Code of Conduct on Disinformation – Report of Microsoft Bing for the period 1 July – 31 Dec 2025

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Subscription overview during the Reporting Period

Commitments	Measures	Bing
II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements		
1	Measure 1.1	☐
	Measure 1.2	☐
	Measure 1.3	☐
	Measure 1.4	☐
	Measure 1.5	☐
	Measure 1.6	☐
2	Measure 2.1	☐
	Measure 2.2	☐
	Measure 2.3	☐
	Measure 2.4	☐
3	Measure 3.1	☐
	Measure 3.2	☐
	Measure 3.3	☐
III. Political advertising		
4	Measure 4.1	☐
	Measure 4.2	☐
5	Measure 5.1	☐
6	Measure 6.1	☐
	Measure 6.2	☐
	Measure 6.3	☐
	Measure 6.4	☐
	Measure 6.5	☐
7	Measure 7.1	☐
	Measure 7.2	☐
	Measure 7.3	☐
	Measure 7.4	☐
8	Measure 8.1	☐
	Measure 8.2	☐
9	Measure 9.1	☐
	Measure 9.2	☐
10	Measure 10.1	☐
	Measure 10.2	☐
11	Measure 11.1	☐
	Measure 11.2	☐
	Measure 11.3	☐
	Measure 11.4	☐
12	Measure 12.1	☐
	Measure 12.2	☐
	Measure 12.3	☐
13	Measure 13.1	☐
	Measure 13.2	☐
	Measure 13.3	☐
IV. Integrity of services		
14	Measure 14.1	☐
	Measure 14.2	☐
	Measure 14.3	☐
15	Measure 15.1	☐
	Measure 15.2	☐
16	Measure 16.1	☒
	Measure 16.2	☐
V. Empowering users		
17	Measure 17.1	☐
	Measure 17.2	☐
	Measure 17.3	☐
18	Measure 18.1	☐
	Measure 18.2	☒
	Measure 18.3	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☒
	Measure 19.2	☒
20	Measure 20.1	☐
	Measure 20.2	☒
21	Measure 21.1	☐
	Measure 21.2	☐
	Measure 21.3	☐
22	Measure 22.1	☐
	Measure 22.2	☒
	Measure 22.3	☒
	Measure 22.4	☐
	Measure 22.5	☐
	Measure 22.6	☐
	Measure 22.7	☒
23	Measure 23.1	☐
	Measure 23.2	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☐
25	Measure 25.1	☐
	Measure 25.2	☐
VI. Empowering the research community		
26	Measure 26.1	☒
	Measure 26.2	☐

	Measure 26.3	☒
27	Measure 27.1	☐
	Measure 27.2	☐
	Measure 27.3	☐
	Measure 27.4	☐
28	Measure 28.1	☐
	Measure 28.2	☒
	Measure 28.3	☒
	Measure 28.4	☐
29	Measure 29.1	☐
	Measure 29.2	☐
	Measure 29.3	☐
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community		
30	Measure 30.1	☐
	Measure 30.2	☐
	Measure 30.3	☐
	Measure 30.4	☐
31	Measure 31.1	☐
	Measure 31.2	☐
	Measure 31.3	☐
	Measure 31.4	☐
32	Measure 32.1	☐
	Measure 32.2	☐
	Measure 32.3	☐
33	Measure 33.1	☐
VIII. Transparency centre		
34	Measure 34.1	☒
	Measure 34.2	☒
	Measure 34.3	☒
	Measure 34.4	☒

	Measure 34.5	☒
35	Measure 35.1	☒
	Measure 35.2	☒
	Measure 35.3	☒
	Measure 35.4	☒
	Measure 35.5	☐
	Measure 35.6	☐
36	Measure 36.1	☐
	Measure 36.2	☐
	Measure 36.3	☐
IX. Permanent Task-Force		
37	Measure 37.1	☒
	Measure 37.2	☒
	Measure 37.3	☐
	Measure 37.4	☒
	Measure 37.5	☒
	Measure 37.6	☒
X. Monitoring of the Code		
38	-	☒
39	-	☐
40	Measure 40.1	☒
	Measure 40.2	☐
	Measure 40.3	☒
	Measure 40.4	☒
	Measure 40.5	☒
	Measure 40.6	☒
41	Measure 41.1	☐
	Measure 41.2	☐
	Measure 41.3	☐
42	-	☒
43	-	☒

Executive summary

Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (MIOL) – the provider of Bing's services in the European Union (EU) – welcomes the opportunity to file this report on Bing compliance with the commitments and measures of the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation that it subscribed to in its Subscription Document dated 15 January 2025. This report covers the period from 1 July to 31 Dec 2025 (the "Reporting Period").

Bing is an online search engine with the primary objective of connecting users to the most relevant search results from the web. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Therefore, addressing misinformation or disinformation in organic search results often requires a different approach than may be appropriate for other types of online services, as over-moderation of content in search could have a significant negative impact on the right to access information, freedom of expression, and media plurality.

Bing carefully balances these competing fundamental rights and interests as it works to ensure that its algorithms return the most high-quality content available that is relevant to the user's queries, working to avoid causing harm to users without unduly limiting their ability to access answers to the questions they seek. In some cases, different features may require different interventions based on functionality and user expectations.

While Bing's remediation efforts may on occasion involve removal of content from search results (where legal or policy considerations warrant removal), in many cases, Bing has found that actions such as targeted ranking interventions, or additional digital literacy features such as Answers pointing to high authority sources, or content provenance indicators, are more effective. Bing regularly reviews the efficacy of its measures to identify additional areas for improvement and works with internal and external subject matter experts in key policy areas to identify new threat vectors or improved mechanisms to help prevent users from being unexpectedly exposed to harmful content in search results that they did not expressly seek to find.

