Code of Practice on Disinformation – Report of Google for the period of 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024

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Executive summary

Google's mission is to organise the world's information to make it universally accessible and useful. To deliver on this mission, elevating authoritative information and combating misinformation and disinformation is of utmost importance. This is especially true around issues such as public health, elections, civic engagement, or other issues that directly impact Google users' lives and civil society, as well as during crises such as the war in Ukraine, and the Israel-Gaza conflict.

Since Google was founded, Google's product, policy, and content enforcement decisions have been guided by the following three principles:

1. **Value openness and accessibility:** Aim to provide access to an open and diverse information ecosystem, while maintaining a responsible approach to supporting information quality;

2. **Respect user choice:** Based on users' intent, access to content that is not illegal or prohibited by Google's policies should be available, but set a high bar for information quality where users have not clearly expressed what they are looking for;

3. **Build for everyone:** Take into account the diversity of users (cultures, languages, backgrounds) and seek to address their needs appropriately.

With these principles in mind, Google implements a multi-faceted approach to address the complex challenges and risks raised by misinformation and disinformation across Google's products and services. Google has long invested in ranking systems that seek to connect people with authoritative sources; in developing and enforcing rules that prohibit harmful behaviours and contents on Google services; and in innovative ways to provide context to users when they might need it most. We realise that fundamental rights are interdependent and are sometimes in tension with each other. When efforts to protect or advance one right may result in limiting another right, we identify and implement mitigation measures to address potential adverse impacts such as, protecting freedom of expression via appeals mechanisms or raising authoritative content to address lower-quality content that may appear on the platform. We comply with applicable laws by removing illegal content, go further by removing content that violates our policies, and regularly evolve these policies in consultation with experts. Our work is not done, and we expect to continue improving upon these efforts in the future.

However, we are cognizant that these are complex issues, affecting all of society, which no single actor is in a position to fully tackle on their own. That is why we have welcomed the multi-stakeholder approach put forward by the European Union with its 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation and, later on, with a Strengthened Code which Google signed in June 2022.

Google's H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024) report includes new metrics and narrative detail, representing meaningful progress in Google's work to meet our commitments under the Code. It highlights the breadth of our work across Member States to tackle the monetisation of disinformation, to provide transparency on political advertising, to detect and counter a range of threats to the integrity of our services, to empower users, and to work with the fact-checking and research communities. It also provides more information about the quantitative impacts of our work at the Member State level than ever before.

In addition to providing new quantitative information about our work, the report also describes our efforts to support and connect users to authoritative content, including by elevating Information Panels to users across the European Economic Area (EEA) and via media literacy campaigns. The report also clarifies how we support researchers across our products, such as through our €25 million inaugural contribution into the European Media and Information Fund (which has independently selected at least 70 projects across Europe), $13.2 million USD grant to the International Fact-Checking Network, additional grants to support research efforts related to Trust & Safety in technology, and through the Google Research Program and YouTube Researcher Program.

Updates to highlight in this report include (but are not limited to):

- **2024 EU Parliamentary Elections:** During the EU Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Google was committed to supporting this democratic process by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding our platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. In an effort to work towards these objectives goal, we launched a prebunking initiative ahead of the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections, which used short video ads on social media in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Poland to discuss techniques used to advance disinformation including decontextualisation, scapegoating and discrediting. It was the largest ever prebunking initiative on social media in the world to date. These videos were translated and available across EU languages along with Arabic, Russian and Turkish. In addition, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections. Elections24Check also created a comprehensive, first-of-its-kind database of election related disinformation, claims and narratives. Search further launched a weekly EU Google Trends Elections Newsletter, featuring EU-wide analysis of Search Trends on parties, candidates, and political topics. In future elections, we are committed to continuing to work with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union.

- **Supporting Researchers in Technology Related to Trust & Safety:** Google has continued to demonstrate its commitment to empowering the research community by hosting workshops with researchers and providing grants to support research efforts related to Trust & Safety areas of interest. These Trust & Safety workshops aim to build relationships among scholars working in siloed fields such

as misinformation, child safety, violent extremism, privacy, at-risk users, and more, to share projects and insights across the broader Trust & Safety ecosystem. We are also committed to assisting researchers in these fields with financial support to continue their research. Google provides unrestricted grants to support research efforts across areas of interest related to Trust & Safety in technology through the Trust & Safety Research Awards. This program, in partnership with University Relations, is one of Google's largest opportunities to partner with external researchers on priority Trust & Safety topics, including child safety, scams, AI, and misinformation. Similarly, we launched the Google Academic Research Awards (GARA) program in June 2024, which will accept research proposals focused on a diverse range of research areas within technology and computing.

- **Investing in the Fact-checking Community:** To support fact-checking initiatives on our platforms, we have continually invested in programs and partnerships to help people access high-quality information. Our main partnerships are with the European Media and Information Fund and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), both of which provide indirect payments to fact-checking members. In February 2024, the IFCN independently selected 20 organisations covering its Phase 3 (Engage) funding, including six organisations from the following EEA Member States: Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain. For the Phase 3 (Engage) round of funding, each organisation will receive $100K USD totalling $2M USD. In addition, Google contributed €25M to help launch the European Media and Information Fund to strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking over 5 years (2021-26). To date, at least 87 media literacy, misinformation and fact-checking projects across 25 countries (including 23 EEA Member States) have been granted €12.86M.

- **Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI):** In H1 2024, we announced new AI safeguards to help protect against misuse. Last year, we introduced SynthID, a technology that adds imperceptible watermarks to AI-generated images and audio so they are easier to identify; this year, we are expanding SynthID's capabilities to watermarking AI-generated text in the Gemini app and web experience, as well as to video in Veo, its recently announced and most capable generative video model. YouTube also introduced a new tool in Creator Studio requiring creators to disclose to viewers when realistic content is made with altered or synthetic media, including generative AI. In addition to these new tools, we are also committed to working with the greater ecosystem to help others benefit from and improve on the advances we are making. As such, we will open-source SynthID text watermarking through our updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit. Underpinning our advancements in AI, as a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), we collaborate with Adobe, Microsoft, startups and many others to build and implement a standard that improves transparency of digital media.

Google has been working on AI for more than a dozen years to solve society's biggest challenges and power Google services people use every day. The progress in large-scale AI models (including generative AI) has sparked additional discussion about the social impacts of AI and raised concerns on topics such as misinformation. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and published AI Principles back in 2018

to guide our work, including application areas we will not pursue. We have since established a governance team to put them into action by conducting ethical reviews of new systems, designed to help avoid bias and incorporating privacy, security and safety. Through our philanthropic arm Google.org we have [supported organisations](#) that are using AI to tackle environmental issues, fact-check misinformation, and increase the impact of nonprofits. Google Search has published [guidance](#) on AI-generated content, outlining its approach to maintaining a high standard of information quality and the overall helpfulness of content on Search. To help address misinformation, Google has also [announced](#) that it will soon be integrating new innovations in watermarking, metadata, and other techniques into its latest generative models. Google also recently joined other leading AI companies to [jointly commit](#) to advancing responsible practices in the development of artificial intelligence which will support efforts by the G7, the OECD, and national governments. Going forward we will continue to report and expand upon Google developed AI tools and are committed to advance bold and responsible AI, to maximise AI's benefits and minimise its risks.

Lastly, the contents of this report should be read with the following context in mind:

- This report discusses the key approaches across the following Google services when it comes to addressing disinformation: Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising.
- For chapters of the Code that involve the same actions across all three services (e.g. participation in the Permanent Task-force or in development of the Transparency Centre), we respond as 'Google, on behalf of related services'.
- It follows the structure and template laid out by the Code's Permanent Task-force, organised around Commitments and Chapters of the Code.
- Unless otherwise specified, metrics provided cover activities and actions during the period from 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024.
- The data provided in this report is subject to a range of factors, including product changes and user settings, and is expected to fluctuate over the time of the reporting period. As Google continues to evolve its approach, in part to better address user and regulatory needs, the data reported here could vary substantially over time including as we build capabilities specific to compliance with the Digital Services Act.
- We are continuously working to improve the safety and reliability of our services. We are not always in a position to pre-announce specific launch dates, details or timelines for upcoming improvements, and therefore may reply 'no' when asked whether we can disclose future plans for Code implementation measures in the coming reporting period. This 'no' should be understood against the background context that we are constantly working to improve safety and reliability and may in fact launch relevant changes without the ability to pre-announce.
- This report is filed concurrently with two 'crisis reports' about our response to the Israel-Gaza conflict and to the war in Ukraine. Additionally, an annex on Google's response toward the upcoming EU Parliamentary election is included in this report. As such, while there will be references to our actions throughout this report, information specific to these events should be sought in dedicated reports.

Google will continue to publish subsequent versions of this report biannually, focusing on the 6 months review period relevant to each filing, as requested under the Code. In addition, we expect to remain a committed and productive member of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, which continued to deliver upon its obligations under the Code throughout 2024.

Google looks forward to continuing to work together with the European Commission and other Code Signatories to address the challenge of disinformation in Europe.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Google Advertising[1]	Google Search	YouTube	Google, on behalf of related services
		II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
1	Measure 1.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.5	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	☑	☐	☐	☐
2	Measure 2.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	☑	☐	☐	☐
3	Measure 3.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 3.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 3.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
		III. Political advertising			
4	Measure 4.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 4.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
5	Measure 5.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
6	Measure 6.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.4	☑	☐	☐	☐

[1] ***Note:*** *Google Advertising refers to both Google Ads and Google AdSense where appropriate. Within the body of the report, 'Google Advertising' is used to refer to both services, whereas the individual service will be named if only applicable to Google Ads or Google AdSense.*

	Measure 6.5	Not subscribed			
7	Measure 7.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 7.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 7.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 7.4	☑	☐	☐	☐
8	Measure 8.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 8.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
9	Measure 9.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 9.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
10	Measure 10.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 10.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
11	Measure 11.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 11.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 11.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 11.4	☑	☐	☐	☐
12	Measure 12.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 12.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 12.3	Not subscribed			
13	Measure 13.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 13.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 13.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
IV. Integrity of services					
14	Measure 14.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 14.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 14.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
15	Measure 15.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 15.2	☐	☑	☑	☐

#	Measure				
16	Measure 16.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 16.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
V. Empowering users					
17	Measure 17.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 17.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 17.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
18	Measure 18.1	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 18.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 18.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 19.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
20	Measure 20.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 20.2	*Not subscribed*			
21	Measure 21.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 21.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 21.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
22	Measure 22.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 22.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 22.3	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 22.4	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 22.5	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 22.6	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 22.7	☐	☑	☑	☐
23	Measure 23.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 23.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☐	☐	☑	☐
25	Measure 25.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 25.2	*Not subscribed*			
VI. Empowering the research community					

26	Measure 26.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 26.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 26.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
27	Measure 27.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 27.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 27.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 27.4	☐	☑	☑	☐
28	Measure 28.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.4	☐	☑	☑	☐
29	Measure 29.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 29.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 29.3	Not subscribed			

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

30	Measure 30.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 30.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 30.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 30.4	☐	☑	☑	☐
31	Measure 31.1	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 31.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 31.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 31.4	☐	☑	☑	☐
32	Measure 32.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 32.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 32.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
33	Measure 33.1	Not subscribed			

VIII. Transparency centre

34	Measure 34.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
35	Measure 35.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
36	Measure 36.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 36.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 36.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
IX. Permanent Task-Force					
37	Measure 37.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	–	☐	☐	☐	☑
39	–	☐	☐	☐	☑
40	Measure 40.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.4	☐	☐	☐	☑

	[Measure 40.5](#)	☐	☐	☐	☑
	[Measure 40.6](#)	☐	☐	☐	☑
41	[Measure 41.1](#)	☐	☐	☐	☑
41	[Measure 41.2](#)	☐	☐	☐	☑
	[Measure 41.3](#)	☐	☐	☐	☑
42	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
43	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
44	-	☐	☐	☐	☑

Guidelines for filling out the report for VLOPSEs

The reporting period to be covered in the reports is six months (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024) for Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPSEs). Signatories shall submit reports outlining policy updates and actions taken to implement the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code. All data and policy updates should be reported for six months period from the submission of last reports.

Reporting per Service

When filling in a report for several services, use colour codes to clearly distinguish between services. At the beginning of the report, clarify what colour is used for which service.

Reporting in text form

Reporting in the form of written text is required for several parts of the report. Most of them are accompanied by a target character limit. Please stick to the target character limit as much as possible. We encourage you to use bullet points and short sentences. When providing information to the QRE, please make sure that your answer covers all the elements of the associated commitment and measure. Links should only be used to provide examples or to illustrate the point. They should not be used to replace explanations or to provide data in the forms. All relevant explanations and data must be included in the report directly, in written form.

Reporting SLIs and data

Reporting on SLIs requires quantitative information to be reported on in this harmonised reporting template.

- SLIs should generally be reported on per Member State. Where required by the Code, reporting needs to be done both per Member State and per language, e.g. SLI 30.1.1.
- If no data is available on Member State level, SLIs might, instead, be exceptionally reported on per language. (NB that Signatories agreed to revisit this issue after the first reporting, to ensure harmonised and meaningful reporting.)
- Please report data in the format provided by the harmonised reporting template, not through external links. Please use the Member State/language template provided in the harmonised reporting template. Where the table asks for 'Other relevant metrics', please name the metric that you would like to report on in addition to the ones already provided. You may include more than the number of additional fields provided where necessary; in that case, please adjust the table as needed.
- Please contextualise all data as much as possible, i.e. include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise the SLIs (e.g. number of pieces of content labelled out of what volume of content).
- If there are no relevant metrics to report on, please leave the respective columns blank.

Reporting on TTPs

If subscribed to Commitment 14, Integrity of Services, we ask you to report on each identified TTP individually. The number of identified TTPs may vary per service. Where more than one TTP are reported under the same action, clarify the reasoning in the methodology. Where input is not provided, keep the placeholder for the relevant TTP and explain reasons and planned remedial action. Additionally, as with all other SLIs, data should be provided per Member State for each individual TTP.

Missing Data and insights on methodology

In case that at the time of reporting there is no data available yet, the data is insufficient, or the methodology is lacking, please outline in the dedicated field (i.e. in the field about further implementation measures planned) how this will be addressed over the upcoming six months, being as specific as possible.

Signatories are encouraged to provide insights about the data/numbers they provide by inserting possible explanations in the boxes of the template "*Methodology of data measurement & insights on data provided*". This should aim to explain the why of what is being reported, for instance - *Are there trends or curiosities that could require or use contextual explanation? What may be driving the change or the difference in the number?* Please also indicate inconsistencies or gaps regarding methodology in the dedicated box.

Attachments

We ask you not to enclose any additional attachments to the harmonised reporting template.

Crisis and elections reporting template

Relevant signatories are asked to provide proportionate and appropriate information and data during a period of crisis and during an election. Reporting is a part of a special chapter at the end of the harmonised reporting template and should follow the guidelines:

- The reporting of signatories' actions should be as specific to the particular crisis or election reported on as possible. To this extent, the rows on "Specific Action" should be filled in with actions that are either put in place specifically for a particular event (for example a media literacy campaign on disinformation related to the Ukraine war, an information panel for the European elections), or to explain in more detail how an action that forms part of the service's general approach to implementing the Code is implemented in the specific context of the crisis or election reported on (for example, what types of narratives in a particular election/crisis would fall into scope of a particular policy of the service, what forms of advertising are ineligible).
- The harmonised reporting template should be filled in by adding additional rows for each item reported on. This means that rather than combined/bulk reporting such as "Depending on severity of violation, we demote or remove content based on policies X, Y, Z", there should be individual rows stating for example "Under Policy X, content is demoted or removed based on severity", "Under Policy Y, content " etc.
- The rows should be colour-coded to indicate which service is being reported on, using the same colour code as for the overall harmonised reporting template.
- Reporting should be brief and to the point, with a suggested character limit entry of 2000 characters.

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Uploading data to the Transparency Centre

The reports should be submitted to the Commission in the form of the pdf via e-mail to the address CNECT COP TASK FORCE CNECT-COP-TASK-FORCE@ec.europa.eu within the agreed deadline. Signatories will upload all data from the harmonised reporting template to the Transparency Centre, allowing easy data access and filtering within the agreed deadline. It is the responsibility of the Signatories to ensure that the uploading takes place and is executed on time. Signatories are also responsible to ensure that the Transparency Centre is operational

and functional by the time of the reports' submission, that the data from the reports are uploaded and made accessible in the Transparency Centre within the above deadline, and that users are able to read, search, filter and download data as needed in a user-friendly way and format.

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 - 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	*Not subscribed*	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 1.1	Google Advertising

QRE 1.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**
	Google AdSense provides a way for publishers to earn money from their online content. AdSense works by matching ads to publisher sites based on content and visitors. The ads are created and paid for by advertisers who want to promote their products.
	In order to protect users and publishers who trust Google AdSense with the monetisation of their content, Google AdSense has rolled out a number of policies and processes geared towards disrupting the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors.
	Here are some examples of AdSense policies that disrupt the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors in the AdSense ecosystem that publishers must adhere to:
	Unreliable and Harmful Claims
	AdSense does not allow content that makes claims that are demonstrably false and could significantly undermine participation or trust in an electoral or democratic process. This includes content that promotes harmful health claims, or relates to a current, major health crisis and contradicts authoritative scientific consensus, as well as content that contradicts authoritative scientific consensus on climate change.
	Replicated Content
	AdSense does not allow Google-served ads on screens with embedded or copied content from others without additional commentary, curation, or otherwise adding value to that content.
	Manipulated Media
	AdSense does not allow content that deceives users through manipulated media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern.
	Dangerous or Derogatory Content
	AdSense does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. This

	includes content that harasses, intimidates, or bullies an individual or group of individuals, as well as content that threatens or advocates for physical or mental harm to oneself or others or content that exploits others through extortion.
	Deceptive Practices AdSense does not allow publishers to engage in deceptive practices. This prohibition includes: enticing users to engage with content under false or unclear pretences, attempting to steal personal information or trick users into sharing personal information, promoting content, products, or services using false, dishonest, or deceptive claims. It also prohibits AdSense publishers from coordinating with other sites or accounts and concealing or misrepresenting their identity or other material details about themselves, where their content relates to politics, social issues or matters of public concern. AdSense publishers are not allowed to direct content about politics, social issues, or matters of public concern to users in a country other than their own, if they misrepresent or conceal their country of origin or other material details about themselves. **Shocking Content** AdSense restricts monetisation on content that contains gruesome, graphic, or disgusting accounts or imagery, that depicts acts of violence, or that contains a significant amount of or prominently features obscene or profane language. Google AdSense also has behavioural policies that all publishers must adhere to (available here). AdSense actively monitors publishers in the AdSense network to check for continued compliance with AdSense Program Policies. If AdSense finds publishers that do not comply with AdSense policies, AdSense may enforce on a site, page, or account level as appropriate. Reviews for AdSense violations occur on an on-going basis. Content review is performed by either, or a combination of: ● Automated mechanisms; and ● Manual reviews performed by human reviewers.
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	**AdSense** Pages and Domains that were actioned for any of the policy topics in scope for reporting, by EEA Member State payment countries in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024). Policies in scope:

	• [Unreliable and Harmful Claims](#); • [Replicated Content](#); • [Manipulated Media](#); • [Dangerous or Derogatory Content](#); • [Deceptive Practices](#); • [Shocking Content](#).		
	Number of Actioned AdSense Pages		**Number of Actioned AdSense Domains**
Level	**Page**		**Domain**
Member States			
Austria	27,219		11
Belgium	35,890		65
Bulgaria	30,056		16
Croatia	17,401		16
Cyprus	283,382		2,881
Czech Republic	175,987		560
Denmark	96,844		21
Estonia	9,372		8
Finland	317,003		6
France	774,651		1,296
Germany	875,275		179
Greece	35,307		19
Hungary	38,404		32
Ireland	502,328		90
Italy	475,871		184
Latvia	181,364		14

Lithuania	25,352	110
Luxembourg	191,460	34
Malta	746	7
Netherlands	336,906	199
Poland	967,723	180
Portugal	91,924	73
Romania	71,169	37
Slovakia	77,889	31
Slovenia	6,543	4
Spain	1,517,884	205
Sweden	61,891	55
Iceland	24	1
Liechtenstein	4	0
Norway	20,849	21
Total EU	**7,225,841**	**6,333**
Total EEA	**7,246,718**	**6,355**

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid[2] or impression[3]) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

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[2] Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.
[3] Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	In order to arrive at a financial value per EU Member State, Google used internal data on the number of relevant AdSense bids blocked and combined it with an estimate of Cost Per Thousand Impressions (CPM) for Display Ads provided by Ebiquity, a third party designated by the EU Code of Practice (CoP) Permanent Task-force for that purpose. The value stated therefore presents an unrealised monetary value for H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024). More about relevant blocked bids: For the purpose of this SLI, a relevant blocked bid is a programmatic request to use Google AdSense to monetise a page or domain that is blocked because Google determined the page or domain violates the policies outlined below and is as such prohibited from monetising with AdSense. More about Ebiquity's estimate: The EU CoP Task-force designated Ebiquity to serve in the capacity of third-party estimator, providing periodic CPM conversion factors for use by signatories of the CoP to derive metrics relevant to this SLI. Ebiquity creates the CPM estimates based on aggregated and anonymised media investment data from its Media Data Vault; its proprietary database infrastructure is used to service its clients. The data provides a non-exhaustive indication of market pricing. As such, Ebiquity provided their own estimate per medium – including the Display Ads CPM mentioned above – as well as a blended CPM for all signatories. Please note that Ebiquity did not provide values for several countries, therefore these are marked as '0' in the table below. Google and Ebiquity's estimate: Though this SLI leverages Ebiquity's CPM estimate as decided within the CoP's Permanent Task-force, Google has not participated in the development of that estimate and in no way endorses the CPM or the underlying methodology and data.
	Euro value of bids that were blocked as a result of demonetisation actions under AdSense policies in scope: ● Unreliable and Harmful Claims; ● Replicated Content; ● Manipulated Media; ● Dangerous or Derogatory Content; ● Deceptive Practices; ● Shocking Content.

	Estimated Cost of Blocked Requests on Pages	Estimated Cost of Blocked Requests on Domains
Level	Page	Domain

Member States		
Austria	€147,652.27	€906.18
Belgium	€216,964.73	€165.31
Bulgaria	€43,483.19	€34.07
Croatia	€77,197.09	€6,718.74
Cyprus	€171,119.00	€205,259.38
Czech Republic	€315,363.31	€617,954.51
Denmark	€240,468.05	€16,400.02
Estonia	€24,476.02	€4,554.90
Finland	€181,943.67	€462.11
France	€2,532,774.99	€78,081.47
Germany	€2,378,271.12	€105,272.55
Greece	€43,603.25	€5,678.38
Hungary	€24,989.12	€1,489.58
Ireland	€2,657,049.95	€12,407.93
Italy	€1,358,551.37	€76,045.85
Latvia	€80,652.46	€31.24
Lithuania	€31,345.63	€1,766.27
Luxembourg	€0.00	€0.00
Malta	€1,914.97	€53.12
Netherlands	€6,161,680.15	€481,964.32
Poland	€508,486.38	€166,512.80
Portugal	€62,478.38	€591.93
Romania	€84,115.51	€51,166.78

Slovakia	€508,264.83	€2,240.75
Slovenia	€17,107.09	€0.06
Spain	€1,481,945.96	€245,827.50
Sweden	€32,055,309.85	€179,530.69
Iceland	€8.58	€45.36
Liechtenstein	€0.00	€0.00
Norway	€390,799.48	€180.80
Total EU	**€51,407,208.33**	**€2,261,116.42**
Total EEA	**€51,798,016.39**	**€2,261,342.58**

Measure 1.2	Google Advertising
QRE 1.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google sets a particularly high bar for information quality on services that involve advertising and content monetisation. In addition, given that many bad actors seek to make money by spreading harmful content, raising the bar for monetisation can also diminish their incentives to misuse Google services. Google prohibits hateful content and deceptive behaviour on Google advertising products. **Changes made due to the invasion of Ukraine** Given the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Google Advertising has continued enforcing policies to protect users, and has continued pausing ads that contain content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war, pausing ads on Google properties and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia, and pausing ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media. Information regarding the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is included in the crisis report section.

SLI 1.2.1	Additional information regarding the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is included in the crisis report section.
Member States	

Measure 1.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** In addition to the policies referenced in QRE 1.2.1, Google Ads provides advertisers with additional controls and helps them exclude types of content that, while in compliance with AdSense policies, may not fit their brand or business. These controls let advertisers apply content filters or exclude certain types of content or terms from their video, display, and search ad campaigns. Advertisers can exclude content such as politics, news, sports, beauty, fashion and many other categories. These categories are listed in the Google Ads Help Centre.
Measure 1.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 1.4.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 1.5	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.5.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The Trustworthy Accountability Group is the leading global certification program fighting criminal activity and increasing trust in the digital advertising industry. Google is currently enrolled in the Verified by Trustworthy Accountability Group program and its Trustworthy Accountability Group-ID status is **active.** Getting verified by the Trustworthy Accountability Group indicates that: ● This company has achieved the Certified Against Fraud seal. ● This company has achieved the Certified Against Malware seal. ● This company has achieved the Brand Safety Certification seal.

	These seals are achieved through independent validation by a third-party auditor, and meeting requirements in the categories of intermediary and seller. These seals apply to the company's global operations. The seals expire on 1 March 2024. Google also partakes in audits including those conducted by independent accreditation organisations such as the Media Rating Council (MRC) and maintains this accreditation via participation in annual audit cycles conducted by the MRC. The current MRC accreditation certifies that: • Google's Google Ads display and Search Clicks measurement methodology and AdSense ad serving technologies adhere to the industry standards for click measurement. • Google Ads video impression and video viewability measurement as reported in the Video Viewability Report adheres to the industry standards for video impression and viewability measurement. • The processes supporting these technologies are accurate. This applies to Google's measurement technology which is used across all device types: desktop, mobile, and tablet, in both browser and mobile apps environments. For more information about what this accreditation means, please see this help page.
QRE 1.5.2	See response to QRE 1.5.1.
Measure 1.6	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.6.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Ads also provides its advertising partners with features that enable them to maintain control over where their ads appear, the format in which their ads run, and their intended audience. Since April 2021, advertisers have the ability to use dynamic exclusion lists that can be updated seamlessly and continuously over time. These lists can be created by advertisers themselves or by a third party they trust, such as brand safety organisations and industry groups. Once advertisers upload a dynamic exclusion list to their Google Ads

	account, they can schedule automatic updates as new web pages or domains are added, ensuring that their exclusion lists remain effective and up-to-date.
QRE 1.6.2	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).
QRE 1.6.3	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that provide brand safety tools).
QRE 1.6.4	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that rate sources).
SLI 1.6.1	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).
Data	

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
Commitment 2					
Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.					
	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	In March 2024, Google Advertising updated the Unacceptable business practices portion of the Misrepresentation Policy to include enticing users to part with money or information by impersonating or falsely implying affiliation with or endorsement by a public figure, brand, or organisation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In July 2024, Google will update the Disclosure requirements for synthetic content under the Political Content Policy. Advertisers will be required to disclose election ads that contain synthetic or digitally altered content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events by selecting the checkbox in the 'Altered or synthetic content' section in their campaign settings.

Measure 2.1	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.1.1	Google Ads provides a way for advertisers, and businesses to reach new customers as they search on Google for words related to an advertiser's business, or browse websites with related themes. **Destination Requirements** Google wants consumers to have a good experience when they click on an ad, so ad destinations must offer unique value to users and be functional, useful, and easy to navigate. Additionally, bad actors often use spam tactics to distribute disinformation because it is not of sufficient quality to gain organic exposure. By fighting spam and low-quality information in general, Google makes it more difficult for these actors to disseminate disinformation. **Here are some examples of the Destination Requirements Policies:** ● Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations with a difficult **Destination Experience**. This includes ads with destinations that contain abusive experiences, content that is unnecessarily difficult to navigate, or ad experiences that do not conform to the Better Ads Standards. ● Google Ads does not allow ads or landing pages with **Insufficient Original Content**. This includes destination content that is designed for the primary purpose of showing ads, destinations that display a message of the

destination not providing any services, and destinations that are incomprehensible or do not make sense.

- Google Ads does not allow ads that do not accurately reflect where the user is being directed, and ads that redirect from the final URL that take the user to a different domain. These are disallowed under the **Destination Mismatch** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with destinations that do not function properly or have been incorrectly set up, which are disallowed under the **Destination Not Working** Policy.
- Google does not allow ads with destinations that are not accessible in the targeted location. These are disallowed under the **Destination Not Accessible** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with destinations that are not crawlable by Google Ads under the **Destination Not Crawlable** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with App or Web Store policy violations. Google Ads also does not allow apps that cannot be recognised by Google, under the **Unrecognised App** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with destinations containing **Unacceptable URLs**. This includes URLs that do not follow standard syntax, IP addresses as display URLs, and display URLs that use unacceptable characters like !, *, #, _, and @.
- Google Ads does not allow phone numbers that have not been verified by Google to feature in call-only ads, call assets, and location assets under the **Unverified Phone Number** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow call-only ads, call assets, and location assets to have phone numbers that have not been verified by Google under the **Unverified Phone Number** Policy. Additionally, the **Unacceptable Phone Number** Policy prohibits: phone numbers that do not have an active voicemail service; phone numbers that are inaccurate, inactive, irrelevant, or that do not connect to the advertised company; virtual phone number services or personal numbering; phone numbers that are not local or domestic for the country one is targeting; fax numbers, premium numbers, or vanity numbers.

Inappropriate Content
Google Ads values diversity and respect for others, and strives to avoid offending users, so Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations that display **Inappropriate Content** such as shocking content or content that promotes hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.

Here are some examples of the Inappropriate Content Policies:
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Dangerous or Derogatory Content**. This is content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or

ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation.

- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Shocking Content**. These are promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
- Google Ads does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a **Sensitive Event** with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Hacked Political Materials**. These are ads that directly facilitate or advertise access to hacked material related to political entities within scope of Google's [Election Ads Policies](). This applies to all protected material that was obtained through the unauthorised intrusion or access of a computer, computer network, or personal electronic device, even if distributed by a third party.

[Misrepresentation]()

Google Ads wants users to trust the ads on the platform, so Google Ads strives to ensure ads are clear and honest, and provide the information that users need to make informed decisions. Through the Misrepresentation Policy, Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations that deceive users by excluding relevant product information or providing misleading information about products, services, or businesses.

Here are some of the Misrepresentation Policies:
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Unacceptable Business Practices**. This includes scamming users by concealing or misstating information about the advertiser's business, product, or service. Google Advertising [updated]() the [Unacceptable business practices]() portion of the [Misrepresentation]() Policy to include enticing users to part with money or information by impersonating or falsely implying affiliation with or endorsement by a public figure, brand, or organisation.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Coordinated Deceptive Practices**. This includes coordinating with other sites or accounts and concealing or misrepresenting one's identity or other material details about oneself, where one's content relates to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern. Google Ads also does not allow directing content about politics, social issues, or matters of public concern to users in a country other than one's own, if one misrepresents or conceals one's country of origin or other material details about oneself.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Misleading Representation**. This includes making misleading statements, obscuring, or omitting material information about one's identity, affiliations, or qualifications.

	- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Manipulated Media**. This includes manipulating media to deceive, defraud, or mislead others such as deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern. - Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Unreliable Claims**. This includes making claims that are demonstrably false and could significantly undermine participation or trust in an electoral or democratic process. This may also include making claims that contradict authoritative, scientific consensus on climate change. - Google Ads does not allow ads that contain **Misleading Ad Design**. This includes ads that make it difficult for the user to understand they are interacting with an ad, and ads that use surreptitious techniques to disguise their nature. - Google Ads does not allow **Clickbait Ads**. This includes ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic, as well as ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action. - Google Ads does not allow ads with **Unclear Relevance**. This is interpreted as promotions that are not relevant to the destination of the ad. - Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Unavailable Offers**. This includes promising products, services, or promotional offers in the ad that are unavailable or are not easily found from the destination. - Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Dishonest Pricing Practices.** This includes ads that do not disclose the payment model or full expense that a user will bear, or advertising products or services as free when they are chargeable.
SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	Number of own-initiative actions taken on advertisements that affect the availability, visibility, and accessibility of information provided by recipients of Google Ads services, by EEA Member State billing country and policy in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024). These actions taken include enforcement against ads and ad assets that violate any of the policy topics in scope for reporting. Content moderation actions taken at Google's 'own initiative' are considered to be actions taken on content shown to or because the content violates Google Ads policies, or where the content is illegal but action is not taken in response to an Article 9 order or Article 16 notice, as defined by the Digital Services Act (DSA). These can encompass both proactive and reactive enforcement actions. Proactive enforcement takes place when Google employees, algorithms, or contractors flag potentially policy-violating content. Reactive enforcement takes place in response to external

notifications, such as user policy flags or legal complaints.

To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violate Google Ads policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks.

Ad or asset disapproval
Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is reviewed.

Account suspension
Google Ads Accounts may be suspended if Google finds violations of its policies or the Terms and Conditions.

For more information on what happens when an ad or account is violating Google Ads policies, please see the 'What happens if you violate our policies' page.

Policies in scope:
- Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content);
- Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

Number of actions taken, by Policy		
Number of actions taken, for Destination Requirements	Number of actions taken, for Inappropriate Content	Number of actions taken, for Misrepresentation
Ads & Ad Assets	**Ads & Ad Assets**	**Ads & Ad Assets**

Level	Ads & Ad Assets	Ads & Ad Assets	Ads & Ad Assets
Member States			
Austria	5,240,000	156,180	302,290
Belgium	14,260,000	158,630	290,460
Bulgaria	2,780,000	78,410	1,730,000

Croatia	2,210,000	31,400	38,060
Cyprus	10,470,000	144,570	522,560
Czech Republic	53,180,000	438,690	563,160
Denmark	38,730,000	169,500	242,830
Estonia	9,080,000	96,330	274,900
Finland	2,210,000	7,990	79,810
France	49,180,000	203,940	2,380,000
Germany	83,070,000	1,050,000	9,500,000
Greece	2,540,000	16,750	181,760
Hungary	3,270,000	35,820	168,750
Ireland	28,100,000	376,590	407,060
Italy	71,940,000	375,610	993,620
Latvia	8,590,000	67,510	219,300
Lithuania	9,290,000	72,950	260,240
Luxembourg	2,150,000	36,080	613,380
Malta	516,710	3,960	678,360
Netherlands	91,610,000	239,400	3,970,000
Poland	13,170,000	853,300	2,010,000
Portugal	1,780,000	5,770	337,820
Romania	3,340,000	67,290	357,940
Slovakia	4,230,000	18,550	105,720
Slovenia	1,090,000	10,210	82,550
Spain	55,890,000	218,990	9,590,000

Sweden	37,790,000	454,930	468,600
Iceland	113,570	390	10,280
Liechtenstein	1,050,000	90	1,070
Norway	3,770,000	10,000	106,140
Total EU	**605,690,000**	**5,390,000**	**36,370,000**
Total EEA	**610,630,000**	**5,400,000**	**36,490,000**

Measure 2.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All newly created ads and ads that are edited by users are reviewed for policy violations. The review of new ads is performed by either, or a combination of: • Automated mechanisms; and • Manual reviews performed by human reviewers. For more information on how the ad review process works, please see the 'About the ad review process' page.
Measure 2.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.3.1	See response to QRE 2.2.1.
SLI 2.3.1	See response to SLI 2.1.1.
Member States	

Measure 2.4	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

	Notification Ads that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved or (if appropriate) limited in where and when they can show. This will be shown in the 'Status' column as 'Disapproved' or 'Eligible (limited),' and the ad may not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed. By hovering the cursor over the status of the ad, there is additional information, including the policy violation impacting the ad. For more information on how to fix a disapproved ad, see the external Help Centre page. **Appeal process** Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the Disapproved Ads and Policy questions form. For more information about the appeal process, check the Help Centre page. For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the submit an appeal process.

SLI 2.4.1

Number of content moderation complaints received from advertisers located in EEA Member States during H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State and by complaint outcome. Advertiser complaints were received via Google Ads standardised path for appealing policy decisions.

Complaint outcomes include initial decision upheld and initial decision reversed. An 'initial decision' refers to the first enforcement of Google's terms of service or product policies. These decisions may be reversed in light of additional information provided by the appellant as part of an appeal or additional automatic, manual review of the content.

Policies in scope:
- Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content);
- Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

Number of complaints received, by EU Member State for relevant policies described above, and complaint outcome in H1 2024

	Number of Ads Appeals	Number of Successful Appeals	Number of Failed Appeals
Level	Ads	Ads	Ads

Member States			
Austria	3,313	1,519	1,794
Belgium	2,923	1,444	1,479
Bulgaria	2,597	887	1,710
Croatia	1,908	285	1,623
Cyprus	47,050	12,257	34,793
Czech Republic	9,621	3,680	5,941
Denmark	3,430	2,216	1,214
Estonia	4,016	760	3,256
Finland	8,233	2,179	6,054
France	12,262	4,568	7,694
Germany	44,961	16,725	28,236
Greece	1,437	426	1,011
Hungary	723	257	466
Ireland	3,126	650	2,476
Italy	8,829	2,816	6,013
Latvia	1,387	903	484
Lithuania	20,789	3,167	17,622
Luxembourg	252	50	202
Malta	5,526	1,959	3,567
Netherlands	104,606	32,852	71,754
Poland	17,576	9,854	7,722
Portugal	12,213	4,360	7,853
Romania	6,520	3,609	2,911

Slovakia	2,092	1,127	965
Slovenia	1,540	452	1,088
Spain	31,382	10,913	20,469
Sweden	7,423	1,664	5,759
Iceland	202	1	201
Liechtenstein	24	10	14
Norway	543	178	365
Total EU	**365,735**	**121,579**	**244,156**
Total EEA	**366,504**	**121,768**	**244,736**

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
Commitment 3			
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.			
	C.3	**M 3.1**	**M 3.2**	**M 3.3**

	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 3.1	**Google Advertising**
QRE 3.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Outlined below are some ways that Google Advertising works across industry partners and civil society to facilitate the flow of information, relevant to tackling disinformation: • **GARM**: YouTube participated in Volumes 1-6 of GARM's Aggregated Measurement Report which serves as a way to provide advertisers with a clear and transparent framework to better understand policy enforcement related to brand safety. YouTube also secured continued Brand Safety Accreditation from the MRC which further demonstrates commitment to the GARM mission. • **Participation in the EU CoP Permanent Task-force's dedicated Working Groups**: The CoP's Permanent Task-force has set up working groups on Integrity of Services, Crisis Response, and Advertising, all of which Google takes part in, and which involve civil society and Industry Signatories discussing relevant trends and technological developments.
Measure 3.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 3.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

	Google takes part in the CoP Practice Permanent Task-force's Working Groups on Crisis Response, Integrity of Services, and Advertising - as mentioned in response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, as Google has publicly communicated, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) continues to engage with other Industry Signatories to the Code in order to stay abreast of cross-platform deceptive practices, such as operations leveraging fake or impersonated accounts.
Measure 3.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 3.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Advertising frequently engages with third-party organisations in order to explain, collect feedback on, and improve Google Advertising policies. Google Advertising has attended meetings with the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), during which transparency tools for political ads were presented. Google Advertising has also exchanged views with experts at numerous policy roundtables, conferences, and workshops - both in Brussels and in the EU capitals. Please also see QRE 3.1.1 for additional information on the collaboration with third party organisations and government entities.

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 4 Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".			
	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 4.1	**Google Advertising**
Measure 4.2	**Google Advertising**

QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5 Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- In June 2024, Google Advertising updated the Political Content Policy to include additional requirements for EU Election Ads in Italy. - Advertisers must comply with applicable local electoral laws, including pausing ads as required during periods defined by law as silence periods. Google does not allow EU Election Ads, as defined by its policies, to serve in Italy during a silence period.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially	Yes

improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In July 2024, Google will update the Disclosure requirements for synthetic content under the Political Content Policy. Advertisers will be required to disclose election ads that contain synthetic or digitally altered content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events by selecting the checkbox in the 'Altered or synthetic content' section in their campaign settings.

Measure 5.1	Google Advertising
QRE 5.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Perimeter of policies** Google's election ads policies generally apply to Google Ads as well as to DV360, Google's end-to-end campaign management tool for enterprise. This point will be signalled through this Chapter by referring, where relevant, to 'Google Ads/DV360' instead of 'Google Ads' or 'Google'. **Policy changes and development** In mid-November 2023, Google Advertising updated the Political Content Policy to require that all verified election advertisers in regions where verification is required must prominently disclose when their ads contain synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. This disclosure must be clear and conspicuous, and must be placed in a location where it is likely to be noticed by users. This policy will apply to image, video, and audio content. Ads that contain synthetic content altered or generated in such a way that is inconsequential to the claims made in the ad will be exempt from these disclosure requirements. This includes editing techniques such as image resizing, cropping, colour or brightening corrections, defect correction (for example, 'red eye' removal), or background edits that do not create realistic depictions of actual events. Examples of ad content that would require a clear and conspicuous disclosure include (non-exhaustive):

- An ad with synthetic content that makes it appear as if a person is saying or doing something they did not say or do; and
- An ad with synthetic content that alters footage of a real event or generates a realistic portrayal of an event to depict scenes that did not actually take place.

Google Ads disallows ads capitalising on sensitive events and prohibits ads that directly facilitate access to hacked material related to political entities within the scope of Google's election ads policies. Google Ads also prohibits advertisers from concealing or misrepresenting their identity or other material details where their content relates to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern.

Prior to February 2022, Google Ads/DV360's global election ads policies included exemptions for advertisers promoting products, services, and news. On 15 February 2022, Google Ads/DV360 removed these exemptions from election ads policies worldwide. Advertisers wishing to promote products, services, and news with ad content in scope of the policy (e.g. featuring a current candidate or officeholder) are now subject to the respective election ads policy, including the requirement that they apply for election ads verification in order to run these ads.

Concurrent with the elimination of election ads exemptions on 15 February 2022, Google Ads/DV360 expanded ad serving options for election ads. Before, election ads could serve only in the country or region to which the ad content pertained (e.g. EU Election Ads could serve only in the EU; US Election Ads could only serve in the US). With this update, advertisers who have completed either election ads or advertiser identity verification are eligible to serve ads in their home country or region that are in scope of an election ads policy pertaining to a different country or region. Advertisers are not permitted to serve election ads outside of their home country or region. For example, a verified New Zealand advertiser is now eligible to run an ad in New Zealand featuring an EU candidate or officeholder, but is not permitted to run that same ad in the EU. This change impacted only ads serving in the advertiser's home country or region.

III. Political Advertising						
Commitment 6						
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising						
	C.6	**M 6.1**	**M 6.2**	**M 6.3**	**M 6.4**	**M 6.5**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 6.1	**Google Advertising**
QRE 6.1.1	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 6.2	Google Advertising
QRE 6.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Trust in advertisers on Google platforms helps deliver a smart and useful web experience for everyone. This means providing transparency about who Google advertisers are and where they are located. All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google Ads/DV360 will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process. For the following ad formats and features available across Google Ads/DV360, the advertiser is responsible for including a 'Paid for by' disclosure directly in the ad, followed by the name of the organisation or individual paying for the ad: - Third-party ad serving on Google Display Network and YouTube; - Audio creatives and Native creatives on DV360; - Video creatives on DV360 (except for creatives served on YouTube). In addition to in-ad disclosures, ads from verified advertisers contain 'About This Ad' and 'Why this Ad' features that allows users to see information related to advertiser identity and on why particular ads are being shown on Search, YouTube, and other Google services. To provide even greater transparency and equip users with more information about who is advertising to them, Google provides transparency on ads through multiple means, such as offering users choice and control when it comes to all ads (not just election ads). In 2021, Google announced updates to bring more transparency to the 'About This Ad' feature by including verified advertiser name and location information as well as a link to other recent ads from the advertiser. The majority of impressions in the EU now include the 'See more ads by this advertiser' link in 'About This Ad'.
QRE 6.2.2	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	The disclosure is either visible directly in the ad itself and/or by clicking the 'About This Ad' feature referred to in response to QRE 6.2.1.	
	(1) Creatives belonging to Google Ads/DV360 accounts that have completed the verification process for EU Election Ads and that were labelled as EU Election Ads, by EU Member State billing country in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024). **(2)** Amounts spent related to those ads in EUR, by EU Member State serving country in H1 2024.	
	Number of Creatives from verified advertisers labelled for EU Election Ads	**Amount spent by verified advertisers on Creatives labelled for EU Election Ads**
Level	**Creative**	**Amount Spent (EUR)**
Member States		
Austria	834	€283,414.12
Belgium	2,943	€1,437,275.92
Bulgaria	698	€139,017.03
Croatia	4,417	€436,747.21
Cyprus	198	€56,504.67
Czech Republic	626	€121,236.86
Denmark	196	€181,040.67
Estonia	338	€79,745.99
Finland	877	€302,807.47
France	160	€85,076.67
Germany	3,716	€2,388,721.61
Greece	1,212	€542,769.23
Hungary	6,206	€1,723,341.66
Ireland	112	€118,413.45

Italy	770	€407,241.06
Latvia	220	€68,870.37
Lithuania	374	€117,679.61
Luxembourg	15	€27,770.64
Malta	617	€25,111.84
Netherlands	4,156	€399,857.62
Poland	11,859	€1,203,576.30
Portugal	15	€23,477.28
Romania	9,912	€1,822,068.42
Slovakia	1,501	€374,844.08
Slovenia	243	€47,904.44
Spain	1,951	€927,411.32
Sweden	1,411	€538,742.43
Iceland	0	€0.00
Liechtenstein	0	€0.00
Norway	0	€0.00
Total EU	**55,577**	**€13,880,667.99**
Total EEA	**55,577**	**€13,880,667.99**

Measure 6.3	**Google Advertising**

QRE 6.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Ads has a user experience team dedicated to regularly conducting qualitative and quantitative user research studies to understand and design for user needs. At the end of 2020, Google Ads updated the visual design and placement of the 'Paid for by' disclosure on Google Search to improve noticeability, comprehension, and usefulness. As part of this process, Google Ads conducted several rounds of qualitative and quantitative research with users interacting with election ads. Feedback was positive and users considered the updated UI to be an improvement in terms of noticeability, comprehension, and usefulness.
Measure 6.4	**Google Advertising**
QRE 6.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google systems do not enable the (re-)sharing of ads across services; as such this QRE is not relevant to Google Advertising.
Measure 6.5	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.5.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 7
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements. Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information regarding Commitment 7 for future reports.

Measure 7.1	**Google Advertising**
QRE 7.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google Ads/DV360 will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process. To provide additional transparency for users, EU Election Ads (as defined by the Political Content Policy) paid for by verified election advertisers are included in the Political Advertising Transparency Report. The verification process is initialised via the following methods: ● Proactive verification application, which is outlined in the Help Centre;

- EU Election Ads are labelled for the 'Election Advertising in the EU' Policy, prompting users to apply for verification and preventing the ads from running until the account becomes verified.
- EU Election Ads attempting to run by non-verified accounts are rejected for failure to fulfil the relevant verification criteria.

The 'Election Advertising in the EU' verification process takes place as follows; each step may take up to 5 days.

Step 1: Advertisers are required to provide the following information to verify their eligibility to run election ads:
- Customer ID;
- Email address;
- Country the organisation is registered in;
- Name of the organisation;
- Registration number;
- Document confirming organisation name;
- Official address;
- Document showing proof of address;
- Attestation that the authorised representative is a citizen of an EU Member State;
- Attestation that the organisation applying for verification is based in an EU Member State;
- Agreement to the Google Election Ads Terms.

Step 2: Advertisers are required to provide the following information to verify their identity:
- Organisation name;
- Organisation address;
- Document showing proof of address;
- Registration document or number for the organisation;
- Authorised representative name;
- Authorised representative address;
- A copy of the authorised representative's government issued photo ID;
- Attestation that the authorised representative is a citizen of an EU Member State;
- Attestation that the organisation applying for verification is based in an EU Member State;
- Agreement to the Google Election Ads Terms.

Following completion of the 'Election Advertising in the EU' verification process:

	• Advertiser identity is verified; • Associated election ads are run with 'Paid for by' disclosures; and • Election ads are displayed in the [Google Political Advertising Transparency Report](#) with associated expenditure metrics. More details about election advertising verification can be found [here](#).
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Ads rejected due to unverified advertisers attempting to run EU Election Ads by EU Member State billing country in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).
	Number of Creatives Actioned
Level	**Creative**
Member States	
Austria	5,310
Belgium	4,145
Bulgaria	1,203
Croatia	494
Cyprus	7,048
Czech Republic	19,156
Denmark	7,225
Estonia	867
Finland	7,358
France	71,648
Germany	68,488
Greece	4,454
Hungary	3,727

Ireland	2,144
Italy	13,766
Latvia	834
Lithuania	2,243
Luxembourg	866
Malta	1,397
Netherlands	34,062
Poland	45,615
Portugal	1,222
Romania	4,810
Slovakia	5,425
Slovenia	544
Spain	9,609
Sweden	8,153
Iceland	7
Liechtenstein	106
Norway	323
Total EU	**331,813**
Total EEA	**332,249**

Measure 7.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 7.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

In light of the overlap of QREs 7.2.1 through 7.3.2, a single answer is provided for all four here rather than repeating elements and risking confusion for the reader.

1. **What happens if advertisers violate Google Ads policies**
Google Ads requires all advertisers – including those promoting political content – to comply with Google Ads policies to ensure a safe and positive experience for users.

Ad or asset disapproval
Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run unless the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed and approved. Election ads from unverified advertisers will get disapproved.

Reporting violations
While Google makes every effort to ensure that ads/listings which may violate Google policies do not run before review, some ads/listings may run on Google before Google Ads Specialists check them. Users can report potentially violative ads with the Report an ad/listing form. The report will be reviewed, and if appropriate, action will be taken on the ad.

Account suspension
Accounts may be suspended if Google Ads finds violations of Google Ads policies or the Terms and Conditions.

If Google Ads detects an egregious policy violation, the account will be suspended immediately and without prior warning. An egregious violation of the Google Ads policies is a violation so serious that it is unlawful or poses significant harm to Google Ads users or the Google Ads digital advertising ecosystem. Egregious violations often reflect that the advertiser's overall business does not adhere to Google Ads policies or that one violation is so severe that Google Ads cannot risk future exposure to Google Ads users. Immediate account suspension is limited to cases where such action is the only effective method to adequately prevent illegal activity and/or significant user harm.

For other violations that lead to account suspension, Google Ads will send advertisers a warning to outline the nature of the policy violation and any remedial action that can be taken, in order to comply. This notification will be sent at least 7 days prior to suspension action.

If Google Ads suspends a Google Ads account, all ads in the suspended account will stop running, and Google Ads will no longer accept advertising from the advertiser, unless the violations are successfully appealed. Learn more about suspended accounts.

Appeal process
Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the Disapproved Ads and Policy questions form. For more information about the appeal process, check the Help Centre page. For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the 'submit an appeal' process.

Explainability
In 2020, Google Ads improved the explainability of Google Ads policies by adding examples of violations and explanations about the enforcement mechanisms that apply for violations of different policies. These can be found under the policies in the Google Ads Help Centre articles, usually in sections such as 'Examples (non-exhaustive)' or in yellow boxes for enforcement actions. To comply with the Digital Services Act, Google Ads added additional appeals information to the Google Ads Help Centre and Google rolled out a new Transparency Centre in August 2023. This allows users to learn more about the policy development process and easily access information about Google policies on a product-by-product basis, find product-specific reporting and appeals tools, and discover Google Transparency Reports.

2. **Election ads verification process**
See response to QRE 7.1.1.

3. **Specific enforcement related to election advertising verification**
- Information in the Google Ads/DV360 payment profile is used for verification, therefore if advertisers make changes to this, they will need to complete identity verification again. They will receive an in-account notification when this is required.
- If Google Ads/DV360 finds that advertisers have provided false information during the verification process, the verification will be revoked and the account may be suspended.
- If Google Ads/DV360 finds that advertisers have violated Google Ads policies, the account may be suspended.

	• If advertisers change their account's invoice setup, they will need to verify their account again to run election ads. • Google Ad Grants accounts are not eligible to run election ads or apply for election ads verification.
QRE 7.2.2	See response to QRE 7.2.1.
Measure 7.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 7.3.1	See response to QRE 7.2.1.
QRE 7.3.2	See response to QRE 7.2.1.
Measure 7.4	**Google Advertising**
QRE 7.4.1	Google Ads will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 8
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 8.1	**Google Advertising**
Measure 8.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Only verified advertisers are permitted to run election ads in the EU. All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process. In addition to election ads verification policies in the EU, election ads are also included in the EU Political Advertising Transparency Report which makes it easy for voters, researchers, and journalists to see - among other things - who is purchasing election ads on Google, YouTube, and Partner properties in Europe and how much money is being spent on those ads. This report includes a searchable ad library that provides important information such as how many impressions election ads have, when they were shown, and how they were targeted in terms of age, gender, and location.

Anyone can access and use this information, and Google has aimed to ensure that it is easy for third parties to analyse it more effectively: the report is searchable and downloadable, and can be filtered by spend, number of impressions, type of ad format, time and region/country. It is usually updated within a matter of minutes after an ad is first served and displays election ads from verified advertisers that have one or more impressions.

Google has also made significant investments in enhancing transparency around election advertising. In May 2022, Google updated the Political Ads Transparency Report, creating a new user interface and adding new tools for accessing and filtering information about targeting, location and formats for specific election ads and advertisers. Globally, Google expanded the election ads verification policies and transparency tools to more countries, including Argentina and Brazil.

The data from the EU Political Advertising Transparency Report and Ad Library is also available on Google Cloud's BigQuery. Using BigQuery's API, any interested third party can write code and run their own unique queries on this data set to develop charts, graphs, tables, or other visualisations of election ads on Google platforms.

As of February 2022, advertisers who have completed either election ads or advertiser identity verification are eligible to serve ads in their home country or region that are in scope of an election ads policy pertaining to a different country or region.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 9.1	**Google Advertising**
Measure 9.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Users engage with a wider variety of ad formats on more Google products than ever before — from Video ads on YouTube to Shopping ads across Search, Display and more — and increasingly want to know more about the ads they see. Google Ads provides tools to users to help them better understand why they are seeing an ad in Google's network. On Google Search and the Search Partner network, 'Paid for by' disclosures will show in ads directly. On YouTube, the disclosure will show in 'About This Ad' which can be accessed through the info icon or the 3-dot icon. Similarly, on websites and apps that partner with Google for display ads, the disclosure will show in the 'About This Ad' feature which can be accessed through the AdChoices icon. More than 30 million global users interact with the ads transparency and control menus every day, and 'About This Ad' has received positive feedback on its streamlined experience.

Users can also edit their preferences to [control the kinds of ads they see](), [block certain ads](), and provide [feedback on ads]() that they think are inappropriate.

Restricted targeting for election ads
Only the following criteria may be used to target election ads:
- Geographic location (except radius around a location);
- Age, gender;
- Contextual options such as: ad placements, topics, keywords against sites, apps, pages and videos.

All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 10			
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.			
	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 10.1	**Google Advertising**
Measure 10.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	The Political Advertising Transparency Report includes EU Election Ads (as defined by the Political Content Policy) which are ads that feature any of the following: ● A political party, current elected officeholder, or candidate for the EU Parliament; ● A political party, current officeholder, or candidate for an elected national office within an EU Member State. Examples include members of a national parliament and presidents that are directly elected; or ● A referendum question up for vote, a referendum campaign group, or a call to vote related to a national referendum or a state or provincial referendum on sovereignty. The Political Advertising Report shows how much those verified election advertisers are spending to run ads on Google Ads/DV360 in the EU. Google Ads/DV360's goal is to provide information that helps everyone better understand how ads of political importance work online. For more information, visit here. It includes election ads (as defined by the Political Content Policy) that were paid for by verified election advertisers and shown: ● At least 1 time; ● Across Search, Display, YouTube and DV360 in supported ad formats; ● Since Google started publishing this information (since 31 May 2018 or later depending on region). Information about an ad gets published usually within a matter of minutes after the ad was first served. This information includes:

- Total ad spend;
- Number of ads;
- Ad formats;
- Advertiser name;
- Number of times the ad was shown to users, or 'impressions'.

The Political Advertising Transparency Report can be filtered by ad format (text, image, video) and advertiser name. The report can also be modified to display ads that were shown during a set date range or in a specific country/region. Correspondingly, the tool provides an overview of ads served in a specific country/region, as well as insights into the top advertisers per country/region and their respective ad spend.

To ensure integrity and accuracy, updates to the report may be delayed.

During the period of 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024, the Political Advertising Transparency Report had approximately 53,000 global monthly page views.

The Political Advertising Transparency Report also publishes ads as a public data set on Google Cloud BigQuery.

	III. Political Advertising				
	Commitment 11				

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces."

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements.

Measure 11.1	**Google Advertising**
Measure 11.2	**Google Advertising**
Measure 11.3	**Google Advertising**
Measure 11.4	**Google Advertising**
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	See responses to QREs 8.2.1 and 10.2.1, in particular as it relates to BigQuery availability of the data in question.
QRE 11.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Developing a Political Advertising Transparency Report that works for researchers:** As mentioned in part 2 of this report, the Political Advertising Transparency Report data is fully available to the public. Data provided in the Political Advertising Transparency Report is available to be downloaded as a CSV from the Political

[Advertising on Google Transparency website](#) and is published as a public data set on [Google Cloud BigQuery](#). Researchers can also export a subset of the ads or access them programmatically.

Within the Google Advertising Political Advertising Transparency team, a User Experience team has been devoted to understanding target users' (including researchers') needs and working with Product Managers, Engineers, and others to develop new and improve existing features and functionalities of the Political Advertising Transparency Report. For example, Google Advertising has an always on survey that surfaces for anyone who views the Political Advertising Transparency Report. Via this survey, Google Advertising consistently gets feedback from researchers, as well as other user groups, and uses this feedback to inform improvements to the website. Researcher feedback has led Google Advertising to make improvements to features and functionalities such as in 'Amount spent' (e.g. increments such as Under €50, €50 - €500, €500 - €1000, etc.) and 'Number of times shown' filters (e.g. increments such as Under 1K, 1K-10K, 10K-50K etc.), where ranges became smaller and more specific , making them more useful to users (including researchers).

For the [Ads Transparency Centre](#), Google Advertising is launching an API to be available globally. Ads serving in the EU/EEA and Turkey became available starting Q3 2023 via the API with enhanced ad detail transparency.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 12
Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.

	C.12	M 12.1	M 12.2	M 12.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	*Not subscribed*

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 12.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 12.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 12.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 12.1.1 (for measures 12.1-12.3)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 13				
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.				
	C.13	**M 13.1**	**M 13.2**	**M 13.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google is committed to working with the members of the Permanent Task-force to deliver upon this measure.

Measure 13.1	**Google Advertising**
Measure 13.2	**Google Advertising**
Measure 13.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google continues to engage with the Permanent Task-force and is committed to delivering upon this measure.

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:
- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains;
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation.

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:
- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...);
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers;
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	● In March 2024, Google Search released an update to its Spam Policies that addresses 'scaled content abuse' - artificially-generated content (including AI-generated content) that seeks to manipulate Google's search ranking.	● YouTube has long been updating, on a regular and ongoing basis, its internal systems and processes related to the detection of content that violates its policies. This includes investment in automated detection systems. ● In March 2024, YouTube's policy on Harmful & Dangerous content was updated to include a stricter stance on audience disclaimers and updated guidelines to better assess the risk of potential harm of the act portrayed. ● Beginning in March 2024, YouTube, in some cases, may automatically set some videos to private when it detects that videos may have been uploaded and published without the channel owner's knowledge or permission. This update is part of YouTube's efforts to keep creators and their channels safe against hijacking. As an added precaution, the channel owner will be signed out of their account and notified by email. ● In March 2024, YouTube introduced a new tool in Creator Studio requiring creators to disclose to viewers when realistic content is made with altered or synthetic

		media, including generative AI, as a follow-up to its approach to responsible AI innovation announced in November 2023. ● In June 2024, YouTube updated its policies to prohibit content showing how to remove certain safety devices. Content showing the use of homemade firearms, automatic firearms, and certain firearm accessories will be age restricted. YouTube expanded enforcement on content sharing links where people can purchase firearms, ammo, or certain accessories. Learn more.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	As announced in YouTube's approach to responsible AI innovation, YouTube requires that creators disclose when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using AI tools. YouTube now applies new labels to content indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic, as well as a more prominent label for certain types of content about sensitive topics.

	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 14 for future reports.

Measure 14.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 14.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search's systems are designed to elevate authoritative information and combat the threats listed in Commitment 14. While many of those TTPs are not relevant to search engines (e.g. TTPs 1 through 5, TTP 11), by seeking to elevate authentic, original, high-quality information, Search's ranking systems directly tackle threats like inauthentic domains (TTP 4), obfuscation (TTP 6), deceptive manipulated media (TTP 7), hack and leak operations (TTP 8), inauthentic coordination (TTP 9), and a broad range of deceptive practices (TTP 10). More information about the design of Search's ranking systems is outlined in the User Empowerment chapter. Google Search's Overall Content Policies outline that Search takes action against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Learn more about Google Search Webmaster Guidelines.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Similar to Google Search, YouTube's systems are designed to connect people with high quality content from authoritative sources. In addition, YouTube has various policies which set out what is not allowed on YouTube. These policies, which can be accessed via this landing page in YouTube's Help Centre, address relevant TTPs. Notably, YouTube's policies tend to be broader than the identified TTPs. As such, related SLIs providing information about actions taken related to the TTP may be overinclusive. YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote authoritative content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, goes beyond these TTPs.

In line with these policies, Search deploys spam protection tools. While these efforts address a wider range of content than mis-/disinformation, they help to reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search through inauthentic behaviours outlined in relevant TTPs.

