



# Code of Conduct on Disinformation – Report of TikTok for the period 1 July 2025 - 31 December 2025



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| <b>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b> |                             |                                     |
| 1                                    | <a href="#">Measure 1.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 1.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 1.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 1.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 1.5</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 1.6</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 2                                    | <a href="#">Measure 2.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 2.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 2.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 2.4</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 3                                    | <a href="#">Measure 3.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 3.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 3.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>III. Political advertising</b>    |                             |                                     |
| 4                                    | <a href="#">Measure 4.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 4.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 5                                    | <a href="#">Measure 5.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 6                                    | <a href="#">Measure 6.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 6.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 6.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 6.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 6.5</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 7                                    | <a href="#">Measure 7.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 7.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 7.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                      | <a href="#">Measure 7.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 8                                    | <a href="#">Measure 8.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |



|                                  |                              |                                     |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 8.2</a>  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 9                                | <a href="#">Measure 9.1</a>  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 9.2</a>  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 10                               | <a href="#">Measure 10.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 10.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 11                               | <a href="#">Measure 11.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 11.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 11.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 11.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 12                               | <a href="#">Measure 12.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 12.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 12.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 13                               | <a href="#">Measure 13.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 13.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 13.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| <b>IV. Integrity of services</b> |                              |                                     |
| 14                               | <a href="#">Measure 14.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 14.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 14.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 15                               | <a href="#">Measure 15.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 15.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 16                               | <a href="#">Measure 16.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 16.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>V. Empowering users</b>       |                              |                                     |
| 17                               | <a href="#">Measure 17.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 17.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 17.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 18                               | <a href="#">Measure 18.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 18.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 18.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |



|  |                              |                                     |
|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 19   | <a href="#">Measure 19.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 19.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 20   | <a href="#">Measure 20.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 20.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 21   | <a href="#">Measure 21.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 21.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 21.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 22   | <a href="#">Measure 22.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 22.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 22.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 22.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 22.5</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 22.6</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 22.7</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 23   | <a href="#">Measure 23.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 23.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 24   | <a href="#">Measure 24.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 25   | <a href="#">Measure 25.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 25.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| <b>VI. Empowering the research community</b> |                              |                                     |
| 26   | <a href="#">Measure 26.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 26.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 26.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 27   | <a href="#">Measure 27.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 27.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 27.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 27.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 28   | <a href="#">Measure 28.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 28.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |



|  |                              |                                     |
|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|  | <a href="#">Measure 28.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 28.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 29   | <a href="#">Measure 29.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 29.2</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 29.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| <b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b> |                              |                                     |
| 30   | <a href="#">Measure 30.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 30.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 30.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 30.4</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 31   | <a href="#">Measure 31.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 31.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 31.3</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 31.4</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 32   | <a href="#">Measure 32.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 32.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 32.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 33   | <a href="#">Measure 33.1</a> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| <b>VIII. Transparency centre</b>                   |                              |                                     |
| 34   | <a href="#">Measure 34.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 34.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 34.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 34.4</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 34.5</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 35   | <a href="#">Measure 35.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 35.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 35.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 35.4</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|  | <a href="#">Measure 35.5</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |



|                                  |                              |                                     |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 35.6</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 36                               | <a href="#">Measure 36.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 36.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 36.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>IX. Permanent Task-Force</b>  |                              |                                     |
| 37                               | <a href="#">Measure 37.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 37.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 37.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 37.4</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 37.5</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 37.6</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>X. Monitoring of the Code</b> |                              |                                     |
| 38                               | <a href="#">Measure 38.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 39                               | -                            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 40                               | <a href="#">Measure 40.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 40.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 40.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 40.4</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 40.5</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 40.6</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 41                               | <a href="#">Measure 41.1</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 41.2</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
|                                  | <a href="#">Measure 41.3</a> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 42                               | -                            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 43                               | -                            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

## Executive summary

### About TikTok

TikTok's mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. With more than 200 million people across Europe coming to TikTok every month, including 178 million in the EU, it's natural for people to hold different opinions. That's why we focus on a shared set of facts when it comes to issues that affect people's safety. A safe, authentic, and trustworthy experience is essential to achieving our goals. Transparency plays a key role in building that trust, allowing online communities and society to assess how TikTok meets its regulatory obligations. As a signatory to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation (the Code), TikTok is committed to sharing clear insights into the actions we take.

TikTok takes disinformation extremely seriously. We are committed to preventing its spread, promoting authoritative information, and supporting media literacy initiatives that strengthen community resilience.

We prioritise proactive content moderation, with the vast majority of violative content removed before it is reported. In H2 2025, more than 98% of videos violating our Integrity and Authenticity policies were removed proactively worldwide.

We continue to address emerging behaviours and risks through our Digital Services Act (DSA) compliance programme, which the Code has operated under since July 2025.

Our actions under the Code demonstrate TikTok's strong commitment to combating disinformation while ensuring transparency and accountability to our community and regulators.

### Our seventh report under the Code - 1 July to 31 December 2025

TikTok has been an active participant in the Code since 2020. We remain engaged in the Code's Taskforce, participate in all relevant working group discussions, and co-chair the working group on Elections (Crisis Response).

This seventh report provides detailed insights into the measures we implement to combat disinformation. Of note during this reporting period:

- We fact-checked more than 13,000 videos working with our 13 IFCN-accredited partners in Europe.
- We maintained 14 media literacy and critical thinking campaigns across Europe and ran 8 temporary media literacy campaigns in countries with elections.
- We approved more than 130 applications to use our Research Tools and study our platform.
- We launched a \$2 million AI Literacy fund in partnership with over 20 global experts to support educational content helping users spot and understand AIGC.
- We continued to invest in combating harmful AI-Generated Content (AIGC) by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions. We updated our AIGC Deceptive policy to address how we define critical events and matters of public importance, now covering a larger surface area of potentially deceptive AIGC content.

Several measures extend beyond EEA member states, including EU candidate countries and nations with significant diaspora communities, thereby helping limit disinformation in Europe.

TikTok remains committed to protecting our community from disinformation, strengthening resilience against misinformation, and upholding transparency and accountability throughout electoral and crisis contexts.

A number of elections took place across Europe in H2 2025, and with that, elevated risks of inauthentic behaviour and attempts to mislead people or our systems in order to influence public discussion. This report details our efforts to safeguard users and protect platform integrity, including:

- Enforcing robust misinformation policies;
- Elevating reliable information from authoritative sources;
- Collaborating with our 13 IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and other external experts to strengthen our approach.

During this period, we devoted multiple resources to election integrity, including:

- Operating Mission Control Centres for dedicated monitoring;
- Participating in the Code's Rapid Response System to streamline coordination with civil society, fact-checkers, and platforms;
- Launching dedicated Election Centres with localised media literacy campaigns;
- Launching up-to-date, detailed coverage of elections across Europe on our [Global Elections Integrity Hub](#) within the Transparency Center.

We published three specific post-election chapters in this report documenting our approach to the Irish presidential election, Czech parliamentary election, and Dutch parliamentary election. We continue to provide dedicated crisis reports on the ongoing conflicts in Israel/Gaza and Russia/Ukraine, outlining our responses and safeguards.

## Our policies

Our Integrity and Authenticity policies are designed to help promote a trustworthy, authentic experience for our users. Our policies cover specific types of misinformation and deceptive behaviours, as well as misleading AI-generated content, conspiracy theories, Covert Influence Operations (CIO) networks, and public safety events like natural disasters. We do not allow false or misleading content that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. We do not allow misinformation or content about civic and electoral processes that may result in voter interference, disrupt the peaceful transfer of power, or lead to off-platform violence. Our policies are thoughtfully crafted to cover a broad range of content and the constantly changing nature of misinformation trends, often based on what's happening in the world. We also tackle deceptive behaviour by removing accounts that seek to mislead people or engage in platform manipulation.

## Enforcing our policies

Disinformation presents unique challenges. It is highly complex, evolves quickly, and often requires context. Our specialised Integrity and Authenticity moderation team receives training to assess, confirm, and take action on harmful misinformation. They also have access to our [independent fact-checking partners](#) to help evaluate content accuracy. We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection and automated moderation technology to action violative content. In H2 2025, 89% of the violative videos we removed globally were taken down through automated technology. We use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, and we rely on automated moderation when our systems have a high degree of confidence that content is violative. To further support proactive moderation at scale, we began testing large language models (LLMs). Because LLMs can comprehend human language and perform highly specific, complex tasks, we are better able to moderate nuanced areas like misinformation by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for our moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.

We are transparent with our community about [how we moderate](#) content and what [moderation actions we take](#). This includes details about what content we make [ineligible for the For You Feed](#). We disclose the underlying metrics in this report.

We also address disinformation by removing accounts that repeatedly post misinformation that violates our policies, and have expert teams who continuously monitor potential disinformation campaigns, inauthentic behavior, and influence operations.

## Transparency and Scrutiny of Advertising

Under our misinformation advertising policy, we are committed to maintaining a safe and trustworthy environment by taking action against misinformation, such as false, misleading, or unsubstantiated content, and manipulated content that misleads viewers and could harm individuals or society, regardless of intent. In H2 2025, we launched more [granular misinformation ad policies](#) in the EEA, providing clearer categorisation and comprehensive coverage to address misinformation in advertising

Like all users of our platform, participants in content monetisation programs must adhere to our Community Guidelines, including our Integrity and Authenticity policies. Those policies make clear that we do not allow activities that may undermine the integrity of our platform or the authenticity of our users. They also make clear that we remove content or accounts, including those of creators, which contain misleading information that causes significant harm or deceptive behaviours. In certain scenarios, we may remove a creator's access to a creator monetisation feature. Our [Creator Code of Conduct](#) outlines the standards we expect creators involved in TikTok programs, features, events and campaigns to uphold, both on and off-platform, including in relation to misinformation-related activities.

## Prohibiting Political Ads

TikTok is first and foremost an entertainment platform, and we're proud to be a place that brings people together through creative and entertaining content. While sharing political beliefs and engaging in political conversation is allowed as organic content on TikTok, our policies prohibit our community, including politicians and political party accounts, from placing [political ads](#) or posting politically [branded content](#). We also prevent [governments, politicians and political party accounts](#) from accessing our monetisation features and campaign fundraising (with a limited exception for government-run public service announcements such as health campaigns).

We focused on the enforcement of our political advertising prohibition in advance of the majority of the provisions in the EU Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising applying in this reporting period from October 2025.

By prohibiting political advertising, campaign fundraising, and limiting access to certain monetisation features, we're aiming to strike a balance between enabling people to discuss the issues that are relevant to their lives while also protecting the creative, entertaining platform that our community wants.

## Ensuring the Integrity of Services

Our [Integrity and Authenticity policies](#) strictly prohibit deceptive behaviors, and we are committed to combating manipulative practices. We remain highly vigilant about the evolving disinformation tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by malicious actors, as outlined in detail in Commitment 14. To effectively combat these threats, we continuously assess and refine our policies, ensuring they remain robust and responsive to emerging challenges in the information ecosystem. Through proactive monitoring and enforcement, we aim to safeguard the integrity of our platform and protect users from harmful influence operations.

We also continue to fight against covert influence operations (CIO), and we do not allow attempts to sway public opinion while misleading our platform's systems or community about the identity, origin, operating location, popularity, or purpose of the account. As shown in our H2 2025 reporting data, TikTok remains highly vigilant in detecting and disrupting CIOs that attempt to coordinate deceptive behavior to manipulate public discourse.



To provide granular transparency, TikTok maintains a [dedicated CIO Transparency Report within our Transparency Centre](#), detailing accounts removed for attempting to mislead the community or platform systems. During this period, our expert teams—comprising specialists in threat intelligence, data science, and law enforcement—focused on behavioural signals and technical linkages to identify coordinated efforts.

We've continued to strengthen our transparency work in Artificial Intelligence (AI) through the Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy, which addresses the use of content created or modified by AI on our platform. To support authentic and transparent experiences for our community, we require creators to label content that has been either completely generated or significantly edited by AI and disclose when their content shows realistic scenes. We detect AI-generated content through a combination of proactive technologies, alerts from experts and fact-checking partners, searches for clips or keywords related to known AI-generated content, and user reports. Since joining the [Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity \(C2PA\)](#) and the [Content Authenticity Initiative \(CAI\)](#) in May 2024, we've continued to collaborate on driving industry adoption of Content Credentials, a technology that helps platforms more easily label AI-generated content. Additionally, in H2 2025, we intensified our user education efforts by launching a \$2 million AI Literacy fund in partnership with over 20 experts to support educational content helping users spot and understand AIGC.

TikTok is also proud to actively participate in the Code's Rapid Response System, which streamlines the exchange of information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms.

## Empowering Users

In addition to taking action on content generated by users that violates our policies, we continuously work to deter misinformation proactively by empowering our community with resources that help them recognise misinformation, critically assess content, and file reports about potentially violative content. We offer our community in Europe easy-to-use in-app and online reporting tools so they can alert us to content or accounts they believe may violate our Community Guidelines or break the law. Content that is reported for being illegal will be reviewed against our policies, and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally.

We continue to dedicate resources to expanding our in-app measures that show users additional context on certain content (e.g., natural disasters and rapidly unfolding events), and to redirect them to authoritative information. We make these tools available in 23 EU official languages, and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users. For example, during this reporting period, we launched temporary in-app search guides to help users navigate sensitive events with authoritative information, including protests (France) and natural disasters such as wildfires (Portugal, Spain). These guides connected users to TikTok's Safety Center and authoritative third-party resources on aid and relief support.

We maintained 14 ongoing media literacy and critical thinking campaigns across Europe, in Germany, Romania, Poland, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Moldova, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands, in collaboration with fact-checking and media literacy partners.

We ran eight temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns, all with in-app Election Centers, in advance of regional elections. For the Dutch, Czech, and Irish elections, our search interventions were seen by users more than 9.3 million times during the reporting period. And, to better inform us about our approach to upcoming elections, we hosted Election Speaker Series, inviting external experts, including those from the fact-checking community, to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.

We continue to offer greater transparency to users about our systems and integrity and authenticity efforts. Our Transparency Center provides a wealth of information about how we [counter deceptive behaviour](#), protect the integrity of specific [global elections](#), disrupt [Covert Influence Operations](#), and provide regular updates about broader trust and safety work through the [Transparency Center blog](#).



## Empowering the Research Community

We recognise the important role of researchers in helping to identify disinformation trends and practices. We maintain, and continue to iterate, our [Research API](#) (providing researchers in Europe with access to public data on content and accounts from our platform) as well as our [Commercial Content API](#) (bringing transparency to paid advertising and other content that is commercial in nature on TikTok) and [Commercial Content Library](#) (a publicly searchable EU ads database with information about paid ads and ad metadata). We also continue to refine the [Virtual Compute Environment](#) (VCE), which offers broader access to user data to qualifying not-for-profit researchers for querying and analyzing applicable data while ensuring robust security and privacy protections.

## Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

TikTok recognises the important contribution of our fact-checking partners in the fight against disinformation. We work closely with 13 [IFCN-accredited](#) fact-checking organisations across the EU, EEA, and wider Europe, which have technical training, resources, and industry-wide insights to impartially assess online misinformation.

Our fact-checking programme incorporates fact-checker input into our broader content moderation efforts. Fact-checkers do not moderate content directly on TikTok, but assess whether a claim is true, false, or unsubstantiated. They also share proactive insight reports that help us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends. This feedback from fact-checkers is relayed to TikTok's moderation teams so that they can ensure it is factored into their moderation work and take the relevant action based on our Community Guidelines. This approach effectively produces a force multiplier to the underlying fact-checking output, ensuring that the disinformation content or trend is more comprehensively and broadly addressed.

## Looking forward

TikTok remains fully committed to the Code and to meaningful collaboration with industry peers, civil society, and EU authorities. By continuously sharing expertise, strengthening our policies, and enhancing enforcement mechanisms, we aim to stay ahead of the evolving tactics of malicious actors. TikTok will continue to iterate on its automated systems to improve the accuracy and coverage of misinformation moderation, ensuring the platform remains a safe and authentic space for creative expression.



## II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements Commitments 1 - 3



| <b>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b>   |  |
|--|--|
| Commitment 1   |  |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   | N/A  |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p> <p>Guidance to support the identification of policies. Improving identification. Improvement of the enforcement of the policies themselves (not the policy wording).</p> | N/A  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]  | N/A  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?  | N/A  |
| <b>Measure 1.1</b>   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 1.1.1</b>   | N/A  |



|   |     |  |
|---|-----|--|
| <b>SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)</b> | N/A |  |
|   |     |  |
|   |     |  |
| <b>SLI 1.1.2 -</b>  | N/A |  |

|                      |  |     |     |     |
|----------------------|--|-----|-----|-----|
| <b>Measure 1.2</b>   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |     |     |     |
| <b>QRE 1.2.1</b>     | N/A  |     |     |     |
| <b>SLI 1.2.1</b>     | N/A  |     |     |     |
| <b>Member States</b> | N/A  | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| <b>Total EU</b>      |  |     |     |     |
| <b>Total EEA</b>     |  |     |     |     |

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| <b>Measure 1.3</b> |  |
|--------------------|--|



|                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
| <p><b>QRE 1.3.1</b></p> | <p>We partner with a number of industry leaders to provide a number of controls and transparency tools to advertising buyers with regard to the placement of ads:</p> <p><b>Controls:</b> We offer pre-campaign solutions to advertisers so they can put additional safeguards in place before their campaign goes live to mitigate the risk of their advertising being displayed adjacent to certain types of user-generated content. These measures are in addition to the Community Guidelines, which provide overarching rules around the types of content that can appear on TikTok and are eligible for the For You feed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>TikTok Inventory Filter:</b> This is our proprietary system, which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter which is now available in 29 countries in the EEA and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the main system through which advertisers purchase ads. We have expanded the functionality of this Inventory Filter in various EEA countries. More details can be found <a href="#">here</a>. The Inventory Filter is informed by industry standards and policies, which include topics that may be susceptible to disinformation. Additionally, this enabled advertisers to:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Selectively exclude unwanted or misaligned videos that do not align with their brand safety requirements from appearing next to their ads through TikTok’s Video Exclusion List solution.</li> <li>○ Exclude specific profile pages from serving their Profile Feed ads through TikTok’s Profile Feed Exclusion List.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● <b>TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”):</b> Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.</li> </ul> <p><b>Transparency:</b> We have partnered with third parties to offer post-campaign solutions that enable advertisers to assess the suitability of user content that ran immediately adjacent to their ad in the For You feed, against their chosen brand suitability parameters:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Zefr:</b> Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform (now available in 29 countries in the EEA). Zefr aligns with industry standards.</li> <li>● <b>IAS:</b> Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability, and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform (post campaign is available in 28 countries in the EEA). As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with industry standards.</li> <li>● <b>DoubleVerify:</b> We are partnering with DoubleVerify to provide advertisers with media quality measurement for ads. DoubleVerify is working actively with us to expand its suite of brand suitability and media quality solutions on the platform. DoubleVerify is available in 27 countries in the EEA.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Measure 1.4</p>      | <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>.</p>  |



|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| <b>QRE 1.4.1</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 1.5      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 1.5.1</b> | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 1.5.2</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 1.6      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 1.6.1</b> | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 1.6.2</b> | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 1.6.3</b> | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 1.6.4</b> | N/A  |
| <b>SLI 1.6.1</b> | N/A  |



| <b>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b>  |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 2  |   |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>Yes</p>  |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>   | <p>At the end of August 2025, we launched more granular misinformation advertising policies in the EEA, providing clearer categorisation, and more targeted risk-based enforcement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Health Misinformation</li> <li>● Environment/Climate Misinformation</li> <li>● Public Safety &amp; Trust Misinformation</li> <li>● Election Misinformation</li> <li>● Other Misinformation</li> </ul> <p>These new policies supersede and expand upon the previous set of five policies introduced in H1 2025, which included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Medical Misinformation</li> <li>● Dangerous Misinformation</li> <li>● Synthetic and Manipulated Media</li> <li>● Dangerous Conspiracy Theories</li> <li>● Climate Misinformation</li> </ul> <p>We have enhanced our automated detection models, which are now operational and support enforcement of the new misinformation advertising policies. We also continue to develop our automated detection models to support the enforcement of the new policies.</p> <p>We provided users with a simple and intuitive way to report advertisements in-app for breach of our misinformation advertising policies in each EU Member State.</p> |



|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>Yes</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>We continue to focus on improving the accuracy and coverage of our automated misinformation moderation systems for advertising.</p>  |
| <p>Measure 2.1</p>   |   |
| <p><b>QRE 2.1.1</b></p>  | <p>In H2 2025, we iterated existing advertising policies for misinformation and launched more granular policies in the EEA (covering <a href="#">Health Misinformation</a>, <a href="#">Environment/Climate Misinformation</a>, <a href="#">Public Safety &amp; Trust Misinformation</a>, <a href="#">Election Misinformation</a>, <a href="#">Other Misinformation</a>), with which advertisers need to comply with. These policies provide clearer categorisation of misinformation types and build on the principles and enforcement experience of the five policies set out in the H1 2025 report, enabling more consistent and targeted enforcement in line with evolving risks.</p> <p>Our advertiser account policies expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours, including prohibiting advertisers from circumventing, evading, or interfering with our advertising systems and processes.</p> |



|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <b>SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above</b> | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b><br><br>We have set out the number of ads that have been removed from our platform for violation of our granular misinformation advertising policies on Health Misinformation, Environment/Climate Misinformation, Public Safety & Trust Misinformation, Election Misinformation, Other Misinformation. We launched these iterated misinformation policies in August 2025. These policies were developed to provide clearer categorisation and more targeted, risk-based enforcement.<br><br>The methodology for ad removals data for misinformation advertising policies was revised in this period to capture refinement in deduplication logic.<br><br>We are pleased to be able to report on the ads removed for breach of our granular misinformation advertising policies. We have provided the political advertising enforcement metrics in the Elections Crisis Chapter of this Report.<br><br>Note that numbers have only been provided for monetised markets and are based on where the ads were displayed. |  |
|  | <b>Number of ads removals under the granular misinformation ad policies</b>  |  |
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |  |
| Austria  | 133  |  |
| Belgium  | 101  |  |
| Bulgaria   | 16   |  |
| Croatia  | 9  |  |
| Cyprus   | 3  |  |
| Czechia  | 22   |  |
| Denmark  | 90   |  |



|             |     |  |
|-------------|-----|--|
| Estonia     | 10  |  |
| Finland     | 22  |  |
| France      | 138 |  |
| Germany     | 656 |  |
| Greece      | 17  |  |
| Hungary     | 49  |  |
| Ireland     | 176 |  |
| Italy       | 102 |  |
| Latvia      | 21  |  |
| Lithuania   | 8   |  |
| Luxembourg  | 1   |  |
| Malta       | -   |  |
| Netherlands | 46  |  |
| Poland      | 77  |  |
| Portugal    | 37  |  |
| Romania     | 19  |  |
| Slovakia    | 11  |  |
| Slovenia    | 12  |  |
| Spain       | 73  |  |




|                  |              |  |
|------------------|--------------|--|
| Sweden           | 195          |  |
| Iceland          | 0            |  |
| Liechtenstein    | -            |  |
| Norway           | 165          |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>2,044</b> |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>2,209</b> |  |

|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| Measure 2.2      |  |
| <b>QRE 2.2.1</b> | <p>TikTok places considerable emphasis on proactive moderation of advertisements. Advertisements are reviewed against our Advertising Policies through a combination of automated and human moderation.</p> <p>Our granular misinformation advertising policies launched in H2 2025 currently cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Health Misinformation</li> <li>● Environment/Climate Misinformation</li> <li>● Public Safety &amp; Trust Misinformation</li> <li>● Election Misinformation</li> <li>● Other Misinformation</li> </ul> <p>Our advertiser account policies expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours, including prohibiting advertisers to circumvent, evade, or interfere with our advertising systems and processes.</p> <p>We provide users with a simple and intuitive way to report advertisements in-app for breach of our Advertising Policies including for misinformation in each EU Member State.</p> <p>There are two main ways to report an advertisement on TikTok, either:</p> |




- By 'long-pressing' (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the advertisement and selecting the "Report" option.
- By selecting the "Share" button available on the right-hand side of the advertisement and then selecting the "Report" option.

The user is then shown categories of reporting reasons from which to select. In H2 2025, we updated this feature to create the specific "Misinformation" category and allow users to report with increased granularity.





|             |   |
|-------------|---|
|             |  |
| Measure 2.3 |   |

**QRE 2.3.1**

TikTok places considerable emphasis on proactive moderation of advertisements. Advertisements and advertiser accounts are reviewed against our Advertising Policies through a combination of automated and human moderation.

Our granular misinformation advertising policies launched in H2 2025 currently cover:

- Health Misinformation
- Environment/Climate Misinformation
- Public Safety & Trust Misinformation
- Election Misinformation
- Other Misinformation


Our advertiser account policies expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours, including prohibiting advertisers to circumvent, evade, or interfere with our advertising systems and processes.

We provide users with a simple and intuitive way to report advertisements in-app for breach of our Advertising Policies including for misinformation in each EU Member State.

There are two main ways to report an advertisement on TikTok, either:

- By 'long-pressing' (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the advertisement and selecting the "Report" option.
- By selecting the "Share" button available on the right-hand side of the advertisement and then selecting the "Report" option.