Bing offers numerous generative AI experiences for users. For example, users may see generative search results on the main search engine results page for informational and complex queries. Generative search results are contained and indicated with an icon with the sentence "This summary was generated by AI from multiple online sources. Find the source links used for this summary under "Based on sources" Learn more about Bing results how Bing delivers search results." Users continue to see traditional search results immediately below any generative results.

Bing also offers a fully generative search experience, known Copilot Search (see Copilot Search). Copilot Search combines the foundation of Bing's search results with the power of large and small language models (LLMs and SLMs). It understands the search query, reviews millions of sources of information, dynamically matches content, and generates search results in a new AI-generated layout to fulfil the intent of the user's query more effectively.

Bing also offers Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator (see Free AI Image Generator - Bing Image Creator). These experiences allow users to create images and videos simply by using their own words to describe, and - within the Reporting Period - image uploads to inspire, the picture they want to see. These features can be accessed directly within Bing.com.

Bing follows the "Trustworthy Search Principles" (found at How Bing delivers search results - Microsoft Support) to guide the product design, experience, algorithms, and mitigation measures that Bing adopts to ensure users' expectations are met while addressing potential risks or harms arising from use of the service, including across Bing's GenAI experiences.

As confirmed by Bing's Year Two and Three Digital Service Act (DSA) Systemic Risk Assessments, the residual risks most relevant to misinformation and disinformation (i.e., those relating to Civic Discourse and Electoral Process, Public Health and Public Security) are categorised as "Low". While Bing is a participant in the elections Rapid Response System, it received no notifications during any of the elections for which this system was activated during the reporting period.

Bing supports the objectives of the European Code of Conduct on Disinformation (the "Code") and we are committed to actively working with Signatories and the European Commission in the context of this Code to defend against possible harms of disinformation on the Bing service.

Unless stated otherwise, data provided under this report covers a reporting period of 1 July 2025 to 31 Dec 2025 ("Reporting Period").

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 - 3

Not subscribed

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

Not subscribed

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 14 – not subscribed

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 15 – not subscribed

IV. Integrity of Services	
Commitment 16 Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures We will continue to work to include data on potential foreign influence operations from teams across Microsoft to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing and Bing generative AI features. We also look forward to continuing to work under this commitment with the other signatories to further cross platform information sharing.
Measure 16.1	Although sharing of disinformation does not occur on the Bing platform (i.e., through the use of user accounts and networks), Bing supports cross-platform information sharing protocols established under this Measure. As a search engine, Bing may however have limited information to share with other platforms about cross-platform influence and foreign interference and therefore subscribes with the understanding that it principally participates as a recipient of information.

QRE 16.1.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Bing is an online search engine, the primary purpose of which is to provide a searchable index of webpages available on the internet to help users find the content they are looking for. Bing does not host the content or control the operation, content, or design of indexed websites. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing does not allow users to post and share content or otherwise enable content to go "viral" through user-to-user exchanges of information on Bing. Although as a search engine Bing does not have any control over third party websites appearing in search results, Bing's ranking algorithms, spam policies, and other safeguards described below can also address and mitigate the risks arising from malicious websites that use other TTPs attempting to manipulate our search engine rankings. Bing's primary mechanism for combatting manipulative behaviors in search results is via its ranking algorithms and systems designed to identify and combat attempts to abuse search engine optimization techniques (i.e., spam). Bing describes the main parameters of its ranking systems in depth in How Bing Delivers Search Results. Abusive techniques and examples of prohibited Search Engine Optimization (SEO) activities are described in the Bing Webmaster Guidelines. These pages provide a deeper, more detailed understanding of how Bing algorithms work that cannot be fully detailed here given the space limitations of this report and complexity of how search engines rank websites. As described in these documents, Bing's ranking algorithms are designed to identify and prioritize high quality, highly authoritative content available online that is relevant to the user's query and to prevent abusive SEO techniques (spam). One of the key ranking techniques Bing uses to prevent low quality or misinformative websites from returning high in search results is through the "quality and credibility" score. Determining the quality and credibility (QC) of a website includes evaluating the clarity of purpose of the site, its usability, and presentation. QC also consists of an evaluation of the page's "authority", which includes factors such as: • Reputation: What types of other websites link to the site? A well-known news site is considered to have a higher reputation than a brand-new blog.

	• Level of discourse: Is the purpose of the content solely to cause harm to individuals or groups of people? For example, a site that promotes violence or resorts to name-calling or bullying will be considered to have a low level of discourse, and therefore lower authority, than a balanced news article. • Level of distortion: How well does the site differentiate fact from opinion? A site that is clearly labeled as satire or parody will have more authority than one that tries to obscure its intent. • Origination and transparency of the ownership: Is the site reporting first-hand information, or does it summarize or republish content from others? If the site doesn't publish original content, do they attribute the source? A first-hand account published on a personal blog could have more authority than unsourced content. In addition to its ranking algorithms, Bing's general abuse/spam policies prohibit certain practices intended to manipulate or deceive the Bing algorithms. These policies include prohibitions intended to address the TTPs employed by malicious actors in the spread of disinformation. Pursuant to the Webmaster Guidelines, Bing may take action on websites employing spam tactics (such as social media schemes, keyword stuffing, malicious behavior, cloaking, link schemes, or misleading structured data markups) or that otherwise violate the Webmaster Guidelines, including by applying ranking penalties (such as demoting a website) or delisting a website from the index. Note that it is not feasible to distinguish between general spam tactics and spam tactics employed by malicious actors specifically for the purpose of spreading disinformation. Therefore, Bing has not presented data on the amount of spam detected and actioned under its policies since these figures are indicative of actions taken toward spam overall and presently cannot be used to provide an accurate assessment of whether it pertains to spam used in connection with disinformation campaigns or spam used for another purpose (e.g., phishing). Bing partners with numerous organizations, including independent third-party organizations and teams across Microsoft, to provide information on potential information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing and Bing generative AI features. For example,

	• Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, such as trusted fact checkers, news publishers, and research organizations, that provide fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and early indicators of information operations, such as narratives or hashtags, to inform early detection and defensive search strategies. These organizations provide information for EEA member states. Bing also utilizes the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results. • Bing partners with Microsoft's internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), to collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams collaborate with external organisations and companies to support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats. Through MTAC and Microsoft's Elections and Societal Resilience team, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA Member States, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections.		
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	Methodology of data measurement (where appropriate insights on data provided) [suggested character limit: 1500 characters] Given the multipronged approach Microsoft and Bing take to monitoring and actioning influence operations and sources of misinformation and disinformation and the multiple internal and external sources relied upon, it is challenging to provide precise reporting on whether an incidence of single information sharing results in a corresponding defensive search intervention or other action.		
	Nr of actions taken (total)	Type of detected content	Other relevant metrics
Data	N/A	N/A	N/A
Measure 16.2	Not subscribed		

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 17 – not subscribed

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 18 Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures N/A

Measure 18.1	Not subscribed
Measure 18.2	

QRE 18.2.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Unlike social media services, for which this Commitment appears primarily oriented, search engines do not typically cause or facilitate the viral propagation of disinformation, as they do not allow users to post or share content directly on the service. Please see How Bing delivers search results and Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines for an overview of how Bing designs its algorithms to deliver high authority and highly relevant content while minimizing the negative impact of spam and less credible information sources. Bing's ranking algorithms and related policies are intended to address deceptive tactics intended to manipulate the algorithms and are discussed in more detail at QREs 16.1.1. In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA, high in relevant search results. Bing's suggestions features offer possible search queries to users to facilitate a more efficient search experience. While search suggestions are not directly tied to virality of content, Bing also undertakes measures to help ensure it does not inadvertently lead users to misleading or other harmful content through suggestions. Specifically, Bing uses a combination of proactive and reactive algorithmic and manual interventions to prevent the display of search suggestions that could lead to low authority content. Users can also adjust and/or deactivate ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, in the Bing Settings Page (see Search - Settings). Bing also provides a tool for users to provide feedback on suggestions they encounter. The feedback tool is shown below.



Clicking "Feedback on these suggestions" allows users to provide specific feedback on individual suggestions on the below bases:





In Bing's generative AI experiences, there is generally no risk of viral spread of generated content through Bing because Bing does not allow users to directly post or otherwise share content on the platform.

	However, Bing has taken steps to prevent the service from being used to create misinformation that might be shared on other platforms through a multipronged approach to mitigations that helps prevent users from creating misinformative content. This system includes terms of use and a code of conduct, classifiers, filters, metaprompting, and robust reporting mechanisms designed to mitigate the risk of potential misuse of the platform. The terms governing usage Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator, for example, prohibit users from using the service to generate fraudulent or misleading information, including the creation of disinformation. Bing's ranking and relevance systems for search, which also provide the backbone to answering user questions in Copilot Search, work to ensure that high authority content is surfaced first in search results. Where Copilot Search systems flag that a user's prompt or generated output may result in low authority or misleading information, the system will take steps to mitigate that possible harm through solutions, such as not returning generated content to the user, diverting the user to a different topic, or redirecting the user to traditional search. Users who encounter problematic content can report concerns at Microsoft-Report a Concern.			
SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	Methodology of data measurement (where appropriate insights on data provided) [suggested character limit: 1500 characters] Bing does not have data relevant to this SLI. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing does not have a news feed for users of user content, allow users to post and share content within Bing, or otherwise enable content to go "viral" on Bing.			
	Total no of violations	Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 2: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 3: indicating the impact of the action taken
Data	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Measure 18.3	Not subscribed			

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 19 Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures N/A
Measure 19.1	
QRE 19.1.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Bing's search engine ranking algorithms are not a traditional "recommender system" in that Bing only provides content to users as a result of their express request, rather than pushing content to users who were not expressly seeking it. That said, the main parameters of Bing's ranking algorithms are published in the "How Bing Ranks Search Results" section of How Bing Delivers Search Results, which is available to Bing users in the EU. Bing also provides information on how it ranks and returns search suggestions in the Enhanced Search Experiences section of How Bing Delivers Search Results. Ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, can be adjusted and/or deactivated through user search settings. Bing's ranking algorithms apply equally to traditional search results and generative AI features that extend to Bing. Please also see 22.2.1.

.Measure 19.2	
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Methodology of data measurement (where appropriate insights on data provided) [suggested character limit: 1500 characters] N/A
	No of times users actively engaged with these settings
Data	N/A

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 20 Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft has continued to improve content provenance measures on its AI image and video generation features, including Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator. As part of Microsoft's commitments to combat deceptive AI, Microsoft is building on its 2024 Tech Accord work: • Developing and implementing technology to mitigate risks related to Deceptive AI Election content, including open-source tools where appropriate • Assessing models in scope to understand the risks they may present regarding Deceptive AI Election Content • Seeking to detect the distribution of this content on their platforms • Seeking to appropriately address this content detected on their platforms • Providing transparency to the public regarding how the company addresses it • Continuing to engage with a diverse set of global civil society organizations, academics

	• Supporting efforts to foster public awareness, media literacy, and all-of-society resilience.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft expects to continue its important work in content provenance tools and ways to help counter harmful AI-generated content. Microsoft is helping to build public trust in digital content through its leadership in the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). A multistakeholder initiative, we are partnering with civil society organizations and industry partners in developing technical standards to certify the origin and integrity of media. These standards are being integrated into Microsoft's AI-generated image services and are helping partners verify if image content was created using AI.
Measure 20.1	Not subscribed
Measure 20.2	
QRE 20.2.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Microsoft is helping to build public trust in digital content through its leadership in the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). A multistakeholder initiative, we are partnering with civil society organizations and industry partners in developing technical standards to certify the origin and integrity of media. These standards are being integrated into Microsoft's AI-generated image services and are helping partners verify if image content was created using AI.