Moreover, Search has policies for what can appear in Google Search features (e.g. knowledge panels, content advisories, 'About This Result', etc.) to make sure that Search is showing high quality and helpful content, while also taking action against content that may promote harmful mis-/disinformation. Relevant policies to the threats listed above include the following:

- **Deceptive Practices Policy**: This policy prohibits content that impersonates any person or organisation, misrepresentation or concealment of ownership or primary purpose, and engagement in inauthentic or coordinated behaviour to deceive, defraud, or mislead. This policy does not cover content with certain artistic, educational, historical, documentary, or scientific considerations, or other substantial benefits to the public.
- **Manipulated Media Policy**: This policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place.
- **Transparency Policy**: This policy notes that news sources on Google should provide clear dates and bylines, as well as information about authors, the

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information in future reports.

	publication, the publisher, company or network behind it, and contact information.	
QRE 14.1.2	Google Search uses a variety of proactive detection efforts to counter spam, which overlaps significantly with TTPs used to disseminate disinformation. As outlined in the overall Google Search Content Policies, action is taken against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Pursuant to the Spam Content Policy, Google Search deploys spam protection tools, such as SpamBrain (Google's AI-based spam-prevention system), to protect search quality and user safety. Addressing a wider range of content than only mis-/disinformation, these efforts help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search. Additional information can be found in the 2022 Google Search Webspam Report. In March 2024, Google Search released an update to its Spam Policies that addresses 'scaled content abuse' - artificially-generated content (including AI-generated content) that seeks to manipulate Google's search ranking. In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust and Safety Team are central to Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1.	YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies as quickly as possible, raising high quality information in rankings and recommendations, curbing the spread of harmful misinformation, and rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU. A YouTube channel may be permanently terminated if the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, or the channel is determined to be wholly dedicated to violating YouTube's guidelines (as may be the case with spam accounts). In some cases, YouTube may terminate a channel for a single case of severe abuse, as explained in the Help Centre. When a channel is terminated, all of its videos are removed. YouTube also reserves the right to restrict a creator's ability to create content at its discretion. A user's channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, the user is prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on their YouTube channel. Violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of Service, and may result in termination of all their existing YouTube channels, any new channels that they create or acquire, and channels in which they are repeatedly or prominently featured.

Lastly, as part of Google's Priority Flaggers program, external trusted third parties, such as NGOs and government agencies, notify Google of harmful content, including related to misinformation. Google's content moderators review content flagged according to Google's [Abuse and Content Policies](#), including Search policies. In H2 2023, Google reached 23 Misinformation Priority Flaggers in the EU, including signing new partners in Romania, Spain and Belgium.

YouTube uses a combination of people and machine learning to detect problematic content automatically and at scale. Machine learning is well-suited to detect patterns, including harmful misinformation, which helps YouTube find content similar to other content that YouTube has already removed, even before it is viewed. Every quarter, YouTube publishes data in the [Community Guidelines enforcement report](#) about removals that were first detected by automated means.

YouTube's Intelligence Desk monitors the news, social media, and user reports to detect new trends surrounding inappropriate content, and works to make sure YouTube's teams are prepared to address them before they can become a larger issue.

In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Google and YouTube's Trust and Safety Teams are central to Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1.

The YouTube community also plays an important role in flagging content they think is inappropriate. YouTube developed the YouTube Priority Flagger program to streamline the reporting process for carefully selected NGOs and government agencies — groups that are trained to identify certain types of harmful content — that are particularly effective at notifying YouTube of content that likely violates its Community Guidelines. The program

		provides partners with dedicated reporting processes and a channel for ongoing discussion and feedback about YouTube's approach to various content areas. Partners also have access to prioritised review of flags. Because of their high degree of accuracy, YouTube prioritises flags from Priority Flaggers for review. Learn more [here](#).
		YouTube continues to invest in automated detection systems, and rely on both human evaluators and machine learning to train their systems on new data. YouTube's engineering teams also continue to update and improve their detection systems regularly. YouTube aims to leverage an even more targeted mix of classifiers, keywords in additional languages, and information from regional analysts to identify narratives their main classifier does not catch. Over time, this will continue to make YouTube faster and more accurate at catching viral misinformation narratives.
Measure 14.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 14.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content moderation on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and weigh signals of authoritativeness so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube enforces a broad range of policies to help build a safer community. These policies include, but are not limited to, YouTube's [Community Guidelines](#), which include policies covering [Spam, Scams, and Deceptive Practices](#), [Impersonation Policy](#) and [Fake Engagement Policy](#). YouTube applies these policies globally, including across the EEA Member States.

and signals to raise authoritative content and reduce low quality content. Google Search's publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Google Search works continuously to improve the quality and effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content.

Furthermore, to ensure its algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a rigorous process that involves both live tests and thousands of trained external Search Quality Raters from around the world. Raters do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search's results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users all around the world. Under the Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines, raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search also provides users the ability to flag content that might be violating Google Search policies.

Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies
In general, enforcement of YouTube's policies is a joint effort between people and machine learning technology. YouTube starts by giving its most experienced team of content moderators enforcement guidelines (detailed explanations of what makes content violative and non-violative), and asks them to differentiate between violative and non-violative material. If the new guidelines allow them to achieve a very high level of accuracy, YouTube expands the testing group to include hundreds of moderators across different backgrounds, languages and experience levels.

Then YouTube may begin revising the guidelines so that they can be accurately interpreted across a larger, more diverse set of moderators, and is only complete once the group reaches a similarly high degree of accuracy. These findings then help train YouTube's machine learning technology to detect potentially violative content at scale. As done with its content moderators, YouTube also tests its models to understand whether it has provided enough context for them to make accurate assessments about what to surface for people to review.

Once models are trained to identify potentially violative content, the role of content moderators remains essential throughout the enforcement process. Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content moderators then help confirm or deny whether the content should be removed.

| | | This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of YouTube's models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. It also means YouTube's enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube (over 500 hours of content every minute), while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

YouTube's Trust & Safety leadership meet with quality assurance leads from across the globe (those responsible for overseeing content moderation teams) to discuss particularly thorny decisions and review the quality of YouTube's enforcement. If needed, guideline tweaks are then drafted to address gaps or to provide clarity for edge cases.

For TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9, YouTube has continued to find opportunities to provide more granular detail around mapping to its policies. To learn more about these methodologies, refer to SLI 14.2.1, SLI 14.2.2, and SLI 14.2.4. |
|---|---|---|

Google Search
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

TTP OR ACTION1	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter** 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation); 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);

10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;

12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

SLI 14.2.1

Methodology

(1) Manual enforcement instances under relevant policy violations (including Deceptive Practices, Manipulated Media, Medical Content, Misleading Content and Transparency Policies) on a global level in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).

(2) Domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search on a global level in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).

Response

(1) In H1 2024, there were 15,626 instances of policy enforcement, globally, which resulted in removal of false, disputed, non-representative facts, misrepresentation information, content that contradicts scientific or medical based consensus and evidence based best practices. The actions were enforced across Search features including knowledge engine, webanswers, news, discover, image and video search.

(2) In H1 2024, there were 501,659 manual actions and 15,381,184 algorithmic actions taken against spam policies. Globally, a total of 15,882,843 domains were affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search.

SLI 14.2.2

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy violating content.

SLI 14.2.3

This SLI is not applicable for Google Search, as users do not need accounts to use the search engine, and generally do not post content on Google Search.

SLI 14.2.4

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy violating content.

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 2												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content

									on the service	overall views/impressions on the service)	(in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States											

TTP OR ACTION 3											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 4												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 5												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 6												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**					**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**	
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/imp	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation

									ressions on the service)	to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States										

TTP OR ACTION 7											
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 8												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 9												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of	Nr of actions	Views/ impressio	Interaction/ engagem	Views/ impressio	Interaction/ engagem	Penetration and impact	Trends on targeted	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in	Views/ impressions of TTP	Interaction/ engagem

	identified TTPs	taken by type	ns before action	ent before action	ns after action	ent after action	on genuine users	audiences		relation to overall content on the service	related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 10												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engage

												ment on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 11												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interactio n/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressio ns after action	Interactio n/ engagem ent after action	Penetrati on and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressio ns of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/imp ressions on the service)	Interactio n/ engagem ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio n/engage ment on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

YouTube
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

TTP OR ACTION 1	SLI 14.2.1 **Methodology**

(1) Number of channels for TTP 1, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024);
(2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote authoritative content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs.

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information in future reports.

In the H2 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube's primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(3) Views/impressions after action for TTP 1 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response
(1) N/A;
(2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;
(3) N/A;
(4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3
Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

Methodology

(1) Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(2) N/A;

(3) N/A.

Response

(1) Please see table below;

(2, 3) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2							SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Number of channels identified	**Number of channels removed**	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	**Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals out of all related channel removals**	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States														
Austria	3,018	3,018									28.87%		
Belgium	1,746	1,746									10.28%		
Bulgaria	1,284	1,284									11.52%		
Croatia	928	928									14.78%		
Cyprus	676	676									23.62%		
Czech Republic	3,238	3,238									16.28%		
Denmark	884	884									15.74%		
Estonia	835	835									16.64%		
Finland	719	719									12.49%		
France	6,211	6,211									11.89%		
Germany	8,701	8,701									15.78%		
Greece	1,570	1,570									8.97%		
Hungary	1,797	1,797									11.92%		
Ireland	1,701	1,701									11.44%		
Italy	7,357	7,357									16.04%		
Latvia	767	767									17.52%		
Lithuania	905	905									20.40%		
Luxembourg	346	346									13.02%		
Malta	237	237									23.01%		
Netherlands	3,502	3,502									13.31%		
Poland	5,235	5,235									13.84%		

Portugal	2,129	2,129									10.57%		
Romania	3,110	3,110									13.25%		
Slovakia	664	664									15.31%		
Slovenia	452	452									14.25%		
Spain	4,093	4,093									13.49%		
Sweden	2,047	2,047									6.81%		
Iceland	139	139									14.82%		
Liechtenstein	3	3									9.68%		
Norway	1,118	1,118									16.52%		
Total EU	**64,152**	**64,152**									**13.57%**		
Total EEA	**65,412**	**65,412**									**13.61%**		

TTP OR ACTION 2												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio

											on the service)	n/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 3												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 4												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 5	SLI 14.2.1
	Methodology
	(1) Number of channels for TTP 5, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024);
	(2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
	(3) Number of videos for TTP 5, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
	(4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.
	Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one

mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote authoritative content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs.

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information in future reports.

In the H2 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube's primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 5 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

<u>SLI 14.2.3</u>
Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

<u>SLI 14.2.4</u>
Methodology
(1) Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

<table>
<tr><td colspan="18">

(2) Percentage of TTP 5 video removals out of all related video removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(3) N/A;

(4) N/A.

Response

(1) Please see table below;

(2) Please see table below;

(3, 4) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

</td></tr>
</table>

	SLI 14.2.1				SLI 14.2.2							SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Number of channels identified	Number of channels removed	Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals out of all related channel removals	Percentage of TTP 5 video removals out of all related video removals	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engage

															service)	ment on the service)
Member States																
Austria	234	234	21	21	0	0	7	9	3	2	0			2.24%	0.13%	
Belgium	380	380	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0			2.24%	0.00%	
Bulgaria	187	187	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			1.68%	0.00%	
Croatia	129	129	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0			2.05%	0.01%	
Cyprus	94	94	16	16	0	0	0	1	13	2	0			3.28%	0.43%	
Czech Republic	313	313	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0			1.57%	0.01%	
Denmark	145	145	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0			2.58%	0.01%	
Estonia	70	70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			1.39%	0.00%	
Finland	168	168	519	519	341	131	19	14	10	4	0			2.92%	0.53%	
France	2,293	2,293	258	258	26	5	21	90	111	5	0			4.39%	0.25%	
Germany	2,377	2,377	1,013	1,013	691	143	28	51	84	16	0			4.31%	0.49%	
Greece	289	289	20	20	4	2	1	7	4	2	0			1.65%	0.15%	
Hungary	482	482	11	11	0	1	3	7	0	0	0			3.20%	0.07%	
Ireland	276	276	6	6	4	0	0	1	0	1	0			1.86%	0.04%	
Italy	1,652	1,652	52	52	8	20	14	3	5	2	0			3.60%	0.08%	
Latvia	111	111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			2.53%	0.00%	
Lithuania	128	128	4	4	3	0	0	1	0	0	0			2.88%	0.04%	

Luxembourg	28	28	10	10	2	2	5	1	0	0	0				1.05%	0.43%		
Malta	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.91%	0.00%		
Netherlands	706	706	205	205	93	61	32	16	3	0	0				2.68%	0.33%		
Poland	1,158	1,158	8	8	5	0	1	1	1	0	0				3.06%	0.01%		
Portugal	369	369	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				1.83%	0.00%		
Romania	703	703	20	20	8	7	4	1	0	0	0				3.00%	0.04%		
Slovakia	148	148	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				3.41%	0.00%		
Slovenia	64	64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.02%	0.00%		
Spain	1,207	1,207	55	55	12	13	15	9	4	2	0				3.98%	0.07%		
Sweden	438	438	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0				1.46%	0.02%		
Iceland	12	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				1.28%	0.00%		
Liechtenstein	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				3.23%	0.00%		
Norway	233	233	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				3.44%	0.00%		
Total EU	**14,179**	**14,179**	**2,228**	**2,228**	**1,206**	**385**	**150**	**213**	**238**	**36**	**0**				**3.00%**	**0.23%**		
Total EEA	**14,425**	**14,425**	**2,228**	**2,228**	**1,206**	**385**	**150**	**213**	**238**	**36**	**0**				**3.00%**	**0.22%**		

TTP OR ACTION 6												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2					SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4	
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related

											on the service	relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States													

TTP OR ACTION 7	<u>**SLI 14.2.1**</u> **Methodology** (1) Number of videos for TTP 7, identified for potential removal, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024); (2) Number of removals of videos for TTP 7, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024. Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone. YouTube's [Community Guidelines](), commitment to promote authoritative content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs. In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining

TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found [here](). YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information in future reports.

In the H2 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube's primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2
Methodology
(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 7 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3
Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4
Methodology
(1) Percentage of TTP 7 video removals out of all related video removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;
(2) N/A;
(3) N/A.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2, 3) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2							SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Number of	Number of	Number of	Number of	Number of	Number of	Number of	Number of	Views after	Penetration	Trends on	Trends on	**Percentage**	Views/ impres	Interaction/

	videos identified	videos removed	videos removed with 0 views	videos removed with 1-10 views	videos removed with 11-100 views	videos removed with 101-1,000 views	videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	videos removed with >10,000 views	action	and impact on genuine users	targeted audiences	narratives used	of TTP 7 video removals out of all related video removals	sions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States															
Austria	24	24	5	11	4	0	3	1	0				0.15%		
Belgium	28	28	3	9	7	2	4	3	0				0.13%		
Bulgaria	21	21	0	5	4	3	5	4	0				0.14%		
Croatia	4	4	3	0	0	1	0	0	0				0.06%		
Cyprus	36	36	12	8	3	1	9	3	0				0.96%		
Czech Republic	20	20	4	4	3	4	2	3	0				0.06%		
Denmark	7	7	0	4	2	1	0	0	0				0.04%		
Estonia	9	9	1	1	1	2	2	2	0				0.17%		

Finland	24	24	5	10	4	3	1	1	0			0.02%	
France	320	320	40	92	88	43	25	32	0			0.31%	
Germany	391	391	44	149	87	43	36	32	0			0.19%	
Greece	151	151	6	21	17	29	55	23	0			1.12%	
Hungary	18	18	3	7	2	2	1	3	0			0.12%	
Ireland	73	73	6	7	6	6	19	29	0			0.51%	
Italy	121	121	28	43	33	10	6	1	0			0.19%	
Latvia	4	4	1	1	1	1	0	0	0			0.05%	
Lithuania	8	8	0	0	4	0	1	3	0			0.09%	
Luxembourg	3	3	0	1	1	1	0	0	0			0.13%	
Malta	3	3	0	1	2	0	0	0	0			0.25%	
Netherlands	142	142	14	38	26	10	22	32	0			0.23%	
Poland	86	86	9	15	19	14	6	23	0			0.10%	
Portugal	15	15	1	7	3	0	1	3	0			0.08%	
Romania	38	38	1	10	5	9	9	4	0			0.07%	
Slovakia	12	12	2	4	2	1	0	3	0			0.12%	
Slovenia	5	5	1	0	2	1	0	1	0			0.19%	
Spain	104	104	10	37	21	19	6	11	0			0.13%	
Sweden	60	60	7	14	31	7	0	1	0			0.22%	
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0.00%	
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0.00%	
Norway	24	24	7	7	5	3	1	1	0			0.21%	
Total EU	**1,727**	**1,727**	**206**	**499**	**378**	**213**	**213**	**218**	**0**			**0.17%**	

Total EEA	1,751	1,751	213	506	383	216	214	219	0			0.17%	

TTP OR ACTION 8													
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 9	SLI 14.2.1 **Methodology** (1) Number of channels for TTP 9, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024); (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024; (3) Number of videos for TTP 9, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote authoritative content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, beyond these TTPs.

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information in future reports.

In the H2 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube's primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response
(1) Please see table below;
(2) Please see table below;
(3) Please see table below;
(4) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2

Methodology

(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 9 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response

(1) Please see table below;

(2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;

(3) Please see table below;

(4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

Methodology

(1) Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(2) Percentage of TTP 9 video removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2024;

(3) N/A;

(4) N/A.

Response

(1) Please see table below;

(2) Please see table below;

(3, 4) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

	SLI 14.2.1				**SLI 14.2.2**							**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**			
	Number of channels identified	**Number of channels removed**	**Number of videos identified**	**Number of videos removed**	**Number of videos removed with 0 views**	**Number of videos removed with 1-10 views**	**Number of videos removed with 11-100 views**	**Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views**	**Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views**	**Number of videos removed with >10,000 views**	**Views after action**	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	**Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals out of all related channel removals**	**Percentage of TTP 9 video removals out of all related video removals**	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to ove	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to

Member States																rall views/impressions on the service)	overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Austria	56	56	180	180	6	17	71	48	27	11	0			0.54%	1.12%		
Belgium	109	109	195	195	6	15	41	48	60	25	0			0.64%	0.90%		
Bulgaria	73	73	130	130	25	27	21	25	22	10	0			0.66%	0.87%		
Croatia	53	53	71	71	1	2	19	15	25	9	0			0.84%	0.99%		
Cyprus	37	37	52	52	1	2	9	15	22	3	0			1.29%	1.39%		
Czech Republic	165	165	261	261	27	48	37	58	67	24	0			0.83%	0.83%		
Denmark	85	85	112	112	4	12	37	29	24	6	0			1.51%	0.66%		
Estonia	38	38	35	35	2	3	8	7	13	2	0			0.76%	0.67%		
Finland	40	40	169	169	36	40	36	21	26	10	0			0.70%	0.17%		
France	311	311	886	886	52	112	173	237	227	85	0			0.60%	0.85%		

Country																
Germany	443	443	1,836	1,836	94	345	279	431	417	270	0			0.80%	0.89%		
Greece	95	95	94	94	2	10	9	21	30	22	0			0.54%	0.69%		
Hungary	80	80	40	40	1	3	10	11	8	7	0			0.53%	0.26%		
Ireland	139	139	120	120	6	16	15	34	38	11	0			0.93%	0.84%		
Italy	253	253	261	261	18	16	43	67	81	36	0			0.55%	0.41%		
Latvia	30	30	110	110	4	6	19	24	41	16	0			0.69%	1.48%		
Lithuania	50	50	111	111	3	13	20	23	28	24	0			1.13%	1.19%		
Luxembourg	11	11	98	98	72	5	8	8	3	2	0			0.41%	4.17%		
Malta	9	9	8	8	0	0	1	3	3	1	0			0.87%	0.68%		
Netherlands	182	182	926	926	52	83	185	275	248	83	0			0.69%	1.51%		
Poland	904	904	1,405	1,405	21	142	262	661	249	70	0			2.39%	1.66%		
Portugal	113	113	59	59	2	2	13	16	18	8	0			0.56%	0.33%		
Romania	172	172	187	187	4	19	31	56	51	26	0			0.73%	0.35%		
Slovakia	36	36	88	88	0	3	9	25	44	7	0			0.83%	0.89%		
Slovenia	26	26	56	56	1	6	10	24	10	5	0			0.82%	2.08%		
Spain	228	228	629	629	17	43	170	150	181	68	0			0.75%	0.80%		
Sweden	149	149	195	195	11	34	29	40	53	28	0			0.50%	0.73%		
Iceland	3	3	42	42	3	1	23	11	4	0	0			0.32%	3.11%		
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0.00%	0.00%		
Norway	70	70	90	90	1	7	8	29	36	9	0			1.03%	0.77%		
Total EU	**3,887**	**3,887**	**8,314**	**8,314**	**468**	**1,024**	**1,565**	**2,372**	**2,016**	**869**	**0**			**0.82%**	**0.84%**		
Total EEA	**3,960**	**3,960**	**8,446**	**8,446**	**472**	**1,032**	**1,596**	**2,412**	**2,056**	**878**	**0**			**0.82%**	**0.84%**		

TTP OR ACTION 10												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 11												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of	Nr of actions	Views/ impressio	Interaction/ engagem	Views/ impressio	Interaction/ engagem	Penetration and impact	Trends on targeted	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in	Views/ impressions of TTP	Interaction/ engagem

	identified TTPs	taken by type	ns before action	ent before action	ns after action	ent after action	on genuine users	audiences		relation to overall content on the service	related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engage

													ment on the service)
Member States													

Measure 14.3	Google Search		YouTube
QRE 14.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The final list of TTPs agreed within the Permanent Task-force in H2 2022 was used by Signatories as part of their reports from then on, as intended. The Permanent Task-force will continue to examine and update the list as necessary in light of the state of the art.		

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 15
Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	Yes	Yes

implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?		
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- In February 2024, Google joined other leading tech companies in pledging to help prevent deceptive AI-generated imagery, audio or video content from interfering with this year's global elections. The 'Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections' is a set of commitments to deploy technology countering harmful AI-generated content meant to deceive voters. - In February 2024, Google shared how they are partnering with the industry, governments and civil society to advance AI. More details can be found here. - In preparation for the EU Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Google shared in February 2024 that it is helping users navigate AI-generated content through ad disclosures, content labels on YouTube, a responsible approach to Generative AI products, providing users with additional context, and digital watermarking. See the European Elections annex included in this report for more information on these efforts. - In February 2024, Google joined the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) and standard, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content. - In May 2024, Google expanded its support for the Institute for Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence and Technology (INSAIT) in Sofia, Bulgaria. This new investment of over $2 million reaffirms Google's commitment to fostering AI research and talent development in Central and Eastern Europe. - In May 2024, Google announced that it will open-source SynthID text watermarking through its updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit to help others benefit from and improve on the advances Google is making. In addition, Google expanded SynthID's capabilities to include watermarking AI-generated text in the Gemini app and web experience, as well as video in Veo, its recently announced and most capable generative video model. - In May 2024, Google introduced the Frontier Safety Framework - a set of protocols for proactively identifying future AI capabilities that could cause severe harm and putting in place mechanisms to detect and mitigate them. **YouTube:**	

	• In March 2024, YouTube [introduced a new tool](#) in Creator Studio requiring creators to disclose to viewers when realistic content is made with altered or synthetic media, including generative AI, as a follow-up to its [approach to responsible AI innovation](#) announced in November 2023. • YouTube expanded its privacy request process to allow individuals globally to request the removal of AI-generated or other synthetic or altered content on YouTube that looks or sounds like them.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Search hopes Google's [SynthID technology](#) can work together with a broad range of solutions for creators and users across society, and it is continuing to evolve SynthID by gathering feedback from users, enhancing its capabilities, and exploring new features. SynthID could be expanded for use across other AI models and Google Search is excited about the potential of integrating it into more Google products and making it available to third parties in the near future — empowering people and organisations to responsibly work with AI-generated content.	As announced in YouTube's [approach to responsible AI innovation](#), YouTube [requires that creators disclose](#) when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using AI tools. YouTube will apply new labels to content indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic, as well as a more prominent label for certain types of content about sensitive topics. YouTube continually invests in the ability to detect policy violative accounts and evolves this work accordingly. YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 15 for future reports.

Measure 15.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The Google Search features Manipulated Media Policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. This includes if such content would cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different understanding or impression, such that it might cause significant harm to groups or individuals, or significantly undermine participation or trust in electoral or civic processes.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated. YouTube's long-standing Misinformation Policies prohibit content that has been technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken out of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm. YouTube detects content that violates Community Guidelines using a combination of machine learning and human review. YouTube also has policies on Spam & Deceptive Practices that prohibit, for example, spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advantage of the YouTube community, Impersonation, and Fake Engagement. Refer to QRE 18.2.1 for how YouTube enforces these policies.
Measure 15.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.2.1	Google's AI principles set out Google's commitment to develop technology responsibly and establish specific application areas that will not be pursued.	Google's AI principles set out Google's commitment to develop technology responsibly and establish specific application areas that will not be pursued. YouTube responsibly applies Google AI principles to all its products.

Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content. However, if AI is used for the primary purpose of manipulating search rankings, that is a violation of Google Search's long-standing policy against spammy automatically-generated content.

Across its services, Google has been examining the risks and challenges associated with more powerful language models.

Improved AI systems can help bolster spam fighting capabilities and even help combat known loss patterns. Google Search introduced a system to better identify queries seeking explicit content, so Google Search can better avoid shocking or offending users not looking for that information, and ultimately make the Google Search experience safer for everyone.

In May 2024, Google published a white paper outlining its end-to-end AI Responsibility Lifecycle: a four-phase process (Research, Design, Govern, Share) that guides responsible AI development at Google. The initial Research and Design phases foster innovation, while the Govern and Share phases focus on risk assessment, testing, monitoring, and transparency. In this paper, Google aims to share its thoughts on emerging best practices for generative AI responsibility with others across the AI ecosystem, and discusses examples of how it has taken what it has learned about new applications, extensions and risks to inform innovation. For each phase of the AI

YouTube's approach to responsible AI innovation
All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated. YouTube has introduced updates that inform viewers when the content they are seeing is altered or synthetic. Specifically, YouTube now requires creators to disclose when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using AI tools.

YouTube also informs viewers that content may be altered or synthetic in two ways. A label may be added to the description panel indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic. For certain types of content about sensitive topics, YouTube will apply a more prominent label to the video player. Examples of content that require disclosures can be found here.

YouTube has noted feedback from its community, including creators, viewers, and artists, about the ways in which emerging technologies could impact them. YouTube makes it possible to request the removal of AI-generated or other synthetic or altered content that simulates an identifiable individual, including their face or voice, using its privacy request process. Not all content will be removed from YouTube, and YouTube will consider a variety of factors when evaluating these requests, some examples can be found here.

Additionally, YouTube has highlighted how it will build responsibility into its AI tools and features for creators. This includes significant, ongoing work to develop guardrails

Responsibility Lifecycle, Google also outlines the specific progress it has made towards building safer products that maximise the positive benefits of AI to society, and looks ahead to what is next.

In line with Google's [principled](#) and [responsible](#) approach to its Generative AI products, Google has prioritised testing across safety risks ranging from cybersecurity vulnerabilities to misinformation and fairness.

Reiterating Google's approach to AI Principles governance rests on a corporate-wide end-to-end commitment to three pillars:

1. **AI Principles** serve as Google's ethical charter and inform its product policies. In this year's report, products that were announced in 2022 that align with the AI Principles are discussed, as well as three in-depth case studies, including how tough decisions are made on what or what not to launch, and how to efficiently address responsible AI issues such as fairness across multiple products.
2. **Education and resources** provide ethics training and technical tools to test, evaluate and monitor the application of the AI Principles to all of Google's products and services. Google is sharing for the first time details of a new company-wide tool for monitoring products' responsible AI maturity, and updates on technical approaches to fairness, data transparency, and more.
3. **Structures and processes** include risk assessment frameworks, ethics reviews, and

that will prevent its AI tools from generating the type of content that does not belong on YouTube.

YouTube will incorporate user feedback and learning to continuously improve protections. And within YouTube, dedicated teams like the intelligence desk are specifically focused on adversarial testing and threat detection to ensure YouTube's systems meet new challenges as they emerge. For example, all content generated by YouTube's AI tools will [include a SynthID watermark](#), which is a tool for watermarking and identifying AI-generated images. Across the industry, Google, including YouTube, continues to help increase transparency around digital content. This includes its work as a [steering member](#) of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA).

Deploying AI technology to power content moderation
YouTube has always used a combination of people and machine learning technologies to enforce its Community Guidelines. AI classifiers help YouTube detect potentially violative content at scale, and reviewers work to confirm whether content has actually crossed policy lines. AI is continuously increasing both the speed and accuracy of YouTube's content moderation systems.

Improved speed and accuracy of YouTube's systems also allows it to reduce the amount of harmful content human reviewers are exposed to.

Google's Commitment to Safe and Secure AI
Google has a long history of supporting collective security through the [Vulnerability Rewards Program (VRP)](#), [Project](#)

	Executive accountability. This report provides a dive deep into how risk is identified and measured in the AI Principles reviews, as well as a behind the scenes look at how Google approaches assessing new AI applications for surveillance concerns as an example of how AI applications that will not be pursued are defined and assessed. See additional details [here](#).	Zero and in the field of [Open Source software security](#). Additionally, Google, including YouTube: ● Joined other leading AI companies at the White House to [commit](#) to advancing the discovery of vulnerabilities in AI systems. ● [Expanded VRP](#) to reward for attack scenarios specific to generative AI. Google believes incentivizing research around AI safety and security, and bringing potential issues to light, will ultimately make AI safer for everyone. Learn more [here](#).

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

	C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	Yes	Yes

of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?		
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published its [Q1 2024](#), and [Q2 2024](#) Quarterly Bulletin, which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms. - In H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), Google TAG published 5 examples of information sharing and learnings in the [TAG Blog](#): - January 2024 - [Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware](#); - February 2024 - [Buying Spying: How the commercial surveillance industry works and what can be done about it](#); - February 2024 - [Tool of First Resort: Israel-Hamas War in Cyber](#); - March 2024 - [A review of zero-day in-the-wild exploits in 2023](#); - June 2024 - [Google disrupted over 10,000 instances of DRAGONBRIDGE activity in Q1 2024](#).	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 16 for future reports.

Measure 16.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**

QRE 16.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Team work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States. One of TAG's missions is to understand and disrupt coordinated information operations threat actors. TAG's work enables Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by rigorous analysis. TAG's investigations do not focus on making judgements about the content on Google platforms, but rather examining technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural patterns to make an assessment that activity is coordinated inauthentic behaviour. TAG regularly publishes its TAG Bulletin, updated quarterly [here](#), which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, as well as additional periodic blog posts. TAG also engages with other platform Signatories to receive and, when strictly necessary for security purposes, share information related to threat actor activity – in compliance with applicable laws. To learn more, refer to SLI 16.1.1. See Google's disclosure policies about [handling security vulnerabilities](#) for developers and security professionals.
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) posts a quarterly Bulletin, which includes disclosure of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's products and services, as well as additional periodic blog posts. In the Bulletin, TAG often notes when findings are similar to or supported by those reported by other platforms. The publicly available H1 2024 TAG Bulletins (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024) show 21,698 YouTube channels across 39 separate actions were involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. Industry partners supported four of those separate actions by providing leads. The TAG Bulletin and periodic blog posts are Google's, including YouTube's, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues. As reported in the Bulletin, some channels YouTube took action on were part of campaigns that uploaded content in some EEA languages, specifically: Spanish (81 channels), French (65 channels), German (25 channels), Italian (21 channels), Polish (21 channels), and Portuguese (7 channels). Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in an EEA Member State

	language does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State. For more information, please see the TAG Bulletin. Google Search and YouTube will explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 16.1.1 for future reports.	
Data		
Measure 16.2	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
QRE 16.2.1	*Not subscribed*	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States. Refer to the TAG Bulletin articles that cover the reporting period to learn more about the number of YouTube channels terminated as part of TAG's investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia, Poland, and other countries around the world. The most recent examples of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as how Google collaborates and shares information, can be found in Google's TAG Blog.