The user is then shown categories of reporting reasons from which to select. In H2 2025, we updated this feature to create the specific "Misinformation" category and allow users to report with increased granularity.





|                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
|                         |   |
| <p><b>SLI 2.3.1</b></p> | <p>We are pleased to be able to report on the ads removed for breach of our granular misinformation advertising policies, including the impressions of those ads in this report. The methodology for ad removals data for misinformation advertising policies was revised in this period to capture refinement in deduplication logic. We have provided the political advertising enforcement metrics in the Elections Crisis Chapter of this Report.</p> |



|                      | Number of ads removals under the granular misinformation ad policies | Number of impressions for ads removed under the granular misinformation ad policies |  |  |
|----------------------|--|---|--|--|
| <b>Member States</b> |  |   |  |  |
| Austria              | 133  | 14,139  |  |  |
| Belgium              | 101  | 35,702  |  |  |
| Bulgaria             | 16   | 1,245   |  |  |
| Croatia              | 9  | 2,019   |  |  |
| Cyprus               | 3  | 1,542   |  |  |
| Czechia              | 22   | 16,572  |  |  |
| Denmark              | 90   | 12,306  |  |  |
| Estonia              | 10   | 620   |  |  |
| Finland              | 22   | 11,521  |  |  |
| France               | 138  | 36,867  |  |  |
| Germany              | 656  | 402,684   |  |  |
| Greece               | 17   | 32,304  |  |  |
| Hungary              | 49   | 189,097   |  |  |
| Ireland              | 176  | 44,960  |  |  |
| Italy                | 102  | 65,589  |  |  |



|                  |              |                  |  |  |
|------------------|--------------|------------------|--|--|
| Latvia           | 21           | 128,011          |  |  |
| Lithuania        | 8            | 866              |  |  |
| Luxembourg       | 1            | 4,632            |  |  |
| Malta            | -            | -                |  |  |
| Netherlands      | 46           | 1,282            |  |  |
| Poland           | 77           | 57,588           |  |  |
| Portugal         | 37           | 40,976           |  |  |
| Romania          | 19           | 2,599            |  |  |
| Slovakia         | 11           | 588              |  |  |
| Slovenia         | 12           | 872              |  |  |
| Spain            | 73           | 7,958            |  |  |
| Sweden           | 195          | 20,877           |  |  |
| Iceland          | 0            | 0                |  |  |
| Liechtenstein    | -            | -                |  |  |
| Norway           | 165          | 23,045           |  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>2,044</b> | <b>1,133,416</b> |  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>2,209</b> | <b>1,156,461</b> |  |  |



|                      |   |   |  |  |
|----------------------|---|---|--|--|
| Measure 2.4          |   |   |  |  |
| <b>QRE 2.4.1</b>     | <p>We are clear with advertisers that their ads must comply with our strict ad policies (see <a href="#">TikTok Business Help Centre</a>). We explain that all ads are reviewed before being uploaded on our platform - usually within 24 hours. Ads already on TikTok may go through an additional stage of review if they are reported, if certain conditions are met (e.g., reaching certain impression thresholds) or because of random sampling conducted at TikTok’s own initiative.</p> <p>Where an advertiser has violated an ad policy, they are informed by way of a notification. This is visible in their TikTok Ads Manager account and/or sent by email (if they have provided a valid email address), or where an advertiser has booked their ad through a TikTok representative, then the representative will inform the advertiser of any violations. Advertisers are able to make use of functionality to appeal rejections of their ads.</p> <p>Transparency is an important part of our overarching DSA compliance programme. Notifications of restrictions include the restriction itself, reason for restriction, whether we made that decision by automated means, how we came to detect the violation (e.g. as a result of a user report or proactive TikTok initiatives) and what their rights of redress are. Advertisers can access online functionality to appeal restrictions on their account or ads. These appeals are then also reviewed against our ad policies and additional information could be provided to advertisers to help them understand the violation and what to do about it.</p> |   |  |  |
| <b>SLI 2.4.1</b>     | <p>We are pleased to be able to share the number of appeals for ads removed under our granular misinformation advertising policies as well as the number of overturns. The methodology for ad removals data for misinformation advertising policies was revised in this period to capture refinement in deduplication logic.</p>  |   |  |  |
|                      | <b>Number of appeals for ads removed under the granular misinformation ad policies</b>  | <b>Number of overturns of appeals under the granular misinformation ad policies</b> |  |  |
| <b>Member States</b> |   |   |  |  |
| Austria              | 0   | 0   |  |  |
| Belgium              | 0   | 0   |  |  |
| Bulgaria             | 0   | 0   |  |  |



|             |   |   |  |  |
|-------------|---|---|--|--|
| Croatia     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Cyprus      | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Czechia     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Denmark     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Estonia     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Finland     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| France      | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Germany     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Greece      | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Hungary     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Ireland     | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Italy       | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Latvia      | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Lithuania   | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Luxembourg  | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Malta       | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Poland      | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Portugal    | 0 | 0 |  |  |



|                  |          |          |  |  |
|------------------|----------|----------|--|--|
| Romania          | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Slovakia         | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Slovenia         | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Spain            | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Sweden           | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Iceland          | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Liechtenstein    | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| Norway           | 0        | 0        |  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> |  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> |  |  |

| <b>II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b>   |   |
|--|---|
| Commitment 3   |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>We have established and strengthened our partnership with third-party fact-checkers to detect harmful misinformation on our platform.</li> </ul> |



|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We have enhanced detection within the advertising ecosystem by further developing our signal-sharing processes and refining our internal systems</li> <li>• We continue to engage in the Task-force and all its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response).</li> </ul>   |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>Yes</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>We will continue to enhance our misinformation detection capabilities through two key initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The optimisation of our collaboration framework with third-party fact-checking organisation in relation to advertising (e.g. Science Feedback); and</li> <li>• Continuing enhancing detection within the advertising ecosystem through signal-sharing to improve our internal databases.</li> </ul>  |
| <p>Measure 3.1</p>   |   |
| <p><b>QRE 3.1.1</b></p>  | <p>As set out later on in this report, we cooperate with a number of third parties to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful misinformation. This information is shared internally to help ensure consistency of approach across our platform.</p> <p>In this reporting period, we began partnering with third-party fact-checking organisation Science Feedback. Science Feedback provides verification of claims that are prone to misinformation. Claims and signals verified by Science Feedback are now integrated into our moderation workflows for ads. We also source claims and signals from across the platform to further enhance our moderation.</p> <p>We also continue to be actively involved in the Task-force working group for Chapter 2, specifically the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response) which we co-chair. We work with other signatories to define and outline metrics regarding the</p> |



|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
|                  | monetary reach and impact of harmful misinformation. We are in close collaboration with industry to ensure alignment and clarity on the reporting of these code requirements.   |
| Measure 3.2      |   |
| <b>QRE 3.2.1</b> | <p>We work with industry partners to discuss common standards and definitions to support consistency of categorising content, adjacency &amp; measurement relevant topics, in appropriate fora. We work closely with IAB Sweden and other organisations such as TAG in the EEA and globally. We are also on the board of the Brand Safety Institute.</p> <p>We continue to share relevant insights and metrics within our quarterly transparency reports, which aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We continue to engage in the subgroups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission.</p> |
| Measure 3.3      |   |
| <b>QRE 3.3.1</b> | We continue to work closely with IAB Sweden and other organisations such as TAG in the EEA and globally.  |



### III. Political Advertising Commitments 4 - 13



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 4  |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 4.1</b>  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>Measure 4.2</b>  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)</b>   | N/A   |
| <b>QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)</b>   | N/A   |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 5  |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 5.1</b>  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 5.1.1</b>  | N/A   |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 6  |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 6.1</b>  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 6.1.1</b>  | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 6.2</b>  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 6.2.1</b>  | N/A   |
| <b>QRE 6.2.2</b>  | N/A   |



|   |     |     |     |
|---|-----|-----|-----|
| <b>SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above</b> | N/A |     |     |
| <b>Member States</b>  | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| <b>Total EU</b>   | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| <b>Total EEA</b>  | N/A | N/A | N/A |

|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| Measure 6.3      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 6.3.1</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 6.4      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 6.4.1</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 6.5      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 6.5.1</b> | N/A  |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 7  |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 7.1</b>  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 7.1.1</b>  | N/A   |
| <b>SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)</b>   | N/A   |



|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| Measure 7.2      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 7.2.1</b> | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 7.2.2</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 7.3      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 7.3.1</b> | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 7.3.2</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 7.4      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 7.4.1</b> | N/A  |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 8  |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 8.1   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 8.2   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 and 8.2)</b>   | N/A   |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 9  |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 9.1   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 9.2   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 and 9.2)</b>   | N/A   |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 10   |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 10.1  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 10.2  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 and 10.2)</b>  | N/A   |



| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 11   |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 11.1  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 11.2  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 11.3  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 11.4  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |



|                                     |     |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4) | N/A |
| QRE 11.4.1                          | N/A |

| III. Political Advertising  |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 12   |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 12.1  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 12.2  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |



|  |  |
|--|--|
| Measure 12.3                               | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 12.1.1 (for measures 12.1-12.3)</b> | N/A  |

| <b>III. Political Advertising</b>   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 13   |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 13.1  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| Measure 13.2  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |



|  |  |
|--|--|
| Measure 13.3                               | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)</b> | N/A  |



## IV. Integrity of Services Commitments 14 - 16



## IV. Integrity of Services

### Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]

Yes



|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Our 2025 Community Guidelines update was launched on August 14, 2025 and went live on September 13, 2025 (due to the 30-day notice period for users). This update ensured that the Community Guidelines remain aligned with our internal policies.             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Our Harmful Misinformation policies are referenced under the hack and leak section. They have all been refined in H2 2025, and they continue to drive our work in combating harmful misinformation, such as conspiracy theories, claims relating to unfolding events, and other forms of dangerous misinformation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● We continue enforcing our <a href="#">AIGC</a> policy against TikTok Shop content.</li> <li>● We launched the Evasive Techniques policy, which combats methods designed to evade moderation systems. Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections” which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections.</li> <li>● We have continued to enhance our ability to detect covert influence operations. To provide more regular and detailed updates about the covert influence operations we disrupt, we have a dedicated <a href="#">Transparency Report</a> on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok’s Transparency Centre. In this report, we include information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts.</li> <li>● We continue to update and refine our policies around <a href="#">Covert Influence Operations</a> in order to stay agile to changing behaviours and tactics on the platform and to ensure more granular detail is enshrined in our policy rationales.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |



Measure 14.1

**QRE 14.1.1**

As well as our Integrity and Authenticity policies in our Community Guidelines, which safeguard against harmful misinformation (see QRE 18.2.1), our Integrity and Authenticity policies also expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours. Our policies on deceptive behaviours relate to the TTPs as follows:

*TTPs which pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and the ways to make these assets seem credible:*

**Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)**

Our Integrity and Authenticity policies, which address **Spam and Deceptive Account Behaviours**, expressly prohibit account behaviours that may spam or mislead our community. You can set up multiple accounts on TikTok to create different channels for authentic creative expression, but not for deceptive purposes.

We do not allow spam, including:

- Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
- Bulk distribution of a high volume of spam; and
- Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes

We also do not allow impersonation, including:

- Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
- Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform

If we determine someone has engaged in any of these deceptive account behaviours, we will ban the account, and may ban any new accounts that are created.



#### **Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) and use of fake followers or subscribers**

Our Integrity and Authenticity policies, which address **fake engagement**, do not allow the trade or marketing of services that attempt to artificially increase engagement or deceive TikTok's recommendation system. We do not allow our users to:

- facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
- provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

If we become aware of accounts or content with inauthentically inflated metrics, we will remove the associated fake followers or likes. Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises and false incentives for engaging with content (to increase gifts, followers, likes, views, or other engagement metrics) is ineligible for our For You feed.

#### **Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains**

TikTok does not have pages, groups, [chat groups](#), fora, or domains. This TTP is not relevant to our platform.

#### **Account hijacking or Impersonation**

Again, our policies prohibit **impersonation**, which refers to accounts that pose as another real person or entity or present as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform. Our users are not allowed to use someone else's name, biographical details, or profile picture in a misleading manner.

In order to protect freedom of expression, we do allow accounts that are clearly parody, commentary, or fan-based, such as where the account name indicates that it is a fan, commentary, or parody account and not affiliated with the subject of the account. We continue to develop our policies to ensure that impersonation of entities (such as businesses or educational institutions, for example) is prohibited and that accounts which impersonate people or entities who are not on the platform are also prohibited. We also issue warnings to users of suspected impersonation accounts and do not recommend those accounts on our For You Feed.



We also have a number of policies that address account hijacking. Our privacy and security policies under our Community Guidelines expressly prohibit users from providing access to their account credentials to others or enabling others to conduct activities against our Community Guidelines. We do not allow access to any part of TikTok through unauthorised methods; attempts to obtain sensitive, confidential, commercial, or personal information; or any abuse of the security, integrity, or reliability of our platform. We also provide practical [guidance](#) to users if they have concerns that their account may have been hacked.

*TTPs which pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views:*

**Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. location spoofing or obfuscation), inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers), use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, and coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.**

We fight against CIOs as our policies prohibit attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose.



When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour and assessing linkages between accounts and techniques to determine if actors are engaging in a coordinated effort to mislead TikTok's systems or our community. In each case, we believe that the people behind these activities coordinate with one another to misrepresent who they are and what they are doing. We know that CIOs will continue to evolve in response to our detection, and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform. That is why we take continuous action against these attempts, including banning accounts found to be linked with previously disrupted networks. We continue to iteratively research and evaluate complex deceptive behaviours on our platform and develop appropriate product and policy solutions as appropriate in the long term. We continue to proactively identify and remove CIO networks that pose risks to user safety. We have published details of CIO networks we identified and removed in H2 2025 in a dedicated monthly report within our Transparency Centre [here](#). For advertising-related CIO measures, please refer to Chapter 2.

**Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)**

We have a number of policies that address hack-and-leak related threats (some examples are below):

- Our hack and leak policy, which aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities, and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures.
- Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation.
- Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure.



- In H2 2025, we deployed a defined suite of misinformation policies. As stated in our Community Guidelines, our policies do not allow misinformation that could cause significant harm to individuals or society, no matter the intent of the person posting it. This includes hoaxes, misleading AIGC, harmful conspiracy theories, and other false information related to public safety, crises, or major civic events—when such content may lead to violence or cause public panic. In addition, content is ineligible for the FYF if it contains misinformation that may cause moderate harm to individuals or society. To be cautious, unverified information about crises, major civic events, or content temporarily under review by fact-checkers is also ineligible for the FYF.
- Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or incites panic, including falsely presenting past crisis events as recent or claiming that critical resources are unavailable during emergencies
- Health misinformation that could cause significant harm, such as promoting unproven treatments that may be fatal, discouraging professional care for life-threatening conditions (e.g., vaccine effectiveness), or spreading false information about how such conditions are transmitted.
- Misinformation that denies the existence of climate change, misrepresents its causes, or contradicts its established environmental impact
- Conspiracy theories or hoaxes that could cause significant harm, such as those that make a violent call to action or have links to previous violence.

**Deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)**

Our ‘Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)’ policy includes commonly used and easily understood language when referring to AIGC, and outlines our existing prohibitions on AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts, including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed. We also do not allow content that contains the likeness of young people, or the likeness of adult private figures used without their permission.



For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime. 'Significantly edited content' is content that shows people doing or saying something they did not do or say, or altering their appearance in a way that makes them difficult to recognise or identify. Misleading AIGC or edited media is audio or visual content that has been edited, including by combining different clips together, to change the composition, sequencing, or timing in a way that alters the meaning of the content and could mislead viewers about the truth of real-world events.

In accordance with our policy, we prohibit AIGC, which features:

- The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualisation, bullying or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals.
- Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely show:
  - Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation.
  - A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  - A public figure who is:
    - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    - taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    - being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.

We updated our AIGC Deceptive policy to address how we define critical events and matters of public importance. Our policy now covers a larger surface area of potentially deceptive AIGC content.



### Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers

Our [Terms of Service](#) require users posting about a **brand or product in return for any payment or other incentive** to disclose their content by enabling the Commercial Disclosure Toggle, which we make available for users. We also provide functionality to enable users to report suspected undisclosed branded content, which reminds the user who posted the suspected undisclosed branded content of our requirements and prompts them to turn the Commercial Disclosure Toggle on if required. We made this requirement even more explicit to users in our [Commercial Disclosure and Paid Marketing](#) section in the Community Guidelines, which was updated in H2 2025 to provide greater clarity.

TikTok prohibits political advertising, including political branded content. When political branded content is not disclosed as such, and TikTok has high confidence that an individual was paid to post political content, TikTok removes the content as it violates TikTok's prohibition on [paid political](#) branded content. Where TikTok has only medium confidence, the content is restricted from appearing in the For You Feed. Note that TikTok has separate policies applying to paid Advertising.

With regard to Advertising Policies, please refer to Chapter 2 concerning Misinformation Advertising Policies.

In addition, our CIO policy can also apply to non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers where it is found that those messages or promotions formed part of a covert influence campaign.

**QRE 14.1.2**

At TikTok, we place considerable emphasis on proactive content moderation and use a combination of technology and safety professionals to detect and remove harmful misinformation and deceptive behaviours on our Platform *before* they are reported to us by users or third parties.

For instance, we take proactive measures to prevent inauthentic or spam accounts from being created. Thus, we have created and used detection models and rule engines that:

- prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
- remove registered accounts based on certain signals (i.e., uncommon behaviour on the platform).

We also manually monitor user reports of inauthentic accounts in order to detect larger clusters or similar inauthentic behaviours.

However, given the complex nature of the TTPs, human moderation is critical to success in this area, and TikTok's moderation teams therefore play a key role in assessing and addressing identified violations. We provide our moderation teams with detailed guidance on how to apply the Integrity and Authenticity policies in our Community Guidelines, and allowing them to route new or evolving content to our fact-checking partners for assessment.

In addition, where content reaches certain popularity levels in terms of the number of video views, it will be flagged for further review. Such a review is undertaken given the extent of the content's dissemination and the increase in potential harm if the content is found to be in breach of our Community Guidelines including our Integrity and Authenticity policies.

Furthermore, during the reporting period, we improved automated detection and enforcement of our 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, effectively increasing the number of videos removed for policy violations. This also decreased the number of visitors per video over the reporting period, demonstrating an effective control strategy as the scope of enforcement increased.



We also have specifically-trained teams that are focused on investigating and detecting CIO on our Platform. We've built international trust and safety teams with specialized expertise across threat intelligence, security, law enforcement, and data science to work on influence operations. These teams continuously pursue and analyse on-platform technical signals as well as leads from external sources. They also collaborate with external intelligence vendors to support specific investigations on a case-by-case basis. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour and assessing linkages between accounts and techniques to determine if actors are engaging in a coordinated effort to mislead TikTok's systems or our community. In each case, we believe that the people behind these activities coordinate with one another to misrepresent who they are and what they are doing.

Accounts that engage in influence operations often avoid posting content that would be violative of platforms' guidelines by itself. That's why we focus on accounts' behaviour and technical linkages when analysing them, specifically looking for evidence that:

- They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or work together to spread the same narrative.
- They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location or use fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
- They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision-making, beliefs, and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.

These criteria are aligned with industry standards and guidance from the experts we regularly consult with. They're particularly important to help us distinguish malicious, inauthentic coordination from authentic interactions that are part of healthy and open communities. For example, it would not violate our policies if a group of people authentically worked together to raise awareness or campaign for a social cause, or express a shared opinion (including political views). However, multiple accounts deceptively working together to spread similar messages in an attempt to influence public discussions would be prohibited and disrupted.

Measure 14.2



|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| <p><b>QRE 14.2.1</b></p> | <p>The implementation of our policies is ensured by different means, including specifically-designed tools (such as toggles to disclose branded content - see QRE 14.1.1) or human investigations to detect deceptive behaviours (for CIO activities - see QRE 14.1.2).</p> <p>The implementation of these policies is also ensured through enforcement measures applied in all EEA countries.</p> <p>CIO investigations are resource-intensive and require in-depth analysis to ensure high confidence in proposed actions. Where our teams have the necessary high degree of confidence that an account is engaged in CIO or is connected to networks we took down in the past as part of a CIO, it is removed from our Platform.</p> <p>Similarly, where our teams have a high degree of confidence that specific content violates one of our TTPs-related policies (See QRE 14.1.1), such content is removed from TikTok.</p> |
|--------------------------|---|

**SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4**



|  |   |  |   |  |  |            |  |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|---|--|--|------------|--|--|--|--|
| TTP OR ACTION1   | <p><b>TTP No. 1: Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)</b></p> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement</b></p> <p>We have based the number of: (i) fake accounts removed; and (ii) followers of the fake accounts (identified at the time of removal of the fake account), on the country the fake account was last active in.</p> <p>We have updated our methodology to report the ratio of monthly average of fake accounts over of monthly active users, based on the latest publication of monthly active users, in order to better reflect TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service.</p> |  |   |  |  |            |  |  |  |  |
|  | SLI 14.2.1  |  | SLI 14.2.2  |  |  | SLI 14.2.3 |  |  | SLI 14.2.4   |  |
|  | Number of actions taken by type   |  | Interaction/ engagement before action   |  |  |            |  |  | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service         |  |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | <b>Number of fake accounts removed</b>  |  | <b>Number of followers of fake accounts identified at the time of removal</b> |  |  |            |  |  | <b>Ratio of monthly average of Fake accounts over monthly active users</b> |  |



| Member States |           |            |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------------|-----------|------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Austria       | 275,013   | 516,597    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Belgium       | 276,630   | 710,701    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bulgaria      | 740,537   | 536,171    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Croatia       | 147,760   | 275,101    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cyprus        | 69,903    | 238,572    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Czechia       | 697,971   | 483,860    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Denmark       | 1,331,720 | 356,463    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Estonia       | 318,121   | 281,011    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finland       | 2,157,515 | 296,319    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| France        | 3,665,177 | 35,178,946 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Germany       | 4,085,474 | 25,739,362 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Greece        | 574,149   | 1,539,168  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hungary       | 109,658   | 468,272    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ireland       | 818,856   | 556,483    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Italy         | 2,122,622 | 5,248,679  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Latvia        | 111,222   | 305,567    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lithuania     | 97,122    | 385,189    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Luxembourg    | 590,180   | 124,675    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |



|                  |                   |                   |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|--|--------------|--|--|
| Malta            | 121,241           | 303,184           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Netherlands      | 781,891           | 1,743,744         |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Poland           | 650,737           | 2,915,171         |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Portugal         | 164,928           | 93,813            |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Romania          | 831,192           | 1,040,434         |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Slovakia         | 2,152,006         | 267,223           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Slovenia         | 537,438           | 171,485           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Spain            | 2,267,032         | 5,489,235         |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Sweden           | 581,988           | 679,496           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Iceland          | 10,661            | 390,806           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Liechtenstein    | 102,299           | 204,297           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| Norway           | 605,111           | 831,032           |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>26,278,083</b> | <b>85,944,921</b> |  |  |  |  | <b>2.46%</b> |  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>26,996,154</b> | <b>87,371,056</b> |  |  |  |  |              |  |  |

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 2</b> | <p><b>TTP no. 2: Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)</b></p> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b></p> <p>We based the number of fake likes that we removed on the country of registration of the user. We also based the number of fake likes prevented on the country of registration of the user.</p> |
|------------------------|--|



|   | SLI 14.2.1                          | SLI 14.2.2                            | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------|------------|
|   | Number of actions taken by type     | Interaction/ engagement before action |            |            |
| <b>List actions per member states (see example table above)</b> | <b>Number of fake likes removed</b> | <b>Number of fake likes prevented</b> |            |            |
| Austria   | 38,934,894                          | 19,008,851                            |            |            |
| Belgium   | 85,571,564                          | 30,168,709                            |            |            |
| Bulgaria  | 24,904,540                          | 31,685,195                            |            |            |
| Croatia   | 7,775,951                           | 9,668,733                             |            |            |
| Cyprus  | 22,642,141                          | 3,767,532                             |            |            |
| Czechia   | 16,989,654                          | 19,668,128                            |            |            |
| Denmark   | 16,915,865                          | 9,668,252                             |            |            |



|            |             |             |  |  |
|------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| Estonia    | 2,986,630   | 4,446,485   |  |  |
| Finland    | 24,261,370  | 12,171,995  |  |  |
| France     | 414,837,042 | 219,950,317 |  |  |
| Germany    | 456,157,071 | 246,027,658 |  |  |
| Greece     | 47,033,332  | 21,966,722  |  |  |
| Hungary    | 13,501,692  | 15,181,755  |  |  |
| Ireland    | 42,182,688  | 27,230,810  |  |  |
| Italy      | 222,535,499 | 214,334,533 |  |  |
| Latvia     | 7,470,818   | 6,568,877   |  |  |
| Lithuania  | 11,749,389  | 9,018,420   |  |  |
| Luxembourg | 9,543,867   | 4,079,877   |  |  |



|               |             |             |  |  |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| Malta         | 4,700,604   | 2,646,563   |  |  |
| Netherlands   | 161,621,982 | 94,762,337  |  |  |
| Poland        | 46,021,290  | 66,824,844  |  |  |
| Portugal      | 32,438,820  | 26,558,717  |  |  |
| Romania       | 81,419,182  | 52,738,121  |  |  |
| Slovakia      | 6,962,433   | 11,438,763  |  |  |
| Slovenia      | 2,819,246   | 3,930,082   |  |  |
| Spain         | 149,910,252 | 106,254,904 |  |  |
| Sweden        | 49,458,775  | 22,663,493  |  |  |
| Iceland       | 1,053,036   | 946,736     |  |  |
| Liechtenstein | 4,783,282   | 123,066     |  |  |



|                  |                      |                      |  |  |
|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| Norway           | 33,390,820           | 11,032,294           |  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>2,001,346,591</b> | <b>1,292,430,673</b> |  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>2,040,573,729</b> | <b>1,304,532,769</b> |  |  |

|  |  |   |                   |                   |
|--|--|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 3</b>                                   | <b>TTP No. 3: Use of fake followers or subscribers</b>   |   |                   |                   |
|  | <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b></p> <p>We based the number of fake followers that we removed on the country of registration of the user. We also based the number of fake followers prevented on the country of registration of the user.</p> |   |                   |                   |
|  | <b>SLI 14.2.1</b>  | <b>SLI 14.2.2</b>                       | <b>SLI 14.2.3</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.4</b> |
|  | Number of actions taken by type  | Interaction/ engagement before action   |                   |                   |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | <b>Number of fake followers removed</b>  | <b>Number of fake follows prevented</b> |                   |                   |



| Member States |             |             |  |  |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| Austria       | 23,938,253  | 4,214,753   |  |  |
| Belgium       | 50,116,048  | 7,502,275   |  |  |
| Bulgaria      | 9,910,390   | 35,247,682  |  |  |
| Croatia       | 4,587,953   | 1,962,862   |  |  |
| Cyprus        | 4,864,435   | 1,455,588   |  |  |
| Czechia       | 10,679,378  | 3,878,007   |  |  |
| Denmark       | 10,366,954  | 2,609,284   |  |  |
| Estonia       | 1,473,885   | 1,340,205   |  |  |
| Finland       | 6,424,265   | 2,723,628   |  |  |
| France        | 282,238,191 | 140,179,192 |  |  |



|             |             |             |  |  |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| Germany     | 521,193,274 | 356,022,240 |  |  |
| Greece      | 12,215,761  | 5,835,967   |  |  |
| Hungary     | 7,142,046   | 4,744,115   |  |  |
| Ireland     | 9,823,577   | 120,305,866 |  |  |
| Italy       | 107,964,050 | 162,353,518 |  |  |
| Latvia      | 2,520,716   | 1,662,985   |  |  |
| Lithuania   | 6,139,492   | 2,204,881   |  |  |
| Luxembourg  | 2,307,542   | 1,246,532   |  |  |
| Malta       | 1,639,396   | 829,824     |  |  |
| Netherlands | 57,569,302  | 21,326,774  |  |  |
| Poland      | 29,711,870  | 13,877,372  |  |  |



|                  |                      |                      |  |  |
|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| Portugal         | 18,083,210           | 9,930,044            |  |  |
| Romania          | 32,090,287           | 27,177,302           |  |  |
| Slovakia         | 6,120,774            | 2,580,861            |  |  |
| Slovenia         | 1,516,876            | 4,152,924            |  |  |
| Spain            | 98,926,679           | 85,448,792           |  |  |
| Sweden           | 21,034,541           | 5,067,460            |  |  |
| Iceland          | 774,407              | 613,779              |  |  |
| Liechtenstein    | 382,120              | 77,208               |  |  |
| Norway           | 12,280,261           | 1,956,410            |  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>1,340,599,145</b> | <b>1,025,880,933</b> |  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>1,354,035,933</b> | <b>1,028,528,330</b> |  |  |



|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 4</b> | <p><b>TTP No. 4: Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, <a href="#">chat groups</a>, fora, or domains</b></p> <p>TikTok does not have pages, groups, chat groups, fora or domains. This TTP is not relevant to our platform.</p> |
|------------------------|--|

|  |  |                   |                   |  |
|--|--|-------------------|-------------------|--|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 5</b>                                   | <p><b>TTP No. 5: Account hijacking or impersonation</b></p> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b></p> <p>The number of accounts removed under our impersonation policy is based on the approximate location of the users. We have updated our methodology to report the ratio of monthly average impersonation accounts banned over monthly active users, based on the latest publication of monthly active users, in order to better reflect TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service.</p> |                   |                   |  |
|  | <b>SLI 14.2.1</b>  | <b>SLI 14.2.2</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.3</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.4</b>  |
|  | Number of actions taken by type  |                   |                   | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service |
| <b>Member States</b>                                     | <b>Number of account banned under impersonation policy</b>   |                   |                   | <b>Impersonation accounts over monthly active users</b>            |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) |  |                   |                   |  |
| Austria  | 700  |                   |                   |  |
| Belgium  | 1,367  |                   |                   |  |



|             |        |  |  |  |
|-------------|--------|--|--|--|
| Bulgaria    | 618    |  |  |  |
| Croatia     | 239    |  |  |  |
| Cyprus      | 180    |  |  |  |
| Czechia     | 520    |  |  |  |
| Denmark     | 554    |  |  |  |
| Estonia     | 159    |  |  |  |
| Finland     | 252    |  |  |  |
| France      | 13,868 |  |  |  |
| Germany     | 9,208  |  |  |  |
| Greece      | 664    |  |  |  |
| Hungary     | 494    |  |  |  |
| Ireland     | 816    |  |  |  |
| Italy       | 3,672  |  |  |  |
| Latvia      | 186    |  |  |  |
| Lithuania   | 374    |  |  |  |
| Luxembourg  | 92     |  |  |  |
| Malta       | 0      |  |  |  |
| Netherlands | 4,286  |  |  |  |
| Poland      | 2,651  |  |  |  |



