Code of Conduct on Disinformation – Report by Google Ireland Limited ('Google') for the period of 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025

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Executive summary

Google's mission is to organise the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful. To deliver on this mission, and as technology evolves, helping users find useful, relevant and high-quality information across our services is of utmost importance.

Since Google was founded, Google's product, policy, and content enforcement decisions have been guided by the following three principles:

1. **We value openness and accessibility:** We lean towards keeping content accessible by providing access to an open and diverse information ecosystem.

2. **We respect user choice:** If users search for content that is not illegal or prohibited by our policies, they should be able to find it.

3. **We build for everyone:** Our services are used around the world by users from different cultures, languages, and backgrounds, and at different stages in their lives. We take the diversity of our users into account in policy development and policy enforcement decisions.

With these principles in mind, Google has long invested in ranking systems and has teams around the world working to connect people with high-quality content; in developing and enforcing rules that prohibit harmful behaviours and content on Google services; and in innovative ways to provide context to users when they might need it most.

How companies like Google address information quality concerns has an impact on society and on the trust users place in our services. We are cognisant that these are complex issues, affecting all of society, which no single actor is in a position to fully tackle on their own. That is why we have welcomed the multi-stakeholder approach put forward by the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

Alongside our participation in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation, we continue to work closely with regulators to ensure that our services appropriately comply with the EU Digital Services Act (EU DSA), in full respect of EU fundamental rights such as freedom of expression.

The work of supporting a healthy information ecosystem is never finished and we remain committed to it. This is in our interest and the interest of our users.

This report includes metrics and narrative detail for Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising users in the European Union (EU), and covers the period from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025.

Updates to highlight in this report include (but are not limited to):

- **2025 Elections across EU Member States:** During the reporting period, voters cast their ballots in Moldova, Czech Republic, Portugal, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Google supported these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse, and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training. In addition, Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that helped people navigate political content that was AI-generated, including ad disclosures, content labels on YouTube, and digital watermarking tools.

- **Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI):** In H1 2025, we announced new AI safeguards to help protect against misuse. We introduced SynthID Detector, a verification portal to identify AI-generated content made with Google AI. The portal, which we have rolled out to early testers, provides detection capabilities across different modalities in one place, and provides essential transparency in the rapidly evolving landscape of generative media.

  - When we launched SynthID — a state-of-the-art tool that embeds imperceptible watermarks and enables the identification of AI-generated content — our aim was to provide a suite of novel technical solutions to help minimise misinformation and misattribution.

  - SynthID not only preserves the content's quality, it acts as a robust watermark that remains detectable even when the content is shared or undergoes a range of transformations. While originally focused on AI-generated imagery only, we have since expanded SynthID to Include AI-generated text, audio and video content, including content generated by our Gemini, Imagen, Lyria and Veo models. Over 10 billion pieces of content have already been watermarked with SynthID.

  - **How SynthID Detector works:** When you upload an image, audio track, video or piece of text created using Google's AI tools, the portal will scan the media for a SynthID watermark. If a watermark is detected, the portal will highlight specific portions of the content most likely to be watermarked. For audio, the portal pinpoints specific segments where a SynthID watermark is detected, and for images, it indicates areas where a watermark is most likely.

- In addition to our continued work and investment in new tools, we are also committed to working with the greater ecosystem to help others benefit from and improve on the advances we are making. As such, we have open-sourced SynthID text watermarking through our updated Responsible Generative AI Toolkit. Underpinning our advancements in AI, as a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), we collaborate with Adobe, Microsoft, OpenAI, Meta, startups, and many others to build and implement the newest version (2.2) of the coalition's technical standard, Content Credentials. This version is more secure against a wider range of tampering attacks due to stricter technical requirements for validating the history of the content's provenance.

Google has been [working on AI](#) for over a decade to solve society's biggest challenges and also power the Google [services people use every day](#). The progress in large-scale AI models (including generative AI) has sparked additional discussion about the social impacts of AI and raised concerns on topics such as disinformation. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and first published [AI Principles](#) in 2018 to guide our work. Google's robust internal governance focuses on responsibility throughout the AI development lifecycle, covering model development, application deployment, and post-launch monitoring. Through our philanthropic arm, Google.org, we have [supported organisations](#) that are using AI to tackle important societal issues. Google Search has published [guidance](#) on AI-generated content, outlining its approach to maintaining a high standard of information quality and the overall helpfulness of content on Search. To help enhance information quality across its services, Google continuously works to integrate new innovations in watermarking, metadata, and other techniques into its latest generative models. Google has also joined other leading AI companies to jointly commit to advancing responsible practices in the development of artificial intelligence which will support efforts by the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and national governments. Going forward we will continue to report and expand upon Google developed AI tools and are committed to advance bold and responsible AI, to maximise AI's benefits and minimise its risks.

Lastly, the contents of this report should be read with the following context in mind:

- This report discusses the key approaches across the following Google services when it comes to addressing disinformation: Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising.
- For chapters of the Code that involve the same actions across all three services (e.g. participation in the Permanent Task-force or in development of the Transparency Centre), we respond as 'Google, on behalf of related services'.
- This report follows the structure and template laid out by the Code's Permanent Task-force, organised around Commitments and Chapters of the Code.
- Unless otherwise specified, metrics provided cover activities and actions during the period from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025.
- The data provided in this report is subject to a range of factors, including product changes and user settings, and so is expected to fluctuate over the time of the reporting period. As Google continues to evolve its approach, in part to better address user and regulatory needs, the data reported here could vary substantially over time.
- We are continuously working to improve the safety and reliability of our services. We are not always in a position to pre-announce specific launch dates, details or timelines for upcoming improvements, and therefore may reply 'no' when asked whether we can disclose future plans for Code implementation measures in the coming reporting period. This 'no' should be understood in the context that we are constantly working to improve safety and reliability and may in fact launch relevant changes without the ability to pre-announce.
- This report is filed concurrently with two 'crisis reports' about our response to the Israel-Gaza conflict and to the war in Ukraine. Additionally, an annex on Google's response toward the recent elections in Moldova, Czech Republic, Portugal, Ireland, and the Netherlands is included in this report.

- The term 'disinformation' in this report refers to the definition included in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

Google looks forward to continuing to work together with other stakeholders in the EU to address challenges related to disinformation.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Google Advertising[1]	Google Search	YouTube	Google, on behalf of related services
	II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements				
1	Measure 1.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 1.5	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	☑	☐	☐	☐
2	Measure 2.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 2.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	☑	☐	☐	☐
3	Measure 3.1	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 3.2	☑	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 3.3	☑	☐	☐	☐
	III. Political Advertising				
4	Measure 4.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 4.2	*Not subscribed*			
5	Measure 5.1	*Not subscribed*			
6	Measure 6.1	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.2	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.3	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.4	*Not subscribed*			
	Measure 6.5	*Not subscribed*			

[1] ***Note:*** *Google Advertising refers to both Google Ads and Google AdSense where appropriate. Within the body of the report, 'Google Advertising' is used to refer to both services, whereas the individual service will be named if a statement is only applicable to Google Ads or Google AdSense.*

7	Measure 7.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 7.2	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 7.3	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 7.4	*Not subscribed*				
8	Measure 8.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 8.2	*Not subscribed*				
9	Measure 9.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 9.2	*Not subscribed*				
10	Measure 10.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 10.2	*Not subscribed*				
11	Measure 11.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 11.2	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 11.3	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 11.4	*Not subscribed*				
12	Measure 12.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 12.2	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 12.3	*Not subscribed*				
13	Measure 13.1	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 13.2	*Not subscribed*				
	Measure 13.3	*Not subscribed*				
IV. Integrity of Services						
14	Measure 14.1	☐	☑	☑	☐	
	Measure 14.2	☐	☑	☑	☐	
	Measure 14.3	☐	☑	☑	☐	
15	Measure 15.1	☐	☑	☑	☐	
	Measure 15.2	☐	☑	☑	☐	
16	Measure 16.1	☐	☑	☑	☐	
	Measure 16.2	☐	☐	☑	☐	
V. Empowering users						

		Blue	Orange	Yellow	Green
17	Measure 17.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 17.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 17.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
18	Measure 18.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 18.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 18.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 19.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
20	Measure 20.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 20.2	Not subscribed			
21	Measure 21.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 21.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 21.3	Not subscribed			
22	Measure 22.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.4	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.5	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.6	Not subscribed			
	Measure 22.7	☐	☑	☑	☐
23	Measure 23.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 23.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☐	☐	☑	☐
25	Measure 25.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 25.2	Not subscribed			

VI. Empowering the research community

		Blue	Orange	Yellow	Green
26	Measure 26.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 26.2	☐	☐	☑	☐
	Measure 26.3	☐	☑	☑	☐

27	Measure 27.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 27.4	Not subscribed			
28	Measure 28.1	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.2	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.3	☐	☑	☑	☐
	Measure 28.4	☐	☑	☑	☐
29	Measure 29.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 29.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 29.3	Not subscribed			
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
30	Measure 30.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 30.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 30.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 30.4	Not subscribed			
31	Measure 31.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.3	Not subscribed			
	Measure 31.4	Not subscribed			
32	Measure 32.1	Not subscribed			
	Measure 32.2	Not subscribed			
	Measure 32.3	Not subscribed			
33	Measure 33.1	Not subscribed			
VIII. Transparency centre					
34	Measure 34.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 34.5	☐	☐	☐	☑

35	Measure 35.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 35.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
36	Measure 36.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 36.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 36.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
IX. Permanent Task-Force					
37	Measure 37.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 37.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	Measure 38.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
39	–	☐	☐	☐	☑
40	Measure 40.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.3	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.4	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.5	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 40.6	☐	☐	☐	☑
41	Measure 41.1	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 41.2	☐	☐	☐	☑
	Measure 41.3	☐	☐	☐	☑

42	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
43	-	☐	☐	☐	☑
44	-	☐	☐	☐	☑

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 - 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 1.1	Not subscribed
QRE 1.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid[2] or impression[3]) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 1.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 1.2.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 1.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

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[2] Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.
[3] Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

Measure 1.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google sets a high bar for information quality on services that involve advertising and content monetisation. Given that many bad actors may seek to make money by spreading harmful content, raising the bar for monetisation can also diminish their incentives to misuse Google services. For example, Google prohibits deceptive behaviour on Google advertising products. Google Ads also provides advertisers with additional controls and helps them exclude types of content that, while in compliance with AdSense policies, may not fit their brand or business. These controls let advertisers apply content filters or exclude certain types of content or terms from their video, display, and search ad campaigns. Advertisers can exclude content such as politics, news, sports, beauty, fashion and many other categories. These categories are listed in the Google Ads Help Centre.
Measure 1.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 1.4.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 1.5	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.5.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google partakes in audits including those conducted by independent accreditation organisations such as the Media Rating Council (MRC) and maintains this accreditation via participation in annual audit cycles conducted by the MRC. The current MRC accreditation certifies that: ● Google Ads display and search clicks measurement methodology and AdSense ad serving technologies adhere to the industry standards for click measurement. ● Google Ads video impression and video viewability measurement as reported in the Video Viewability Report adheres to the industry standards for video impression and viewability measurement.

	- The processes supporting these technologies are accurate. This applies to Google's measurement technology which is used across all device types: desktop, mobile, and tablet, in both browser and mobile apps environments. For more information about what this accreditation means, please see this [help page]().
QRE 1.5.2	See response to QRE 1.5.1.
Measure 1.6	**Google Advertising**
QRE 1.6.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Ads provides its advertising partners with features that enable them to maintain control over where their ads appear, the format in which their ads run, and their intended audience. Since April 2021, advertisers have the [ability]() to use [dynamic exclusion lists]() that can be updated seamlessly and continuously over time. These lists can be created by advertisers themselves or by a third party they trust, such as brand safety organisations and industry groups. Once advertisers upload a dynamic exclusion list to their Google Ads account, they can schedule automatic updates as new web pages or domains are added, ensuring that their exclusion lists remain effective and up-to-date.
QRE 1.6.2	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).
QRE 1.6.3	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that provide brand safety tools).
QRE 1.6.4	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that rate sources).
SLI 1.6.1	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).
Data	

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
Commitment 2 Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.					
	C.2	**M 2.1**	**M 2.2**	**M 2.3**	**M 2.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Advertising**	*Not subscribed*	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**	**Google Advertising**

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 2.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 2.1.1	*Not subscribed*

Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 2.2	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All newly created ads and ads that are edited by users are reviewed for policy violations. The review of new ads is performed by either, or a combination of: • Automated mechanisms; and • Manual reviews performed by human reviewers. For more information on how the ad review process works, please see the 'About the ad review process' page.

Measure 2.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.3.1	See response to QRE 2.2.1.
SLI 2.3.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing relevant policies	Number of own-initiative actions taken on advertisements that affect the availability, visibility, and accessibility of information provided by recipients of Google Ads services during the reporting period, by EEA Member State billing country and policy. These actions taken include enforcement against ads and ad assets that violate any of the policy topics in scope for reporting. Google takes content moderation actions on content which violates or may be shown to violate Google Ads policies, or where the content is illegal. These can encompass both proactive and reactive enforcement actions. Proactive enforcement takes place when potentially policy-violating content has been flagged internally, for example, via algorithms or contractors. Reactive enforcement takes place in response to external notifications, such as user policy flags or legal complaints (e.g. an Article 9 order or an Article 16 notice under the Digital Services Act). To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violates Google Ads policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks.

Ad or asset disapproval
Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is reviewed.

Account suspension
Google Ads Accounts may be suspended if Google finds violations of its policies or the Terms and Conditions.

For more information on what happens when an ad or account is violating Google Ads policies, please see the 'What happens if you violate our policies' page.

