

Code of Practice on
Disinformation – Report of
Google for the period of
1 January 2023 - 30 June 2023

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Executive summary

Google's mission is to organise the world's information to make it universally accessible and useful. To deliver on this mission, elevating authoritative information and combating misinformation and disinformation is of utmost importance. This is especially so around issues such as public health, elections, civic engagement, or other issues that directly impact Google users' lives and civil society, as well as during crises such as the war in Ukraine.

Since Google was founded, Google's product, policy, and content enforcement decisions have been guided by the following three principles:

1. **Value openness and accessibility:** Aim to provide access to an open and diverse information ecosystem, while maintaining a responsible approach to supporting information quality;
2. **Respect user choice:** Based on users' intent, access to content that is not illegal or prohibited by Google's policies should be available, but set a high bar for information quality where users have not clearly expressed what they are looking for;
3. **Build for everyone:** Take into account the diversity of users (cultures, languages, backgrounds) and seek to address their needs appropriately.

With these principles in mind, Google implements a multi-faceted approach to address the complex challenges and risks raised by misinformation and disinformation across Google's products and services. Google has long invested in ranking systems that seek to connect people with authoritative sources; in developing and enforcing rules that prohibit the most harmful behaviours and contents on Google services; and in innovative ways to provide context to users when they might need it most. We realise that fundamental rights are interdependent and are sometimes in tension with each other. When efforts to protect or advance one right may result in the limitation of another right, our approach is to identify and implement sensible mitigation measures to address potential adverse impacts. This balancing involves considering appropriate and proportionate mitigation techniques, such as protecting freedom of expression via appeals mechanisms, or raising authoritative content to address lower quality content that may appear on the platform, rather than removing low-quality content altogether unless it is unequivocally harmful. Our work is not done, and we expect to continue improving upon these efforts in the future.

However, we are cognizant that these are complex issues, affecting all of society, which no single actor is in a position to fully tackle on their own. That is why we have long welcomed the multi-stakeholder approach put forward by the European Union with its 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation and, later on, with a Strengthened Code which Google signed in June 2022.

The baseline report produced by Google in January 2023 noted that future reports *'may require improvements'* and *'become more detailed over time'*. Accordingly, Google's H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023) report includes new metrics and narrative detail, representing meaningful progress in Google's work to meet our commitments under the Code. It highlights the breadth of our work across Member States to tackle the monetisation of disinformation, to provide transparency on political advertising, to detect and counter a range of threats to the integrity of our services, to empower users, and to work with the fact-checking and research communities; and provides more information about the quantitative impacts of our work at the Member State level than ever before.

For example, the report provides an in-depth overview of relevant policies that we diligently enforce, including: demonetisation actions we have taken against pages and domains, ads creatives actioned on due to violation of relevant policies, or actions taken under YouTube's misinformation and other relevant policies.

In addition to providing new quantitative information about our work, the report also describes our efforts to support and connect users to authoritative content, including by elevating Information Panels to users across the European Economic Area (EEA) or via media literacy campaigns. The report also clarifies how we support researchers across our products, such as through our 25 million EUR inaugural investment into the [European Media and Information Fund](#) (which has funded 47 projects across Europe), 13.2 million USD donation to the [International Fact-Checking Network](#), and through the [YouTube Researcher Program](#).

Example updates noted in this report include (but are not limited to):

- AI Principles: In January 2023, Google published its 4th annual AI Principles Progress Update — Google's review of its commitment to responsibly develop emerging technologies like artificial intelligence.
- Report on Cyber Threat Landscape: In February 2023, one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG), with additional research from Mandiant and Trust & Safety, provided insights into changes in the cyber threat landscape triggered by the war. The report [Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape](#) encompasses new findings, and retrospective insights, across government-backed attackers, information operations (IO) and cybercriminal ecosystem threat actors.
- Jigsaw Prebunking report: In February 2023, Jigsaw published its findings of the largest prebunking experiment on social media to date which was launched in September 2022.
- Webspam report: In April 2023, Google published its Webspam Report 2022, reporting that SpamBrain detected 5 times more spam sites compared to 2021 and 200 times compared to when it first launched.
- Super Searchers Program: Since the launch of the Super Searchers Program in Brussels, Google worked with Public Libraries 2030 to implement respective trainings in Ireland, Italy, and Portugal.

- Spam policy updates: Google Search updated its spam policies as part of its Search Essentials.
- Content Advisories: In Q1 2023, Google Search expanded the availability of content advisories to searches where its systems do not have high confidence in the overall quality of the results available for the search to French and German.
- YouTube's ['Hit Pause'](#) campaign has now launched in all EEA Member States.
- YouTube sponsored 'Global Fact 10', an international gathering of fact-checkers who convened to discuss trends and technology.
- Refreshed Ads metrics were incorporated into the political advertising section and we expect to update the section further based on the new EU Political Ads Regulation.
- Search metrics related to content advisories and views on the 'About This Result' feature (SLI 17.1.1), the launch of the Super Searchers Program (SLI 17.2.1), and impressions on Fact Check Rich Snippets (SLI 21.1.1).
- Member State breakdowns for manual and algorithmic actions for Search spam policies in the EEA (SLI 14.2.1 & SLI 18.2.1).
- YouTube's expansion of mapping and metrics related to TTPs (SLI 14.2.1 & SLI 14.2.2).
- Member State breakdowns for YouTube metrics related to impressions on information panels (SLI 17.1.1), impressions on the Media Literacy campaign (SLI 17.2.1), views on videos removed for violating misinformation policies (SLI 18.2.1), misinformation video removal reinstatements (SLI 24.1.1), and the YouTube Researcher Program (SLI 26.2.1).

Going forward we will continue to explore options to expand upon the data we have provided in this report, including in the quantity, the language, and the quantitative information. We will also explore opportunities to share more about engagement with other Signatories and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) on various chapters of the Code.

Moreover, Google has been [working on AI](#) for more than a dozen years and has been applying AI to solve society's biggest challenges and power Google [services people use every day](#). The recent progress in large-scale AI models (including generative AI) has sparked additional discussion about the social impacts of AI and raised concerns on topics such as misinformation. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and has published [AI Principles](#) to guide our work, including application areas we will not pursue. We have also established a governance team to put them into action by conducting ethical reviews of new systems, avoiding bias and incorporating privacy, security and safety. Google Search has published [guidance](#) on AI-generated content, outlining its approach to maintaining a high standard of information quality and the overall helpfulness of content on Search. To help address misinformation, Google has also [announced](#) that it will soon be integrating new innovations in watermarking, metadata, and other techniques into its latest generative models. Google also recently joined other leading AI companies to [jointly commit](#) to advancing responsible practices in the development of artificial intelligence which will support efforts by the G7, the OECD, and national governments. Going forward we will continue to report and expand upon Google developed AI tools and are committed to advance bold and responsible AI, to maximise AI's benefits and minimise its risks.

Lastly, the contents of this report should be read with the following context in mind:

- This report discusses the key approaches across the following Google services when it comes to addressing disinformation: Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising.
- For chapters of the Code that involve the same actions across all three services (e.g. participation in the Permanent Task-force or in development of the Transparency Centre), we respond as 'Google, on behalf of related services'.
- It follows the structure and template laid out by the Code's Permanent Task-force, organised around Commitments and Chapters of the Code.
- Unless otherwise specified, metrics provided cover activities and actions during the period from 1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023.
- The data provided in this report is subject to a range of factors, including product changes and user settings, and is expected to fluctuate over the time of the reporting period. As Google continues to evolve its approach, in part to better address user and regulatory needs, the data reported here could vary substantially over time including as we build capabilities specific to compliance with the Digital Services Act. Additionally, we have recently launched Google's [Transparency Center](#), a central hub where users can learn more about our policies, as well as information about how we develop and enforce them.
- We are continuously working to improve the safety and reliability of our services. We are not always in a position to pre-announce specific launch dates, details or timelines for upcoming improvements, and therefore may reply 'no' when asked whether we can disclose future plans for Code implementation measures in the coming reporting period. This 'no' should be understood against the background context that we are constantly working to improve safety and reliability and may in fact launch relevant changes without the ability to pre-announce.
- This report is filed concurrently with two 'crisis reports' about our response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to the war in Ukraine. As such, while there will be references to our actions throughout this report, information specific to these events should be sought in dedicated reports.

Google will continue to publish subsequent versions of this report biannually, focusing on the 6 months review period relevant to each filing, as requested under the Code. In addition, we expect to remain a committed and productive member of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, which has continued to deliver upon its obligations under the Code through the first half of 2023.

Google looks forward to continuing to work together with the European Commission and other Code Signatories to address the challenge of disinformation in Europe.

Correction as of 26 March 2024:

Values for SLI 24.1.1 'Number of videos removed that were then reinstated due to a creator's appeal' have been updated due to a technical issue affecting data on reinstatement and updates are noted in the relevant section of the report.

Values for the following metrics have been updated due to data transposition errors and updates are noted in the relevant sections of the report.

- SLI 26.1.1 'Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to YouTube' - updated for Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia.
- Appendix on the Russia-Ukraine conflict – videos that YouTube has removed since 24 February 2022.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Google Advertising ¹	Google Search	YouTube	Google, on behalf of related services
II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
1	Measure 1.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 1.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 1.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 1.4	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 1.5	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 1.6	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Measure 2.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 2.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 2.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 2.4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Measure 3.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 3.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 3.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
III. Political advertising					
4	Measure 4.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 4.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Measure 5.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Measure 6.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 6.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 6.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

¹ **Note:** Google Advertising refers to both Google Ads and Google AdSense where appropriate. Within the body of the report, 'Google Advertising' is used to refer to both services, whereas the individual service will be named if only applicable to Google Ads or Google AdSense.

	Measure 6.4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 6.5	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
7	Measure 7.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 7.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 7.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 7.4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Measure 8.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 8.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Measure 9.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 9.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Measure 10.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 10.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Measure 11.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 11.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 11.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 11.4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Measure 12.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 12.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 12.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
13	Measure 13.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 13.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 13.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IV. Integrity of services					
14	Measure 14.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 14.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 14.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	Measure 15.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Measure 15.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	Measure 16.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 16.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	V. Empowering users				
17	Measure 17.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 17.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 17.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	Measure 18.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 18.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 18.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	Measure 19.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 19.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	Measure 20.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 20.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
21	Measure 21.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 21.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 21.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22	Measure 22.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 22.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 22.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 22.4	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 22.5	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 22.6	<i>Not subscribed</i>			
	Measure 22.7	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	Measure 23.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 23.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	Measure 24.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

25	Measure 25.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>				
	Measure 25.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>				
VI. Empowering the research community						
26	Measure 26.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 26.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 26.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
27	Measure 27.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 27.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 27.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 27.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
28	Measure 28.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 28.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 28.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 28.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
29	Measure 29.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>				
	Measure 29.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>				
	Measure 29.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>				
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community						
30	Measure 30.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 30.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 30.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 30.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
31	Measure 31.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 31.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 31.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Measure 31.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
32	Measure 32.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

	Measure 32.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 32.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33	Measure 33.1	Not subscribed			
VIII. Transparency centre					
34	Measure 34.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 34.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 34.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 34.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 34.5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
35	Measure 35.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 35.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 35.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 35.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 35.5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 35.6	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
36	Measure 36.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 36.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 36.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IX. Permanent Task-Force					
37	Measure 37.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 37.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 37.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 37.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 37.5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 37.6	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

39	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
40	Measure 40.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 40.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 40.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 40.4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 40.5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 40.6	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
41	Measure 41.1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 41.2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Measure 41.3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
42	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
43	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
44	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Guidelines for filling out the report for VLOPSEs

Reports are detailing how Signatories have implemented their Commitments under the Code and Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service, where relevant and requested by the Code at Member State level. Relevant Signatories that have been designated by the Commission as Very Large Online Platforms or Very Large Search Engines (as defined in the DSA), will report every six-months on the implementation of the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code.

Reporting period

The reporting period to be covered in the reports is six months (January 2023-June 2023) for Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPSEs). Signatories shall submit reports outlining policy updates and actions taken to implement the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code. All data and policy updates should be reported for six months period from the submission of baseline reports.

Reporting per Service

When filling in a report for several services, use colour codes to clearly distinguish between services. At the beginning of the report, clarify what colour is used for which service.

Reporting in text form

Reporting in the form of written text is required for several parts of the report. Most of them are accompanied by a target character limit. Please stick to the target character limit as much as possible. We encourage you to use bullet points and short sentences. When providing information to the QRE, please make sure that your answer covers all the elements of the associated commitment and measure. Links should only be used to provide examples or to illustrate the point. They should not be used to replace explanations or to provide data in the forms. All relevant explanations and data must be included in the report directly, in written form.

Reporting SLIs and data

Reporting on SLIs requires quantitative information to be reported on in this harmonised reporting template.

- SLIs should generally be reported on per Member State. Where required by the Code, reporting needs to be done both per Member State and per language, e.g. SLI 30.1.1.
- If no data is available on Member State level, SLIs might, instead, be exceptionally reported on per language. (NB that Signatories agreed to revisit this issue after the first reporting, to ensure harmonised and meaningful reporting.)
- Please report data in the format provided by the harmonised reporting template, not through external links. Please use the Member State/language template provided in the harmonised reporting template. Where the table asks for 'Other relevant metrics', please name the metric that you would like to report on in addition to the ones already provided. You may include more than the number of additional fields provided where necessary; in that case, please adjust the table as needed.
- Please contextualize all data as much as possible, i.e. include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualize the SLIs (e.g. number of pieces of content labelled out of what volume of content).
- If there are no relevant metrics to report on, please leave the respective columns blank.