|                  |               |  |  |               |
|------------------|---------------|--|--|---------------|
| Portugal         | 580           |  |  |               |
| Romania          | 2,082         |  |  |               |
| Slovakia         | 333           |  |  |               |
| Slovenia         | 108           |  |  |               |
| Spain            | 4,021         |  |  |               |
| Sweden           | 1,070         |  |  |               |
| Iceland          | 35            |  |  |               |
| Liechtenstein    | 0             |  |  |               |
| Norway           | 407           |  |  |               |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>49,094</b> |  |  | <b>0.005%</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>49,536</b> |  |  |               |



|  |  |                                       |                                 |                                      |                              |  |                   |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 6</b>                     | <p><b>TTP No. 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)</b></p> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b></p> <p>The number of new CIO network discoveries found to be targeting European audiences relates to our public disclosures for the period July 1 to December 31 2025. We have categorised disrupted CIO networks by the country we assess that the network targeted. We have included any network which we assess to have targeted one or more European markets, or have operated from an EU market. We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our transparency reports <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p>CIO networks identified and removed are detailed below, including the assessed geographic location of network operation and the assessed target audience of the network, which we assess via technical and behavioural evidence from proprietary and open sources. The number of followers of CIO networks has been based on the number of accounts that followed any account within a network as of the date of that network’s removal.</p> |                                       |                                 |                                      |                              |  |                   |
|  | <b>SLI 14.2.1</b>  | <b>SLI 14.2.2</b>                     |                                 |                                      | <b>SLI 14.2.3</b>            |  | <b>SLI 14.2.4</b> |
| <b>Assessed Network Operating Location</b> | Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken by type   | Interaction/ engagement before action | Views/ impressions after action | Interaction/ engagement after action | Trends on targeted audiences |  |                   |
| <b>July-December 2025</b>                  |  |                                       |                                 |                                      |                              |  |                   |
|  |  |                                       |                                 |                                      |                              |  |                   |



|          |                      |   |              |              |  |  |
|----------|----------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Thailand | 398 removed accounts | Accounts within the network had 709,570 cumulative followers at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Thailand and targeted a Chinese-speaking audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives of Chinese dominance and Western inefficiencies. The network was found to use AI-generated content, which often incorporated various animal characters, as commentary on global events. |  |
|----------|----------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|



|         |                     |  |              |              |  |  |
|---------|---------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Belarus | 15 removed accounts | Accounts within the network had 50,498 cumulative followers at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Belarus and targeted a European audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives criticizing Polish and Latvian immigration policies. Some accounts in this network posed as members of local media and independent journalism outlets in an attempt to increase the network's credibility. |  |
|---------|---------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--|--|



|         |                     |   |              |              |   |  |
|---------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| Hungary | 95 removed accounts | Accounts within the network had 131,342 cumulative followers at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Hungary and targeted a Hungarian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to the Fidesz political party. The network was found to coordinate across multiple online platforms. |  |
|---------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|--|



|         |                     |  |              |              |  |  |
|---------|---------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Hungary | 28 removed accounts | Accounts within the network had 18,247 cumulative followers at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Hungary and targeted a Hungarian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives favorable to the Fidesz political party. The network was found to like and repost its own content in an attempt to artificially amplify its reach. |  |
|---------|---------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--|--|



|        |                     |  |              |              |  |  |
|--------|---------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Poland | 14 removed accounts | Accounts within the network had 35,929 cumulative followers at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Poland and targeted a Polish audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote Poland's withdrawal from the European Union. The network was found to utilize AI-generated personas in order to deliver its messaging. |  |
|--------|---------------------|--|--------------|--------------|--|--|



|    |    |        |              |              |   |
|----|----|--------|--------------|--------------|---|
| US | 10 | 57,000 | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from the US and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created fake media brands in order to promote Russia and China as leaders on the global stage. The network targeted Latino-Americans, African-Americans, and African audiences, as well as English and Spanish-speaking audiences worldwide. |
|----|----|--------|--------------|--------------|---|

|                        |   |   |  |   |  |
|------------------------|---|---|--|---|--|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 7</b> | <b>TTP No. 7: Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)</b><br>We have based the following numbers on the country in which the video was posted: videos removed because of violations of the Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy. The number of views of videos removed because of violation of each of these policies is based on the approximate location of the user. |   |  |   |  |
| <b>Member States</b>   | <b>Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy</b>   | <b>Number of views of videos removed because of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy</b> | <b>Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "Creator labeled as AI-generated"</b> | <b>Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "AI-generated"</b> |  |



|          |        |             |           |           |
|----------|--------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| Austria  | 1,564  | 2,121,335   | 201,805   | 292,401   |
| Belgium  | 2,899  | 33,524,248  | 217,554   | 461,238   |
| Bulgaria | 2,181  | 1,380,041   | 211,748   | 832,573   |
| Croatia  | 1,190  | 857,576     | 37,272    | 94,124    |
| Cyprus   | 1,214  | 877,703     | 81,169    | 100,228   |
| Czechia  | 1,551  | 166,156     | 83,516    | 455,194   |
| Denmark  | 1,920  | 2,522,414   | 77,101    | 114,169   |
| Estonia  | 1,571  | 202,878     | 19,864    | 63,904    |
| Finland  | 921    | 417,085     | 96,657    | 178,869   |
| France   | 28,565 | 145,692,240 | 2,059,058 | 2,665,168 |



|             |        |             |           |           |
|-------------|--------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| Germany     | 50,378 | 113,670,298 | 2,464,204 | 3,887,735 |
| Greece      | 2,284  | 929,995     | 270,031   | 445,046   |
| Hungary     | 990    | 2,318,366   | 129,245   | 647,102   |
| Ireland     | 1,722  | 1,125,060   | 49,195    | 131,936   |
| Italy       | 15,434 | 93,101,464  | 1,065,142 | 2,778,340 |
| Latvia      | 1,519  | 2,530       | 47,877    | 150,166   |
| Lithuania   | 1,727  | 8,952,387   | 51,553    | 169,243   |
| Luxembourg  | 1,620  | 164,719     | 22,700    | 26,034    |
| Malta       | 382    | 2,127       | 15,886    | 26,024    |
| Netherlands | 7,974  | 28,839,022  | 503,436   | 884,486   |



|               |        |            |           |           |
|---------------|--------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Poland        | 7,227  | 14,249,635 | 317,103   | 1,455,778 |
| Portugal      | 1,659  | 6,862,825  | 205,448   | 697,724   |
| Romania       | 10,458 | 6,624,761  | 387,039   | 1,826,466 |
| Slovakia      | 1,589  | 346,191    | 30,216    | 281,735   |
| Slovenia      | 844    | 3,070,784  | 17,599    | 35,187    |
| Spain         | 16,129 | 40,748,793 | 1,258,302 | 3,289,279 |
| Sweden        | 5,168  | 4,607,858  | 224,541   | 336,203   |
| Iceland       | 175    | 414        | 5,341     | 11,757    |
| Liechtenstein | 484    | 0          | 634       | 530       |
| Norway        | 1,282  | 2,920,599  | 91,415    | 154,897   |



|           |         |             |            |            |
|-----------|---------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Total EU  | 170,680 | 513,378,491 | 10,145,261 | 22,326,352 |
| Total EEA | 172,621 | 516,299,504 | 10,242,651 | 22,493,536 |

|                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| TTP OR ACTION 8 Member | <p><b>TTP No. 8: Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)</b></p> <p>We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6. We have also provided data on violations of our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy under TTP No. 7. Our hack and leak policy was launched in H1 2024, but we do not have meaningful metrics under this policy to report for H2 2025.</p> |
|------------------------|---|

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| TTP OR ACTION 9 | <p><b>TTP No. 9: Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)</b></p> <p>In H2 2025, we launched the Evasive Techniques policy, which combats methods designed to evade moderation systems.</p> <p>We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.</p> |
|-----------------|--|



|                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 10</b> | <p><b>TTP No. 10: Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers</b></p> <p>We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.</p> |
|-------------------------|--|

|  |  |                   |                   |                   |
|--|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 11</b>                                  | <p><b>TTP No. 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers</b></p> <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b><br/>We are unable to provide this metric due to insufficient data available for the reporting period.</p> |                   |                   |                   |
|  | <b>SLI 14.2.1</b>  | <b>SLI 14.2.2</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.3</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.4</b> |
|  | Number of actions taken by type  |                   |                   |                   |
| <b>Member States</b>                                     |  |                   |                   |                   |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) |  |                   |                   |                   |



|  |   |                   |                   |                   |
|--|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>TTP OR ACTION 12</b>                                  | <b>TTP No. 12: Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts</b>               |                   |                   |                   |
|  | We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6. |                   |                   |                   |
|  | <b>SLI 14.2.1</b>   | <b>SLI 14.2.2</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.3</b> | <b>SLI 14.2.4</b> |
|  |   |                   |                   |                   |
| <b>Member States</b>                                     |   |                   |                   |                   |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) |   |                   |                   |                   |

|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| <b>Measure 14.3</b> |  |
| <b>QRE 14.3.1</b>   | We collaborated as part of the Integrity of Services working group to set up the first list of TTPs. We continue to provide updates on observed TTPs through our regular <a href="#">CIO transparency reporting</a> , including observations on novel and emerging tradecraft. |

**IV. Integrity of Services**



| Commitment 15  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.</p> |  |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>  | <p>Yes</p>   |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● We provided extensive training for moderators and risk containment agents to help them better detect and remove deceptive AIGC more quickly. We also conducted a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of our AI policies and provided guidance to reduce systemic error.</li> <li>● We published our <a href="#">Responsible AI Principles</a>.</li> <li>● Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “<a href="#">Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections</a>” which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections.</li> <li>● We continue to participate in relevant working groups, such as the Generative AI working group, which commenced in September 2023.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>   | <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p>Measure 15.1</p>  |  |

**QRE 15.1.1**

Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy includes commonly used and easily understood language when referring to AIGC, and outlines our existing prohibitions on AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts, including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed. As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.

While we welcome the creativity that new AI may unlock, in line with our updated policy, users must proactively disclose when their content is AI-generated or manipulated but shows realistic scenes (i.e. fake people, places, or events that look like they are real). We launched an AI toggle in September 2023, which allows users to self-disclose AI-generated content when posting. When this has been turned on, a tag “Creator labelled as AI-generated” is displayed to users. Alternatively, this can be done through the use of a sticker or caption, such as ‘synthetic’, ‘fake’, ‘not real’, or ‘altered’.

We also automatically label content made with TikTok effects if they use AI. TikTok may automatically apply the “AI-generated” label to content we identify as completely generated or significantly edited with AI. This may happen when a creator uses TikTok AI effects or uploads AI-generated content that has Content Credentials attached, a technology from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). Content Credentials attach metadata to content that we can use to recognize and label AIGC instantly. Once content is labeled as AI-generated with an auto-label, users are unable to remove the label from the post.

We do not allow:

- AIGC that shows the likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualisation, bullying or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals.
- AIGC that shows the likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
- Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  - Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  - A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  - A public figure who is:
    - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.



|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
|                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).</li> <li>■ being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.</li> </ul>   |
| Measure 15.2      |   |
| <b>QRE 15.2.1</b> | <p>We have a number of measures to ensure the AI systems we develop uphold the principles of fairness and comply with applicable laws. To that end:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● We have in place internal guidelines on Algorithmic Fairness that are developed with adherence to our commitment to human rights as outlined here: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/en/upholding-human-rights">https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/en/upholding-human-rights</a></li> <li>● We have continued to scale our algorithmic fairness compliance review process for new or updated AI systems that meet certain risk-based thresholds.</li> </ul> <p>We are also proud to be a launch partner of the Partnership on AI's <a href="#">Responsible Practices</a> for AIGC.</p> |

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>IV. Integrity of Services</b>   |            |
| Commitment 16  |            |
| <p>Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.</p> |            |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>  | <p>Yes</p> |



|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <p>We continue to engage in the subgroups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission. For example, we participated in cross-industry forums such as EU elections roundtables in markets including Czechia, Netherlands, Ireland, and Estonia.</p> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Measure 16.1</p>  |   |



|  |   |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|
| <p><b>QRE 16.1.1</b></p>   | <p>Central to our strategy for identifying and removing CIO on our platforms is working with our stakeholders, including civil society and user reports. This approach facilitates us - and others - disrupting the network's operations in their early stages. In addition to continuously enhancing our in-house capabilities, we proactively engage in comprehensive reviews of our peers' publicly disclosed findings and swiftly implement necessary actions in alignment with our policies.</p> <p>To provide more regular and detailed updates about the CIO we disrupt, we have a dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok's Transparency Centre. In this report, we also have information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts. The insights and metrics in this report aim to inform industry peers and the research community.</p> <p>We share relevant insights and metrics within our transparency reports, which aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We also review relevant insights and metrics from other industry peers to cross-compare for any similar behaviour on TikTok.</p> <p>We continue to engage in the subgroups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission. For example, we participated in cross-industry forums such as EU elections roundtable in markets including Czechia, Netherlands, Ireland, and Estonia.</p> <p>As we have detailed in other chapters to this report, we have robust monetisation integrity policies in place and have established joint operating procedures between specialist CIO investigations teams and monetisation integrity teams to work on joint investigations of CIOs involving monetised products.</p> |  |  |
| <p><b>SLI 16.1.1</b><br/>Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing</p> | <p>N/A</p>  |  |  |
| <p><b>Data</b></p>   |   |  |  |
| <p>Measure 16.2</p>  |   |  |  |



**QRE 16.2.1**

We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our transparency reports [here](#). As new deceptive behaviours emerge, we'll continue to evolve our response, strengthen enforcement capabilities, and publish our findings.



## V. Empowering Users Commitments 17 - 25



### V. Empowering Users

#### Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission’s initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]

Yes



If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].

We have 14 ongoing media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in Europe (12 in EU/EEA—Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal; 2 in wider European countries—Georgia and Moldova).

- We ran 8 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  - 7 in the EU
    - Czechia (Parliamentary election): Demagog.cz
    - Portugal (local election): Polígrafo
    - Estonia (local election): Lead Stories
    - Ireland (presidential election): The Journal
    - Netherlands (parliamentary election)
    - Denmark (local and municipal election): Sikker Digital
    - Portugal (presidential election): Polígrafo
  - 1 in Norway (parliamentary election)
- Following wildfires in Portugal and Spain, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content during natural disasters. The guide links to TikTok's [tragic event support guide](#) and authoritative third party resources ([PT](#))([ES](#)) of information about aid and relief support. The intervention is available in all in-app languages.
- Following protests in France, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content when events are unfolding rapidly. The guide links to TikTok's [Community Guidelines](#) and [Well-being Guide](#).
- Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Holocaust Education, and the War in Ukraine.
- Continued to support mental well-being awareness and literacy and to combat misinformation with reliable content through the [WHO's Fides](#) network, a diverse community of trusted healthcare professionals and content creators in a number of countries, including France.
- We launched a \$2 Million [AI Literacy fund](#) in partnership with more than 20 civil society organisations across 12 markets worldwide. The ad credit fund is designed to support the creation of educational content that will appear in For You feeds. This initiative launched alongside several new company updates to spot, shape and understand AI-generated content.
- Brought greater transparency about our systems and our integrity and authenticity efforts to our community by sharing regular insights and updates. In H2 2025, we launched a new:



|  |  |
|--|--|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Transparency Center <a href="#">Global Elections Hub</a> , including dedicated coverage of elections across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Hub outlines our policies, product features, and moderation practices that help protect platform integrity during elections. Throughout this reporting period, we regularly updated the Hub with information on our safety efforts in markets with active elections, including Croatia, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland and Ireland.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p>Measure 17.1</p>  |  |



|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| <b>QRE 17.1.1</b> | <p>In addition to actioning content that violates our Integrity and Authenticity policies, we continue to dedicate resources to: expanding our in-app measures that show users additional context on certain content (e.g., natural disasters and rapidly unfolding events); redirecting them to authoritative information; and making these tools available in 22 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic).</p> <p>We work with external experts to combat harmful misinformation. For example, we work with the World Health Organisation (WHO) on medical information, and our global fact-checking partners, taking into account their feedback to continually identify new topics and consider which tools may be best suited for raising awareness around that topic.</p> <p>We deploy a combination of in-app <b>user intervention tools</b> on topical issues such as elections , the Israel-Hamas Conflict, <a href="#">Holocaust Education</a>, and the War in Ukraine.</p> <p><b>Video notice tags.</b></p> <p>A video notice tag is an information bar at the bottom of a video which is automatically applied to a specific word or hashtag (or set of hashtags). The information bar is clickable and invites users to “<i>Learn more about</i> [the topic]”. Users will be directed to an in-app guide, or reliable third party resource, as appropriate.</p> <p><b>Search intervention.</b> If users search for terms associated with a topic, they will be presented with a banner encouraging them to verify the facts and providing a link to a trusted source of information. Search interventions are not deployed for search terms that violate our Community Guidelines, which are actioned according to our policies.</p> |
|-------------------|---|

|                      | <b>Number of impressions of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)</b> | <b>Number of clicks of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)</b> | <b>Click Through Rate of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)</b> |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| <b>Member States</b> |  |   |   |
| Austria              | 5,277,690  | 12,183  | 0.23%   |
| Belgium              | 4,272,551  | 11,406  | 0.27%   |



|             |            |         |       |
|-------------|------------|---------|-------|
| Bulgaria    | 1,391,022  | 5,720   | 0.41% |
| Croatia     | 1,712,040  | 5,626   | 0.33% |
| Cyprus      | 541,854    | 1,921   | 0.35% |
| Czechia     | 6,870,967  | 20,382  | 0.30% |
| Denmark     | 2,689,559  | 9,100   | 0.34% |
| Estonia     | 616,310    | 1,758   | 0.29% |
| Finland     | 4,949,138  | 13,168  | 0.27% |
| France      | 2,831,696  | 8,848   | 0.31% |
| Germany     | 51,482,928 | 104,962 | 0.20% |
| Greece      | 4,047,588  | 13,967  | 0.35% |
| Hungary     | 5,035,208  | 22,909  | 0.45% |
| Ireland     | 4,963,937  | 10,640  | 0.21% |
| Italy       | 2,496,350  | 6,890   | 0.28% |
| Latvia      | 726,387    | 2,391   | 0.33% |
| Lithuania   | 1,276,323  | 3,737   | 0.29% |
| Luxembourg  | 283,503    | 889     | 0.31% |
| Malta       | 280,070    | 624     | 0.22% |
| Netherlands | 15,845,058 | 30,527  | 0.19% |
| Poland      | 44,663,927 | 102,742 | 0.23% |



|                      |  |  |  |
|----------------------|--|--|--|
| Portugal             | 4,341,529  | 13,909   | 0.32%  |
| Romania              | 8,944,711  | 33,681   | 0.38%  |
| Slovakia             | 1,720,734  | 4,828  | 0.28%  |
| Slovenia             | 902,688  | 2,127  | 0.24%  |
| Spain                | 14,877,236   | 51,570   | 0.35%  |
| Sweden               | 7,366,500  | 24,351   | 0.33%  |
| Iceland              | 333,235  | 822  | 0.25%  |
| Liechtenstein        | 16,829   | 28   | 0.17%  |
| Norway               | 4,001,321  | 11,833   | 0.30%  |
| <b>Total EU</b>      | <b>200,407,504</b>   | <b>520,856</b>   | <b>0.26%</b>   |
| <b>Total EEA</b>     | <b>204,758,889</b>   | <b>533,539</b>   | <b>0.26%</b>   |
|                      | <b>Number of impressions of topic covered by video Intervention (Election)</b> | <b>Number of clicks by video Intervention (Election)</b> | <b>Click Through Rate by video Intervention (Election)</b> |
| <b>Member States</b> |  |  |  |
| Austria              | —  | —  | —  |
| Belgium              | —  | —  | —  |
| Bulgaria             | —  | —  | —  |
| Croatia              | —  | —  | —  |
| Cyprus               | —  | —  | —  |



|             |             |         |       |
|-------------|-------------|---------|-------|
| Czechia     | 12,864,847  | 20,235  | 0.16% |
| Denmark     | —           | —       | —     |
| Estonia     | —           | —       | —     |
| Finland     | —           | —       | —     |
| France      | —           | —       | —     |
| Germany     | —           | —       | —     |
| Greece      | —           | —       | —     |
| Hungary     | —           | —       | —     |
| Ireland     | 80,491,704  | 130,720 | 0.16% |
| Italy       | —           | —       | —     |
| Latvia      | —           | —       | —     |
| Lithuania   | —           | —       | —     |
| Luxembourg  | —           | —       | —     |
| Malta       | —           | —       | —     |
| Netherlands | 351,346,642 | 450,440 | 0.12% |
| Poland      | —           | —       | —     |
| Portugal    | —           | —       | —     |
| Romania     | —           | —       | —     |
| Slovakia    | —           | —       | —     |



|                  |   |   |   |
|------------------|---|---|---|
| Slovenia         | — | — | — |
| Spain            | — | — | — |
| Sweden           | — | — | — |
| Iceland          | — | — | — |
| Liechtenstein    | — | — | — |
| Norway           | — | — | — |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | — | — | — |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | — | — | — |

|                      | <b>Number of impressions of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)</b> | <b>Number of clicks of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)</b> | <b>Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)</b> |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| <b>Member States</b> |  |   |   |
| Austria              | 15,048   | 2,000   | 13.29%  |
| Belgium              | 19,346   | 2,120   | 10.96%  |
| Bulgaria             | 6,622  | 849   | 12.82%  |
| Croatia              | 12,451   | 1,592   | 12.79%  |
| Cyprus               | 1,791  | 180   | 10.05%  |
| Czechia              | 11,106   | 1,417   | 12.76%  |
| Denmark              | 8,045  | 970   | 12.06%  |



|             |         |        |        |
|-------------|---------|--------|--------|
| Estonia     | 2,236   | 204    | 9.12%  |
| Finland     | 11,905  | 832    | 6.99%  |
| France      | 109,188 | 11,863 | 10.86% |
| Germany     | 117,368 | 14,515 | 12.37% |
| Greece      | 11,538  | 1,276  | 11.06% |
| Hungary     | 9,367   | 1,186  | 12.66% |
| Ireland     | 12,261  | 868    | 7.08%  |
| Italy       | 45,353  | 5,124  | 11.30% |
| Latvia      | 2,435   | 259    | 10.64% |
| Lithuania   | 5,043   | 482    | 9.56%  |
| Luxembourg  | 1,185   | 174    | 14.68% |
| Malta       | 914     | 86     | 9.41%  |
| Netherlands | 39,950  | 4,240  | 10.61% |
| Poland      | 740     | 82     | 11.08% |
| Portugal    | 9,750   | 1,007  | 10.33% |
| Romania     | 18,916  | 2,082  | 11.01% |
| Slovakia    | 5,025   | 588    | 11.70% |
| Slovenia    | 7,154   | 921    | 12.87% |
| Spain       | 471,915 | 48,883 | 10.36% |



|                  |                |                |               |
|------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| Sweden           | 23,410         | 2,149          | 9.18%         |
| Iceland          | 1,018          | 98             | 9.63%         |
| Liechtenstein    | 88             | 9              | 10.23%        |
| Norway           | 10,807         | 1,108          | 10.25%        |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>980,062</b> | <b>105,949</b> | <b>10.81%</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>991,975</b> | <b>107,164</b> | <b>10.80%</b> |

|                      | Number of impressions of Search interventions (Election) | Number of clicks of Search interventions (Election) | Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Election) |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| <b>Member States</b> |  |   |   |
| Austria              | —  | —   | —   |
| Belgium              | —  | —   | —   |
| Bulgaria             | —  | —   | —   |
| Croatia              | —  | —   | —   |
| Cyprus               | —  | —   | —   |
| Czechia              | 654,163  | 3,340   | 0.51%   |
| Denmark              | —  | —   | —   |
| Estonia              | —  | —   | —   |
| Finland              | —  | —   | —   |



|             |           |        |       |
|-------------|-----------|--------|-------|
| France      | —         | —      | —     |
| Germany     | —         | —      | —     |
| Greece      | —         | —      | —     |
| Hungary     | —         | —      | —     |
| Ireland     | 1,240,745 | 8,399  | 0.68% |
| Italy       | —         | —      | —     |
| Latvia      | —         | —      | —     |
| Lithuania   | —         | —      | —     |
| Luxembourg  | —         | —      | —     |
| Malta       | —         | —      | —     |
| Netherlands | 7,405,370 | 38,927 | 0.53% |
| Poland      | —         | —      | —     |
| Portugal    | —         | —      | —     |
| Romania     | —         | —      | —     |
| Slovakia    | —         | —      | —     |
| Slovenia    | —         | —      | —     |
| Spain       | —         | —      | —     |
| Sweden      | —         | —      | —     |
| Iceland     | —         | —      | —     |



|                  |   |   |   |
|------------------|---|---|---|
| Liechtenstein    | — | — | — |
| Norway           | — | — | — |
| <b>Total EU</b>  |   |   |   |
| <b>Total EEA</b> |   |   |   |

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Measure 17.2 |  |
|--------------|--|




## QRE 17.2.1

In order to raise awareness among our users about specific topics and empower them, we run a variety of on and off-platform media literacy campaigns. Our approach may differ depending on the topic. We localise certain campaigns (e.g., for elections) meaning we collaborate with national partners to develop an approach that best resonates with the local audience. For other issues such as the War in Ukraine, our priority is to connect users to accurate and trusted resources.

Below are examples of the campaigns we have most recently run in-app which have leveraged a number of the intervention tools we have outlined in our response to QRE 17.1.1 (e.g. search interventions and video notice tags).


**(I) Promoting election integrity.** As well as the election integrity pages on TikTok's [Safety Center](#) and [Transparency Center](#), and the new dedicated [Global Elections Hub](#), which provides an overview of our overall approach to protecting TikTok through the elections, including the most relevant policies that we use to protect the platform during elections, our media literacy features, and the continuous updates we make to support our community in real-time. Along with the hub, we launched media literacy campaigns in advance of several elections in the EU and wider Europe.

- **Czechia Parliamentary Elections 2025:** From 4 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Czech parliamentary election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.






- **Portugal Local Elections 2025:** From 16 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Portugal local elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Polígrafo](#).





- **Estonia Local Elections 2025:** From 24 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Estonia local election. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to our Estonian fact-checking partner, [Lead Stories](#) for digital literacy resources.



### Election Awareness


TikTok values not only creativity and expression, but also authenticity and integrity. Treat others with kindness and respect. Always follow our **Community Guidelines** when creating, viewing or interacting with election-related content. Bullying, harassment, threats, and all forms of abusive behaviours go against our policies. If you see something you think might violate our guidelines, you can report it. Thank you for helping us keep TikTok safe!

- Visit your **local election office website** for voting guidance.
- Verify information using authoritative sources. Build **digital literacy skills** and make informed judgments online.

[Give feedback](#)



- **Ireland Presidential Election 2025:** From 24 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Irish presidential elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [The Journal](#).






- **Netherlands Parliamentary Election 2025:** From 29 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Dutch parliamentary elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.





- **Danish Local and Municipal Elections 2025:** From 24 Oct 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Danish local and municipal elections. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to [Sikker Digital](#) for digital literacy resources.





- **Portugal Presidential Election 2026:** From 9 Dec 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2026 Portugal presidential election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Polígrafo](#).





- **Norway Parliamentary Elections 2025:** From 8 Aug 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Norwegian parliamentary election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.






**(II) Media literacy (General).** We continue our ongoing **general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns** in the EU in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners, spanning 14 countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal).

**(III) Media literacy (War in Ukraine).** We continue to serve 17 localised media literacy campaigns specific to the war in Ukraine in: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechia, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Austria, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

- Partnered with Lead Stories: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
- Partnered with fakenews.pl: Poland.
- Partnered with Correctiv: Germany, Austria.

Through these media literacy campaigns, users searching for keywords relating to the war in Ukraine on TikTok are directed to tips prepared in partnership with local media literacy bodies and our trusted fact-checking partners, to help them identify misinformation and prevent its spread on the platform.