Policies in scope:
- Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content);
- Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

	Number of actions taken, by policy		
	Number of actions taken, for Destination Requirements	Number of actions taken, for Inappropriate Content	Number of actions taken, for Misrepresentation
Level	Ads & Ad Assets	Ads & Ad Assets	Ads & Ad Assets
Member States			
Austria	8,558,947	176,712	550,104
Belgium	10,146,325	174,131	1,103,042
Bulgaria	13,012,850	73,255	4,099,084
Croatia	2,565,291	22,775	149,653
Cyprus	11,047,741	214,616	2,612,130
Czech Republic	20,018,821	403,011	6,074,846

Denmark	16,354,214	192,766	1,380,073
Estonia	2,905,799	21,023	822,081
Finland	4,989,902	74,304	512,802
France	252,736,323	752,422	4,689,004
Germany	208,184,248	924,430	6,529,947
Greece	3,147,306	31,903	238,327
Hungary	7,064,451	113,487	345,110
Ireland	18,054,072	2,318,725	10,614,303
Italy	55,127,772	349,416	39,759,721
Latvia	2,169,264	24,493	5,758,223
Lithuania	7,975,427	92,851	898,983
Luxembourg	11,806,902	98,041	84,250
Malta	3,354,788	3,429	327,889
Netherlands	171,424,901	915,585	64,374,444
Poland	40,259,580	636,331	3,340,905
Portugal	3,760,047	101,150	579,452
Romania	13,628,774	476,512	810,376
Slovakia	7,547,063	433,271	308,335
Slovenia	3,241,865	28,183	291,623
Spain	62,458,598	690,980	5,132,572
Sweden	19,790,524	171,056	23,135,985
Iceland	156,178	2,575	185,293
Liechtenstein	142,661	1,680	6,486

Norway	3,585,167	44,325	654,742
Total EU	**981,331,795**	**9,514,858**	**184,523,264**
Total EEA	**985,215,801**	**9,563,438**	**185,369,785**

Measure 2.4	**Google Advertising**
QRE 2.4.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Notification** Ads that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved or (if appropriate) limited in where and when they can show. This will be shown in the 'Status' column as 'Disapproved' or 'Eligible (limited),' and the ad may not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed. By hovering the cursor over the status of the ad, there is additional information, including the policy violation impacting the ad. For more information on how to fix a disapproved ad, see the external Help Centre page. **Appeal process** Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the Disapproved Ads and Policy Questions form. For more information about the appeal process, check the Help Centre page. For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the submit an appeal process.
SLI 2.4.1	Number of content moderation complaints received from advertisers located in EEA Member States during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State and by complaint outcome. Advertiser complaints were received via Google Ads standardised path for appealing policy decisions. Complaint outcomes include initial decision upheld and initial decision reversed. An 'initial decision' refers to the first enforcement of Google's terms of service or product policies. These decisions may be reversed in light of additional information provided by the appellant as part of an appeal or additional automatic, manual review of the content. Policies in scope: ● Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content);

	• Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events); • Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).		
	Number of complaints received and complaint outcomes during the reporting period, by EU Member State for relevant policies described above.		
	Number of Ads Appeals	**Number of Successful Appeals**	**Number of Failed Appeals**
Level	**Ads**	**Ads**	**Ads**
Member States			
Austria	38,933	17,857	21,076
Belgium	36,390	11,707	24,683
Bulgaria	32,515	12,766	19,749
Croatia	11,393	3,269	8,124
Cyprus	190,226	64,443	125,783
Czech Republic	90,148	25,832	64,316
Denmark	32,482	16,230	16,252
Estonia	37,309	13,246	24,063
Finland	10,533	6,872	3,661
France	207,588	44,094	163,494
Germany	293,021	83,235	209,786
Greece	23,996	7,689	16,307
Hungary	29,374	12,891	16,483
Ireland	31,397	6,997	24,400
Italy	538,950	66,743	472,207
Latvia	24,049	7,896	16,153

Lithuania	156,934	27,714	129,220
Luxembourg	4,400	1,048	3,352
Malta	25,669	9,221	16,448
Netherlands	170,283	81,051	89,232
Poland	189,587	86,444	103,143
Portugal	16,658	4,815	11,843
Romania	56,164	27,616	28,548
Slovakia	11,569	6,911	4,658
Slovenia	90,015	20,156	69,859
Spain	166,245	49,507	116,738
Sweden	116,774	64,384	52,390
Iceland	221	151	70
Liechtenstein	1,673	112	1,561
Norway	14,146	4,448	9,698
Total EU	**2,632,602**	**780,634**	**1,851,968**
Total EEA	**2,648,642**	**785,345**	**1,863,297**

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
Commitment 3			
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.			
	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 3.1	Google Advertising
QRE 3.1.1	Google Advertising works across industry and with civil society to facilitate the flow of information, relevant to tackling disinformation. For example, Google participates in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force's dedicated Working Groups, such as the Working Group on elections, which involves civil society and Industry Signatories.
Measure 3.2	Google Advertising
QRE 3.2.1	Google takes part in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force's Working Group on elections - as mentioned in response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG)[4] continues to engage with other

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[4] **Note:** *The change from TAG (Threat Analysis Group) to GTIG (Google Threat Intelligence Group) represents the consolidation of Google's various cybersecurity intelligence teams into a single, unified entity.*

	Industry Signatories to the Code in order to stay abreast of cross-platform deceptive practices, such as operations leveraging fake or impersonated accounts.
Measure 3.3	**Google Advertising**
QRE 3.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Advertising frequently engages with third-party organisations in order to explain, collect feedback on, and improve Google Advertising policies. Google Advertising has also exchanged views with experts at numerous policy roundtables, conferences, and workshops - both in Brussels and in the EU capitals.

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of 'political and issue advertising'.

	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 4.1	Not subscribed
Measure 4.2	Not subscribed

QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	*Not subscribed*
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5		
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	**M 5.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 5.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 5.1.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 6
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising.

	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 6.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 6.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.2.2	*Not subscribed*
SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 6.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.3.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 6.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.4.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 6.5	*Not subscribed*
QRE 6.5.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 7
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 7.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	*Not subscribed*

Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 7.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.2.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 7.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.3.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.3.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 7.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 7.4.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 8 Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
	C.8	**M 8.1**	**M 8.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	*Not subscribed*

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 8.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 8.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 9		
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.		
	C.9	**M 9.1**	**M 9.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 9.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 9.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 10
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	*Not subscribed*

of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 10.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 10.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 11
Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 11.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 11.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 11.3	*Not subscribed*
Measure 11.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	*Not subscribed*
QRE 11.4.1	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 12

Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.

	C.12	M 12.1	M 12.2	M 12.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 12.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 12.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 12.3	*Not subscribed*

QRE 12.1.1 (for measures 12.1-12.3)	*Not subscribed*

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 13 Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.			
	C.13	**M 13.1**	**M 13.2**	**M 13.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 13.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 13.2	*Not subscribed*
Measure 13.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1–13.3)	*Not subscribed*

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:
- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains;
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation.

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:
- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...);
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers;
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	See QRE 14.1.2
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 14.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 14.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search's systems are designed to elevate high-quality information and combat the threats listed in Commitment 14. While many of those tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are not relevant to search engines (e.g. TTPs 1 through 5, TTP 11), by seeking to elevate	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube's systems are designed to connect people with high-quality content. In addition, YouTube has various policies which set out what is not allowed on YouTube. These policies, which can be accessed in

trustworthy, high-quality information, Search's ranking systems directly tackle threats like inauthentic domains (TTP 4), obfuscation (TTP 6), deceptive manipulated media (TTP 7), hack and leak operations (TTP 8), inauthentic coordination (TTP 9), and a broad range of deceptive practices (TTP 10). More information about the design of Search's ranking systems is outlined in the User Empowerment chapter.

Google Search's Overall Content Policies outline that Search takes action against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Learn more about Google Search Webmaster Guidelines.

In line with these policies, Search deploys spam protection tools. These efforts address a range of deceptive practices and help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search through inauthentic behaviours outlined in relevant TTPs.

Moreover, Search has policies and community guidelines specifically governing what can appear in Google Search features (e.g. 'knowledge panels', 'About This Result', etc.) to make sure that Search is showing high-quality and helpful content, while also taking action against content that may promote harmful disinformation. Relevant policies to the threats listed above include the following:

- **Deceptive Practices Policy**: This policy prohibits content that impersonates any person or organisation, misrepresentation or concealment of

YouTube's Help Centre, address relevant TTPs. Notably, YouTube's policies tend to be broader than the identified TTPs. As such, related SLIs providing information about actions taken related to the TTP may be overinclusive.

YouTube's Community Guidelines, commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, go beyond these TTPs.

In this report, YouTube has provided data relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines enforcement report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.

	ownership or primary purpose, and engagement in inauthentic or coordinated behaviour to deceive, defraud, or mislead. This policy does not cover content with certain artistic, educational, historical, documentary, or scientific considerations, or other substantial benefits to the public. ● **Manipulated Media Policy**: This policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. ● **Transparency Policy**: This policy notes that news sources on Google should provide clear dates and bylines, as well as information about authors, the publication, the publisher, company or network behind it, and contact information.	
QRE 14.1.2	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search uses a variety of proactive detection efforts to counter spam, which overlaps significantly with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to disseminate disinformation. As outlined in the overall Google Search Content Policies and Community Guidelines for user generated content, action is taken against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies, raising high-quality information in rankings and recommendations curbing the spread of harmful misinformation, and rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU. YouTube uses a combination of people and machine learning to detect problematic content automatically and at scale. Machine learning is well-suited to detect patterns, including harmful

	Pursuant to the [Spam Content Policy](#), Google Search deploys spam protection tools, such as SpamBrain (Google's AI-based spam-prevention system), to protect search quality and user safety. These efforts help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search. In March 2024, we announced three new [spam-related policies](#), addressing 'scaled content abuse', which includes artificially-generated content that seeks to manipulate Google's search ranking, expired domain abuse, and site reputation abuse. In addition, Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Trust and Safety Teams are central to Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1.	misinformation, which helps YouTube find content similar to other content that YouTube has already removed, even before it is viewed. Every quarter, YouTube publishes data in the [Community Guidelines enforcement report](#) about removals that were first detected by automated means. YouTube's Intelligence Desk monitors the news, social media, and user reports to detect new trends surrounding inappropriate content, and works to make sure YouTube's teams are prepared to address them before they can become a larger issue. In addition, Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Google and YouTube's Trust and Safety Teams are central to Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1. YouTube continues to invest in automated detection systems, and rely on both human evaluators and machine learning to train their systems on new data. YouTube's engineering teams also continue to update and improve their detection systems regularly.
Measure 14.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 14.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube enforces a broad range of policies to help build a safer community. These policies include, but are not limited to, YouTube's [Community Guidelines](#), which include policies covering

moderation on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and weigh signals of high-quality information so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors and signals to raise high-quality content and reduce low quality content. Google Search's publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Google Search works continuously to improve the quality and effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content.

To ensure our algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a rigorous process that involves both live tests and the Search Quality Rating Program. Ratings do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search's results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users globally. Under the Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines, raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search also provides users the ability to flag content that might be violating Google Search policies.

Spam, Deceptive Practices, and Scams, Impersonation and Fake Engagement. YouTube applies these policies globally, including across the EEA Member States.

Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies
In general, enforcement of YouTube's policies is a joint effort between people and machine learning technology. YouTube starts by giving a team of experienced content moderators enforcement guidelines (detailed explanations of what makes content violative and non-violative), and asks them to differentiate between violative and non-violative material. If the new guidelines allow them to achieve a very high level of accuracy, YouTube expands the testing group to include moderators across different backgrounds, languages and experience levels.

Then YouTube may begin revising the guidelines so that they can be accurately interpreted across a larger, more diverse set of moderators. These findings then help train YouTube's machine learning technology to detect potentially violative content at scale. As done with its content moderators, YouTube also tests its models to understand whether it has provided enough context for them to make accurate assessments about what to surface for people to review.

Once models are trained to identify potentially violative content, the role of content moderators remains essential throughout the enforcement process. Machine learning helps identify potentially violative content at scale and content moderators may then help assess whether the content should be removed. In some cases, YouTube's systems may take automated action, such as when

	there is high confidence that the content is violative given similar content that was previously removed.
	This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of YouTube's models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. It also means YouTube's enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube, while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.
	YouTube provides data for TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9.

Google Search	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	
TTP OR ACTION 1	<u>**Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter**</u> 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation); 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers); 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers; 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts. <u>**SLI 14.2.1**</u> **Methodology** (1) Manual enforcement instances under relevant policy violations (including Deceptive Practices, Manipulated Media, Medical Content, Misleading Content and Transparency Policies) on a global level during the reporting period. (2) Domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search on a global level during the reporting period.

	A note regarding content moderation action: Most, but not all, of policy-violating content on Google Search and its features is moderated globally.

Response
(1) During the reporting period, there were 30,609 instances of policy enforcement, globally, which resulted in removal of false, disputed, non-representative facts, misrepresentation information, content that contradicts scientific or medical based consensus and evidence based best practices. The actions were enforced across Search features including knowledge engine, webanswers, news, discover, image and video search.
(2) During the reporting period, there were 318,012 manual actions and 38,837,715 algorithmic actions taken against spam policies. Globally, a total of 39,125,118 unique domains were affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search.

SLI 14.2.2
These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy-violating content.

SLI 14.2.3
This SLI is not applicable for Google Search, as users do not need accounts to use the search engine, and generally do not post content on Google Search.

SLI 14.2.4
These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy-violating content. |

YouTube
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

TTP OR ACTION 1	Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant

Community Guideline.

Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs.

SLI 14.2.1
(1) Number of channels identified and removed for TTP 1 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

SLI 14.2.4
(1) Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals out of all related channel removals during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

Refer to the Community Guidelines enforcement report for more information regarding removed violative content.

	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2	SLI 14.2.3	SLI 14.2.4
	Number of channels removed			Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals
Member States				
Austria	1,676			15.20%
Belgium	1,507			30.69%
Bulgaria	1,688			20.07%
Croatia	367			17.95%
Cyprus	76,212			59.74%
Czech Republic	3,576			36.74%
Denmark	1,954			39.77%

Estonia	402			15.04%
Finland	34,451			31.86%
France	28,462			19.52%
Germany	70,558			19.82%
Greece	1,508			32.65%
Hungary	602			25.17%
Ireland	1,549			26.39%
Italy	16,274			41.07%
Latvia	7,581			24.57%
Lithuania	1,271			33.39%
Luxembourg	277			17.98%
Malta	167			13.14%
Netherlands	38,549			20.53%
Poland	28,648			37.77%
Portugal	925			15.35%
Romania	4,525			38.00%
Slovakia	579			26.56%
Slovenia	153			16.76%
Spain	8,053			22.06%
Sweden	4,240			20.35%
Iceland	136			24.55%
Liechtenstein	8			9.09%
Norway	1,036			31.20%

Total EU	335,754			27.67%
Total EEA	336,934			27.68%

TTP OR ACTION 5	Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs. **SLI 14.2.1** (1) Number of channels identified and removed for TTP 5 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Number of videos identified and removed for TTP 5 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State. The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone. **SLI 14.2.2** (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 5 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State. Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views, actions, or engagement after YouTube removes the content. **SLI 14.2.3** Refer to SLI 14.2.2, which provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken. Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. **SLI 14.2.4** (1) Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals out of all related channel removals during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Percentage of TTP 5 video removals out of all related video removals during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

	Refer to the Community Guidelines enforcement report for more information regarding removed violative videos.										
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**						**SLI 14.2.3**	**SLI 14.2.4**	
	Number of channels removed	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with:							Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals	Percentage of TTP 5 video removals
			0 views	1-10 views	11-100 views	101-1,000 views	1,001-10,000 views	>10,000 views			
Member States											
Austria	188	1	0	0	0	0	0	1		1.70%	0.01%
Belgium	395	822	11	1	3	719	84	4		8.04%	3.13%
Bulgaria	313	3	1	0	2	0	0	0		3.72%	0.01%
Croatia	121	4	0	1	0	0	3	0		5.92%	0.06%
Cyprus	98	111	20	10	56	24	1	0		0.08%	1.33%
Czech Republic	326	363	120	25	110	98	10	0		3.35%	0.71%
Denmark	151	1	1	0	0	0	0	0		3.07%	0.01%
Estonia	48	2	0	1	0	1	0	0		1.80%	0.03%
Finland	148	56	15	0	15	15	9	2		0.14%	0.47%
France	1,964	268	54	34	65	82	30	3		1.35%	0.18%
Germany	2,200	998	146	51	197	286	287	31		0.62%	0.59%
Greece	257	10	4	1	1	1	2	1		5.57%	0.06%
Hungary	209	33	16	0	4	12	1	0		8.74%	0.17%
Ireland	210	936	5	4	15	161	621	130		3.58%	4.44%
Italy	1,655	571	56	33	171	202	75	34		4.18%	0.50%

Latvia	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0.21%	0.00%
Lithuania	86	268	0	0	2	0	9	257		2.26%	2.52%
Luxembourg	17	3	1	0	0	0	0	2		1.10%	0.24%
Malta	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1.10%	0.00%
Netherlands	666	254	26	34	45	84	36	29		0.35%	0.30%
Poland	1,134	108	15	14	38	27	10	4		1.50%	0.12%
Portugal	320	26	9	1	2	14	0	0		5.31%	0.08%
Romania	887	98	14	24	13	5	20	22		7.45%	0.11%
Slovakia	140	2	1	0	0	0	1	0		6.42%	0.01%
Slovenia	48	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		5.26%	0.00%
Spain	1,269	2,309	93	143	815	905	263	90		3.48%	1.72%
Sweden	379	69	22	3	13	21	8	2		1.82%	0.26%
Iceland	12	1	0	0	0	1	0	0		2.17%	0.10%
Liechtenstein	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1.14%	0.00%
Norway	235	19	8	0	1	9	1	0		7.08%	0.11%
Total EU	**13,308**	**7,316**	**630**	**380**	**1,567**	**2,657**	**1,470**	**612**		**1.10%**	**0.63%**
Total EEA	**13,556**	**7,336**	**638**	**380**	**1,568**	**2,667**	**1,471**	**612**		**1.11%**	**0.62%**

TTP OR ACTION 7	Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs.