Reporting on TTPs

If subscribed to Commitment 14, Integrity of Services, we ask you to report on each identified TTP individually. The number of identified TTPs may vary per service. Where more than one TTP are reported under the same action, clarify the reasoning in the methodology. Where input is not provided, keep the placeholder for the relevant TTP and explain reasons and planned remedial action. Additionally, as with all other SLIs, data should be provided per Member State for each individual TTP.

Missing Data and insights on methodology

In case that at the time of reporting there is no data available yet, the data is insufficient, or the methodology is lacking, please outline in the dedicated field (i.e. in the field about further implementation measures planned) how this will be addressed over the upcoming six months, being as specific as possible. Signatories are encouraged to provide insights about the data/numbers they provide by inserting possible explanations in the boxes of the template “*Methodology of data measurement & insights on data provided*”. This should aim to explain the why of what is being reported, for instance - *Are there trends or curiosities that could require or use contextual explanation? What may be driving the change or the difference in the number?* Please also indicate inconsistencies or gaps regarding methodology in the dedicated box.

Attachments

We ask you not to enclose any additional attachments to the harmonised reporting template.

Crisis reporting template

Relevant signatories are asked to provide proportionate and appropriate information and data in special situations like a crisis. Reporting is a part of a special chapter at the end of the harmonised reporting template and should follow the guidelines:

- The “Intervention or action (short summary)” column should describe the action in very few words (for instance “We remove autocomplete suggestions that comprise harmful misinformation about the pandemic.”, “Under Policy X, content is demoted or removed based on severity”, etc.).
- The “Intervention or action (explanation and implementation)” should provide explanation and context on implementation and rationale of the intervention. For instance, why and which authoritative sources were promoted throughout the crisis and how the promotion would look like for users, how the integrity teams detect and disrupt crisis related disinformation campaigns and which disinformation campaigns were found/disrupted, etc.
- The harmonised reporting template should be filled in by adding additional rows for each item reported on. This means that rather than combined/bulk reporting such as “Depending on severity of violation, we demote or remove content based on policies X, Y, Z”, there should be individual rows stating for example “Under Policy X, content is demoted or removed based on severity”, “Under Policy Y, content [...]” etc.
- The rows should be colour-coded to indicate which service is being reported on, using the same colour code as for the overall harmonised reporting template.
- Reporting should be brief and to the point, not exceeding 500 characters in the [second column] and not exceeding 2000 characters in the “Intervention or action (explanation and implementation)” column unless absolutely necessary.
- Where Signatories assess that there are no meaningful or feasible metrics under the Code for a particular intervention or action, they are able to outline concisely why that is the case and whether or not they expect to be able to provide further metrics in the next reporting period.

Uploading data to the Transparency Centre

The reports should be submitted to the Commission in the form of the pdf via e-mail to the address CNECT COP TASK FORCE CNECT-COP-TASK-FORCE@ec.europa.eu within the agreed deadline. Signatories will upload all data from the harmonised reporting template to the Transparency Centre, allowing easy data access and filtering within the shortest delay but not later than 7 days from the reporting deadline. It is the

responsibility of the Signatories to ensure that the uploading takes place and is executed on time. Signatories are also responsible to ensure that the Transparency Centre is operational and functional by the time of the reports' submission, that the data from the reports are uploaded and made accessible in the Transparency Centre within the above deadline, and that users are able to read, search, filter and download data as needed in a user-friendly way and format.

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 - 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	<i>Not subscribed</i>	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 1.1	Google Advertising
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QRE 1.1.1

Google AdSense provides a way for publishers to earn money from their online content. AdSense works by matching ads to publisher sites based on content and visitors. The ads are created and paid for by advertisers who want to promote their products.

In order to protect users and publishers who trust Google AdSense with the monetisation of their content, Google AdSense has rolled out a number of policies and processes geared towards disrupting the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors.

Here are some examples of AdSense policies that disrupt the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors in the AdSense ecosystem that publishers must adhere to:

[Unreliable and Harmful Claims](#)

AdSense does not allow content that makes claims that are demonstrably false and could significantly undermine participation or trust in an electoral or democratic process. This includes content that promotes harmful health claims, or relates to a current, major health crisis and contradicts authoritative scientific consensus, as well as content that contradicts authoritative scientific consensus on climate change.

[Replicated Content](#)

AdSense does not allow Google-served ads on screens with embedded or copied content from others without additional commentary, curation, or otherwise adding value to that content.

[Manipulated Media](#)

AdSense does not allow content that deceives users through manipulated media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern.

[Dangerous or Derogatory Content](#)

AdSense does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. This includes content that harasses, intimidates, or bullies an individual or group of individuals, as well as content that threatens or advocates for physical or

	<p>mental harm to oneself or others or content that exploits others through extortion.</p> <p>Deceptive Practices</p> <p>AdSense does not allow publishers to engage in deceptive practices. This prohibition includes: enticing users to engage with content under false or unclear pretences, attempting to steal personal information or trick users into sharing personal information, promoting content, products, or services using false, dishonest, or deceptive claims. It also prohibits AdSense publishers from coordinating with other sites or accounts and concealing or misrepresenting their identity or other material details about themselves, where their content relates to politics, social issues or matters of public concern. AdSense publishers are not allowed to direct content about politics, social issues, or matters of public concern to users in a country other than their own, if they misrepresent or conceal their country of origin or other material details about themselves.</p> <p>Shocking Content</p> <p>AdSense restricts monetization on content that contains gruesome, graphic, or disgusting accounts or imagery, that depicts acts of violence, or that contains a significant amount of or prominently features obscene or profane language.</p> <p>Google AdSense also has behavioural policies that all publishers must adhere to (available here).</p> <p>AdSense actively monitors publishers in the AdSense network to check for continued compliance with AdSense Program Policies. If AdSense finds publishers that do not comply with AdSense policies, AdSense may enforce on a site, page, or account level as appropriate. Reviews for AdSense violations occur on an on-going basis. Content review is performed by either, or a combination of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automated mechanisms; and • Manual reviews performed by human reviewers.
<p>SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)</p>	<p>AdSense Pages and Domains that were actioned for any of the policy topics in scope for reporting, by EEA Member State payment countries in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023).</p> <p>Policies in scope:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unreliable and Harmful Claims; • Replicated Content; • Manipulated Media;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dangerous or Derogatory Content; • Deceptive Practices; • Shocking Content. 	
	Number of Actioned AdSense Pages	Number of Actioned AdSense Domains
Level	Page	Domain
Member States		
Austria	101,361	14
Belgium	157,537	19
Bulgaria	257,799	16
Croatia	56,297	12
Cyprus	479,632	340
Czech Republic	915,482	101
Denmark	139,920	20
Estonia	51,974	1
Finland	52,958	11
France	1,676,271	1018
Germany	2,238,332	120
Greece	90,542	17
Hungary	323,978	49
Ireland	1,313,219	115
Italy	1,011,283	167
Latvia	1,224,570	14
Lithuania	131,973	80

Luxembourg	232,807	102
Malta	689	4
Netherlands	904,254	97
Poland	3,112,246	171
Portugal	91,180	46
Romania	244,944	26
Slovakia	113,174	25
Slovenia	22,416	3
Spain	5,020,854	177
Sweden	163,377	38
Iceland	1,565	1
Liechtenstein	4	0
Norway	71,323	16
Total EU	20,129,069	2,803
Total EEA	20,201,961	2,820

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid² or impression³) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

² Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

³ Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	<p>In order to arrive at a financial value per EU Member State, Google used internal data on the number of relevant AdSense bids blocked and combined it with an estimate of Cost Per Thousand Impressions (CPM) for Display Ads provided by Ebiquity, a third party designated by the EU Code of Practice (CoP) Permanent Task-force for that purpose. The value stated therefore presents an unrealised monetary value for H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023).</p> <p><u>More about relevant blocked bids:</u> For the purpose of this SLI, a relevant blocked bid is a programmatic request to use Google AdSense to monetise a page or domain that is blocked because Google determined the page or domain violates the policies outlined below and is as such prohibited from monetising with AdSense.</p> <p><u>More about Ebiquity’s estimate:</u> The EU CoP Task-force designated Ebiquity to serve in the capacity of third-party estimator, providing periodic CPM conversion factors for use by signatories of the CoP to derive metrics relevant to this SLI. Ebiquity creates the CPM estimates based on aggregated and anonymized media investment data from its Media Data Vault; its proprietary database infrastructure is used to service its clients. The data provides a non-exhaustive indication of market pricing. As such, Ebiquity provided their own estimate per medium – including the Display Ads CPM mentioned above – as well as a blended CPM for all signatories. Please note that Ebiquity did not provide values for several countries, therefore these are marked as ‘0’ in the table below.</p> <p><u>Google and Ebiquity’s estimate:</u> Though this SLI leverages Ebiquity’s CPM estimate as decided within the CoP’s Permanent Task-force, Google has not participated in the development of that estimate and in no way endorses the CPM or the underlying methodology and data.</p>	
	<p>Euro value of bids that were blocked as a result of demonetisation actions under AdSense policies in scope:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unreliable and Harmful Claims; • Replicated Content; • Manipulated Media; • Dangerous or Derogatory Content; • Deceptive Practices; • Shocking Content. 	
	Estimated Cost of Blocked Requests on Pages	Estimated Cost of Blocked Requests on Domains
Level	Page	Domain

Member States		
Austria	€215,846.86	€700.98
Belgium	€329,970.16	€22.70
Bulgaria	€1,006,230.06	€46,939.33
Croatia	€128,924.74	€444,520.80
Cyprus	€361,624.43	€447,377.11
Czech Republic	€736,465.21	€25,690.96
Denmark	€315,661.09	€7,813.16
Estonia	€22,868.47	€6.03
Finland	€45,653.64	€21,864.63
France	€1,301,724.83	€43,945.16
Germany	€2,885,394.17	€127,725.01
Greece	€137,394.51	€3,310.73
Hungary	€100,593.72	€6,491.50
Ireland	€10,424,216.07	€6,804.76
Italy	€1,127,488.18	€38,524.48
Latvia	€169,879.38	€1,586.93
Lithuania	€84,048.84	€2,478.34
Luxembourg	€0.00	€0.00
Malta	€2,701.51	€68.58
Netherlands	€6,693,291.01	€126,097.74
Poland	€1,143,294.64	€133,219.58
Portugal	€157,905.89	€9,523.42

Romania	€175,378.43	€56,733.37
Slovakia	€0.00	€0.00
Slovenia	€10,307.73	€4,351.55
Spain	€1,307,325.59	€246,824.84
Sweden	€547,076.09	€116,786.27
Iceland	€623.43	€3,513.05
Liechtenstein	€0.00	€0.00
Norway	€768,249.95	€138.49
Total EU	€29,431,265.24	€1,919,407.95
Total EEA	€30,200,138.62	€1,923,059.49

Measure 1.2	Google Advertising
QRE 1.2.1	<p>Google sets a particularly high bar for information quality on services that involve advertising and content monetisation. In addition, given that many bad actors seek to make money by spreading harmful content, raising the bar for monetisation can also diminish their incentives to misuse Google services. Google prohibits hateful content and deceptive behaviour on Google advertising products. This includes prohibiting publishers that seek to use Google AdSense services from displaying ads on pages aimed at harassing and bullying, or otherwise promoting dangerous or derogatory content. Google AdSense is constantly adapting policies to further meet this goal. For example, changes to policies have taken place to further protect users from harmful content related to climate change and COVID-19. In response to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Google Advertising has also implemented and enforced policies to protect users, including pausing ads that contain content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war, pausing ads on Google properties and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia, and pausing ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media.</p> <p>Updating monetisation policies on climate change</p> <p>Due to the growing number of advertising and publisher partners that have expressed concerns about ads and monetised content promoting inaccurate claims concerning climate change, Google announced a new addition to the monetisation policies</p>

	<p>for Google advertisers, publishers and YouTube creators in October 2021. This policy addition prohibits ads for, and monetisation of, content that runs contrary to scientific consensus around the existence and causes of climate change.</p> <p>Product policy updates in response to COVID-19 misinformation In light of misinformation risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, Google continues to re-evaluate and update policies to help users stay informed about COVID-19 related issues. AdSense prohibits the monetisation of content that promotes harmful health claims, or relates to a current, major health crisis and contradicts authoritative scientific consensus.</p> <p>Changes made due to the invasion of Ukraine Due to the invasion of Ukraine Google Advertising has also adapted and enforced policies to protect users. This is in addition to wide ranging actions taken such as pausing Google Ads in Russia as well as prohibiting the monetisation of any Russian-Federation state funded media.</p>
SLI 1.2.1	There were no relevant policy reviews to share during this reporting period. Information regarding the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is included in the crisis report section.
Member States	

Measure 1.3	Google Advertising
QRE 1.3.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>In addition to the policies referenced in QRE 1.2.1, Google Ads provides advertisers with additional controls and helps them exclude types of content that, while in compliance with AdSense policies, may not fit their brand or business. These controls let advertisers apply content filters or exclude certain types of content or terms from their video, display, and search ad campaigns. Advertisers can exclude content such as politics, news, sports, beauty, fashion and many other categories. These categories are listed in the Google Ads Help Centre.</p>
Measure 1.4	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 1.4.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 1.5	Google Advertising