**(IV) Israel-Hamas conflict.** To help raise awareness and to protect our users, we have search interventions which are triggered when users search for neutral terms related to this topic (e.g., Israel, Palestine). These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also directs them to well-being resources.





|  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|
| <p style="background-color: #cccccc; color: black; padding: 10px;">SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above</p> |  |  |  |
|  | <p>We are pleased to report metrics on the 14 general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns that ran through the reporting period in Germany, Romania, Poland, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Moldova, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands.</p> |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |



| <b>Member States</b>   | <b>Total number of impressions of the H5 Page (Views generated between July 1 and December 31, 2025)</b> | <b>Number of impressions of the search intervention</b> | <b>Number of clicks on the search intervention</b> | <b>Click through rate of the search intervention</b> |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| France (in partnership with AFP)                                     | 48,144   | 26,260,992  | 71,577   | 0.27%  |
| Portugal (in partnership with Poligrafo)                             | 10,369   | 5,426,533   | 22,811   | 0.42%  |
| Denmark (in partnership with Logically Facts)                        | 4,098  | 202,542   | 881  | 0.43%  |
| The Netherlands (in partnership with Nieuwscheckers)                 | 34,937   | 2,739,245   | 41,868   | 1.53%  |
| Ireland (in partnership with The journal.ie)                         | 905  | 359,461   | 1,883  | 0.52%  |
| Finland (in partnership with Logically Facts)                        | 1,543  | 186,559   | 2,994  | 1.60%  |
| Sweden (in partnership with Logically Facts)                         | 2,342  | 413,554   | 4,115  | 1.00%  |
| Spain (in partnership with Maldita)                                  | 21,922   | 17,986,294  | 42,554   | 0.24%  |
| Italy (in partnership with Facta)                                    | 1,433  | 439,721   | 2,290  | 0.52%  |
| Austria (in partnership with Correctiv, joint campaign with Germany) | 4,607  | 1,535,546   | 7,965  | 0.52%  |
| Germany (in partnership with Correctiv, joint campaign with Austria) | 7,790  | 536,473   | 2,533  | 0.47%  |



|          |        |           |        |       |
|----------|--------|-----------|--------|-------|
| Poland   | 10,369 | 9,183,221 | 54,480 | 0.59% |
| Bulgaria | 1,137  | 297,690   | 1,905  | 0.64% |
| Croatia  | 1,256  | 397,876   | 2,240  | 0.56% |
| Czechia  | 2,270  | 962,911   | 3,190  | 0.33% |
| Slovenia | 535    | 129,253   | 801    | 0.62% |



|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <p>Measure 17.3</p>      |  |
| <p><b>QRE 17.3.1</b></p> | <p>We work with fact-checking partners and media literacy bodies to develop campaigns that educate users and redirect them to authoritative resources. Specific examples of partnerships within the campaigns and projects set out in QRE 17.2.1 are:</p> <p><b>(I) Promoting election integrity.</b></p> <p>We partner with various media organisations and fact-checkers to promote election integrity on TikTok. For more detail about the input our fact-checking partners provide please refer to QRE 30.1.3.</p> <p>During this reporting period, we worked with European fact-checkers and media literacy organisations on 6 temporary <b>media literacy election integrity campaigns</b>, in advance of regional elections, through our in-app Election Centers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Portugal (local election): Polígrafo</li> <li>• Estonia (local election): Lead Stories</li> <li>• Ireland (presidential election): The Journal</li> <li>• Denmark (local and municipal elections): Sikker Digital</li> <li>• Portugal (presidential election): Polígrafo</li> <li>• Czechia (parliamentary election): Demagog.cz</li> </ul> <p><b>(II) War in Ukraine.</b></p> <p>We continue to run our media literacy campaigns about the war in Ukraine, developed in partnership with our media literacy partners Correctiv in Austria and Germany, Fakenews.pl in Poland and Lead Stories in Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania. We also expanded this campaign to Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Czechia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria.</p> |

## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 18



|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.</p> |   |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>                          | <p>Yes</p>  |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continued to improve the accuracy of, and overall coverage provided by, our machine learning detection models.</li> <li>Began testing large language models (LLMs) to further support proactive moderation at scale. Because LLMs can comprehend human language and perform highly specific, complex tasks, we are better able to moderate nuanced areas like misinformation by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.</li> <li>TikTok teams and personnel also regularly participate in research-focused events. In October 2025, TikTok co-sponsored the EU DisinfoLab conference in Slovenia. Several TikTok staff attended, and we co-led a session with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue on how platforms and conflict mediators can work together to reduce the risks of violence during conflicts.</li> <li>Continued to participate in, and co-chair, the working group on Elections.</li> <li>TikTok gathered its global Safety Advisory Councils in Singapore in October 2025 to consult them on a variety of topics including our approach to media literacy.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>         | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Measure 18.1</p>  | <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>.</p>  |



|   |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| QRE 18.1.1  | N/A  |  |  |  |
| QRE 18.1.2  | N/A  |  |  |  |
| QRE 18.1.3  | N/A  |  |  |  |
| SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies | N/A  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |
| Measure 18.2  |  |  |  |  |
| QRE 18.2.1  | <p>We take action against misinformation that causes significant harm to individuals, our community, or the larger public regardless of intent. We do this by removing content and accounts that violate our rules, by investing in media literacy and connecting our community to authoritative information, and by partnering with experts.</p> <p>Our Terms of Service and Integrity and Authenticity policies under our Community Guidelines are the first line of defence in combating harmful misinformation and (as outlined in more detail in QRE 14.1.1) deceptive behaviours on our platform. These rules make clear to our users what content we remove or make ineligible for the For You feed when they pose a risk of harm to our users and our community.</p> <p>Specifically, our policies do not allow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Misinformation</b></li> </ul> |  |  |  |



- Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or may induce panic about a crisis event or emergency, including using historical footage of a previous attack as if it were current, or incorrectly claiming a basic necessity (such as food or water) is no longer available in a particular location. Health misinformation, such as misleading statements about vaccines, inaccurate medical advice that discourages people from getting appropriate medical care for a life-threatening disease, or other misinformation which may cause negative health effects on an individual's life.
- Climate change misinformation that undermines well-established scientific consensus, such as denying the existence of climate change or the factors that contribute to it.
- Conspiracy theories that name and attack individual people.
- Conspiracy theories that are violent or hateful, such as making a violent call to action, having links to previous violence, denying well-documented violent events, or causing prejudice towards a group with a protected attribute.

- **Civic and Election Integrity**

- Election misinformation, including:
  - How, when, and where to vote or register to vote;
  - Eligibility requirements of voters to participate in an election, and the qualifications for candidates to run for office;
  - Laws, processes, and procedures that govern the organisation and implementation of elections and other civic processes, such as referendums, ballot propositions, or censuses;
  - Final results or outcome of an election.

- **Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)**

- The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
- The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
- Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  - Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation;
  - A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
- A public figure who is:
  - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour;



- taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
- being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

- **Fake Engagement**

- Facilitating the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes.
- Providing instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

We have made even clearer to our users [here](#) that the following content is ineligible for the For You feed:

- **Misinformation**

- Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society".
- Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness.
- Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest.
- Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study.
- Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event.
- Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review.

- **Civic and Election Integrity**

- Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied.
- Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill.

- **Fake Engagement**

- Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content.



As outlined in the QRE 14, we also remove accounts that seek to mislead people or use TikTok to deceptively sway public opinion. These activities range from inauthentic or fake account creation, to more sophisticated efforts to undermine public trust.

We have policy experts within our Trust and Safety team dedicated to the topic of integrity and authenticity. They continually keep these policies under review and collaborate with external partners and experts to understand whether updates or new policies are required and ensure they are informed by a diversity of perspectives, expertise, and lived experiences.

**Enforcing our policies.** We remove content – including video, audio, livestream, images, comments, links, or other text – that violates our Integrity and Authenticity policies. Individuals are notified of our decisions and can appeal them if they believe no violation has occurred. We also make clear in our Community Guidelines that we will temporarily or permanently ban accounts and/or users that are involved in serious or repeated violations, including violations of our Integrity and Authenticity policies.

We enforce our Community Guidelines policies, including our Integrity and Authenticity policies, through a mix of technology and human moderation. To do this effectively at scale, we continue to invest in our automated review process as well as in people and training. At TikTok we place a considerable emphasis on proactive content moderation. This means our teams work to detect and remove harmful material before it is reported to us.

However, misinformation is different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our misinformation policies. While machine learning models form the backbone of our misinformation detection capability, human moderators also play a critical role in reviewing, confirming, and actioning violations. We have qualified moderators who have enhanced training, expertise, and tools to take action on harmful misinformation. This includes access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of new content.

We strive to maintain a balance between freedom of expression and protecting our users and the wider public from harmful content. Our approach to combating harmful misinformation, as stated in our Community Guidelines, is to remove content that is both false and can cause harm to individuals or the wider public. This does not include simply inaccurate information which does not pose a risk of harm. Additionally, in cases where fact-checks are inconclusive, especially during emergency or unfolding events, content may not be removed and may instead become



|   |   |   |  |   |
|---|---|---|--|---|
|   | <p>ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed and labelled with the “unverified content” label to limit the spread of potentially misleading information.</p> <p>We are pleased to include in this report the number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the relevant Integrity and Authenticity policies as explained to users <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p>Note that in relation to the metrics we have shared at SLI 18.2.1 below, of all the views from users in the EEA that were recorded in H1 2025, fewer than 1 in per 10,000 views were of content identified and removed for violating our policies around harmful misinformation.</p> |   |  |   |
| <p><b>SLI 18.2.1</b></p>  | <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b></p> <p>We have based the following numbers on the country in which the video was posted: videos removed because of violations of our Misinformation, Civic and Election Integrity and Edited media and AIGC policies.</p> <p>The number of views of videos removed because of violation of each of these policies is based on the approximate location of the user.</p> <p>We also updated the methodology on the number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under our Misinformation policy.</p>   |   |  |   |
| <p>List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)</p> | <p><b>Total no of violations</b></p>  | <p><b>Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken</b></p>                             | <p><b>Total no of violations</b></p>   | <p><b>Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken</b></p> |
|   | <p><b>Number of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy</b></p>  | <p><b>Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy</b></p> | <p><b>Number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the Misinformation policy.</b></p> |   |
| <p><b>Member States</b></p>   |   |   |  |   |



|          |        |             |       |  |
|----------|--------|-------------|-------|--|
| Austria  | 2,612  | 1,946,472   | 2871  |  |
| Belgium  | 4,150  | 8,424,034   | 3069  |  |
| Bulgaria | 4,828  | 3,601,953   | 9427  |  |
| Croatia  | 638    | 984,109     | 793   |  |
| Cyprus   | 701    | 825,228     | 1060  |  |
| Czechia  | 2,855  | 846,267     | 5263  |  |
| Denmark  | 2,484  | 1,938,348   | 2085  |  |
| Estonia  | 527    | 9,792       | 865   |  |
| Finland  | 1,357  | 8,695,926   | 1752  |  |
| France   | 37,466 | 94,473,247  | 60520 |  |
| Germany  | 42,642 | 179,399,985 | 47221 |  |
| Greece   | 4,602  | 1,556,421   | 8200  |  |
| Hungary  | 1,490  | 1,328,847   | 2489  |  |
| Ireland  | 2,613  | 885,690     | 3489  |  |
| Italy    | 18,667 | 40,083,897  | 36707 |  |
| Latvia   | 705    | 448,180     | 1107  |  |



|                  |                |                    |                |  |
|------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|--|
| Lithuania        | 1,086          | 59,207             | 1257           |  |
| Luxembourg       | 349            | 14,382             | 305            |  |
| Malta            | 159            | 876,245            | 283            |  |
| Netherlands      | 14,335         | 15,235,784         | 13311          |  |
| Poland           | 14,770         | 22,162,809         | 15480          |  |
| Portugal         | 3,141          | 2,107,021          | 2561           |  |
| Romania          | 28,743         | 45,185,198         | 32030          |  |
| Slovakia         | 1,122          | 858,265            | 1861           |  |
| Slovenia         | 370            | 26,882             | 589            |  |
| Spain            | 21,592         | 25,310,043         | 38779          |  |
| Sweden           | 4,159          | 2,192,170          | 4633           |  |
| Iceland          | 123            | 6,208              | 188            |  |
| Liechtenstein    | 143            | 24,362             | 76             |  |
| Norway           | 1,662          | 2,467,190          | 1681           |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>218,163</b> | <b>459,476,402</b> | <b>298007</b>  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>220,091</b> | <b>461,974,162</b> | <b>299,952</b> |  |



| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) |
|--|--|---|---|--|
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |   |   |  |
| Austria  | 511  | 219,339   | 1564  | 2,121,335  |
| Belgium  | 864  | 292,729   | 2899  | 33,524,248   |
| Bulgaria   | 402  | 58,515  | 2181  | 1,380,041  |
| Croatia  | 63   | 49  | 1190  | 857,576  |
| Cyprus   | 85   | 9   | 1214  | 877,703  |
| Czechia  | 338  | 50,350  | 1551  | 166,156  |
| Denmark  | 512  | 20,319  | 1920  | 2,522,414  |
| Estonia  | 45   | 60,189  | 1571  | 202,878  |
| Finland  | 268  | 162,976   | 921   | 417,085  |
| France   | 3,650  | 6,727,613   | 28565   | 145,692,240  |
| Germany  | 5,287  | 926,431   | 50378   | 113,670,298  |
| Greece   | 960  | 48,866  | 2284  | 929,995  |
| Hungary  | 876  | 13,680  | 990   | 2,318,366  |
| Ireland  | 413  | 8,482   | 1722  | 1,125,060  |



|                  |  |                   |                |                    |
|------------------|--|-------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Italy            | 2,726  | 723,486           | 15434          | 93,101,464         |
| Latvia           | 301  | 318               | 1519           | 2,530              |
| Lithuania        | 61   | 1,190             | 1727           | 8,952,387          |
| Luxembourg       | 48   | 10                | 1620           | 164,719            |
| Malta            | 26   | 0                 | 382            | 2,127              |
| Netherlands      | 907  | 2,340,996         | 7974           | 28,839,022         |
| Poland           | 1,038  | 399,418           | 7227           | 14,249,635         |
| Portugal         | 270  | 38,447            | 1659           | 6,862,825          |
| Romania          | 4,622  | 5,017,440         | 10458          | 6,624,761          |
| Slovakia         | 64   | 639               | 1589           | 346,191            |
| Slovenia         | 34   | 7                 | 844            | 3,070,784          |
| Spain            | 1,483  | 162,917           | 16129          | 40,748,793         |
| Sweden           | 761  | 455               | 5168           | 4,607,858          |
| Iceland          | 19   | 0                 | 175            | 414                |
| Liechtenstein    | 4  | 0                 | 484            | 0                  |
| Norway           | 290  | 1,582             | 1282           | 2,920,599          |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>26,615</b>  | <b>17,274,870</b> | <b>170,680</b> | <b>513,378,491</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>26,928</b>  | <b>17,276,452</b> | <b>172,621</b> | <b>516,299,504</b> |
| Measure 18.3     | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |                   |                |                    |



|            |     |
|------------|-----|
| QRE 18.3.1 | N/A |
|------------|-----|

### V. Empowering Users

#### Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

|  |  |
|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● At TikTok, we strive to bring transparency to how we protect our platform. We continue to increase the reports we voluntarily publish, the depth of data we disclose, and the frequency with which we publish.</li> <li>● We also worked to make it easier for people to independently study our data and platform. For example through:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Our <a href="#">Research Tools</a>, which empower over 900 research teams to independently study our platform.</li> <li>○ Adding additional functionality to the Research API, including a <a href="#">compliance API</a> (launched in June 2025) that improves the data refresh process for researchers, helping to ensure that efforts to comply with our Terms of Service (ToS) do not impede researchers' ability to efficiently access data from TikTok's Research API.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |



|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Measure 19.1</p>  |   |
| <p><b>QRE 19.1.1</b></p>   | <p>The For You feed is the interface users first see when they open TikTok. It's central to the TikTok experience and where most of our users spend their time exploring the platform.</p> <p>We make clear to users in our Terms of Service and Community Guidelines (and also provide more context in our Help Center <a href="#">article</a> and Transparency Center <a href="#">page</a>, and Safety Center <a href="#">guide</a>) that each account holder's For You feed is based on a personalised recommendation system. The For You feed is curated to each user. Safety is built into our content recommendations. As well as removing harmful misinformation content that violates our Community Guidelines, we take steps to avoid recommending certain categories of content that may not be appropriate for a broad audience including general conspiracy theories and unverified information related to an emergency or unfolding event. We may also make some of this content harder to find in search.</p> <p><b>Main parameters.</b> The system recommends content by ranking content based on a combination of factors including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● User interactions (e.g. content users like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that users follow back);</li> <li>● Content information (e.g. sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country the content was published); and</li> <li>● User information (e.g. device settings, language preferences, location, time zone and day, and device types).</li> </ul> <p>The main parameters help us make predictions on the content users are likely to be interested in. Different factors can play a larger or smaller role in what's recommended, and</p> |





the importance – or weighting – of a factor can change over time. For many users, the time spent watching a specific video is generally weighted more heavily than other factors. These predictions are also influenced by the interactions of other people on TikTok who appear to have similar interests. For example, if a user likes videos 1, 2, and 3 and a second user likes videos 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the recommendation system may predict that the first user will also like videos 4 and 5.

Users can also access the “Why this video” feature, which allows them to see with any particular video that appears in their For You feed factors that influenced why it appeared in their feed. This feature provides added transparency in relation to how our ranking system works and empowers our users to better understand why a particular video has been recommended to them. The feature essentially explains to users how past interactions on the platform have impacted the video they have been recommended.

**User preferences.** Together with the safeguards we build into our platform by design, we also empower our users to customise their experience to their preferences and comfort.

These include a number of features to help shape the content they see. For example, in the For You feed:

- Users can click on any video and select “not interested” to indicate that they do not want to see similar content.
- Users are able to automatically filter out specific words or hashtags from the content recommended to them (see [here](#)).
- Users are able to [refresh their For You feed](#) if they no longer feel like recommendations are relevant to them or are too similar. When the For You feed is refreshed, users view a number of new videos which include popular videos (e.g., they have a high view count or a high like rate). Their interaction with these new videos will inform future recommendations.
- Users can also personalise their “For You” page through our new **Manage Topics** feature (June 2025). This allows users to adjust the frequency of content they see related to particular topics. The settings don’t eliminate topics entirely but can influence how often they’re recommended as peoples’ interests evolve over time. It adds to the many ways people shape their feed every day - including liking or sharing videos, searching for topics, or simply watching videos for longer.



- As part of our obligations under the **DSA (Article 38)**, we introduced non-personalized feeds on our platform, which provide our European users with an alternative to personalised recommender systems. They are able to turn off personalisation so that feeds show non-personalised content. The For You feed will instead show popular videos in their region and internationally. See [here](#).

Measure 19.2

**SLI 19.2.1 – user settings**

**Methodology of data measurement:**

The number of users who have filtered hashtags or a keyword to set preferences for For You feed, the number of times users clicked “not interested” in relation to the For You feed, and the number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh are all based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.

The number for videos tagged with AIGC label includes both automatic and creator-generated labeling.



|  | No of times users actively engaged with these settings | No of times users actively engaged with these settings  |  |  |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <b>Number of users that filtered hashtags or words</b> | <b>Number of users that clicked on "not interested"</b> | <b>Number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh</b> | <b>Number of Videos tagged with AIGC label</b> |
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |   |  |  |
| Austria  | 81,940   | 1,054,601   | 56,468   | 494,206  |
| Belgium  | 123,591  | 1,636,355   | 90,963   | 678,792  |
| Bulgaria   | 59,087   | 1,077,505   | 45,808   | 1,044,321                                      |
| Croatia  | 30,698   | 564,614   | 25,259   | 131,396  |
| Cyprus   | 17,932   | 224,295   | 15,464   | 181,397  |
| Czechia  | 63,982   | 849,428   | 41,602   | 538,710  |
| Denmark  | 49,192   | 637,478   | 31,304   | 191,270  |
| Estonia  | 18,895   | 182,527   | 13,036   | 83,768   |
| Finland  | 67,907   | 680,821   | 49,088   | 275,526  |
| France   | 680,454  | 9,545,884   | 490,210  | 4,724,226                                      |
| Germany  | 813,569  | 9,455,189   | 584,609  | 6,351,939                                      |
| Greece   | 89,043   | 1,629,313   | 81,664   | 715,077  |
| Hungary  | 63,484   | 1,179,383   | 35,106   | 776,347  |



|                  |                  |                   |                  |                   |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Ireland          | 83,988           | 1,014,346         | 60,748           | 181,131           |
| Italy            | 429,072          | 7,991,598         | 277,864          | 3,843,482         |
| Latvia           | 28,449           | 361,290           | 22,190           | 198,043           |
| Lithuania        | 34,507           | 402,385           | 26,669           | 220,796           |
| Luxembourg       | 7,038            | 97,071            | 5,142            | 48,734            |
| Malta            | 6,444            | 98,531            | 7,840            | 41,910            |
| Netherlands      | 267,432          | 2,926,699         | 204,997          | 1,387,922         |
| Poland           | 285,891          | 4,192,550         | 179,424          | 1,772,881         |
| Portugal         | 96,468           | 1,293,884         | 64,318           | 903,172           |
| Romania          | 155,037          | 3,379,837         | 196,717          | 2,213,505         |
| Slovakia         | 28,269           | 399,464           | 14,507           | 311,951           |
| Slovenia         | 14,149           | 204,523           | 11,366           | 52,786            |
| Spain            | 502,835          | 8,571,737         | 433,076          | 4,547,581         |
| Sweden           | 118,791          | 1,562,220         | 105,302          | 560,744           |
| Iceland          | 6,537            | 65,577            | 3,173            | 17,098            |
| Liechtenstein    | 229              | 3,947             | 364              | 1,164             |
| Norway           | 74,159           | 820,642           | 47,990           | 246,312           |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>4,218,144</b> | <b>61,213,528</b> | <b>3,170,741</b> | <b>32,471,613</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>4,299,069</b> | <b>62,103,694</b> | <b>3,222,268</b> | <b>32,736,187</b> |



## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 20.1  |   |
| <b>QRE 20.1.1</b>   | N/A   |



|              |     |
|--------------|-----|
| Measure 20.2 |     |
| QRE 20.2.1   | N/A |

| V. Empowering Users   |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 21   |   |
| <p>Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.</p> |   |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>   | <p>Yes</p>  |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● We ran 8 temporary <b>media literacy election integrity campaigns</b> in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 7 in the EU                 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Czechia (parliamentary election) with Demagog.cz</li> <li>■ Portugal (local election) with Polígrafo</li> <li>■ Estonia (local election) with Lead Stories</li> <li>■ Ireland (presidential election) with The Journal</li> <li>■ Netherlands (parliamentary election) N/A</li> <li>■ Denmark (local and municipal election) with Sikker Digital</li> <li>■ Portugal (presidential election) with Polígrafo</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> |



|  |  |
|--|--|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 1 in Norway (parliamentary election) N/A</li> <li>● Following wildfires in Portugal and Spain, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content during natural disasters. The guide links to TikTok's <a href="#">tragic event support guide</a> and authoritative third party resources (PT)(ES) of information about aid and relief support. The intervention is available in all in-app languages.</li> <li>● Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around the elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Holocaust Education, and the War in Ukraine.</li> <li>● We partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our <b>unverified content label</b> to inform viewers <a href="#">via a banner</a> that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility.</li> <li>● We launched a \$2 Million <a href="#">AI Literacy fund</a> in partnership with more than 20 civil society organisations across 12 markets worldwide. The ad credit fund is designed to support the creation of educational content that will appear in For You feeds. This initiative launched alongside several new company updates to spot, shape and understand AI-generated content.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p>Measure 21.1</p>  |  |

**QRE 21.1.1**

We currently have 13 IFCN accredited fact-checking partners across the EU, EEA, and wider Europe:

1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
3. Demagog
4. Facta
5. Faktograf
6. Internews Kosova
7. Lead Stories
8. Newtral
9. Poligrafo
10. Reuters
11. Teyit
12. [Science Feedback](#) - For advertising-related fact-checking partnerships, please refer to Chapter 2.
13. [Geofacts](#)

These partners provide fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages, including at least one official language of each EU Member States, plus Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.