SLI 14.2.1

(1) Number of videos identified and removed for TTP 7 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

SLI 14.2.2

(1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 7 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views, actions, or engagement after YouTube removes the content.

SLI 14.2.3

Refer to SLI 14.2.2, which provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken. Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform.

SLI 14.2.4

(1) Percentage of TTP 7 video removals out of all related video removals during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

Refer to the Community Guidelines enforcement report for more information regarding removed violative videos.

SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2						SLI 14.2.3	SLI 14.2.4
Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with:							Percentage of TTP 7 video removals
	0 views	1-10 views	11-100 views	101-1,000 views	1,001-10,000 views	>10,000 views		
Member States								

Austria	14	1	5	3	4	1	0	0.09%
Belgium	12	1	4	2	2	2	1	0.05%
Bulgaria	11	0	4	2	4	1	0	0.04%
Croatia	4	0	1	1	2	0	0	0.06%
Cyprus	6	1	3	0	2	0	0	0.07%
Czech Republic	23	4	9	4	4	1	1	0.04%
Denmark	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	0.02%
Estonia	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.03%
Finland	8	0	1	3	2	2	0	0.07%
France	101	13	44	16	17	7	4	0.07%
Germany	194	22	70	35	27	26	14	0.11%
Greece	12	1	3	2	3	2	1	0.07%
Hungary	5	4	0	1	0	0	0	0.03%
Ireland	26	0	12	4	4	4	2	0.12%
Italy	42	4	20	9	6	2	1	0.04%
Latvia	4	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.04%
Lithuania	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.02%
Luxembourg	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.16%
Malta	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0.12%
Netherlands	117	19	44	24	18	4	8	0.14%
Poland	56	9	18	10	8	5	6	0.06%
Portugal	13	2	5	2	3	1	0	0.04%
Romania	18	5	6	4	2	0	1	0.02%

Slovakia	3	0	0	2	0	1	0	0.02%
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Spain	72	13	22	12	13	5	7	0.05%
Sweden	27	7	13	4	1	2	0	0.10%
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Norway	5	0	1	3	1	0	0	0.03%
Total EU	**779**	**107**	**289**	**142**	**124**	**67**	**50**	**0.07%**
Total EEA	**784**	**107**	**290**	**145**	**125**	**67**	**50**	**0.07%**

TTP OR ACTION 9	Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs. **SLI 14.2.1** (1) Number of channels identified and removed for TTP 9 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Number of videos identified and removed for TTP 9 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State. The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone. **SLI 14.2.2** (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 9 during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State. Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views, actions, or engagement after YouTube removes the content.

SLI 14.2.3

Refer to SLI 14.2.2, which provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken. Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform.

SLI 14.2.4

(1) Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals out of all related channel removals during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State;

(2) Percentage of TTP 9 video removals out of all related video removals during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.

Refer to the Community Guidelines enforcement report for more information regarding removed violative videos.

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2						SLI 14.2.3	SLI 14.2.4	
	Number of channels removed	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with:							Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals	Percentage of TTP 9 video removals
			0 views	1-10 views	11-100 views	101-1,000 views	1,001-10,000 views	>10,000 views			
Member States											
Austria	36	1	1	0	0	0	0	0		0.33%	0.01%
Belgium	47	9	0	0	0	2	3	4		0.96%	0.03%
Bulgaria	32	2	0	0	0	1	1	0		0.38%	0.01%
Croatia	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0.68%	0.00%
Cyprus	25	24	0	0	3	1	15	5		0.02%	0.29%
Czech Republic	93	7	1	0	0	2	2	2		0.96%	0.01%

Denmark	26	6	0	0	2	2	1	1		0.53%	0.04%
Estonia	9	6	0	2	0	2	2	0		0.34%	0.10%
Finland	37	7	1	0	1	4	0	1		0.03%	0.06%
France	310	27	2	0	3	2	5	15		0.21%	0.02%
Germany	615	186	3	2	5	50	87	39		0.17%	0.11%
Greece	30	1	0	0	0	0	1	0		0.65%	0.01%
Hungary	26	2	0	0	0	0	2	0		1.09%	0.01%
Ireland	31	1	0	0	0	1	0	0		0.53%	0.00%
Italy	143	10	0	2	1	4	1	2		0.36%	0.01%
Latvia	30	3	0	1	0	1	1	0		0.10%	0.03%
Lithuania	22	3	0	0	1	0	2	0		0.58%	0.03%
Luxembourg	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0.26%	0.00%
Malta	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0.47%	0.00%
Netherlands	298	115	4	2	6	19	63	21		0.16%	0.13%
Poland	235	18	1	3	1	2	4	7		0.31%	0.02%
Portugal	32	2	0	0	0	1	0	1		0.53%	0.01%
Romania	86	6	0	0	2	0	2	2		0.72%	0.01%
Slovakia	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1.01%	0.00%
Slovenia	13	1	0	1	0	0	0	0		1.42%	0.03%
Spain	197	12	0	0	1	0	5	6		0.54%	0.01%
Sweden	62	2	0	1	0	1	0	0		0.30%	0.01%
Iceland	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0.36%	0.00%
Liechtenstein	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1.14%	0.00%

Norway	40	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1.20%	0.01%
Total EU	2,481	451	13	14	26	95	197	106	0.20%	0.04%
Total EEA	2,524	452	13	14	26	95	198	106	0.21%	0.04%

Measure 14.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 14.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The final list of TTPs agreed within the Permanent Task-force in H2 2022 was used by Signatories as part of their reports from then on, as intended. The Permanent Task-force will continue to examine and update the list as necessary in light of technical advancements and evolving disinformation tactics.	

IV. Integrity of Services		
Commitment 15		
Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.		
	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	See QRE 15.1.1
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 15.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** The Google Search Manipulated Media Policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated.

| | creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. This includes if such content would cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different understanding or impression, such that it might cause significant harm to groups or individuals, or significantly undermine participation or trust in electoral or civic processes. | YouTube [requires creators to disclose](#) when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using AI tools. YouTube also informs viewers that content may be altered or synthetic in two ways. A label may be added to the description panel indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic. For certain types of content about sensitive topics, YouTube will apply a more prominent label to the video player. Examples of content that require disclosures can be found [here](#).

YouTube has noted feedback from its community, including creators, viewers, and artists, about the ways in which emerging technologies could impact them. YouTube makes it possible to request the removal of AI-generated or other synthetic or altered content that simulates an identifiable individual, including their face or voice, using its [privacy request](#) process. Not all content will be removed from YouTube, and YouTube will consider a variety of factors when evaluating these requests, some examples can be found [here](#).

Additionally, YouTube has highlighted how it will [build responsibility into its AI tools and features](#) for creators. This includes significant, ongoing work to develop guardrails that will prevent its AI tools from generating the type of content that does not belong on YouTube.

YouTube works to continuously improve protections. And within YouTube, dedicated teams like the intelligence desk are specifically focused on adversarial testing and threat detection to ensure YouTube's systems meet new challenges as they emerge. Content generated by YouTube's AI tools [includes a SynthID watermark](#), which is a tool for watermarking and identifying AI-generated images. Across the industry, Google, including |

		YouTube, continues to help increase transparency around digital content. This includes its work as a steering member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). YouTube's Misinformation Policies prohibit content that has been technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (usually beyond clips taken out of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm. YouTube detects content that violates Community Guidelines using a combination of machine learning and human review. YouTube also has policies on: ● Spam, Deceptive Practices, and Scams that prohibit, for example, spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advantage of the YouTube community; ● Impersonation; ● Fake Engagement. Refer to QRE 18.2.1 for how YouTube enforces these policies.
Measure 15.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 15.2.1	Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content quality on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and balance signals of high quality so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors and signals to raise high quality content and reduce low quality content. Google Search's publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Furthermore, our systems are designed to provide access to trustworthy information on the open	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube has always used a combination of people and machine learning technologies to enforce its Community Guidelines. AI helps YouTube detect potentially violative content at scale, while humans provide critical oversight. AI is continuously increasing both the speed and accuracy of YouTube's content moderation systems. Improved speed and accuracy of YouTube's systems also allows it

web while protecting users and society from content that violates our policies. Google Search works continuously to improve the effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content. To ensure our algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a rigorous process that involves both live tests and the Search Quality Rating Program. Ratings do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search's results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users globally. Under the Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines, raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search also uses automated measures to detect webspam content. We define webspam as any irrelevant or useless web content that aims to exploit search engine algorithms to appear as relevant results. This includes pages that engage in abusive behaviour to manipulate search engine rankings, thereby inhibiting search engines from providing high quality results to users.	to reduce the amount of harmful content human reviewers are exposed to. Refer to QRE 14.2.1 for information on how YouTube implements and enforces its policies, including through machine learning technology.

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.			
	C.16	**M 16.1**	**M 16.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	• Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) published its Q3 2025, and Q4 2025 Quarterly Bulletin, which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 16.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**

QRE 16.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States. One of GTIG's missions is to understand and disrupt coordinated information operations threat actors. Their work enables Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by rigorous analysis. Their investigations do not focus on making judgements about the content on Google platforms, but rather examining technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural patterns to make an assessment that activity is coordinated inauthentic behaviour. GTIG regularly publishes the TAG Bulletin, updated quarterly [here](#), which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, as well as additional periodic blog posts. GTIG also engages with other platform Signatories to receive and, when permitted by law and strictly necessary for security purposes, share information related to threat actor activity – in compliance with applicable laws. To learn more, refer to SLI 16.1.1. See Google's disclosure policies about [handling security vulnerabilities](#) for developers and security professionals.
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) posts a quarterly Bulletin, which includes disclosure of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's products and services, as well as additional periodic blog posts. In the Bulletin, they often note when findings are similar to or supported by those reported by other platforms. **YouTube** The publicly available [TAG Bulletins](#) that were published for the reporting period show: - The number of actions taken on YouTube channels involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. - The languages of the uploaded content that were part of campaigns. - Brief descriptions of the campaigns. - Instances when industry partners supported YouTube's actions by providing leads.

Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in an EEA Member State language does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State.

The TAG Bulletin and periodic blog posts are Google's, including YouTube's, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues.

The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to provide a means for cooperation and communication between them for a period of time ahead, during and after the election period.

The RRS allows non-platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to report time-sensitive content or accounts that they deem may present serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process, and enables discussion with the platform Signatories in light of their respective policies.

The disclosures below also include reporting through the RRS of allegedly illegal content. Although the Article 16 Digital Services Act (DSA) mechanism should be used by non-platform Signatories to report allegedly illegal content, Google reviews such notifications, too, as part of the RRS, provided the non-platform Signatory has already used the Article 16 DSA mechanism to submit them and shares the appropriate notification reference with Google through the RRS.

Search
- **Czech Republic** - no notifications were received through RRS.
- **Ireland** - no notifications were received through RRS.
- **The Netherlands** - no notifications were received through RRS.
- **Portugal** - no notifications were received through RRS.
- **Moldova** - no notifications were received through RRS.

YouTube
- **Czech Republic** - no notifications were received through RRS.
- **Ireland** - 31 notifications were received through RRS;
  - 24 flags were found to be non-violative;
  - 7 flags led to the removal of content or accounts.

	• **The Netherlands** - no notifications were received through RRS.
	• **Portugal** - no notifications were received through RRS.
	• **Moldova** - 142 notifications were received through RRS;
	    ○ 86 flags were found to be non-violative;
	    ○ 56 flags led to the removal of content or accounts.

Data	
Measure 16.2	*Not subscribed* **YouTube**
QRE 16.2.1	*Not subscribed* **Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States. Refer to the Bulletin articles that cover the reporting period to learn more about the number of YouTube channels terminated as part of investigations into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia, Poland, and other countries around the world. The most recent examples of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as how Google collaborates and shares information, can be found in Google's TAG Blog and Threat Intelligence website.

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 17 In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.				
	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Google's 'Super Searchers' information literacy curriculum was updated in consultation with experts in the SIFT method, a practical framework to evaluate information (Stop, Investigate the source, Find better coverage, and Trace claims to the original context). When combined with AI-powered tools like AI Mode, Super Searchers helps users find trustworthy information and understand it in context.	See QRE 17.1.1
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	No	No

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 17.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search aims to connect users with high-quality information, and help users understand and evaluate that information. Google Search has deeply invested in both information quality and information literacy. Some ways in which Google Search does this include: ● **'About This Result':** Next to most results on Google Search, there is a menu icon that users can tap to learn more about the result or feature and where the information is coming from. With this additional context, users can make a more informed decision about the sites they want to visit and what results will be most useful for them. When available, users will see a description of the website from Wikipedia, which provides free, reliable information about tens of millions of sites on the web. If a website does not have a Wikipedia description, Google Search will show	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube takes its responsibility efforts seriously, outlining clear policies used to moderate content on the platform and providing tools that users can leverage to improve their media literacy education and better evaluate what content and sources to trust. Information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. For example, topics that are more prone to misinformation may have information panels that show basic background info, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more context on the topic. If a user wants to learn more, the panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels.

an AI summary which synthesises additional information, explaining how the response was generated and highlighting referenced web pages. More information on the 'About This Result' feature can be found [here](#) and [here](#).	During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.
The 'More About This Page' link within the 'About This Result' feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:	For information about YouTube's altered and synthetic disclosures and labels, please refer to QRE 15.1.1. Further EEA Member State coverage can be found in SLI 17.1.1.

The 'More About This Page' link within the 'About This Result' feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:

- **See more information about the source**: Users will be able to read what a site says about itself in its own words, when that information is available.
- **Find what others on the web have said about a site**: Reading what others on the web have written about a site can help users better evaluate sources.
- **Learn more about the topic**: In the 'About the topic' section, users can find information about the same topic from other sources.

Additional information can be found in the Google Search blog post [here](#).

- **'About This Image':** With added insights in 'About This Image', users will know if an image may have been generated with Google's AI tools when they come across it in Search or Chrome.

All images generated with Imagen 2 in Google's consumer products are marked by SynthID, a tool developed by Google DeepMind that adds a digital watermark directly into the pixels of images generated. SynthID watermarks are imperceptible to the human eye but detectable for identification. 'About This Image' tool is available in more than 40 languages around the world, including English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.

- Google Search has also conducted extensive adversarial testing and red teaming to identify and mitigate potential harmful and problematic content. Google Search is also applying filters to avoid generating images of named people.