<p>QRE 1.5.1</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>The Trustworthy Accountability Group is the leading global certification program fighting criminal activity and increasing trust in the digital advertising industry. Google is currently enrolled in the Verified by Trustworthy Accountability Group program and its Trustworthy Accountability Group-ID status is active. Getting verified by the Trustworthy Accountability Group indicates that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This company has achieved the Certified Against Fraud seal. • This company has achieved the Certified Against Malware seal. • This company has achieved the Brand Safety Certification seal. <p>These seals are achieved through independent validation by a third-party auditor, and meeting requirements in the categories of intermediary and seller. These seals apply to the company’s global operations. The seals expire on 1 March 2024.</p> <p>Google also partakes in audits including those conducted by independent accreditation organisations such as the Media Rating Council (MRC) and maintains this accreditation via participation in annual audit cycles conducted by the MRC.</p> <p>The current MRC accreditation certifies that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google's Google Ads display and Search Clicks measurement methodology and AdSense ad serving technologies adhere to the industry standards for click measurement. • Google Ads video impression and video viewability measurement as reported in the Video Viewability Report adheres to the industry standards for video impression and viewability measurement. • The processes supporting these technologies are accurate. This applies to Google’s measurement technology which is used across all device types: desktop, mobile, and tablet, in both browser and mobile apps environments. <p>For more information about what this accreditation means, please see this help page.</p>
<p>QRE 1.5.2</p>	<p>See response to QRE 1.5.1.</p>
<p>Measure 1.6</p>	<p>Google Advertising</p>

QRE 1.6.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Ads also provides its advertising partners with features that enable them to maintain control over where their ads appear, the format in which their ads run, and their intended audience.</p> <p>Since April 2021, advertisers have the ability to use dynamic exclusion lists that can be updated seamlessly and continuously over time. These lists can be created by advertisers themselves or by a third party they trust, such as brand safety organisations and industry groups. Once advertisers upload a dynamic exclusion list to their Google Ads account, they can schedule automatic updates as new web pages or domains are added, ensuring that their exclusion lists remain effective and up-to-date.</p>
QRE 1.6.2	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).
QRE 1.6.3	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that provide brand safety tools).
QRE 1.6.4	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that rate sources).
SLI 1.6.1	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).
Data	

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
Commitment 2					
Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.					
	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising
	Google Advertising				

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 2.1	Google Advertising
QRE 2.1.1	<p>Google Ads provides a way for advertisers, and businesses to reach new customers as they search on Google for words related to an advertiser’s business, or browse websites with related themes.</p> <p><u>Destination Requirements</u></p> <p>Google wants consumers to have a good experience when they click on an ad, so ad destinations must offer unique value to users and be functional, useful, and easy to navigate. Additionally, bad actors often use spam tactics to distribute disinformation because it is not of sufficient quality to gain organic exposure. By fighting spam and low-quality information in general, Google makes it more difficult for these actors to disseminate disinformation.</p> <p>Here are some examples of the Destination Requirements Policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations with a difficult Destination Experience. This includes ads with destinations that contain abusive experiences, content that is unnecessarily difficult to navigate, or ad experiences that

do not conform to the [Better Ads Standards](#).

- Google Ads does not allow ads or landing pages with **Insufficient Original Content**. This includes destination content that is designed for the primary purpose of showing ads, destinations that display a message of the destination not providing any services, and destinations that are incomprehensible or do not make sense.
- Google Ads does not allow ads that do not accurately reflect where the user is being directed, and ads that redirect from the final URL that take the user to a different domain. These are disallowed under the **Destination Mismatch** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with destinations that do not function properly or have been incorrectly set up, which are disallowed under the **Destination Not Working** Policy.
- Google does not allow ads with destinations that are not accessible in the targeted location. These are disallowed under the **Destination Not Accessible** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with destinations that are not crawlable by Google Ads under the **Destination Not Crawlable** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with App or Web Store policy violations. Google Ads also does not allow apps that cannot be recognised by Google, under the **Unrecognised App** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow ads with destinations containing **Unacceptable URLs**. This includes URLs that do not follow standard syntax, IP addresses as display URLs, and display URLs that use unacceptable characters like !, *, #, _, and @.
- Google Ads does not allow phone numbers that have not been verified by Google to feature in call-only ads, call assets, and location assets under the **Unverified Phone Number** Policy.
- Google Ads does not allow call-only ads, call assets, and location assets to have phone numbers that have not been verified by Google under the **Unverified Phone Number** Policy. Additionally, the **Unacceptable Phone Number** Policy prohibits: phone numbers that do not have an active voicemail service; phone numbers that are inaccurate, inactive, irrelevant, or that do not connect to the advertised company; virtual phone number services or personal numbering; phone numbers that are not local or domestic for the country one is targeting; fax numbers, premium numbers, or vanity numbers.

Inappropriate Content

Google Ads values diversity and respect for others, and strives to avoid offending users, so Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations that display **Inappropriate Content** such as shocking content or content that promotes hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.

Here are some examples of the Inappropriate Content Policies:

- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Dangerous or Derogatory Content**. This is content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Shocking Content**. These are promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
- Google Ads does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a **Sensitive Event** with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Hacked Political Materials**. These are ads that directly facilitate or advertise access to hacked material related to political entities within scope of Google's [election ads policies](#). This applies to all protected material that was obtained through the unauthorised intrusion or access of a computer, computer network, or personal electronic device, even if distributed by a third party.

Misrepresentation

Google Ads wants users to trust the ads on the platform, so Google Ads strives to ensure ads are clear and honest, and provide the information that users need to make informed decisions. Through the Misrepresentation Policy, Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations that deceive users by excluding relevant product information or providing misleading information about products, services, or businesses.

Here are some of the Misrepresentation Policies:

- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Unacceptable Business Practices**. This includes scamming users by concealing or misstating information about the advertiser's business, product, or service.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Coordinated Deceptive Practices**. This includes coordinating with other sites or accounts and concealing or misrepresenting one's identity or other material details about oneself, where one's content relates to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern. Google Ads also does not allow directing content about politics, social issues, or matters of public concern to users in a country other than one's own, if one misrepresents or conceals one's country of origin or other material details about oneself.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Misleading Representation**. This includes making misleading statements, obscuring, or omitting material information about one's identity, affiliations, or qualifications.
- Google Ads does not allow ads containing **Manipulated Media**. This includes manipulating media to deceive, defraud, or

	<p>mislead others such as deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Google Ads does not allow ads containing Unreliable Claims. This includes making claims that are demonstrably false and could significantly undermine participation or trust in an electoral or democratic process. This may also include making claims that contradict authoritative, scientific consensus on climate change. ● Google Ads does not allow ads that contain Misleading Ad Design. This includes ads that make it difficult for the user to understand they are interacting with an ad, and ads that use surreptitious techniques to disguise their nature. ● Google Ads does not allow Clickbait Ads. This includes ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic, as well as ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action. ● Google Ads does not allow ads with Unclear Relevance. This is interpreted as promotions that are not relevant to the destination of the ad. ● Google Ads does not allow ads containing Unavailable Offers. This includes promising products, services, or promotional offers in the ad that are unavailable or are not easily found from the destination. ● Google Ads does not allow ads containing Dishonest Pricing Practices. This includes ads that do not disclose the payment model or full expense that a user will bear, or advertising products or services as free when they are chargeable.
<p>SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above</p>	<p>Creatives that were actioned for any of the policy topics in scope for reporting, by EEA Member State billing country and policy in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023).</p> <p>To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violate Google Ads policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks.</p> <p>Ad or asset disapproval Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is reviewed.</p> <p>Account suspension Google Ads Accounts may be suspended if Google finds violations of its policies or the Terms and Conditions.</p>

For more information on what happens when an ad or account is violating Google Ads policies, please see the ['What happens if you violate our policies' page](#).

Policies in scope:

- [Destination Requirements](#) (Insufficient Original Content);
- [Inappropriate Content](#) (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- [Misrepresentation](#) (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

Number of Creatives actioned by Policy

	Number of Creatives actioned for Destination Requirements	Number of Creatives actioned for Inappropriate Content	Number of Creatives actioned for Misrepresentation
Level	Creative	Creative	Creative
Member States			
Austria	3,028,902	410,843	19,708
Belgium	7,817,979	10,937	50,124
Bulgaria	2,255,464	15,256	128,472
Croatia	358,297	970	4,975
Cyprus	11,774,216	2,725,767	360,511
Czech Republic	6,944,558	73,121	240,751
Denmark	19,626,841	30,676	19,032
Estonia	1,377,830	15,202	34,958
Finland	2,076,812	7,076	34,999
France	29,036,384	163,621	321,637
Germany	228,427,441	184,037	618,049

Greece	1,365,842	1,176	129,651
Hungary	3,582,666	28,843	38,581
Ireland	23,833,157	43,673	5,394,600
Italy	12,259,507	9,152	145,745
Latvia	2,870,979	50,582	47,719
Lithuania	675,073	1,843	54,489
Luxembourg	706,119	586	1,762
Malta	1,753,214	23,366	223,834
Netherlands	102,237,161	140,498	292,294
Poland	10,530,334	200,108	1,116,823
Portugal	2,431,585	626	103,643
Romania	3,033,402	5,989	79,613
Slovakia	1,808,510	4,058	46,823
Slovenia	403,336	1,286	35,627
Spain	98,784,567	19,970	413,569
Sweden	10,714,795	31,600	28,213
Iceland	120,178	91	1,601
Liechtenstein	232,003	82	135
Norway	1,862,517	3,808	12,730
Total EU	589,714,971	4,200,862	9,986,202
Total EEA	591,929,669	4,204,843	10,000,668

Measure 2.2	Google Advertising
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QRE 2.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>All newly created ads or ads that are edited by users are reviewed for policy violations. The review of new ads is performed by either, or a combination of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automated mechanisms; and • Manual reviews performed by human reviewers. <p>For more information on how the ad review process works, please see the ‘About the ad review process’ page.</p>
Measure 2.3	Google Advertising
QRE 2.3.1	See response to QRE 2.2.1.
SLI 2.3.1	See response to SLI 2.1.1
Member States	

Measure 2.4	Google Advertising
QRE 2.4.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Notification</p> <p>Ads that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved or (if appropriate) limited in where and when they can show. This will be shown in the ‘Status’ column as ‘Disapproved’ or ‘Eligible (limited),’ and the ad may not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed. By hovering the cursor over the status of the ad, there is additional information, including the policy violation impacting the ad. For more information on how to fix a disapproved ad, see the external Help Centre page.</p> <p>Appeal process</p>

	Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the Disapproved Ads and Policy questions form. For more information about the appeal process, check the Help Centre page . For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the submit an appeal process .			
SLI 2.4.1	Number of Self-serve appeals (SSA) and success status of appeals Note: <i>An appeal is considered successful if all entities that were reviewed as part of the appeal are overturned, failed if none are overturned and partially successful when some are overturned.</i>			
	Policies in scope: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Destination Requirements (Insufficient Original Content); • Inappropriate Content (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events); • Misrepresentation (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices). 			
	Number of Ads Appeals and Overturns by Advertiser Billing Country (EEA Member State) for relevant policies described above, in H1 2023			
	Number of Ads Appeals	Number of Successful Appeals	Number of Partially Successful Appeals	Number of Failed Appeals
Level	Ads	Ads	Ads	Ads
Member States				
Austria	4,103	1,473	565	2,065
Belgium	5,009	1,628	722	2,659
Bulgaria	2,492	839	330	1,323
Croatia	1,111	396	106	609
Cyprus	3,245	884	612	1,749
Czech Republic	6,814	2,269	975	3,570

Denmark	4,678	1,929	760	1,989
Estonia	2,031	625	251	1,155
Finland	2,443	925	253	1,265
France	24,429	6,942	2,678	14,809
Germany	34,274	11,550	5,021	17,703
Greece	4,645	1,468	583	2,594
Hungary	4,365	1,524	417	2,424
Ireland	3,034	798	376	1,860
Italy	16,836	4,815	1,797	10,224
Latvia	1,673	471	153	1,049
Lithuania	2,398	767	272	1,359
Luxembourg	854	183	73	598
Malta	957	240	255	462
Netherlands	19,173	5,672	2,780	10,721
Poland	15,430	5,568	1,633	8,229
Portugal	4,765	1,304	411	3,050
Romania	5,724	2,166	604	2,954
Slovakia	2,638	943	323	1,372
Slovenia	1,149	404	146	599
Spain	22,421	7,174	3,223	12,024
Sweden	5,366	1,904	838	2,624
Iceland	140	33	12	95

Liechtenstein	124	66	12	46
Norway	2,506	748	264	1,494
Total EU	202,057	64,861	26,157	111,039
Total EEA	204,827	65,708	26,445	112,674

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the	No

maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 3.1	Google Advertising
QRE 3.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Outlined below are some ways that Google Advertising works across industry partners and civil society to facilitate the flow of information, relevant to tackling disinformation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● GARM: YouTube participated in Volumes 1-4 of GARM’s Aggregated Measurement Report which serves as a way to provide advertisers with a clear and transparent framework to better understand policy enforcement related to brand safety. YouTube also secured continued Brand Safety Accreditation from the MRC which further demonstrates commitment to the GARM mission. ● Participation in the EU CoP Permanent Task-force’s dedicated Working Groups: The CoP’s Permanent Task-force has set up working groups on Integrity of Services, Crisis Response, and Advertising, all of which Google takes part in, and which involve civil society and Industry Signatories discussing relevant trends and technological developments. ● Google Ad Grants Crisis Relief program: To help elevate authoritative information related to COVID-19, Google launched the Google Ad Grants Crisis Relief program. The Ad Grants Crisis Relief program is awarding in-kind Ad Grants to help the World Health Organization (WHO) and global government entities provide ads on the Google.com search result pages to direct users to authoritative information regarding COVID-19.
Measure 3.2	Google Advertising
QRE 3.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p>

	<p>Google takes part in GARM’s work and in the CoP Practice Permanent Task-force’s Working Groups on Crisis Response, Integrity of Services, and Advertising - as mentioned in response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, as Google has publicly communicated, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) continues to engage with other Industry Signatories to the Code in order to stay abreast of cross-platform deceptive practices, such as operations leveraging fake or impersonated accounts.</p>
Measure 3.3	<p>Google Advertising</p>
QRE 3.3.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Advertising frequently engages with third-party organisations in order to explain, collect feedback on, and improve Google Advertising policies. Google Advertising has attended meetings with the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), during which transparency tools for political ads were presented. Google Advertising has also exchanged views with experts at numerous policy roundtables, conferences, and workshops - both in Brussels and in the EU capitals.</p> <p>Please also see QRE 3.1.1 for additional information on the collaboration with third party organisations and government entities.</p>

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of “political and issue advertising”.