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 17 In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	• In May 2024, Google announced that it will open-source SynthID text watermarking through its updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit to help others benefit from and improve on the advances Google is making. In addition, Google expanded SynthID's capabilities to include watermarking AI-generated text in the Gemini app and web experience, as well as video in Veo, its recently announced and most capable generative video model. • Google Search expanded the 'About This Image' tool to 40 additional languages	• In H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), YouTube deployed additional content in the 'Hit Pause' campaign, which at the time of this report, is available in all EU Member States. • In H1 2024, Educational election public service announcements (PSAs) were used in all EU Member States during the EU elections to provide information on how to vote and/or where to vote, and to remind users about 'Hit Pause' content.

	around the world, including French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.	• YouTube continues to expand its deployment of information panels on topics prone to misinformation globally.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	'About This Image' is getting a new field that will show if a SynthID watermark has been detected on an image shown in Search. If it has been detected, ATI will indicate this by saying 'Made with Google AI' and 'Part or all of this image was made or altered with AI'.	YouTube plans to continue rolling out new content, and will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 17 for future reports.

Measure 17.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search aims to connect users with high quality information, and help users understand and evaluate that information. Google Search has deeply invested in both information quality and information literacy. Some ways in which Google Search does this include: • **'About This Result'**: Next to most results on	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube takes its responsibility efforts seriously, outlining clear policies used to moderate content on the platform and providing tools that users can leverage to improve their media literacy education and better evaluate what content and sources to trust.

Google Search, there is a menu icon that users can tap to learn more about the result or feature and where the information is coming from. With this additional context, users can make a more informed decision about the sites they want to visit and what results will be most useful for them. When available, users will see a description of the website from Wikipedia, which provides free, reliable information about tens of millions of sites on the web. If a website does not have a Wikipedia description, Google Search will show additional context that may be available, such as when Google Search first indexed the site. Users will also be able to quickly see if their connection to the site is secure based on its use of the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts all data between the website and the browser they are using, to help them stay safe as they browse the web. More information on the 'About This Result' feature can be found [here](#), and [here](#).

The 'More About This Page' link within the 'About This Result' feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:

- **See more information about the source**: Users will be able to read what a site says about itself in its own words, when that information is available.
- **Find what others on the web have said**

Information panels may also appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. For example, topics that are prone to misinformation may have information panels that show basic background info, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more context on the topic. If a user wants to learn more, the panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to expand its deployment of these information panels globally.

During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.

Further EEA Member State coverage can be found in SLI 17.1.1.

about a site: Reading what others on the web have written about a site can help users better evaluate sources.

- **Learn more about the topic**: In the 'About the topic' section, users can find information about the same topic from other sources.

In December 2023, Google Search expanded this feature to 40 new languages, including Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, Greek, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, and Swedish.

Additional information can be found in the Google Search blog post here.

- **'About This Image':** With added insights in 'About This Image', users will know if an image may have been generated with Google's AI tools when they come across it in Search or Chrome. All images generated with Imagen 2 in Google's consumer products will be marked by SynthID, a tool developed by Google DeepMind that adds a digital watermark directly into the pixels of images generated. SynthID watermarks are imperceptible to the human eye but detectable for identification. In addition, Search recently expanded the 'About This Image' tool to 40 additional languages around the world, including French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.

	○ Consistent with its AI principles, Google Search also conducted extensive adversarial testing and red teaming to identify and mitigate potential harmful and problematic content. Google Search is also applying filters to avoid generating images of named people. Google Search will continue investing in new techniques to improve the safety and privacy protections of its models. More information on the 'About This Image' feature can be found [here](#). ● **Content Advisory Notices**: Helpful notices for users that highlight when information is scarce or when interest is travelling faster than facts. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic. More information is available in the blog posts ['A new notice in Search for rapidly evolving results'](#), ['New ways we're helping you find high-quality information'](#) and ['Helping Europeans find facts in moments that matter'](#).	
SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	(1) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State;	Impressions of information panels (excluding [fact-check panels](#), [crisis resource panel](#), [non-COVID medical panels](#)) in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.

(2) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State;

(3) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for potentially unreliable sets of results in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State;

Note metrics 1-3 are estimated proportions; metric 1 represents the number of content advisories for low relevance results out of all queries over the reporting period; metric 2 and 3 follow the same logic but are for content advisories for rapidly changing results and content advisories for potentially unreliable sets of results, respectively.

(4) Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State;

(5) Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State;

(6) Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State;

(7) Number of times the 'Personalisation' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State.

	Search only							YouTube only
	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results (%)	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results (%)	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for potentially unreliable set of results (%)	Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed	Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Personalisation' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-COVID medical panels)
Level	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions
Member States								
Austria	0.130%	0.00025%	0.0001195%	637,300	2,988,676	10,529,380	10,426,260	51,045,483
Belgium	0.117%	0.00010%	0.0000778%	948,054	3,553,058	13,272,438	13,163,798	142,517,321
Bulgaria	0.159%	0.00011%	0.0000173%	457,490	1,365,536	6,104,558	6,089,546	38,806,535
Croatia	0.137%	0.00014%	0.0000440%	259,468	1,169,712	5,520,658	5,505,334	51,324,389
Cyprus	0.183%	0.00006%	0.0001088%	101,432	291,106	1,111,636	1,104,946	5,389,481
Czech Republic	0.140%	0.00008%	0.0000121%	520,110	2,680,152	9,714,988	9,681,520	92,147,691
Denmark	0.119%	0.00025%	0.0000000%	224,462	1,540,296	5,616,970	5,579,418	18,276,276
Estonia	0.223%	0.00047%	0.0000000%	91,774	337,510	1,517,698	1,513,270	15,691,350
Finland	0.139%	0.00237%	0.0000151%	579,836	1,866,232	7,702,572	7,686,080	17,180,106
France	0.085%	0.00014%	0.0001290%	6,544,390	24,872,974	88,035,082	87,344,094	963,006,483
Germany	0.111%	0.00032%	0.0002020%	6,628,536	27,710,052	95,314,110	94,466,426	1,951,804,676
Greece	0.168%	0.00009%	0.0000109%	639,346	2,779,146	11,819,482	11,769,060	42,428,213
Hungary	0.150%	0.00008%	0.0000000%	475,746	2,143,554	9,271,576	9,233,940	86,437,861

Ireland	0.104%	0.00017%	0.0000998%	673,800	2,119,038	6,813,672	6,747,606	69,366,991
Italy	0.153%	0.00011%	0.0000250%	5,749,690	25,661,424	90,502,938	89,904,652	561,534,470
Latvia	0.230%	0.00005%	0.0000000%	111,746	413,378	1,747,176	1,739,566	38,831,470
Lithuania	0.208%	0.00007%	0.0000000%	205,630	648,242	2,917,288	2,905,458	46,732,236
Luxembourg	0.164%	0.00015%	0.0001546%	52,704	206,486	738,052	729,660	3,225,429
Malta	0.173%	0.00000%	0.0000000%	57,930	184,810	662,658	657,346	2,653,667
Netherlands	0.120%	0.00014%	0.0000238%	1,599,362	6,481,408	23,671,586	23,519,202	337,677,957
Poland	0.093%	0.00005%	0.0000035%	1,792,268	15,087,638	53,228,256	53,001,228	257,796,199
Portugal	0.093%	0.00009%	0.0000804%	994,164	3,089,010	12,421,696	12,303,388	34,711,850
Romania	0.111%	0.00008%	0.0000202%	746,084	3,320,010	14,109,540	14,068,506	100,415,965
Slovakia	0.149%	0.00006%	0.0000000%	248,160	1,163,220	5,059,280	5,041,790	38,522,320
Slovenia	0.201%	0.00006%	0.0000000%	150,396	567,804	2,620,786	2,614,050	16,735,774
Spain	0.084%	0.00029%	0.0001005%	5,138,854	17,672,910	64,511,172	63,967,174	541,465,059
Sweden	0.111%	0.00034%	0.0000059%	470,782	3,510,100	12,680,472	12,595,750	107,864,441
Iceland	0.191%	0.00026%	0.0000000%	18,824	93,458	340,538	337,208	1,311,914
Liechtenstein	0.161%	0.00000%	0.0000000%	2,830	10,504	38,822	38,194	169,240
Norway	0.089%	0.00022%	0.0000098%	206,182	1,527,778	5,662,336	5,610,680	18,311,399
Total EU	**0.115%**	**0.00022%**	**0.0000849%**	**36,099,514**	**153,423,482**	**557,215,720**	**553,359,068**	**5,633,589,693**
Total EEA	**0.114%**	**0.00022%**	**0.0000838%**	**36,327,350**	**155,055,222**	**563,257,416**	**559,345,150**	**5,653,382,246**

Measure 17.2	Google Search		YouTube	
QRE 17.2.1	**Jigsaw-led Research** Jigsaw, a unit within Google that explores threats to open societies and builds technology that inspires scalable solutions, began conducting research on 'information interventions' more than 10 years ago. Information interventions			

are tools that provide helpful information to users at a critical moment in their online journey so that they can protect themselves online from a range of online harms such as harmful misinformation.

Jigsaw has since contributed research and technology on ways to make people more resilient to disinformation. Their research efforts are based on behavioural science and ethnographic studies that examine when people might be vulnerable to specific messages and how to provide helpful information when people need it most. Jigsaw regularly contributes to the research community and publishes their findings. To learn more specifically about Jigsaw's prebunking findings, visit their dedicated website here.

Notable publications by Jigsaw in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024) have included:

- January 2024 - Prebunking research has demonstrated positive effects on misinformation resilience when measured immediately after treatment via messages, games, or videos. However, very little is currently known about their long-term effectiveness and the mechanisms by which such treatment effects decay over time. Jigsaw and their collaborators found that text-based and video-based inoculation interventions can remain effective for one month and that memory-enhancing 'boosters' or shortened versions of the original message can enhance the diminishing effects of counter-misinformation interventions. Finally, the researchers propose an integrated memory-motivation model, concluding that misinformation researchers would benefit from integrating knowledge from the cognitive science of memory to design a new generation of psychological interventions that can counter misinformation durably over time and at-scale. More information about the experiment's methodology and findings are available via preprint here and is under peer review.

- May 2024 - Most existing literature assumes a paradigm where 'expert' organised disinformation creators and flawed AI models deceive 'ordinary' users. Based on longitudinal ethnographic research with misinformation creators and consumers between 2022-2023, Jigsaw collaborated on a study finding that GenAI supports bricolage work, where non-experts increasingly use GenAI to remix, repackage, and (re)produce content to meet their personal needs and desires. The researchers argue for shifting analysis from the public as consumers of AI content to bricoleurs who use GenAI creatively, often without a detailed understanding of its underlying technology. They analyse how these understudied emergent uses of GenAI produce new or accelerated misinformation harms, and their implications for AI products, platforms and policies. More information about the experiment's methodology and findings are available via preprint here and is under peer review.

Grants

In H1 2024, Google.org has supported a number of organisations that seek to help build a safer and more tolerant online world, and promote media literacy. This includes:

- A $1M grant to Barnardos to 'promote safe internet use for children and teens across Ireland. The announcement follows the success of the initial Online Safety Programme launched by Barnardos in 2019 with €1 million in grant funding from Google.org. Over the past five years, more than 3,000 workshops in 700 schools across Ireland have reached over 90,000 students, and delivered over 2,000 parent workshops on online safety nationwide. The new grant will enable Barnardos to extend the programme to children aged between 10 and 15 and will address new areas including AI. The new programme will also see Barnardos working in collaboration for the first time to help shape the programme with Webwise, leading online safety organisation and Media Literacy Ireland, Ireland's media literacy network.'

- A $1M grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank. The grant will fund youth-led hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018.

Search

To raise awareness of its features and build literacy across society, Google Search is working with information literacy experts to help design tools in a way that allows users to feel confident and in control of the information they consume and the choices they make. Please see as well the partnerships listed in response to QRE 28.3.1, notably funding for the European Media & Information Fund.

In addition, Google Search builds capacity for librarians to empower their patrons and the general public with information literacy. At the end of September 2022, in cooperation with Google Search's partner, 'Public Libraries 2030', Google Search launched a Training of Trainers program called 'Super Searchers' for librarians and library staff that seeks to achieve the following objectives: (a) provide librarians and library staff with the skills to build the information literacy capacity of the general public; (b) increase the information literacy capacity of library patrons and the general public. Since the launch, Google and 'Public Libraries 2030' have provided Super Searchers training in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK. Note, Public Libraries 2030 (PL2030), Google Search's implementing partner, shared feedback that language barriers and lack of interest from patrons made it challenging to scale this program across the EU. While the

agreement with PL2030 ended in H1 2023, the pilot program continued to expand in non-EU countries (e.g. in the US through the Public Library Association).

YouTube

YouTube remains committed to supporting efforts that deepen users' collective understanding of misinformation. To empower users to think critically and use YouTube's products safely and responsibly, YouTube invests in media literacy campaigns to improve users' experiences on YouTube. In 2022, YouTube launched 'Hit Pause', a global media literacy campaign, which is live in all EEA Member States as well as 40+ additional countries around the world, including all official EU languages. In H1 2024, YouTube launched additional content in the 'Hit Pause' campaign, which at the time of this report, is available in all EU Member States.

The program seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs) via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated [YouTube channel](). The YouTube channel hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content, as well as additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation – from using emotional language to cherry picking information. The content of this campaign helps to amplify other in-product interventions, such as information panels, which are meant to provide context for topics that are often subject to misinformation.

EEA Member State coverage of 'Hit Pause' media literacy impressions can be found in SLI 17.2.1.

In H1 2024, educational election public service announcements (PSAs) were used in all EU Member States during the EU elections to provide information on how to vote and/or where to vote.

SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above	In previous reports, Google Search, partnering with Public Libraries 2030 (PL2030), provided quantitative information related to the Super Searchers Program, a media literacy program targeting librarians and library staff across Europe. In H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), the program did not hold any training sessions in the EU. Google Search will explore	Media Literacy campaign impressions in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.

		Impressions from YouTube's media literacy campaigns
Level		Impressions
Member States		
Austria		3,923,897
Belgium		4,492,852
Bulgaria		9,487,004
Croatia		6,694,881
Cyprus		353,502
Czech Republic		7,028,030
Denmark		2,623,159
Estonia		929,629
Finland		6,600,887
France		14,588,599
Germany		66,235,197
Greece		6,663,804
Hungary		5,161,342
Ireland		5,780,263
Italy		64,292,543
Latvia		1,635,715
Lithuania		3,661,143
Luxembourg		193,570
Malta		182,871

"opportunities to provide more information regarding SLI 17.2.1 for future reports."

Netherlands	22,584,813
Poland	17,263,471
Portugal	11,718,295
Romania	24,871,695
Slovakia	1,762,761
Slovenia	2,406,570
Spain	61,018,473
Sweden	13,301,473
Iceland	286
Liechtenstein	19,603
Norway	2,488
Total EU	**365,456,439**
Total EEA	**365,478,816**

Measure 17.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.3.1	See response to QRE 17.2.1.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube partners with media literacy experts and researchers to identify unique and engaging ways to build up the YouTube Community's media literacy. For example, to inform the 'Hit Pause' global campaign, YouTube partnered with the National Association for Media Literacy Education (NAMLE), a U.S.-based organisation, to identify which competency areas the campaign should focus on.

	As YouTube continues to gather research, evolve the media literacy program and add even more markets, YouTube will continue to explore partnerships and opportunities.
	For additional information about YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign, please refer to QRE 17.2.1.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18
Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	• In March 2024, YouTube's [policy on Harmful & Dangerous content](#) was updated to include a stricter stance on audience disclaimers and updated guidelines to better assess the risk of potential harm of the act portrayed.

		- In March 2024, in some cases, YouTube may automatically set some videos to private when it detects that videos may have been uploaded and published without the channel owner's knowledge or permission. This update is part of YouTube's efforts to keep creators and their channels safe against hijacking. As an added precaution, the channel owner will be signed out of their account and notified by email. - In March 2024, YouTube introduced a new tool in Creator Studio requiring creators to disclose to viewers when realistic content is made with altered or synthetic media, including generative AI, as a follow-up to its approach to responsible AI innovation announced in November 2023.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 18 for future reports.

Measure 18.1	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
QRE 18.1.1	*Not subscribed*	YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies as quickly as possible, surfacing high quality information in ranking and recommendations, and rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU. **Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies** Each of YouTube's policies is carefully thought through so they are consistent, well-informed, and can be applied to content from around the world. They are developed in consultation with a wide range of external industry and policy experts, as well as YouTube Creators. New policies go through multiple rounds of testing before they go live to ensure YouTube's global team of content reviewers can apply them accurately and consistently. YouTube relies on a combination of humans and machine learning technology to flag inappropriate content and enforce YouTube's community guidelines. This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of YouTube's models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. In some cases, that same machine learning automatically takes an action, if there is high confidence that content is violative given information about similar or related content that has been previously removed. Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content

moderators then help confirm whether the content should be removed or remain on the platform. It also means YouTube's enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube, while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

A focus on responsible recommendations
Recommendations play an important role in how YouTube maintains a responsible platform. Recommendations connect viewers to high-quality information and minimise the chances of seeing problematic content. Not all content is recommended. Recommendations also complement the work done by the robust Community Guidelines that define what is and is not allowed on YouTube. YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis. The latest policy updates, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.

YouTube uses classifiers to identify whether a video is 'authoritative'. These classifications rely on human evaluators who assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos. These evaluators hail from around the world and are trained through a set of detailed, publicly available rating guidelines. YouTube also relies on certified experts to assist with evaluating content involving certain topics.

These human evaluations are used to train YouTube's system to model their decisions, and YouTube then scales their assessments to all videos across the platform. Learn

more about how YouTube elevates quality information and determines authoritative content on the [How YouTube Works website](#) and the [YouTube Blog](#).

Limiting low quality content
YouTube has built systems to ensure that its ranking and recommendations surface high quality content to curb the spread of harmful misinformation and '[borderline](#)' content — content that comes close to, but does not quite violate YouTube's [Community Guidelines](#). To determine borderline content, external evaluators located around the world look at whether content is inaccurate, misleading or deceptive; insensitive or intolerant; harmful or with the potential to cause harm. This input trains YouTube systems to automatically identify this type of content. Consistent with YouTube's efforts to connect users with high quality information, not all content is widely recommended on YouTube, which includes low quality content considered to be borderline.

| QRE 18.1.2 | *Not subscribed* | **YouTube's Recommendation Systems**

Overview
On YouTube, recommendations help users discover more of the videos they love, whether it is a great new recipe to try or finding their next favourite song.

Users can find recommendations at work in two main places - the homepage and the 'Up Next' panel:

• **Homepage**: A user's homepage is what they typically see when they first open YouTube. |

- **Up Next**: The Up Next panel appears when a user is watching a video. It suggests additional content based on what they're currently watching and personalised signals (details below).

An overview into how YouTube's recommendation system works can be found on [the How YouTube Works website](#).

Signals used to recommend content
YouTube's recommendation system is constantly evolving, learning every day from information that YouTube calls signals, the primary ones being: watch history, search history, channel subscriptions, likes, dislikes, feedback selections 'Not interested' or 'Don't recommend channel,' and satisfaction surveys.

Refer to QRE 19.1.1 for more information.

Responsible Recommendations
Recommendations help connect users to high-quality information, and at the same time complement the work done by YouTube [Community Guidelines](#), which define what is not allowed on YouTube.

Raising Quality Content
YouTube takes the additional step of recommending authoritative videos to viewers on topics such as news, politics, medical, and scientific information. Human evaluators, trained using [publicly available guidelines](#), assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos. To decide if a video is authoritative, evaluators look at factors like the expertise and

		reputation of the speaker or channel, the main topic of the video, and whether the content delivers on its promise or achieves its goal. The more authoritative a video, the more it is promoted in recommendations.
		Controls to personalise recommendations YouTube has built controls that help users decide how much data they want to provide. Users can [view, delete, or turn on or off their YouTube watch and search history](#) whenever they want. And, if users do not want to see recommendations at all, they can turn off and clear their YouTube watch history. For users with YouTube watch history off and no significant prior watch history, the homepage will show the search bar and the Guide menu, with no feed of recommended videos.
		Users can also tell YouTube when it is recommending something a user is not interested in. For example, buttons on the homepage and in the 'Up next' section allow users to filter and choose recommendations by specific topics. Users can also click on 'Not interested' and/or 'Don't recommend channel' to tell YouTube that a video or channel is not what a user wanted to see at that time, and YouTube will consider that when generating recommendations for that viewer in the future.
		Additional information about how a user can manage their recommendation settings are outlined [here](#) in YouTube's Help Centre.
QRE 18.1.3	*Not subscribed*	Refer to QRE 18.1.1 and QRE 18.1.2.

SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	*Not subscribed*	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 18.1.1 for future reports.
	Not subscribed	
Data	*Not subscribed*	
Measure 18.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 18.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search has the following policies which complement the Content Policies outlined in QRE 14.1.1: Medical Content Policy: This policy prohibits content that contradicts or runs contrary to scientific or medical consensus and evidence-based best practices. Misleading Content Policy: This policy states that Search features and News prohibits preview content that misleads users to engage with it by promising details which are not reflected in the underlying content. These policies also provide users with information on how to report specific types of content that violate those policies. Google Search removes content for policy violations based on user reports as well as through its internal content moderation processes. More extensive policies are deployed for Search features, and can be found at the Content Policies Help Centre.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** See response to QRE 14.1.1 to see how YouTube's Community Guidelines map to the TTPs. These policies seek to, among other things, limit the spread of misleading or deceptive content that poses a serious risk of egregious harm. **Community Guidelines Enforcement** After a creator's first Community Guidelines violation, they will typically get a warning with no penalty to their channel. They will have the chance to take a policy training to allow the warning to expire after 90 days. Creators will also get the chance to receive a warning in another policy category. If the same policy is violated within that 90 day window, the creator's channel will be given a strike. If the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, their channel may be permanently removed from YouTube. In some cases, YouTube may terminate a

In addition, Google Search removes content that has been determined to be unlawful under applicable law, in response to a notification from a third party, such as a user or an authority. Examples include material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid 'right to be forgotten request' or material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid court order. Google Search measures the number of court and government Legal Removal requests biannually (across all products), and publishes this information in transparency reports.

channel for a single case of severe abuse, as explained in the Help Centre. YouTube may also remove content for reasons other than Community Guidelines violations, such as a first-party privacy complaint or a court order. In these cases, creators will not be issued a strike.

If a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain the action taken on their content and which of YouTube's policies the content violated. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes here.

YouTube also reserves the right to restrict a creator's ability to create content on YouTube at its discretion. A channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, users are prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on the YouTube channel. A violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of Service, and may result in termination of all existing YouTube channels of the user, any new channels created or acquired, and channels in which the user is repeatedly or prominently featured.

Refer to SLI 18.2.1 on YouTube's enforcement at an EEA Member State level.

SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	See response to SLI 14.2.1.	(1) Number of videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Views threshold on videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State.					
	YouTube only						
	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views
Level	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos
Member States							
Austria	249	33	75	55	55	23	8
Belgium	340	18	96	83	80	50	13
Bulgaria	224	14	48	50	58	35	19
Croatia	86	6	17	23	14	22	4
Cyprus	100	16	19	17	19	21	8
Czech Republic	236	26	44	52	46	45	23
Denmark	166	11	26	47	43	29	10
Estonia	63	6	12	13	20	9	3
Finland	209	32	50	36	51	27	13
France	1,795	143	449	480	388	216	119
Germany	2,496	246	699	614	512	288	137

Greece	438	38	82	89	95	94	40
Hungary	142	25	45	30	18	16	8
Ireland	753	92	224	171	134	88	44
Italy	4,494	312	975	1,250	1,097	633	227
Latvia	118	15	28	30	28	14	3
Lithuania	120	14	28	32	20	18	8
Luxembourg	13	2	5	2	4	0	0
Malta	34	2	4	11	5	11	1
Netherlands	1,105	95	311	279	228	126	66
Poland	1,054	108	194	222	255	166	109
Portugal	411	38	105	107	88	52	21
Romania	347	50	75	62	95	45	20
Slovakia	96	10	25	15	19	16	11
Slovenia	92	6	19	25	24	13	5
Spain	3,189	373	793	723	670	434	196
Sweden	475	41	81	143	129	67	14
Iceland	19	3	4	4	5	3	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	212	24	35	62	56	26	9
Total EU	**18,845**	**1,772**	**4,529**	**4,661**	**4,195**	**2,558**	**1,130**
Total EEA	**19,076**	**1,799**	**4,568**	**4,727**	**4,256**	**2,587**	**1,139**
Measure 18.3	**Google Search**			**YouTube**			
QRE 18.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**						

Google, including YouTube, works with industry leaders across the technology sector, government, and civil society to set good policies, remain abreast of emerging challenges, and establish, share, and learn from industry best practices and research.

Described below are recent examples that demonstrate Google's, including YouTube, commitment to these actions:

Jigsaw-led Research
As described in QRE 17.2.1, Jigsaw is a unit within Google that explores threats to open societies and builds technology that inspires scalable solutions, began conducting research on 'information interventions' more than 10 years ago. Jigsaw has since contributed research and technology on ways to make people more resilient to disinformation. Their research efforts are based on behavioural science and ethnographic studies that examine when people might be vulnerable to specific messages and how to provide helpful information when people need it most. These interventions provide a methodology for proactively addressing a range of threats to people online, as a complement to approaches that focus on removing or downranking material online.

Notable research efforts by Jigsaw that they have run on and with YouTube include but are not limited to:
- Accuracy Prompts (APs): APs remind users to think about accuracy. The prompts work by serving users bite-sized digital literacy tips at a moment when it might matter. Lab studies conducted across 16 countries with over 30,000 participants, suggest that APs increase engagement with accurate information and decrease engagement with less accurate information. Small experiments on YouTube suggest users enjoy the experience and report that it makes them feel safer online.
- Prebunking Messages: Preemptive messages using inoculation theory, or 'prebunking', can help individuals identify manipulative narratives and strategies. In partnership with several universities, including the University of Cambridge and the University of Bristol, Jigsaw developed prebunking videos to test the efficacy of prebunking messages concerning manipulation techniques commonly encountered online. These videos were then tested with over 1,000,000 YouTube users in the US and demonstrated that prebunking can be scaled effectively using ads. Jigsaw then partnered with misinformation experts in Central and Eastern Europe to develop videos prebunking anti-migrant narratives, which have helped tens of millions of EU citizens on Facebook, TikTok, X, and YouTube build resilience to targeted misinformation.
- Prebunking Video Campaign: Jigsaw published their findings from a prebunking video campaign on Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube to help educate German audiences about three manipulation techniques

commonly used to spread disinformation in their country. Over 50% of the online audience on each platform saw the videos. The videos were also effective at helping viewers spot manipulation techniques, with the highest average improvement of any prebunking campaign to date. This project was made possible through the partnership of Google Germany, Moonshot, and local organisations Correctiv, Alfred Landecker Foundation, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Das NETTZ, klicksafe, and Neue Deutsche Medienmacher*innen. Building off of previous prebunking projects in Germany, this campaign achieved over 42 million views across all platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. It reached 58% of YouTube users in Germany aged 18–54 and 54% of users on Facebook and Instagram, respectively. More information about the German campaign aimed at helping people build resilience to manipulation tactics online is available here and here.

- Additional information on these research efforts can be found on the Info Interventions website.

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 19			
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.			
	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No, Search has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but Search regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to its recommendation system.	No, YouTube has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but YouTube regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to its recommendation system.
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 19 for future reports.

Measure 19.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 19.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search's ranking systems sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user's query include: • **Meaning of your query**: To return relevant results, Google Search first needs to establish the intent behind a user's query. Google Search builds language models to decipher how the words that a user enters into the search box match up to the most useful content available.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube knows that everyone has unique viewing habits and uses signals to recommend content. YouTube's system compares the user's viewing habits with those that are similar to others, and uses that information to suggest other content. YouTube's recommendation system is constantly evolving, learning every day from over 80 billion pieces of information or 'signals,' the primary ones being: • **Watch history**: YouTube's system uses the videos a user watches to give better recommendations, remember where a user left off, and more.

- **Relevance of content**: Next, Google Search systems analyse the content to assess whether it contains information that might be relevant to what the user is looking for. The most basic signal that information is relevant is when content contains the same keywords as the user's search query.
- **Quality of content**: Google Search systems prioritise content that seems most helpful by identifying signals that can help determine which content demonstrates expertise, authoritativeness, and trustworthiness. For example, one of several factors that Google Search uses to help determine this is by understanding if other prominent websites link or refer to the content. Aggregated feedback from the Google Search quality evaluation process is used to further refine how Google Search systems discern the quality of information.
- **Usability**: Google Search systems also consider the usability of content. When all things are relatively equal, content that people will find more accessible may perform better.
- **Context and settings**: Information such as user location, past Google Search history, and [Search settings](#) all help Google Search ensure user results are what is most useful and relevant at that moment. Google Search uses the user's country and location to deliver content relevant to their area. For instance, if a user in Chicago searches 'football', Google Search will likely show the user results about American football and the

- **Search history**: YouTube's system uses what a user searches for on YouTube to influence future recommendations.
- **Channel subscriptions**: YouTube's system uses information about the channels a user subscribes to in order to recommend other videos they may like.
- **Likes**: YouTube's system uses a user's likes information to try to predict the likelihood that they will be interested in similar videos in the future.
- **Dislikes**: YouTube's system uses videos a user dislikes to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- **'Not interested' feedback selections**: YouTube's system uses videos a user marks as 'Not interested' to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- **'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections**: YouTube's system uses 'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections as a signal that the channel content likely is not something a user enjoyed watching.
- **Satisfaction surveys**: YouTube's system uses user surveys that ask a user to rate videos that they watched, which helps the system understand satisfaction, not just watch time.

Different YouTube features rely on certain recommendation signals more than others. For example, YouTube uses the video a user is currently watching as an important signal when suggesting a video to play next. The

Chicago Bears first. Whereas if the user searches 'football' in London, Google will show results about soccer and the Premier League. Google Search settings are also an important indicator of which results a user is likely to find useful, such as if they set a preferred language or opted in to SafeSearch (a tool that helps filter out explicit results). Google Search also includes features that personalise results based on the activity in their Google account. The user can control what Google Search activity is used to improve their experience, including adjusting what data is saved to their Google account at myaccount.google.com. To disable Google Search personalisation based on activity in a user's account, the user can turn off personal results in Search. Users can also prevent activity being stored to the user's account or delete particular history items in Web & App Activity. Google Search systems are designed to match a user's interests, but they are not designed to infer sensitive characteristics like race, religion or political party.

The How Search Works website explains the ins and outs of Google Search. The following links provide additional information about helping people and businesses learn how Search works and how results are automatically generated.

influence of each signal on recommendations can vary based on many variables, including but not limited to the user's device type and the type of content they are watching. This is why the same user will see different recommendations on a mobile phone vs. a television.

In addition, YouTube raises up authoritative videos in search and recommendations to viewers on topics such as news, politics, medical, and scientific information. Human evaluators, trained using publicly available guidelines, assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos. To decide if a video is authoritative, evaluators look at factors like the expertise and reputation of the speaker or channel, the main topic of the video, and whether the content delivers on its promise or achieves its goal. The more authoritative a video, the more likely it will be promoted in recommendations.

The How YouTube Works website explains more details, including YouTube's recommender system. Additionally, YouTube's Help Centre informs users how to manage their recommendations and search results.