More information on the 'About This Image' feature can be found [here](). We continue looking at ways to integrate integrity signals more directly throughout the Search experience, with a view to enhancing user experience and providing users with the context needed to make informed decisions about the information they see online. For example, we are looking at embedding image provenance into Google Search features in order to enable users to check image provenance more seamlessly.

- **Content Advisory Notices:** Helpful notices for users that highlight when information is scarce or

	when interest is travelling faster than facts. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic. 　　○　Google Search is evolving Content Advisory Notices by exploring new ways to present users with helpful and relevant information through our AI features.	
SLI 17.1.1 – actions enforcing policies above	(1) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; Note metrics 1 and 2 are estimated proportions; metric 1 represents the number of content advisories for low relevance results out of all queries over the reporting period; metric 2 follows the same logic but is for content advisories for rapidly changing results. (3) Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (4) Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State;	(1) Number of impressions on information panels during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State. (2) Number of impressions on labels indicating altered or synthetic content during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State. Note: Since the H2 2024 report, YouTube derives the metric from a subset of the data by using random sampling to estimate the number of impressions.

	Search only					YouTube only	
	(5) Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.						
	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results (%)	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results (%)	Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed	Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Impressions on information panels	Impressions on labels indicating altered or synthetic content
Member States							
Austria	0.132%	0.00122%	702,132	12,509,528	12,233,724	35,436,900	97,074,600
Belgium	0.115%	0.00101%	930,096	15,291,148	14,976,336	139,752,900	99,382,200
Bulgaria	0.152%	0.00239%	643,268	6,941,628	6,701,300	52,956,700	61,140,600
Croatia	0.147%	0.00156%	443,332	6,013,696	5,731,792	52,579,800	41,299,300
Cyprus	0.173%	0.00146%	136,788	1,685,780	1,646,720	4,353,000	15,044,500
Czech Republic	0.134%	0.00089%	898,600	11,324,284	11,142,872	117,762,400	108,281,500
Denmark	0.109%	0.00166%	380,172	7,531,808	7,429,444	18,210,000	50,458,400
Estonia	0.199%	0.00178%	116,624	1,638,496	1,613,708	16,565,900	19,797,300
Finland	0.128%	0.00168%	456,244	9,561,232	9,408,808	16,550,200	55,616,500
France	0.095%	0.00068%	6,159,488	86,792,728	83,466,528	860,771,700	700,025,700
Germany	0.132%	0.00124%	8,044,964	125,073,084	121,571,264	1,817,072,400	1,053,238,700

Greece	0.188%	0.00100%	1,087,608	13,193,056	12,714,524	28,401,500	86,025,500
Hungary	0.163%	0.00204%	776,040	9,961,460	9,685,708	44,661,000	54,791,100
Ireland	0.085%	0.00290%	503,028	9,524,584	9,184,180	66,024,000	88,340,500
Italy	0.184%	0.00085%	6,129,184	102,324,924	97,573,396	355,847,700	692,892,600
Latvia	0.233%	0.00167%	190,916	1,862,000	1,824,356	46,580,400	38,949,600
Lithuania	0.188%	0.00110%	241,240	2,894,388	2,839,712	49,898,800	37,585,600
Luxembourg	0.150%	0.00170%	48,308	843,152	826,924	2,629,900	7,255,000
Malta	0.125%	0.00210%	56,456	785,324	766,872	2,572,500	6,504,700
Netherlands	0.115%	0.00138%	2,095,124	33,387,144	32,520,212	457,391,700	325,040,900
Poland	0.095%	0.00095%	3,099,436	55,970,412	54,803,280	199,452,000	490,280,400
Portugal	0.099%	0.00167%	1,106,964	13,756,904	13,356,636	23,057,900	120,349,000
Romania	0.111%	0.00245%	1,331,804	14,184,688	13,780,236	89,976,900	163,318,700
Slovakia	0.176%	0.00115%	442,660	5,467,060	5,362,208	23,796,300	38,073,100
Slovenia	0.194%	0.00132%	170,464	2,331,344	2,259,820	15,106,100	18,283,300
Spain	0.094%	0.00120%	6,148,056	71,952,800	69,559,316	353,322,900	752,917,000
Sweden	0.099%	0.00198%	783,028	16,449,984	16,213,896	94,865,900	112,427,500
Iceland	0.147%	0.00330%	16,796	449,448	440,140	1,098,900	4,603,500
Liechtenstein	0.173%	0.00158%	2,240	46,528	45,812	181,600	462,300
Norway	0.070%	0.00175%	434,208	7,785,088	7,678,792	23,963,100	76,312,900
Total EU	**0.125%**	**0.00119%**	**43,122,024**	**639,252,636**	**619,193,772**	**4,985,597,400**	**5,334,393,800**
Total EEA	**0.124%**	**0.00120%**	**43,575,268**	**647,533,700**	**627,358,516**	**5,010,841,000**	**5,415,772,500**

Measure 17.2	Google Search		YouTube	
QRE 17.2.1	**Grants**			

In H2 2025, Google.org supported a number of organisations that seek to help build a safer online world and promote media literacy. This includes over $7M in funding to further expand access to Be Internet Awesome and other child safety curricula.

Search
Super Searchers is our information literacy scaled education program, launched globally in 2022. The program was developed in consultation with information literacy experts and is a train-the-trainer program delivered through local partner organisations. The program teaches foundational information literacy skills, using evidence-based approaches such as the SIFT Method (a useful framework which compels users to Stop, Check it out, Investigate the source, Find better coverage and Trace back to original context).

The content was recently refreshed in November 2025 to reflect innovations in Search, such as AI Mode and AI Overviews. These tools are now incorporated into the Super Searchers curriculum, which helps users identify and evaluate the accuracy of information found online.

YouTube
YouTube remains committed to supporting efforts that deepen users' collective understanding of misinformation. To empower users to think critically and use YouTube's products safely and responsibly, YouTube invests in media literacy campaigns to improve users' experiences on YouTube. In 2022, YouTube launched 'Hit Pause', a global media literacy campaign, which is live in all EEA Member States and the campaign has run in 40+ additional countries around the world, including all official EU languages.

The program seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs) via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated [YouTube channel](). The YouTube channel hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content. There is additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation – from using emotional language to cherry picking information.

EEA Member State coverage of 'Hit Pause' media literacy impressions can be found in SLI 17.2.1.

SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above	In the reporting period, as part of the Super Searchers Program, 16 librarians, educators, and others who empower users with information literacy tools were trained across the 1 training session held in Europe.	Media Literacy campaign impressions during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.
		Impressions from YouTube's media literacy campaigns
Member States		
Austria		3,107,142
Belgium		2,038,464
Bulgaria		2,506,221
Croatia		1,941,695
Cyprus		200,595
Czech Republic		4,772,598
Denmark		1,832,197
Estonia		251,623
Finland		1,853,365
France		28,332,778
Germany		28,667,395
Greece		4,168,868
Hungary		4,028,295
Ireland		1,854,044
Italy		22,611,323
Latvia		410,984
Lithuania		976,023

Luxembourg		197,541
Malta		409,677
Netherlands		6,223,229
Poland		16,142,521
Portugal		4,463,198
Romania		7,302,666
Slovakia		2,024,229
Slovenia		687,317
Spain		23,417,687
Sweden		3,712,435
Iceland		239,963
Liechtenstein		23,369
Norway		1,559,768
Total EU		**174,134,110**
Total EEA		**175,957,210**

Measure 17.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.3.1	See response to QRE 17.2.1.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube partners with media literacy experts and researchers to identify unique and engaging ways to build up the YouTube Community's media literacy. For example, to inform the 'Hit Pause' global campaign, YouTube partnered with the National Association for

	Media Literacy Education (NAMLE), a U.S.-based organisation, to identify which competency areas the campaign should focus on. For additional information about YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign, please refer to QRE 17.2.1.	

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 18 Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.			
	C.18	**M 18.1**	**M 18.2**	**M 18.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	*Not subscribed*	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	No	No

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 18.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 18.1.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 18.1.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 18.1.3	*Not subscribed*
SLI 18.1.1 – actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 18.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 18.2.1	Google Search has the following policies which complement the Content Policies outlined in QRE 14.1.1: Medical Content Policy: This policy prohibits content in Search features that contradicts or runs contrary to scientific or medical consensus and evidence-based best practices. Misleading Content Policy: This policy states that Search features and News prohibits preview content that misleads users to engage with it by promising details which are not reflected in the underlying content.	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** See response to QRE 14.1.1 to see how YouTube's Community Guidelines map to the TTPs. These policies seek to, among other things, limit the spread of misleading or deceptive content that poses a serious risk of egregious harm. **Community Guidelines Enforcement**

These policies also provide users with information on how to report specific types of content that violate those policies. Google Search removes content in Search features for policy violations based on user reports as well as through its internal content moderation processes. More extensive policies are deployed for Search features, and can be found at the Content Policies Help Centre.

Google Search also enforces the Safe Browsing Repeat Offenders Policy. Safe Browsing is a service that helps protect users across the internet from dangerous websites and files by identifying and flagging malicious and deceptive content. When Safe Browsing detects that a website has been compromised or is hosting harmful content, it notifies the website owner and provides tools and information to help them diagnose and fix the issue. Per policy, sites that repeatedly switch between compliant and non-compliant behaviour within a short window of time are classified as Repeat Offenders for 30 days, during which they are unable to request additional review. When a site is established as a Repeat Offender, the website owner is notified via email.

In addition, Google Search removes content that has been determined to be unlawful under applicable law, in response to a notification from a third party, such as a user or an authority. Examples include material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid 'right to be forgotten request' or material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid court order. Google reports the number of Legal Removal requests (including requests impacting Google Search), biannually in transparency reports.

After a creator's first Community Guidelines violation, they will typically get a warning with no penalty to their channel. They will have the chance to take a policy training to allow the warning to expire after 90 days. Creators will also get the chance to receive a warning in another policy category. If the same policy is violated within that 90 day window, the creator's channel will be given a strike.

If the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, their channel may be removed from YouTube. In some cases, YouTube may terminate a channel for a single case of severe abuse, as explained in the Help Centre. YouTube may also remove content for reasons other than Community Guidelines violations, such as a first-party privacy complaint or a court order. In these cases, creators will not be issued a strike.

If a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain the action taken on their content and which of YouTube's policies the content violated. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes can be found here.

YouTube also reserves the right to restrict a creator's ability to create content on YouTube at its discretion. A channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, users are prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on the YouTube channel. A violation of this

		restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's [Terms of Service](#), and may result in termination of all existing YouTube channels of the user, any new channels created or acquired, and channels in which the user is repeatedly or prominently featured. Refer to SLI 18.2.1 on YouTube's enforcement at an EEA Member State level.					
SLI 18.2.1 – actions taken in response to policy violations	See response to SLI 14.2.1.	(1) Number of videos removed for violations of YouTube's [Misinformation Policies](#) in the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Views threshold on videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in the reporting period broken down by EEA Member State.					

YouTube only						
Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views
Member States						
Austria	85	5	18	17	23	14	8
Belgium	34	4	11	10	5	3	1
Bulgaria	48	18	10	4	7	8	1
Croatia	7	0	3	2	2	0	0
Cyprus	17	3	5	1	4	2	2
Czech Republic	55	10	18	10	9	5	3

Denmark	12	1	7	0	2	1	1
Estonia	78	1	3	3	8	63	0
Finland	22	3	9	4	2	4	0
France	235	29	69	55	41	29	12
Germany	799	89	188	161	171	125	65
Greece	24	2	5	3	4	6	4
Hungary	16	4	2	4	4	2	0
Ireland	84	17	25	18	13	8	3
Italy	76	8	29	18	11	5	5
Latvia	34	3	7	5	10	7	2
Lithuania	17	1	3	5	3	3	2
Luxembourg	3	0	2	0	1	0	0
Malta	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	216	35	82	44	32	8	15
Poland	115	26	33	19	15	13	9
Portugal	50	7	14	13	12	4	0
Romania	36	7	12	7	4	3	3
Slovakia	9	4	2	2	0	1	0
Slovenia	15	4	2	1	4	4	0
Spain	648	76	154	149	145	85	39
Sweden	52	10	20	10	7	5	0
Iceland	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Norway	30	15	6	5	3	1	0
Total EU	2,789	367	735	565	539	408	175
Total EEA	2,820	382	741	570	542	409	176

Measure 18.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 18.3.1	Google, including YouTube, works with stakeholders across the technology sector, government, and civil society to set good policies, remain abreast of emerging challenges, and establish, share, and learn from industry best practices and research. In 2024, Google published a paper on determining trustworthiness through context and provenance, showing how better assessment tools can empower people to make informed decisions about what they're seeing on the internet. In July 2025, Google introduced Backstory, an experimental artificial intelligence (AI) tool that surfaces information and helps people learn more about the context of images seen online. When given an image and a written prompt, Backstory investigates whether an image was AI-generated, when and where it's previously been used online, and whether it's been digitally altered. It quickly equips users with helpful information, responds to further prompts, describes whether and how an image has been used, and how its story may have changed over time. Backstory also generates easy-to-read reports of its findings. As Google continues to conduct research and develop Backstory, we are working closely with trusted testers, including content creators and expert information practitioners, who manage, organise and disseminate high-quality information. Over the past few months, we have been gathering feedback about examples, user experiences and more to improve our technology and make it more helpful. We welcomed over 140 industry practitioners to our five Backstory Signal Sessions (Buenos Aires, London, Kuala Lumpur, Coimbra-Portugal, & Delhi).	

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 19
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**	**Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 19.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 19.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.**

[Google Search's ranking systems](#) sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user's query include:	On YouTube, recommendations help users discover more of the videos they love, whether it is a great new recipe to try or finding their next favourite song.

Google Search's ranking systems sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user's query include:

- **Meaning of user's query**: To return relevant results, Google Search first needs to establish the intent behind a user's query. Google Search builds language models to decipher how the words that a user enters into the search box match up to the most useful content available.
- **Relevance of content**: Next, Google Search systems analyse the content to assess whether it contains information that might be relevant to what the user is looking for. The most basic signal that information is relevant is when content contains the same keywords as the user's search query.
- **Quality of content**: Google Search systems prioritise content that seems most helpful by identifying signals that can help determine which content demonstrates expertise, high-quality, and trustworthiness. For example, one of several factors that Google Search uses to help determine this is by understanding if other prominent websites link or refer to the content. Aggregated feedback from the Google Search quality evaluation process is used to further refine

On YouTube, recommendations help users discover more of the videos they love, whether it is a great new recipe to try or finding their next favourite song.

Users can find recommendations across the platform, including the homepage, the 'Up Next' panel, and the Shorts tab:

- **Homepage**: A user's homepage is what they typically see when they first open YouTube.
- **Up Next**: The Up Next panel appears when a user is watching a video. It suggests additional content based on what they are currently watching and personalised signals (details below).
- **Shorts:** Shorts are ranked based on their performance and personalisation.

YouTube understands that individuals have unique viewing habits and [uses signals to recommend content](#). YouTube's system compares the user's viewing habits with those that are similar to others, and uses that information to suggest other content.

YouTube's recommendation system is constantly evolving, learning every day from over 80 billion pieces of information or 'signals,' the primary ones being:
- **Watch history**: YouTube's system uses the videos a user watches to give better recommendations, remember where a user left off, and more.
- **Search history**: YouTube's system uses what a user searches for on YouTube to influence future recommendations.
- **Channel subscriptions**: YouTube's system uses information about the channels a user subscribes to in order to recommend videos they may like.

how Google Search systems discern the quality of information.