	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

Measure 4.1	Google Advertising
Measure 4.2	Google Advertising
QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.
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III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5		
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

Measure 5.1	Google Advertising
QRE 5.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Perimeter of policies Google’s election ads policies generally apply to Google Ads as well as to DV360, Google’s end-to-end campaign management tool for enterprise. This point will be signalled through this Chapter by referring, where relevant, to ‘Google Ads/DV360’ instead of ‘Google Ads’ or ‘Google’.</p> <p>Policy changes and development Google Ads disallows ads capitalising on sensitive events and prohibits ads that directly facilitate access to hacked material related to political entities within the scope of Google’s election ads policies. Google Ads also prohibits advertisers from concealing or misrepresenting their identity or other material details where their content relates to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern.</p> <p>Prior to February 2022, Google Ads/DV360’s global election ads policies included exemptions for advertisers promoting products, services, and news. On 15 February 2022, Google Ads/DV360 removed these exemptions from election ads policies worldwide. Advertisers wishing to promote products, services, and news with ad content in scope of the policy (e.g. featuring a current candidate or officeholder) are now subject to the respective election ads policy, including the requirement that they apply for election ads verification in order to run these ads.</p> <p>Concurrent with the elimination of election ads exemptions on 15 February 2022, Google Ads/DV360 expanded ad serving options for election ads. Before, election ads could serve only in the country or region to which the ad content pertained (e.g. EU Election Ads could serve only in the EU; US Election Ads could only serve in the US). With this update, advertisers who have completed either election ads or advertiser identity verification are eligible to serve ads in their home country or region that are in scope of an election ads policy pertaining to a different country or region. Advertisers are not permitted to serve election ads outside of their home country or region. For example, a verified New Zealand advertiser is now eligible to run an ad in New Zealand featuring an EU candidate or officeholder, but is not permitted to run that same ad in the EU. This change impacted only ads serving in the advertiser’s home country or region.</p>

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising

	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

Measure 6.1	Google Advertising
QRE 6.1.1	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

Measure 6.2	Google Advertising
QRE 6.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Trust in advertisers on Google platforms helps deliver a smart and useful web experience for everyone. This means providing transparency about who Google advertisers are and where they are located.</p> <p>All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google Ads/DV360 will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process.</p> <p>For the following ad formats and features available across Google Ads/DV360, the advertiser is responsible for including a 'Paid for by' disclosure directly in the ad, followed by the name of the organisation or individual paying for the ad:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Third-party ad serving on Google Display Network and YouTube; ● Audio creatives and Native creatives on DV360; ● Video creatives on DV360 (except for creatives served on YouTube). <p>In addition to in-ad disclosures, ads from verified advertisers contain 'About This Ad' and 'Why this Ad' features that allows users to see information related to advertiser identity and on why particular ads are being shown on Search, YouTube, and other Google services.</p> <p>To provide even greater transparency and equip users with more information about who is advertising to them, Google provides transparency on ads through multiple means, such as offering users choice and control when it comes to all ads (not just election ads). In 2021, Google announced updates to bring more transparency to the 'About This Ad' feature by including verified advertiser name and location information as well as a link to other recent ads from the advertiser. The majority of impressions in the EU now include the 'See more ads by this advertiser' link in 'About This Ad'.</p>
QRE 6.2.2	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p>

	The disclosure is either visible directly in the ad itself and/or by clicking the 'About This Ad' feature referred to in response to QRE 6.2.1.	
SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	(1) Creatives belonging to Google Ads/DV360 accounts that have completed the verification process for EU Election Ads and that were labelled as EU Election Ads, by EU Member State billing country in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023); (2) Amounts spent related to those ads in EUR, by EU Member State serving country in H1 2023.	
	Number of Creatives from verified advertisers labelled for EU Election Ads	Amount spent by verified advertisers on Creatives labelled for EU Election Ads
Level	Creative	Amount Spent (EUR)
Member States		
Austria	1,415	€228,443.47
Belgium	728	€176,663.89
Bulgaria	214	€143,614.05
Croatia	96	€4,221.75
Cyprus	641	€45,077.36
Czech Republic	354	€131,582.98
Denmark	66	€12,628.99
Estonia	438	€91,829.52
Finland	1,562	€405,765.60
France	24	€33,807.17
Germany	666	€305,619.73
Greece	2,390	€924,993.06
Hungary	555	€211,512.15
Ireland	0	€1,831.25

Italy	340	€72,797.55
Latvia	24	€5,461.65
Lithuania	1,064	€123,345.23
Luxembourg	41	€6,863.71
Malta	0	€329.72
Netherlands	2,925	€544,713.15
Poland	527	€69,052.83
Portugal	0	€3,658.54
Romania	1,721	€262,191.07
Slovakia	443	€177,416.38
Slovenia	24	€2,051.88
Spain	3,852	€382,075.30
Sweden	331	€44,015.83
Iceland	0	€0.00
Liechtenstein	0	€0.00
Norway	0	€0.00
Total EU	20,441	€4,411,563.81
Total EEA	20,441	€4,411,563.81

Measure 6.3	Google Advertising
QRE 6.3.1	Google Ads has a user experience team dedicated to regularly conducting qualitative and quantitative user research studies to understand and design for user needs. Recently (end of 2020), Google Ads updated the visual design and placement of the 'Paid for by' disclosure on Google Search to improve noticeability, comprehension, and usefulness. As part of this process, Google

	Ads conducted several rounds of qualitative and quantitative research with users interacting with election ads. Feedback was positive and users considered the updated UI to be an improvement in terms of noticeability, comprehension, and usefulness.
Measure 6.4	Google Advertising
QRE 6.4.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now. Google systems do not enable the (re-)sharing of ads across services; as such this QRE is not relevant to Google Advertising.
Measure 6.5	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 6.5.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final. Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information regarding Commitment 7 for future reports.

Measure 7.1	Google Advertising
QRE 7.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google Ads/DV360 will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process.</p> <p>To provide additional transparency for users, EU Election Ads (as defined by the Political Content Policy) paid for by verified election advertisers are included in the Political Advertising Transparency Report.</p> <p>The verification process is initialised via the following methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proactive verification application, which is outlined in the Help Centre: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EU Election Ads are labelled for the 'Election Advertising in the EU' Policy, prompting users to apply for verification and preventing the ads from running until the account becomes verified. ○ EU Election Ads attempting to run by non-verified accounts are rejected for failure to fulfil the relevant verification criteria. <p>The 'Election Advertising in the EU' verification process takes place as follows; each step may take up to 5 days. Step 1: Advertisers are required to provide the following information to verify their eligibility to run election ads:</p>

- Customer ID;
- Email address;
- Country the organisation is registered in;
- Name of the organisation;
- Registration number;
- Document confirming organisation name;
- Official address;
- Document showing proof of address;
- Attestation that the authorised representative is a citizen of an EU Member State;
- Attestation that the organisation applying for verification is based in an EU Member State;
- Agreement to the Google Election Ads terms.

Step 2: Advertisers are required to provide the following information to verify their identity:

- Organisation name;
- Organisation address;
- Document showing proof of address;
- Registration document or number for the organisation;
- Authorised representative name;
- Authorised representative address;
- A copy of the authorised representative's government issued photo ID;
- Attestation that the authorised representative is a citizen of an EU Member State;
- Attestation that the organisation applying for verification is based in an EU Member State;
- Agreement to the Google Election Ads terms.

Following completion of the 'Election Advertising in the EU' verification process:

- Advertiser identity is verified;
- Associated election ads are run with 'Paid for by' disclosures; and
- Election ads are displayed in the [Google Political Advertising Transparency Report](#) with associated expenditure metrics.

More details about election advertising verification can be found [here](#).

SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Ads rejected due to unverified advertisers attempting to run EU Election Ads by EU Member State billing country in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023).	
	Number of Creatives Actioned	
Level	Creative	
Member States		
Austria		2,084
Belgium		1,113
Bulgaria		327
Croatia		244
Cyprus		452
Czech Republic		7,234
Denmark		1,779
Estonia		193
Finland		4,080
France		3,439
Germany		56,011
Greece		2,248
Hungary		2,389
Ireland		281
Italy		14,994
Latvia		256
Lithuania		755

Luxembourg	53
Malta	1,277
Netherlands	9,199
Poland	23,008
Portugal	52
Romania	1,372
Slovakia	1,166
Slovenia	59
Spain	4,938
Sweden	2,820
Iceland	3
Liechtenstein	6
Norway	147
Total EU	141,823
Total EEA	141,979

Measure 7.2	Google Advertising
QRE 7.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>In light of the overlap of QREs 7.2.1 through 7.3.2, a single answer is provided for all four here rather than repeating elements and risking confusion for the reader.</p> <p>1. What happens if advertisers violate Google Ads policies</p>

Google Ads requires all advertisers – including those promoting political content – to comply with Google Ads policies to ensure a safe and positive experience for users.

Ad or asset disapproval

Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run unless the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed and approved. Election ads from unverified advertisers will get disapproved.

Reporting violations

While Google makes every effort to ensure that ads/listings which may violate Google policies do not run before review, some ads/listings may run on Google before Google Ads Specialists check them. Users can report potentially violative ads with the [Report an ad/listing](#) form. The report will be reviewed, and if appropriate, action will be taken on the ad.

Account suspension

Accounts may be suspended if Google Ads finds violations of Google Ads policies or the Terms and Conditions.

If Google Ads detects an [egregious policy violation](#), the account will be suspended immediately and without prior warning. An egregious violation of the Google Ads policies is a violation so serious that it is unlawful or poses significant harm to Google Ads users or the Google Ads digital advertising ecosystem. Egregious violations often reflect that the advertiser's overall business does not adhere to Google Ads policies or that one violation is so severe that Google Ads cannot risk future exposure to Google Ads users. Immediate account suspension is limited to cases where such action is the only effective method to adequately prevent illegal activity and/or significant user harm.

For [other violations](#) that lead to account suspension, Google Ads will send advertisers a warning to outline the nature of the policy violation and any remedial action that can be taken, in order to comply. This notification will be sent at least 7 days prior to suspension action.

In September 2021, Google Ads introduced a [three-strikes system](#) for repeat violations of particular non-egregious policies. For repeat violations of these policies, Google Ads issues strikes to the Google Ads account, and penalties progressively increase from removal of the relevant ad to a temporary hold on the account to account suspension. If a Google Ads account receives three strikes for violating a particular policy within a set period of time, that account will be suspended for repeat policy violations. Google Ads' goal is to increase accountability for advertisers and also encourage them to learn more about Google

Ads advertising policies to prevent future violations, creating a better overall experience. Google Ads will continue to provide resources in the Help Centre to make it easier for advertisers to comply with Google Ads policies and optimise campaigns. [Learn more](#) about enforcement procedures for repeat violations.

If Google Ads suspends a Google Ads account, all ads in the suspended account will stop running, and Google Ads will no longer accept advertising from the advertiser, unless the violations are successfully appealed. [Learn more](#) about suspended accounts.

Appeal process

Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the Disapproved Ads and Policy questions form. For more information about the appeal process, check the [Help Centre page](#). For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the 'submit an appeal' process.

Explainability

In 2020, Google Ads improved the explainability of Google Ads policies by adding examples of violations and explanations about the enforcement mechanisms that apply for violations of different policies. These can be found under the policies in the [Google Ads Help Centre](#) articles, usually in sections such as 'Examples (non-exhaustive)' or in yellow boxes for enforcement actions.

2. Election ads verification process

See response to QRE 7.1.1.

3. Specific enforcement related to election advertising verification

- Information in the Google Ads/DV360 payment profile is used for verification, therefore if advertisers make changes to this, they will need to complete identity verification again. They will receive an in-account notification when this is required.
- If Google Ads/DV360 finds that advertisers have provided false information during the verification process, the verification will be revoked and the account may be suspended.
- If Google Ads/DV360 finds that advertisers have violated Google Ads policies, the account may be suspended.
- If advertisers change their account's invoice setup, they will need to verify their account again to run election ads.
- Google Ad Grants accounts are not eligible to run election ads or apply for election ads verification.

