.7 million

Instagram

- VIU Reach: 1.7 million
- EDR Reach: 1.3 million

Bulgaria Parliamentary Election

External engagement and preparations for the Bulgarian snap parliamentary election began early, spanning the electoral commission, government, and the European Commission. Meta held two meetings with the Bulgarian Minister of e-Governance and cross-government partners to discuss election-related topics, and directed them to existing escalation channels. The Communications Regulation Commission (CRC), Bulgaria's DSC, was engaged to explain overall election efforts and respond to its requests for information.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period and onboarded the BROD/GATE hub to its direct reporting channel. The Central Election Commission was offered escalation channel onboarding but remained offboarded.

Throughout the campaign, Meta stayed in regular contact with civil society and research organisations, including the Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI), the GATE Institute and BROD hub.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (23 March to 26 April 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 2
- Number of reports received during the election period: 17

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

- VIU Reach: 3.4 million
- EDR Reach: 2.8 million

Instagram

- VIU Reach: 1.3 million
- EDR Reach: 1 million

Cyprus Parliamentary Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, with in-person engagement with the Central Election Service (CES). CES was temporarily re-onboarded to Meta's escalation channels for blackout period reporting. The Cyprus Radio and Television Authority, as the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC), was onboarded to Meta's direct reporting channel. Meta also engaged with the Minister of the Interior.

MEDDMO was onboarded as the Rapid Response System partner and proactively flagged content during the election period.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (27 April to 2 June 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
- Number of reports received during the election period: 34

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook

- VIU Reach: 463K
- EDR Reach: 385.5K

Instagram

- VIU Reach: 455.7K
- EDR Reach: 383.4K

Malta General Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts were put in place quickly following the snap election announcement. Meta engaged with the Malta Communications Authority (DSC) through a roundtable covering platform preparedness, content moderation coverage, risk identification, and election integrity safeguards. The Maltese Electoral Commission was contacted for onboarding to direct escalation channels and confirmed its official website for the election products.

Meta activated its Rapid Response System for the election period, with the MEDDMO hub onboarded as the RRS partner covering Malta. Meta held two RRS meetings with MEDDMO, and all cases were cleared during the election period.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (8 May to 7 June 2026):

- Number of onboarded partners per market: 1
- Number of onboarded flaggers: 1
- Number of reports received during the election period: 11

Voter Information Unit and Election Day Reminder Reach:

Facebook • VIU Reach: 343.3K • EDR Reach: 295.9K	Instagram • VIU Reach: 175.8K • EDR Reach: 153.5K
<u>Responsible Approach to Generative AI</u> Meta’s approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for the EU national elections. Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling: Our Community Standards and Advertising Standards apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by Meta’s third-party fact-checking partners, whose rating options allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is generated or edited by AI. Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from certain organic content creation tools. For advertising content, Meta labels images and videos that were created or significantly edited using our 1P generative AI ad creative tools. Meta has begun labelling a wider range of media content when we detect industry-standard AI indicators or when users disclose that they are uploading AI-generated or AI-edited content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context. Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration: Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the Partnership on AI, for example, and signed onto the tech accord designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2026 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media. [Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].	
Scrutiny of Ads Placements	
The measures outlined in Commitments 1 to 3 of this report were in place for the elections covered in this report. They were complemented by the prohibited ads policy outlined above. Most pertinently, under these policies, content that is fact-checked cannot be used for an ad under our Advertising Standards.	
Political Advertising	

[Since 6 October 2025](#), Meta no longer allows social issue, political, and electoral ads (“SIEP ads”) on our platforms in the EU and associated territories.

Integrity of Services

All the measures outlined in Commitments 14 to 16 of this report were in place ahead of the European national elections.

Empowering the Research Community

Since 2023, researchers in Europe have had access to the Meta Content Library, enabling them to study various topics, including disinformation.