- **Usability**: Google Search systems also consider the usability of content. When all things are relatively equal, content that people will find more accessible may perform better.
- **Context and settings**: Information such as user location, past Google Search history, and Search settings all help Google Search ensure user results are what is most useful and relevant at that moment. Google Search uses the user's country and location to deliver content relevant to their area. For instance, if a user in Chicago searches 'football', Google Search will likely show the user results about American football and the Chicago Bears first. Whereas if the user searches 'football' in London, Google will show results about soccer and the Premier League. Google Search settings are also an important indicator of which results a user is likely to find useful, such as if they set a preferred language or opted in to SafeSearch (a tool that helps filter out explicit results). Google Search also includes features that personalise results based on the activity in their Google account. The user can control what Google Search activity is used to improve their experience, including adjusting what data is saved to their Google account at myaccount.google.com. To

- **Likes**: YouTube's system uses a user's likes information to try to predict the likelihood that they will be interested in similar videos in the future.
- **Dislikes**: YouTube's system uses videos a user dislikes to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- **'Not interested' feedback selections**: YouTube's system uses videos a user marks as 'Not interested' to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- **'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections**: YouTube's system uses 'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections as a signal that the channel content likely is not something a user enjoyed watching.

Different YouTube features rely on certain recommendation signals more than others. For example, YouTube uses the video a user is currently watching as an important signal when suggesting a video to play next. The influence of each signal on recommendations can vary based on many variables, including but not limited to the user's device type and the type of content they are watching. This is why the same user will see different recommendations on a mobile phone vs. a television.

Recommendations
Recommendations connect viewers to high-quality information and complement the work done by the Community Guidelines that define what is and is not allowed on YouTube. YouTube raises up videos in search and recommendations to viewers on certain topics where quality is key. Human evaluators, trained using publicly available guidelines, assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos.

	disable Google Search personalisation based on activity in a user's account, the user can turn off personal results in Search. Users can also prevent activity being stored to the user's account or delete particular history items in Web & App Activity. Google Search systems are designed to match a user's interests, but they are not designed to infer sensitive characteristics like race, religion or political party. The How Search Works website explains the ins and outs of Google Search. The following links provide additional information about helping people and businesses learn how Search works and how results are automatically generated.	These human evaluations are used to train YouTube's system to model their decisions, and YouTube then scales their assessments to all videos across the platform. Learn more about how YouTube elevates high-quality information on the How YouTube Works website and the YouTube Blog. **Controls to personalise recommendations** YouTube has built controls that help users decide how much data they want to provide. Users can view, delete, or turn on or off their YouTube watch and search history whenever they want. And, if users do not want to see recommendations at all on the homepage or on the Shorts tab, they can turn off and clear their YouTube watch history. For users with YouTube watch history off and no significant prior watch history, the homepage will show the search bar and the Guide menu, with no feed of recommended videos. Users can also tell YouTube when it is recommending something a user is not interested in. For example, buttons on the homepage and in the 'Up next' section allow users to filter and choose recommendations by specific topics. Users can also click on 'Not interested' and/or 'Don't recommend channel' to tell YouTube that a video or channel is not what a user wanted to see at that time, and YouTube will consider that when generating recommendations for that viewer in the future. Additional information about how a user can manage their recommendation settings are outlined here in YouTube's Help Centre.
Measure 19.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Number of views for each unique combination of a user and their device on the personal results control during the reporting period specifically within the	YouTube shares the number of Monthly Active Recipients across the official EU Member States that are signed in to the platform (those not signed in are signed out) in the latest published report on Information

	context of Search Personalisation, broken down by EEA Member State.	about Monthly Active Recipients under the Digital Service Act (EU). Signed-in users are able to amend their settings in their YouTube or Google Accounts.
	Number of views for each unique combination of a user and their device on the personal results control	
Member States		
Austria	252,245	
Belgium	364,308	
Bulgaria	149,177	
Croatia	128,802	
Cyprus	31,129	
Czech Republic	279,246	
Denmark	115,801	
Estonia	32,749	
Finland	187,356	
France	2,323,547	
Germany	2,547,868	
Greece	286,809	
Hungary	212,691	
Ireland	163,041	
Italy	2,296,161	
Latvia	51,893	
Lithuania	73,093	

Luxembourg	15,488	
Malta	12,800	
Netherlands	570,290	
Poland	1,249,431	
Portugal	273,744	
Romania	419,990	
Slovakia	120,506	
Slovenia	44,359	
Spain	1,756,188	
Sweden	252,634	
Iceland	5,509	
Liechtenstein	588	
Norway	117,881	
Total EU	**14,211,346**	
Total EEA	**14,335,324**	

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 20			
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.			
	C.20	M 20.1	M 20.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 20.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 20.1.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 20.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 20.2.1	*Not subscribed*

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 21
Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 21.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 21.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 21.1.1 – actions taken under measure 21.1	*Not subscribed*
Data	Data

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	*Not subscribed*
Data	**Data**

Measure 21.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 21.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 21.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 21.3.1	*Not subscribed*

V. Empowering Users

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Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

</div>

	C.22	M 22.1	M 22.2	M 22.3	M 22.4	M 22.5	M 22.6	M 22.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	See QRE 22.7.1
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	No	No

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 22.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.1.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
Member States	*Not subscribed*

Measure 22.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.2.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 22.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.3.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 22.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.4.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.4.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
Data	
Measure 22.5	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.5.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.5.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*

Member States	

SLI 22.5.2 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
Data	
Measure 22.6	*Not subscribed*
QRE 22.6.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 22.6.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*Not subscribed*
Data	
Measure 22.7	**Google Search** / **YouTube**
QRE 22.7.1	

Measure 22.7 — Google Search:

Google Search deploys the following features:

- **'SOS Alerts':** Structured content that appears on a Google Search page, including high-quality help links and local relevant information when a crisis strikes. The alerts aim to make emergency information more accessible during a crisis. Google brings together relevant and high-quality content from the web, media, and Google products, and then highlights that information across Google products such as Google Search and Google Maps. See [Help Centre](#) for more information.
- Search uses page quality, in addition to other ranking signals, to surface election-related information. More details are provided in the

Measure 22.7 — YouTube:

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

YouTube highlights information from high-quality, third-party sources using information panels. As users navigate YouTube, they might see a variety of different information panels. These panels provide additional context, with each designed to help users make their own decisions about the content they find.

These information panels will show regardless of what opinions or perspectives are expressed in a video. If users want to learn more, most panels link to the third-party partner's website.

Information panels on YouTube include, but are not limited to:

Search Quality Rater Guidelines, which provide guidance for queries related to 'Government, Civics & Society'. As stated in the Rater Guidelines, 'For pages about clear Your Money or Your Life (YMYL) topics, we have very high Page Quality rating standards because low quality pages on such topics could potentially negatively impact a person's health, financial stability, or safety, or the welfare or well-being of society.'

- **Panels on topics prone to misinformation:** Topics that are prone to misinformation, such as the moon landing, may display an information panel at the top of search results or under a video. These information panels show basic background information, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more context on a topic. The panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels. More details found here.
- **Election information panels:** The election-related features are only available in select countries/regions during election cycles. Users may see candidate information panels, voting information panels, election integrity information panels, or election results information panels. More details found here.

Additionally, learn more about health-related information panels and crisis resource panels in YouTube's Help Centre.

For information about YouTube's altered and synthetic disclosures and labels, please refer to QRE 15.1.1.

Additional data points and EEA Member State coverage is provided in SLI 17.1.1.

SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Number of views/impressions on Google Search Crisis Response (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts') alerts in the reporting period, for EEA Member States.	Please refer to SLI 17.1.1 for relevant metrics related to impressions of information panels and impressions on labels indicating altered or synthetic content.
	During the reporting period, 149,894,220 views/impressions were made on the Google Search Crisis Response alerts (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts').	

V. Empowering users			
Commitment 23			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.			
	C.23	**M 23.1**	**M 23.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 23.1	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 23.1.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google Search aims to make the process of submitting removal requests as easy as possible, and has built reporting tools, which allow users in all EU Member States to report potentially violative content for review under Search's Content Policies and Community Guidelines for user generated content. The Report Content On Google tool, for example, guides users to the right reporting form to provide the necessary information for the legal or policy issue they seek to flag. Google Search has reporting tools for Search features, such as knowledge panels and featured snippets. For overall Search Results, users can flag	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies, and surfacing high-quality information in ranking and recommendations. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU. **Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies** Each of YouTube's policies is carefully thought through so they are consistent, well-informed, and can be applied to content from around the world. They are developed in consultation with a wide range of external experts, as well as YouTube Creators. New policies go through testing before they go live to ensure YouTube's global team of content reviewers can apply them accurately and consistently. **Flagging inappropriate or harmful content on YouTube**

content via the three dots in Search features and 10 blue links. Using the Send Feedback option in 'About This Result', users can then send feedback about the result, describing the issue and attaching a screenshot.

YouTube offers YouTube users the possibility to report or flag content that they believe violates YouTube's Community Guidelines or other policies. Users can report content using YouTube's flagging feature, which is available to signed-in users in all EU Member States via computer (desktop or laptop), mobile devices, and other surfaces. Details on how to report different types of content using YouTube's flagging feature is outlined in YouTube's Help Centre.

In addition to user flagging, YouTube uses machine learning technology to flag videos for review. YouTube developed powerful machine learning that detects content that may violate YouTube's policies. In some cases, YouTube's systems may take automated action, such as when there is high confidence that the content is violative given similar content that was previously removed.

YouTube relies on this combination of people and machine learning technology to flag inappropriate content and enforce YouTube's community guidelines.

Information about YouTube's content moderation efforts, specifically regarding human resources dedicated to content moderation across the official EU Member State languages can be found in relevant sections of the VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA).

Reporting illegal content
While YouTube's Community Guidelines are policies that apply globally, YouTube is available in more than 100 different countries; therefore, processes are in place to review and appropriately act on requests from users, courts, and governments about content that violates local laws. Users can report illegal content using webforms dedicated to specific legal issues such as trademark, copyright, counterfeit and

Measure 23.2	Google Search	YouTube
		defamation. Webforms may also be accessed via the flagging feature after selecting Legal Issue as the report reason. Users can learn more about YouTube's legal policies and how to report legal violations here in YouTube's Help Centre.
QRE 23.2.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Removal requests are handled according to the product area, issue type, and region, by a global team of front-line reviewers and Policy Leads who have expertise in a range of product areas, issue types (such as defamation or copyright infringement), local laws, and languages. Removal requests are processed in accordance with the mission of complying with the law and Google's policies while maximising access to information and preserving user expression. For some classes of content policy violations, such as copyright, Google Search deploys automation to speed the processing of high-volume complaints. To avoid abuse in this process, Google Search relies upon: 1) Limitations on who may submit high volumes of requests through flows like the Trusted Copyright Removals Program, ensuring that participants in	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Content can be flagged by YouTube users, YouTube's machine learning technology, and human content moderators. All users agree to not 'misuse any reporting, flagging, complaint, dispute, or appeals process, including by making groundless, vexatious, or frivolous submissions' in YouTube's Terms of Service. Additionally, YouTube ensures integrity of its systems through: ● Having a dedicated team to identify and mitigate the impact of sophisticated bad actors on YouTube at scale, while protecting the broader community; ● Partnering with Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Trust & Safety Teams to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post (See QRE 16.1.1 and QRE 16.2.1); ● Legal protections, such as those found in the Digital Services Act; ● Educating users about Community Guidelines violations through its guided policy experience; ● Providing clear communication on appeals processes and notifications, and regular policy updates on its Help Centre; and,

this program are organisations with bona fide copyright interests unlikely to abuse their rights to suppress unrelated content; 2) Legal protections, such as those found in the Digital Services Act, or the possibility for Google or webmasters to file suit against submitters of bad-faith copyright complaints; 3) Handling counter-notifications from affected webmasters; 4) Tracking patterns of abusive behaviour and adjusting Google Search automation to avoid automatically honouring abusive takedowns of a kind Google Search has become aware of.	• Investing in automated systems to provide efficient detection of content to be evaluated by human reviewers. Where appropriate, YouTube makes it clear to users that it has taken action on their content and provides them the opportunity to appeal that decision. For more detailed information about YouTube's complaint handling systems (i.e. appeals), please see the latest VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA).

V. Empowering users
Commitment 24
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube

	Not subscribed	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation	Not subscribed	No

measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*	N/A

Measure 24.1	*Not subscribed*	YouTube
QRE 24.1.1	*Not subscribed*	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** As noted in QRE 18.2.1, if a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain what content was removed or age restricted, which policies the content violated, how it affects the user's channel, and what the creator can do next. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes here. Sometimes a single case of severe abuse will result in channel termination without warning.

The below appeals processes are available in all Member States, which are outlined in the YouTube Help Centre:

- Appeal a Community Guidelines strike;
- Appeal a Community Guidelines video removal;
- Appeal the age restriction of a video;
- Appeal playlist or thumbnail removals;
- Appeal a channel termination.

After a creator submits an appeal

After a creator submits an appeal, they will get an email from YouTube letting them know the appeal outcome. One of the following will happen:

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, YouTube will reinstate it and remove the strike from their channel. If a user appeals a warning and the appeal is granted, the next offence will be a warning.

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, but is not appropriate for all audiences, YouTube will apply an age-restriction. If it is a video, it will not be visible to users who are signed out, are under 18 years of age, or have Restricted Mode turned on. If it is a custom thumbnail, it will be removed.

- If YouTube finds that a user's content was in violation of YouTube's Community Guidelines, the strike will stay and the video will remain down from the site. There is no additional penalty for appeals that are rejected.

For a more granular Member State level breakdown, refer to SLI 24.1.1.

		For more information about YouTube's median time needed to action a complaint, please see the latest [VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA)](#).	
SLI 24.1.1 – enforcement actions	*Not subscribed*	(1) Video appeals against content removals for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State; (2) Video reinstatements following a successful appeal against content removals for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member State.	
	Not subscribed	**Number of video appeals**	**Number of video reinstatements**
Member States	*Not subscribed*		
Austria		22	5
Belgium		12	4
Bulgaria		11	0
Croatia		0	0
Cyprus		9	1
Czech Republic		12	5
Denmark		1	1
Estonia		14	1
Finland		9	0
France		98	38
Germany		202	54

Greece		8	1
Hungary		6	2
Ireland		40	13
Italy		60	39
Latvia		11	2
Lithuania		4	0
Luxembourg		1	0
Malta		0	0
Netherlands		55	22
Poland		51	13
Portugal		11	2
Romania		19	9
Slovakia		4	3
Slovenia		5	2
Spain		133	36
Sweden		10	2
Iceland		0	0
Liechtenstein		0	0
Norway		7	5
Total EU		**808**	**255**
Total EEA		**815**	**260**

V. Empowering users

Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 25.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 25.1.1	*Not subscribed*

SLI 25.1.1	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 25.2	Not subscribed
QRE 25.2.1	Not subscribed
SLI 25.2.1 – use of select tools	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 26 Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.				
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**C.26** **Google Search** **YouTube**	**M 26.1** **Google Search** **YouTube**	**M 26.2** **YouTube**	**M 26.3** **Google Search** **YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 26.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 26.1.1	**Google Researcher Program** Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. For researchers who are not affiliated with an EU institution and don't meet the qualifications for the EU program, Google also offers a global alternative. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact. For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page. **YouTube Researcher Program** The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for eligible academic researchers from around the world, who are affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution. Learn more about the data available in the YouTube API reference. **Transparency into paid content on YouTube** YouTube provides users a bespoke front end search page to access publicly available data containing organic content with paid product placements, sponsorships and endorsements as disclosed by creators. This is to enable users to understand that creators may receive goods or services in exchange for promotion. This search page complements YouTube's existing process of displaying a disclosure message when creators disclose to YouTube that their content contains paid promotions. Learn more about adding paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements here.	
QRE 26.1.2	**Google Researcher Program** Approved researchers will receive permissions and access to public data for Search and YouTube in the following ways: • **Search**: Access to an API for limited scraping with a budget for quota; • **YouTube**: Permission for scraping limited to metadata. For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page. **YouTube Researcher Program** The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. The program allows eligible academic researchers around the world to independently analyse the data	

they collect, including generating new/derived metrics for their research. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data.