QRE 7.2.2	See response to QRE 7.2.1.
Measure 7.3	Google Advertising
QRE 7.3.1	See response to QRE 7.2.1.
QRE 7.3.2	See response to QRE 7.2.1.
Measure 7.4	Google Advertising
QRE 7.4.1	Google Ads will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 8			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	Yes

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

Measure 8.1	Google Advertising
Measure 8.2	Google Advertising
QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	<p>Only verified advertisers are permitted to run election ads in the EU. All election ads run by verified election advertisers in regions where election ads verification is required must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process.</p> <p>In addition to election ads verification policies in the EU, election ads are also included in the EU Political Advertising Transparency Report which makes it easy for voters, researchers, and journalists to see - among other things - who is purchasing election ads on Google, YouTube, and Partner properties in Europe and how much money is being spent on those ads.</p> <p>This report includes a searchable ad library that provides important information such as how many impressions election ads have, when they were shown, and how they were targeted in terms of age, gender, and location.</p> <p>Anyone can access and use this information, and Google has aimed to ensure that it is easy for third parties to analyse it more effectively: the report is searchable and downloadable, and can be filtered by spend, number of impressions, type of ad format, time and region/country. It is usually updated within a matter of minutes after an ad is first served and displays election ads from verified advertisers that have one or more impressions.</p> <p>Google has also made significant investments in enhancing transparency around election advertising. In May 2022, Google updated the Political Ads Transparency Report, creating a new user interface and adding new tools for accessing and filtering information about targeting, location and formats for specific election ads and advertisers. Globally, Google expanded the election ads verification policies and transparency tools to more countries, including Argentina and Brazil.</p>

	<p>The data from the EU Political Advertising Transparency Report and Ad Library is also available on Google Cloud's BigQuery. Using BigQuery's API, any interested third party can write code and run their own unique queries on this data set to develop charts, graphs, tables, or other visualisations of election ads on Google platforms.</p> <p>As of February 2022, advertisers who have completed either election ads or advertiser identity verification are eligible to serve ads in their home country or region that are in scope of an election ads policy pertaining to a different country or region.</p>
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III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.
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Measure 9.1	Google Advertising
Measure 9.2	Google Advertising
QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Users engage with a wider variety of ad formats on more Google products than ever before — from Video ads on YouTube to Shopping ads across Search, Display and more — and increasingly want to know more about the ads they see. Google Ads provides tools to users to help them better understand why they are seeing an ad in Google’s network. On Google Search and the Search Partner network, 'Paid for by' disclosures will show in ads directly. On YouTube, the disclosure will show in 'About This Ad' which can be accessed through the info icon or the 3-dot icon. Similarly, on websites and apps that partner with Google for display ads, the disclosure will show in the 'About This Ad' feature which can be accessed through the AdChoices icon. More than 30 million global users interact with the ads transparency and control menus every day, and 'About This Ad' has received positive feedback on its streamlined experience.</p> <p>Users can also edit their preferences to control the kinds of ads they see, block certain ads, and provide feedback on ads that they think are inappropriate.</p> <p>Restricted targeting for election ads</p> <p>Only the following criteria may be used to target election ads:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographic location (except radius around a location); • Age, gender; • Contextual options such as: ad placements, topics, keywords against sites, apps, pages and videos. <p>All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads.</p>

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.

Measure 10.1	Google Advertising
Measure 10.2	Google Advertising

QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)

The [Political Advertising Transparency Report](#) includes EU Election Ads (as defined by the Political Content [Policy](#)) which are ads that feature any of the following:

- A political party, current elected officeholder, or candidate for the EU Parliament;
- A political party, current officeholder, or candidate for an elected national office within an EU Member State. Examples include members of a national parliament and presidents that are directly elected; or
- A referendum question up for vote, a referendum campaign group, or a call to vote related to a national referendum or a state or provincial referendum on sovereignty.

The Political Advertising Report shows how much those verified election advertisers are spending to run ads on Google Ads/DV360 in the EU. Google Ads/DV360's goal is to provide information that helps everyone better understand how ads of political importance work online. For more information, visit [here](#).

It includes election ads (as defined by the Political Content [Policy](#)) that were paid for by [verified](#) election advertisers and shown:

- At least 1 time;
- Across Search, Display, YouTube and DV360 in supported ad formats;
- Since Google started publishing this information (since 31 May 2018 or later depending on region).

Information about an ad gets published usually within a matter of minutes after the ad was first served. This information includes:

- Total ad spend;
- Number of ads;
- Ad formats;
- Advertiser name;
- Number of times the ad was shown to users, or 'impressions'.

The Political Advertising Transparency Report can be filtered by ad format (text, image, video) and advertiser name. The report can also be modified to display ads that were shown during a set date range or in a specific country/region. Correspondingly, the tool provides an overview of ads served in a specific country/region, as well as insights into the top advertisers per country/region and their respective ad spend.

To ensure integrity and accuracy, updates to the report may be delayed.

	<p>During the period of 1 January to 30 June 2023, the Political Advertising Transparency Report had approximately 44,000 global monthly pageviews.</p> <p>The Political Advertising Transparency Report also publishes ads as a public data set on Google Cloud BigQuery.</p>
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III. Political Advertising

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.”

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Advertising is planning on adapting policies and enforcement to take into account the new EU Political Ads Regulation requirements, once final.
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Measure 11.1	Google Advertising
Measure 11.2	Google Advertising
Measure 11.3	Google Advertising
Measure 11.4	Google Advertising
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	See responses to QREs 8.2.1 and 10.2.1, in particular as it relates to BigQuery availability of the data in question.
QRE 11.4.1	<p>Developing a Political Advertising Transparency Report that works for researchers:</p> <p>As mentioned in part 2 of this report, the Political Advertising Transparency Report data is fully available to the public. Data provided in the Political Advertising Transparency Report is available to be downloaded as a CSV from the Political Advertising on Google Transparency website and is published as a public data set on Google Cloud BigQuery. Researchers can also export a subset of the ads or access them programmatically.</p> <p>Within the Google Advertising Political Advertising Transparency team, a User Experience team has been devoted to understanding target users' (including researchers') needs and working with Product Managers, Engineers, and others to develop new and improve existing features and functionalities of the Political Advertising Transparency Report. For example, Google Advertising has an always on survey that surfaces for anyone who views the Political Advertising Transparency Report. Via this survey, Google Advertising consistently gets feedback from researchers, as well as other user groups, and uses this feedback to inform improvements to the website. Researcher feedback has led Google Advertising to make improvements to features and functionalities such as in 'Amount spent' (e.g. increments such as Under €50, €50 - €500, €500 - €1000, etc.) and 'Number of times shown' filters (e.g. increments such as Under 1K, 1K-10K, 10K-50K etc.), where ranges became smaller and more specific, making them more useful to users (including researchers).</p> <p>For the Ads Transparency Center, Google Advertising is launching an API to be available globally. Ads serving in the EU/EEA and Turkey will be available starting Q3 2023 via the API with enhanced ad detail transparency.</p>

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 12

Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.

	C.12	M 12.1	M 12.2	M 12.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	<i>Not subscribed</i>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Measure 12.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 12.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 12.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google continues to engage with the Permanent Task-force and is committed to delivering upon this measure.

Measure 13.1	Google Advertising
Measure 13.2	Google Advertising

Measure 13.3	Google Advertising
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now. Google continues to engage with the Permanent Task-force and is committed to delivering upon this measure.

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains;
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation.

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes” ...);
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers;
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
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<p>In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In April 2023, Google published its Webspam Report 2022, reporting that SpamBrain detected 5 times more spam sites compared to 2021 and 200 times more sites compared to when it first launched. ● In addition to fighting spam, Google Search updated its spam policies as part of its Search Essentials. These spam policies cover the most common types of spam and abusive behaviours that could lead to a site ranking lower or not appearing at all in Search results. Google Search updated its spam policies with more relevant and precise language, and included new examples that help site owners avoid creating harmful content. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● YouTube has long been updating, on a regular and ongoing basis, its internal systems and processes related to the detection of content that violates its policies. This includes investment in automated detection systems. ● As of June 2023, YouTube updated its Impersonation Policy around fan channels, requiring creators to declare this in the channel name or handle so that it is obvious to the viewer that the channel does not represent the original creator, artist or entity.
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 14 for future reports.</p>

Measure 14.1	Google Search	YouTube
<p>QRE 14.1.1</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search’s systems are designed to elevate authoritative information and combat the threats listed in Commitment 14. While many of those TTPs are not relevant to search engines (e.g. TTPs 1 through 5, TTP 11), by seeking to elevate authentic, original, high-quality information, Search’s ranking systems directly tackle threats like inauthentic domains (TTP 4), obfuscation (TTP 6), deceptive manipulated media (TTP 7), hack and leak operations (TTP 8), inauthentic coordination (TTP 9), and a broad range of deceptive practices (TTP 10). More information about the design of Search’s ranking systems is outlined in the User Empowerment chapter.</p> <p>Google Search’s Overall Content Policies outline that Search takes action against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Learn more about Google Search Webmaster Guidelines.</p> <p>In line with these policies, Search deploys spam protection tools. While these efforts address a wider range of content than mis-/disinformation, they help to reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search through inauthentic behaviours outlined in relevant TTPs.</p>	<p>Similar to Google Search, YouTube’s systems are designed to connect people with high quality content from authoritative sources.</p> <p>In addition, YouTube has various policies which set out what is not allowed on YouTube. These policies, which can be accessed via this landing page in YouTube’s Help Centre, address relevant TTPs. Notably, YouTube’s policies tend to be broader than the identified TTPs. As such, related SLIs providing information about actions taken related to the TTP may be overinclusive.</p> <p>Community Guidelines broadly address the following TTPs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts); 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments); 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers; 5. Account hijacking or impersonation; 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...); 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content); 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers); 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform

	<p>Moreover, Search has policies for what can appear in Google Search features (e.g. knowledge panels, content advisories, ‘About This Result’, etc.) to make sure that Search is showing high quality and helpful content, while also taking action against content that may promote harmful mis-/disinformation. Relevant policies to the threats listed above include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deceptive Practices Policy: This policy prohibits content that impersonates any person or organisation, misrepresentation or concealment of ownership or primary purpose, and engagement in inauthentic or coordinated behaviour to deceive, defraud, or mislead. This policy does not cover content with certain artistic, educational, historical, documentary, or scientific considerations, or other substantial benefits to the public. • Manipulated Media Policy: This policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. • Transparency Policy: This policy notes that news sources on Google should provide clear dates and bylines, as well as information about authors, the publication, the publisher, company or network behind it, and contact information. 	<p>algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;</p> <p>11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers.</p> <p>In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Relevant to TTP 8 is the Misinformation Policy removals in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding in future reports.</p>
QRE 14.1.2	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested

character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search uses a variety of proactive detection efforts to counter spam, which overlaps significantly with TTPs used to disseminate disinformation. As outlined in the overall Google Search [Content Policies](#), action is taken against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems.

Pursuant to the Spam Content Policy, Google Search deploys spam protection tools, such as SpamBrain (Google’s AI-based spam-prevention system), to protect search quality and user safety. Addressing a wider range of content than only mis-/disinformation, these efforts help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search. Additional information can be found in the [2022 Google Search Webspam Report](#).

In addition, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust and Safety Team are central to Google’s work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in Search’s response to QRE 16.1.1.

character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.

YouTube’s approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube’s policies as quickly as possible, prioritising high quality information in rankings and recommendations, and rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU.

YouTube uses a combination of people and machine learning to detect problematic content at scale. Machine learning is well-suited to detect patterns, including harmful misinformation, which helps YouTube find content similar to other content that YouTube has already removed, even before it is viewed. YouTube also recognises that the best way to quickly remove content is to anticipate problems before they emerge. YouTube’s Intelligence Desk monitors the news, social media, and user reports to detect new trends surrounding inappropriate content, and works to make sure YouTube’s teams are prepared to address them before they can become a larger issue.

The YouTube community also plays an important role in flagging content they think is inappropriate. YouTube has its own Priority Flagger program through which carefully selected NGOs and government agencies — groups that are trained to identify certain types of harmful content — have access to specialised reporting processes and prioritised review of flags.

		<p>YouTube continues to invest in automated detection systems, and rely on both human evaluators and machine learning to train their systems on new data. YouTube’s engineering teams also continue to update and improve their detection systems regularly. YouTube aims to leverage an even more targeted mix of classifiers, keywords in additional languages, and information from regional analysts to identify narratives their main classifier does not catch. Over time, this will make YouTube faster and more accurate at catching viral misinformation narratives.</p>
Measure 14.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 14.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content moderation on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and weigh signals of authoritativeness so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors and signals to raise authoritative content and reduce low quality content. Google Search’s publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Google Search works continuously to improve the quality and effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content.</p>	<p>YouTube enforces a broad range of policies to help build a safer community. These policies include, but are not limited to, YouTube’s Community Guidelines Policies, which include Spam, Scams, and Deceptive Practices, Impersonation Policy and Fake Engagement Policy.</p> <p>Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies</p> <p>Enforcement of YouTube’s policies is a joint effort between people and machine learning technology. YouTube starts by giving its most experienced team of content moderators enforcement guidelines (detailed explanations of what makes content violative), and asks them to differentiate between violative and non-violative material. If the new guidelines allow them to achieve a very high level of accuracy, YouTube expands the testing group to include hundreds of moderators across different backgrounds, languages and experience levels.</p> <p>YouTube then begins revising the guidelines so that they can be accurately interpreted across a larger, more diverse set of moderators. This process can take a few months, and is only</p>

Furthermore, to ensure its algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a [rigorous process](#) that involves both live tests and thousands of trained external Search Quality Raters from around the world. Raters do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search's results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users all around the world. Under the Google [Search Quality Rater Guidelines](#), raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search also provides users the ability to flag content that might be violating Google Search policies.

complete once the group reaches a similarly high degree of accuracy. These findings then help train YouTube's machine learning technology to detect potentially violative content at scale. As done with its content moderators, YouTube also tests its models to understand whether it has provided enough context for them to make accurate assessments about what to surface for people to review.

Once models are trained to identify potentially violative content, the role of content moderators remains essential throughout the enforcement process. Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content moderators then help confirm or deny whether the content should be removed.