Measure 19.2	Google Search	YouTube

SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Number of impressions on the personal results control for logged in users in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.	YouTube is sharing the percentage of Daily Active Users that are signed in to the platform (those not signed in are signed out). Signed in users are able to amend their settings in their YouTube or Google Accounts. The average percentage of signed in Daily Active Users overH1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State.
	Number of impressions on the personal results control for logged in users	**Percentage of daily active users that are signed in**
Level	**Impressions**	**Signed In Users**
Member State		
Austria	36,814	65%
Belgium	44,207	68%
Bulgaria	17,657	70%
Croatia	17,897	70%
Cyprus	4,009	72%
Czech Republic	34,423	68%
Denmark	14,847	60%
Estonia	5,097	70%
Finland	34,828	67%
France	287,249	68%
Germany	381,939	64%
Greece	50,585	71%
Hungary	34,870	69%
Ireland	22,737	64%

Italy	278,124	72%
Latvia	7,269	67%
Lithuania	11,922	73%
Luxembourg	2,204	61%
Malta	1,495	71%
Netherlands	89,998	65%
Poland	166,500	71%
Portugal	31,692	73%
Romania	51,947	72%
Slovakia	18,849	70%
Slovenia	5,660	69%
Spain	231,880	72%
Sweden	45,299	62%
Iceland	695	63%
Liechtenstein	75	53%
Norway	17,249	60%
Total EU	**1,929,998**	**69%**
Total EEA	**1,948,017**	**68%**

V. Empowering Users		
Commitment 20		
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.		
	C.20	**M 20.1**	**M 20.2**

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed		
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	*Not subscribed*		
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	*Not subscribed*		
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	*Not subscribed*		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*		

Measure 20.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 20.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 20.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 20.2.1	*Not subscribed*

	V. Empowering Users			

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	Google Search continues to beta test two new Fact Check Explorer features which allow a user (i) to search by image to see if a fact-check has been written on it already and (ii) to see a timeline of the context around an image. More information is available [here]().	• YouTube continues to expand its deployment of information panels on topics prone to misinformation globally. • YouTube continues to invest resources to aid fact-check organisations in developing their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially	Yes	Yes

improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	For example: • On 25 October 2023, Google Search announced a beta of Image Search functionality in FactCheck Claim Search API.	YouTube will continue to provide training and support to fact-checkers and fact-checking organisations, so they can maximise their reach and presence on YouTube, bringing more native video fact-checking content to YouTube's video-sharing platform. YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 21 for future reports.

Measure 21.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 21.1.1	Fact-check articles in Google Search results help provide context and information to users. Google Search relies on machine-readable ClaimReview markup on websites to enhance search results for fact-check articles with 'rich snippets', to make it easy for users to understand at a glance what is being fact-checked and what the fact-checker's assessment is (if they meet Google Search's eligibility and technical criteria). Google also provides tools like Fact Check Explorer and the Google FactCheck Claim Search API. The 'Fact Check' label in Google Search applies to published stories with fact-checked content that is indicated by the schema.org ClaimReview markup, like round-up stories	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** As a video-sharing platform, fact-checkers are able to post and share both short- and long-form video content on YouTube. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms. YouTube raises up authoritative videos in search and recommendations, which may include fact-check content,

that contain multiple fact-check analyses within a single article.

(1) schema.org ClaimReview mark up
Google Search enables any fact-checker to signal their fact-checks for the purpose of being indexed free by implementing the schema.org ClaimReview markup on their content. Google provides training to fact-checking organisations on how to use the ClaimReview markup, as its success relies on publishers using the ClaimReview markup, reflected by the metrics outlined in SLI 21.1.1.

The use of ClaimReview markup is not restricted to any set of organisations that partner with Google Search. As such, the remainder of QRE 21.1.1 (naming specific fact-checking organisations worked with) does not apply to Google Search.

(2) Fact Check Explorer
In June 2023, the Google Research team collaborated with fact-checking organisations from around the world in beta testing two new features, which allow a user (i) to search by image to see if a fact-check has been written on it already and (ii) to see a timeline of the context around an image. Since then, Google Search and Google Research launched the Image Search feature in April 2024, allowing any user to upload or copy the link of an image into the Fact Check

to viewers on topics such as news, politics, medical, and scientific information. Human evaluators, trained using publicly available guidelines, assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos. To decide if a video is authoritative, evaluators look at factors like the expertise and reputation of the speaker or channel, the main topic of the video, and whether the content delivers on its promise or achieves its goal. The more authoritative a video, the more likely it will be raised in recommendations.

Users can subscribe to fact-checking channels to get notifications when new content has been uploaded, helping to build and engage audiences for fact-checking organisations. The content is also searchable on YouTube—e.g., users search for specific channels or content related to topics that fact-checkers may cover. As fact-checkers create and share more content on YouTube, users will have access and exposure to more fact-check content integrated into the YouTube corpus of content.

YouTube Studio provides tools and information through which YouTube creators, including fact-checkers, can manage their presence, grow their channels, interact with their audiences, and make money—all in one place. Fact-checking organisations with YouTube channels can view data about their video performance through the Channel Analytics Dashboard in YouTube Studio. Available data includes views, watch time, traffic sources, and search queries that led viewers to their video content.

Explorer to see if it has been used in an existing fact-check. Journalists and fact-checkers can also use this feature through the Fact Check Tools API, which gives them the ability to show relevant fact-checks for an image on their own websites. During the European Parliamentary Elections, Elections24Check integrated the API into the coalition's misinformation platform and database. The second feature, which provides context to an image, is still in beta testing, and now has about 2,000 beta testers.

In addition, Google Research, along with four fact-checking partners, published a research paper that presents the results of a two-year study using human raters to annotate online media-based misinformation, mostly focusing on images, based on claims assessed in a large sample of publicly-accessible fact checks with the ClaimReview markup. In this study, 135,838 fact-checks were analysed dating back to 1995. Key findings include:
- A large majority of these claims (most recently, about 80%) involve media;
- Images were historically the dominant modality associated with misinformation claims, until 2022 when videos accounted for more than 60% of fact-checked claims that include media; and,
- AI-generated content was rare until the spring of 2023, when their presence in fact-check misinformation claims dramatically increased.

Creators who participate in the YouTube Partner Program have access to YouTube's Creator Support teams, who can provide guidance on how channels use YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.

YouTube has continued its regular meetings with several EU-based fact-checking organisations to better understand their needs on YouTube's platform. YouTube has also invested resources to aid Fact Check organisations develop their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form.

Additionally, YouTube provides details on how text-based information panels provide additional context on certain topics prone to misinformation by highlighting relevant, third-party articles for relevant queries and content.

YouTube's information panels rely on third-party publishers, and fact-check information panels leverage the ClaimReview tagging system. All publishers are welcome to participate in ClaimReview provided they follow the publicly available ClaimReview structured data guidelines, and are either part of the International Fact-Checking Network or are an authoritative publisher.

YouTube continues to explore ways to support fact-checker content.

	[The Annotated Misinformation, Media-Based](link) (AMMeBa) dataset used in this study was also made publicly available in the hopes that these data will serve as both a means of evaluating mitigation methods in a realistic setting and as a first-of-its-kind census of the types and modalities of online misinformation. The findings were analysed and co-published with four fact-checking organisations Maldita (Spain), Full Fact (UK), Duke Reporters Lab (USA), and Factly (India).	
SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1	(1) Number of articles available with the Fact Check Rich Snippet in Google Search in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), globally; (2) Number of impressions on Fact Check Rich Snippets in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below); (3) Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the beginning and end of H1 2024, globally; (4) Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the beginning and end of H1 2024, broken down by EEA language (see table below).	YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 21.1.1 for future reports.
	(1) In H1 2024, 298,382 articles were available with the Fact Check Rich Snippet in Google Search, globally; (3) At the beginning of H1 2024, 294,204 articles were available in the Google Search Fact Check Explorer,	

	Number of impressions on Fact Check Rich Snippets, by EEA Member State	Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the beginning of H1 2024, broken down by EEA language	Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the end of H1 2024, broken down by EEA language	
	globally. At the end of H1 2024, 399,319 articles were available, globally.			
Level	Impressions	Articles	Articles	
Member State				
Austria	2,121,395			
Belgium	2,405,088			
Bulgaria	910,486			
Croatia	1,214,203			
Cyprus	267,880			
Czech Republic	837,864			
Denmark	1,333,726			
Estonia	108,735			
Finland	1,022,486			
France	21,231,262			
Germany	23,693,049			
Greece	2,488,609			

Hungary	811,103			
Ireland	1,947,196			
Italy	9,120,887			
Latvia	157,754			
Lithuania	267,218			
Luxembourg	203,958			
Malta	125,929			
Netherlands	3,481,272			
Poland	13,428,716			
Portugal	9,187,992			
Romania	1,133,381			
Slovakia	714,454			
Slovenia	264,029			
Spain	20,098,316			
Sweden	1,762,667			
Iceland	97,039			
Liechtenstein	9,188			
Norway	1,812,234			
Total EU	**120,339,655**			
Total EEA	**122,258,116**			
Bulgarian		425	2,283	
Croatian		1,773	887	
Czech		372	2,100	

Danish		751	812	
Dutch		1,939	3,960	
English		115,472	130,430	
Estonian		0	0	
Finnish		201	1,485	
French		6,649	9,235	
German		6,465	8,895	
Greek		2,679	5,365	
Hungarian		233	1,097	
Irish		0	0	
Italian		6,082	6,273	
Latvian		0	0	
Lithuanian		0	0	
Maltese		0	0	
Polish		8,157	9,829	
Portuguese		27,725	27,868	
Romanian		296	671	
Slovak		443	2,158	
Slovenian		0	0	
Spanish		21,329	44,986	
Swedish		31	249	
Icelandic		0	0	
Norwegian		530	548	

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	SLI 21.1.2 does not apply to Google Search. Should Search's product features change, Search will reconsider a response at that time.	SLI 21.1.2 does not apply to YouTube. Should YouTube's product features change, YouTube will reconsider a response at that time.
Member State		

Measure 21.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 21.2.1	*Not subscribed*	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** There are a variety of ways in which YouTube may undertake research or testing for updates to its policies, features and programs. For example, YouTube has a process for running experiments on new features, collecting feedback, and gradually rolling out the new features. An experiment is a test that YouTube uses to measure how users react to new and improved product features, including labelling. YouTube may consider rolling out features more broadly based on user feedback from experiments. If a user wants to share thoughts on any feature, they can send feedback. All users, including fact-checkers, can also report a video for misinformation or misleading content on YouTube, which helps identify narratives or content that may need additional products, such as labelling.

		In addition to in-product and experiment feedback, YouTube may also conduct user research on products to learn more about user and creator preferences. At times, YouTube may also commission research from third parties to get broader insights into market trends, perceptions, or product opportunities. All of these factors can help inform product development. YouTube also holds regular meetings with EU-based fact-checking organisations to ensure YouTube is working in partnership towards shared goals, and may incorporate findings into YouTube's product. Once a feature is ready, it is typically deployed through a gradual launch of the new feature. Sometimes, YouTube may initially launch a feature to a small percentage of users, and increase that percentage over time until the new feature is available to users globally.
Measure 21.3	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 21.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search's content advisory notices help alert users to when they have encountered a query and results set that may not yet include high quality information from reliable sources or when the results retrieved are likely to be off-topic and therefore unhelpful. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a	YouTube works with authoritative information providers around the world — like news organisations, health authorities, and learning institutions — to create information panels that provide additional context about the content they are searching for and watching on the platform. YouTube consulted published literature from third-party experts and conducted user experience research prior to launching its information panels. YouTube provides more details and its considerations used in developing certain information panels on the following: ● Topics prone to misinformation; ● Authoritative news sources;

topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic.
 	
Google Search releases these content advisories, following both user research and multiple rounds of consultations with academic experts in mis-and disinformation. Content advisories include:
    ● (i) those when a topic is rapidly evolving, available to users globally (see more regarding this feature here); and
    ● (ii) where Google Search systems do not have high confidence in the overall quality of search results in English (see blog and blog for details).
 	
Google Search consulted independent experts to consider their feedback on the effectiveness and possible risks of the content advisory feature ahead of its launch. Google generally conducts research with prospective and current users and where applicable, reviews published literature from third-party experts in developing its products and features.
	● Election related content;
	● Health related content;
	● Crisis resources.
	
	For example, to identify authoritative health sources that users see across YouTube's health product features, YouTube uses principles and definitions developed by an expert panel convened by the National Academy of Medicine (NAM) and verified by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for global application.

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 22
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

	C.22	M 22.1	M 22.2	M 22.3	M 22.4	M 22.5	M 22.6	M 22.7

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	YouTube shared how election information panels made it easier for people to register to vote, find out how to vote, learn more about the candidates, and to access the election results for the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024. YouTube continues to expand its deployment of information panels on topics prone to misinformation globally.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Search and YouTube prioritise providing users with tools to help them make informed decisions. Google Search and YouTube look forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Measure 22.7 for future reports.	

Measure 22.1	Not subscribed

QRE 22.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.1.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 22.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 22.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.3.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 22.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.4.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.4.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 22.5	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.5.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.5.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Member States	*Not subscribed*

SLI 22.5.2 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Measure 22.6	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.6.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.6.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*

Measure 22.7	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 22.7.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search deploys the following features: ● **'SOS Alerts':** Structured content that appears on a Google Search page, including authoritative help links and local relevant information when a crisis strikes. The alerts aim to make emergency information more accessible during a crisis. Google brings together relevant and authoritative content from the web, media, and Google products, and then highlights that information across Google products such as Google Search and Google Maps. See Help Centre for more information. ● **Special features created to provide information about COVID-19:** Structured features which provide structured, authoritative information about the COVID-19 pandemic including information on COVID-19 vaccines. The features organise the search result pages to help users easily navigate to trusted COVID resources.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube highlights information from authoritative third-party sources using information panels. As users navigate YouTube, they might see a variety of different information panels. These panels provide additional context, with each designed to help users make their own decisions about the content they find. These information panels will show regardless of what opinions or perspectives are expressed in a video. If users want to learn more, most panels also link to the third-party partner's website. Information panels may not be available in all countries/regions and languages. YouTube is working to bring more information panels to more countries/regions and languages. Information panels on YouTube include, but are not limited to: ● **Panels on topics prone to misinformation:** Topics that are prone to misinformation, such as the moon landing, may display an information panel at the top of search results or under a video. These information panels show basic background info, sourced from independent,

		third-party partners, to give more context on a topic. The panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to expand its deployment of these information panels globally. More details found [here](.). ● **Election information panels:** The election-related features are only available in select countries/regions during election cycles. Users may see candidate information panels, voting information panels, election integrity information panels, or election results information panels. More details found [here](.). ● **Health-related information panels:** Health-related topics, such as cancer treatment misinformation, may have a health information panel in your search results. These panels show info like symptoms, prevention and treatment options. More details found [here](.). ● **Crisis resource panels**: These panels let users connect with live support, 24/7 from recognised service partners. The panels may surface on the Watch page, when a user watches videos on topics related to suicide or self-harm, or in search results, when a user searches for topics related to certain health crises or emotional distress. More details found [here](.). Additional data points and EEA Member State coverage is provided in SLI 22.7.1.

SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Number of views/impressions on the following Google Search features in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), for EEA Member States: • Crisis Response (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts'); • Structured features for COVID-19.	Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-COVID medical panels) in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 22.7.1 for future reports.
	In H1 2024, the following number of views/impressions were made on the Google Search features below: • 31,515,553 views/impressions on Crisis Response alerts (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts'); • 18,600 views/impressions on COVID-19 Structured Features.	
		Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-COVID medical panels)
Level		**Impressions**
Member States		
Austria		51,045,483
Belgium		142,517,321
Bulgaria		38,806,535
Croatia		51,324,389
Cyprus		5,389,481
Czech Republic		92,147,691
Denmark		18,276,276
Estonia		15,691,350

Finland		17,180,106
France		963,006,483
Germany		1,951,804,676
Greece		42,428,213
Hungary		86,437,861
Ireland		69,366,991
Italy		561,534,470
Latvia		38,831,470
Lithuania		46,732,236
Luxembourg		3,225,429
Malta		2,653,667
Netherlands		337,677,957
Poland		257,796,199
Portugal		34,711,850
Romania		100,415,965
Slovakia		38,522,320
Slovenia		16,735,774
Spain		541,465,059
Sweden		107,864,441
Iceland		1,311,914
Liechtenstein		169,240
Norway		18,311,399
Total EU		**5,633,589,693**

Total EEA		5,653,382,246

V. Empowering users		
Commitment 23 Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.		
	C.23	**M 23.1**	**M 23.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube has continued to make a flagging feature available to signed-in users across all EU Member States. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 23 for future reports.

Measure 23.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 23.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search aims to make the process of submitting removal requests as easy as possible, and has built reporting tools, which allow users in all EU Member States to report potentially violative content for review under Search Content Policies. The Report Content On Google tool, for example, guides users to the right reporting form to provide the necessary information for the legal or policy issue they seek to flag. Google Search has reporting tools for Search features, such as knowledge panels and featured snippets. For overall Search Results, users can flag content via the three dots in Search features and 10 blue links. Using the Send Feedback option in 'About This Result', users can then send feedback about the result, describing the issue and attaching a screenshot.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Flagging inappropriate or harmful content on YouTube** YouTube offers YouTube users an opportunity to report or flag content that they believe violates YouTube's Community Guidelines or other policies. Users can report content using YouTube's flagging feature, which is available to signed-in users in all EU Member States via computer (desktop or laptop), mobile devices, and other surfaces. Details on how to report different types of content using YouTube's flagging feature is outlined in YouTube's Help Centre. YouTube also has a Priority Flagger program through which NGOs and government agencies who are particularly effective at identifying certain types of harmful content have access to more sophisticated reporting processes and prioritised review of flags. In addition to user flagging, YouTube uses machine learning technology to flag videos for review. YouTube developed powerful machine learning that detects content that may violate YouTube's policies and sends it for human review. In some cases, that same machine learning automatically takes an action, if there is high confidence that content is violative given information about similar or related content that has been previously removed.

Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content moderators then help confirm whether the content should be removed or remain on the platform. This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of these models over time. It also means that the enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube (over 500 hours of content every minute), while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

Information about YouTube's content moderation efforts across the official EU Member State languages can be found in the **Human Resources involved in Content Moderation** section of the [VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA)](#).

Reporting illegal content
While YouTube's Community Guidelines are policies that apply globally, YouTube is available in more than 100 different countries; therefore, processes are in place to review and appropriately act on requests from users, courts, and governments about content that violates local laws. Users can report illegal content using [webforms](#) dedicated to specific legal issues such as trademark, copyright, counterfeit and defamation. Webforms may also be accessed via the flagging feature after selecting Infringes my Rights or Legal Issue as the report reason. To expedite the review, users should report content that

		violates the legal policies outlined here in YouTube's Help Centre.
Measure 23.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 23.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search carefully scrutinises most removal complaints that arrive in Google Search systems. Removal requests are handled according to the product area, issue type, and region, by a global team of front-line reviewers and Policy Leads who have expertise in a range of product areas, issue types (such as defamation or copyright infringement), local laws, and languages. Removal requests are processed in accordance with the mission of complying with the law and Google's policies while maximising access to information and preserving user expression. For most classes of requests, trained reviewers manually assess the removals. In some cases, such as copyright takedowns, Google Search deploys automation to speed the processing of high-volume complaints. To avoid abuse in this process, Google Search relies upon: 1) Limitations on who may submit high volumes of requests through flows like the Trusted Copyright Removals Program, ensuring that participants in this program are organisations with bona fide copyright interests unlikely to abuse their rights to suppress unrelated content;	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** As outlined in QRE 23.1.1, content can be flagged by YouTube users, YouTube's Priority Flagger Program, YouTube's machine learning technology, and human content moderators. All users agree to not 'misuse any reporting, flagging, complaint, dispute, or appeals process, including by making groundless, vexatious, or frivolous submissions' in YouTube's Terms of Service. Additionally, YouTube ensures integrity of its systems through: • Having a dedicated team to identify and mitigate the impact of sophisticated bad actors on YouTube at scale, while protecting the broader community; • Partnering with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post (See QRE 16.1.1 and QRE 16.2.1); • Educating users about Community Guidelines violations through its guided policy experience; • Providing clear communication on appeals processes and notifications, and regular policy updates on its Help Centre;

	2) Legal protections, such as those found in the E-Commerce Directive. Google or webmasters can file suit against submitters of bad-faith copyright complaints; 3) Handling counter-notifications from affected webmasters; 4) Tracking patterns of abusive behaviour and adjusting Google Search automation to avoid automatically honouring abusive takedowns of a kind Google Search has become aware of.	• Investing in automated systems to provide efficient detection of content to be evaluated by human reviewers. Where appropriate, YouTube makes it clear to users that it has taken action on their content and provides them the opportunity to appeal that decision. For more detailed information about YouTube's complaint handling systems (i.e. appeals), please see the latest VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA).

V. Empowering users
Commitment 24
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube

	Not subscribed	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Not subscribed	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	*Not subscribed*	In January 2024, as part of an update to harassment & cyberbullying enforcement, YouTube began striking content that realistically simulates deceased minors or victims of deadly or well-documented major violent events describing their death or violence experienced. [Learn more]().
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	*Not subscribed*	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 24 for future reports.

Measure 24.1	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
QRE 24.1.1	*Not subscribed*	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** As noted in QRE 18.2.1, if a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain what content was removed or age restricted, which policies

the content violated, how it affects the user's channel, and what the creator can do next. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes [here](#).

Sometimes a single case of severe abuse will result in [channel termination](#) without warning.

The below appeals processes are available in all Member States, which are outlined in the YouTube Help Centre:
- [Appeal a Community Guidelines strike](#);
- [Appeal a Community Guidelines video removal](#);
- [Appeal the age restriction of a video](#);
- [Appeal playlist or thumbnail removals](#);
- [Appeal a channel termination](#).

After a creator submits an appeal
After a creator submits an appeal, they will get an email from YouTube letting them know the appeal outcome. One of the following will happen:

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, YouTube will reinstate it and remove the strike from their channel. If a user appeals a warning and the appeal is granted, the next offence will be a warning.

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, but is not appropriate for all audiences, YouTube will apply an age-restriction. If it is a video, it will not be visible to users who are signed out, are under 18 years of age,

		or have [Restricted Mode](#) turned on. If it is a custom thumbnail, it will be removed.
		If YouTube finds that a user's content was in violation of YouTube's Community Guidelines, the strike will stay and the video will remain down from the site. There is no additional penalty for appeals that are rejected. For a more granular Member State level breakdown, refer to SLI 24.1.1. For more information about YouTube's median time needed to action a complaint, please see the latest [VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA)](#).
SLI 24.1.1 – enforcement actions	*Not subscribed*	(1) Appeals following video removal for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Video reinstatements following a successful appeal against content removals for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State.
	Not subscribed	**Number of videos removed that were subsequently appealed**	**Number of videos removed that were then reinstated following a creator's appeal**
Member States	*Not subscribed*		

Austria		36	4
Belgium		27	3
Bulgaria		22	3
Croatia		9	0
Cyprus		3	0
Czech Republic		25	2
Denmark		17	2
Estonia		11	0
Finland		24	4
France		188	32
Germany		337	50
Greece		61	4
Hungary		23	0
Ireland		85	9
Italy		365	80
Latvia		11	2
Lithuania		9	2
Luxembourg		1	0
Malta		9	3
Netherlands		117	13
Poland		114	23
Portugal		36	0
Romania		40	8

Slovakia		16	3
Slovenia		9	3
Spain		328	25
Sweden		56	6
Iceland		4	0
Liechtenstein		0	0
Norway		24	4
Total EU		**1,979**	**281**
Total EEA		**2,007**	**285**

V. Empowering users

Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	*Not subscribed*

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 25.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 25.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 25.1.1	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 25.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 25.2.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 26 Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.				
	C.26	**M 26.1**	**M 26.2**	**M 26.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube is exploring ways that it can continue to expand the YouTube Researcher Program, based in part on feedback from researchers.

Measure 26.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**

QRE 26.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**
	Google Trends Google Search and YouTube provide publicly available data via Google Trends, which provides access to a largely unfiltered sample of actual search requests made to Google Search and YouTube's search function. It is anonymised (no one is personally identified), categorised (determined by the topic for a search query) and aggregated (grouped together). This allows Google Trends to display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography. See Trends Help Centre for details. **Google Fact Check Explorer** Google Search also provides tools like Fact Check Explorer and the Google FactCheck Claim Search API. Google Search Fact Check Explorer allows anyone to explore the Fact Check articles that are using the ClaimReview markup. See QRE 31.4.1 for more details on ClaimReview markup; additional information about the Fact Check Markup Tool can be found here, and in Search's response to QRE 21.1.1. Using the Google FactCheck Claim Search API, users can query the same set of Fact Check results available via the Fact Check Explorer or a developer could continuously get the latest updates on a particular query. Use of the FactCheck Claim Search API is subject to Google's API Terms of Service. To learn more, check the detailed API documentation. **Google Researcher Program** As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact. For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page. **YouTube Researcher Program** The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for eligible academic researchers from around the world, who are affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution. Learn more about the data available in the YouTube API reference.

	Transparency into paid content on YouTube YouTube provides users a bespoke [front end search page](#) to access publicly available data containing organic content with paid product placements, sponsorships and endorsements as disclosed by creators. This is to enable users to understand that creators may receive goods or services in exchange for promotion. This search page complements YouTube's existing process of displaying a disclosure message when creators disclose to YouTube that their content contains paid promotions. Learn more about adding paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements [here](#). Users can also query the same set of results using the [YouTube Data API](#). Use is subject to [YouTube's API Terms of Service](#).
QRE 26.1.2	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Trends** The information provided via Google Trends is a sample of all of Google Search and YouTube's search activity. The 2 different samples of Google Trends data that can be accessed are: ● **Real-time data** - a sample covering the last seven days; ● **Non-realtime data** - a separate sample from real-time data that goes as far back as 2004 and up to 72 hours before one's search. Only a sample of Google Search and YouTube searches are used in Google Trends (a publicly available research tool), because Google, including YouTube, handles billions of searches per day. Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, Google can look at a dataset representative of all searches on Google, which includes YouTube, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world. See Trends [Help Centre](#) for details. **Google Fact Check Explorer** The Fact Check Explorer includes the following information, from fact-check articles using the ClaimReview markup: ● **Claim made by:** Name of the publisher making the claim; ● **Rating text:** True or False; ● **Fact Check article:** The fact-checking article on the publisher's site; ● **Claim reviewed:** A short summary of the claim being evaluated;

- **Tags:** The tags that show up next to the claim.

For additional details on fields included on Google Fact Check API, see [API documentation](#).

Google Researcher Program
Approved researchers will receive permissions and access to public data for Search and YouTube in the following ways:
- **Search**: Access to an API for limited scraping with a budget for quota;
- **YouTube**: Permission for scraping limited to metadata.

For additional details, see the [Researcher Program landing page](#).

YouTube Researcher Program
The [YouTube Researcher Program](#) provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. The program allows eligible academic researchers around the world to independently analyse the data they collect, including generating new/derived metrics for their research. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data.

Transparency into paid content on YouTube
The information provided via the [bespoke front end search page](#) allows users to view videos with active paid product placements, sponsorships, and endorsements that have been declared on YouTube.
- **Paid product placements**
  - Videos about a product or service because there is a connection between the creator and the maker of the product or service;
  - Videos created for a company or business in exchange for compensation or free of charge products/services;
  - Videos where that company or business's brand, message, or product is included directly in the content and the company has given the creator money or free of charge products to make the video.
- **Endorsements -** Videos created for an advertiser or marketer that contains a message that reflects the opinions, beliefs, or experiences of the creator.
- **Sponsorships -** Videos that have been financed in whole or in part by a company, without integrating the brand, message, or product directly into the content. Sponsorships generally promote the brand, message, or product of the third party.

SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	Definitions can be found on the YouTube Help Centre. Additional data points are provided in SLI 26.1.1 and 26.2.1.	
	(1) Number of Fact Check API tool requests from users in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), globally; (2) Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below); (3) Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to Google Search in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).	Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to YouTube in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).
	(1) In H1 2024, the Fact Check Search API received approximately 158,624 requests from Google Search users, globally.	
	Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users	**Number of Google Trends users researching Google Search**	**Number of Google Trends users researching YouTube**
Level	Users	Users	Users
Member State			
Austria	516	78,041	2,495
Belgium	631	114,983	1,514
Bulgaria	364	34,763	2,335
Croatia	194	19,687	838
Cyprus	93	13,353	667

Czech Republic	544	48,766	1,846
Denmark	993	118,984	1,665
Estonia	68	13,325	171
Finland	282	51,642	1,173
France	4,345	1,352,538	12,053
Germany	6,216	676,916	19,917
Greece	446	36,501	1,184
Hungary	350	67,410	1,503
Ireland	816	32,045,636	2,172
Italy	2,592	599,048	14,355
Latvia	85	17,849	1,337
Lithuania	124	49,434	1,170
Luxembourg	94	65,878	3
Malta	58	6,011	6
Netherlands	1,619	348,980	6,042
Poland	2,659	374,848	9,356
Portugal	784	74,228	3,017
Romania	462	183,217	3,039
Slovakia	319	20,157	504
Slovenia	175	11,506	1,166
Spain	5,457	419,376	13,383
Sweden	829	102,181	2,023
Iceland	33	7,109	334

Liechtenstein	2	1,016	0
Norway	893	75,064	1,013
Total EU	**31,115**	**36,945,258**	**104,934**
Total EEA	**32,043**	**37,028,447**	**106,281**
Measure 26.2	**Google Search**		**YouTube**
QRE 26.2.1	*Not subscribed*		Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2
QRE 26.2.2	*Not subscribed*		Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2
QRE 26.2.3	*Not subscribed*		**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Researcher Program** The Google Researcher Program, which includes YouTube, has a 3-step application process: 1. Review and confirm the applicant's eligibility; 2. Submit an application, which requires a Google account; 3. If approved, the applicant gains permission to access public data relevant to their research. Once an application has been submitted, accepted researchers will be notified via email. **YouTube Researcher Program** The YouTube Researcher Program has a 3-step application process:

		1. YouTube verifies the applicant is an academic researcher affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution; 2. The Researcher creates an API project in the Google Cloud Console and enables the relevant YouTube APIs. They can learn more by visiting the [enabled APIs page](#); 3. The Researcher [applies](#) with their institutional email (e.g. with a .edu suffix), includes as much detail as possible, and confirms that all of their information is accurate. Once an application has been submitted, YouTube's operations team will conduct a review and let applicants know if they are accepted into the program.
SLI 26.2.1 – meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	*Not subscribed*	(1-4) Applications received, approved, rejected or under review for the YouTube Researcher Program in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), broken down by EEA Member States (* indicates applications that were rejected on the basis of incorrect/incomplete application); (5) Total number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher Program API in H1 2024, broken down by EEA Member States; (6) Median application resolution time in days in H1 2024, reported at the EU and EEA level. Please note the following: ● Cells with '0' under applications received signify that

		Applications Received	Applications Approved	Applications Rejected	Applications under Review	Number of unique researchers accessing the API	Median application resolution time
	there were no applications submitted by a researcher from that country. Similarly, cells with '0' signify that there were no applications approved, rejected, or under review for that country. ● Applications under review reflect those applications still being processed at the end of the reporting period. The outcomes of these applications will be included in the next reporting period. ● Researchers accessing the Researcher Program API from 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024 may have been approved before H1 2024. There can be more than one researcher per application. ● Median Application Resolution time is the median number of days from application creation to application resolution. Applications may go back and forth between the applicant and API Ops Agents throughout the approval process. This metric does not reflect YouTube's first response back to the applicant.						
	Not subscribed	Applications Received	Applications Approved	Applications Rejected	Applications under Review	Number of unique researchers accessing the API	Median application resolution time
Member State	*Not subscribed*						

Country						
Austria	1	1	0	0	2	-
Belgium	2	1	0	1	2	-
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	-
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	-
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	-
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	-
Denmark	1	1	0	0	1	-
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	-
Finland	1	0	1	0	1	-
France	5	3	1	1	7	-
Germany	8	6	2	0	16	-
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	-
Hungary	0	0	0	0	1	-
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	-
Italy	3	3	0	0	6	-
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	-
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	-
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	-
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	-
Netherlands	3	1	1	1	4	-
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	-
Portugal	2	0	2	0	0	-
Romania	1	1	0	0	0	-

Slovakia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Slovenia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Spain		0	0	0	0	3	-
Sweden		0	0	0	0	0	-
Iceland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	0	-
Norway		0	0	0	0	0	-
Total EU		**27**	**17**	**7**	**3**	**43**	**4.5 days**
Total EEA		**27**	**17**	**7**	**3**	**43**	**4.5 days**
Measure 26.3	**Google Search**				**YouTube**		

QRE 26.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Trends** For Google Trends, users have an option to report an issue by taking a screenshot of the malfunction area and then submitting it for feedback via the Send Feedback option on the Google Trends page. Additionally, users can access the Trends Help Centre to troubleshoot any issues they may be experiencing. **Google Fact Check Explorer** Within Google Search's Fact Check Explorer, the Report Issue option provides users the ability to report issues to Google. **Google Researcher Program** For the Google Researcher Program, the most up to date information is captured in the Program description on the Transparency Centre, and also on the Acceptable Use Policy page. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines. **YouTube Researcher Program** For the YouTube Researcher Program, there is support available via email. Researchers can contact YouTube, with

	questions and to report technical issues or other suspected faults, via a unique email alias, provided upon acceptance into the program. Questions are answered by YouTube's Developer Support team and by other relevant internal parties as needed.
	Google is not aware of any malfunctions during the reporting period that would have prevented access to these reporting systems.