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 21 – not subscribed

V. Empowering Users	
Commitment 22 Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Microsoft works with multiple external partners on trainings, resources, and solutions for local newsrooms. Through a collaboration with the CUNY Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism, the Poynter Institute, and the Thomson Reuters Foundation, Microsoft trained thousands of journalists globally on developing AI policies for newsrooms and ethical AI use in news. Microsoft also partners with The Lenfest Institute to develop AI solutions for local newsrooms. The solutions focus on supporting the business sustainability of newsrooms, and many have been made public online and through in-person panels and convenings. Microsoft continued work with the human rights-focused nonprofit WITNESS to enhance journalists' and fact-checkers' capacity to address AI threats to elections. Through this partnership, Microsoft and WITNESS created resources to build literacy around AI detection and how detection technology complements core information literacy approaches. These resources were debuted to global audiences at the International Journalism Festival in April 2025 and are available here: Things to know before using AI detection tools - Library. Microsoft also supported and collaborated on the development and release of The Newsroom Toolkit from the Poynter Institute's MediaWise. The toolkit is a resource for journalists and media professionals seeking to integrate AI literacy into their reporting and organizational practices. Poynter reported the release of the toolkit was met with high interest and enthusiasm by industry professionals, with 431 individuals attending the webinar launch from 50 countries, including European Union countries. The toolkit was downloaded 1,857 times in the first three months after release.

	In September 2025, Microsoft and Minecraft Education rolled out educational materials for users around AI and AI literacy to continue to promote ongoing engagement and education: Build AI Literacy with Reed Smart | Minecraft Education. In parallel, Microsoft announced enhancements to Search Coach, a tool available through Teams for Education to help learners develop critical thinking skills when they are assessing online information: Empowering Learners for the Age of AI: New Information Literacy Features Coming to Search Progress | Microsoft Community Hub.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft plans a refresh of our AI Classroom Safety Toolkit in approximately six months. This toolkit is used in classrooms around the globe to advance learning objectives that include assessing the trustworthiness of AI information sources. See here for more: Unlock generative AI safely and responsibly—classroom toolkit
Measure 22.1	Not subscribed

Measure 22.2	
QRE 22.2.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Bing utilizes a variety of signals – including trustworthiness indicators from trusted fact checkers and research organizations – as one of several means to help determine the authority score of a given website and rank it accordingly in search results. Microsoft also maintains additional partnerships with fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA to strengthen the company's capacity and understanding of global threats to disinformation and inform interventions in Bing to protect users against related risks. These partnerships are part of a broader effort to empower Microsoft users to better understand the information they consume across our platforms and products. The above mechanisms and the Bing algorithm's emphasis on promoting high authority content are applied equally to core search as well as Bing generative AI features to help ensure that users are protected from misleading information across Bing surfaces. Ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, can be adjusted and/or deactivated through user search setting.

Measure 22.3	
QRE 22.3.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] The above-mentioned policies and measures are available to EU users in EU languages through the Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines and How Bing delivers search results.
Measure 22.4	Not subscribed
Measure 22.5	Not subscribed
Measure 22.6	Not subscribed
Measure 22.7	
QRE 22.7.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]. In addition to broader measures described in this report, Bing has taken special care to counter low authority information and misinformation in relation to elections, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and EU Member State elections as detailed below and further in the Crisis and Elections Reporting appendices. Microsoft is an active participant in the Task-force's Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group. In addition, Microsoft works with election authorities responsible for running elections to promote trusted information regarding elections and monitors for foreign information operations targeting elections. Additional detail is provided in the Crisis Reporting appendix. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Bing has closely monitored low authority information trend and works to promote authoritative content related to the conflict. • Bing has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (*see* SLI 22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing and integrated into Copilot Search • Bing works with Microsoft's Elections and Societal Resilience Team and Threat Assessment Center (MTAC) to ensure access to signals regarding Russian cyber and information operations targeting Ukraine to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and generative AI search tools. • Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, including trusted fact checkers, news publishers, research organizations and nonprofit organizations, to provide information related to information operations, such as actors,

domains, narratives, and emerging data voids manipulated, to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and Bing's generative AI experiences.

- Bing also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content.
- These measures have helped ensure that Bing is generally promoting authoritative news sources, timelines, and other factual information at the top of algorithmic search results and in Copilot Search.

Additional information concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict is contained in the Crisis Reporting Appendices.

SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above

Methodology of data measurement (where appropriate insights on data provided) [suggested character limit: 1500 characters]

Bing has revised the SLI action descriptions below for accuracy with respect to the metrics provided pursuant to this Section. Please see below key metrics.

Although defensive search actions are taken at a global level (and therefore applied in every Member State), Bing has endeavoured to provide the additional following data for this SLI:

- **"Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)"** refers to the total number of queries entered by users that were addressed with defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis during the Reporting Period.
- **"Impressions (RU/UA)"** reflects the number of user impressions for queries searched by users where defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis were applied during the Reporting Period.

	Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)	Impressions (RU/UA)
Member States		
Austria	1,507	37,256
Belgium	2,526	46,794
Bulgaria	-	-
Croatia	-	-
Cyprus	-	-
Czech Republic	2	2
Denmark	1,181	6,998
Estonia	3	3
Finland	794	6,875
France	4,747	178,814
Germany	8,298	312,600

Greece	-	-
Hungary	-	-
Ireland	3,583	28,677
Italy	3,870	57,862
Latvia	-	-
Lithuania	1	1
Luxembourg	-	-
Malta	-	-
Netherlands	3,743	22,083
Poland	2,753	23,942
Portugal	1,611	9,388
Romania	1	2
Slovakia	1	1
Slovenia	-	-
Spain	2,903	23,183
Sweden	3,618	18,444
Iceland	-	-
Liechtenstein	-	-
Norway	2,369	11,689
Total EU	30,277	784,614
Total EEA	43,511	784,614
Total Global	963,847	5,790,217

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 23 – not subscribed

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 24 – not subscribed

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 25 – not subscribed

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the research community	
Commitment 26 Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is dedicated to supporting the research community and welcomes feedback from this vital community and the Commission on the types of data that would be most useful for safety research.
Measure 26.1	
QRE 26.1.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Bing and Microsoft are dedicated to supporting the research community and regularly provide information and data to the research community in a variety of ways. Consistent with the EU's CoCD and the Digital Services Act (DSA) regulation, researchers may request data from Bing. Bing uses the same intake process for both CoCD and DSA research requests. Researchers may easily request access for publicly accessible Bing data through Bing's Qualified Researcher Program (aligned with DSA Article 40(12)) and resources for researchers seeking access to datasets (aligned with DSA Article 40(4) and launched in this Reporting Period). However, because these datasets are already available open-

	source (see below), some researchers may elect to obtain datasets via the below means to avoid the burden of an application and credentialing process. Bing also offers use of Bing APIs to the public, referred to as "Grounding with Bing". These APIs are offered for less than 15 Euros for up to 1,000 transactions per month, which may be leveraged by the research community. Researchers who are registered webmasters may utilize Bing's Keyword research and Backlinks Webmaster Tools to provide insights into search usage and keywords. Bing is working on ways to provide deeper research access to the tool across the research community and looks forward to providing more information as it is available. Microsoft maintains a public portal of codes, APIs, software development kits, and datasets that are available to the Research Community at Researcher Tools: code, datasets, & models - Microsoft Research. These public research tools can be accessed by researchers and download instantaneously without formal applications or login credentials. Microsoft is also a leader in Responsible AI and offers and offers a range of tools and resources to promote responsible usage of artificial intelligence. Information on Microsoft's tools, practices, and policies to uphold its responsible AI principles can be found at Responsible AI: Ethical policies and practices | Microsoft AI. Lastly, given the open nature of the Bing index and public nature of search results, researchers can utilize Bing, Copilot Search, Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator to run specific queries and analyze results (unlike social media which may require private accounts or connections between users to access certain materials).
QRE 26.1.2	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] In the reporting period, Bing published information on resources for researchers seeking access to datasets.
SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	Methodology of data measurement (where appropriate insights on data provided) [suggested character limit: 1500 characters] Bing has a tracking tool for all the data requests by researchers in alignment with DSA, Article 40(12) and Article 40(4). The tool includes the information on the researcher, received and response dates, link to

	information related to the application, provided answer and rational amongst other information.
	Nr of CoCD research requests
Data	0
Measure 26.2	Not subscribed
Measure 26.3	
QRE 26.3.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] For Bing's Keyword Research tool, users can report issues by creating a support request ticket at Webmaster Support - Bing Webmaster Tools. For Bing API access, users can report issues at https://aka.ms/bingapisupport. For Bing's EU qualified researcher program, users can find information to report issues at Bing Qualified Researcher Program - Microsoft Support

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 27 – not subscribed

VI. Empowering the research community	
Commitment 28 Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures

	Bing and Microsoft have ongoing research projects and internal research on misinformation risks in image generation services, generative AI in elections, and other important topics.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Ongoing review of researcher feedback and requests may result in additional measures and resources. In addition, Microsoft Research regularly explores potential partnerships with third party research institutions and discusses potential misinformation and disinformation related research that may leverage Bing data with research institutions. Microsoft's internal research divisions also regularly initiate and support research relevant to misinformation and disinformation and further research may be released in the next reporting period.
Measure 28.1	Not subscribed
Measure 28.2	
QRE 28.2.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] See QRE 26.1.1.
Measure 28.3	
QRE 28.3.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] We look forward to partnering with other relevant signatories on this project and will provide further reporting as the annual consultation is established.
Measure 28.4	Not subscribed

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 29 – not subscribed

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

Not subscribed

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre	
Commitment 34 To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft Bing has actively contributed in the context of the Transparency Center subgroup, providing feedback on the functioning and usability of the Transparency Center website.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft Bing is committed to the proper functioning of the Transparency Center website and will therefore continue its engagement in the Transparency Center subgroup in order to assess the necessity of technical adjustments and new actions to improve the website.
Measure 34.1	
Measure 34.2	
Measure 34.3	
Measure 34.4	
Measure 34.5	

VIII. Transparency Centre	
Commitment 35 Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft Bing will upload this March 2026 Report, for the Reporting Period 1 July until 31 Dec 2025, to the Transparency Centre website in a timely manner. This will include clear and simple information on the new or existing policies and actions that each service has implemented based on our Subscription document.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures In the context of the work of the Transparency Center subgroup, Microsoft Bing will assess the necessity of technical adjustments where necessary, aiming to ensure the information on the website pertaining to Bing remains easily accessible and complete for users.
Measure 35.1	
Measure 35.2	
Measure 35.3	
Measure 35.4	
Measure 35.5	Not subscribed
Measure 35.6	Not subscribed