This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of YouTube's models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. It also means YouTube's enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube (over 500 hours of content every minute), while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

YouTube's Trust & Safety leadership meet with quality assurance leads from across the globe (those responsible for overseeing content moderation teams) to discuss particularly thorny decisions and review the quality of YouTube's enforcement. If needed, guideline tweaks are then drafted to address gaps or to provide clarity for edge cases.

		For TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9, YouTube has continued to find opportunities to provide more granular detail around mapping to its policies. To learn more about these methodologies, refer to SLI 14.2.1 and SLI 14.2.2.
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Google Search	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	
TTP OR ACTION1	<p><u>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter</u></p> <p>6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);</p> <p>9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);</p> <p>10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;</p> <p>12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.</p> <p><u>SLI 14.2.1:</u></p> <p>Methodology</p> <p>(1) Manual enforcement instances under relevant policy violations (including Deceptive Practices, Manipulated Media, Medical Content, Misleading Content and Transparency Policies) on a global level in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023). The increase in policy violations relative to the figure reported in the baseline report is attributed to improvements in workflow reporting.</p> <p>(2) Domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search, broken down by EEA Member State in H1 2023.</p> <p>Response</p> <p>(1) In H1 2023, there were 41,840 instances of policy enforcement which resulted in removal of false, disputed, non-representative facts, misrepresentation information, content that contradicts scientific or medical based consensus and evidence based best practices. The actions were enforced across Search features including knowledge engine, webanswers, news, discover, image and video search.</p>

(2) See table below for number of domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search, broken down by EEA Member State in H1 2023. Please note that the EEA Member State breakdown for this metric is determined using Top Level Domain or IP address, and if different pages map to different countries, choosing the country with the largest number of pages. Top Level Domain or IP address mapping to countries may not be completely accurate.

SLI 14.2.2

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search’s systems are trained to block policy violating content.

SLI 14.2.3

This SLI is not applicable for Google Search, as users do not need accounts to use the search engine, and generally do not post content on Google Search.

SLI 14.2.4

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search’s systems are trained to block policy violating content.

SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Number of domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search	Views/ impression / s before action	Interaction / engagement before action	Views/ impression / s after action	Interaction / engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impression / s of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction /engagement on the service)

Member State												
Austria	39,755											
Belgium	60,565											
Bulgaria	63,597											
Croatia	340,503											
Cyprus	54,749											
Czech Republic	460,714											
Denmark	251,875											
Estonia	44,892											
Finland	94,857											
France	417,577											
Germany	525,863											
Greece	283,771											
Hungary	148,370											
Ireland	35,507											
Italy	535,824											
Latvia	39,060											
Lithuania	48,244											
Luxembourg	27,774											
Malta	6,857											
Netherlands	201,140											

Poland	383,958											
Portugal	43,444											
Romania	276,999											
Slovakia	44,136											
Slovenia	28,300											
Spain	320,426											
Sweden	1,266,817											
Iceland	14,887											
Liechtenstein	360											
Norway	151,867											
Total EU	6,045,574											
Total EEA	6,212,688											

TTP OR ACTION 2												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall

												on the service)	interactio n/engage ment on the service)
Member States													

TTP OR ACTION 3													
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interactio n/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressio ns after action	Interactio n/ engagem ent after action	Penetratio n and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressio ns of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/imp ressions on the service)	Interactio n/ engagem ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio n/engage ment on the service)	
Member States													

TTP OR ACTION 4												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 5												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall	Views/ impressions of TTP related content	Interaction/ engagement with TTP

											content on the service	(in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States													

TTP OR ACTION 6													
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)	

Member States												
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TTP OR ACTION 7	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 8	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 9												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

												n/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 10												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 11												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall	Views/ impressions of TTP related content	Interaction/ engagement with TTP

											content on the service	(in relation to overall views/imp ressions on the service)	related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States													

YouTube	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	
TTP OR ACTION 1	<p><u>SLI 14.2.1</u> Methodology</p> <p>(1) Number of channels for TTP 1, identified for potential removal, globally for reporting period H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023); (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 1, globally for reporting period H1 2023.</p> <p>Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube’s Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.</p> <p>Community Guidelines broadly address the following TTPs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts); 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);

3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
5. Account hijacking or impersonation;
7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...);
8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers.

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. However, YouTube is not currently able to provide more granular information regarding TTPs 2, 3, 8, 10 and 11. Relevant to TTP 8 is the Misinformation Policy removals in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. As noted above, TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are significant data challenges in providing granular data regarding each of the TTPs. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.1 in future reports.

In the January 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube’s primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response

- (1) In H1 2023, there were 7,366,792 channels identified for potential removal for violation(s) of TTP 1, globally;
- (2) In H1 2023, there were 7,366,792 channels removed due to violation(s) of TTP 1, globally.

SLI 14.2.2

Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 1 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;

(4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): YouTube took on additional effort to provide more granular view information by TTP, as available.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response

(1) N/A;

(2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;

(3) N/A;

(4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

The Community Guidelines Transparency Report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2						SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States															

TTP OR ACTION 2	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of	Nr of actions	Views/impression	Interaction/engagement	Views/impression	Interaction/engagement	Penetration and impact on	Trends on targeted	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in	Views/impressions of TTP	Interaction/engagement

	identified TTPs	taken by type	ns before action	ent before action	ns after action	ent after action	genuine users	audiences		relation to overall content on the service	related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	nt with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 3												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States												
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TTP OR ACTION 4	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 5	<p>SLI 14.2.1 Methodology</p> <p>(1) Number of channels for TTP 5, identified for potential removal, globally for reporting period H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023);</p> <p>(2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 5, globally for reporting period H1 2023;</p> <p>(3) Number of videos for TTP 5, identified for potential removal, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;</p> <p>(4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 5, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.</p> <p>The location listed in the table below is based on the uploader’s IP address at the time the video was uploaded. The IP address usually</p>
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corresponds with where an uploader is geolocated, unless they are using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy server.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

Community Guidelines broadly address the following TTPs:

1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
5. Account hijacking or impersonation;
7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...);
8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers.

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. However, YouTube is not currently able to provide more granular information regarding TTPs 2, 3, 8, 10 and 11. Relevant to TTP 8 is the Misinformation Policy removals in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. As noted above, TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are significant data challenges in providing granular data regarding each of the TTPs. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.1 in future reports.

In the January 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube's primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response

- (1) In H1 2023, there were 104,808 channels identified for potential removal for violation(s) of TTP 5 , globally;
- (2) In H1 2023, there were 104,808 channels removed due to violation(s) of TTP 5, globally;
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2**Methodology**

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 5 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.

The location listed in the table below is the country of upload of the video. This data is based on the uploader's IP address at the time the video was uploaded. The IP address usually corresponds with where an uploader is geolocated, unless they are using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy server.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): YouTube took on additional effort to provide more granular view information by TTP, as available.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

The Community Guidelines Transparency Report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2							SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall

Latvia	36	36	2	0	11	15	8	0	0						
Lithuania	33	33	4	4	8	17	0	0	0						
Luxembourg	67	67	37	28	2	0	0	0	0						
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Netherlands	245	245	88	52	51	17	28	9	0						
Poland	198	198	115	45	29	4	3	2	0						
Portugal	86	86	39	11	7	8	14	7	0						
Romania	17	17	10	3	0	2	1	1	0						
Slovakia	28	28	22	1	2	0	2	1	0						
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Spain	300	300	93	6	28	34	101	38	0						
Sweden	13,190	13,190	12,777	344	34	33	2	0	0						
Iceland	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Norway	17	17	17	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Total EU	28,789	28,789	23,867	3,625	588	292	300	117	0						
Total EEA	28,811	28,811	23,889	3,625	588	292	300	117	0						

TTP OR ACTION 6															
	SLI 14.2.1			SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3				SLI 14.2.4			

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 7	<p>SLI 14.2.1 Methodology</p> <p>(1) Number of videos for TTP 7, identified for potential removal, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023);</p> <p>(2) Number of removals of videos for TTP 7, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.</p> <p>The location listed in the table below is based on the uploader’s IP address at the time the video was uploaded. The IP address usually corresponds with where an uploader is geolocated, unless they are using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy server.</p> <p>Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube’s Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.</p> <p>Community Guidelines broadly address the following TTPs:</p>
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1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
3. Use of fake followers or subscribers;
5. Account hijacking or impersonation;
7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes” ...);
8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers.

In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. However, YouTube is not currently able to provide more granular information regarding TTPs 2, 3, 8, 10 and 11. Relevant to TTP 8 is the Misinformation Policy removals in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. As noted above, TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are significant data challenges in providing granular data regarding each of the TTPs. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.1 in future reports.

In the January 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube’s primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2

Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;

- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 7 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.

The location listed in the table below is the country of upload of the video. This data is based on the uploader's IP address at the time the video was uploaded. The IP address usually corresponds with where an uploader is geolocated, unless they are using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy server.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): YouTube took on additional effort to provide more granular view information by TTP, as available.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions

on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

The Community Guidelines Transparency Report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2						SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
	Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States															
Austria	4	4	0	1	2	1	0	0	0						
Belgium	18	18	2	4	5	4	3	0	0						

Bulgaria	10	10	0	4	3	0	2	1	0						
Croatia	3	3	0	1	0	1	1	0	0						
Cyprus	4	4	0	1	2	0	1	0	0						
Czech Republic	9	9	0	2	3	2	2	0	0						
Denmark	8	8	0	1	4	1	2	0	0						
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Finland	12	12	0	6	3	2	1	0	0						
France	60	60	1	24	22	8	2	3	0						
Germany	97	97	5	33	25	16	10	8	0						
Greece	24	24	0	4	7	8	2	3	0						
Hungary	7	7	0	1	1	2	0	3	0						
Ireland	15	15	0	4	6	3	2	0	0						
Italy	45	45	0	22	13	3	2	5	0						
Latvia	5	5	0	2	2	0	1	0	0						
Lithuania	8	8	0	1	2	2	1	2	0						
Luxembourg	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0						
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Netherlands	47	47	3	25	8	7	1	3	0						
Poland	57	57	4	14	18	13	4	4	0						
Portugal	12	12	2	4	4	2	0	0	0						
Romania	21	21	1	1	6	4	5	4	0						

Slovakia	6	6	0	1	2	2	0	1	0						
Slovenia	3	3	0	1	1	1	0	0	0						
Spain	40	40	1	14	10	8	5	2	0						
Sweden	17	17	0	3	6	4	4	0	0						
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Norway	4	4	0	1	2	0	1	0	0						
Total EU	534	534	19	176	155	94	51	39	0						
Total EEA	538	538	19	177	157	94	52	39	0						

TTP OR ACTION 8	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)

Member States												
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TTP OR ACTION 9	<p><u>SLI 14.2.1</u> Methodology</p> <p>(1) Number of channels for TTP 9, identified for potential removal, globally for reporting period H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023); (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 9, globally for reporting period H1 2023; (3) Number of videos for TTP 9, identified for potential removal, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023; (4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 9, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.</p> <p>The location listed in the table below is based on the uploader’s IP address at the time the video was uploaded. The IP address usually corresponds with where an uploader is geolocated, unless they are using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy server.</p> <p>Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube’s Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline. In addition, the number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.</p> <p>Community Guidelines broadly address the following TTPs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts); 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments); 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers; 5. Account hijacking or impersonation; 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...); 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content); 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers); 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers; 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers.
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In this report, YouTube has provided more granular information relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. However, YouTube is not currently able to provide more granular information regarding TTPs 2, 3, 8, 10 and 11. Relevant to TTP 8 is the Misinformation Policy removals in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the Community Guidelines Transparency Report, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. As noted above, TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are significant data challenges in providing granular data regarding each of the TTPs. YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.1 in future reports.

In the January 2023 EU CoP report, YouTube shared information on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin and periodic blog posts. The TAG Bulletin continues to be YouTube's primary public source of information on TTP-related issues.

Response

- (1) In H1 2023, there were 301,198 channels identified for potential removal for violation(s) of TTP 9, globally;
- (2) In H1 2023, there were 301,198 channels removed due to violation(s) of TTP 9, globally;
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) Please see table below.

SLI 14.2.2

Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 9 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2023.

The location listed in the table below is the country of upload of the video. This data is based on the uploader's IP address at the time the video was uploaded. The IP address usually corresponds with where an uploader is geolocated, unless they are using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy server.

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one to one mapping.

Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube’s Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): YouTube took on additional effort to provide more granular view information by TTP, as available.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 in future reports.

Response

(1) Please see table below;

(2) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (2) in future reports;

(3) Please see table below.;

(4) YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 14.2.2 (4) in future reports.