Transparency into paid content on YouTube
The information provided via the [bespoke front end search page](#) allows users to view videos with active paid product placements, sponsorships, and endorsements that have been declared on YouTube.

- **Paid product placements**
    - Videos about a product or service because there is a connection between the creator and the maker of the product or service;
    - Videos created for a company or business in exchange for compensation or free of charge products/services;
    - Videos where that company or business's brand, message, or product is included directly in the content and the company has given the creator money or free of charge products to make the video.
- **Endorsements** - Videos created for an advertiser or marketer that contains a message that reflects the opinions, beliefs, or experiences of the creator.
- **Sponsorships** - Videos that have been financed in whole or in part by a company, without integrating the brand, message, or product directly into the content. Sponsorships generally promote the brand, message, or product of the third party.

Definitions can be found on the [YouTube Help Centre](#).

Additional data points are provided in SLI 26.1.1 and 26.2.1.

SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	Total number of applications under the Google Researcher Program, broken down by: • Applications Approved • Applications Rejected • Applications Under Review We note that most of the applications Google Search received in the reporting period either constituted spam, or did not contribute to the detection, identification and understanding of systemic risks in the EU.	Total number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher Program API during the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member States. • Researchers accessing the Researcher Program API during the reporting period may have been approved before the reporting period. There can be more than one researcher per application.

	Total number of applications approved	Total number of applications rejected	Total number of applications under review	Number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher API
Level	Users	Users	Users	Users
Member State				
Austria				2
Belgium				2
Bulgaria				0
Croatia				0
Cyprus				0
Czech Republic				1
Denmark				2
Estonia				0
Finland				2
France				5
Germany				16
Greece				0
Hungary				0
Ireland				0
Italy				8
Latvia				0
Lithuania				0
Luxembourg				0

Malta				0
Netherlands				4
Poland				0
Portugal				0
Romania				1
Slovakia				0
Slovenia				0
Spain				26
Sweden				0
Iceland				0
Liechtenstein				0
Norway				0
Total EU				**69**
Total EEA	**4**	**8**	**0**	**69**
Measure 26.2	*Not subscribed*			**YouTube**
QRE 26.2.1	*Not subscribed*			Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2.
QRE 26.2.2	*Not subscribed*			Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2.
QRE 26.2.3	*Not subscribed*			**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** **Google Researcher Program**

<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>The Google Researcher Program, which includes YouTube, has a 3-step application process:

1. Review and confirm the applicant's eligibility;
2. Submit an application, which requires a Google account;
3. If approved, the applicant gains permission to access public data relevant to their research.

Once an application has been submitted, accepted researchers will be notified via email.

YouTube Researcher Program
The YouTube Researcher Program has a 3-step application process:

1. YouTube verifies the applicant is an academic researcher affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution;
2. The Researcher creates an API project in the Google Cloud Console and enables the relevant YouTube APIs. They can learn more by visiting the enabled APIs page;
3. The Researcher applies with their institutional email (e.g. with a .edu suffix), includes as much detail as possible, and confirms that all of their information is accurate.

Once an application has been submitted, YouTube's operations team will conduct a review and let applicants know if they are accepted into the program.</td></tr>
<tr><td>**SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness,**</td><td>*Not subscribed*</td><td>(1-4) Applications received, approved, rejected or under review for the YouTube Researcher Program in the reporting period, broken down by EEA Member States.

(5) Median application resolution time in days in the reporting</td></tr>
</table>

		Applications Received	Applications Approved	Applications Rejected	Applications under Review	Median application resolution time
and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	period, reported at the EU and EEA level. Refer to SLI 26.1.1 for the total number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher Program API. Please note the following: ● Cells with '0' under applications received signify that there were no applications submitted by a researcher from that country. Similarly, cells with '0' signify that there were no applications approved, rejected, or under review for that country. ● Median Application Resolution time is the median number of days from application creation to application resolution, which may include communication back and forth with the applicant. This metric does not reflect YouTube's first response back to the applicant.					
	Not subscribed	**Applications Received**	**Applications Approved**	**Applications Rejected**	**Applications under Review**	**Median application resolution time**
Member State	*Not subscribed*					
Austria		2	2	0	0	-
Belgium		0	0	0	0	-
Bulgaria		0	0	0	0	-
Croatia		0	0	0	0	-
Cyprus		0	0	0	0	-

Czech Republic		3	2	1	0	-
Denmark		2	2	0	0	-
Estonia		0	0	0	0	-
Finland		3	3	0	0	-
France		0	0	0	0	-
Germany		10	8	1	1	-
Greece		0	0	0	0	-
Hungary		0	0	0	0	-
Ireland		1	0	1	0	-
Italy		2	2	0	0	-
Latvia		0	0	0	0	-
Lithuania		0	0	0	0	-
Luxembourg		0	0	0	0	-
Malta		0	0	0	0	-
Netherlands		4	4	0	0	-
Poland		1	0	1	0	-
Portugal		0	0	0	0	-
Romania		0	0	0	0	-
Slovakia		0	0	0	0	-
Slovenia		0	0	0	0	-
Spain		50	31	18	1	-
Sweden		1	1	0	0	-
Iceland		0	0	0	0	-

Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	-
Norway		0	0	0	0	-
Total EU		**79**	**55**	**22**	**2**	**10.0 Days**
Total EEA		**79**	**55**	**22**	**2**	**10.0 Days**

Measure 26.3	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 26.3.1	**Google Researcher Program** For the Google Researcher Program, the most up-to-date information is captured in the program description on the Transparency Centre, and also on the Acceptable Use Policy page. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines. **YouTube Researcher Program** For the YouTube Researcher Program, there is support available via email. Researchers can contact YouTube, with questions and to report technical issues or other suspected faults, via a unique email alias, provided upon acceptance into the program. Questions are answered by YouTube's Developer Support team and by other relevant internal parties as needed. Google is not aware of any malfunctions during the reporting period that would have prevented access to these reporting systems.	

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 27
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 27.1	Not subscribed
QRE 27.1.1	Not subscribed
Measure 27.2	Not subscribed
QRE 27.2.1	Not subscribed
Measure 27.3	Not subscribed
QRE 27.3.1	Not subscribed
SLI 27.3.1 – research projects vetted by the independent	Not subscribed

third-party body	
Data	
Measure 27.4	*Not subscribed*
QRE 27.4.1	*Not subscribed*

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28 Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	**M 28.1**	**M 28.2**	**M 28.3**	**M 28.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**	**Google Search YouTube**

	Google Search	**YouTube**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In October 2025, Google announced the recipients of the 2025 Google Academic Research Awards (GARA), committing $5.6 million to support 56 projects led by 84 researchers across 12 countries. Each recipient received up to $100,000 USD in funding and is paired with a Google research sponsor.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 28.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.1.1	Google has a longstanding commitment to transparency, and has led the way in transparency reporting of content removals and government requests for user data for more than a decade. **Google** Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact. Google has teams that operate the Google Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and evaluate potential updates and developments for the Google Researcher Program. Additional information can be found on the Google Transparency Centre. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines. Additionally, Google's partnership with Lumen is an independent research project managed by the Berkman Klein Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. The Lumen database houses millions of content takedown requests that have been voluntarily shared by various companies, including Google. Its purpose is to facilitate academic and industry research concerning the availability of online content. As part of Google's partnership with Lumen, information about the legal notices Google receives may be sent to the Lumen project for publication. Google informs users about its Lumen practices under the 'Transparency at our core' section of the Legal Removals Help Centre. Additional information on Lumen can be found here. **YouTube** The YouTube Researcher Program provides eligible academic researchers from around the world with scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data. (See YouTube API reference for more information).	

YouTube has teams that operate the YouTube Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and provide technical support throughout the research project. They also evaluate potential updates and developments for the YouTube Researcher Program. Researchers can use any of the options below to obtain support:

- YouTube provides a contact email alias to researchers who have been granted access to the program;
- [YouTube API Code Samples at GitHub](#).

Measure 28.2	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 28.2.1	See response to QRE 28.1.1.	

Measure 28.3	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 28.3.1	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google continues to engage constructively with the Code of Conduct's Permanent Task-force and with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). Additionally, refer to QRE 26.1.1 to learn more about how Google, including YouTube, provides opportunities for researchers on its platforms.	

Measure 28.4	**Google Search**	**YouTube**
QRE 28.4.1	In 2021, Google committed €25M to help launch the European Media & Information Fund (EMIF) and a final scheduled payment was made in February 2026. Overall, 121 projects related to information quality received grants across 28 countries (including 26 EEA Member States). The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund's support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications.	

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 29 Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.				
	C.29	M 29.1	M 29.2	M 29.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 29.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.1.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.1.2	*Not subscribed*

QRE 29.1.3	*Not subscribed*
SLI 29.1.1 – reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 29.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.2.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.2.2	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.2.3	*Not subscribed*
SLI 29.2.1 – reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (of various resilience-fostering measures)	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed
Data	
Measure 29.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 29.3.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 29.3.1 – reach of stakeholders or citizens	*Not subscribed*
	Not subscribed

informed about the outcome of research projects (effective repositories of advertising)	
Data	*Not subscribed*

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 30 Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.					
	C.30	**M 30.1**	**M 30.2**	**M 30.3**	**M 30.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 30.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 30.1.1	*Not subscribed*

QRE 30.1.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.1.3	Not subscribed
SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Not subscribed
Member States	

Measure 30.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.3	Not subscribed
Measure 30.3	Not subscribed
QRE 30.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 30.4	Not subscribed
QRE 30.4.1	Not subscribed

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 31					
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.					
	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed

	Not subscribed

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 31.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 31.2	
QRE 31.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	*Not subscribed*
Member States	

SLI 31.1.2 – impact of actions taken	*Not subscribed*

Member States	

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 31.3	Not subscribed
QRE 31.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 31.4	Not subscribed
QRE 31.4.1	Not subscribed

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	Not subscribed

of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 32.1	*Not subscribed*
Measure 32.2	
QRE 32.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 32.1.1 – use of the interfaces and other tools	*Not subscribed*
Data	*Not subscribed*
Measure 32.3	*Not subscribed*
QRE 32.3.1	*Not subscribed*

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitment 33

	Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.	
	C.33	**M 33.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	*Not subscribed*	*Not subscribed*

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	*Not subscribed*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	*Not subscribed*
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	*Not subscribed*

Measure 33.1	*Not subscribed*
QRE 33.1.1	*Not subscribed*
SLI 33.1.1 – number of European fact-checker	*Not subscribed*

s that are IFCN-certified	
Data	*Not subscribed*

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre						
Commitment 34 To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.						
	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments and alongside other Signatories, Google helped maintain the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Transparency Centre, located at https://disinfocode.eu during the reporting period.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 34.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 34.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**

VIII. Transparency Centre							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, and alongside other Signatories, Google populated the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Transparency Centre with related relevant information during the reporting period.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 35.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 35.6	**Google, on behalf of related services**

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36				
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	**M 36.1**	**M 36.2**	**M 36.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, Google uploaded its H1 2025 PDF report to the newly launched Transparency Centre in September 2025, and completed the final upload in October 2025 after site maintenance.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In line with Code commitments, Google plans to upload reports and pertinent updates to the Transparency Centre located at https://disinfocode.eu.

Measure 36.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 36.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 36.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34–36)	N/A
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34–36)	N/A
SLI 36.1.1 – (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	During the period from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,676 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 11,362 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.
Data	

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force							
Commitment 37							
Signatories commit to participate in the Permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.							
	C.37	**M 37.1**	**M 37.2**	**M 37.3**	**M 37.4**	**M 37.5**	**M 37.6**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 37.1	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.2	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.3	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.4	**Google, on behalf of related services**
Measure 37.5	**Google, on behalf of related services**

Measure 37.6	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 37.6.1	Google has continued to meaningfully engage in Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to participation in meetings, and providing feedback.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 38.1	**Code of Conduct Regulatory Text**	**Google, on behalf of related services**
QRE 38.1.1	Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply	**Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.** Google has several teams across the company, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments made under this Code. This is core to

	with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.	Google's mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful content. To enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google relies both on specially-trained experts and machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 39
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H2 2025 (1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025), Google provided its seventh report to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

	X. Monitoring of the Code						
	Commitment 40 Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.						
	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H2 2025 (1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025), Google provided its seventh report which included reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code				
Commitment 41 Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.				
	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	- Google has been a participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators. - Google supported the publication of Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through its collaboration with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), Avaaz and the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 42 Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As requested by the European Commission, Google provides an Annex on Elections to this report. During the reporting period, Google activated temporary Rapid Response Systems (RRSs) for elections in Czech Republic, Ireland, Moldova and the Netherlands at the EC's request and also participated in discussions on the establishment of a permanent Elections RRS by the Task-force.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 43
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.

	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 44
Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations,

	independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.
	C.44
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**Google, on behalf of related services**

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A - It was agreed with the European Commission that this commitment is duplicative of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) requirements, and should therefore be deleted from the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation text. Google is taking steps to be subject to an audit under the DSA, for relevant services.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
War in Ukraine

Overview

In response to the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has continued through 2025, Google remains committed to help by providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, and providing high-quality information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during this conflict:

1. Continued online services manipulation and coordinated influence operations;
2. Advertising and monetisation linked to state-backed Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.

The following sections summarise Google's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the war in Ukraine.

1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations
Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is helping Ukraine by monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors.

2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation
During the reporting period, Google continued to pause the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia via Google demand and third-party bidding, ads on Google's properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Google paused ads containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager in August 2024. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure
Google expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google's free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the war in Ukraine broke out. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats.

GTIG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the war, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. GTIG's [findings](#) have shown that government-backed actors from [Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea](#) have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, nonprofit organisations, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the war as a lure for malicious campaigns.

Future measures
Google aims to continue the following approach when responding to future crisis situations:
- Elevate access to high-quality information across Google services;
- Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
- Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
- Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the war in Ukraine, including its Sensitive Events Policy.	No changes to Ads policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the war in Ukraine during this reporting period. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google Search		

Enforcement of existing policies	Google Search continued to enforce all Google Search policies during the war in Ukraine.	No changes to Search policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the war in Ukraine. Google Search continues to enforce all Google Search policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
YouTube		
Enforcement of existing policies	YouTube continued to enforce all Community Guidelines policies during the war in Ukraine.	No changes to YouTube's Community Guidelines and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the war in Ukraine during this reporting period. YouTube continues to enforce all policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		
Enforces the Google Ads Misrepresentation Policy focusing on ensuring ads are honest and transparent, providing users with the information needed to make informed decisions. This policy covers various forms of deception, including unacceptable business practices and misleading representations.	Specifically for the war in Ukraine, Google Ads focused on the Manipulated Media sub-category in the Misrepresentation Policy which disallows the practice of deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues or matters of public concern. Google Ads also enforced the Clickbait Ads Policy which is a sub-category under the Misrepresentation Policy. This policy prohibits ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic.	
	Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for more details on Google Ads Misrepresentation Policy, including Manipulated Media and Clickbait Ads sub-categories.	