VIII. Transparency Centre
Commitment 36 – not subscribed

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force	
Commitment 37 Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft Bing has actively engaged in and contributed to the work of the Task-force and the relevant Subgroups and Working Groups that took place during the reporting period.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft Bing is committed to continuing its active engagement in and contribution to the Task-force and relevant Subgroups and Working Groups in the upcoming six-month period.
Measure 37.1	
Measure 37.2	
Measure 37.3	Not subscribed
Measure 37.4	
Measure 37.5	
Measure 37.6	
QRE 37.6.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Microsoft Bing has actively engaged in and contributed to all the Task-force Plenary meetings as well as to the meetings of all Subgroups and Working Groups relevant to its subscription that were active in the current reporting period. As part of each Subgroup and Working Group relevant to its subscription that has taken place during the reporting period, Microsoft Bing has actively contributed to the development of the deliverables that were collectively agreed.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 38 The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures A dedicated team across Microsoft and led by Bing continues to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Conduct across all applicable geographical areas. The team consists of representatives from Bing's T&S function, known as the Responsible AI and Defense (RAID) team, relevant product attorneys, as well as members from the European Government Affairs team and Elections and Societal Resilience Team.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Bing will continue its efforts to ensure continued progress towards compliance of relevant measures.
Measure 38.1	
QRE 38.1.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] Bing has a dedicated team to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Conduct across all applicable geographical areas. The team consists of representatives from Bing's T&S function, known as the Responsible AI and Defense (RAID) team, relevant product attorneys, as well as members from the European Government Affairs team and Elections and Societal Resilience Team. In addition, we implemented an internal tracking process that captured all relevant commitments, responsible entity and persons responsible for compliance with the Code of Conduct.

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 39 – not subscribed

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 40 Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures This Report sets out in detail the measures that Bing has taken in view of the regular reporting that it has subscribed to under the Code of Conduct.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Bing has worked over the past months to ensure it is in a position for the delivery of the March 2026 Report and looks forward continuing this trend going forward.

Measure 40.1	
Measure 40.2	Not subscribed
Measure 40.3	
Measure 40.4	
Measure 40.5	
Measure 40.6	

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 41 – not subscribed

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 42 Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft Bing has been an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force's Elections Working Group, working with signatories to finalize the Elections Rapid Response System, which has subsequently been implemented in our internal workflows.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft Bing will continue its cooperation with other Signatories in the context of the Task-force's Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group.

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 43 Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft Bing will provide its March 2026 Report in accordance with the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies as jointly developed by Signatories in the Monitoring and Reporting Subgroup under the Code's Task-force.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft Bing stands ready to continue its engagement in the respective Task-force Subgroups to update where necessary the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies in view of its experience with reporting.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]. **Bing** has observed instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to the Russia<>Ukraine conflict. Trends include the spread of antisemitic conspiracy narratives, increasing use of AI-generated content, including targeting Ukrainian and European political leaders, and attempts to influence LLM outputs by seeding pro-Kremlin narratives across online sources. In parallel, extremist and fringe communities are leveraged to amplify pro-Kremlin narratives among Western audiences.
Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]. **Microsoft** has been actively involved in identifying and helping counter Russia's cyber and influence operations aimed against Ukraine. In addition to supporting nonprofits, journalists, and academics within Ukraine, Microsoft's Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) team closely tracks cyber-enabled influence operations. MTAC's work includes analysing the ways these methods are leveraged to target audiences in Central and Eastern Europe. **Bing** has implemented the following measures: (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].
Policies and Terms and Conditions
Outline any changes to your policies

Policy	**Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)**	**Rationale**
N/A	Bing has not implemented additional policies specific to this crisis since its last report.	Prior to this reporting period, Bing had already established measures to address this crisis. Although Bing continues to refine its approach to addressing this crisis and continues to evolve mitigation measures, it has not introduced specific policy changes this reporting period.
Scrutiny of Ads Placements Not subscribed		
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.		
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A	
Political Advertising Not subscribed		

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A
Integrity of Services	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Bing has implemented the following measures: (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available More than 963,847 queries searched by users in the globally related to the Russia/Ukraine conflict have been treated with defensive search interventions, resulting in over 5,790,217 impressions. For member state level reporting, see SLI 22.7.1.
Empowering Users	

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Articles from news and fact checking organizations, may also appear as part of specialized Bing Answers. In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checking organizations and journalist-driven fact-checks, high in relevant search results. In addition, Bing utilizes information, including fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and narratives, to inform the Bing algorithm and defensive search measures that power Bing and Bing generative AI features. Bing works with independent third-party organizations to provide early indicators of narratives, hashtags, or information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing. Bing also utilizes the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available See QRE 22.7.1 for further information.
Empowering the Research Community	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention See QRE 26.1.1 for general research support. Bing has not made datasets available pertaining specifically to this crisis.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community Not subscribed	

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

Israel – Hamas conflict

Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

Bing has observed instances of data void manipulation to show low-authority content to unsuspecting users related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. This type of search algorithm manipulation could potentially be used as a tactic to spread disinformation. Other themes observed have included foreign influence operations speculating on the humanitarian crisis and scale of civilian causalities related to conflict and military operations in the area, often referring to manipulated videos and images circulating online and narratives on broader Middle East conflicts.

Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

As part of its regular practices, Bing employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Bing has not introduced specific policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks related to this crisis.

Policy	Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)	Rationale

N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements Not subscribed		
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.		
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	
Political Advertising Not subscribed		
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.		
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	
Integrity of Services		

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Bing has not introduced specific practices or policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks. However, Bing continues to monitor this crisis and may evolve its approach as needed. As part of its regular practices, Bing employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A
Empowering Users	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Bing has not introduced specific practices or policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks. However, Bing continues to monitor this crisis and may evolve its approach as needed. Nonetheless, articles from news and fact checking organizations may also appear as part of specialized Bing Answers. In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA, high in relevant search results.