SLI 14.2.3

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

SLI 14.2.4

The Community Guidelines Transparency Report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2.1

SLI 14.2.2

SLI 14.2.3

SLI 14.2.4

	Number of videos identified	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views	Views after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impresions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impresions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States															
Austria	706	706	81	145	85	185	185	25	0						
Belgium	840	840	35	137	112	227	272	57	0						
Bulgaria	541	541	21	66	141	168	125	20	0						
Croatia	498	498	43	77	44	182	130	22	0						
Cyprus	229	229	81	102	20	17	8	1	0						
Czech Republic	447	447	40	153	53	88	94	19	0						
Denmark	575	575	11	77	74	201	183	29	0						
Estonia	204	204	0	16	17	72	88	11	0						

Finland	945	945	131	333	216	171	81	13	0						
France	19,796	19,796	2,801	6,301	1,703	4,976	3,851	164	0						
Germany	68,033	68,033	12,359	24,149	7,558	13,718	9,083	1,166	0						
Greece	248	248	2	21	37	99	78	11	0						
Hungary	402	402	10	45	70	142	115	20	0						
Ireland	372	372	64	102	67	63	62	14	0						
Italy	3,364	3,364	590	883	292	541	995	63	0						
Latvia	63	63	2	13	7	10	23	8	0						
Lithuania	220	220	17	19	39	69	62	14	0						
Luxembourg	332	332	29	62	76	108	50	7	0						
Malta	21	21	1	0	2	8	8	2	0						
Netherlands	10,026	10,026	1,423	2,197	1,302	2,806	2,044	254	0						
Poland	4,524	4,524	112	874	1,129	1,430	852	127	0						
Portugal	362	362	2	27	58	134	132	9	0						
Romania	3,070	3,070	216	542	547	941	729	95	0						
Slovakia	95	95	1	9	14	35	34	2	0						
Slovenia	44	44	4	2	8	17	10	3	0						
Spain	1,931	1,931	18	185	341	613	647	127	0						
Sweden	3,214	3,214	611	1,429	474	446	223	31	0						
Iceland	96	96	3	5	10	45	32	1	0						
Liechtenstein	8	8	0	0	4	2	2	0	0						

Norway	880	880	44	155	197	273	189	22	0						
Total EU	121,102	121,102	18,705	37,966	14,486	27,467	20,164	2,314	0						
Total EEA	122,086	122,086	18,752	38,126	14,697	27,787	20,387	2,337	0						

TTP OR ACTION 10	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 11	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		

	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States												

TTP OR ACTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction)

terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In January 2023, Google published its 4th annual AI Principles Progress Update — Google’s review of its commitment to responsibly develop emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. This new report provides Google’s most comprehensive look at how AI Principles are put into practice. Google believes a formalised governance structure to support the implementation of its AI Principles – and rigorous testing and ethics reviews — is necessary to put the principles into practice. 	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As generative image capabilities are rolled out at Google over the next year, Google Search commits to leveraging IPTC Photo Metadata Standard to add metadata tags to images that are generated by Google AI. Creators and publishers will be able to add a similar markup to their own images, so a label can be displayed in Search to indicate the images as AI generated. More information is available here. 	<p>YouTube currently has no future implementation measures to announce; however, YouTube continually invests in the ability to detect policy violative accounts and evolves this work accordingly.</p> <p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 15 for future reports.</p>

Measure 15.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.1.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023	YouTube’s Misinformation Policies prohibit content that has been technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken out of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm. YouTube detects content

	<p>Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>The Google Search features Manipulated Media Policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. This includes if such content would cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different understanding or impression, such that it might cause significant harm to groups or individuals, or significantly undermine participation or trust in electoral or civic processes.</p>	<p>that violates Community Guidelines using a combination of machine learning and human review. YouTube also has policies on Spam & Deceptive Practices that prohibit, for example, spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advantage of the YouTube community and Fake Engagement.</p>
Measure 15.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.2.1	<p>Google's AI principles set out Google's commitment to develop technology responsibly and establish specific application areas that will not be pursued.</p> <p>Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content. However, if AI is used for the primary purpose of manipulating search rankings, that's a violation of Google Search's long-standing policy against spammy automatically-generated content.</p> <p>Across its services, Google has been examining the risks and challenges associated with more powerful language models. Improved AI systems can help bolster spam fighting capabilities and even help combat known loss patterns. Google Search recently introduced a system to better identify queries seeking explicit content, so Google Search can better avoid shocking or</p>	<p>Before YouTube does the work of removing content that violates their policies, YouTube has to make sure the line between what is removed and what is allowed is drawn in the right place — with a goal of preserving free expression, while also protecting and promoting a vibrant community. To that end, YouTube has a dedicated policy development team that systematically reviews all of YouTube's policies to ensure that they are current, keep YouTube's community safe, and do not stifle YouTube's openness.</p> <p>The product, policy, and enforcement decisions YouTube makes are guided by a set of considerations that are consistent across YouTube's products and services.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value openness and accessibility: YouTube aims to provide access to an open and diverse information ecosystem. But that does not mean that anything goes

offending users not looking for that information, and ultimately make the Google Search experience safer for everyone.

In January 2023, Google published its [4th annual AI Principles Progress Update](#) — Google’s review of its commitment to responsibly develop emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. This new report provides Google’s most comprehensive look at how the AI Principles are put into practice. Google believes a formalised governance structure to support the implementation of its AI Principles – and rigorous testing and ethics reviews — is necessary to put the principles into practice.

Google’s approach to AI Principles governance rests on a corporate-wide end-to-end commitment to three pillars:

1. **AI Principles** serve as Google’s ethical charter and inform its product policies. In this year’s report, products that were announced in 2022 that align with the AI Principles are discussed, as well as three in-depth case studies, including how tough decisions are made on what or what not to launch, and how to efficiently address responsible AI issues such as fairness across multiple products.
2. **Education and resources** provide ethics training and technical tools to test, evaluate and monitor the application of the AI Principles to all of Google’s products and services. Google is sharing for the first time details of a new company-wide tool for monitoring products’ responsible AI maturity, and

on YouTube’s services. YouTube believes that a healthy and responsible approach to supporting information quality should aim toward keeping content accessible.

- **Respecting end-user rights:** Users who express an intent to explore content that is not illegal or prohibited by YouTube’s policies should be able to find it, even if all available indicators suggest it is of relatively low quality. YouTube sets a high bar for information quality where users have not clearly expressed what they are looking for.
- **Build for everyone:** YouTube’s products and services are used around the world by users from different cultures, languages, and backgrounds, and at different stages in their lives. YouTube’s product and policy development, as well as their policy enforcement decisions, take into account the diversity of their users and seek to address their needs appropriately.

Information on Algorithms

YouTube has developed machine learning algorithms that aid the detection of content that may violate their policies. Once potentially problematic content is flagged by YouTube’s automated systems, YouTube’s human content moderators verify whether it indeed violates YouTube’s policies. If it does, the content is removed and is used to train YouTube’s machines for better coverage in the future.

Measures for Equal Treatment of Users

	<p>updates on technical approaches to fairness, data transparency, and more.</p> <p>3. Structures and processes include risk assessment frameworks, ethics reviews, and Executive accountability. This report provides a dive deep into how risk is identified and measured in the AI Principles reviews, as well as a behind the scenes look at how Google approaches assessing new AI applications for surveillance concerns as an example of how AI applications that will not be pursued are defined and assessed.</p> <p>See additional details here.</p>	<p>YouTube works hard to ensure that YouTube’s systems are not designed to be biased against content belonging to individuals or groups based on political viewpoints or other attributes like gender or sexual orientation. Not all content is recommended, and YouTube’s search and recommendation systems do not take into account specific political perspectives in determining content that is recommended. YouTube audits its machine learning systems to help ensure that unintended algorithmic bias such as gender bias is not present. YouTube corrects mistakes when they are found and re-trains the systems to be more accurate moving forward.</p> <p>Google’s AI Principles In January 2023, Google published its 4th annual AI Principles Progress Update — Google’s review of its commitment to responsibly develop emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, see additional details here. YouTube responsibly applies Google AI principles to all its products.</p>
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IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

	C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published its Q1 2023 and Q2 2023 Quarterly Bulletin, which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms. • In February 2023, one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Google TAG, with additional research from Mandiant and Trust & Safety, provided insights into changes in the cyber threat landscape triggered by the war. The report Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape encompasses new findings and retrospective insights, across government-backed attackers, information operations (IO), and cybercriminal ecosystem threat actors. It also includes threat actor deep dives focused on specific campaigns from 2022. 	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 16 for future reports.

Measure 16.1	Google Search	YouTube
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<p>QRE 16.1.1</p>	<p>Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Team work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States.</p> <p>One of TAG’s missions is to understand and disrupt coordinated information operations threat actors. TAG’s work enables Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by rigorous analysis. TAG’s investigations do not focus on making judgements about the content on Google platforms, but rather examining technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural patterns to make an assessment that activity is coordinated inauthentic behaviour.</p> <p>TAG regularly publishes its TAG Bulletin [Q1 2023, Q2 2023], which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms, as well as additional periodic blog posts. TAG also engages with other platform Signatories to receive and, when strictly necessary for security purposes, share information related to threat actor activity – in compliance with applicable laws.</p> <p>In February 2023, one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Google TAG, with additional research from Mandiant and Google Trust & Safety, provided insights into changes in the cyber threat landscape triggered by the war. The report Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape encompasses new findings and retrospective insights, across government-backed attackers, information operations (IO), and cybercriminal ecosystem threat actors. It also includes threat actor deep dives focused on specific campaigns from 2022. The report found that: (1) Russian government-backed attackers have engaged in an aggressive, multi-pronged effort to gain a decisive wartime advantage in cyberspace, often with mixed results; (2) Moscow has leveraged the full spectrum of IO – from overt state-backed media to covert platforms and accounts – to shape public perception of the war; and (3) the invasion has triggered a notable shift in the Eastern European cybercriminal ecosystem that will likely have long term implications for both coordination between criminal groups and the scale of cybercrime worldwide. More information about the report is available here.</p>
<p>SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing</p>	<p>Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) posts a quarterly Bulletin, which includes disclosure of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s products and services, as well as additional periodic blog posts. In the Bulletin, TAG often notes when findings are similar to or supported by those reported by other platforms. The publicly available H1 2023 TAG Bulletins (Jan - Jun 2023) show 35,826 YouTube channels across 44 separate actions were involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. Industry partners supported five of those separate actions by providing leads. The TAG Bulletin and periodic</p>

	<p>blog posts are Google, including YouTube's, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues.</p> <p>As reported in the Bulletin, some channels YouTube took action on were parts of campaigns that uploaded content in some EEA languages, specifically: Spanish (472 channels), Lithuanian (13 channels), French (3 channels), and German (4 channels). Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Campaigns that uploaded content in EEA languages accounted for less than 4% of YouTube channels involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns as reported in the Bulletin. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in the language of one EEA Member State does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State. For more information, please see the TAG Bulletin.</p> <p>YouTube and Search will explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 16.1.1 for future reports.</p>	
Data		
Measure 16.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube
QRE 16.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<p>Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States.</p> <p>The most recent examples of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims can be found in Google's TAG Blog. An example, which is further detailed in the TAG Blog, is presented below.</p> <p>Moscow leveraging the full spectrum of information operations (IO)</p>

Moscow has leveraged the full spectrum of IO – from overt state-backed media to covert platforms and accounts – to shape public perception of the war. These operations have three goals:

- Undermine the Ukrainian government;
- Fracture international support for Ukraine;
- Maintain domestic support in Russia for the war.

Google’s TAG team has seen spikes of activity associated with key events in the conflict such as the buildup, invasion, and troop mobilisation in Russia. Google has worked aggressively across products, teams, and regions to counter these activities where they violate its policies and disrupt overt and covert IO campaigns.

Google disrupted 1,950 instances of Russian IO activity on its platforms in 2022. The covert Russian IO disrupted on Google product surfaces primarily focused on maintaining Russian domestic support for the war in Ukraine, with over 90% of the instances in the Russian language.

V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Q1 2023, Google Search expanded the availability of content advisories to searches where its systems do not have high confidence in the overall quality of the results available for the search in French and German. This does not mean that no helpful information is available, or that a particular result is low-quality. These notices provide context about the whole set of results on the page, and you can always see the results for your query, even when the advisory is present. Respective metrics were added under SLI 17.1.1. 	<p>For example:</p> <p>In November 2022, YouTube launched its 'Hit Pause' media literacy campaign, and as of June 2023, the campaign is live in all EEA Member States.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Google Search added two sections to its 'About This Result' features in the EU, namely the 'Your Search and this result' section and the 'Personalization' section. This report includes new metrics on the number of times each section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed. ● Since the launch of the Super Searchers Programme in Brussels, Google worked with Public Libraries 2030 to implement respective trainings in Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In February 2023, Jigsaw published its findings of the largest prebunking experiment on social media to date. The experiment was launched in September 2022 and ran until January 2023, ultimately reaching almost a third of the Polish, Czech, and Slovak populations, garnering over 38 million views. These videos help individuals better identify two rhetorical strategies commonly used to spread false claims online and thus defend themselves against manipulation. More information about the experiment's findings are available here. 	
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● See Google Search's response to Commitment 15 for more information on Google's commitment to leveraging IPTC Photo Metadata Standard to add metadata tags to 	<p>YouTube has plans to launch another media literacy campaign in H2 2023 (Jul. - Dec. 2023), and will continue to explore opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 17 for future reports.</p>

	images that are generated by Google AI, and respective markups by creators and publishers.	
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Measure 17.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search aims to connect users with high quality information, and help users understand and evaluate that information. Google Search has deeply invested in both information quality and information literacy. Some ways in which Google Search does this include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘About This Result’: Next to most results on Google Search, there is a menu icon that users can tap to learn more about the result or feature and where the information is coming from. With this additional context, users can make a more informed decision about the sites they want to visit and what results will be most useful for them. When available, users will see a description of the website from Wikipedia, which provides free, reliable information about tens of millions of sites on the web. If a website does not have a Wikipedia description, Google Search will show additional context that may be available, such as when Google Search first indexed the site. Users will also be 	<p>YouTube takes its responsibility efforts seriously, outlining clear policies used to moderate content on the platform and providing tools that users can leverage to improve their media literacy education and better evaluate what content and sources to trust.</p> <p>In addition to making authoritative sources readily available on the YouTube homepage and in search results, information panels may also appear alongside search results and videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. For example, developing news in search results may link to articles from authoritative sources on ongoing breaking stories. During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users, e.g. in 2022 during the French presidential election, YouTube surfaced information panels linking to authoritative sources.</p> <p>Further EEA Member State coverage can be found in SLI 17.1.1.</p>

able to quickly see if their connection to the site is secure based on its use of the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts all data between the website and the browser they are using, to help them stay safe as they browse the web. More information on the 'About This Result' feature can be found [here](#), and [here](#).