As noted above, Google Ads enforces the [Sensitive Events Policy](#) which does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google Ads enforced [the Sensitive Events Policy](#) and paused ads on pages containing content that is exploitative, dismissive, or condones the invasion in March 2022. This is in addition to the [pausing of ads](#) from and on Russian Federation state-funded media in February 2022.
	Google Advertising continues to remain vigilant in enforcing all relevant policies, including the Sensitive Events Policy, related to the war in Ukraine.
Enforces the [Inappropriate Content Policy](#) which does not allow ads or destinations that display shocking content or that promote hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google Ads focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory and Shocking Content sub-categories of the Inappropriate Content Policy. The Dangerous or Derogatory sub-category does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. The Shocking Content sub-category does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
	Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for more details on Google Ads Inappropriate Content Policy.
Enforces the [Other Restricted Businesses Policy](#) which restricts certain kinds of businesses from advertising with Google Ads to prevent users from being exploited, even if individual businesses appear to comply with other policies.	In order to protect users, Google Ads specifically focused on enforcing the Government Documents and Official Services Policy which disallows the promotion of documents and/or services that facilitate the acquisition, renewal, replacement or lookup of official documents or information that are available directly from a government or government delegated provider.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Enforces policies, such as the [Misleading Representation Policy](#) and the [Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy](#), on AdSense that aim to prohibit the monetisation of content that has misleading representation, unreliable and harmful claims, deceptive practices, manipulated media, or is deemed dangerous or derogatory.	Google AdSense will continue to monitor and prevent monetisation of content that violates these policies.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused Google AdSense's monetisation of Russian Federation state-funded media.	Beginning in February 2022, Google AdSense prohibited the monetisation of any Russian Federation state-funded media (i.e. sites, apps, YouTube channels). It is important to note that Google's current [Publisher Policies](#) and [advertiser-friendly guidelines](#) already prohibited many forms of content related to the war in Ukraine from monetising. In addition, Google Advertising paused the monetisation of content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the invasion across services.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused the ability of Russian-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager.	In August 2024, due to ongoing developments in Russia, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media since February 2022.	Google also paused ads from and for Russian Federation [state-funded media](#).
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Enforced the Coordinated Deceptive Practices Policy which prohibits advertisers from promoting content related to public concerns while misrepresenting or	Accounts found to be engaging in Coordinated Deceptive Practices are suspended immediately and without prior warning. Clickbait ads are disapproved upon detection. Repeated violations of this policy can lead to an account suspension.

concealing their identity or country or origin.	
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
Not subscribed	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed

Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Continued to enforce Spam and Webmaster Policies.	See more details about Google Search's implementation of its Spam and Webmaster Policies in the response to QRE 14.1.2.
	See overall spam metrics in SLI 14.2.1. Google Search is unable to provide spam metrics specific to this crisis event.
YouTube	
YouTube continues to enforce its Community Guidelines, including but not limited to misinformation policies, which establish what type of content and behaviour is not allowed on the platform.	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for information on how YouTube enforces its Community Guidelines.
	From 24 February 2022 through 30 June 2025, YouTube took the following actions related to the ongoing war in Ukraine: • Removed over 160,000 videos and over 12,000 channels. • Blocked over 5.9 million videos and over 1,000 channels. Since June 2025, YouTube's enforcement continues within its standard enforcement systems, which detect violations of its content policies, including those pertaining to misinformation, hate

	speech, and graphic violence. This data can be found in the Removal section of YouTube's [Community Guidelines Transparency Report](#).
Google, on behalf of related services	
Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the [Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative](#) — including compromise assessments, incident response services, [shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services](#) — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.	N/A
	N/A
Announced a new Online Safety and Security Partnership with the [International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES)](#) to provide free security training and tools to high-risk users. Google's new partnership with IFES combines Google's account security tools, like the [Advanced Protection Program (APP)](#), and IFES's history in supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections management bodies.	IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across the world, including: • **Security training:** In collaboration with [Google's Safety Engineering Centre](#), IFES will expand its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices and create content for specialised audiences. • **Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries:** Google's tools and resources for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES's international networks, helping more people use things like Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google's strongest form of account security for high-risk users, [Google Titan Security Keys](#), [Project Shield](#), a free tool to help protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more. • **Industry thought leadership and case studies:** IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES's partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its [Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG)](#) to help IFES further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process.
	N/A

Expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google's free protection against DDoS attack, so that Ukrainian government websites, embassies worldwide and other governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves and continue to offer their crucial services.	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.
	N/A
Added websites and domains identified as threats to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.	Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine. Google sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.
	N/A
Automatically increased Google account security protections (including more frequent authentication challenges) for people in Ukraine and the surrounding region.	Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection Program — which delivers Google's highest level of security — is currently protecting the accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine.
	N/A
Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the war in Ukraine. GTIG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.	Throughout 2025, Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.
	Please refer to the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Empowering Users	
Google Search	
Limited recommendations globally for a number of Russian state-funded media outlets. Enforced its Content Policies, including Misinformation Policies, which establish what types of content is not allowed on Google Search.	N/A
	Google removed 28 websites that were delisted under the EU sanctions on Russian state media during the reporting period.
In efforts to help users find accurate and fact-checked information online, Google Search deployed 'About This Image' to English language users globally in October 2023, and was made available on Circle to Search and Google Lens starting in July 2024.	'About This Image' enables users to check the credibility and context of an image or photo found online. This feature allows users to discover the image's history, how other websites are using the image, and any metadata available. The tool is available in over 40 additional languages around the world, including English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese. It is also available on Circle to Search and Google Lens, giving users more ways to quickly get context on images that they see wherever they come across them. We continue looking at ways to integrate integrity signals more directly throughout the Search experience, with a view to enhancing user experience and providing users with the context needed to make informed decisions about the information they see online. For example, we are looking at embedding image provenance into Google Search features in order to enable users to check image provenance more seamlessly.
	Please refer to QRE 17.1.1 for more details on 'About This Image'.
Deploys features that enhance access to high-quality information on Search.	Globally, Google has surfaced features on Search to provide quick access to high-quality information, including highlighting news coverage from trusted sources and other helpful context about the invasion. See below for details on features in Ukraine.
	Search reports metrics on the 'About This Result' & the 'More About This Page' features in SLI 17.1.1.

N/A	N/A
	N/A
Displayed content advisories when results for a query are rapidly evolving, providing a message that lets users know the topic may still be developing.	This notice is particularly important during the crisis, given how quickly new search terms are developing. In such cases, it is helpful to alert users to the fact that a new search term or query is so new that high-quality information has not been published yet on the open web. Among other languages, these notices are launched in Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.
	See SLI 17.1.1 for metrics on the impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results.
N/A	N/A
	N/A
YouTube	
YouTube continues its '[Hit Pause](#)' global media literacy campaign, to teach viewers critical skills and to improve users' experiences on YouTube.	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign has been teaching viewers critical media literacy skills. These skills are important in all crisis situations, including the war in Ukraine.

	See Commitment 17 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to surface videos from high-quality sources in search results and recommendations.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube surfaces videos from high-quality sources in search results and recommendations. These high-quality sources are important in all crisis situations, including the war in Ukraine.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to provide features to enhance access to high-quality information, including Information Panels, on YouTube.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube enhances access to high-quality information, including information panels on topics prone to misinformation.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	
Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts.	Access to high-quality information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google worked closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Empowering the research community	
Google Search	
See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.	
YouTube	

YouTube established the [YouTube Researcher Program](#), which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	
Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](#). This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate the intensified cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine. LetsData is one of [17 companies](#) joining the second cohort of the [Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program](#).	The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation. Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created [LetsData](#), which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate this challenge. LetsData offers AI radar against disinformation. It provides real-time media and social media monitoring in more than 50 countries, empowering state agencies, businesses and civil societies to proactively navigate risks and seize opportunities in the face of disinformation. Since launching, their AI-powered solution has experienced rapid growth, establishing operations in the U.S. while continuing to anchor their technology and product development in Europe. Now, they are one of [17 companies](#) joining the second cohort of the [Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program](#). This group of startups, from nine countries across Europe and North America, will get access to Google's tools, partners and practices to help them continue to scale — and ultimately make the world a safer place.

	See Commitment 28 for metrics on these efforts.
In June 2025, Google announced the final recipients of the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, a $10 million fund providing additional equity-free cash awards along with Google support, mentorship and product expertise to Ukrainian-founded tech companies.	In March 2022, Google launched the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, which began with an initial $5 million in 2022 and expanded with a new $10 million fund for 2024. This fund provides crucial equity-free cash awards and dedicated Google support to help founders sustain and grow their businesses, strengthen their community and lay a vital foundation for post-war economic recovery. In June 2025, Google announced the final 35 recipients of the program. These 35 ambitious companies are making incredible technological advancements in critical areas from medical research to AI. Each selected startup receives up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $350,000 in Google Cloud credits. Google's goal is to provide them with unique expertise, connections and resources to adapt and expand despite the ongoing war. We're confident these entrepreneurs and all the others supported by this fund will drive their country's economic recovery and lead the next generation of global tech leaders.
	In November 2025, Google announced that the fund had successfully supported 156 startups in total since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Combined, these companies raised over $60 million in follow-on funding, grew their revenues by approximately 100%, and created over 500 new jobs.

Empowering the fact-checking community
Google Search
Not subscribed
YouTube
Not subscribed
Google, on behalf of related services
Not subscribed

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
Israel-Gaza conflict

Overview

Following the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google has actively worked to support humanitarian and relief efforts, ensure platforms and partnerships are responsive to the current crisis, and counter the threat of disinformation. Google identified a few areas of focus for addressing the ongoing crisis:

- Humanitarian and relief efforts;
- Platforms and partnerships to protect our services from coordinated influence operations, hate speech, and graphic and terrorist content.

Humanitarian and relief efforts

Google.org has provided more than $18 million to nonprofits providing relief to civilians affected in Israel and Gaza. This includes more than $11 million raised globally by Google employees with company match and $1 million in donated Search Ads to nonprofits so they can better connect with people in need and provide information to those looking to help. We also provided $6 million in Google.org grant funding, including $3 million provided to Natal, an apolitical nonprofit organisation focused on psychological treatment of victims of trauma. The remaining funds were provided to organisations focussed on humanitarian aid and relief in Gaza, including $1 million to Save the Children, $1 million to Palestinian Red Crescent, $1 million to International Medical Corps.

Specifically, Google's humanitarian and relief efforts with these organisations include:
- Natal- Israel Trauma and Resiliency Centre: In the early days of the war, calls to Natal's support hotline went from around 300 a day to 8,000 a day. With our funding, they were able to scale their support to patients by 450%, including multidisciplinary treatment and mental & psychosocial support to direct and indirect victims of trauma due to terror and war in Israel.
- [See two-year detailed report] After more than two years and thanks to Google's support, International Medical Corps continues to deliver lifesaving health and humanitarian services across Gaza. In addition to the two field hospitals they have been operating in Dier al Balah and Al Zawaida, they announced that they opened a third field hospital in Gaza City in November 2025, significantly expanding access to critical care for civilians in the north. As of late Jan 2026, International Medical Corps has:
  - Provided 533,119 outpatient consultations;
  - Performed more than 19,771 surgeries;
  - Supported 9,238 deliveries, including 1,930 caesarean sections;

○ Screened 154,473 children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women for malnutrition; and much more.

Platforms and partnerships

As the conflict continues, Google is committed to tackling disinformation, hate speech, graphic content and terrorist content by continuing to find ways to provide support through its products. For example, Google has deployed language capabilities to support emergency efforts including emergency translations, and localising Google content to help users, businesses and nonprofit organisations. Google has also pledged to help its partners in these extraordinary circumstances. For example, when schools closed in October 2023, the Ministry of Education in Israel used Meet as their core teach-from-home platform and Google provided support. Google has been in touch with Gaza-based partners and participants in its Palestine Launchpad program, its digital skills and entrepreneurship program for Palestinians, to try to support those who have been significantly impacted by this crisis.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the Israel-Gaza conflict.	No changes to Ads policies were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Advertising continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google Search		
Enhanced enforcement of existing policies	While Google Search relied on existing policies to address the information challenges posed by the Hamas attacks and Israel's response, Google Search gave special priority to reports of issues related to the crisis in recognition of the importance and urgency of the risks to human life.	No changes to Search policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Search continues to enforce all Google Search policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.

YouTube		
Enforcement of existing policies	YouTube's Hate Speech Policy prohibits content denying, trivialising, or minimising violent historical events, including the 7 October Hamas attacks in Israel. YouTube relies on a variety of factors to determine whether a major violent event is covered, using guidance from outside experts and governing bodies to inform its approach.	No changes to YouTube Community Guidelines and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. YouTube continues to enforce all policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		
Google AdSense enforces the Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy which does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group of people on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, or nationality.	In order to protect users and advertisers, Google requires that all publishers comply with Google Publisher Policies in order to monetise on AdSense. Due to the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google AdSense focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy. Under this policy, Google AdSense does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. Nor is content allowed that harasses, intimidates, or bullies an individual or group of individuals. In addition, content that threatens or advocates for physical or mental harm to oneself or others is also not allowed. Google also does not allow content that seeks to exploit others, like extortion, blackmail.	
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.	

Implementation of a Sensitive Event	Since 7 October 2023, Google Ads has taken several measures across its platforms in response to the Israel-Gaza conflict, including implementing a sensitive event to help prevent exploitative ads around this conflict. Google's mission to elevate high-quality information and enhance information quality across its services is of utmost importance and Google Ads has and will continue to rigorously enforce its policies. Google Ads often institutes sensitive events following natural disasters or other tragic events. When a sensitive event is declared, Google Ads does not allow ads that exploit or capitalise on these tragedies. Google does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence. Google does not allow ads that claim victims of a sensitive event were responsible for their own tragedy or similar instances of victim blaming; ads that claim victims of a sensitive event are not deserving of remedy or support.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.
Within the Inappropriate Content Policy, Google Advertising does not allow Shocking Content.	Google does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma. Google does not allow promotions containing gratuitous portrayals of bodily fluids or waste. Google does not allow promotions containing obscene or profane language. Google does not allow promotions that are likely to shock or scare.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.

Google Advertising enforces the Misrepresentation Policy, which includes [Clickbait ads]().	Google does not allow ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic. Google also does not allow ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.
No changes to the enforcement of Ads Policies as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict.	To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all [applicable laws and regulations]() in addition to the [Google Ads policies](). Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violate these policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks. Google Ads policy violations can lead to ad or asset disapproval, or account suspension.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Teams across the company are dedicating resources as part of an urgent escalations workforce to respond to the Israel-Gaza conflict and take quick measures as needed.	Google Advertising invests heavily in the enforcement of its policies. Google Advertising has a team of thousands working around the clock to create and enforce its policies at scale.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
Not subscribed	Not subscribed
	Not subscribed
Integrity of Services	
Google Search	

Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is closely monitoring relevant activity concerning the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States.
	See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts.