	Bing partners with numerous organizations, including independent third-party organizations and teams across Microsoft, to provide information on potential information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing and Bing generative AI features. For example, • Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, such as trusted fact checkers, news publishers, and research organizations, that provide fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and early indicators of information operations, such as narratives or hashtags, to inform early detection and defensive search strategies. These organizations provide information for EEA member states, including in Irish, Dutch, and Czech languages, countries that had elections in the period. Bing also utilizes the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results. • Bing partners with Microsoft's internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), to collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams collaborate with external organisations and companies to support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats. Through MTAC and Microsoft's Elections and Societal Resilience team, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA Member States, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A
Empowering the Research Community	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention See QRE 26.1.1 for general research support. Bing has not made datasets available pertaining specifically to this crisis.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available N/A

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
European national elections (Dutch General Parliamentary Elections)
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]. **Bing** anticipated instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to elections. As part of its regular information integrity operations, Bing detected information manipulation themes related to the Dutch national election, which have been ingested to inform defensive search interventions.
Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]. **Bing** takes a multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity and regularly updates its processes, policies, and practices to adapt to evolving risks, trends, and technological innovations. This approach includes: (1) defensive search interventions; (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources; (3) removal of auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content; (4) partnerships with independent organizations for threat intelligence on information manipulation, civic integrity and nation state affiliated actors to inform potential algorithmic interventions and contribute to broader research community; (5) special information panels and answers to direct users to high authority sources concerning elections and voting; (6) internal working groups dedicated to addressing company-wide election initiatives; (7) establishing special election-focused product feature teams; (8) conducting internal research on content provenance and elections; (9) evaluating and undertaking red-team testing for generative AI features with respect to elections; (10) ensuring Responsible AI reviews for all AI features; (11) undertaking comprehensive risk assessments related to elections and electoral processes; (12) developing and continuing to improve targeted monitoring both for web search and Bing generative AI features; (13) restricting generative AI responses for certain types of election-related content; (14) leveraging blocklists and classifiers in generative AI experiences to restrict generation of images or certain types of content concerning politicians and certain election-related topics (15) integrating information on political parties, candidates, and elections from local election authorities (including in the EU) or high authority third party sources to inform defensive interventions and election-related product mitigations; and (16) regularly evaluating whether additional measures, metrics, or mitigations should be implemented. These measures are integrated into Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report. In addition, we offer Microsoft AccountGuard, a security service designed to enhance protections for organizations involved in democratic processes and civil society. The program provides an extra layer of cyber threat monitoring and notification of nation-state actors targeting high-risk customers who enroll. AccountGuard is available in 40 countries, including 23 European Union Countries: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The service is also offered to candidates for the EU Parliament from any member nation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Outline any changes to your policies		
Policy	**Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)**	**Rationale**
Authoritative Information sources	Bing empowered voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites	
Authoritative Information sources	As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on election-related information seeking queries.	See more at Microsoft announces new steps to help protect elections - Microsoft On the Issues
Deepfakes and Elections	Microsoft-Report Election Misrepresentation is a webpage created to empower political candidates, campaigns and election authorities to report alleged deepfakes of themselves to Microsoft. To date, we have not received an actionable report of deceptive AI targeting elections on Microsoft platforms. Microsoft's Office of Responsible AI has also established policies concerning election-related content and works with teams, including Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator on implementation.	See more at Meeting the moment: combating AI deepfakes in elections through new tech accord
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		

Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A
Political Advertising Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A
Integrity of Services	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's	Description of intervention

relevant Commitment and Measure)	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available
Empowering Users	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure) **Partnerships with Election Authorities and Trusted Partners**	Description of intervention Bing empowers voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites. Additionally, Bing receives data from independent third-party organizations, election authorities and other sources of trusted election information to ensure accurate election critical information is provided to voters. In addition, Bing works to provide user-facing information panels on election information for major European elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available
Empowering the Research Community	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Microsoft is undertaking additional research on how users interact with content provenance tools and the use of content provenance tools for AI and elections and other research concerning AI and elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available Such research helps to inform Bing safety mitigations.

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A

Reporting on the service's response during elections
European national elections (Czech parliamentary elections)
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]. **Bing** anticipated instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to elections. As part of its regular information integrity operations, Bing detected information manipulation themes related to the Czech Parliamentary Election, which have been ingested to inform defensive search interventions.
Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]. **Bing** takes a multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity and regularly updates its processes, policies, and practices to adapt to evolving risks, trends, and technological innovations. This approach includes: (1) defensive search interventions; (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources; (3) removal of auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content; (4) partnerships with independent organizations for threat intelligence on information manipulation, civic integrity and nation state affiliated actors to inform potential algorithmic interventions and contribute to broader research community; (5) special information panels and answers to direct users to high authority sources concerning elections and voting; (6) internal working groups dedicated to addressing company-wide election initiatives; (7) establishing special election-focused product feature teams; (8) conducting internal research on content provenance and elections; (9) evaluating and undertaking red-team testing for generative AI features with respect to elections; (10) ensuring Responsible AI reviews for all AI features; (11) undertaking

comprehensive risk assessments related to elections and electoral processes; (12) developing and continuing to improve targeted monitoring both for web search and Bing generative AI features; (13) restricting generative AI responses for certain types of election-related content; (14) leveraging blocklists and classifiers in generative AI experiences to restrict generation of images or certain types of content concerning politicians and certain election-related topics (15) integrating information on political parties, candidates, and elections from local election authorities (including in the EU) or high authority third party sources to inform defensive interventions and election-related product mitigations; and (16) regularly evaluating whether additional measures, metrics, or mitigations should be implemented. These measures are integrated into Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