We ensure that our users benefit from the context and insights provided by the fact checking organisations we partner with in the following ways:

- **Enforcement of misinformation policies.** Our fact-checking partners play a critical role in helping us enforce our misinformation policies, which aim to promote a trustworthy and authentic experience for our users. We consider context and fact-checking to be key to consistently and accurately enforcing these policies, so, while machine learning models form the backbone of our misinformation detection capability, human moderators also play a critical role in reviewing, confirming, and actioning violations. As part of this process, our moderators can also provide content to our expert fact-checking partners for further evaluation. Where fact-checking partners advise that content is false, our moderators take measures to assess and remove it from our platform. Our response to QRE 31.1.1 provides further insight into the way in which fact-checking partners are involved in this process.



|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Unverified content labelling.</b> As mentioned above, we partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers <a href="#">via a banner</a> that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility. In these circumstances, the content creator is also notified that their video was flagged as unsubstantiated content and the video will become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed.</li> <li>● <b>In-app tools related to specific topics</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Election integrity.</b> We have launched campaigns in advance of several major elections aimed at educating the public about the voting process which encourage users to fact-check information with our fact-checking partners. For example, the election integrity campaign we rolled out in advance of Portugal's local elections in October 2025 included an in-app <a href="#">Election Centre</a>. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with fact-checking organisation <a href="#">Polígrafo</a>. In total, during the reporting period, we ran 8 temporary <b>media literacy election integrity campaigns</b> in advance of regional elections.</li> <li>○ <b>Rapidly changing events:</b> Following protests in France, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content when events are unfolding rapidly. The guide links to TikTok's <a href="#">Community Guidelines</a> and <a href="#">Well-being Guide</a>.</li> <li>○ <b>Natural disasters:</b> Following wildfires in Portugal and Spain, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on interacting with sensitive content during natural disasters. The guide links to TikTok's <a href="#">tragic event support guide</a> and authoritative third party resources (<a href="#">PT</a>)(<a href="#">ES</a>) of information about aid and relief support. The intervention is available in all in-app languages.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● <b>User awareness of our fact-checking partnerships and labels.</b> We have created pages on our <a href="#">Safety Center</a> and <a href="#">Transparency Center</a> to raise users' awareness about our fact-checking program and labels and to support the work of our fact-checking partners.</li> </ul> |
| <p>SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1</p> | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p>   |



|  |   |  |  |   |  |
|--|---|--|--|---|--|
|  | <p>The share of removals under our harmful misinformation policy, share of proactive removals, share of removals before any views and share of the removals within 24h are relative to the total removals of each policy.</p> <p>The share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up indicates the percentage of users who do not share a video after seeing the label pop up. This metric is based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.</p> |  |  |   |  |
|  | Reach of labels/<br>fact-checkers and<br>other authoritative<br>sources   | Other pertinent<br>metric                            | Other pertinent<br>metric                                      | Other pertinent<br>metric   | Other<br>pertinent<br>metric                                       |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <b>Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up)</b>   | <b>Share of removals under misinformation policy</b> | <b>Share of proactive removals under misinformation policy</b> | <b>Share of video removals before any views under misinformation policy</b> | <b>Share of video removals within 24h by misinformation policy</b> |
| <b>Member States</b>   |   |  |  |   |  |
| Austria  | 30.37%  | 28.57%   | 98.77%   | 85.60%  | 91.54%   |
| Belgium  | 29.07%  | 32.26%   | 98.29%   | 86.10%  | 90.80%   |
| Bulgaria   | 35.32%  | 52.31%   | 99.52%   | 78.27%  | 92.65%   |
| Croatia  | 25.89%  | 21.13%   | 97.81%   | 82.13%  | 92.16%   |
| Cyprus   | 33.62%  | 25.18%   | 98.00%   | 85.02%  | 92.58%   |
| Czechia  | 31.01%  | 41.67%   | 99.37%   | 80.18%  | 94.92%   |



|             |        |        |        |        |        |
|-------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Denmark     | 31.82% | 18.65% | 98.79% | 84.02% | 90.10% |
| Estonia     | 30.88% | 7.88%  | 99.24% | 85.01% | 93.93% |
| Finland     | 29.58% | 31.31% | 97.20% | 82.76% | 91.75% |
| France      | 30.16% | 31.65% | 97.72% | 80.63% | 88.60% |
| Germany     | 29.86% | 29.76% | 96.93% | 83.42% | 90.34% |
| Greece      | 30.64% | 35.82% | 99.17% | 81.49% | 95.59% |
| Hungary     | 28.14% | 15.44% | 98.79% | 92.35% | 96.31% |
| Ireland     | 33.69% | 28.97% | 98.97% | 89.48% | 93.19% |
| Italy       | 32.14% | 36.23% | 92.03% | 84.00% | 91.51% |
| Latvia      | 36.08% | 19.79% | 99.29% | 86.10% | 95.32% |
| Lithuania   | 31.90% | 25.86% | 98.99% | 59.21% | 66.67% |
| Luxembourg  | 32.63% | 2.81%  | 98.85% | 86.82% | 90.54% |
| Malta       | 28.83% | 13.64% | 95.60% | 89.31% | 91.19% |
| Netherlands | 29.12% | 42.73% | 98.74% | 81.47% | 82.21% |
| Poland      | 30.73% | 37.40% | 98.31% | 76.58% | 91.66% |
| Portugal    | 29.97% | 41.29% | 99.49% | 87.33% | 92.26% |
| Romania     | 28.50% | 52.46% | 98.90% | 78.00% | 91.12% |
| Slovakia    | 28.39% | 27.99% | 98.93% | 76.83% | 94.74% |
| Slovenia    | 30.61% | 7.33%  | 99.73% | 88.92% | 96.22% |



|                      |               |  |  |   |   |
|----------------------|---------------|--|--|---|---|
| Spain                | 36.23%        | 35.84%   | 99.07%   | 88.68%  | 92.00%  |
| Sweden               | 29.51%        | 25.98%   | 98.92%   | 88.05%  | 94.45%  |
| Iceland              | 33.50%        | 25.52%   | 98.37%   | 86.18%  | 86.99%  |
| Liechtenstein        | 31.25%        | 4.15%  | 98.60%   | 93.71%  | 95.80%  |
| Norway               | 29.55%        | 27.09%   | 98.26%   | 85.98%  | 92.66%  |
| <b>Total EU</b>      | <b>31.26%</b> | <b>33.30%</b>  | <b>97.70%</b>  | <b>82.24%</b>   | <b>90.35%</b>   |
| <b>Total EEA</b>     | <b>31.23%</b> | <b>33.09%</b>  | <b>97.70%</b>  | <b>82.28%</b>   | <b>90.37%</b>   |
| <b>Member States</b> |               | <b>Share of video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy</b> | <b>Share of proactive video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy</b> | <b>Share of video removals before any views under Civic and Election Integrity policy</b> | <b>Share of video removals within 24h under Civic and Election Integrity policy</b> |
| Austria              |               | 5.59%  | 99.02%   | 94.91%  | 97.06%  |
| Belgium              |               | 6.72%  | 99.65%   | 95.72%  | 70.14%  |
| Bulgaria             |               | 4.36%  | 99.00%   | 95.52%  | 91.04%  |
| Croatia              |               | 2.09%  | 100.00%  | 98.41%  | 100.00%   |
| Cyprus               |               | 3.05%  | 100.00%  | 96.47%  | 96.47%  |
| Czechia              |               | 4.93%  | 98.52%   | 92.60%  | 95.56%  |
| Denmark              |               | 3.84%  | 98.63%   | 89.06%  | 96.68%  |



|             |  |       |         |         |         |
|-------------|--|-------|---------|---------|---------|
| Estonia     |  | 0.67% | 97.78%  | 82.22%  | 91.11%  |
| Finland     |  | 6.18% | 97.39%  | 90.67%  | 92.91%  |
| France      |  | 3.08% | 98.82%  | 94.33%  | 97.86%  |
| Germany     |  | 3.69% | 98.85%  | 95.80%  | 98.20%  |
| Greece      |  | 7.47% | 99.90%  | 95.52%  | 99.38%  |
| Hungary     |  | 9.07% | 99.66%  | 95.55%  | 99.09%  |
| Ireland     |  | 4.58% | 98.06%  | 94.67%  | 97.34%  |
| Italy       |  | 5.29% | 76.27%  | 91.53%  | 96.92%  |
| Latvia      |  | 8.45% | 100.00% | 28.57%  | 16.61%  |
| Lithuania   |  | 1.45% | 96.72%  | 98.36%  | 96.72%  |
| Luxembourg  |  | 0.39% | 100.00% | 95.83%  | 100.00% |
| Malta       |  | 2.23% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| Netherlands |  | 2.70% | 96.47%  | 82.25%  | 84.12%  |
| Poland      |  | 2.63% | 99.33%  | 89.31%  | 94.03%  |
| Portugal    |  | 3.55% | 99.63%  | 94.81%  | 97.41%  |
| Romania     |  | 8.44% | 98.55%  | 79.64%  | 93.70%  |
| Slovakia    |  | 1.60% | 100.00% | 93.75%  | 96.88%  |
| Slovenia    |  | 0.67% | 100.00% | 94.12%  | 100.00% |
| Spain       |  | 2.46% | 99.39%  | 88.60%  | 93.73%  |



|                      |  |   |   |  |  |
|----------------------|--|---|---|--|--|
| Sweden               |  | 4.75%   | 99.61%  | 98.29%   | 99.21%   |
| Iceland              |  | 3.94%   | 100.00%   | 100.00%  | 100.00%  |
| Liechtenstein        |  | 0.12%   | 100.00%   | 100.00%  | 100.00%  |
| Norway               |  | 4.73%   | 100.00%   | 97.59%   | 100.00%  |
| <b>Total EU</b>      |  | <b>4.06%</b>  | <b>96.56%</b>   | <b>90.25%</b>  | <b>94.34%</b>  |
| <b>Total EEA</b>     |  | <b>4.05%</b>  | <b>96.60%</b>   | <b>90.33%</b>  | <b>94.40%</b>  |
| <b>Member States</b> |  | <b>% video removals under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy</b> | <b>% proactive video removals under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy</b> | <b>% video removals before any views under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy</b> | <b>% video removals within 24h under Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy</b> |
| Austria              |  | 17.10%  | 97.51%  | 88.55%   | 86.96%   |
| Belgium              |  | 22.54%  | 98.03%  | 84.24%   | 82.03%   |
| Bulgaria             |  | 23.63%  | 99.08%  | 87.35%   | 88.77%   |
| Croatia              |  | 39.42%  | 98.40%  | 95.55%   | 96.05%   |
| Cyprus               |  | 43.61%  | 97.94%  | 92.50%   | 92.50%   |
| Czechia              |  | 22.64%  | 99.03%  | 92.07%   | 93.55%   |
| Denmark              |  | 14.42%  | 98.65%  | 93.59%   | 93.70%   |
| Estonia              |  | 23.48%  | 98.79%  | 97.90%   | 97.90%   |



|             |  |        |        |        |        |
|-------------|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Finland     |  | 21.25% | 97.39% | 91.10% | 93.05% |
| France      |  | 24.13% | 96.36% | 91.40% | 91.17% |
| Germany     |  | 35.15% | 97.74% | 92.71% | 92.71% |
| Greece      |  | 17.78% | 98.77% | 84.15% | 86.73% |
| Hungary     |  | 10.26% | 96.97% | 92.12% | 91.92% |
| Ireland     |  | 19.09% | 97.97% | 91.29% | 90.24% |
| Italy       |  | 29.96% | 82.05% | 89.87% | 89.16% |
| Latvia      |  | 42.64% | 98.88% | 97.63% | 97.43% |
| Lithuania   |  | 41.12% | 98.61% | 96.41% | 96.41% |
| Luxembourg  |  | 13.06% | 99.57% | 98.46% | 98.64% |
| Malta       |  | 32.76% | 97.91% | 96.34% | 95.81% |
| Netherlands |  | 23.77% | 97.35% | 88.90% | 88.15% |
| Poland      |  | 18.30% | 97.45% | 93.23% | 94.52% |
| Portugal    |  | 21.81% | 98.61% | 84.33% | 85.11% |
| Romania     |  | 19.09% | 98.16% | 89.30% | 84.11% |
| Slovakia    |  | 39.64% | 99.50% | 97.17% | 97.99% |
| Slovenia    |  | 16.71% | 98.70% | 96.21% | 95.73% |
| Spain       |  | 26.77% | 99.32% | 92.43% | 91.18% |
| Sweden      |  | 32.28% | 99.28% | 93.73% | 93.77% |



|                  |  |               |               |               |               |
|------------------|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Iceland          |  | 36.31%        | 100.00%       | 94.29%        | 93.71%        |
| Liechtenstein    |  | 14.06%        | 99.38%        | 100.00%       | 99.79%        |
| Norway           |  | 20.89%        | 98.21%        | 89.63%        | 90.41%        |
| <b>Total EU</b>  |  | <b>26.06%</b> | <b>96.42%</b> | <b>91.67%</b> | <b>91.18%</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> |  | <b>25.95%</b> | <b>96.44%</b> | <b>91.68%</b> | <b>91.21%</b> |

|  |   |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| <b>SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1</b>                   | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b><br><br>The number of videos tagged with the unverified content label is based on the country in which the video was posted.<br><br>The share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up indicates the percentage of users who do not share a video after seeing the label pop-up. This metric is based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools. |  |  |  |
|  |   | Number of labels applied to content, such as on the basis of such articles |  | Meaningful metrics such as the impact of 21.1. measures on user interactions with, or user re-shares of, content fact-checked as false or misleading |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) |   | <b>Number of videos tagged with the unverified content label</b>           |  | <b>Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up)</b>  |
| <b>Member States</b>   |   |  |  |  |



|            |  |       |  |        |
|------------|--|-------|--|--------|
| Austria    |  | 77    |  | 30.37% |
| Belgium    |  | 178   |  | 29.07% |
| Bulgaria   |  | 198   |  | 35.32% |
| Croatia    |  | 5     |  | 25.89% |
| Cyprus     |  | 17    |  | 33.62% |
| Czechia    |  | 314   |  | 31.01% |
| Denmark    |  | 298   |  | 31.82% |
| Estonia    |  | 34    |  | 30.88% |
| Finland    |  | 57    |  | 29.58% |
| France     |  | 2,397 |  | 30.16% |
| Germany    |  | 1,945 |  | 29.86% |
| Greece     |  | 264   |  | 30.64% |
| Hungary    |  | 33    |  | 28.14% |
| Ireland    |  | 39    |  | 33.69% |
| Italy      |  | 943   |  | 32.14% |
| Latvia     |  | 2     |  | 36.08% |
| Lithuania  |  | 12    |  | 31.90% |
| Luxembourg |  | 6     |  | 32.63% |
| Malta      |  | 0     |  | 28.83% |



|                  |  |              |  |               |
|------------------|--|--------------|--|---------------|
| Netherlands      |  | 325          |  | 29.12%        |
| Poland           |  | 425          |  | 30.73%        |
| Portugal         |  | 138          |  | 29.97%        |
| Romania          |  | 597          |  | 28.50%        |
| Slovakia         |  | 133          |  | 28.39%        |
| Slovenia         |  | 6            |  | 30.61%        |
| Spain            |  | 549          |  | 36.23%        |
| Sweden           |  | 123          |  | 29.51%        |
| Iceland          |  | 0            |  | 33.50%        |
| Liechtenstein    |  | 0            |  | 31.25%        |
| Norway           |  | 79           |  | 29.55%        |
| <b>Total EU</b>  |  | <b>9,115</b> |  | <b>31.26%</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> |  | <b>9,194</b> |  | <b>31.23%</b> |

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 21.2      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 21.2.1</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 21.3      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 21.3.1</b> | N/A  |



## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A.  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 22.1  |   |



|   |     |
|---|-----|
| QRE 22.1.1                                    | N/A |
| SLI 22.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A |
|   | N/A |

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Measure 22.2 | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| QRE 22.2.1   | N/A  |
| Measure 22.3 | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| QRE 22.3.1   | N/A  |
| Measure 22.4 | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| QRE 22.4.1   | N/A  |



|   |  |
|---|--|
| SLI 22.4.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A  |
|   | N/A  |
| Data  | N/A  |
| Measure 22.5                                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| QRE 22.5.1                                    | N/A  |
| SLI 22.5.1 - actions enforcing policies above |  |
|   | N/A  |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| SLI 22.5.2 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A  |
|   | N/A  |
| Data  |  |
| Measure 22.6                                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| QRE 22.6.1                                    | N/A  |
| SLI 22.6.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A  |



|  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|
|  | N/A  |  |  |  |
| <b>Data</b>  |  |  |  |  |
| Measure 22.7   |  |  |  |  |
| <b>QRE 22.7.1</b>                                    | As per our response to QRE 17.1.1, we have numerous tools that lead users to authoritative sources available in all EU member states and in 23 official EU languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic). We also run localised campaigns on specific topics which deploy different engagement techniques depending on the subject matter and / or member state involved, e.g., in-person workshops, radio and newspaper campaigns. |  |  |  |
| <b>SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above</b> | N/A  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |



## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 23


Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>                  | <p>Yes</p>  |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In line with our DSA requirements, we continued to provide a <a href="#">dedicated reporting channel</a> and appeals process for users who disagree with the outcome, for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content,' enabling users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. For advertising-related user reporting flow, please refer to Chapter 2.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Measure 23.1</p>  |   |



## QRE 23.1.1

We provide users with [simple, intuitive ways](#) to report/flag content in-app for any breach of our Terms of Service or Community Guidelines including for harmful misinformation in each EU Member State and in an official language of the European Union.







- By 'long-pressing' (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the video content and selecting the "Report" option.
- By selecting the "Share" button available on the right-hand side of the video content and then selecting the "Report" option.

The user is then shown categories of reporting reasons from which to select (which align with the harms our Community Guidelines seek to address). In 2024, we updated this feature to make the "Misinformation" categories more intuitive and allow users to report with increased granularity.

In line with our DSA requirements, we continued to provide a [dedicated reporting channel](#), and appeals process for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content,' enabling users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law.



People can report TikTok content or accounts without needing to sign in or have an account by accessing the Report function using the “More options (...)” menu on videos or profiles in their browser, or through our “Report Inappropriate content” webform which is available in our Help [Centre](#). Harmful misinformation can be reported across content features such as video, comment, search, hashtag, sound, or account.

Measure 23.2

**QRE 23.2.1**

**Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.**

**Reporting system**

To ensure the integrity of our reporting system, we deploy a combination of advanced moderation technologies and teams of human safety experts. Videos uploaded to TikTok are initially reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which aims to identify content that violates our Community Guidelines. If a potential violation of our Community Guidelines is found, the automated review system will either pass it on to our moderation teams for further review or, if there is a high degree of confidence that the content violates our Community Guidelines, remove it automatically. Automated removal is only applied when violations are clear-cut, such as where the content contains nudity or pertains to youth safety. We are constantly working to improve the precision of our automated moderation technology so we can more effectively remove violative content at scale, while also reducing the number of incorrect removals.

To support the fair and consistent review of potentially violative content, where violations are less clear-cut, content will be passed to our human moderation teams for further review. Human moderators can take additional context and nuance into account, which cannot always be picked up by technology, and in the context of harmful misinformation, for example, our moderators have direct access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of new content.

We have sought to make our Community Guidelines as clear and complete as possible and have put in place robust Quality Assurance processes (including steps such as review of moderation cases, flows, appeals and undertaking Root Cause Analyses).

As part of our requirements under the DSA, we have introduced an [additional reporting channel](#) for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. TikTok will review the content against our Community Guidelines and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally. If it is not removed, our illegal content moderation team will further review the content to assess whether it is unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction - this assessment is undertaken by human review. If it is, access to that content will be restricted in that country. Those who report suspected illegal content will be notified of our decision, including if we consider that the content is not illegal. Users who disagree can [appeal](#) those decisions using the appeals process.



|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | <p>We also note that whilst user reports are important, at TikTok we place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content. We are proud that the vast majority of removed content is identified proactively before it is reported to us.</p> <p><b><u>Appeals system.</u></b></p> <p>We are transparent with users in relation to appeals. We set out <a href="#">the options</a> that may be available both to the user who reported the content and the creator of the affected content, where they disagree with the decision we have taken.</p> <p>The integrity of our appeals systems is reinforced by the involvement of our dedicated moderation processes that take context and nuance into consideration when deciding whether content violates our Community Guidelines or is illegal.</p> <p>To ensure consistency within this process and its overall integrity, we have sought to make our policies as clear and complete as possible and have put in place robust Quality Assurance processes (including steps such as auditing appeals and undertaking Root Cause Analyses).</p> <p>If users who have submitted an appeal are still not satisfied with our decision, they can share feedback with us via the <a href="#">webform</a> on TikTok.com. We continuously take user feedback into consideration to identify areas of improvement, including within the appeals process. Users may also have other legal rights in relation to decisions we make, as set out further <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |
|--|---|

**V. Empowering Users**

Commitment 24



|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.</p> |   |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>   | <p>No</p>   |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>  | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>  | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Measure 24.1</p>   |   |
| <p><b>QRE 24.1.1</b></p>  | <p>Users in all EU member states are notified by an in-app notification in their relevant local language where the following action is taken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● removal or otherwise restriction of access to their content;</li> <li>● a ban of the account;</li> <li>● restriction of their access to a feature (such as LIVE); or</li> <li>● restriction of their ability to monetise.</li> </ul> |



|   |   |   |  |  |
|---|---|---|--|--|
|   | <p>Such notifications are provided in near real time after action has been taken (i.e. generally within several seconds or up to a few minutes).</p> <p>Where we have taken any of these decisions, an in-app inbox notification sets out the violation deemed to have taken place, along with an option for users to “disagree” and submit an appeal. Users can submit appeals within 180 days of being notified of the decision they want to appeal. Further information, including about how to appeal a decision and other redress possibilities is set out <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p>All such appeals raised will be queued for review by our dedicated moderation process so as to ensure that context is adequately taken into account in reaching a determination.</p> <p>As mentioned above, our users have the ability to share feedback with us to the extent that they don't agree with the result of their appeal. They can do so by using the in-app function which allows them to "report a problem". We are continuously taking user feedback into consideration in order to identify areas of improvement within the appeals process.</p> |   |  |  |
| <p><b>SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions</b></p>                                | <p><b>Methodology of data measurement:</b></p> <p>The number of appeals/overturns is based on the country in which the video being appealed/overturned was posted. These numbers are only related to our Misinformation, Civic and Election Integrity and Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policies.</p>  |   |  |  |
| <p>List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)</p> | <p>Number of actions appealed</p>   | <p>Metrics on results of appeals</p>  | <p>Number of actions appealed</p>  |  |
| <p><b>Member States</b></p>   | <p><b>Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy</b></p>  | <p><b>Number of overturns of appeals for violation of misinformation policy</b></p> | <p><b>Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy</b></p> |  |
| <p>Austria</p>  | <p>885</p>  | <p>683</p>  | <p>77.2%</p>   |  |



|           |        |        |       |  |
|-----------|--------|--------|-------|--|
| Belgium   | 1,047  | 877    | 83.8% |  |
| Bulgaria  | 1,375  | 983    | 71.5% |  |
| Croatia   | 133    | 106    | 79.7% |  |
| Cyprus    | 155    | 122    | 78.7% |  |
| Czechia   | 1,119  | 936    | 83.6% |  |
| Denmark   | 546    | 441    | 80.8% |  |
| Estonia   | 181    | 137    | 75.7% |  |
| Finland   | 424    | 346    | 81.6% |  |
| France    | 7,543  | 6,307  | 83.6% |  |
| Germany   | 14,569 | 10,635 | 73.0% |  |
| Greece    | 1,206  | 1,022  | 84.7% |  |
| Hungary   | 362    | 285    | 78.7% |  |
| Ireland   | 856    | 716    | 83.6% |  |
| Italy     | 4,912  | 3,583  | 72.9% |  |
| Latvia    | 253    | 227    | 89.7% |  |
| Lithuania | 275    | 201    | 73.1% |  |



|  |  |   |  |  |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| Luxembourg   | 60   | 50  | 83.3%  |  |
| Malta  | 33   | 25  | 75.8%  |  |
| Netherlands  | 4,467  | 3,223   | 72.2%  |  |
| Poland   | 5,049  | 3,488   | 69.1%  |  |
| Portugal   | 823  | 648   | 78.7%  |  |
| Romania  | 8,645  | 4,885   | 56.5%  |  |
| Slovakia   | 358  | 287   | 80.2%  |  |
| Slovenia   | 125  | 104   | 83.2%  |  |
| Spain  | 5,671  | 4,159   | 73.3%  |  |
| Sweden   | 1,039  | 831   | 80.0%  |  |
| Iceland  | 36   | 33  | 91.7%  |  |
| Liechtenstein  | 4  | 2   | 50.0%  |  |
| Norway   | 547  | 429   | 78.4%  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>62,111</b>                                  | <b>45,307</b>                                       | <b>72.9%</b>                                     |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b>   | <b>62,698</b>                                  | <b>45,771</b>                                       | <b>73.0%</b>                                     |  |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <b>Number of appeals of videos removed for</b> | <b>Number of overturns of appeals for violation</b> | <b>Appeal success rate of videos removed for</b> |  |



|                      | violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | of Civic and Election Integrity policy | violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy |  |
|----------------------|--|--|--|--|
| <b>Member States</b> |  |  |  |  |
| Austria              | 152  | 128                                    | 84.2%  |  |
| Belgium              | 171  | 145                                    | 84.8%  |  |
| Bulgaria             | 71   | 60                                     | 84.5%  |  |
| Croatia              | 13   | 12                                     | 92.3%  |  |
| Cyprus               | 13   | 11                                     | 84.6%  |  |
| Czechia              | 110  | 96                                     | 87.3%  |  |
| Denmark              | 88   | 69                                     | 78.4%  |  |
| Estonia              | 23   | 15                                     | 65.2%  |  |
| Finland              | 61   | 47                                     | 77.0%  |  |
| France               | 362  | 309                                    | 85.4%  |  |
| Germany              | 1,475  | 1,191                                  | 80.7%  |  |
| Greece               | 168  | 150                                    | 89.3%  |  |
| Hungary              | 189  | 163                                    | 86.2%  |  |



|               |       |     |        |  |
|---------------|-------|-----|--------|--|
| Ireland       | 85    | 77  | 90.6%  |  |
| Italy         | 367   | 309 | 84.2%  |  |
| Latvia        | 23    | 21  | 91.3%  |  |
| Lithuania     | 28    | 25  | 89.3%  |  |
| Luxembourg    | 7     | 6   | 85.7%  |  |
| Malta         | 6     | 6   | 100.0% |  |
| Netherlands   | 330   | 246 | 74.5%  |  |
| Poland        | 284   | 238 | 83.8%  |  |
| Portugal      | 76    | 58  | 76.3%  |  |
| Romania       | 1,219 | 777 | 63.7%  |  |
| Slovakia      | 19    | 15  | 78.9%  |  |
| Slovenia      | 11    | 5   | 45.5%  |  |
| Spain         | 374   | 328 | 87.7%  |  |
| Sweden        | 163   | 130 | 79.8%  |  |
| Iceland       | 7     | 6   | 85.7%  |  |
| Liechtenstein | 0     | 0   | 0.0%   |  |



|  |  |   |  |  |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| Norway   | 105  | 87  | 82.9%  |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>5,888</b>   | <b>4,637</b>  | <b>78.8%</b>   |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b>   | <b>6,000</b>   | <b>4,730</b>  | <b>78.8%</b>   |  |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <b>Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)</b> | <b>Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)</b> | <b>Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)</b> |  |
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |   |  |  |
| Austria  | 645  | 574   | 89.0%  |  |
| Belgium  | 590  | 521   | 88.3%  |  |
| Bulgaria   | 333  | 278   | 83.5%  |  |
| Croatia  | 256  | 229   | 89.5%  |  |
| Cyprus   | 246  | 213   | 86.6%  |  |
| Czechia  | 479  | 418   | 87.3%  |  |
| Denmark  | 567  | 540   | 95.2%  |  |
| Estonia  | 362  | 308   | 85.1%  |  |
| Finland  | 429  | 388   | 90.4%  |  |



|             |        |       |       |  |
|-------------|--------|-------|-------|--|
| France      | 3,308  | 2,905 | 87.8% |  |
| Germany     | 10,927 | 9,547 | 87.4% |  |
| Greece      | 461    | 395   | 85.7% |  |
| Hungary     | 242    | 205   | 84.7% |  |
| Ireland     | 416    | 388   | 93.3% |  |
| Italy       | 2,796  | 2,399 | 85.8% |  |
| Latvia      | 544    | 487   | 89.5% |  |
| Lithuania   | 470    | 411   | 87.4% |  |
| Luxembourg  | 86     | 81    | 94.2% |  |
| Malta       | 62     | 54    | 87.1% |  |
| Netherlands | 4,138  | 3,671 | 88.7% |  |
| Poland      | 1,910  | 1,563 | 81.8% |  |
| Portugal    | 291    | 253   | 86.9% |  |
| Romania     | 2,528  | 2,208 | 87.3% |  |
| Slovakia    | 337    | 290   | 86.1% |  |
| Slovenia    | 168    | 148   | 88.1% |  |



|                  |               |               |              |  |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--|
| Spain            | 3,988         | 3,608         | 90.5%        |  |
| Sweden           | 830           | 701           | 84.5%        |  |
| Iceland          | 34            | 33            | 97.1%        |  |
| Liechtenstein    | 3             | 3             | 100.0%       |  |
| Norway           | 527           | 477           | 90.5%        |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>37,409</b> | <b>32,783</b> | <b>87.6%</b> |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>37,973</b> | <b>33,296</b> | <b>87.7%</b> |  |



## V. Empowering Users

### Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 25.1  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 25.1.1</b>   | N/A   |
| <b>SLI 25.1.1</b>   | N/A   |



|   |  |
|---|--|
|   | N/A  |
| <b>Data</b>                             |  |
| Measure 25.2                            | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 25.2.1</b>                       | N/A  |
| <b>SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools</b> | N/A  |
|   | N/A  |
| <b>Data</b>                             |  |