YouTube	
YouTube's teams have been working quickly to remove content that violates its policies including those pertaining to hate speech, violent extremism, violent or graphic content, harassment, and misinformation. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.	- Per YouTube's Hate Speech Policy, content that promotes violence or hatred against groups based on their ethnicity, nationality, race or religion is not allowed on YouTube. This includes Jewish, Muslim, and other religious or ethnic communities. - Per YouTube's Violent Extremist Policy, content that praises, promotes or in any way aids violent criminal organisations is prohibited. Additionally, content produced by designated terrorist organisations, such as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (U.S.), or organisation identified by the United Nations, is not allowed on YouTube. This includes content produced by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). - In addition, YouTube has a dedicated button underneath every video on YouTube to flag content with the option to mark it as 'promotes terrorism.' - Per YouTube's Violent or Graphic Content Policies, YouTube prohibits violent or gory content intended to shock or disgust viewers. Additionally, content encouraging others to commit violent acts against individuals or a defined group of people, including the Jewish, Muslim and other religious communities, is not allowed on YouTube. - Per YouTube's Harassment Policies, content that promotes harmful conspiracy theories or targets individuals based on their protected group status is not allowed on YouTube. Additionally, content that realistically simulates deceased minors or victims of deadly or well-documented major violent events describing their death or violence experienced, is not allowed on YouTube. - Per YouTube's Misinformation Policies, content containing certain types of misinformation that can cause real-world harm, including certain types of misattributed content, is not allowed on YouTube.

	From 6 October 2023 through 30 June 2025, YouTube took the following actions after the terrorist attack by Hamas in Israel and the escalated conflict now underway in Israel and Gaza: ● Removed over 140,000 videos and over 6,000 channels; ● Removed over 500 million comments. Since June 2025, YouTube's enforcement continues within its standard enforcement systems, which detect violations of its content policies, including those pertaining to misinformation, hate speech, and graphic violence. This data can be found in the Removal section of YouTube's [Community Guidelines Transparency Report](#).
Google, on behalf of related services	
Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. GTIG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.	Throughout 2025, Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. For example, in November 2025, GTIG identified a campaign that was sharing content in English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian about various topics including the Israel-Gaza conflict. For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the [Q3 2025 Bulletin](#) and [Q4 2025 Bulletin](#).
	Please refer to the [Q3 2025 Bulletin](#) and [Q4 2025 Bulletin](#) for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.
Empowering Users	
Google Search	
In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality information to users.	See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report.
	See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	

YouTube is continuing to actively surface high-quality news content in search results for queries about Israel and Gaza, including through its breaking news and top news shelves.	YouTube's recommendation system is prominently surfacing news from high-quality sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates. YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves are surfacing at the top of search results related to the attacks in Israel and on the homepage, prominently featuring content from high-quality news sources.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Empowering the research community	
Google Search	
Google established the Google Research Program in August 2023, which provides eligible EU researchers to apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google Search provides publicly available data via the Google Research Program which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
N/A	N/A
YouTube	
YouTube established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.
Google, on behalf of related services	

| As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact. | See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza. |
| | See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts. |

Empowering the fact-checking community
Google Search
Not subscribed
YouTube
Not subscribed
Google, on behalf of related services
Not subscribed

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election
Elections in the EU

Overview

In elections and other democratic processes, people want access to high-quality information and a broad range of perspectives. High-quality information helps people make informed decisions when voting and counteracts abuse by bad actors. Consistent with its broader approach to elections around the world, during the various elections across the EU in the reporting period, Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training – with a strong focus on helping people navigate AI-generated content.

Across Google, various teams support democratic processes by connecting people to election information like practical tips on how to register to vote or providing high-quality information about candidates. In 2025, a number of key elections took place around the world and across the EU in particular. During the reporting period, voters cast their votes in Moldova, Czech Republic, Portugal, Ireland and the Netherlands. Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. Across its efforts, Google also has an increased focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and the part it can play in the disinformation landscape — while also leveraging AI models to augment Google's abuse-fighting efforts.

Safeguarding Google platforms and disrupting the spread of disinformation

To better secure its products and prevent abuse, Google continues to enhance its enforcement systems and to invest in Trust & Safety operations — including at its Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) for Content Responsibility in Dublin, dedicated to online safety in Europe and around the world. Google also continues to partner with the wider ecosystem to combat disinformation.

- **Enforcing Google policies and using AI models to fight abuse at scale:** Google has long-standing policies that inform how it approaches areas like manipulated media, hate and harassment, and incitement to violence — along with policies around demonstrably false claims that could undermine democratic processes, for example in YouTube's Community Guidelines. To help enforce Google policies, Google's AI models are enhancing its abuse-fighting efforts. With recent advances in Google's Large Language Models (LLMs), Google is building faster and more adaptable enforcement systems that enable us to remain nimble and take action even more quickly when new threats emerge.
- **Working with the wider ecosystem:** Since Google's inaugural commitment of €25 million to help launch the European Media & Information Fund, an effort designed to strengthen media literacy and information quality across Europe, 121 projects have been funded across 28 countries so far.

Helping people navigate AI-generated content

Like any emerging technology, AI presents new opportunities as well as challenges. For example, generative AI makes it easier than ever to create new content, but it can also raise questions about trustworthiness of information. Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate content that was AI-generated. Overall, harmful altered or synthetic political content did not appear to be widespread on Google's platforms. Measures that helped mitigate that risk include:

- **Ads disclosures:** Google expanded its Political Content Policies in November 2023 to require advertisers to disclose when their election ads include synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. Google's ads policies already prohibit the use of manipulated media to mislead people, like deep fakes or doctored content. In September 2025, Google updated the Political Content Policies restricting political advertising in the European Union.
- **Content labels on YouTube:** YouTube's Misinformation Policies prohibit technically manipulated content that misleads users and could pose a serious risk of egregious harm — and YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created realistic altered or synthetic content, and will display a label that indicates for people when the content they are watching is synthetic. For sensitive content, including election related content, that contains realistic altered or synthetic material, the label appears on the video itself and in the video description.
- **Provide users with additional context:** 'About This Image' in Search helps people assess the credibility and context of images found online. We continue looking at ways to integrate integrity signals more directly throughout the Search experience, with a view to enhancing user experience and providing users with the context needed to make informed decisions about the information they see online. For example, we are looking at embedding image provenance into Google Search features in order to enable users to check image provenance more seamlessly.
- **Industry collaboration**: Google is a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) and standard, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content.

Informing voters surfacing high-quality information

In the build-up to elections, people need useful, relevant and timely information to help them navigate the electoral process. Here are some of the ways Google makes it easy for people to find what they need, and which were deployed during elections that took place across the EU in 2025:

- **High-quality Information on YouTube:** For news and information related to elections, YouTube's systems prominently surface high-quality content, on the YouTube homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube also displays information panels at the top of search results and below videos to provide additional context. For example, YouTube may surface various election information panels above search results or on videos related to election candidates, parties or voting.
- **Ongoing transparency on Election Ads:** Starting September 2025, Google restricted political advertising in the European Union under new regulations. Since mid-August 2025, advertisers have been asked to declare if they intend to run political advertising. EU

Election Ads previously shown in the Political Ads Transparency Report will remain publicly accessible in the Ads Transparency Centre, subject to retention policies.

Equipping campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training

As elections come with increased cybersecurity risks, Google works hard to help high-risk users, such as campaigns and election officials, civil society and news sources, improve their security in light of existing and emerging threats, and to educate them on how to use Google's products and services.

- **Security tools for campaign and election teams**: Google offers free services like its Advanced Protection Program — Google's strongest set of cyber protections — and Project Shield, which provides unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Google also partners with Possible, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Deutschland sicher im Netz (DSIN) to scale account security training and to provide security tools including Titan Security Keys, which defend against phishing attacks and prevent bad actors from accessing users' Google Accounts.
- **Tackling coordinated influence operations**: Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) helps identify, monitor and tackle emerging threats, ranging from coordinated influence operations to cyber espionage campaigns against high-risk entities. Google reports on actions taken in its quarterly bulletin, and meets regularly with government officials and others in the industry to share threat information and suspected election interference. Mandiant also helps organisations build holistic election security programs and harden their defences with comprehensive solutions, services and tools, including proactive exposure management, proactive intelligence threat hunts, cyber crisis communication services and threat intelligence tracking of information operations. A recent publication from the team gives an overview of the global election cybersecurity landscape, designed to help election organisations tackle a range of potential threats.

Google is committed to working with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union — building on its commitments made in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Google Advertising

Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.

Google Search		
N/A	N/A	N/A

YouTube		
N/A	N/A	N/A

Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A

Scrutiny of Ads Placements		

Google Advertising		
Political Content Policy Google stopped serving political advertising in the EU before the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) Regulation entered into force in October 2025.	In 2019, Google launched the EU Election Ads Policy, which required advertisers wishing to run EU Election Ads in the EU to complete a two-step verification process. Once an advertiser had completed EU Election Ads verification, all their EU Election Ads contained a disclosure that identified who paid for the ad. All EU Election Ads run by verified EU election advertisers in the EU were also subject to targeting restrictions. To provide transparency for users, Google published a Political Advertising transparency report and a political ads library. Only ads that were in scope of the Election Ads Policy, and that were run by verified election advertisers, were included in the report. In July 2024, Google updated the Disclosure requirements for synthetic content under the Political Content Policy, requiring advertisers to disclose election ads that contained synthetic or digitally altered content that inauthentically depicted real or realistic-looking people or events. In June 2024, Google updated the policy for EU Election Ads to include restrictions in Italy that required advertisers to comply with applicable local electoral laws, including pausing ads as required during periods defined by law as silence periods. Google did not allow EU Election Ads, as defined by Ads' policies, to serve in Italy during a silence period.	

	In September 2025, Google updated the Political Content Policy to include a regional restriction for the EU. Under this new restriction (as well as previous Election Ads Policy), forms of political advertising, as defined by EU Regulation 2024/900, are no longer permitted to serve on Google platforms in EU countries.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Misrepresentation Policy	AdSense policies that disrupt the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors related to politics in the AdSense ecosystem that publishers must adhere to include Manipulated Media and Deceptive Practices.
	Google Ads provides a way for advertisers and businesses to reach new customers as they search on Google for words related to an advertiser's business, or browse websites with related themes. However, Google Ads enforces policies that do not allow ads or destinations related to politics that display Inappropriate Content or Misrepresentation. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Inappropriate Content include the Sensitive Event Policy and Hacked Political Materials Policy. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Misrepresentation include the Coordinated Deceptive Practices and Manipulated Media Policy.
	In March 2024, Google Advertising updated the Unacceptable business practices portion of the Misrepresentation Policy to include enticing users to part with money or information by impersonating or falsely implying affiliation with or endorsement by a public figure, brand, or organisation. Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in March 2024 for advertisers outside of France. For advertisers in France, Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in April 2024. The reason for this was that toward the end of 2023 and into 2024, Google Advertising faced a targeted campaign of ads featuring the likeness of public figures to scam users, often through the use of deep fakes. When Google Advertising detected this threat, it created a dedicated team to respond immediately. It also pinpointed patterns in the bad actors' behaviour, trained its automated enforcement models to detect similar ads and began removing them at scale. Google Advertising also updated its Misrepresentation Policy to better enable it to rapidly suspend the accounts of bad actors.

| | In October 2025, the Google Ads Misrepresentation policy concerning Dishonest Pricing Practices was updated to ensure greater transparency and prevent user deception. These updates require advertisers to clearly and conspicuously disclose the payment model or full expense that a user will bear and prohibits pricing practices that create a false or misleading impression of the cost of a product or service, leading to inflated or unexpected charges. |
| | Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for metrics related to these policies. |

Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
Not subscribed	

Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Search works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. Search policies are enforced globally.	See Commitment 14-15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search's policies are enforced globally, including during elections in the EU.
	See Commitment 14-15 for metrics on these efforts.
Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search will approach responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to future elections.
	See Commitment 15 for more details on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's	YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updates policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found here.

policies are enforced across languages and locales.	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.
YouTube creators are required to disclose when they upload a video that contains realistic altered or synthetic content, after which YouTube adds a transparency label so that viewers have this important context.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube approaches responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to future elections.
	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.
Google, on behalf of related services	
Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world.
	See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.
Google helped develop the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) to streamline the exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms.	The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to ensure rapid and effective cooperation and communication between them ahead and during the election period. The RRS allows non-platform Signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies. The RRS also provides an opportunity for platform Signatories to provide feedback - such as on broader trends - to the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force Working Group with Member State authorities, independent experts and civil society organisations.
	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.

In an effort to equip election campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training, Google's Project Shield provides free and unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks - a method of censorship and intimidation.	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.
	N/A
Empowering Users	
Google Search	
In 2026, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality information to voters.	See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report.
	See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.
Users often see a Knowledge Panel on the Search Results page for searches about people and organisations—a box with an overview of key information (e.g. candidates and parties) to help them go deeper. See here for more information.	Search is committed to providing timely and high-quality information on Google Search to help voters understand, navigate, and participate in democratic processes. Through its products, Google Search hopes to connect users with the civic information that they need. Find more information here.
	N/A
YouTube	

YouTube's systems prioritise connecting viewers with high-quality information, including on events such as elections in the EU.	YouTube's recommendation system prominently surfaces news from high-quality sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates. YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves surface at the top of search results, prominently featuring content from high-quality news sources, which may include information about EU elections.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
Election information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about election related content they are viewing.	Information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.
	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.
Google on behalf of related services	
Leading up to and during key elections in the EU, Google Search deployed election features to help users prepare for elections and access high-quality election information.	In advance of the 2025 elections in the EU, Google launched features to help users prepare for the elections and access high-quality election information. In Ireland, the Czech Republic and Netherlands, for example, we launched Search Homepage Promotions to help users easily find and access election commission websites.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Google partnered with ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank, to empower young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities.	With the voting age lowered to 16+ in some European countries, more young people can participate in the democratic process. To support them, Google.org has awarded a $1 million grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank looking for innovative solutions to fight election disinformation and reduce barriers to voting using tech. The grant funded youth-led hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to focus on information quality and

	develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018. ThinkYoung launched a call for applications for a chance to test and develop solutions alongside its partners and experts. This initiative has paid out €300,000 in cash and prizes to the winning teams.
	In October 2025, with Google's support, the grand winner was awarded €200,000 at The Grand Final in Brussels, and another two winners were each awarded €30,000.
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Empowering the Research Community	
Google Search	
Search provides publicly available data via the Google Researcher Program.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search provides publicly available data via the Google Researcher Program.
	Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube	
YouTube established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to EU elections during the reporting period.
	See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.

Google on behalf of related services	
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the [Google Researcher Program](). This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the EU elections in 2025.
	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
Google regularly undertakes stakeholder engagement to discuss Google's election preparedness.	Google's consultations with civil society organisations, academics and other relevant subject matter experts serve to both inform and share its resources and technologies. Since its launch, the Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) Dublin has held hundreds of public and private engagements, to share Google's experience of managing content risk and hear from experts across a wide range of topics related to election integrity. Google also offered training to political parties on how to efficiently use Google platforms ahead of elections and secured direct communication channels with all these parties and key candidates.
	Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community	
Google Search	
Not subscribed	
YouTube	
Not subscribed	
Google on behalf of related services	
Not subscribed	