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 27					
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.					
	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially	Yes	Yes

improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Search and YouTube will continue to engage in discussions with other Signatories, the EU Commission, European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and civil society, as part of the Permanent Task-force, in order to help set up workstreams related to Commitment 27 and to meaningfully engage with those. Over the next six months, the members of the working group plan to (a) identify appropriate governing principles for the new intermediary body, (b) lay out its core functions, (c) outline an organisational structure, staffing, and budgetary needs, (d) identify an appropriate form and place of establishment, and (e) provide a timeline for the body's initial phases of work. YouTube is exploring ways that it can continue to expand the YouTube Researcher Program, based in part on feedback from researchers.	

Measure 27.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google, including YouTube, participates in the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body, engaging with industry representatives, academia, and civil society to develop an organisational model for a new independent intermediary body that will facilitate data sharing between digital platforms, including search engines, and independent, external researchers. The working group follows commitments made as part of the EU's Code of Practice on Disinformation. Members of the working group come together to (a) identify appropriate governing principles for the new intermediary body, (b) lay out its core functions, (c) outline an organisational structure, staffing, and budgetary needs, (d) identify an appropriate form and place of establishment, and (e) provide a timeline for the body's initial phases of work. More information is available here.	

Measure 27.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with other Signatories, the European Commission, EDMO, and civil society, as part of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, in order to satisfy Commitment 27. As of the filing of this report, there is no agreed-upon funding plan to report on.	

Measure 27.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with other Signatories, the European Commission, EDMO, and civil society, as part of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, in order to satisfy Commitment 27. As no third-party body has yet been established, Google Search and YouTube are unable to report on the cooperation with it at this time.	
SLI 27.3.1 – research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with other Signatories, the European Commission, EDMO, and civil society, as part of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, in order to satisfy Commitment 27. As no third-party body has yet been established, Google Search and YouTube are unable to report on the cooperation with it at this time.	
Data		

Measure 27.4	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**	YouTube has a program for eligible academic researchers from around the world who are interested in using YouTube's global Data API for their next research project. The program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Learn more about what data is available in

Google Search continues to explore options to engage in pilot programs towards sharing data with vetted researchers for the purpose of investigating mis-/disinformation.	the YouTube API reference. There is an application process with detailed policies, eligibility criteria, and guidance that can be found on the YouTube Research Policies page. Refer to SLI 26.2.1 for the number of researchers from the EU who were approved to use the YouTube Research API through the YouTube Researcher Program during the reporting period. While there continue to be researchers actively using the API and studying the topic of Misinformation, as self-identified, no newly approved researchers in this reporting period identified misinformation as their research topic. Additionally, refer to SLI 26.2.1 for an EEA Member State Breakdown of applications to the YouTube Researcher Program.

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28					
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- In H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), Google hosted 25 researchers across disciplines with deep expertise in Trust & Safety-related research areas. Google brought this group together to build relationships between scholars working in siloed fields: misinformation, child safety, violent extremism, privacy, at-risk users, and more to share projects and insights across a broader Trust & Safety ecosystem. - Additionally in 2024, Google hosted a workshop with over 30 attendees, including academics, at the Trust & Safety Forum in Lille, France exploring Safety by Design frameworks and implementation constraints, including misinformation. - Google also kicked-off the second year of the Trust & Safety Research Awards in 2024, Google's academic grant program. This program, in partnership with University Relations, is one of Google's largest opportunities to partner with external researchers on priority trust & safety topics, including child safety, scams, AI, and misinformation. New to the program this year, three office hours sessions were held with over 150 potential applicants asking questions about the program.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube is exploring ways that it can continue to expand the YouTube Researcher Program, based in part on feedback from researchers.

Measure 28.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.1.1	Google has a longstanding commitment to transparency, and has led the way in transparency reporting of content removals and government requests for user data over the past decade plus. Google and YouTube's products, processes, and practices via the Lumen Database, Google Trends, and Fact Check	

Explorer show some of the ways that Google provides tools to support not only researchers, but journalists and others, to understand more about Google.

Please refer to QRE 26.1.1, QRE 26.1.2, and QRE 26.3.1 for further information about [Google Fact Check Tool API](#) and [Google Trends](#).

Google
Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](#). Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.

Google has teams that operate the Google Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and evaluate potential updates and developments for the Google Researcher Program. Additional information can be found on the [Google Transparency Centre](#). Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their [Search Researcher Result API guidelines](#).

Additionally, Google's partnership with Lumen is an independent research project managed by the [Berkman Klein Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School](#). The Lumen database houses millions of content takedown requests that have been voluntarily shared by various companies, including Google. Its purpose is to facilitate academic and industry research concerning the availability of online content. As part of Google's partnership with Lumen, information about the legal notices Google receives may be sent to the Lumen project for publication. Google informs users about its Lumen practices under the 'Transparency at our core' section of the [Legal Removals Help Centre](#). Additional information on Lumen can be found [here](#).

Google further demonstrates its commitment to empowering the research community by hosting workshops. In H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), Google hosted 25 researchers across disciplines with deep expertise in Trust & Safety-related research areas. Google brought this group together to build relationships between scholars working in siloed fields: misinformation, child safety, violent extremism, privacy, at-risk users, and more to share projects and insights across a broader Trust & Safety ecosystem. Discussion topics included how to increase research impact, providing EU-based researchers access to data, and the overlap of AI and Trust & Safety.

Additionally in H1 2024, Google hosted a workshop with over 30 attendees, including academics, at the Trust & Safety (T&S) Forum in Lille, France exploring Safety by Design frameworks and implementation constraints, including misinformation.

Google's Trust & Safety also continues to provide unrestricted grants to support research efforts across areas of interest related to Trust & Safety in technology through the Trust & Safety Research Awards. This program, in partnership with University Relations, is one of Google's largest opportunities to partner with external researchers on priority trust & safety topics, including child safety, scams, AI, and misinformation. In its first year in 2023, Google received over 250 applications and funded nine projects with an EU-focus in priority areas including trusted flagging, the use of large language models (LLMs) for digital scams, and minority-targeted disinformation. New to the program in 2024, three office hours sessions were held with over 150 potential applicants asking questions about the program. Additional information on the Trust & Safety Research Awards can be found here.

Similar to the Trust & Safety Research Awards program, Google launched the Google Academic Research Awards (GARA) program in June 2024. In each funding cycle, the GARA program will publish a series of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) focused on a diverse range of research areas within technology and computing. As of 27 June 2024, Google started accepting applications, globally.

YouTube
The YouTube Researcher Program provides eligible academic researchers from around the world with scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data. (See YouTube API reference for more information).

YouTube has teams that operate the YouTube Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and provide technical support throughout the research project. They also evaluate potential updates and developments for the YouTube Researcher Program. Researchers can use any of the options below to obtain support:

- YouTube provides a contact email alias to researchers who have been granted access to the program;
- YouTube API Code Samples at GitHub.

In addition, Google Search and YouTube's Product and Policy teams regularly communicate with researchers who reach

	out with questions about the functioning of YouTube or seek to receive feedback on past or future research projects.	
Measure 28.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 28.2.1	See response to QRE 28.1.1.	
Measure 28.3	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 28.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force and with EDMO. As of the time of this report, no annual consultation has yet taken place, but Google Search and YouTube stand ready to collaborate with EDMO to that end in 2023. In 2021, Google contributed €25M to help launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) to 'strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-26). The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund's support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications. Refer to QRE 30.1.1 to learn more details about EMIF's grant distribution. Additionally, refer to QRE 26.1.1 to learn more about how Google, including YouTube, provides opportunities for researchers on its platforms.	
Measure 28.4	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 28.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Refer to QRE 30.1.1, QRE 30.1.3, and QRE 30.2.1 to learn more about how Google, including YouTube, structured agreements with partners such that the resources provided are independently managed.	

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 29				
Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.				
	C.29	**M 29.1**	**M 29.2**	**M 29.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 29.1	*Not subscribed*

QRE 29.1.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.1.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.1.3	*Not subscribed*
SLI 29.1.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 29.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.2.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.2.3	*Not subscribed*
SLI 29.2.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (of various resilience-fostering measures)	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 29.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.3.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 29.3.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (effective	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed

repositories of advertising)	
Data	*Not subscribed*

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community				
Commitment 30 Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers				
	C.30	**M 30.1**	**M 30.2**	**M 30.3**	**M 30.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- Between January and June 2024, Google held eight misinformation-related events, including an elections focused event with discussions on empowering voters with accurate information, protecting its platforms, combating misinformation, and equipping campaigns with top-tier security. Key concerns included measuring misinformation moderation success, balancing free speech with moderation, differentiating speech from reach, and emphasising media literacy. - In February 2024, through its $13.2M partnership with Google, including YouTube, the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) independently selected 20 organisations covering its Phase 3 (Engage) funding. This included six organisations from the following EEA Member States: Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain. For the Phase 3 (Engage) round of funding, each organisation will receive $100K USD totalling $2M USD. - In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition	

<table>
<tr>
<td colspan="3">of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections.

● In April 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network's (IFCN) Global Fact Check Fund opened its Build application process for grants of $25,000 each. The grants will fund organisations' operational capacity to support fact-checking in local and regional work.

● To date, across all IFCN Global Fact Check Fund grant rounds, IFCN has independently selected organisations in Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands.

● YouTube continues to invest resources to aid Fact Check organisations in developing their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form.

● Currently, there are 11 EU-based IFCN signatories that participate in YouTube Partner Program (YPP), have an active YouTube channel and produce fact-check content on YouTube or through ClaimReview. These organisations are across the following Member States - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</td>
<td colspan="2">● IFCN will continue to announce its grant opportunities on their website.

● YouTube will continue to provide training and support to fact-checkers and fact-checking organisations, so they can maximise their reach and presence on YouTube, bringing more native video fact-checking content to YouTube's video-sharing platform.

● YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 30 for future reports.</td>
</tr>
</table>

Measure 30.1	Google Search	YouTube

| QRE 30.1.1 | Globally, Google, including YouTube, works with publishers and journalists to support quality journalism and global media literacy. Google's digital tools, training and [resources](#) are helping newsrooms to find, verify and tell stories. [Google News Initiative](#) has provided training, including digital verification techniques, to over 145,000 European journalists since 2015, and Google's free online curriculum has been visited over 400,000 times.

As mentioned in response to QRE 21.1.1, Google Search and YouTube enable any fact-checkers to mark up their content for the purpose of indexation in Google's and others' services for free using the publicly available schema.org ClaimReview mark-up. Fact-checkers must also be either a verified signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network's Code of Principles or an authoritative publisher to be eligible on YouTube. Accordingly, Google and YouTube agreements and partnerships with fact-checking organisations differ from those of services that would rely upon proprietary tools or closed partnerships.

European Media and Information Fund
In 2021, Google contributed €25M to help launch the [European Media and Information Fund](#) (EMIF) 'to strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-26).

The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund's support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications. To date, at least 87 media literacy, misinformation and fact-checking projects across 25 countries (including 23 EEA Member States) have been granted €12.86M. The list of independently selected grantees from this fund available [here](#).

International Fact-Checking Network
On 29 November 2022, Google, including YouTube, announced they will work with the [International Fact-Checking Network](#) (IFCN), to [provide $13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations](#) via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, $1.2M USD will be used by IFCN to operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach. The goal is to reach fact-checking organisations of differing maturity:

- **Build**: fact-checkers with little or no online presence;
- **Grow**: fact-checkers with a basic digital presence looking to expand reach;
- **Engage**: digitally mature fact-checkers, looking to invest in new technologies. |

For regular updates on application windows for each grant round, announcements about which organisations were independently selected, and information about grant distribution across EEA Member States, visit the IFCN website here.

- In February 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) independently selected 20 organisations covering its Phase 3 (Engage) funding. This included six organisations from the following EEA Member States: Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain. For the Phase 3 (Engage) round of funding, each organisation will receive $100K USD totalling $2M USD.
- In April 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network's (IFCN) Global Fact Check Fund opened its Build application process for grants of $25,000 each. The grants will fund organisations' operational capacity to support fact-checking in local and regional work.
- In June 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network's (IFCN) independently selected 39 organisations across 34 countries covering its Phase 4 (Build) funding. This included 8 organisations from the following EEA Member States: Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain. For the Phase 4 (Build) round of funding, each organisation will receive $25K USD totalling $975K USD.
- To date, across all IFCN Global Fact Check Fund grant rounds, IFCN has independently selected organisations in Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands.

Additional Partnerships
In addition to the indirect funding via organisations such as IFCN and the EMIF, Google funds the following projects:

- In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that works together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections.

YouTube
As a video-sharing platform, YouTube allows fact-checkers to post and share both short- and long-form video content. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms. Every fact-checking creator on YouTube agrees to follow the YouTube Community Guidelines and Terms of Service. As YouTube is available in all EU Member States, fact-checking organisations from all Member States are welcome to share content on YouTube's platform.

	Fact-checking organisations who meet certain eligibility criteria may also participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP), a monetisation program. Creators who are accepted into YPP agree to additional terms that govern monetisation, including YouTube's Advertiser-Friendly Guidelines.

Currently, there are 11 EU-based IFCN Signatories that participate in YPP, have an active YouTube channel and produce fact-check content on YouTube or through ClaimReview.. These organisations are across the following Member States - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

YouTube continues to partner with fact-checking organisations to support their efforts to create video content and share it on YouTube. |
| **QRE 30.1.2** | **Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

Google's main partnerships are with the European Media and Information Fund and the International Fact-Checking Network. Both organisations provide indirect payments to fact-checking members.

Additional partnerships include the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) as mentioned in QRE 30.1.1

YouTube
YouTube has agreements with the EU-based fact-checking organisations that participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP), YouTube's monetisation program, as mentioned in QRE 30.1.1. |
| **QRE 30.1.3** | Google contributed €25M to help launch the European Media and Information Fund 'to strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-26). To date, at least 87 media literacy, misinformation and fact-checking projects across 25 countries (including 23 EEA Member States) have been granted €12.86M. The list of independently selected grantees from this fund available here.

Additionally, Google and YouTube are working with the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), to provide $13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, $1.2M USD will be used by IFCN to operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach. For regular updates on application windows for |

each grant round, announcements about which organisations were independently selected, and information about grant distribution across EEA Member States, visit the IFCN website here.

- In February 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) independently selected 20 organisations covering its Phase 3 (Engage) funding. This included six organisations from the following EEA Member States: Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain. For the Phase 3 (Engage) round of funding, each organisation will receive $100K USD totalling $2M USD.
- In April 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network's (IFCN) Global Fact Check Fund opened its Build application process for grants of $25,000 each. The grants will fund organisations' operational capacity to support fact-checking in local and regional work.
- In June 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network's (IFCN) independently selected 39 organisations across 34 countries covering its Phase 4 (Build) funding. This included 8 organisations from the following EEA Member States: Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain. For the Phase 4 (Build) round of funding, each organisation will receive $25K USD totalling $975K USD.
- To date, across all IFCN Global Fact Check Fund grant rounds, IFCN has independently selected organisations in Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands.

YouTube

In addition to the grant programs mentioned above, fact-checking organisations may also be eligible to generate revenue through YouTube's monetisation program, the YouTube Partner Program (YPP). Fact-checking creators who participate in YPP also have access to Creator Support teams, who provide guidance to channels on how to maximise their presence and engagement on YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.

Currently, there are 11 EU-based IFCN signatories that participate in YPP, have an active YouTube channel and produce fact-check content on YouTube or through ClaimReview. These organisations are across the following Member States - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

As a video-sharing platform, YouTube allows fact-checkers to post and share both short- and long-form video content. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms.

	YouTube raises up authoritative videos in search and recommendations, which may include fact-check content, to viewers on topics such as news, politics, medical, and scientific information. Human evaluators, trained using [publicly available guidelines](#), assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos. To decide if a video is authoritative, evaluators look at factors like the expertise and reputation of the speaker or channel, the main topic of the video, and whether the content delivers on its promise or achieves its goal. The more authoritative a video, the more likely it will be promoted in recommendations. YouTube continues to partner with fact-checking organisations to support their efforts to create video content and share it on YouTube.
SLI 30.1.1 – Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	As per QRE 30.1.1, the funded organisations, European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) and International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), will independently evaluate and select projects for funding. As such, EMIF and IFCN will determine Member State and language coverage.
Member States	

Measure 30.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 30.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) Partnership** The '[funding mechanism principles](#)' of EMIF are explained on their website and were previously published in the Baseline report. The [governance process](#) is explained transparently in detail. Additionally, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) has agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive financial support, and they do not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the selection process. **International Fact-Checking Network Partnership**	

	Google, including YouTube, is working with the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), to provide $13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, $1.2M USD will be used by IFCN to independently operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach. International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)'s Code of Principles are a set of five commitments around fairness, transparency, standards, and honesty. Google, including YouTube, previously published them in the Baseline report and they are explained in detail on the IFCN website here. **Additional Partnerships** The methodologies and principles of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) can be found on their website here. **YouTube** The eligibility criteria and participation requirements for YouTube's Partner Program (YPP) can be found here. Additional information about getting paid on YouTube can be found here. YouTube's automated systems and human reviewers assess each channel as a whole to make sure the channel follows all of the policies and guidelines. To focus YouTube's support for creators who are active and engaged with the community, YouTube may turn off monetisation on channels that have not uploaded a video or posted to the Community tab for 6 months or more.
QRE 30.2.2	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **European Media and Information Fund (EMIF)** EMIF will issue reports on a yearly basis regarding the distribution of the Fund. Within the progress updates, there will be a public impact assessment. The impact assessment will outline: ● Measures taken to ensure that the Fund is being managed in good faith and in compliance with applicable laws; ● Update to assess the transparent process by which applications to the Fund for financial support are considered to ensure that all applicants are treated fairly and reasonably; ● An assessment of the decision making of the Management Committee (and its delegates) presenting how

decisions are made independently, without any conflict of interest, and according to the charter;
- An assessment of how funds have been distributed across the entire EEA region, including the United Kingdom, and to a diverse range of projects.

Additionally, EMIF refers to [funding](#) 'a wide geographic coverage (minimum 12 Member States each year), while supporting projects that foster diversity and help building networks of specialists at national and EU levels. Given the diversity and specific vulnerabilities of national information environments, EMIF shall fund a wide and well-balanced portfolio of projects.'

The latest publications about EMIF's progress and accountability can be found [here](#).

International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)
IFCN has [a public webpage](#) dedicated to the Global Fact Check Fund to outline full details of governance and application process. IFCN will issue progress reports on a quarterly basis regarding the distribution of the Fund, these will outline the following:

- Measures taken to ensure the Fund is being managed in good faith and in compliance with applicable laws;
- An assessment of how funds have been distributed across the entire world to a diverse range of organisations, including a breakdown of how support has been provided among organisations within the 27 EU Member States;
- Specific details on the decision making process and relevant information on overall progress.

YouTube
Fact-checking creators who participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP) have access to Creator Support teams, who can provide guidance on how channels use YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.

YouTube has also established regular meetings with several major EU-based Fact-checking organisations to better support their needs on the platform. Some of these touchpoints include, but are not limited to:
- Regular meetings with EU-based fact-checking organisations who are members of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) including: Maldita.es,, Faktograf, CORRECTIV, Teyit, Demagog, Full Fact, AFP, dpa, TjekDet, Pagella Politica/Facta News;
- Training sessions to aid Fact-Check organisations in developing their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form.

QRE 30.2.3	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**
	This QRE focuses on Signatories that are European fact-checking organisations - as such, there is nothing for Google Search or YouTube to report.

Measure 30.3	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 30.3.1	Central partners, such as the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), help bring together fact-checkers from around the globe. Google also leads efforts to facilitate cross-border collaboration through research sessions.	
	International Fact-Checking Network	
	On IFCN's website, they state that their organisation 'enable fact-checkers through networking, capacity building and collaboration. IFCN promotes the excellence of fact-checking to more than 100 organisations worldwide through advocacy, training and global events.'	
	European Media and Information Fund (EMIF)	
	The EMIF 'ensures a wide geographic coverage (minimum 12 Member States each year), while supporting projects that foster diversity and help building networks of specialists at national and EU levels. Given the diversity and specific vulnerabilities of national information environments, EMIF shall fund a wide and well-balanced portfolio of projects' (excerpt from EMIF Funding Principles).	
	In addition, the very design of Google's approach towards fact-checking facilitates cross-border cooperation among fact-checkers, in that Google does not index fact-checks submitted via a private repository but rather those made available on the open web, and Google makes those easily searchable via Fact Check Explorer.	
	Google	
	Google News Initiative maintained the long-term partnership with German Press Agency DPA to expand the Faktencheck23 initiative based on three pillars: verification and fact-checking training for journalists, a new fact-checking challenge and a fact-checking summit to convene practitioners, academics and KOFs from the DACH region. To expand opportunities, Austrian Press Agency APA (Austria) and Swiss Press Agency SDA Keystone (Switzerland) are the local partners to offer verification and fact-checking training to journalists in the respective markets. The goal of	

Faktencheck23 is to advance verification and fact-checking skills while fostering cross-border collaboration. Separately, Google is funding APA among other things to develop two products, a central API hub for fact-checked data and data driven content, and to host the inaugural 'The Future of Fact Checking' summit in Austria.

In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check content content regarding EU Parliamentary elections. Participating fact-checking organisations not only cover almost the entire EU but also the wider community of neighbouring European countries. To support cross-border collaboration, Elections24Check created a comprehensive database of election related disinformation, claims and narratives — the first open database of its kind supporting research and fact-checking around the world. A final report concludes 46 organisations working across 36 countries contributed over three thousand articles into a collaborative database. 'The project met its ambitious goals and established a new standard for this collaboration between fact-checking organisations, significantly impacting the European community.'

The coalition members have access to new beta features in Fact Check Explorer which allow organisations to search fact-checks by image in addition to text — increasingly important with the creation of more imagery made with generative AI. Google also provides training on how to see the context and timeline of an image to understand when it was first indexed by Google and how it has been used since, which helps trace the provenance and history of an image across the web.

YouTube
As an open platform operating in all EU Member States, YouTube enables fact-checking content posted by an organisation in one Member State to be viewed by any YouTube user anywhere in the EU or around the world. This access enables cross-border collaboration between fact-checking organisations who may view other fact-check content and recognise similar patterns or narratives. YouTube's search functionality further enables cross-border discovery (e.g., a search for a particular fact-check organisation with a YouTube channel will return a link to that channel at or near the top of results).

Measure 30.4	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 30.4.1	In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with	

coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections.		

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community				
Commitment 31				
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.				
	C.31	**M 31.1**	**M 31.2**	**M 31.3**	**M 31.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No, Google Search has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but Google Search regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to surfacing information panels and authoritative information.	Yes. Additionally, to integrate fact-checking content in a manner fit for YouTube's video-sharing platform, YouTube needs to have more video fact-checking content on the platform. Thus, investments in training how to leverage YouTube, and support for fact-checking creators, are a critical piece of the product integration commitment.
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A	- YouTube continues to invest resources to aid Fact-Check organisations in developing their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form. - YouTube Create, an app that gives mobile creators the tools they need to take their videos to the next level, is available in

		several EU markets including Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and Spain.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	For example, YouTube will continue to invest and support fact-checkers' creation of short- and long-form video content through trainings and additional resources. YouTube will continue to ensure that authoritative content is surfaced to users through search and recommendations on the platform. YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 31 for future reports.

Measure 31.1	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
Measure 31.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 31.1.1	See response to QRE 21.1.1.	See response to QRE 21.1.1.
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	See response to SLI 21.1.1.	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring

		opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 31.1.1 for future reports.
Member States		

	Google Search	YouTube
SLI 31.1.2 – impact of actions taken	Google Search's use of fact-checks does not involve taking specific actions with regards to content that is fact-checked (e.g. marking it as false or removing it), which in turn does not make it possible to report on the impact of such actions.	YouTube's use of fact-checks does not involve taking specific actions with regards to content that is fact-checked (e.g. marking it as false or removing it), which in turn does not make it possible to report on the impact of such actions.
Member States		

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Discussions around relevant baseline information have been initiated within the Permanent Task-force, and will continue through the next reporting period.
Member States	

Measure 31.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 31.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search and YouTube are members of the Fact-Checking working group. The working group was set up as part of the Task-force, and has met since 3 April 2023. At the time of this report, the working group has not yet finalised the roadmap for the repository, but expect to have more to share in future reports.	

Measure 31.4	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 31.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google, including YouTube, has helped develop the 'ClaimReview' HTML mark-up, an open standard that lets any fact-checker mark up their content so it can be identified and used by any online service. This standard is not proprietary to Google or YouTube and is designed to be interoperable across the web. In order to make it easier for fact-checkers to leverage the ClaimReview mark-up, Google has developed a free tool that simplifies the process of marking up webpages using this standard. **YouTube** Given concerns about resources to produce long-form video content, YouTube believes that the Shorts format on the platform is a possible technical solution for fact-checkers to create video content while minimising production resources. YouTube Shorts can be made directly from the YouTube app, and since September 2023, YouTube has been rolling out the beta version of YouTube Create, an app that gives mobile creators the tools they need to take their short- and long-form videos to the next level, to several EU markets. Creators can easily make high-quality videos with editing tools, effects, filters, and transitions all in an intuitive, easy-to-use interface—without the need for complicated editing tools or desktop software. YouTube has provided, and will continue to offer, tools and techniques to help fact-checking organisations have a greater presence on YouTube, which includes leveraging Shorts, a format compatible with multiple platforms.	

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community			
Commitment 32			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.			

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- Between January and June 2024, Google held eight misinformation-related events, including an elections focused event with discussions on empowering voters with accurate information, protecting its platforms, combating misinformation, and equipping campaigns with top-tier security. Key concerns included measuring misinformation moderation success, balancing free speech with moderation, differentiating speech from reach, and emphasising media literacy. - In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections. - YouTube continues to engage in regular discussions with members of industry bodies including the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). YouTube also provides global fact training to support Fact-checking organisations as YouTube creators. - YouTube continues to invest resources to aid fact-check organisations in developing their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form.	

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Search plans to continue to engage in regular discussion with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) (see QRE 32.3.1 for more details).	YouTube plans to engage in regular discussions with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) (see QRE 32.3.1 for more details). YouTube also plans to expand training to support fact-checking organisations as YouTube creators, including supporting organisations that may be eligible for YouTube's monetisation program. YouTube will continue to ensure that fact-checkers on the platform are aware of the creator analytics available to users.

Measure 32.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
Measure 32.2	*Not subscribed*	**YouTube**
QRE 32.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Search Console is a free service offered by Google that includes various tools and reports to help webmasters, including fact-checking organisations, to monitor, maintain, and troubleshoot their site's	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** As a video-sharing platform, fact-checkers are able to post and share both short- and long-form video content on YouTube. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms.

	presence in Google Search.

The Search Performance report shows important metrics about how a site performs in Google Search results including how often the site appears in Google Search, what search queries are most likely to show on the site, how often searchers click through for those queries, and site views from all EU countries. This can help fact-checkers assess how their content is performing on Google Search. Further information on the Search Performance report can be found [here](). | YouTube raises up authoritative videos in search and recommendations, which may include fact-check content, to viewers on topics such as news, politics, medical, and scientific information. Human evaluators, trained using [publicly available guidelines](), assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos. To decide if a video is authoritative, evaluators look at factors like the expertise and reputation of the speaker or channel, the main topic of the video, and whether the content delivers on its promise or achieves its goal. The more authoritative a video, the more likely it will be promoted in recommendations.

YouTube Studio provides tools and information through which YouTube creators can manage their presence, grow their channels, interact with their audiences, and make money—all in one place. Fact-checking organisations with YouTube channels can view data about their video performance through the Channel Analytics Dashboard in [YouTube Studio](). Available data includes views, watch time, traffic sources, and search queries that led viewers to their video content.

In addition, YouTube provides details about text-based information panels on YouTube through the [YouTube Help Centre](). |
| **SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools** | Fact-checkers are not required to identify themselves as such in order to use the Search console. Accordingly, Google Search is unable to report on usage of the Search console among fact-checkers. | YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 32.1.1 for future reports. |
| | | |

Data		
Measure 32.3	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 32.3.1	**International Fact-Checking Network** Google, including YouTube, has been in regular discussions with industry bodies, such as the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), to discuss collaborations and efforts to build and support the work of fact-checkers. Some of these conversations have been about: • Improving support and funding to fact-checking initiatives and technical capabilities; • Opening additional channels of communication from the fact-checking community to YouTube; • Scaled trainings on platform best practices to help fact-checkers increase engagement on YouTube and manage their channel strategy. Google, including YouTube, is working with the IFCN, to provide $13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, $1.23M USD will be used by IFCN to operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach. **European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN)** In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections. Participating fact-checking organisations not only cover almost the entire EU but also the wider community of neighbouring European countries. To support cross-border collaboration, Elections24Check created a comprehensive database of election related disinformation, claims and narratives — the first open database of its kind which will support research and fact-checking around the world. A final report concludes 46 organisations working across 36 countries contributed over three thousand articles into a collaborative database. 'The project met its ambitious goals and established a new standard for this collaboration between fact-checking organisations, significantly impacting the European community.' The coalition members have access to new beta features in Fact Check Explorer which allow organisations to search fact-checks by image in addition to text — increasingly important with the creation of more imagery made with generative AI. Google also provides training on how to see the context and timeline of an image to understand when it was first indexed by Google and how it has been used since, which helps trace the provenance and history of an image across the web.	