## VI. Empowering the research community Commitments 26 - 29



| <b>VI. Empowering the research community</b>   |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Commitment 26</b>   |   |
| Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data. |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enabled researchers to efficiently identify popular, high-engagement content through our Research Tools (Research API and <a href="#">VCE</a>) by filtering videos by numbers of views and comments, supporting studies across topics including potential disinformation.</li> </ul> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]  | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?  | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 26.1</b>  |   |
| <b>QRE 26.1.1</b>  | Our dedicated <a href="#">TikTok for Developers</a> website hosts our Research Tools and Commercial Content APIs (detailed below).  |



|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <p><b>QRE 26.1.2</b></p> | <p>In this H2 2025 report, TikTok has shared more than 2,000 data points across 30 EU/EEA countries.</p> <p>We provide access to researchers to data that is publicly available on our platform through our Research Tools and Commercial Content API hosted on our dedicated <a href="#">TikTok for Developers</a> website.</p>   |
| <p><b>SLI 26.1.1</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Data</b></p>       |  |
| <p>Measure 26.2</p>      |  |
| <p><b>QRE 26.2.1</b></p> | <p><b>(I) Research API</b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, number of comments, shares, likes, followers and following lists, and favourites that a video receives on our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p><b>(II) Virtual Compute Environment (VCE)</b></p> <p>Through our VCE, qualifying not-for-profit researchers and academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the EU can query and analyse TikTok’s public data. To protect the security and privacy of our users the VCE is designed to ensure that TikTok data is processed within confined parameters. TikTok only reviews the results to ensure that there is no identifiable individual information extracted out of the platform. All aggregated results will be shared as a downloadable link to the approved primary researcher's email.</p> <p><b>(III) Commercial Content API</b></p> <p>Through our Commercial Content API, qualifying researchers and professionals, who can be located in any country, can request public data about searches on ads and other commercial</p> |



|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
|                          | <p>contents including ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information. To date, the Commercial Content API only includes data from EU countries.</p> <p><b>(IV) Commercial Content Library</b></p> <p>TikTok's <a href="#">Commercial Content Library</a> (CCL) is a repository of ads and other commercial content posted on TikTok.</p> <p>There are two main sub-libraries within the CCL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Ad Library</b>: This library features ads that we're paid to display to people, including those that aren't currently active or have been paused by the advertisers.</li> <li>• <b>Other commercial content</b>: This library features content that we're not paid to display, including content that promotes a brand, product, or service.</li> </ul> <p>The CCL currently includes information on ads available to users in the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland, and the U.K.</p>   |
| <p><b>QRE 26.2.2</b></p> | <p><b>(I) Research API</b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, number of comments, shares, likes, followers and following lists, and favourites that a video receives on our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p><b>(II) Virtual Compute Environment (VCE)</b></p> <p>Through our VCE, qualifying not-for-profit researchers and academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the EU can query and analyse TikTok's public data. To protect the security and privacy of our users the VCE is designed to ensure that TikTok data is processed within confined parameters. TikTok only reviews the results to ensure that there is no identifiable individual information extracted out of the platform. All aggregated results will be shared as a downloadable link to the approved primary researcher's email.</p> <p><b>(III) Commercial Content API</b></p> |



|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
|                          | <p>Through our Commercial Content API, qualifying researchers and professionals, who can be located in any country, can request public data about commercial content including ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information. To date, the Commercial Content API only includes data from EU countries.</p> <p><b>(IV) Commercial Content Library</b></p> <p>TikTok's <a href="#">Commercial Content Library</a> (CCL) is a repository of ads and other commercial content posted on TikTok.</p> <p>There are two main sub-libraries within the CCL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Ad Library:</b> This library features ads that we're paid to display to people, including those that aren't currently active or have been paused by the advertisers.</li> <li>• <b>Other commercial content:</b> This library features content that we're not paid to display, including content that promotes a brand, product, or service.</li> </ul> <p>The CCL currently includes information on ads available to users in the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland, and the U.K.</p> |
| <p><b>QRE 26.2.3</b></p> | <p>We make detailed information available to applicants about our Research Tools (<a href="#">Research API</a> and <a href="#">VCE</a>) and <a href="#">Commercial Content API</a>, through our dedicated <a href="#">TikTok for Developers</a> website, including on what data is made available and how to apply for access.</p> <p>Once an application has been approved for access to our Research Tools, we provide step-by-step instructions for researchers on how to access research data, how to comply with the security steps, and how to run queries on the data.</p> <p>Similarly with the Commercial Content API, we provide participants with detailed information on <a href="#">how to query ad data and fetch public advertiser data</a>.</p>  |
| <p><b>SLI 26.2.1</b></p> | <p><b>Research Tools, Commercial Content API, and the Commercial Content Library</b></p> <p>During this reporting period we received:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 201 applications to access TikTok's Research Tools (Research API and VCE) from researchers in the EU and EEA.</li> </ul>  |



|                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>90 applications to access the TikTok Commercial Content API.</li> </ul> |  |  |   |   |   |
|-----------------|--|--|--|---|---|---|
|                 | Number of applications received for Research Tools   | Number of applications accepted for Research Tools | Number of applications rejected for Research Tools | Number of applications received for TikTok Commercial Content API | Number of applications accepted for TikTok Commercial Content API | Number of applications rejected for TikTok Commercial Content API |
| <b>Austria</b>  | 8  | 6  | 2  | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Belgium</b>  | 5  | 3  | 2  | 2   | 2   | 0   |
| <b>Bulgaria</b> | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Croatia</b>  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Cyprus</b>   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1   | 1   | 0   |
| <b>Czechia</b>  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 2   | 2   | 0   |
| <b>Denmark</b>  | 6  | 6  | 0  | 10  | 10  | 0   |
| <b>Estonia</b>  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1   | 1   | 0   |
| <b>Finland</b>  | 3  | 3  | 0  | 1   | 1   | 0   |
| <b>France</b>   | 25   | 10   | 11   | 17  | 17  | 0   |
| <b>Germany</b>  | 50   | 34   | 10   | 16  | 16  | 0   |
| <b>Greece</b>   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Hungary</b>  | 3  | 3  | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Ireland</b>  | 6  | 4  | 2  | 2   | 2   | 0   |



|                  |            |            |           |           |           |          |
|------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| Italy            | 24         | 18         | 6         | 2         | 2         | 0        |
| Latvia           | 1          | 0          | 1         | 2         | 2         | 0        |
| Lithuania        | 1          | 1          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        |
| Luxembourg       | 1          | 0          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        |
| Malta            | 0          | 0          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        |
| Netherlands      | 11         | 10         | 1         | 7         | 7         | 0        |
| Poland           | 5          | 4          | 1         | 9         | 9         | 0        |
| Portugal         | 4          | 3          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        |
| Romania          | 5          | 2          | 1         | 2         | 2         | 0        |
| Slovakia         | 0          | 0          | 0         | 1         | 1         | 0        |
| Slovenia         | 2          | 1          | 1         | 1         | 1         | 0        |
| Spain            | 35         | 14         | 17        | 7         | 7         | 0        |
| Sweden           | 10         | 7          | 2         | 4         | 4         | 0        |
| Iceland          | 0          | 0          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        |
| Lichtenstein     | 0          | 0          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        |
| Norway           | 2          | 1          | 0         | 3         | 3         | 0        |
| <b>EU Level</b>  | <b>207</b> | <b>130</b> | <b>57</b> | <b>87</b> | <b>87</b> | <b>0</b> |
| <b>EEA Level</b> | <b>209</b> | <b>131</b> | <b>57</b> | <b>90</b> | <b>90</b> | <b>0</b> |
| Measure 26.3     |            |            |           |           |           |          |



|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| <b>QRE 26.3.1</b> | <p>We welcome feedback from researchers on our APIs and have a <a href="#">dedicated support form</a> where researchers can provide feedback about their experience. In response to recent feedback, we have added the option to our Research Tools to filter video results by number of views and number of comments. This feature helps researchers more efficiently identify popular and high-engagement content, with the goal of enabling research across many topics including the potential dissemination of disinformation.</p> |
|-------------------|---|

| <b>VI. Empowering the research community</b>  |   |
|---|---|
| <b>Commitment 27</b>  |   |
| <p>Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.</p> |   |
| <p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>   | <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>.</p> |
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>  | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>  | <p>N/A</p>  |



|  |  |
|--|--|
| Measure 27.1   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 27.1.1</b>  | N/A  |
| Measure 27.2   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 27.2.1</b>  | N/A  |
| Measure 27.3   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 27.3.1</b>  | N/A  |
| <b>SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body</b> | N/A  |
|  | N/A  |
| <b>Data</b>  | N/A  |
| Measure 27.4   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 27.4.1</b>  | N/A  |

|  |
|--|
| <b>VI. Empowering the research community</b> |
| Commitment 28                                |



| Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.  |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enable researchers to efficiently identify popular, high-engagement content through our Research Tools (Research API and <a href="#">VCE</a>) by filtering videos by views and comments, supporting studies across topics including potential disinformation.</li> </ul>   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 28.1  |   |
| <b>QRE 28.1.1</b>   | <p>TikTok is committed to facilitating research and engaging with the research community.</p> <p>As set out above, TikTok is committed to facilitating research through our Research Tools, Commercial Content APIs and Commercial Content Library, full details of which are available on our <a href="#">TikTok for Developers</a> and <a href="#">Commercial Content Library</a> websites.</p> <p>TikTok teams and personnel also regularly participate in <b>research-focused events</b>. During this reporting period, we hosted an academic API workshop in our Dublin office (July), conducted a demo of the VCE for a Spanish NGO (September), participated in the DSA Data Access Days</p> |



|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
|                          | <p>hosted by the DSA40 Collaboratory (September), attended the Stanford Trust &amp; Safety Research Conference (September), hosted two webinars for academic and NGO researchers in Europe (October), conducted a small Research Tools briefing for an Italian university lab (November), hosted a webinar about the Research Tools for academic researchers in Romania (November), and presented two Research Tools demos for groups at the University of Texas at Austin (November).</p> <p>As well as opportunities to share context about our approach, research interests, and opportunities to collaborate, these events enable us to learn from the important work being done by the research community on various topics, which include aspects related to harmful misinformation.</p>  |
| <p>Measure 28.2</p>      |   |
| <p><b>QRE 28.2.1</b></p> | <p>We have a dedicated <a href="#">TikTok for Developers</a> website which hosts our Research Tools and Commercial Content APIs.</p> <p>With the <a href="#">Research API</a>, researchers can access:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public account data, such as user profiles, followers and following lists, liked videos, pinned videos and reposted videos.</li> <li>• Public content data, such as comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares and likes that a video receives.</li> </ul> <p>Through the VCE, qualifying not-for-profit researchers in the EU can access and analyse TikTok's public data, including public U18 data, in a secure environment that is subject to strict security controls.</p> <p>Our <a href="#">commercial content related APIs</a> includes ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information. These APIs will allow the public and researchers to perform customised - advertiser name or keyword based - searches on ads and other commercial content data that is stored in the Commercial Content Library repository. The <a href="#">Library</a> is a searchable database with information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad ran, main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), number of people who were served the ad, and more.</p> |



|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Measure 28.3      |   |
| <b>QRE 28.3.1</b> | The data we make available and the application criteria for our Research Tools ( <a href="#">Research API</a> and <a href="#">VCE</a> ) and <a href="#">Commercial Content API</a> is research topic agnostic and clearly set out in our dedicated <a href="#">TikTok for Developers</a> website. In August 2024, we introduced a due diligence process with an external vendor to confirm the eligibility of NGO applicants. |
| Measure 28.4      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .  |
| <b>QRE 28.4.1</b> | N/A   |



## VI. Empowering the research community

### Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| <b>Measure 29.1</b>   | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> .    |
| <b>QRE 29.1.1</b>   | N/A   |
| <b>QRE 29.1.2</b>   | N/A   |
| <b>QRE 29.1.3</b>   | N/A   |



|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>SLI 29.1.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects</b> | N/A  |
|   | N/A  |
| <b>Data</b>   | N/A  |
| Measure 29.2  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 29.2.1</b>   | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 29.2.2</b>   | N/A  |
| <b>QRE 29.2.3</b>   | N/A  |
| <b>SLI 29.2.1</b>   | N/A  |
|   | N/A  |
| <b>Data</b>   | N/A  |
| Measure 29.3  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 29.3.1</b>   | N/A  |
| <b>SLI 29.3.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects</b> | N/A  |
|   | N/A  |
| <b>Data</b>   | N/A  |



## VII. Empowering the fact-checking community Commitments 30 - 33



| <b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b>  |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 30   |   |
| Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]   | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 30.1  |   |
| <b>QRE 30.1.1</b>   | <p>Within Europe, we work with 13 fact-checking partners who provide fact-checking coverage in 23 EEA languages, including at least one official language of every EU Member State, and additional languages including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Albanian and Serbian.</p> <p>Our partners have teams of fact-checkers who review and verify reported content. Our Integrity and Authenticity moderators then use that independent feedback to take action and where</p> |



|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
|                          | <p>appropriate, remove or make ineligible for recommendation false or misleading content or label unverified content.</p> <p>Our agreements with our partners are standardised, meaning the agreements are based on our template master services agreements and consistent with common standards and conditions. We reviewed and updated our template standard agreements as part of our annual contract renewal process.</p> <p>The terms of the agreements describe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The service the fact-checking partner will provide, namely, that their team of fact checkers review, assess and rate video content uploaded to their fact-checking queue, and will provide regular pro-active Insights Reports about general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generate particular misinformation or disinformation.</li> <li>● The expected results e.g., the fact-checkers advise on whether the content may be or contain misinformation and rate it using our classification categories.</li> <li>● An option to receive pro-actively flagging of potential harmful misinformation from our partners.</li> <li>● The languages in which they will provide fact-checking services.</li> <li>● The ability to request temporary coverage regarding additional languages or support on ad hoc additional projects.</li> <li>● All other key terms including the applicable term and fees and payment arrangements.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>QRE 30.1.2</b></p> | <p>We currently have 13 IFCN accredited fact-checking partners across the EU, EEA, and wider Europe:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)</li> <li>2. Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)</li> <li>3. Demagog</li> <li>4. Facta</li> <li>5. Geofacts</li> <li>6. Faktograf</li> <li>7. Internews Kosova (Kallxo)</li> <li>8. Lead Stories</li> <li>9. Newtral</li> </ol>   |



|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
|                          | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Poligrafo</li> <li>11. Reuters</li> <li>12. Science Feedback- For advertising-related fact-checking partnerships, please refer to Chapter 2.</li> <li>13. Teyit</li> </ol> <p>These partners provide fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages, including at least one official language of each EU Member States, and additional languages including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Albanian and Serbian.</p> <p>We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with these fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis.</p> <p>Outside of our fact-checking program, we also collaborate with fact-checking organisations to develop a variety of media literacy campaigns. For example, during this reporting period, we worked with European fact-checkers on 6 temporary <b>media literacy campaigns</b>, in advance of regional elections, through our in-app Election Centers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Portugal Local Elections - <a href="#">Polígrafo</a></li> <li>● Estonia Local Elections - <a href="#">Lead Stories</a></li> <li>● Ireland Presidential Election - <a href="#">The Journal</a></li> <li>● Portugal Presidential Election - <a href="#">Polígrafo</a></li> <li>● Denmark (local and municipal elections): <a href="#">Sikker Digital</a></li> <li>● Czechia (parliamentary election elections): <a href="#">Demagog.cz</a></li> </ul> <p>Globally, we have more than 20 IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and we keep users updated <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |
| <p><b>QRE 30.1.3</b></p> | <p>We have fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish.</p>  |



We have fact-checking coverage in a number of other European languages or languages used in Europe which affect European users, including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian and we can request additional support in Azeri, Armenian, and Belarusian.

In terms of global fact-checking initiatives, we currently cover more than 60 languages and 130 markets across the world, thereby improving the overall integrity of the service and benefiting European users.

In order to effectively scale the feedback provided by our fact-checkers globally, we have implemented the measures listed below.

- **Insights reports.** Our fact-checking partners provide regular reports identifying general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generated particular misinformation or disinformation.
- **Proactive detection by our fact-checking partners.** Our fact-checking partners are authorised to proactively identify content that may constitute harmful misinformation on our platform, which our moderators assess against our Community Guidelines, and suggest prominent misinformation that is circulating online that may benefit from verification.
- **Fact-checking guidelines.** Where relevant, we create guidelines and trending topic reminders for our moderators which are informed by previous fact checking assessments. This helps our teams leverage the insights from our fact-checking partners and supports swift and accurate decisions on flagged content regardless of the language in which the original claim was made.

Moderation teams working dedicated misinformation queues receive enhanced training on our misinformation policies and have access to the above-mentioned tools and measures, which enables them to make accurate content decisions across Europe and globally.

We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content and reduce exposure to potentially distressing content for our human safety experts. Before content is posted to our platform, it's reviewed by automated moderation technologies which identify content or behavior that may violate our policies or For You feed eligibility standards, or that may require age-restriction or other actions. While undergoing this review, the content is visible only to the uploader.



If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either take action against the content or flag it for human review. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are more clear-cut.

Some of the methods and technologies that support these efforts include:

- **Vision-based:** Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
- **Audio-based:** Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
- **Text-based:** Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our [fact-checking partners](#), to inform our keyword lists.
- **Similarity-based:** "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
- **Activity-based:** Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
- **LLMs:** We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
- **Content Credentials:** We launched the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to automatically label AI-generated content that originated on other major platforms.

Continuing to leverage the fact-checking output in this way enables us to further increase the positive impact of our fact checking programme.



| SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations |                                    |
|---|------------------------------------|
| Austria   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Belgium   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Bulgaria  | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Croatia   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Cyprus  | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Czechia   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Denmark   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Estonia   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Finland   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| France  | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Germany   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Greece  | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Hungary   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Ireland   | Fact-checking coverage implemented |



|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| Italy         | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Latvia        | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Lithuania     | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Luxembourg    | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Malta         | No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. |
| Netherlands   | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Poland        | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Portugal      | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Romania       | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Slovakia      | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Slovenia      | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Spain         | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Sweden        | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |
| Iceland       | No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. |
| Liechtenstein | Fact-checking coverage implemented   |



|                  |                                    |
|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Norway           | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | 22 languages                       |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | 23 languages                       |

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Measure 30.2      |   |
| <b>QRE 30.2.1</b> | <p>Our agreements with our fact-checking partners are standardised, meaning the agreements are based on our template master services agreements and consistent with common standards and conditions. These agreements, as with all of our agreements, must meet the ethical and professional standards we set internally including containing anti-bribery and corruption provisions.</p> <p>Our partners are compensated in a fair, transparent way based on the work done by them using standardised rates. Our fact-checking partners then invoice us on a monthly basis based on work done.</p> <p>All of our fact-checking partners are independent organisations, which are certified through the non-partisan IFCN. Our agreements with them explicitly state that the fact-checkers are non-exclusive, independent contractors of TikTok who retain editorial independence in relation to the fact-checking, and that the services shall be performed in a professional manner and in line with the highest standards in the industry. Our processes are also set up to ensure our fact-checking partners' independence. Our partners access flagged content through a tool dedicated for their use and provide their assessment of the accuracy of the content by providing a rating. Fact-checkers will do so independently from us, and their review may include calling sources, consulting public data or authenticating videos and images.</p> <p>To facilitate transparency and openness with our fact-checking partners, we regularly meet them and provide data regarding their feedback and also conduct surveys with them.</p> |
| <b>QRE 30.2.2</b> | <p>We meet regularly with our fact-checking partners and have an ongoing dialogue with them about how our partnership is working and evolving. We survey our fact-checking partners to encourage feedback about what we are doing well and how we could improve.</p>  |



|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| <b>QRE 30.2.3</b> | This provision is not relevant to TikTok, only to fact-checking organisations.   |
| Measure 30.3      |  |
| <b>QRE 30.3.1</b> | <p>Given our fact-checking partners are all IFCN-accredited, our fact-checking partners already engage in some informal cross-border collaboration through that network.</p> <p>In October 2025, TikTok co-sponsored the EU DisinfoLab conference in Slovenia. Several TikTok staff attended, and we co-led a session with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue on how platforms and conflict mediators can work together to reduce the risk of violence during conflicts.</p> |
| Measure 30.4      |  |
| <b>QRE 30.4.1</b> | We maintain dialogue with EFCSN on these and other issues. We continue to be open to discussing and exploring what further progress can be made on these points.   |

| <b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b>  |     |
|---|-----|
| Commitment 31   |     |
| Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages. |     |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  | No  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A |



|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>   | <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p>Measure 31.1</p>  | <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>.</p>  |
| <p>Measure 31.2</p>  |   |
| <p><b>QRE 31.1.1</b></p>   | <p>We see harmful misinformation as different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we work with 13 fact-checking partners in Europe, covering 23 EEA languages.</p> <p>As previously outlined, we place considerable emphasis on proactive detection and automated moderation technology to action violative content. For example, "multi-modal LLMs" can perform complex, highly specific tasks related to visual content. We can use this technology to make misinformation moderation easier by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.</p> <p>Our Integrity and Authenticity moderators receive specialised training to assess, confirm, and take action on harmful misinformation. This includes direct access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of content. We also use fact-checking feedback to provide additional context to users about certain content. As mentioned, when our fact checking partners conclude that the fact-check is inconclusive or content is not able to be confirmed, (which is especially common during unfolding events or crises), we inform viewers <a href="#">via a banner</a> when we identify a video with unverified content in an effort to raise users' awareness about the credibility of the content and to reduce sharing. The video may also become ineligible for recommendation into anyone's For You feed to limit the spread of potentially misleading information.</p> |



|  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| <b>SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks</b>                                 | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b>  |  |  |  |
|  | The number of fact checked videos is based on the number of videos that have been reviewed by one of our fact-checking partners in the relevant territory. |  |  |  |
|  | Number of fact-checked articles published  |  |  |  |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <b>Number of fact checked videos (tasks)</b>   |  |  |  |
| <b>Member States</b>   |  |  |  |  |
| Austria  | 52   |  |  |  |
| Belgium  | 396  |  |  |  |
| Bulgaria   | 1,221  |  |  |  |
| Croatia  | 135  |  |  |  |
| Cyprus   | 21   |  |  |  |
| Czechia  | 367  |  |  |  |
| Denmark  | 239  |  |  |  |
| Estonia  | 326  |  |  |  |
| Finland  | 58   |  |  |  |
| France   | 3,659  |  |  |  |
| Germany  | 1,203  |  |  |  |



|               |       |  |  |  |
|---------------|-------|--|--|--|
| Greece        | 97    |  |  |  |
| Hungary       | 107   |  |  |  |
| Ireland       | 53    |  |  |  |
| Italy         | 743   |  |  |  |
| Latvia        | 223   |  |  |  |
| Lithuania     | 182   |  |  |  |
| Luxembourg    | 1     |  |  |  |
| Malta         | 1     |  |  |  |
| Netherlands   | 1,603 |  |  |  |
| Poland        | 806   |  |  |  |
| Portugal      | 344   |  |  |  |
| Romania       | 308   |  |  |  |
| Slovakia      | 283   |  |  |  |
| Slovenia      | 193   |  |  |  |
| Spain         | 349   |  |  |  |
| Sweden        | 102   |  |  |  |
| Iceland       | 5     |  |  |  |
| Liechtenstein | 0     |  |  |  |
| Norway        | 190   |  |  |  |



|                  |               |  |  |  |
|------------------|---------------|--|--|--|
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>13,072</b> |  |  |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>13,267</b> |  |  |  |

|  |   |   |  |
|--|---|---|--|
| <b>SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken</b>                            | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b>   |   |  |
|  | <p>The number of videos removed as a result of a fact-checking assessment and the number of videos removed because of policy guidelines and known misinformation trends..</p> <p>These metrics correspond to the numbers of removals under the misinformation policy since all of its enforcement are based on the policy guidelines and known misinformation trends.</p> |   |  |
|  | N/A   |   |  |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <b>Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment</b>   | <b>Number of videos removed under Misinformation policy</b> |  |
| <b>Member States</b>   |   |   |  |
| Austria  | 12  | 2,612   |  |
| Belgium  | 11  | 4,150   |  |
| Bulgaria   | 166   | 4,828   |  |
| Croatia  | 40  | 638   |  |
| Cyprus   | 1   | 701   |  |
| Czechia  | 20  | 2,855   |  |
| Denmark  | 12  | 2,484   |  |
| Estonia  | 28  | 527   |  |



|             |     |        |  |
|-------------|-----|--------|--|
| Finland     | 7   | 1,357  |  |
| France      | 273 | 37,466 |  |
| Germany     | 216 | 42,642 |  |
| Greece      | 7   | 4,602  |  |
| Hungary     | 4   | 1,490  |  |
| Ireland     | 3   | 2,613  |  |
| Italy       | 207 | 18,667 |  |
| Latvia      | 0   | 705    |  |
| Lithuania   | 7   | 1,086  |  |
| Luxembourg  | 0   | 349    |  |
| Malta       | 0   | 159    |  |
| Netherlands | 258 | 14,335 |  |
| Poland      | 128 | 14,770 |  |
| Portugal    | 48  | 3,141  |  |
| Romania     | 65  | 28,743 |  |
| Slovakia    | 18  | 1,122  |  |
| Slovenia    | 5   | 370    |  |
| Spain       | 50  | 21,592 |  |
| Sweden      | 3   | 4,159  |  |



|                  |              |                |  |
|------------------|--------------|----------------|--|
| Iceland          | 1            | 123            |  |
| Liechtenstein    | 0            | 143            |  |
| Norway           | 10           | 1,662          |  |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>1,589</b> | <b>218,163</b> |  |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>1,600</b> | <b>220,091</b> |  |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2</b> | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b><br><br>The metric we have provided demonstrates the % of videos which have been removed as a result of the fact checking assessment, in comparison to the total number of videos removed because of violation of our harmful misinformation policy. |
|  |   |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)                               | <b>Videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment as a percentage of total number of videos removed due to violation of harmful misinformation policy</b>   |
| Austria  | 0.5%  |
| Belgium  | 0.3%  |
| Bulgaria   | 3.4%  |
| Croatia  | 6.3%  |
| Cyprus   | 0.1%  |



|             |      |
|-------------|------|
| Czechia     | 0.7% |
| Denmark     | 0.5% |
| Estonia     | 5.3% |
| Finland     | 0.5% |
| France      | 0.7% |
| Germany     | 0.5% |
| Greece      | 0.2% |
| Hungary     | 0.3% |
| Ireland     | 0.1% |
| Italy       | 1.1% |
| Latvia      | 0.0% |
| Lithuania   | 0.6% |
| Luxembourg  | 0.0% |
| Malta       | 0.0% |
| Netherlands | 1.8% |
| Poland      | 0.9% |
| Portugal    | 1.5% |
| Romania     | 0.2% |
| Slovakia    | 1.6% |



|                  |             |
|------------------|-------------|
| Slovenia         | 1.4%        |
| Spain            | 0.2%        |
| Sweden           | 0.1%        |
| Iceland          | 0.8%        |
| Liechtenstein    | 0.0%        |
| Norway           | 0.6%        |
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>0.7%</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>0.7%</b> |

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 31.3      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 31.3.1</b> | N/A  |
| Measure 31.4      | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| <b>QRE 31.4.1</b> | N/A  |

**VII. Empowering the fact-checking community**



| Commitment 32  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.</p> |  |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | N/A  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]  | N/A  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?  | N/A  |
| Measure 32.1   |  |
| Measure 32.2   |  |
| <b>QRE 32.1.1</b>  | <p>Our fact-checking partners access content which has been flagged for review through a content review tool made available for their exclusive use. The dashboard shows our fact-checkers certain quantitative information about the services they provide, including the number of videos queued for assessment at any one time, as well as the time the review has taken. Fact-checkers</p> |



|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
|  | can also use the dashboard to see the rating they applied to videos they have previously assessed.  |  |
| SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools | <b>Methodology of data measurement:</b>   |  |
|  | N/A. As mentioned in our response to QRE 32.1.1, the dashboard we currently share with our partners only contains high level quantitative information about the services they provide, including the number of videos queued for assessment at any one time, as well as the time the review has taken. We are continuing to work with our fact checking partners to understand what further data it would be helpful for us to share with them. |  |
|  |   |  |
| <b>Data</b>  |   |  |
| Measure 32.3                                       |   |  |
| <b>QRE 32.3.1</b>                                  | We continue to participate in the Code Taskforce and in all relevant working group discussions.   |  |

|  |
|--|
| <b>VII. Empowering the fact-checking community</b>   |
| <p><b>Commitment 33</b></p> <p>Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.</p> |



|   |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 33.1  | TikTok did not subscribe to this measure as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>      |
| <b>QRE 33.1.1</b>   | N/A   |
| <b>SLI 33.1.1 - number of European fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified</b>  | N/A   |