In addition, we offer Microsoft AccountGuard, a security service designed to enhance protections for organizations involved in democratic processes and civil society. The program provides an extra layer of cyber threat monitoring and notification of nation-state actors targeting high-risk customers who enroll. AccountGuard is available in 40 countries, including 23 European Union Countries: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The service is also offered to candidates for the EU Parliament from any member nation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy	**Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)**	**Rationale**
Authoritative Information sources	Bing empowered voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites	

Authoritative Information sources	As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on election-related information seeking queries.	See more at Microsoft announces new steps to help protect elections - Microsoft On the Issues
Deepfakes and Elections	Microsoft-Report Election Misrepresentation is a webpage created to empower political candidates and campaigns to report alleged deepfakes of themselves to Microsoft. To date, we have not received an actionable report of deceptive AI targeting elections on Microsoft platforms. Microsoft's Office of Responsible AI has also established policies concerning election-related content and works with teams, including Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator on implementation.	See more at Meeting the moment: combating AI deepfakes in elections through new tech accord
Scrutiny of Ads Placements Not subscribed		
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.		
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	

Political Advertising Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A
Integrity of Services	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on election-related information seeking queries. Bing identified information manipulation themes related to the Czech parliamentary election, which have informed defensive search interventions and fanouts to related search terms.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available
Empowering Users	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	

Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure) **Partnerships with Election Authorities and Trusted Partners**	Description of intervention Bing empowers voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites. Additionally, Bing receives data from independent third-party organizations, election authorities and other sources of trusted election information to ensure accurate election critical information is provided to voters. In addition, Bing works to provide user-facing information panels on election information for major European elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available
Empowering the Research Community	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Microsoft is undertaking additional research on how users interact with content provenance tools and the use of content provenance tools for AI and elections and other research concerning AI and elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available Such research helps to inform Bing safety mitigations.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's	Description of intervention: N/A

relevant Commitment and Measure)	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
European national elections (Irish presidential elections)
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]. **Bing** anticipated instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to elections. As part of its regular information integrity operations, Bing detected information manipulation themes related to the Irish presidential election, which have been ingested to inform defensive search interventions.
Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]. **Bing** takes a multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity and regularly updates its processes, policies, and practices to adapt to evolving risks, trends, and technological innovations. This approach includes: (1) defensive search interventions; (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources; (3) removal of auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content; (4) partnerships with independent organizations for threat intelligence on information manipulation, civic integrity and nation state affiliated actors to inform potential algorithmic interventions and contribute to broader research community; (5) special information panels and answers to direct users to high authority sources concerning elections and voting; (6) internal working groups dedicated to addressing company-wide election initiatives; (7) establishing special election-focused product feature teams; (8) conducting internal research on content provenance and elections; (9) evaluating and undertaking red-team testing for generative AI features with respect to elections; (10) ensuring Responsible AI reviews for all AI features; (11) undertaking comprehensive risk assessments related to elections and electoral processes; (12) developing and continuing to improve targeted monitoring both for web search and Bing generative AI features; (13) restricting generative AI responses for certain types of election-related content; (14) leveraging blocklists and classifiers in generative AI experiences to restrict generation of images or certain types of content concerning politicians and certain election-related topics (15) integrating information on political parties, candidates, and elections from local election authorities (including in the EU) or high authority third party sources to inform defensive interventions and election-related product mitigations; and (16) regularly evaluating whether additional measures, metrics, or mitigations should be implemented. These measures are integrated into Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report. In addition, we offer Microsoft AccountGuard, a security service designed to enhance protections for organizations involved in democratic processes and civil society. The program provides an extra layer of cyber threat monitoring and notification of nation-state actors targeting high-risk customers who enroll. AccountGuard is available in 40

countries, including 23 European Union Countries: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The service is also offered to candidates for the EU Parliament from any member nation.		
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Outline any changes to your policies		
Policy	**Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)**	**Rationale**
Authoritative Information sources	Bing empowered voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites	
Authoritative Information sources	As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on select election-related information seeking queries for elections.	See more at Microsoft announces new steps to help protect elections - Microsoft On the Issues
Deepfakes and Elections	Microsoft-Report Election Misrepresentation is a webpage created to empower political candidates and campaigns to report alleged deepfakes of themselves to Microsoft. To date, we have not received an actionable report of deceptive AI targeting elections on Microsoft platforms.	See more at Meeting the moment: combating AI deepfakes in elections through new tech accord

	Microsoft's Office of Responsible AI has also established policies concerning election-related content and works with teams, including Bing, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator on implementation.	
Scrutiny of Ads Placements Not subscribed		
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.		
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	
Political Advertising Not subscribed		
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.		
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A	
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A	

Integrity of Services	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention As part of its multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity, Bing directed users to high-authority sources and official resources on election-related information seeking queries. Bing identified information manipulation themes related to the Irish presidential election, which have informed defensive search interventions and fanouts to related search terms.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available
Empowering Users	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure) **Partnerships with Election Authorities and Trusted Partners**	Description of intervention Bing empowers voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites. Additionally, Bing receives data from independent third-party organizations, election authorities and other sources of trusted election information to ensure accurate election critical information is provided to voters. In addition, Bing works to provide user-facing information panels on election information for major European elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available

Empowering the Research Community	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention Microsoft is undertaking additional research on how users interact with content provenance tools and the use of content provenance tools for AI and elections and other research concerning AI and elections.
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available Such research helps to inform Bing safety mitigations.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community Not subscribed	
Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.	
Specific Action applied (with reference to the Code's relevant Commitment and Measure)	Description of intervention: N/A
	Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available: N/A