Google Representatives from Google and YouTube regularly attend and host misinformation related events. They will continue to meet regularly with fact-checking organisations to better understand what fact-checkers need to better leverage Google and YouTube. These meetings include EU-based fact-checking organisations who are members of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). **YouTube** Creators who participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP) have access to Creator Support teams, who can provide guidance on how channels use YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community		
Commitment 33		
Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.		
	C.33	**M 33.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially	*Not subscribed*

improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 33.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 33.1.1	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
SLI 33.1.1 - number of European fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre						
Commitment 34 To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website						
	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments and alongside other Signatories, Google helped maintain the EU CoP Transparency Centre, located at https://disinfocode.eu in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 34.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**

Measure 34.4	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.5	Google, on behalf of related services

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, and alongside other Signatories, Google populated the EU CoP Transparency Centre with related relevant information in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 35.1	Google, on behalf of related services

Measure 35.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.6	**Google, on behalf of related services**

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36 Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, Google uploaded its report to the newly launched Transparency Centre in March 2024.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In line with Code commitments, Google plans to upload reports and pertinent updates to the Transparency Centre located at https://disinfocode.eu.

Measure 36.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 36.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 36.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34–36)	Google has continued to be an active participant in the working group that successfully launched the common Transparency Centre in 2023. Google assisted with establishing the website's requirements, selecting a vendor to build the website and overseeing the development of the website's key functionalities and interface. Google ensured that the Centre allows the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Centre to be navigated both by commitment and signatory). Each signatory is responsible for ensuring that the information they upload to the website is correct and accurate. Entities interested in joining the Code's Task-force are able to sign up through a dedicated online application form on the website. Google has supported the working group in collecting feedback on the user experience of the website and will continue to seek such feedback from relevant stakeholders to better maintain and update the website.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34–36)	The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	Between 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024, the comment Transparency Centre was visited by approximately 6,200 unique users, and reports were downloaded approximately 7,600 times from about 1,800 unique users. Download metrics specifically for Google's EU Code of Practice on Disinformation reports between 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024 are listed below: ● The baseline report published in January 2023 was downloaded 534 times by 206 unique users. ● The H1 2023 report published in July 2023 was downloaded 394 times by 175 unique users. ● The H2 2023 report published in March 2024 was downloaded 618 times by 218 unique users.
Data	

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force								
Commitment 37 Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.								
	C.37	**M 37.1**	**M 37.2**	**M 37.3**	**M 37.4**	**M 37.5**	**M 37.6**	**M 37.7**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 37.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**

Measure 37.6	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 37.6.1	Google has continued to meaningfully engage in all Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to participation and/or co-steering of meetings, producing documents, and providing feedback.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 38.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 38.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google has several teams across the company that work on the challenges of misinformation and disinformation, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments per this Code. This is core to Google's mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful content. To enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google

	relies both on specially-trained experts and machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 39
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	In line with Code commitments in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), Google provided its third report to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.							
	C.40	**M 40.1**	**M 40.2**	**M 40.3**	**M 40.4**	**M 40.5**	**M 40.6**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	In line with Code commitments in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024), Google provided its third report which included reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 41
Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order

to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.				
	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	- Google has been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators. - Google supported the publication of Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through its collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	As part of its efforts to support the 2024 European Parliamentary elections, Google provided additional information and data through briefings and other engagements to provide information about its approach. For example, Google participated in the EU Commission's [stress test], a simulation exercise with platforms, Digital Services Coordinators, and civil society organisations to test readiness against election manipulation and interference in relation to the European election.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 43

Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.	
	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 44
Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

	C.44
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here.	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Overview

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has continued to be a humanitarian disaster throughout 2024, creating significant social and economic challenges through disrupted energy markets and supply chains. Almost two years after the start of the invasion, Ukrainians are still facing deadly attacks and the realities of life under an active invasion — and Google continues to help by providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, fighting disinformation, and providing authoritative information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during the invasion of Ukraine:

1. Continued online services manipulation and malign influence operations;
2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.

The following sections summarise Google's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the invasion of Ukraine.

1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations

Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is helping Ukraine by monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors. Google has also announced new long-term partnerships across Central and Eastern Europe.

In the Baltics, Google entered into long-term partnerships with the Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence. These two organisations have received €1.3 million in funding from Google to build on their impactful work towards increasing media literacy, building further resilience and actively tackling disinformation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Furthermore, Google is partnering with the Charles University in Prague, the main research centre of the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO) project, and providing €1 million in funding for CEDMO to further expand its research into information disorders (such as misinformation, disinformation or clickbait), and work to increase the level of media and digital literacy in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia.

2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation

During the reporting period, Google had paused the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia, ads on Google's properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, new Cloud sign ups, the payments functionality for most of

Google's services, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Due to the war in Ukraine, Google paused ads containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, ads are not available to any entities or individuals that are restricted under applicable trade sanctions and export compliance laws. While additional updates have been made regarding the availability of AdSense in Russia, those are outside the reporting period and will be included in the next report. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure
As the Ukrainian government is under near-constant digital attack, Google expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google's free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the invasion. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats.

TAG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the invasion, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. TAG's findings have shown that government-backed actors from Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, NGOs, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the invasion as a lure for malicious campaigns.

Google is continuing to provide critical cybersecurity and technical infrastructure support by donating 50,000 new Google Workspace licences to the Ukrainian government. By providing these licences and a year of free access to Google Workspace solutions, including Google's cloud-first, zero-trust security model, Google can help provide Ukrainian public institutions with the security and protection they need to deal with constant threats to their digital systems. In February 2023, Google also announced an extension of the free access to premium Google Workspace for Education features for 250 universities and colleges until the end of August 2023.

Google aims to continue to follow the following approach when responding to future crisis situations:
- Elevate access to authoritative information across Google services;
- Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
- Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
- Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

Future measures
Google is continually making investments in products, programs and partnerships to help fight disinformation, both in Ukraine and globally. Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.

Google joins the international community in expressing sincere hope for a return to a peaceful and sovereign Ukraine — and will continue to look for new ways to help those whose lives have been so deeply and tragically affected.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Sensitive Events Policy	On 9 February 2024, Google introduced a new Sensitive Events Policy into the [AdSense Program Policies](#). A 'Sensitive Event' is an unforeseen event or development that creates significant risk to Google's ability to provide high quality, relevant information and ground truth, and reduce insensitive or exploitative content in prominent and monetised features. During a sensitive event, Google may take a variety of actions to address these risks.	No changes to Ads policies or terms were made during the reporting period as a result of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google Search		
N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		

Enforces the Google Ads Misrepresentative Content Policy which does not allow ads or destinations that deceive users by excluding relevant product information or providing misleading information about products, services, or businesses.	Specifically for the invasion of Ukraine, Google Ads focused on the Manipulated Media sub-category in the Misrepresentative Content Policy which disallows the practice of deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues or matters of public concern. Google Ads also enforced the Clickbait Ads Policy which is a sub-category under the Misrepresentative Content Policy. This policy prohibits ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic.
	Please refer to QRE 2.1.1 and SLI 2.1.1 for more details on Google Ads Misrepresentation Policy, including Manipulated Media and Clickbait Ads sub-categories.
As noted above, Google Ads enforces the Sensitive Events Policy which does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.	Due to the invasion of Ukraine, Google Ads enforced the Sensitive Events Policy and paused ads on pages containing content that is exploitative, dismissive, or condones the invasion in March 2022. This is in addition to the pausing of ads from and on Russian Federation state-funded media in February 2022.
	Google Advertising continues to remain vigilant in enforcing all relevant policies, including the Sensitive Events Policy, related to the invasion of Ukraine.
Enforces the Inappropriate Content Policy which does not allow ads or destinations that display shocking content or that promote hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.	Due to the invasion of Ukraine, Google Ads focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory and Shocking Content sub-categories of the Inappropriate Content Policy. The Dangerous or Derogatory sub-category does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. The Shocking Content sub-category does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
	Please refer to QRE 2.1.1 and SLI 2.1.1 for more details on Google Ads Inappropriate Content Policy, including Dangerous or Derogatory and Shocking Content sub-categories.

Enforces [Other Restricted Businesses](#) which restrict certain kinds of businesses from advertising with Google Ads to prevent users from being exploited, even if individual businesses appear to comply with other policies.	In order to protect users, Google Ads specifically focused on enforcing the Government Documents and Official Services Policy which disallows the promotion of documents and/or services that facilitate the acquisition, renewal, replacement or lookup of official documents or information that are available directly from a government or government delegated provider.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Enforces policies, such as the [Misrepresentative Content Policy](#) and the [Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy](#), that aim to prohibit the monetisation of content that has misleading representation, unreliable and harmful claims, deceptive practices, manipulated media, or is deemed dangerous or derogatory.	Google Advertising will continue to monitor and prevent monetisation of content that violates these policies.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Paused Google AdSense's monetisation of Russian Federation state-funded media.	Beginning in February 2022, Google AdSense prohibited the monetisation of any Russian Federation state-funded media (i.e. sites, apps, YouTube channels). It is important to note that Google's current [Publisher Policies](#) and [advertiser-friendly guidelines](#) already prohibited many forms of content related to the invasion of Ukraine from monetising. In addition, Google Advertising paused the monetisation of content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the invasion across services.
	Please see QRE 1.1.1 and SLI 1.1.1 for more details on monetisation on Google Ads.
Paused ads serving in Russia and ads that exploit the war since March 2022.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google paused ads containing content that [exploits](#), dismisses, or condones the war. As part of Google Advertising's [suspension of ads in Russia,](#) Google paused all ads on Google properties and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia.

	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media since February 2022 and added new regions and individuals to the list of entities or individuals that are restricted under applicable trade sanctions and export compliance laws.	Google also paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media. In addition, Ads are not available to any entities or individuals that are restricted under applicable trade sanctions and export compliance laws. Currently, there are embargoes on Crimea, Cuba, so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), Iran, North Korea and Syria.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Enforced the Coordinated Deceptive Practices Policy which prohibits advertisers from promoting content related to public concerns while misrepresenting or concealing their identity or country or origin. Enforced Google's Clickbait Ads Policy which prohibits ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action.	Accounts found to be engaging in Coordinated Deceptive Practices are suspended immediately and without prior warning. Clickbait ads are disapproved upon detection. Repeated violations of this policy can lead to an account suspension.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.	N/A
	N/A

Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Continued to enforce Spam and Webmaster Policies.	See more details about Google Search's implementation of its Spam and Webmaster Policies in the response to QRE 14.1.2.
	See overall spam metrics in SLI 14.2.1. Google Search is unable to provide spam metrics specific to this crisis event.
YouTube	
YouTube continues to enforce its Community Guidelines, including but not limited to misinformation policies, which establish what type of content and behaviour is not allowed on the platform.	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for information on how YouTube enforces its Community Guidelines.
	Since 24 February 2022, related to the ongoing war in Ukraine: • YouTube has terminated over 12,000 channels and removed over 140,000 videos for violating its content policies, including those pertaining to misinformation, hate speech, and graphic violence. • YouTube has blocked over 1,000 channels and over 5.5 million videos.
Since March 2022, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring cybersecurity activity, including in Eastern Europe, regarding the invasion of Ukraine.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring cybersecurity activity, including in Eastern Europe, regarding the invasion of Ukraine.
	See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the TAG Bulletin Q1 2024 and TAG Bulletin Q2 2024 where you will find details on investigations into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.
Google, on behalf of related services	

Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative — including compromise assessments, incident response services, shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.	N/A
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Announced a new Online Safety and Security Partnership with the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) to provide free security training and tools to high-risk users. Google's new partnership with IFES combines Google's account security tools, like the Advanced Protection Program (APP), and IFES's history in supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections management bodies.	IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across the world, including: • **Security training:** In collaboration with Google's Safety Engineering Centre, IFES will expand its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices and create content for specialised audiences. • **Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries:** Google's tools and resources for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES's international networks, helping more people use things like Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google's strongest form of account security for high-risk users, Google Titan Security Keys, Project Shield, a free tool to help protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more. • **Industry thought leadership and case studies:** IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES's partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its Threat Analysis Group (TAG) to help IFES further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process.
	In February 2023, Google committed to providing 100,000 Titan Security Keys to high-risk individuals at no cost.

Expanded eligibility for [Project Shield](), Google's free protection against DDoS attack, so that Ukrainian government websites, embassies worldwide and other governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves and continue to offer their crucial services.	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks. In H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), Project Shield expanded eligibility to select government entities under exigent circumstances.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Added websites and domains identified as threats to [Safe Browsing]() to protect users from further exploitation.	Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the invasion of Ukraine. Google sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users [government-backed attacker alerts]() notifying them of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable [Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing]() and ensure that all devices are updated.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Automatically increased Google account security protections (including more frequent authentication challenges) for people in Ukraine and the surrounding region.	Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection Program — which delivers Google's highest level of security — is currently protecting the accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Expanded the Google Priority Flagger Program to countries across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).	As part of Google's [commitment]() to fight misinformation in the context of the Ukraine / Russia war, Google expanded the Priority Flagger Program to now be available in 10 countries across CEE (EE, LV, LT, PL, SK, HU, RO, MD, UA, BG). The program provides channels for participating organisations to notify Google of content on its products and services that may violate Google policies and Community Guidelines. 20+ local organisations are now actively contributing to the program, ranging from both government and civil society sectors, among them Ukraine's [Centre for Countering Disinformation](). In H2 2023, Google reached 23 Misinformation Priority Flaggers in the EU, including signing new partners in Romania, Spain and Belgium. In H1 2023, Google onboarded four Misinformation Priority Flaggers in Moldova and Ukraine.

	Onboarded 20+ entities in CEE, including Ukraine's [Centre for Countering Disinformation]().
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the invasion of Ukraine. TAG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.	Throughout 2024, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. For example, in January 2024, TAG identified a campaign that was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russian leadership and critical of Ukraine, the United States, and Western Europe. For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the [Q1 2024 TAG Bulletin]() and [Q2 2024 TAG Bulletin]().
	Please refer to the [Q1 2024 TAG Bulletin]() and [Q2 2024 TAG Bulletin]() for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Empowering Users

Google Search	
Limited recommendations globally for a number of Russian state-funded media outlets. Enforced its [Content Policies](), including Misinformation Policies, which establish what types of content is not allowed on Google Search.	As stipulated by the EU's Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350, Search removed RT and Sputnik from Google's Search results in the EU.
	Google removed four websites that were delisted under the EU sanctions on Russian state media in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).
In efforts to help users find accurate and fact-checked information online, Google Search deployed ['About This Image']() to English language users globally in October 2023, and [expanded]() the tool to 40	'About This Image' enables users to check the credibility and context of an image or photo found online. This feature allows users to discover the image's history, how other websites are using the image, and any metadata available. In April 2024, Google Search announced that it [expanded]() the tool to 40 additional languages around the world, including French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.

additional languages around the world in H1 2024 (1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024).	Please refer to QRE 17.1.1 for more details on 'About This Image'.
Deploys features that enhance access to trusted information on Search.	Globally, Google has surfaced features on Search to provide quick access to authoritative information, including highlighting news coverage from trusted sources and other helpful context about the invasion. See below for details on features in Ukraine.
	Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Displays an 'SOS Alert' on Google Search in Ukraine and Eastern Europe and works with expert organisations to source helpful humanitarian information.	Google Search features an 'SOS Alert' in Ukraine that provides refugees with information in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. This includes links to UNHCR's Ukraine Help pages and hotline, safety tips from the ICRC, and a link to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Foreign student emergency info hotline. Google Search also launched an 'SOS Alert' in Poland that provides refugees with information in English, Polish, and Ukrainian, including links to the 'I Help Ukrainians Hub' created by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland and the 'Information for Ukrainian citizens' page hosted by the Polish Office for Foreigners.
	See overall metrics in SLI 22.7.1. Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Displayed content advisories when results for a query are rapidly evolving, providing a message that lets users know the topic may still be developing.	This notice is particularly important during the crisis, given how quickly new search terms are developing. In such cases, it is helpful to alert users to the fact that a new search term or query is so new that authoritative information has not been published yet on the open web. Among other languages, these notices are launched in Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.

	See SLI 17.1.1 for metrics on the impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results. Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
To help the increasing number of refugees in the region, Google developed ways for businesses to flag if they are providing services to refugees.	Hotel owners in countries neighbouring Ukraine can indicate on their Business Profile whether they are offering free or discounted accommodations for refugees. Local businesses can post to their Business Profile on Search and Maps to offer various services and aid to refugees from Ukraine.
	Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
YouTube	
YouTube expanded 'Hit Pause', a global media literacy campaign, to teach viewers critical skills and to improve users' experiences on YouTube.	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign has been teaching viewers critical media literacy skills. These skills are important in all crisis situations, including the invasion of Ukraine.
	See Commitment 17 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to surface videos from authoritative sources in search results and recommendations.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube surfaces videos from authoritative sources in search results and recommendations. These authoritative sources are important in all crisis situations, including the invasion of Ukraine.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to provide features to enhance access to trusted information, including Information Panels, on YouTube.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube enhances access to trusted information, including information panels on topics prone to misinformation.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.

Google, on behalf of related services	
[Announced](#) plans at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) to expand Jigsaw's 'prebunking' campaign to Germany.	In the fall and winter of 2022, Google piloted [Jigsaw's 'prebunking' campaign](#) in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia, to preemptively fight against narratives scapegoating Ukrainian refugees. Jigsaw developed [a series of six short videos](#) prebunking then emerging disinformation narratives and the rhetorical tactics used to press them. These narratives were identified through interviews conducted with experts in Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, including Demagog, the Polish National Research Institute NASK, and One World in Schools. One video focused on narratives scapegoating Ukrainian refugees for the escalating cost of living while the other highlighted fearmongering over Ukrainian refugees' purported violent and dangerous nature. The initiative proved so effective that Google just [launched](#) a new prebunking campaign in Germany, in partnership with [Moonshot](#) and local experts with expertise in the content safety, media literacy, and misinformation in the German context: [Correctiv](#), [Alfred Landecker Foundation, Amadeu Antonio Foundation](#), [Das NETTZ](#), [klicksafe](#), and [Neue Deutsche Medienmacher*innen](#). The campaign focuses on commonly used disinformation techniques such as fearmongering and decontextualisation. In the next iteration of this report, Google will provide information on the expansion of Jigsaw's media literacy initiative to Ukraine utilising prebunking to combat the spread of misinformation online and increase resilience to common online manipulation methods.
	The pilot campaign was launched in September 2022 and ran until January 2023, reaching almost a third of the Polish, Czech and Slovak populations, garnering over 38 million views. The share of viewers who could correctly identify the misinformation tactics (fearmongering or scapegoating) increased by as much as 8 percentage points after viewing one of these videos.
Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts.	Access to authoritative information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google [worked](#) closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas, and to feature information on Search and Maps about shelter, humanitarian

	services, and aid points. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.
	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

Empowering the research community	

Google Search	
See more details about how Google Search provides access to researchers in the response to Commitment 26-28.	

YouTube	
YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may include content about the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.

Google, on behalf of related services	
Continued new long-term partnerships across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), a region considered highly vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda due to its geographic proximity to the war in Ukraine.	In the Baltics, Google entered into long-term partnership with the Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, two established and well-respected organisations, to provide funding to build on their impactful work towards increasing media literacy, building further resilience and actively tackling disinformation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Furthermore, Google partnered with the Charles University in Prague, the main research centre of the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO) project, to further expand its research into information disorders (such as misinformation, disinformation or clickbait), and work to increase the level of media and digital literacy in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia. |

	The [Civic Resilience Initiative](#) and the [Baltic Centre for Media Excellence](#) received €1.3 million in funding from Google as part of Google's commitment to invest $10M to address misinformation and disinformation surrounding the invasion of Ukraine As part of that commitment, Google also provided €1 million in funding for [CEDMO](#).
Forged partnerships with think tanks and civil society organisations to conduct region-specific research into misinformation and disinformation and rolled out [cash grants to support fact-checking](#) networks and nonprofits.	As an information company, Google takes its responsibility seriously to provide reliable, trustworthy information to people when they need it. A big part of the challenge is addressing misinformation spreading about the realities and facts of the invasion of Ukraine. Google committed funding to this effort, including new partnerships with think tanks and civil society organisations to conduct region-specific research into misinformation and disinformation, as well as cash grants to support fact-checking networks and nonprofits.
	[Techsoup Europe](#) received a $2.5 million [Google.org](#) grant to help civil society organisations across Central and Eastern Europe leverage technology to fight disinformation at scale. This grant is part of Google's commitment to invest $10M to address misinformation and disinformation surrounding the invasion of Ukraine.
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](#). This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
	See Commitments 26-28 for metrics on these efforts.
In 2024, Google kicked-off the second year of the [Trust & Safety (T&S) Research Awards](#), Google's academic grant program.	The [Trust & Safety Research Awards](#), which was launched in October 2023, provides unrestricted grants to support research efforts related to Trust & Safety in technology. This program, in partnership with University Relations, is one of Google's largest opportunities to partner with external researchers on priority trust & safety topics, including child safety, scams, AI, and misinformation. In its first year, Google received over 250 applications and funded nine projects

	with an EU-focus in priority areas including trusted flagging, the use of large language models (LLMs) for digital scams, and minority-targeted disinformation. New to the program in 2024, three office hours sessions were held with over 150 potential applicants asking questions about the program. Additional information on the Trust & Safety Research Awards can be found here. Similar to the Trust & Safety Research Awards program, Google launched the Google Academic Research Awards (GARA) program in June 2024. In each funding cycle, the GARA program will publish a series of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) focused on a diverse range of research areas within technology and computing. As of 27 June 2024, Google started accepting applications, globally.
	See Commitments 26-28 for details on these efforts.
Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate the intensified cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine. LetsData is one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program.	The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation. So Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate this challenge. LetsData offers AI radar against disinformation. It provides real-time media and social media monitoring in more than 50 countries, empowering state agencies, businesses and civil societies to proactively navigate risks and seize opportunities in the face of disinformation. Since launching, their AI-powered solution has experienced rapid growth, establishing operations in the U.S. while continuing to anchor their technology and product development in Europe. Now, they are one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program. This group of startups, from nine countries across Europe and North America, will get access to Google's tools, partners and practices to help them continue to scale — and ultimately make the world a safer place.
	See Commitment 28 for metrics on these efforts.
In February 2024, Google announced a second Google for Startups Ukraine	In March 2022, Google launched the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, which has gone on to provide $5 million in equity-free cash awards to 58 recipients. Startups supported by the

Support Fund, worth $10 million, to allocate equity-free cash awards throughout 2024 and 2025.	Ukraine Support Fund have received $15.8 million in follow-on funding, created 100% revenue growth and significantly increased their employment despite the war and hardships they have faced. For the second Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, announced during the H1 2024 reporting period, selected Ukraine-based startups will be announced on a rolling basis and will receive up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, as well as ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $300,000 in Cloud credits. This hands-on support is designed to help Ukrainian entrepreneurs maintain and grow their businesses, strengthen their community and build a foundation for post-war economic recovery. Applications will open later this year.
	Recipients will receive up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, as well as ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $300,000 in Cloud credits.
Empowering the fact-checking community	
Google Search	
See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
YouTube	
See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
Google, on behalf of related services	
Hosted Fighting Misinformation Online (FMO) event to discuss commitments to tackling Russian disinformation in and outside the CEE region.	The event was organised by Google and YouTube in partnership with the European University Institute, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, alongside with local organisations Demagog and Mixer, with almost 50 speakers from 19 countries.

	N/A
Google, including YouTube, partnered with organisations focused on media literacy through the Google News Initiative, including support of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Google also helped launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) to 'strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-2026).	See Commitments 30-32 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, partners with organisations to support media literacy and fact-checking, which may include content about the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
	See Commitments 30-32 for details on these efforts.
Paused the vast majority of commercial activity in Russia.	Google has paused activities including serving Google ads in Russia; advertising globally for advertisers based in Russia; Play's billing system (users cannot purchase apps or make in-app purchases); payment-related services including via Google Pay; Premium/paid YouTube features, and new Cloud sign ups. In 2023, in compliance with EU sanctions, Google stopped monetisation for Russia based creators, including views outside of Russia.
	Google is committed to complying with all applicable sanctions and trade compliance laws.

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
Israel-Gaza conflict

Overview

The terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent conflict in Gaza is tragically affecting and disrupting the lives of millions of people. Following the unfolding of these terrorist attacks, Google has actively worked to support humanitarian and relief efforts, ensure platforms and partnerships are responsive to the current crisis, and counter the threat of disinformation. Google identified a few areas of focus for addressing the ongoing crisis:

- Humanitarian and relief efforts;
- Supporting Israeli tech firms and Palestinian businesses; and
- Platforms and partnerships to tackle disinformation, hate speech, and graphic and terrorist content.

Humanitarian and relief efforts

Google, and Google's employees, have committed more than $8 million to nonprofits in both Israel and Palestine, providing relief to those affected. This includes more than $1 million raised by Google employees with company match and $1 million in donated Search Ads to nonprofits so they can better connect with people in need and provide information to those looking to help.

Google's employee giving campaign supports organisations such as Magen David Adom and Emotional First-Aid by Telephone & Internet (ERAN) for immediate relief to those impacted in Israel. Google is also committing an additional $3 million to NATAL for local emergency response, and psychological and emotional support for victims, children and families. In efforts to raise awareness and combat the rise of antisemitism. In addition to committing to non profits, Google also signed the ADL pledge to fight antisemitism.

Google's employee giving campaign also supports organisations like Palestine Red Crescent Society and UNICEF in the State of Palestine. Google has also commited an additional $3 million to aid organisations providing support for people in Gaza, including Save the Children, which is providing essentials — food, shelter, and psychological support. Google is continuing to monitor the crisis as it develops to provide further support.

Supporting Israeli tech firms and Palestinian businesses

Across Europe and Israel, Google is committed to supporting startups as they work at the forefront of innovation: striving to solve some of the most critical issues facing the world. These pioneering startups and businesses often struggle to access the support, expertise and tools they

need to help them scale. In light of the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google is investing $8 million to support Israeli tech firms and Palestinian businesses. Of that investment, Google is providing $4 million to support Israeli AI startups and offer access to Google's knowledge, expertise (e.g. Cloud support), and mentorship opportunities in Israel and $4 million to support Palestinian startups and businesses. In addition, Google has announced that it will provide loans and grants to 1,000 Palestinian small businesses in partnership with local and global non-profit organisations, and will also provide seed grants to 50 Palestinian tech startups in hopes to preserve 4,500 jobs and create additional job opportunities.

Platforms and partnerships
As the conflict continues, Google is committed to tackling disinformation, hate speech, graphic content and terrorist content by continuing to find ways to provide support through its products. For example, Google has deployed language capabilities to support emergency efforts including emergency translations, and localising Google content to help users, businesses and NGOs. Google has also pledged to help its partners in these extraordinary circumstances. For example, when schools closed in October 2023, the Ministry of Education in Israel used Meet as their core teach-from-home platform and Google provided support. Google has been in touch with Gaza-based partners and participants in its Palestine Launchpad program, its digital skills and entrepreneurship program for Palestinians, to try to support those who have been significantly impacted by this crisis.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the Israel-Gaza conflict.	No changes to Ads policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google Search		
Enhanced enforcement of existing policies	While Google Search relied on existing policies to address the information challenges	No changes to Search policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the

	posed by the Hamas attacks and Israel's response, Google Search gave special priority to reports of issues related to the crisis in recognition of the importance and urgency of the risks to human life.	Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Search continues to enforce all Google Search policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
YouTube		
Enforcement of existing policies, including YouTube's Hate Speech Policy	YouTube's Hate Speech Policy prohibits content denying, trivialising, or minimising violent historical events, including the 7 October Hamas attacks in Israel. YouTube relies on a variety of factors to determine whether a major violent event is covered, using guidance from outside experts and governing bodies to inform its approach.	No changes to YouTube Community Guidelines and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. YouTube continues to enforce all policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		
Google AdSense enforces the Dangerous or Derogatory Policy which does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group of people on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, or nationality.	In order to protect users and advertisers, Google requires that all publishers comply with Google Publisher Policies in order to monetise on AdSense. Due to the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google AdSense focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy. Under this policy, Google AdSense does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. Nor is content allowed that harasses, intimidates, or bullies an individual or group of individuals. In addition, content that threatens	

	or advocates for physical or mental harm to oneself or others is also not allowed. Google also does not allow content that seeks to exploit others, like extortion, blackmail.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Implementation of a [Sensitive Event](#)	Since 7 October 2023, Google Ads has taken several measures across its platforms in response to the Israel-Gaza conflict, including implementing a sensitive event to help prevent exploitative ads around this conflict. Content moderation on its platforms is a critical focus right now and Google Ads has and will continue to rigorously enforce its policies around hate speech, violence and shocking content.
	Google Ads often institutes sensitive events following natural disasters or other tragic events. When a sensitive event is declared, Google Ads does not allow ads that exploit or capitalise on these tragedies.
	Google does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence. Google does not allow ads that claim victims of a sensitive event were responsible for their own tragedy or similar instances of victim blaming; ads that claim victims of a sensitive event are not deserving of remedy or support.
	See SLI 2.1.1 for metrics on this policy.
Within the Inappropriate Content Policy, Google Advertising does not allow [Shocking Content](#).	Google does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
	Google does not allow promotions containing gratuitous portrayals of bodily fluids or waste.
	Google does not allow promotions containing obscene or profane language.
	Google does not allow promotions that are likely to shock or scare.

	See SLI 2.1.1 for metrics on this policy.
Google Advertising enforces the Misrepresentation Policy, which includes [Clickbait ads]().	Google does not allow ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic. Google also does not allow ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action.
	See SLI 2.1.1 for metrics on this policy.
No changes to the enforcement of Ads Policies as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict.	To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violate these policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks. Google Ads policy violations can lead to ad or asset disapproval, or account suspension.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Teams across the company are dedicating resources as part of a task-force to respond to the Israel-Gaza conflict and take quick measures as needed.	Google Advertising invests heavily in the enforcement of its policies. Google Advertising has a team of thousands working around the clock to create and enforce its policies at scale.
	See Commitments 1 and 2 for more details on the enforcement of Google Advertising's policies.
Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
[Israel Election Ads]()	Google supports responsible political advertising, and expects all political ads and destinations to comply with local legal requirements. This includes campaign and election laws and mandated election 'silence periods' for any geographic areas that they target. Google has different [requirements for political and election advertising]() based on region.

	In some regions, election ads may run only if the advertiser is verified by Google. In these regions, election ads are subject to disclosure requirements and targeting restrictions; see below for additional information. In other regions, there are restrictions on political ads. Ads may run as long as they are compliant with all Google Ads policies and local laws and regulations. Advertisers may run Israel Election Ads in Israel only if the advertiser completes Israel Election Ads verification. During verification, advertisers who want to run Israel Election Ads in Israel must disclose whether they are a candidate, current elected officeholder, political party or candidate list composed of one or more political parties for the Knesset. For these advertisers, all ads run in the verified account will be considered election ads. Advertisers may run Israel Election Ads outside of Israel only if the advertiser has completed either Election Ads or Advertiser Identity verification.
	N/A
Disclosure requirements for election advertising	All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required, including Israel, must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process. Advertisers who want to run Israel Election Ads in Israel must include disclaimers in their ads as required by Israeli law.
	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Restricted targeting for election ads	Only the following criteria may be used to target election ads: Geographic location (except radius around a location), age, gender, contextual targeting options (such as: ad placements, topics, keywords against sites, apps, pages and videos). All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads.
	N/A

| Disclosure requirements for synthetic content | Google Advertising believes that users should have information to make informed decisions when viewing election ads that contain synthetic content that has been digitally altered or generated. Accordingly, verified election advertisers in regions where verification is required, including Israel, must prominently disclose when their ads contain synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. This disclosure must be clear and conspicuous and must be placed in a location where it is likely to be noticed by users. This policy applies to image, video and audio content.