## VIII. Transparency Centre Commitments 34 - 36



| <b>VIII. Transparency Centre</b>   |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Commitment 34</b>   |   |
| To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                                     | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | We have been an active participant in the working group that has successfully launched the common Transparency Centre in 2023. We held the position of co-chair of the Transparency working group since September 2023, before the position was transferred to VOST, a civil society organisation that is a signatory of the Code. We have since supported VOST's work on the relaunched shared Transparency Center at <a href="https://disinfocode.eu">disinfocode.eu</a> and continue to upload reports and share feedback as required. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]                    | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?  | N/A   |
| Measure 34.1   | We continue to work with VOST to maintain the Transparency Center.  |
| Measure 34.2   | We continue to fund VOST in line with our standing agreement.   |



|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Measure 34.3 | We provided information for H1 2025 to be published on the VOST-maintained Transparency Center during H2 2025. |
| Measure 34.4 | No changes.  |
| Measure 34.5 | We remain in correspondence with VOST and other signatories regarding the Transparency Center.                 |

| <b>VIII. Transparency Centre</b>  |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 35   |   |
| Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable. |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  | No, through our participation in the Transparency Centre working group, we have ensured that the Transparency Centre will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Centre to be navigated both by commitment and by signatory). |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]   | N/A   |



|   |   |
|---|---|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A   |
| Measure 35.1  | No changes since the last report. We continue to publish a list of commitments on the VOST transparency center.   |
| Measure 35.2  | No changes since the last report (H1 2025).   |
| Measure 35.3  | No changes since the last report. We continue to provide updates to the VOST Transparency Center in order to meet this commitment, as well as making such information available on our own Transparency Center.             |
| Measure 35.4  | No changes since the previous report. We continue to publish relevant information about our response to crises in the report itself as well as the <a href="https://disinfocode.eu">Disinfocode.eu</a> Transparency Center. |
| Measure 35.5  | No changes since the last report. VOST maintains the Transparency Center and we continue to support this.   |
| Measure 35.6  | No changes since the last report. VOST maintains the Transparency Center and we continue to support this.   |

|   |
|---|
| <b>VIII. Transparency Centre</b>  |
| <p>Commitment 36</p> <p>Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.</p> |



|   |   |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                  | No  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A   |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A   |
| Measure 36.1  | We provided an update in line with our disclosures in the H1 2025 report shortly after the submission of the previous report to the EC, in line with the agreed deadline.   |
| Measure 36.2  | We provided an update in line with our disclosures in the H1 2025 report shortly after the submission of the previous report to the EC, in line with the agreed deadline.   |
| Measure 36.3  | No changes. The Transparency Center continues to function as intended. We provided metrics in the previous report that were provided by VOST. The metric itself and its wording were agreed with the EC's representatives and adopted by all platforms. |
| <b>QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)</b>   | The Transparency Centre was successfully launched in February 2023. We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.   |
| <b>QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)</b>   | The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.   |



|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| <p><b>SLI 36.1.1</b></p> | <p>We worked with the vendor to develop relevant metrics for this SLI.</p>  |
| <p><b>Data</b></p>       | <p>Between July 1 and December 31 2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,350 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 3,456 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.</p> |



## IX. Permanent Task-Force Commitment 37



| <b>IX. Permanent Task-Force</b>   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Commitment 37</b>  |  |
| <p>Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.</p> |  |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  | No   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | We have meaningfully engaged in the Task-force / Plenaries and all working groups. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]   | N/A  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A  |
| Measure 37.1  | We have attended all Plenary meetings.   |
| Measure 37.2  | We continue to participate in all relevant workstreams of the Task-force.          |
| Measure 37.3  | We continue to participate in all relevant workstreams of the Task-force.          |



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| Measure 37.4      | We continue to participate in all relevant workstreams of the Task-force.  |
| Measure 37.5      | We continue to participate in all relevant workstreams of the Task-force.  |
| Measure 37.6      | We continue to engage in the work of the Task-force.   |
| <b>QRE 37.6.1</b> | <p>We have meaningfully engaged in the Task-force and all of its working groups by attending and participating in meetings and engaging in any relevant discussions, in particular regarding elections and further developing/activating the Rapid Response System (RRS).</p> <p>We will continue to engage in the Task-force and all of its working groups and subgroups.</p> |



## X. Monitoring of Code Commitment 38 - 43



| <b>X. Monitoring of Code</b>  |     |
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| <b>Commitment 38</b>  |     |
| The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code. |     |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                                    | No  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]                   | N/A |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A |
| Measure 38.1  |     |



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| <b>QRE 38.1.1</b> | <p>TikTok will continue to have appropriate resources in place to meet our commitments and compliance.</p> <p>Given the breadth of the Code and the commitments therein, our work spans multiple teams, including Trust and Safety, Legal, Monetisation Integrity, Product and Public Policy. Teams across the globe are deployed to ensure that we meet our commitments and compliance with the notable involvement of our Trust and Safety Leadership.</p> <p>We have dedicated Trust and Safety staff in the European Union. We recognise the importance of local knowledge and expertise as we work to ensure online safety for our users. We take a similar approach to our third party partnerships.</p> |
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| <b>X. Monitoring of Code</b>  |   |
| Commitment 39   |   |
| Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble. |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> . |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | N/A   |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]                                   | N/A   |



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| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
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| X. Monitoring of Code   |  |
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| <b>Commitment 40</b><br>Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level. |  |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]  | Yes  |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | We have reported on the SLIs and QREs relevant to the Commitments we signed-up to within this report.  |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]   | N/A  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A  |
| Measure 40.1  | We publish a report, detailing the implementation of the commitments and measures (including QREs and SLIs) we have signed up to under the Code, every 6 months. |



|              |  |
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| Measure 40.2 | We publish a report, detailing the implementation of the commitments and measures (including QREs and SLIs) we have signed up to under the Code, every 6 months. |
| Measure 40.3 | We publish our reports online. All reports published under the Code can be accessed through our <a href="#">Transparency Center</a> .                            |
| Measure 40.4 | We continue to work with the Taskforce, as applicable.   |
| Measure 40.5 | We continue to engage in the work of the Task-force, as applicable.  |
| Measure 40.6 | We continue to work and cooperate with the EC, as applicable.  |

## X. Monitoring of Code

### Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

|  |  |
|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No, pending further updates from the Commission. |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | N/A  |



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| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A |
| Measure 41.1  | N/A |
| Measure 41.2  | N/A |
| Measure 41.3  | N/A |

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| <b>X. Monitoring of Code</b>   |   |
| Commitment 42  |   |
| Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce. |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]   | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].   | We have been an active participant in the Crisis Response working group, which resulted in the implementation of the Rapid Response System being developed/ activated for elections. We |



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|   | have also published Crisis Reports specific to the War in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict and 2025 elections reports on the Irish Presidential Election, Czech Parliamentary Election, and Dutch Parliamentary Election along with this report. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | N/A  |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?   | N/A  |

| <b>X. Monitoring of Code</b>  |   |
|---|---|
| Commitment 43   |   |
| Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force. |   |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]                                    | Yes   |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participated in the monitoring and reporting working group.</li> <li>• Published transparency report in September 2025.</li> </ul> |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve   | N/A   |



|   |     |
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| the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]                                 |     |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |



## Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

### War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

#### ***Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].***

Since the start of the war of aggression by Russia on Ukraine in February 2022 (the “**War in Ukraine**”), we have observed false or unverified claims about specific attacks and events, the development or use of weapons, the involvement of particular countries, and military activities such as troop movements. We have also seen misleadingly repurposed footage, including clips from video games, AI-generated content, or unrelated past events presented as current.

While no specific threats related to the War in Ukraine were identified or anticipated in H2 2025, we remained alert to the spread of harmful misinformation and covert influence operations (CIO), and continue working to prevent such content from being shared.

#### **(I) Spread of harmful misinformation**

TikTok takes a multi-faceted approach to tackling the spread of harmful misinformation, regardless of intent. This includes our [Integrity and Authenticity policies](#), as well as our products, operational practices, and external partnerships with fact-checkers, media literacy organisations, and researchers. We support our Integrity and Authenticity moderators with detailed misinformation policy guidance, enhanced training, and direct access to our IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners, who help assess the accuracy of content.

We continue to take swift action against misinformation, conspiracy theories, fake engagement, and fake accounts relating to the War in Ukraine.

#### **(II) CIOs**

TikTok's [integrity and authenticity policies](#) do not allow deceptive behaviour that may cause harm to our community or society at large. This includes coordinated attempts to influence or sway public opinion while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems about an account's identity, approximate location, relationships, popularity, or purpose. We have specifically-trained teams on high alert to investigate, disrupt and remove CIO networks from our platform and we provide regular updates in our dedicated [CIO transparency reports. For advertising-related CIO measures, please refer to Chapter 2.](#)

#### ***Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].***

We aim to ensure that TikTok is a source of reliable and safe information and recognise the heightened risk and impact of misleading information during a time of crisis such as the War in Ukraine.

#### **(I) Upholding TikTok's Community Guidelines**



Continuing to enforce our [policies](#) against [violence](#), [hate](#), and [harmful misinformation](#) by taking action to remove violative content and accounts. We use a combination of advanced moderation technologies and teams of human safety experts to identify, review, and action content that violates our policies.

### Automated Review

We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content and reduce exposure to potentially distressing content for our human moderators. Before content is posted to our platform, it's reviewed by automated moderation technologies which identify content or behavior that may violate our policies or For You feed eligibility standards, or that may require age-restriction or other actions. While undergoing this review, the content is visible only to the uploader.

If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either take action against the content or flag it for further review by our human moderation teams. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut.

Some of the methods and technologies that support these efforts include:

- **Vision-based:** Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
- **Audio-based:** Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
- **Text-based:** Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves.
- **Similarity-based:** "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
- **Activity-based:** Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
- **LLMs:** We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
- We work with external groups, for example [Tech Against Terrorism](#) in the context of [violent extremist](#) content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.

### Scaling human expertise

Human insight plays a crucial role in the content moderation process, from our community or external experts, to our own safety professionals. Our teams of human safety experts speak more than 60 languages and dialects, including Russian and Ukrainian. We strive to promote a caring working environment for all TikTok employees, and especially for trust and safety professionals. We use an evidence-based approach to develop programmes and resources that support their psychological well-being, including for Trust & Safety personnel working on mis & disinformation.



In H2 2025, we removed 1,352 videos in relation to the War in Ukraine, which violated our misinformation policies.

## **(II) Leveraging our Global Fact-Checking Program**

We use a layered approach to detect harmful misinformation that violates our Community Guidelines, with our Global Fact-Checking Program playing a key role. We assess the accuracy of harmful or hard-to-verify claims by partnering with more than 20 [IFCN-accredited](#) fact-checking organizations who support over 60 languages on TikTok, including Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian. We also collaborate with certain fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives. This helps facilitate proactive responses against high-harm trends and ensures that our Integrity and Authenticity moderators have up-to-date guidance.

To limit the spread of potentially misleading information, we apply [warning labels](#) and prompt users to reconsider sharing content about unfolding or emergency events that have been reviewed by fact-checkers but cannot be verified—referred to as “unverified content.” Recognising that the situation around the Conflict can change rapidly, we have put in place a process allowing our fact-checking partners to quickly update us if claims previously marked as “unverified” are later verified or clarified with additional context.

## **(III) Disruption of CIOs**

Disrupting CIO networks targeting discourse related to the War in Ukraine remains a priority. Between July and December 2025, we took action to remove a total of four such networks.

## **(IV) Mitigating the risk of monetisation of harmful misinformation**

Political advertising has been prohibited on our platform for many years, but as an additional risk mitigation measure against the risk of profiteering from the War in Ukraine we prohibit Russian-based advertisers from outbound targeting of EU markets. We also suspended TikTok in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

## **(V) Localised media literacy campaigns**

Proactive measures aimed at improving our users' digital literacy are vital, and we recognise the importance of increasing the prominence of authoritative information. We have 17 localised media literacy campaigns addressing disinformation related to the War in Ukraine in Austria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine in close collaboration with our factchecking partners. Users searching for keywords relating to the War in Ukraine are directed to tips, prepared in partnership with our fact-checking partners, to help users identify misinformation and prevent the spread of it on the platform.

## **(VI) Adding opt-in screens over content that could be shocking or graphic**

We recognise that some content that may otherwise break our rules can be in the public interest, and we allow this content to remain on the platform for documentary, educational, and counterspeech purposes. As we continue to make [public interest exceptions](#) for some content, we provide opt-in screens to help prevent people from unexpectedly viewing shocking or graphic content.



**(VII) External engagement**

We are committed to engaging with experts across the industry and civil society, and cooperating with law enforcement agencies globally in line with our [Law Enforcement Guidelines](#), to further safeguard and secure our platform during times of conflict.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

**Policies and Terms and Conditions**

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy                                       | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)                         | Rationale  |
|--|---|--|
| No relevant updates in the reporting period. | N/A<br>In a crisis, we keep under review our policies and to ensure moderation teams have supplementary guidance. | During the reporting period, no crisis-specific policy changes were implemented.<br><br>No update during the reporting period. |

**Scrutiny of Ads Placements**

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.



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| <p><b>Content moderation</b><br/>(Commitment 2, Measure 2.2)</p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>TikTok places considerable emphasis on proactive moderation of advertisements. Advertisements are reviewed against our Advertising Policies through a combination of automated and human moderation.</p> <p>These policies prohibit, among other things, ad content and landing pages to display negative content regarding military or police symbols, sensitive military events, militarism, advocating or whitewashing of war, terrorism, illegal organizations, or unlawful elements.</p> <hr/> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Given the range of potential policy violations that could be engaged, we are currently unable to provide metrics specific to this issue.</p> |
| <p><b>Political Advertising</b></p>  |   |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> |   |
| <p><b>Political Advertising</b></p>  | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this Chapter as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a></p> <hr/> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Integrity of Services</b></p>  |   |



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| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> |  |
| <p><b>Identifying and removing CIO networks</b><br/><i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i></p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>We combat CIO because our Integrity and Authenticity policies prohibit attempts to manipulate public opinion while misleading our systems or users about identity, origin, approximate location, popularity, or purpose. Dedicated teams monitor and investigate CIO networks and have removed networks targeting discourse related to the War in Ukraine in line with these policies.</p> <p>We know that CIO will continue to evolve in response to our detection and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform, which is why we continually seek to strengthen our policies and enforcement actions in order to protect our community against new types of harmful misinformation and inauthentic behaviours.</p>   |
|  | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Between July to December 2025, we took action to remove the following 4 networks (consisting of 114 accounts in total) that were found to be involved in coordinated attempts to influence public opinion about the Russia-Ukraine war while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p><b>1. Network Origin: Ukraine</b></p> <p><b>Description:</b> We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted a Russian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives undermining trust in the Russian government, within the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The network attempted to direct users to an off-platform messaging channel.<br/> <b>Accounts Removed:</b> 53<br/> <b>Followers:</b> 114,830</p> </li> <li> <p><b>2. Network Origin: Ukraine</b></p> <p><b>Description:</b> We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted a Russian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives of Russian military defeat, within the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as news accounts.<br/> <b>Accounts Removed:</b> 35<br/> <b>Followers:</b> 1,184,387</p> </li> </ol> |



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|  | <p>3. <b>Network Origin:</b> Belarus</p> <p><b>Description:</b> We assess that this network operated from Belarus and targeted a Russian-speaking audience within Ukraine. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts, posing as a partisan group, in order to promote narratives of Ukrainian military defeat and political incompetence. The network directed users to an off-platform messaging channel.<br/> <b>Accounts Removed:</b> 16<br/> <b>Followers:</b> 37,680</p> <p>4. <b>Network Origin:</b> US</p> <p><b>Description:</b> We assess that this network operated from the US and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created fake media brands in order to promote Russia and China as leaders on the global stage. The network targeted Latino-Americans, African-Americans, and African audiences, as well as English and Spanish-speaking audiences worldwide.<br/> <b>Accounts Removed:</b> 10<br/> <b>Followers:</b> 57,000</p> <p>We publish CIO networks we identify and remove, including those relating to the War in Ukraine, in our dedicated <a href="#">CIO transparency report</a>.</p>  |
| <p><b>Tackling Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)</b></p> <p><i>(Commitments 14 and 15, Measures 14.1, 15.1 and 15.2).</i></p> | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy <a href="#">makes it clear</a> that we do not want our users to be misled about crisis events. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by AI technology or machine-learning processes. It includes images of real people and may show highly realistic-looking scenes.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organization, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;</li> <li>● A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;</li> <li>● Matters of public importance, including debates about significant and challenging policy issues;</li> <li>● A public figure who is:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior</li> <li>○ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |



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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ spreading misinformation about matters of public importance</li> </ul> <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including depictions of public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI-generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>We have an <a href="#">AI-generated content label</a> for users to easily inform their community when they post AIGC. The label can be applied to any content that has been completely generated or significantly edited by AI, which makes it easier to comply with the obligation to disclose AIGC that shows realistic scenes. Creators can do this through this label or through other types of disclosures, like a sticker, watermark, or caption.</p> <p>TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of <a href="#">Content Credentials technology</a> from <a href="#">the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity</a> (C2PA), which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AIGC, including AIGC created on some other platforms. AI-generated content. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated content, already used by <b>37 million creators</b>. TikTok’s commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.</p> <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>Our efforts support transparent and responsible content creation practices, both in the context of the War in Ukraine and more broadly on our platform.</p> |
| <p><b>Removing harmful misinformation from our platform</b><br/>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</p> | <p><b><i>Description of intervention</i></b></p> <p>We prioritise proactive content moderation, with the vast majority of violative content removed before it is viewed or reported. In H2 2025, more than 98% of videos violating our Integrity and Authenticity policies were removed proactively worldwide.</p> <p>We take action to remove accounts or content that contain inaccurate, misleading, or false information that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. In conflict environments, such information may include content that is repurposed from past conflicts, content that makes false and harmful claims about specific events, or incites panic. In certain circumstances, we may reduce the prominence of such content.</p> <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>In the context of the crisis, we have proactively removed 1,313 videos in H2 containing harmful misinformation related to the War in Ukraine. We carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of content as well as working closely with our fact-checking partners and responding to emerging trends they identify.</p>   |



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|  | <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - <b>1,352</b></li> <li>• Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (only focusing on RU/UA) - <b>1,458</b></li> <li>• Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - <b>1,313</b></li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>   |   |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> |   |
| <p><b>Not proactively promoting news-type content to our users</b><br/><i>(Commitment 18, Measure 18.1)</i></p>                        | <p><b>Description of intervention</b><br/>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>.</p> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br/>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Applying our state affiliated media label</b><br/><i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.1)</i></p>                                       | <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Creating localised media literacy campaigns</b><br/><i>(Commitment 17, Measures 17.2 and 17.3)</i></p>                           | <p><b>Description of intervention</b><br/>We recognise the importance of proactive measures that are aimed at improving our users' digital literacy and increasing the prominence of authoritative information.</p> <p>We have localised media literacy campaigns related to the crisis to raise awareness amongst our users. We promoted the campaign through a combination of our in-app intervention tools to ensure that authoritative information is promoted to our</p>   |



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|   | <p>users.</p> <p>Users searching for keywords related to the War in Ukraine are directed to tips, prepared in partnership with our fact checking partners. These tips help users identify misinformation and prevent its spread on the platform.</p> <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>Working with our fact-checking partners, we have 17 localised media literacy campaigns addressing disinformation related to the War in Ukraine in Austria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics for the media literacy campaigns (EEA total numbers, in countries where campaigns are active):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Total Number of impressions of the search intervention - 23,191,195</b></li> <li>● <b>Total Number of clicks on the search intervention - 109,770</b></li> <li>● <b>Click through rate of the search intervention - 0.47%</b></li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Empowering the Research Community</b></p>   |   |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p>                      |   |
| <p><b>Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 26, Measure 26.1 and 26.2)</i></p> | <p><b><i>Description of intervention</i></b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives from our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the War in Ukraine that have been approved from July-December 2025: 0</p>  |
| <p><b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b></p>  |   |



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| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.           |  |
| <b>Applying our unverified content label and making content ineligible for recommendation</b><br><br><i>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.2)</i> | <b>Description of intervention</b><br><br>Where our Integrity & Authenticity moderators or fact-checking partners determine that content is not able to be verified at the given time (which is common during an unfolding event), we apply our unverified content label to the content to encourage users to consider the reliability or source of the content. The application of the label will also result in the content becoming ineligible for recommendation in order to limit the spread of potentially misleading information. Our unverified content label is available to users in 23 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic).  |
|   | <b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br><br>N/A   |
| <b>Ensuring fact-checking coverage</b><br><br><i>(Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</i>  | <b>Description of intervention</b><br><br>Our fact checking efforts cover Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and all major European languages (including 18 official European languages as well as a number of other languages which affect European users).   |
|   | <b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br><br>Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforce our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we have ensured that, in the context of the crisis, our fact-checking programme covers Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian.<br><br>More generally, we work with 13 fact-checking partners in Europe, providing fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages, including at least one official language of each EU Member States, and additional languages including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Albanian and Serbian.<br><br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Number of fact-checked videos with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 665</b></li> <li>● <b>Number of videos removed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 78</b></li> <li>● <b>Number of videos not recommended in the For Your Feed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 147</b></li> </ul> |



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| <b>Collaborating with our fact-checking partners in relation to emerging trends</b><br><br><i>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.1)</i> | <b>Description of intervention</b><br><br>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a> |
|   | <b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br><br>N/A                                  |

## Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

### Israel-Hamas Conflict

***Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].***

TikTok acknowledges the significance and sensitivity of the Israel–Hamas conflict (referred to as the “Conflict” in this chapter), which has been ongoing for an extended period. We recognise that it continues to be a challenging and deeply felt issue for many people around the world and on TikTok. TikTok continues to moderate violative content at scale, while respecting and protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of European users. We remain committed to supporting freedom of expression, upholding our commitment to [human rights](#), and maintaining the safety and integrity of our platform during the Conflict.

Below, we outline some of the main threats, both observed and considered, in relation to the Conflict and the steps taken to address them during the reporting period.

#### **(I) Spread of harmful misinformation**

TikTok takes a multi-faceted approach to tackling the spread of harmful misinformation, regardless of intent. This includes our [Integrity and Authenticity policies](#), as well as our products, operational practices, and external partnerships with fact-checkers, media literacy organisations, and researchers. We support our Integrity and Authenticity moderators with detailed misinformation policy guidance, enhanced training, and direct access to our IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners, who help assess the accuracy of content.

We continue to take swift action against misinformation, conspiracy theories, fake engagement, and fake accounts relating to the Conflict.

#### **(II) [Covert Influence Operations \(CIO\)](#)**

TikTok's [integrity and authenticity policies](#) do not allow deceptive behaviour that may cause harm to our community or society at large. This includes coordinated attempts to influence or sway public opinion while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems about an account's identity, approximate location, relationships, popularity, or purpose. We have specifically-trained teams on high alert to investigate, disrupt and remove CIO networks from our platform and we provide regular updates in our dedicated [CIO transparency reports](#). [For advertising-related CIO measures, please refer to Chapter 2.](#)



***Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].***

We aim to ensure that TikTok is a source of reliable and safe information and recognise the heightened risk and impact of misleading information during a time of crisis such as the Conflict.

**(I) Upholding TikTok's Community Guidelines**

Continuing to enforce our [policies](#) against [violence](#), [hate](#), and [harmful misinformation](#) by taking action to remove violative content and accounts. For example, we remove content that promotes Hamas, or otherwise supports the attacks or mocks victims affected by the violence. We do not tolerate attempts to incite violence or spread hateful ideologies. We have a zero-tolerance policy for content praising violent and hateful organisations and individuals, and those organisations and individuals aren't allowed on our platform. We also block hashtags that promote violence or otherwise break our rules. We use a combination of advanced moderation technologies and teams of human safety experts to identify, review, and action content that violates our policies.

**Automated Review**

We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content and reduce exposure to potentially distressing content for our human moderators. Before content is posted to our platform, it's reviewed by automated moderation technologies which identify content or behavior that may violate our policies or For You feed eligibility standards, or that may require age-restriction or other actions. While undergoing this review, the content is visible only to the uploader.

If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either take action against the content or flag it for further review by our human moderation teams. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut.

Some of the methods and technologies that support these efforts include:

- **Vision-based:** Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines, such as weapons or hate symbols.
- **Audio-based:** Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our policies, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
- **Text-based:** Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our [fact-checking partners](#), to inform our keyword lists.
- **Similarity-based:** "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.



- **Activity-based:** Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
- **LLMs:** We use multimodal LLMs to help moderate content faster and more consistently at scale, from taking automated action on activity like fake engagement, to empowering teams with better moderation tools and risk insights.
- We work with external groups, for example [Tech Against Terrorism](#) in the context of [violent extremist](#) content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.

### **Scaling human expertise**

Human insight plays a crucial role in the content moderation process, from our community or external experts, to our own safety professionals. TikTok has Arabic and Hebrew speaking content moderators who review content and assist with Conflict-related translations. We continue to focus on moderator care through the provision of internal training and well-being resources for T&S personnel working on mis & disinformation.

In H2 2025, we have removed 3,901 videos in relation to the Conflict, which violated our misinformation policies.

### **(II) Leveraging our Global Fact-Checking Program**

We use a layered approach to detect harmful misinformation that violates our Community Guidelines, with our Global Fact-Checking Program playing a key role. We assess the accuracy of harmful or hard-to-verify claims by partnering with more than 20 [IFCN-accredited](#) fact-checking organizations who support over 60 languages on TikTok, including Arabic and Hebrew. We also collaborate with certain fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives. This helps facilitate proactive responses against high-harm trends and ensures that our Integrity and Authenticity moderators have up-to-date guidance.

To limit the spread of potentially misleading information, we apply [warning labels](#) and prompt users to reconsider sharing content about unfolding or emergency events that have been reviewed by fact-checkers but cannot be verified—referred to as “unverified content.” Recognising that the situation around the Conflict can change rapidly, we have put in place a process allowing our fact-checking partners to quickly update us if claims previously marked as “unverified” are later verified or clarified with additional context.

### **(III) Disruption of CIOs**

Disrupting CIO networks targeting discourse related to Israel and Palestine remains a priority. Between July and December 2025, we took action to remove a total of four such networks.

### **(IV) Deploying search interventions to raise awareness of potential misinformation**

To help raise awareness and to protect our users, we provide in-app search interventions that are triggered when users search for non-violating terms related



to the Conflict (e.g., Israel, Palestine). These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources.

**(V) Adding opt-in screens over content that could be shocking or graphic**

We recognise that some content that may otherwise break our rules can be of public interest, and we allow this content to remain on the platform for documentary, educational, and counterspeech purposes. As we continue to make [public interest exceptions](#) for some content, we provide opt-in screens to help prevent people from unexpectedly viewing shocking or graphic content.

**(VI) External engagement**

We are committed to engaging with experts across the industry and civil society, such as [Tech Against Terrorism](#) and cooperating with law enforcement agencies globally in line with our [Law Enforcement Guidelines](#), to further safeguard and secure our platform during times of conflict.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

**Policies and Terms and Conditions**

**Outline any changes to your policies**

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|--------|---|--|
| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | During the reporting period, no Conflict-specific policy changes were implemented. |
|--------|---|--|

**Scrutiny of Ads Placements**



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| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. |   |
| <b>Content moderation</b><br>(Commitment 2, Measure 2.2)  | <b>Description of intervention</b><br>TikTok places considerable emphasis on proactive moderation of advertisements. Advertisements are reviewed against our Advertising Policies through a combination of automated and human moderation.<br><br>These policies prohibit, among other things, ad content and landing pages to display negative content regarding military or police symbols, sensitive military events, militarism, advocating or whitewashing of war, terrorism, illegal organizations, or unlawful elements. |
|   | <b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br><br>Given the range of potential policy violations that could be engaged, we are currently unable to provide metrics specific to this issue.   |
| <b>Political Advertising</b>  |   |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. |   |
| <b>Political Advertising</b>  | <b>Description of intervention</b><br><br>TikTok did not subscribe to this Chapter as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a>  |
|   | <b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br><br>N/A  |
| <b>Integrity of Services</b>  |   |



Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

**Identifying and removing CIO networks**

*(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)*

**Description of intervention**

We combat CIO because our Integrity and Authenticity policies prohibit attempts to manipulate public opinion while misleading our systems or users about identity, origin, approximate location, popularity, or purpose. Dedicated teams monitor and investigate CIO networks and have removed networks targeting discourse related to Israel and Palestine in line with these policies.

We know that CIO will continue to evolve in response to our detection and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform, which is why we continually seek to strengthen our policies and enforcement actions in order to protect our community against new types of harmful misinformation and inauthentic behaviours.

**Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available**

Between July-December 2025, we took action to remove the following four networks (consisting of 75 accounts in total) that were found to be related to the Conflict:

1. **Network Origin:** Iran

**Description:** We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted Israeli and Palestinian audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives that divide Israelis and promote Palestinian nationalism. This network was found to use sock puppet accounts and accounts posing as news accounts to deliver language-tailored messaging to the target audiences.

**Accounts in network:** 22

**Followers of network:** 15,061

2. **Network Origin:** Unidentified

**Description:** We assess that this network targeted an Israeli audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to exploit and increase social tension among the Israeli population. The network attempted to direct users to an off-platform communication channel. The network was found to be using location obfuscation services in order to hide their true location.

**Accounts in network:** 14



|   |  |
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|   | <p><b>Followers of network:</b> 12,685</p> <p>3. <b>Network Origin:</b> Iran</p> <p>Description: We assess that this network operated from Iran and primarily targeted Francophone Africa. The individuals behind the network created inauthentic accounts in order to spread pro-Iran, anti-US, and anti-Israel content. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as news accounts.</p> <p><b>Accounts in network:</b> 26<br/><b>Followers of network:</b> 10,994</p> <p>4. <b>Network Origin:</b> Iran</p> <p><b>Description:</b> We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted Arabic-speaking audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives critical of Israel’s actions and the inaction of Arab countries regarding Palestine. This network was found to create fictitious personas which posed as generic Arab users and masked its operating location through advanced operational security.</p> <p><b>Accounts in network:</b> 13<br/><b>Followers of network:</b> 39</p> <p>We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove, including those relating to the Conflict, in our dedicated <a href="#">CIO transparency report</a>.</p> |
| <p><b>Tackling Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i></p> | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy <a href="#">makes it clear</a> that we do not want our users to be misled about crisis events. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by AI technology or machine-learning processes. It includes images of real people and may show highly realistic-looking scenes.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organization, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;</li> <li>● A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;</li> <li>● A public figure who is:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior</li> <li>○ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>   |



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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ spreading misinformation about matters of public importance</li> </ul> <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including depictions of public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI-generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>We have an <a href="#">AI-generated content label</a> for users to easily inform their community when they post AIGC. The label can be applied to any content that has been completely generated or significantly edited by AI, which makes it easier to comply with the obligation to disclose AIGC that shows realistic scenes. Creators can do this through this label or through other types of disclosures, like a sticker, watermark, or caption.</p> <p>TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of <a href="#">Content Credentials technology</a> from <a href="#">the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA)</a>, which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AIGC, including AIGC created on some other platforms. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated content, already used by <b>37 million creators</b>. TikTok’s commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.</p> <hr/> <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>Our efforts support transparent and responsible content creation practices, which are relevant both in the context of the Conflict and more broadly on our platform.</p> |
| <p><b>Removing harmful misinformation from our platform</b><br/>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</p> | <p><b><i>Description of intervention</i></b></p> <p>We take proactive measures to remove accounts or content that contain inaccurate, misleading, or false information which may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. In conflict environments, this includes content repurposed from previous conflicts, false or harmful claims about specific events, or material that incites panic. In some cases, we may also reduce the visibility of such content.</p> <p>To ensure users can trust the information on our platform, we remove misleading AI-generated content that could cause harm. Misinformation is considered harmful when it is likely to directly lead to violence, fuel tensions, encourage harmful actions, or provoke public panic. Additionally, we restrict misinformation that undermines public trust or distorts public understanding on important matters, even if it does not directly result in violence.</p> <p>We prioritise proactive content moderation, with the vast majority of violative content removed before it is viewed or reported. In H2 2025, more than 98% of videos violating our Integrity and Authenticity policies were removed proactively worldwide.</p>   |



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|   | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>In the context of the crisis, we have proactively removed 3,874 videos in H2 containing harmful misinformation related to the Conflict. We carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of content (e.g. hashtags/sensitive keyword lists) as well as working closely with our fact-checking partners and responding to emerging trends they identify.</p> <p>We have Arabic and Hebrew speaking content moderation as we recognise the importance of language and cultural context in the misinformation moderation process.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL-Hamas) - 3,901</b></li> <li>• <b>Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL-Hamas) - 4,941</b></li> <li>• <b>Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas): 3,874</b></li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>  |  |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p>  |  |
| <p><b>Deploying search interventions to raise awareness of potential misinformation</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 21, Measure 21.1)</i></p> | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>To minimise the discoverability of misinformation and help to protect our users, we have launched search interventions which are triggered when users search for neutral terms related to the Conflict (e.g., Israel, Palestine).</p> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also direct them to well-being resources.</p>  |
| <p><b>Not proactively promoting news-type content to our users</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 18,</i></p>                                    | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a></p>   |



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| <p>Measure 18.1)</p>  | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Empowering the Research Community</b></p>   |   |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p>                  |   |
| <p><b>Measures taken to support research into Conflict- related misinformation and disinformation</b></p> <p>(Commitment 26, Measure 26.1 and 26.2)</p> | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives from our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <hr/> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the Conflict that have been approved from July-December 2025: 0</p>    |
| <p><b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b></p>  |   |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p>                  |   |
| <p><b>Applying our unverified content label to make content ineligible for recommendation</b></p> <p>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.2)</p>                  | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Where our Integrity and Authenticity moderators or fact-checking partners determine that content cannot be verified at the given time (which is common during an emergency or unfolding event), we apply our unverified content label to the content to encourage users to consider the reliability or source of the content. The application of the label will also result in the content becoming ineligible for recommendation in order to limit the spread of potentially misleading information. Our unverified content label is available to users in 23 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic).</p> |



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|   | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b><br/>         We share metrics relating to the unverified content label in the relevant section of the main report (SLI 21.1.2).</p>  |
| <p><b>Ensuring fact-checking coverage</b><br/><br/>         (Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</p> | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>As part of our fact-checking program, TikTok works with more than 20 IFCN-accredited fact-checking organisations that support more than 60 languages, including Hebrew and Arabic, to help assess the accuracy of content in this rapidly-changing environment. In the context of the Conflict, our independent fact-checking partners are following our standard practice, whereby they do not moderate content directly on TikTok, but assess whether a claim is true, false, or unsubstantiated so that our moderators can take action based on our Community Guidelines. Fact-checker input is then incorporated into our broader content moderation efforts in a number of different ways, as further outlined in the ‘indication of impact’ section below.</p> <hr/> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>We see harmful misinformation as different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we have ensured that, in the context of the Conflict, our fact-checking programme covers Arabic and Hebrew.</p> <p>As noted above, we also incorporate fact-checker input into our broader content moderation efforts in different ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they’re seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform.</li> <li>● Collaborating with our fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives has facilitated proactive responses against high-harm trends and has helped to ensure that our Integrity and Authenticity moderators have up-to-date guidance.</li> <li>●</li> </ul> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Number of fact checked tasks related to IL/Hamas - 879</b></li> <li>● <b>Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 101</b></li> <li>● <b>Number of videos demoted (NR) as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 199</b></li> </ul> |



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| <p><b>Collaborating with our fact-checking partners in relation to emerging trends</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.1)</i></p> | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a></p> |
|  | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>                                  |



## Reporting on the signatory's response during an election

### Ireland Election 2025

#### Threats observed during the electoral period: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

We have comprehensive measures in place to anticipate and address the risks associated with electoral processes, including the risks associated with election misinformation in the context of the Irish presidential election held on 24 October 2025.

In advance of the election, a dedicated election Task-Force was established to proactively assess potential risks. Through cross-functional consultations, the team identified key threats—including the spread of AI-generated deepfakes and misinformation—and developed response strategies to mitigate them before they could gain traction on the platform.

Throughout the election, we monitored for and actioned inauthentic behavior, and removed content that violated our Community Guidelines.

#### Mitigations in place during the electoral period: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

##### Enforcing our policies

##### (I) Monitoring capabilities

We have dedicated Trust and Safety professionals working to keep our platform safe. As they usually do, our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently [enforcing our rules](#) to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. In advance of the election, we had proactive data monitoring, trend detection and regular monitoring of enriched keywords and accounts.

##### (II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration

As part of our advance preparations ahead of the Irish presidential election, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC) bringing together employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams were able to provide consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, during, and immediately after the election.

##### (III) Integrity and Authenticity policies



We prioritise proactive content moderation, with the vast majority of violative content removed before it is viewed or reported. In H2 2025, more than 98% of videos violating our Integrity and Authenticity policies were removed proactively worldwide.

#### **(IV) Fact-checking**

Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify.

Within Europe, we partner with 13 fact-checking organisations who provide fact-checking coverage in 25 languages (22 official EU languages plus Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish). Reuters serves as the fact-checking partner for Ireland.

#### **(V) Deterring covert influence operations**

We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encourage them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our [website](#).

#### **(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content**

Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an [AI-generated content label](#) to help people do this. TikTok has a 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.

#### **(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPAs)**

Many political leaders, ministers, and political parties have a presence on TikTok. These politicians and parties play an important role on our platform - we believe that verified accounts belonging to politicians and institutions provide the electorate with another route to access their representatives, and additional trusted voices in the shared fight against misinformation.

We strongly recommend GPPAs have their accounts [verified by TikTok](#). Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they're seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.

#### **Directing people to trusted sources**



**(I) Investing in media literacy**

We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. From 24 Sept to 25 Oct 2025, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Irish presidential election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with [The Journal](#)'s fact-checking unit.

**External engagement at the national and EU levels**

**(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COPD Signatories**

Throughout the election period, our teams maintained communication with XFNs as part of the COCD Rapid Response System (RRS). We received 10 reports via the RRS related to AIGC, misinformation and impersonation, which were rapidly addressed. Actions included banning of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.

**(II) Engagement with local experts**

To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Irish Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with local fact-checking partner Reuters who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

**Policies and Terms and Conditions**

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | Rationale<br>N/A |
|--------|---|------------------|
| N/A    | N/A   |                  |



| Scrutiny of Ads Placements  |  |
|---|--|
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. |  |
| <p><b>Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b><br/>(Commitment 2 and Measure 2.1 and Measure 2.3)</p>                                      | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>At the end of August 2025, we implemented specific granular misinformation policies that provide comprehensive coverage to address harmful misinformation in advertising. In particular, election-related misinformation is explicitly addressed within this policy framework under the Election Misinformation Policy.</p> <p>In addition, we are pleased to be able to report on the advertisements removed for breach of our political advertising policy in H2 2025, including the impressions associated with those advertisements. This information is set out in the “Political Advertising Data H2 2025” section at the end of this document.</p> |
|   | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and it is one way that we can reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Irish Presidential Election (22 Sep., 2025, and 26 Oct., 2025): 2,134</li> </ul>  |
| Political Advertising   |  |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. |  |
| <b>Political Advertising</b>  | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a></p>   |



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|   | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Integrity of Services</b></p>   |   |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |   |
| <p><b>Identifying and removing CIO networks</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i></p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>During the Irish presidential election, we did not detect any instances of CIO on the Platform. We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove in our dedicated <a href="#">CIO transparency reports</a>.</p> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Tackling misleading AIGC and edited media</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i></p>                                 | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy <a href="#">makes it clear</a> that we do not want our users to be misled about crisis events. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by AI technology or machine-learning processes. It includes images of real people and may show highly realistic-looking scenes.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organization, scientific or medical society, or government entity providing critical services;</li> <li>● A critical event, such as an election, natural disaster, or a mass casualty incident;</li> <li>● Matters of public importance, including debates about significant and challenging policy issues;</li> <li>● A public figure who is:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior</li> <li>○ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)</li> <li>○ spreading misinformation about matters of public importance</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |



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|   | <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including depictions of public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI-generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>We have an <a href="#">AI-generated content label</a> for users to easily inform their community when they post AIGC. The label can be applied to any content that has been completely generated or significantly edited by AI, which makes it easier to comply with the obligation to disclose AIGC that shows realistic scenes. Creators can do this through this label or through other types of disclosures, like a sticker, watermark, or caption.</p> <p>TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of <a href="#">Content Credentials technology</a> from <a href="#">the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity</a> (C2PA), which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AIGC, including AIGC created on some other platforms. AI-generated content. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated content, already used by <b>37 million creators</b>. TikTok’s commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of videos removed for violating our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy during the Irish presidential election: 36</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Rolling out Media literacy campaigns</b><br/><i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i></p>   | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>From 24 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app <a href="#">Election Centre</a> to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Irish presidential election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation <a href="#">The Journal</a>.</p> <p>We directed people to the Election Centre through prompts on videos, LIVEs and searches related to elections.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>The Election Centre launched before the Irish presidential election was visited 111,131 times.</p>   |



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| <p><b>Engagement with local and regional experts</b><br/><i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i></p>   | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Irish presidential election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with Reuters who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>This engagement with external regional and local experts allowed us to inform our country-level approach to the Irish presidential election.</p>   |
| <p><b>Empowering the Research Community</b></p>   |   |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |   |
| <p><b>Providing access to our Research API</b><br/><i>(Commitment 26 and Measures 26.1 and 26.2)</i></p>                                      | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, and comments from our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the Irish presidential election that have been approved from July-December 2025: 0</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b></p>  |   |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |   |



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| <p><b>Ensuring fact-checking coverage</b> (<i>Commitment 30, Measure 30.1</i>)</p> | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Reuters serves as the fact-checking partner for Ireland and provided coverage throughout the election period.</p>  |
|  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Please refer to Chapter 7 - Empowering the Fact-Checking Community for metrics.</p> |



## Reporting on the signatory's response during an election

### Czechia Federal Election 2025

#### Threats observed during the electoral period: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

We have comprehensive measures in place to anticipate and address risks associated with electoral processes, including risks associated with election misinformation in the context of the Czech federal election held on 3 & 4 October 2025. In advance of the election, a core election Task-Force was formed, and consultations between cross-functional teams helped to identify and design response strategies.

TikTok did not observe major threats during the Czech election. Through the election, we monitored for and actioned inauthentic behavior and removed content that violated our Community Guidelines.

#### Mitigations in place during the electoral period: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

##### Enforcing our policies

##### **(I) Monitoring capabilities**

We have dedicated Trust and Safety professionals working to keep our platform safe. As they usually do, our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently [enforcing our rules](#) to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. In advance of the election, we had proactive data monitoring, trend detection, and regular monitoring of election keywords and accounts.

##### **(II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration**

As part of our advance preparations, ahead of the Czech election, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC) bringing together employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams provided consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, and during, the election.

##### **(III) Integrity and Authenticity policies**

We prioritise proactive content moderation, with the vast majority of violative content removed before it is viewed or reported.



#### **(IV) Fact-checking**

Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify.

Within Europe, we partner with 13 fact-checking organisations who provide fact-checking coverage in 25 languages (22 official EU languages plus Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish). Lead Stories serves as the fact-checking partner for Czechia.

#### **(V) Deterring covert influence operations**

We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encourage them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our [website](#).

#### **(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content**

Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an [AI-generated content label](#) to help people do this. TikTok has a 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.

#### **(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPAs)**

Many political leaders, ministers, and political parties have a presence on TikTok. These politicians and parties play an important role on our platform - we believe that verified accounts belonging to politicians and institutions provide the electorate with another route to access their representatives, and additional trusted voices in the shared fight against misinformation.

We strongly recommend GPPAs have their accounts [verified by TikTok](#). Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they're seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.

#### **Directing people to trusted sources**

#### **(I) Investing in media literacy**



We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. We engaged with the local fact-checking Demagog.cz to develop, review, and launch two videos as part of a media literacy campaign.

**External engagement at the national and EU levels**

**(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COCD Signatories**

The COCD Rapid Response System (RRS) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 1 RRS. Throughout the election period, the team maintained consistent prioritisation of RRS requests and ensured timely, accurate support for cross-functional partners.

**(II) Engagement with local experts**

To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Czech election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with our local fact-checking partner, LeadStories, who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

**Policies and Terms and Conditions**

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | Rationale |
|--------|---|-----------|
| N/A    | N/A   | N/A       |

**Scrutiny of Ads Placements**



|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b><br/><i>(Commitment 2 and Measure 2.1 and Measure 2.3)</i></p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>At the end of August 2025, we implemented specific granular misinformation policies that provide comprehensive coverage to address harmful misinformation in advertising. In particular, election-related misinformation is explicitly addressed within this policy framework under the Election Misinformation Policy.</p> <p>In addition, we are pleased to be able to report on the advertisements removed for breach of our political advertising policy in H2 2025, including the impressions associated with those advertisements. This information is set out in the “Political Advertising Data H2 2025” section at the end of this document.</p> |
|   | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and it is one way that we can reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Czech Election (1 Sep., 2025, and 5 Oct., 2025): 1,092</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Political Advertising</b></p>   |  |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Political Advertising</b></p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a></p>   |



|   |   |
|---|---|
|   | <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Integrity of Services</b></p>   |   |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |   |
| <p><b>Identifying and removing CIO networks</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i></p>   | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>During the Czech parliamentary election, we did not detect any instances of CIO on the Platform. We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove in our dedicated <a href="#">CIO transparency report</a>.</p> <p>N/A</p>  |
| <p><b>Tackling misleading AIGC and edited media</b></p> <p><i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i></p>                                 | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy <a href="#">makes it clear</a> that we do not want our users to be misled about political issues. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation,</li> <li>● A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster,</li> <li>● A public figure who is:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behaviour</li> <li>○ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)</li> <li>○ being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |



|   |  |
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|   | <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including depictions of public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of <a href="#">Content Credentials technology</a> from <a href="#">the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity</a> (C2PA), which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AIGC, including AIGC created on some other platforms. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated content, already used by <b>37 million creators</b>. TikTok’s commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of videos removed for violating our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy during the Czech parliamentary election: 17</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Rolling out Media literacy campaigns</b><br/><i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i></p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b><br/>From 4 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app <a href="#">Election Centre</a> to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Czech parliamentary election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.</p> <p><b>Indication of impact including relevant metrics when available</b><br/>The Election Centre launched before the Czech election was visited 78,337 times.</p>  |
| <p><b>Engagement with local and regional experts</b><br/><i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i></p>   | <p><b>Description of intervention</b><br/>To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Czech election, we engaged with our fact-checking partner, LeadStories, to ensure our responsible teams for election integrity on the platform are aware of online trends concerning the elections.<br/>We engaged with national authorities through onboarding, education, regulatory escalations, and proactive outreach with authorities. Stakeholders include the following: CTU, OSCE, media regulator, police, political parties/campaigns, and the Czech government.</p> <p><b>Indication of impact including relevant metrics when available</b></p>   |



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|   | <p>This engagement with external regional and local experts, as well as national authorities, allowed us to inform our country-level approach to the Czech election.</p>   |
| <p><b>Empowering the Research Community</b></p>   |  |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Providing access to our Research API</b><br/><i>(Commitment 26 and Measures 26.1 and 26.2)</i></p>                                      | <p><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, and comments from our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> <hr/> <p><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the Czech election that have been approved from July-December 2025: 0</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Ensuring fact-checking coverage</b> <i>(Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</i></p>  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Lead Stories serves as the fact-checking partner for Czechia and provided coverage throughout the election period.</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Please refer to Chapter 7 - Empowering the Fact-Checking Community for metrics.</p>  |



## Reporting on the signatory's response during an election

### Netherlands Election 2025

#### Threats observed during the electoral period: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

We have comprehensive measures in place to anticipate and address risks associated with electoral processes, including risks associated with election misinformation in the context of the Dutch parliamentary election held on 29 October 2025. In advance of the election, a core election Task-Force was formed, and consultations between cross-functional teams helped to identify and design response strategies.

TikTok did not observe major threats during the Dutch election. Through the election, we monitored for and actioned inauthentic behavior and removed content that violated our Community Guidelines.

#### Mitigations in place during the electoral period: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

##### (I) Monitoring capabilities

We have dedicated Trust and Safety professionals working to keep our platform safe. As they usually do, our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently [enforcing our rules](#) to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. In advance of the election, we had proactive data monitoring, trend detection, and regular monitoring of election keywords and accounts.

##### (II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration

As part of our advance preparations, ahead of the Dutch election, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC) bringing together employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams provided consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, and during, the election.

##### (III) Integrity and Authenticity policies

We prioritise proactive content moderation, with the vast majority of violative content removed before it is viewed or reported.

##### (IV) Fact-checking



Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify.

Within Europe, we partner with 13 fact-checking organisations who provide fact-checking coverage in 25 languages (22 official EU languages plus Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish). Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa) serves as the fact-checking partner for the Netherlands.

#### **(V) Deterring covert influence operations**

We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encouraging them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our [website](#).

#### **(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content**

Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an [AI-generated content label](#) to help people do this. TikTok has a 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.

#### **(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPAs)**

Many political leaders, ministers, and political parties have a presence on TikTok. These politicians and parties play an important role on our platform - we believe that verified accounts belonging to politicians and institutions provide the electorate with another route to access their representatives, and additional trusted voices in the shared fight against misinformation.

We strongly recommend GPPAs have their accounts [verified by TikTok](#). Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they're seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.

#### **Directing people to trusted sources**

##### **(I) Investing in media literacy**

We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy.

#### **External engagement at the national and EU levels**



|  |  |                  |
|--|--|------------------|
| <p><b>(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COCD Signatories</b></p> <p>The COCD Rapid Response System (RRS) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 1 RRS with the content violating our AIGC policies. Throughout the election period, the team maintained consistent prioritisation of RRS requests and ensured timely, accurate support for cross-functional partners.</p> <p><b>(II) Engagement with local experts</b></p> <p>To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Dutch election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with our fact-checking partner, dpa, who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.</p> <p>[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].</p> |  |                  |
| <b>Policies and Terms and Conditions</b>   |  |                  |
| Outline any changes to your policies   |  |                  |
| <b>Policy</b>  | <b>Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)</b> | <b>Rationale</b> |
| N/A  | N/A  | N/A              |
| <b>Scrutiny of Ads Placements</b>  |  |                  |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.  |  |                  |
| <b>Scrutiny of Ad Placements</b>   | <i>Description of intervention</i>   |                  |



|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><i>(Commitment 2 and Measure 2.1 and 2.3)</i></p>  | <p>At the end of August 2025, we implemented specific granular misinformation policies that provide comprehensive coverage to address harmful misinformation in advertising. In particular, election-related misinformation is explicitly addressed within this policy framework under the Election Misinformation Policy.</p> <p>In addition, we are pleased to be able to report on the advertisements removed for breach of our political advertising policy in H2 2025, including the impressions associated with those advertisements. This information is set out in the “Political Advertising Data H2 2025” section at the end of this document.</p> |
|   | <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and it is one way that we can reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the Netherlands Election (29 Sep. 2025, and 2 Nov. 2025): 2,113</li> </ul>       |
| <p><b>Political Advertising</b></p>   |  |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>Political Advertising</b></p>   | <p><b><i>Description of intervention</i></b></p> <p>TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment as outlined in the January 2025 <a href="#">Subscription Document</a></p>  |
|   | <p><b><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <p><b>Integrity of Services</b></p>   |  |



| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. |  |
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| <b>Identifying and removing CIO networks</b><br><br><i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i>  | <p align="center"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>During the Dutch parliamentary election, we did not detect any instances of CIO on the Platform. We publish details of the CIO networks we identify and remove in our dedicated <a href="#">CIO transparency report</a>.</p>   |
|   | <p align="center"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>N/A</p>   |
| <b>Tackling misleading AIGC and edited media</b><br><br><i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i>                          | <p align="center"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy <a href="#">makes it clear</a> that we do not want our users to be misled about political issues. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation,</li> <li>● A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster,</li> <li>● A public figure who is:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behaviour</li> <li>○ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)</li> <li>○ being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including depictions of public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.</p> <p>TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of <a href="#">Content Credentials technology</a> from <a href="#">the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity</a> (C2PA), which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AI-generated content. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated</p> |



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|   | <p>content, already used by <b>37 million creators</b>. TikTok’s commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.</p> <p>TikTok is a member of the Content Authenticity Initiative and the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, and was the first video sharing platform to put Content Credentials into practice. We have the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to instantly recognise and label AIGC. This helped us to expand auto-labelling to AIGC created on some other platforms.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of videos removed for violating our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy during the Dutch parliamentary election: 324</p> |
| <p><b>Empowering Users</b></p>  |   |
| <p><b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b></p> |   |
| <p><b>Rolling out Media literacy campaigns</b><br/>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</p>  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>From 29 Sept 2025, we launched an in-app <a href="#">Election Centre</a> to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Dutch parliamentary elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>The Election Centre launched before the Dutch election was visited 337,472 times</p>   |
| <p><b>Engagement with local and regional experts</b><br/>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</p>  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Dutch election, we engaged with our fact-checking partner, dpa, to ensure our responsible teams for election integrity on the platform are aware of online trends concerning the elections.</p> <p>We engaged with national authorities through the following: regulator briefings and roundtables, election questionnaires, ACM &amp; Ministry of Interior TAC tour (Dublin), media briefings, regulator conference panel participation, TikTok 101 workshops for political parties, MP and party meetings, and NGO election integrity discussions. Our stakeholders included: ACM (Dutch DSC), European Commission, OSCE, Ministry of Interior Affairs, and political parties.</p>   |



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|  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>This engagement with external regional and local experts allowed us to inform our country-level approach to the Dutch election.</p>   |
| <b>Empowering the Research Community</b>   |   |
| <b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b> |   |
| <p><b>Providing access to our Research API</b><br/>(Commitment 26 and Measures 26.1 and 26.2)</p>                                      | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, and comments from our platform. More information is available <a href="#">here</a>.</p> |
|  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the Dutch election that have been approved from July-December 2025: 0</p>  |
| <b>Empowering the Fact-Checking Community</b>  |   |
| <b>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</b> |   |
| <p><b>Ensuring fact-checking coverage</b> (Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</p>  | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Description of intervention</b></p> <p><a href="#">dpa</a> serves as the fact-checking partner for the Netherlands and provided coverage throughout the election period.</p>  |



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|  | <p align="center"><b>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</b></p> <p>Please refer to Chapter 7 - Empowering the Fact-Checking Community for metrics.</p> |
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| <b>Political Advertising Data H2 2025</b> |   |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|---|--|
|   | <p>We are pleased to be able to report on the advertisements removed for breach of our political advertising policies in H2 2025. We also report on the impressions of those advertisements, the number of appeals for advertisements removed under our political advertising policies, and the number of overturns of appeals under political advertising policies in this report.</p> |   |   |  |
|   | <b>Number of ad removals under the political advertising policy</b>   | <b>Number of impressions for ads removed under the political advertising policy</b> | <b>Number of appeals for ads removed under the political advertising policy</b> | <b>Number of overturns of appeals under political advertising policy</b> |
| <b>Member States</b>                      |   |   |   |  |
| Austria                                   | 8,244   | 423,614   | 32  | 14   |
| Belgium                                   | 9,775   | 216,750   | 38  | 20   |
| Bulgaria                                  | 5,210   | 548,993   | 9   | 5  |
| Croatia                                   | 2,923   | 689,032   | 9   | 5  |



|           |        |            |     |    |
|-----------|--------|------------|-----|----|
| Cyprus    | 3,021  | 176,644    | 4   | 1  |
| Czechia   | 5,129  | 491,726    | 18  | 8  |
| Denmark   | 6,341  | 398,472    | 24  | 8  |
| Estonia   | 3,788  | 118,907    | 14  | 8  |
| Finland   | 5,311  | 2,302,474  | 31  | 13 |
| France    | 44,669 | 3,424,385  | 106 | 47 |
| Germany   | 39,954 | 19,602,053 | 103 | 48 |
| Greece    | 8,233  | 2,248,609  | 25  | 4  |
| Hungary   | 6,288  | 1,793,000  | 33  | 20 |
| Ireland   | 8,733  | 79,364,632 | 33  | 17 |
| Italy     | 21,066 | 5,329,180  | 64  | 26 |
| Latvia    | 4,090  | 785,542    | 11  | 5  |
| Lithuania | 3,888  | 149,043    | 9   | 4  |



|               |        |           |     |     |
|---------------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Luxembourg    | 539    | 41,397    | 0   | 0   |
| Malta         | N/A    | N/A       | N/A | N/A |
| Netherlands   | 10,984 | 2,926,946 | 54  | 20  |
| Poland        | 10,537 | 3,823,822 | 40  | 16  |
| Portugal      | 6,398  | 613,813   | 20  | 5   |
| Romania       | 15,952 | 4,555,253 | 53  | 26  |
| Slovakia      | 3,435  | 141,933   | 4   | 1   |
| Slovenia      | 2,921  | 175,671   | 6   | 3   |
| Spain         | 18,931 | 9,441,256 | 88  | 41  |
| Sweden        | 8,049  | 377,009   | 35  | 14  |
| Iceland       | 7      | 0         | 0   | 0   |
| Liechtenstein | N/A    | N/A       | N/A | N/A |
| Norway        | 7,893  | 444,893   | 42  | 11  |



|                  |                |                    |            |            |
|------------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Total EU</b>  | <b>264,409</b> | <b>140,160,156</b> | <b>863</b> | <b>379</b> |
| <b>Total EEA</b> | <b>272,309</b> | <b>140,605,049</b> | <b>905</b> | <b>390</b> |