Ads that contain synthetic content altered or generated in such a way that is inconsequential to the claims made in the ad are exempt from these disclosure requirements. This includes editing techniques such as image resizing, cropping, colour or brightening corrections, defect correction (for example, 'red eye' removal) or background edits that do not create realistic depictions of actual events. |
| :--- | :--- |
| | Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports. |
| Political Advertising Transparency Report | Google Political Advertising Transparency Report includes only election ads, while the Ads Transparency Centre covers both election and non-election ads that are run by verified advertisers. In order to view the information provided for Israel Election Ads, please visit the Political Advertising Transparency Report for Israel. |
| | See Commitment 10 and 11 for more details on this effort. |
| Integrity of Services | |
| **Google Search** | |
| Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is closely monitoring relevant activity concerning the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information. | See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Team work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States. |

	See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube's teams have been working quickly to remove content that violates its policies including those pertaining to hate speech, violent extremism, violent or graphic content, harassment, and misinformation. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.	- Per YouTube's Hate Speech Policy, content that promotes violence or hatred against groups based on their ethnicity, nationality, race or religion is not allowed on YouTube. This includes Jewish, Muslim, and other religious or ethnic communities. - Per YouTube's Violent Extremist Policy, content that praises, promotes or in any way aids violent criminal organisations is prohibited. Additionally, content produced by designated terrorist organisations, such as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (U.S.), or organisation identified by the United Nations, is not allowed on YouTube. This includes content produced by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). - In addition, YouTube has a dedicated button underneath every video on YouTube to flag content with the option to mark it as 'promotes terrorism.' - Per YouTube's Violent or Graphic Content Policies, YouTube prohibits violent or gory content intended to shock or disgust viewers. Additionally, content encouraging others to commit violent acts against individuals or a defined group of people, including the Jewish, Muslim and other religious communities, is not allowed on YouTube. - Per YouTube's Harassment Policies, content that promotes harmful conspiracy theories or targets individuals based on their protected group status is not allowed on YouTube. Additionally, content that realistically simulates deceased minors or victims of deadly or well-documented major violent events describing their death or violence experienced, is not allowed on YouTube. - Per YouTube's Misinformation Policies, content containing certain types of misinformation that can cause real-world harm, including certain types of misattributed content, is not allowed on YouTube.

	As of 30 June 2024, following the terrorist attack by Hamas in Israel and the escalated conflict now underway in Israel and Gaza, YouTube has globally: ● Removed over 115,000 videos; ● Terminated over 5,500 channels; and ● Removed over 200 million comments.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is closely monitoring activity in Israel and Gaza with regards to the ongoing conflict, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been monitoring activity in Israel and Gaza. See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the TAG Bulletin Q1 2024 and TAG Bulletin Q2 2024.
Google, on behalf of related services	
Google's Priority Flagger Program	As part of Google's Priority Flaggers program, external trusted third parties, such as NGOs and government agencies, notify Google of harmful content, including related to misinformation. Google's content moderators review content flagged according to Google's Abuse and Content Policies. In H2 2023, Google reached 23 Misinformation Priority Flaggers in the EU. See Commitment 14 for more details on this effort.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. TAG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.	Throughout 2024, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. For example, in February 2024, TAG identified a campaign that was sharing content in English and Hebrew that was critical of the Israeli government and its actions in the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict. The campaign also shared content depicting alleged cyber attacks targeting Israeli organisations. For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q1 2024 TAG Bulletin and Q2 2024 TAG Bulletin.

	Please refer to the Q1 2024 TAG Bulletin and Q2 2024 TAG Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.
Empowering Users	
Google Search	
See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
YouTube	
YouTube is continuing to actively surface authoritative news content in search results for queries about Israel and Gaza, including through its breaking news and top news shelves.	YouTube's recommendation system is prominently surfacing news from authoritative sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates. YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves are surfacing at the top of search results related to the attacks in Israel and on the homepage, prominently featuring content from authoritative news sources.
	YouTube will explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding how YouTube connects viewers with high-quality news and information from authoritative sources for future reports.
A crisis resource panel was launched in YouTube search to provide timely information from Israeli authorities available in Hebrew, Arabic, and English.	From 8 October 2023 to 26 October 2023, YouTube launched a crisis resource panel to highlight authoritative and verified information from Israeli authorities for users in Israel. The crisis resource panel directed users towards resources like the Israeli National Emergency Portal.
	YouTube will explore opportunities to provide more granular information on this topic for future reports.

Empowering the research community	
Google Search	
Google established the Google Research Program in August 2023, which provides eligible EU researchers to apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube.	See Commitments 26 & 28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitments 26 & 28 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitment 26-28 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitments 26-28 for metrics on these efforts.
In 2024, Google kicked-off the second year of the Trust & Safety (T&S) Research Awards, Google's academic grant program.	The Trust & Safety Research Awards, which was launched in October 2023, provides unrestricted grants to support research efforts related to Trust & Safety in technology. This program, in partnership with University Relations, is one of Google's largest opportunities to partner with external researchers on priority trust & safety topics, including child safety,

	scams, AI, and misinformation. In its first year, Google received over 250 applications and funded nine projects with an EU-focus in priority areas including trusted flagging, the use of large language models (LLMs) for digital scams, and minority-targeted disinformation. New to the program in 2024, three office hours sessions were held with over 150 potential applicants asking questions about the program. Additional information on the Trust & Safety Research Awards can be found [here](#). Similar to the Trust & Safety Research Awards program, Google launched the Google Academic Research Awards (GARA) program in June 2024. In each funding cycle, the GARA program will publish a series of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) focused on a diverse range of research areas within technology and computing. As of 27 June 2024, Google started accepting applications, globally.
	See Commitments 26-28 for additional details on researcher support efforts.
Empowering the fact-checking community	
Google Search	
See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
YouTube	
See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
Google, on behalf of related services	

Google, including YouTube, partnered with organisations focused on media literacy through the Google News Initiative, including support of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). And Google helped launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) to 'strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-2026).	See Commitments 30-32 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, partners with organisations to support media literacy and fact-checking, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitments 30-32 for more details on these efforts.
Google contributed €25M to help launch the European Media & Information Fund (EMIF). In December 2023, the EMIF announced an application window for project proposals to urgently respond to the threats posed by disinformation on specific areas, including the Israel-Gaza conflict.	The EMIF is seeking project proposals that 'combine best journalistic practices, outcomes from fact-checking activities, and analytical frameworks from leading research.' This application window was open until 5 February 2024 and its total indicative allocation is €750,000. Learn more here.
	See Commitment 30 for more details on these efforts.

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election
European Elections

Overview

In elections and other democratic processes, people want access to authoritative information and a broad range of perspectives. High-quality information helps people make informed decisions when voting and counteracts abuse by bad actors. Consistent with its broader approach to elections around the world, during the EU Parliamentary elections in June 2024, Google was committed to supporting this democratic process by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training.

To do so, Google will continue its efforts in 2024 to:
- Safeguard its platforms and disrupt the spread of misinformation;
- Inform voters by surfacing high-quality information;
- Equip campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training; and
- Help people navigate AI-generated content.

Across Google and YouTube, various teams support democratic processes by connecting people to election information like practical tips on how to register to vote or providing authoritative information about candidates. This year, a number of key elections are taking place around the world. In June 2024, voters across the 27 Member States of the European Union took to the polls to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). Google was committed to supporting this democratic process by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. Across its efforts, Google also has an increased focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and the part it can play in the misinformation landscape — while also leveraging AI models to augment Google's abuse-fighting efforts.

Safeguarding Google platforms and disrupting the spread of misinformation

To better secure its products and prevent abuse, Google continues to enhance its enforcement systems and to invest in Trust & Safety operations — including at its Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) for Content Responsibility in Dublin, dedicated to online safety in Europe and around the world. Google also continues to partner with the wider ecosystem to combat misinformation.
- **Enforcing Google policies and using AI models to fight abuse at scale:** Google has long-standing policies that inform how it approaches areas like manipulated media, hate and harassment, and incitement to violence — along with policies around demonstrably false claims that could undermine democratic processes, for example in YouTube's Community Guidelines and its Political Content

for advertisers. To help enforce Google policies, Google's AI models are enhancing its abuse-fighting efforts. With recent advances in Google's Large Language Models (LLMs), Google is building faster and more adaptable enforcement systems that enable us to remain nimble and take action even more quickly when new threats emerge.

- **Working with the wider ecosystem on countering misinformation:** Since Google's inaugural contribution of €25 million to help launch the European Media & Information Fund, an effort designed to strengthen media literacy and fight misinformation across Europe, 70 projects have been funded across 24 countries so far, covering topics ranging from fact-checking during elections and critical events, to improving media literacy of populations who are typically harder to reach. Google also supports the Global Fact Check Fund as well as numerous civil society, research and media literacy efforts from partners, including Google.org grantee TechSoup Europe, as well as Civic Resilience Initiative, Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, CEDMO and more. In addition, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that worked together to fact-check the European Parliamentary Elections. Elections24Check also created a comprehensive, first-of-its-kind database of election related disinformation, claims and narratives.
- **Prebunking to preempt manipulation online:** Google and Jigsaw announced a prebunking initiative ahead of the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections. The initiative kicked off on 15 May and lasted 5 weeks. It was the largest ever prebunking initiative on social media in the world to date. Three prebunking videos were created to address common misinformation tactics. The videos were made available in all EU languages (plus Russian, Arabic and Turkish) and were amplified with ads in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Belgium.

Helping people navigate AI-generated content

Like any emerging technology, AI presents new opportunities as well as challenges. For example, generative AI makes it easier than ever to create new content, but it can also raise questions about trustworthiness of information. Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate content that was AI-generated. Overall, harmful altered or synthetic political content did not appear to be widespread on Google's platforms. Measures that helped mitigate that risk include:

- **Ads disclosures:** Google expanded its Political Content Policies to require advertisers to disclose when their election ads include synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. Google's ads policies already prohibit the use of manipulated media to mislead people, like deep fakes or doctored content.
- **Content labels on YouTube:** YouTube's Misinformation Policies prohibit technically manipulated content that misleads users and could pose a serious risk of egregious harm — and YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created realistic altered or synthetic content, and will display a label that indicates for people when the content they are watching is synthetic. For sensitive content, including election related content, that contains realistic altered or synthetic material, the label appears on the video itself and in the video description.

- **A responsible approach to Generative AI products**: In line with its principled and responsible approach to its Generative AI products like Gemini, Google has prioritised testing across safety risks ranging from cybersecurity vulnerabilities to misinformation and fairness. Out of an abundance of caution on such an important topic, Google is restricting the types of election-related queries for which Gemini will return responses.
- **Provide users with additional context:** 'About This Image' in Search helps people assess the credibility and context of images found online.
- **Digital watermarking:** SynthID, a tool in beta from Google DeepMind, directly embeds a digital watermark into AI-generated images and audio. Google recently expanded SynthID's capabilities to watermark AI-generated text in the Gemini app and web experience, as well as to video in Veo, Google's recently announced and most capable generative video model.
- **Industry collaboration**: Google joined the C2PA coalition and standard, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content. Alongside other leading tech companies, Google also pledged to help prevent deceptive AI-generated imagery, audio or video content from interfering with this year's global elections. The 'Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections' is a set of commitments to deploy technology countering harmful AI-generated content meant to deceive voters.

Informing voters surfacing high-quality information

In the build-up to elections, people need useful, relevant and timely information to help them navigate the electoral process. Here are some of the ways Google makes it easy for people to find what they need, and which were deployed during the European Parliamentary elections:
- **Voting details and Election Results on Google Search:** Google collaborated with the European Parliament to build a How to Vote and How to Register feature for the European Parliament elections, which featured aggregated voting information from Electoral Commissions and authorities in the 27 EU Member States on Google Search. From the beginning of April through the end of the election, when people searched for topics like 'how to vote,' they found details such as ID requirements, registration, voting deadlines, voting abroad and guidance for different means of voting, like in person or via mail. In addition, Google also surfaced authoritative election results from the European Parliament via dpa-infocom, a leading German press agency, in an Election Results feature.
- **Authoritative Information on YouTube:** For news and information related to elections, YouTube's systems prominently surface content from authoritative sources, on the YouTube homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube also displays information panels at the top of search results and below videos to provide additional context from authoritative sources. For example, YouTube may surface various election information panels above search results or on videos related to election candidates, parties or voting.
- **Ongoing transparency on Election Ads**: All advertisers who wish to run election ads in the EU on Google's platforms are required to go through a verification process and have an in-ad disclosure that clearly shows who paid for the ad. These ads are published in

Google's Political Ads Transparency Report, where anyone can look up information such as how much was spent and where it was shown. Google also limits how advertisers can target election ads.

Equipping campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training
As elections come with increased cybersecurity risks, Google works hard to help high-risk users, such as campaigns and election officials, civil society and news sources, improve their security in light of existing and emerging threats, and to educate them on how to use Google's products and services.

- **Security tools for campaign and election teams**: Google offers free services like its Advanced Protection Program — Google's strongest set of cyber protections — and Project Shield, which provides unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Google also partners with Possible, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Deutschland sicher im Netz (DSIN) to scale account security training and to provide security tools including Titan Security Keys, which defend against phishing attacks and prevent bad actors from accessing users' Google Accounts.
- **Tackling coordinated influence operations**: Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and the team at Mandiant Intelligence help identify, monitor and tackle emerging threats, ranging from coordinated influence operations to cyber espionage campaigns against high-risk entities. Google reports on actions taken in its quarterly TAG bulletin, and meets regularly with government officials and others in the industry to share threat information and suspected election interference. Mandiant also helps organisations build holistic election security programs and harden their defences with comprehensive solutions, services and tools, including proactive exposure management, proactive intelligence threat hunts, cyber crisis communication services and threat intelligence tracking of information operations. A recent publication from the team gives an overview of the global election cybersecurity landscape, designed to help election organisations tackle a range of potential threats.
- **Helpful resources at euelections.withgoogle**: Google launched an EU-specific hub at euelections.withgoogle with resources and trainings to help campaigns connect with voters and manage their security and digital presence. In advance of the European Parliamentary elections in 2019, Google conducted in-person and online security training for more than 2,500 campaign and election officials, and, for the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections, Google built on these numbers by directly reaching 3,500 campaigners through in-person trainings and briefings on election integrity and tackling misinformation across the region.

Google is committed to working with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union — building on its commitments made in the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational

responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Political Content Policy	In mid-November 2023, Google Advertising updated its Political Content Policy to require that all verified election advertisers in regions where verification is required (e.g. the EU) must prominently disclose when their ads contain synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. See QRE 1.2.1 for more information on this policy change.	Google Advertising believes that users should have information to make informed decisions when viewing election ads that contain synthetic content that has been digitally altered or generated. Accordingly, verified election advertisers in regions where verification is required, must prominently disclose when their ads contain synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. This disclosure must be clear and conspicuous and must be placed in a location where it is likely to be noticed by users. This policy applies to image, video and audio content.
Election Ads Policies	For additional information on changes made to policies related to election ads prior to H1 2023, refer to QRE 5.1.1. In May 2024, Google Advertising updated the policy for EU Election Ads under the Political Content Policy to include restrictions in Italy to include that 'Advertisers must comply with applicable local electoral laws, including pausing ads as required during periods defined by law as silence periods. Google does not allow EU Election Ads, as defined by	Google Advertising supports responsible political advertising, and it has consistently expected all political ads and destinations to comply with local legal requirements. This includes campaign and election laws and election 'silence periods' for any geographic areas they target. Google requires all advertisers to fully comply with applicable laws and regulations, including local electoral laws. Advertisers are expected to familiarise themselves with the

	Ads' policies, to serve in Italy during a silence period.'	local law and regulations for any location their ads target.
Misrepresentation Policy	In March 2024, Google Advertising updated the Unacceptable business practices portion of the Misrepresentation Policy to include enticing users to part with money or information by impersonating or falsely implying affiliation with or endorsement by a public figure, brand, or organisation. Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in March 2024 for advertisers outside of France. For advertisers in France, Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in April 2024.	Toward the end of 2023 and into 2024, Google Advertising faced a targeted campaign of ads featuring the likeness of public figures to scam users, often through the use of deep fakes. When Google Advertising detected this threat, it created a dedicated team to respond immediately. It also pinpointed patterns in the bad actors' behaviour, trained its automated enforcement models to detect similar ads and began removing them at scale. Google Advertising also updated its Misrepresentation Policy to better enable it to rapidly suspend the accounts of bad actors.
Google Search		
N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube		
Synthetic or realistic content disclosures and content labels	In March 2024, YouTube introduced a new tool in Creator Studio requiring creators to disclose to viewers when realistic content is made with altered or synthetic media, including generative AI. YouTube also applies labels to content indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic, as well as a more prominent label for certain types of content about sensitive topics, such as elections.	Generative AI has the potential to unlock creativity on YouTube and transform the experience for viewers and creators on YouTube's platform. But just as important, these opportunities must be balanced with YouTube's responsibility to protect its community. All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated. To help keep viewers informed about the content they are viewing, YouTube requires

	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube will approach responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to [future elections]().	creators to disclose content that is meaningfully altered or synthetically generated when it seems realistic.
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		
Google Ads and AdSense enforces policies that prohibit ad content as it may relate to politics and elections that deceive users.	AdSense policies that disrupt the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors related to politics in the AdSense ecosystem that publishers must adhere to include [Manipulated Media]() and [Deceptive Practices](). For more information on these policies, refer to QRE 1.1.1. Google Ads provides a way for advertisers and businesses to reach new customers as they search on Google for words related to an advertiser's business, or browse websites with related themes. However, Google Ads enforces policies that do not allow ads or destinations related to politics that display Inappropriate Content or Misrepresentation. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Inappropriate Content include the Sensitive Event Policy and Hacked Political Materials Policy. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Misrepresentation include the Coordinated Deceptive Practices and Manipulated Media Policy.	
	Please refer to QRE 1.1.1 and QRE 2.1.1 for more details on Google Ads Misrepresentation Policy and Inappropriate Content Policy. Refer to SLI 2.1.1 for metrics related to these policies.	
Political Advertising		
Google Advertising		
Google maintains the EU Political Advertising on Google Transparency Report to show	Google maintains the EU Political Advertising on Google Transparency Report to show voters who is purchasing election ads on Google in the EU and how much money is being spent. This	

voters who is purchasing election ads on Google in the EU and how much money is being spent.	report includes a searchable election Ad Library that provides valuable data such as which ad had the highest impressions, what the latest election ads running on the Google platform are, and how the ads are targeted in terms of age, gender, and location.
	The EU Political Advertising on Google Transparency Report includes data on election ads published through Google Ads and Google Display & Video 360 starting from 21 March 2019. This data is continually updated.
See Political Advertising Chapter in EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for information on political advertising related to EU Elections.	See Political Advertising Chapter in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for information on political advertising related to EU Elections.
	See Political Advertising Chapter in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report.
Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Search works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. Search policies are enforced globally.	See Commitment 14-15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Search's policies are enforced globally, including during the EU Parliamentary Elections. Search continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updates to policies can be found here.
	See Commitment 14-15 for metrics on these efforts.
Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Search will approach responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to future elections.
	See Commitment 15 for more details on these efforts.

| Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information. | See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world. |
| | Search will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding future elections in future reports. |

YouTube	
YouTube works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.	YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updates policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.
	As of 9 June 2024, YouTube has terminated over 1,000 channels and removed over 140 EU election-related videos for violating its policies, including Community Guidelines. Over 60% of those removed videos were taken down before they had 100 views.
Ahead of the EU Parliamentary Elections, YouTube introduced new updates to help viewers understand when they are watching a video that contains realistic altered or synthetic content. Creators are now required to disclose when they upload this type of content, after which YouTube adds a transparency label so that viewers have this important context.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube approaches responsible AI innovation, which were applied to elections, like the EU Parliamentary Elections.
	From the week leading up to and week following the EU election (between 30 May and 16 June 2024), the 'altered or synthetic' label was shown more than 40 million times on the video player across the EU.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world.
	As of 9 June 2024, through investigations into coordinated influence operations in the EU as part of proactive coverage for the EU Parliamentary elections, YouTube terminated 240 channels.

Google, on behalf of related services	
In February 2024, Google signed the 'Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections' pledging to work collaboratively on tools to detect and address online distribution of AI content, drive educational campaigns, and provide transparency, among other concrete steps along with other leading technology companies.	Google signed this accord as a voluntary framework and committed to taking action to advance the seven principal goals. Additionally, Google committed to the following steps in 2024: • Developing and implementing technology to mitigate risks related to Deceptive AI Election content; • Assessing models in scope of this accord to understand the risks they may present regarding Deceptive AI Election Content; • Seeking to detect the distribution of Deceptive AI election content; • Seeking to appropriately address Deceptive AI Election Content that is detected; • Fostering cross-industry resilience to Deceptive AI Election Content; • Providing transparency to the public; • Continuing to engage with a diverse set of global civil society organisations, academics; and • Supporting efforts to foster public awareness and all-of-society resilience.
	Google will continue to explore opportunities to support transparency regarding use of AI in future elections.
Google's Priority Flagger Program provided additional monitoring for potentially harmful content related to the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections.	Google's Priority Flagger Program provides channels for participating organisations – government agencies and non-governmental organisations – to notify Google of potentially harmful content on certain products that may violate specific policies, which it then prioritises for review.
	See Commitment 14 for more details on this effort.
Google helped develop the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) for the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections to streamline the exchange of information between civil society	The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the code of practice to ensure rapid and effective cooperation and communication between them ahead and during the election period.

organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms.	The RRS allowed non-platform Signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies. The RRS also provided an opportunity for platform Signatories to provide feedback - such as on broader trends - to the EU CoP Permanent Task-forceWorking Group with Member State authorities, independent experts and civil society organisations.
	Related to the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections, YouTube received six notifications through the Rapid Response System (RSS) escalation channel. Google did not receive any notifications for Search or Ads through the RRS escalation channel. This indicates that Google's existing public flagging channels are capable of addressing concerns about how to raise escalations.
In an effort to equip election campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training, Google's Project Shield provides free and unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks - a method of censorship and intimidation.	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.
	During the EU Parliamentary elections (6 June 2024 to 9 June 2024): • Project Shield saw a higher number of DDoS attacks against Project Shield beneficiaries compared to previous elections. • Poland received the most attacks, followed by Ireland, and then Romania. • The largest number of attacks was seen on 9 June 2024, and the single largest attack was also observed on the same day.
Google participated in the EU Commission's stress test simulation to test its readiness against election manipulation and interference.	As part of its efforts to support the 2024 European Parliamentary elections, Google provided additional information and data through briefings and other engagements to provide information about its approach. For example, Google participated in the EU Commission's stress test, a simulation exercise with platforms, Digital Services Coordinators, and civil society organisations to test readiness against election manipulation and interference in relation to the European election. This simulation features a series of fictitious scenarios based on past

	experiences with attempts of election manipulation and interference, as well as cyber-enabled information manipulation and hybrid threats.
	Google will continue to explore opportunities to ensure the integrity of elections across its platforms in the EU.

Empowering Users	
Google Search	
In 2024, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality and authoritative information to voters.	See Commitment 14-15 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report.
	See Commitment 14-15 for metrics on these efforts.
Users often see a Knowledge Panel on the Search Results page for searches about people and organisations—a box with an overview of key information (e.g. candidates and parties) to help them go deeper. See here for more information.	Search is committed to providing timely and authoritative information on Google Search to help voters understand, navigate, and participate in democratic processes. Through its products, Google Search hopes to connect users with the civic information that they need. Find more information here.
	Google Search will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information regarding knowledge panels for candidates and parties.
Search launched a weekly EU Google Trends Elections Newsletter, featuring EU-wide analysis of Search Trends on parties, candidates, and political topics, as well as the Google Trends Elections Hub featuring real-time charts that provide an overview of how Search interest in the parties, candidates and political topics are evolving, based on Google Trends data.	The newsletter aims to provide external stakeholders, including media and EU policymakers, with in-depth analysis and insights on search trends for parties, candidates, and political topics. Each edition of the newsletter includes an analysis of major geographic trends, comparisons between current and previous election cycles and highlights the top searched election and voting questions as the election approaches. Additionally, to help give insight into the issues and topics voters want to learn more about, Google Search launched a Google Trends Elections Hub for the European Parliamentary Elections, with EU-wide Search Trends as well as country-level data for Germany, France, Poland and Spain. The hub features real-time charts that provide an overview of how Search

	interest in the parties, candidates and political topics are evolving, based on Google Trends data.
	The 2024 EU Parliamentary elections was one of the top trending topics worldwide between 6 June and 9 June, which gives a sense of how much the topic moved searches in and outside of Europe. In addition, the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections was the most searched EU Election across the EU since 2004, when the Google Trends series began, which indicates the unique level of interest this election had.
Leading up to and during the 2024 EU Parliamentary Election, Google Search deployed 'How to Vote','How to Register', and Election Results features to help users prepare for the election and access authoritative election information.	Google collaborated with the European Parliament to build a How to Vote and How to Register feature for the European Parliament elections, which featured aggregated voting information from Electoral Commissions and authorities in the 27 EU Member States on Google Search and across 22 languages. From the beginning of April through the end of the election, when people searched for topics like 'how to vote,' they found details such as ID requirements, registration, voting deadlines, voting abroad and guidance for different means of voting, like in person or via mail. In addition, Google also surfaced authoritative election results from the European Parliament via dpa-infocom, a leading German press agency, in an Election Results feature.
	The 'How to Vote' and 'How to Register' features for the EU Parliamentary elections were seen over 115 million times. At its peak on 9 June, the EU Parliamentary 'Election Results' feature represented 10% of Search traffic in the EU.
YouTube	

YouTube's systems prioritise connecting viewers with high-quality news and information from authoritative sources, including events such as the EU Parliamentary elections.	YouTube's [recommendation system](#) prominently surfaces news from authoritative sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates. YouTube's [Top News and Breaking News shelves](#) surface at the top of search results, prominently featuring content from authoritative news sources, which may include information about the EU Parliamentary elections.
	YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding this topic in future reports.
Election information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about election related content they are viewing.	Information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.
	As of 3 July 2024: ● YouTube's election results information panels and public service announcements (PSAs) have been collectively shown over 985 million times across the EU. ● YouTube featured election-related info panels and PSAs, including voter education, candidates, and election results, over 1.1 billion times across the EU. ● YouTube voter education PSAs and information panels, which helped people learn how to vote and how to register, were collectively shown across the EU over 300 million times.
Google on behalf of related services	

Before the European elections in June 2024, the AFP provided resources for journalists to raise awareness of disinformation and actions to tackle it. The Google News Initiative supports the AFP's efforts to raise awareness of disinformation and promote media literacy amongst users, including their efforts related to the European elections.	In the run up to the European elections in June, AFP provided resources for journalists to raise awareness of disinformation and actions to tackle it. The global news agency published a series of short videos on their award-winning YouTube playlist 'AFP Fact Check: How to verify information online' in at least eight European languages and a three-part online course in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese on tackling disinformation during elections. AFP's scaled training curriculum, courses and videos are proudly supported by the Google News Initiative.
	See Commitment 17 for metrics on these efforts.
In 2024, Google announced its EU prebunking campaign ahead of parliamentary elections. The campaign – which teaches audiences how to spot common manipulation techniques before they encounter them via short video ads on social media – kicked off in May 2024 in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Poland.	Google announced a prebunking initiative ahead of the European Parliamentary Elections to bolster media literacy. The effort, which kicked off on 15 May and lasted five weeks, focused on techniques used to advance disinformation including decontextualisation, scapegoating and discrediting through short video ads on social media in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Poland. It was the largest ever prebunking initiative on social media in the world to date. The videos are also translated and available in all EU languages along with Arabic, Russian and Turkish, and were amplified with ads in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Belgium.
	The initiative reached over 120 million unique viewers in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Belgium. In addition, about 1.14 million people viewed media literacy resources from fact-checkers, the European Parliament, EDMO, and media and civil society partners who were featured on prebunking sites.
Google partnered with ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank, to empower young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities.	With the voting age lowered to 16+ in some European countries, more young people can participate in the democratic process. To support them, Google.org is awarding a $1 million grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank. The grant funded youth-led hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018.

	See Commitment 17 for more details on these metrics.
To help give insight into the issues and topics voters want to learn more about, Google launched a Google Trends Elections Hub for the European Parliamentary Elections, with EU-wide Search Trends as well as country-level data for Germany, France, Poland and Spain.	The hub features real-time charts that provide an overview of how Search interest in the parties, candidates and political topics are evolving, based on Google Trends data.
	Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.

Empowering the Research Community	
Google Search	
Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.
	Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the EU parliamentary elections.
	YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding this topic in future reports.
Google on behalf of related services	

As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](#). This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26-28 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the upcoming EU Parliamentary elections.
	See Commitments 26-28 for metrics on these efforts.
Google regularly undertakes stakeholder engagement to discuss Google's election preparedness.	Google's consultations with civil society organisations, academics and other relevant subject matter experts serve to both inform and share its resources and technologies. In advance of the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections in particular, Google hosted and sponsored events across Europe - including Brussels, Warsaw, Berlin, Italy and elsewhere - to convene policymakers, civil society, media and experts on election integrity and tackling misinformation. The Brussels Fighting Misinformation Online event, part of Google's flagship event series in partnership with the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, convened a special European elections format where the focus was on AI and elections integrity and featured workshops, panels, demos, trainings and keynotes.
	See QRE 30.1.1 for more details on Google's event series in partnership with the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community	
Google Search	
See Google on behalf of related services below.	See Google on behalf of related services below.
	See Google on behalf of related services below.
YouTube	
See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.

	See section 'Google, on behalf of related services' below.
Google on behalf of related services	
Google, including YouTube, partnered with organisations focused on media literacy through the Google News Initiative, including support of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). And Google helped launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) to 'strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-2026).	See Commitments 30-32 in the EU Code of Practice Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, partners with organisations to support media literacy and fact-checking, which may include content about the upcoming EU Parliamentary elections.
	See Commitments 30-32 for more details on these metrics.
Google funded fact-checking efforts for the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections.	Google issued a grant to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network to build a coalition of 40+ fact-checking organisations to fact-check the EU parliamentary elections in 2024. The sum of the grant is €1.5M funded by Google and YouTube.
	See Commitments 30-32 for more details on these metrics.
Google contributed €25M to help launch the European Media & Information Fund (EMIF). In December 2023, the EMIF announced an application window for project proposals to urgently respond to the threats posed by disinformation on specific areas, including the European Parliament 2024 Elections.	The EMIF is seeking project proposals that 'combine best journalistic practices, outcomes from fact-checking activities, and analytical frameworks from leading research.' This application window is open until 5 February 2024 and its total indicative allocation is €750,000. Learn more here.
	See Commitment 30 for more details on these efforts.
In March 2024, Google, including YouTube, announced a €1.5 million contribution to the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to launch Elections24Check, a	To support cross-border collaboration, Elections24Check created a comprehensive database of election related disinformation, claims and narratives — the first open database of its kind which supports research and fact-checking around the world. Participating fact-checking

| coalition of 40+ news and fact-checking organisations, with coverage across Europe, that works together to fact-check the 2024 European Parliamentary Elections. | organisations not only cover almost the entire EU but also the wider community of neighbouring European countries.

The coalition members have access to [new beta features](#) in [Fact Check Explorer](#) which allow organisations to search fact-checks by image in addition to text — increasingly important with the creation of more imagery made with generative AI. Google is also providing training on how to see the context and timeline of an image to understand when it was first indexed by Google and how it has been used since, which helps trace the provenance and history of an image across the web. |
| | A [final report](#) concludes 46 organisations working across 36 countries contributed over three thousand articles into a collaborative database. 'The project met its ambitious goals and established a new standard for this collaboration between fact-checking organisations, significantly impacting the European community.' |