The 'More About This Page' link within the 'About This Result' feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:

- **See more information about the source:** Users will be able to read what a site says about itself in its own words, when that information is available.
- **Find what others on the web have said about a site:** Reading what others on the web have written about a site can help users better evaluate sources.
- **Learn more about the topic:** In the 'About the topic' section, users can find information about the same topic from other sources.

Additional information can be found in the Google Search blog post [here](#).

- **Content Advisory Notices:** Helpful notices for users that highlight when information is scarce or when interest is travelling faster than facts. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or

	<p>nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic. More information is available in the blog posts 'A new notice in Search for rapidly evolving results', 'New ways we're helping you find high-quality information' and 'Helping Europeans find facts in moments that matter'.</p>	
<p>SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above</p>	<p>(1) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State;</p> <p>(2) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State;</p> <p>(3) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for potentially unreliable sets of results in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State;</p> <p>Note metrics 1-3 are estimated proportions; metric 1 represents the number of content advisories for low relevance results out of all queries over the reporting period; metric 2 and 3 follow the same logic but are for content advisories for rapidly changing results and content advisories for potentially unreliable sets of results, respectively.</p> <p>(4) Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State;</p>	<p>Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panel, health information panels) in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State.</p>

	(5) Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State;							
	(6) Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State;							
	(7) Number of times the 'Personalization' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State.							
	Search only						YouTube only	
	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for potentially unreliable set of results	Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed	Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Personalization' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Impressions of information panels
Level	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions
Member States								
Austria	0.105%	0.00100%	0.0001050%	627,740	7,761,324	6,492,172	3,387,552	20,247,284
Belgium	0.107%	0.00073%	0.0000475%	1,125,374	9,664,156	8,174,370	4,293,944	100,974,654
Bulgaria	0.142%	0.00059%	0.0000285%	276,192	2,627,608	2,279,628	1,905,872	19,319,781
Croatia	0.125%	0.00088%	0.0000192%	66,158	2,222,578	1,969,846	1,715,138	38,136,263

Cyprus	0.169%	0.00079%	0.0000934%	67,234	718,672	615,818	421,530	1,242,349
Czech Republic	0.112%	0.00033%	0.0000058%	72,028	4,000,940	3,423,262	3,122,816	62,727,930
Denmark	0.107%	0.00084%	0.0000152%	68,852	2,866,258	2,325,168	2,051,192	4,564,299
Estonia	0.193%	0.00110%	0.0000395%	49,046	872,860	733,922	578,916	12,976,919
Finland	0.116%	0.00123%	0.0000184%	77,466	3,294,360	2,823,276	2,545,610	4,679,470
France	0.075%	0.00042%	0.0000812%	6,798,828	65,663,952	56,107,876	29,348,786	716,555,464
Germany	0.093%	0.00103%	0.0000889%	5,558,068	72,891,892	60,677,516	31,726,354	1,513,401,484
Greece	0.128%	0.00062%	0.0000163%	166,446	5,206,194	4,595,204	4,029,026	12,079,641
Hungary	0.116%	0.00065%	0.0000109%	59,708	3,823,538	3,335,378	3,041,818	48,257,787
Ireland	0.123%	0.00089%	0.0001156%	836,388	6,160,342	5,075,816	2,648,350	42,894,776
Italy	0.132%	0.00069%	0.0000130%	5,188,864	66,527,774	58,329,654	30,330,376	457,695,279
Latvia	0.198%	0.00054%	0.0000174%	44,384	830,442	713,732	591,286	36,584,534
Lithuania	0.180%	0.00057%	0.0000190%	121,156	1,401,238	1,191,676	975,574	37,359,304
Luxembourg	0.164%	0.00082%	0.0000359%	67,600	411,600	339,800	188,300	1,015,524
Malta	0.198%	0.00083%	0.0001513%	46,400	421,500	364,800	216,300	1,020,762
Netherlands	0.104%	0.00091%	0.0000186%	1,510,996	18,163,800	15,084,624	8,128,298	244,690,832
Poland	0.080%	0.00054%	0.0000035%	202,532	20,932,162	18,384,254	17,500,028	150,405,170
Portugal	0.056%	0.00042%	0.0000141%	911,850	8,562,484	7,521,508	3,926,660	8,716,631
Romania	0.111%	0.00061%	0.0000217%	213,490	5,905,846	5,164,352	4,423,948	73,492,851
Slovakia	0.145%	0.00048%	0.0000051%	32,340	1,946,934	1,690,870	1,557,532	18,061,861
Slovenia	0.165%	0.00040%	0.0000212%	83,912	1,127,722	963,198	811,668	11,801,990
Spain	0.067%	0.00055%	0.0000338%	4,394,058	45,495,160	40,356,746	21,370,078	317,436,505

Sweden	0.110%	0.00172%	0.0000167%	153,382	6,002,578	4,973,444	4,419,482	61,749,357
Iceland	0.183%	0.00123%	0.0001219%	12,800	236,900	187,600	119,500	878,332
Liechtenstein	0.170%	0.00081%	0.0%	900	24,900	20,600	10,500	75,647
Norway	0.132%	0.00078%	0.0000234%	78,452	2,651,306	2,173,726	1,899,960	4,216,279
Total EU	0.099%	0.00072%	0.0000441%	28,820,492	365,503,914	313,707,910	185,256,434	4,018,088,701
Total EEA	0.099%	0.00072%	0.0000439%	28,912,644	368,417,020	316,089,836	187,286,394	4,023,258,959

Measure 17.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.2.1	<p>In February 2023, Jigsaw published its findings of the largest prebunking experiment on social media to date. The experiment was launched in September 2022 and ran until January 2023, ultimately reaching almost a third of the Polish, Czech, and Slovak populations, garnering over 38 million views. These videos help individuals better identify two rhetorical strategies commonly used to spread false claims online and thus defend themselves against manipulation. More information about the experiment’s findings are available here. The initiative proved so effective that Google expanded it to Germany, in partnership with Moonshot and six local NGOs. More information about the German campaign aimed at helping people build resilience to manipulation tactics online is available here and here.</p> <p>Google also funded the project 'BuloBús: Route against misinformation' by Maldita.es where a minibus travelled to 20 towns across Spain between April and May 2023 to improve media literacy. The 'BuloBús' had the support of the Google News Initiative and aimed to help citizens detect hoaxes and scams that circulate on the Internet, and provide them with tools to fight misinformation.</p> <p>In 2023, Google, including YouTube, allocated grants to Facts Matter to conduct a study on the publication and operationalisation of a 'harms-framework' around misinformation.</p> <p>Search</p> <p>To raise awareness of its features and build literacy across society, Google Search is working with information literacy experts to help design tools in a way that allows users to feel confident and in control of the information they consume and the choices they make. Please see as well the partnerships listed in response to QRE 28.3.1, notably funding for the European Media & Information Fund.</p> <p>In addition, Google Search is continuing to build capacity for librarians to empower their patrons and the general public with</p>	

	<p>information literacy. At the end of September 2022, in cooperation with Google Search’s partner, ‘Public Libraries 2030’, Google Search launched a Training of Trainers program called ‘Super Searchers’ for librarians and library staff that seeks to achieve the following objectives: (a) provide librarians and library staff with the skills to build the information literacy capacity of the general public; (b) increase the information literacy capacity of library patrons and the general public. Since the launch, Google and ‘Public Libraries 2030’ have provided Super Searchers training in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK.</p> <p>YouTube</p> <p>In the face of near limitless access to information, YouTube remains committed to supporting efforts that deepen users’ collective understanding of misinformation. To empower users to think critically and use YouTube’s products safely and responsibly, YouTube invests in media literacy campaigns to improve users’ experiences on YouTube. The most recent global media literacy campaign, which will target over 70 countries around the globe, launched in 2022. As of June 2023, the campaign is live in all EEA Member States.</p> <p>Branded 'Hit Pause', the program seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs) via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated YouTube channel. The YouTube channel hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content, as well as additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation – from using emotional language to cherry picking information.</p> <p>YouTube has further plans for a media literacy campaign to be rolled out across EEA Member States.</p>	
SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<p>Since the launch of the Super Searchers Program, there has been one training in Portugal (12 library staff trained), one training in Italy (30 library staff trained), and three training sessions in Ireland (150 library staff trained in total).</p>	<p>Media Literacy campaign impressions in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State.</p>
Level		Number of impressions from YouTube's European media literacy campaign, 'Hit Pause'
Member States		Impressions

Austria		7,642,990
Belgium		10,417,060
Bulgaria		4,617,059
Croatia		3,458,565
Cyprus		476,270
Czech Republic		11,327,132
Denmark		1,772,084
Estonia		353,200
Finland		2,401,573
France		68,293,437
Germany		65,245,470
Greece		4,922,903
Hungary		5,211,575
Ireland		4,511,218
Italy		61,915,414
Latvia		509,871
Lithuania		3,573,558
Luxembourg		532,624
Malta		361,286
Netherlands		20,197,399
Poland		42,318,049
Portugal		5,147,362

Romania		18,688,336
Slovakia		2,478,246
Slovenia		1,403,331
Spain		49,049,657
Sweden		11,584,032
Iceland		216,265
Liechtenstein		39,005
Norway		2,815,878
Total EU		404,875,148
Total EEA		407,946,296

Measure 17.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.3.1	See response to QRE 17.2.1.	<p>YouTube partners with media literacy experts to identify unique and engaging ways to build up the YouTube Community’s media literacy. For example, to inform the ‘Hit Pause’ global campaign, YouTube partnered with the National Association for Media Literacy Education (NAMLE), a U.S.-based organisation, to identify which competency areas the campaign should focus on. As of June 2023, the ‘Hit Pause’ campaign is live in all EEA Member States.</p> <p>As YouTube continues to evolve the media literacy program and add even more markets, YouTube will continue to explore opportunities to work with regional expert organisations.</p> <p>For additional information, please refer to QRE 17.2.1.</p>

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	See row below for Google Search's new implementation measures.	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As of June 2023, YouTube updated its approach to past US election misinformation. This specific aspect of YouTube's elections misinformation policy represents just one piece of a broad, holistic approach towards supporting elections on YouTube. As of June 2023, YouTube updated its Impersonation Policy around fan channels, requiring creators to explicitly state this in the channel name or handle.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In February 2023, Jigsaw published its findings of the largest prebunking experiment on social media to date. The experiment was launched in September 2022 and ran until January 2023, ultimately reaching almost a third of the Polish, Czech, and Slovak populations, garnering over 38 million views. These videos help individuals better identify two rhetorical strategies commonly used to spread false claims online 	

	<p>and thus defend themselves against manipulation. More information about the experiment's findings are available here.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initiative proved so effective that Google expanded it to Germany, in partnership with Moonshot and six local NGOs. More information about the German campaign is available here and here. 	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 18 for future reports.

Measure 18.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube
QRE 18.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<p>YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies as quickly as possible, surfacing high quality information in ranking and recommendations, and rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists.</p> <p>YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU.</p> <p>A focus on responsible recommendations</p> <p>Recommendations play an important role in how YouTube maintains a responsible platform. Recommendations connect viewers to high-quality information and minimise the chances of seeing problematic content. Not all content is recommended.</p>

		<p>Recommendations also complement the work done by the robust Community Guidelines that define what is and is not allowed on YouTube.</p> <p>For example, YouTube uses classifiers to identify whether a video is 'authoritative'. These classifications rely on human evaluators who assess the quality of information in each channel or video. These evaluators hail from around the world and are trained through a set of detailed, publicly available rating guidelines. YouTube also relies on certified experts, such as medical doctors, to assist with evaluating content involving health information.</p> <p>To determine authoritativeness, evaluators answer a few key questions. What kind of expertise is needed to achieve the video goal? What is the reputation of the speaker in the video and the channel it is on? What is the main topic of the video (eg. News, Sports, History, Science, etc)? Is the content primarily meant to be satire? These answers and more determine how authoritative a video is. The higher the score, the more the video is promoted when it comes to news and information content.</p> <p>These human evaluations are used to train YouTube's system to model their decisions, and YouTube now scales their assessments to all videos across the platform.</p> <p>Among these tools, YouTube's Recommendation System is the most relevant to Measure 18.1 and, accordingly, will be the focus of QREs 18.1.2 and 18.1.3.</p>
QRE 18.1.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube's Recommendation Systems

Overview

On YouTube, recommendations help users discover more of the videos they love, whether it is a great new recipe to try or finding their next favourite song. Recommendations help connect users to high-quality information, and at the same time complement the work done by YouTube [Community Guidelines](#), which define what is not allowed on YouTube.

The success of YouTube's recommendations depends on accurately predicting the videos users want to watch. When YouTube's recommendations are at their best, they connect billions of people around the world to content that uniquely inspires, informs, and entertains. A deeper look into how YouTube's recommendation system works can be found in [this article](#).

Signals used to recommend content

YouTube's recommendation system is constantly evolving, learning every day from information that YouTube calls signals, including but not limited to: watch history, search history, channel subscriptions, likes, dislikes, and satisfaction surveys. More information about signals that YouTube uses to recommend content can be viewed [here](#).

Managing recommendations and search results

YouTube's system sorts through billions of videos to recommend content tailored to a user's specific interests.

YouTube has also built controls that help users decide how much data they want to provide. Users can pause, edit, or delete their YouTube watch and search history whenever they want. And, if users do not want to see recommendations at all, they can turn off and clear their YouTube watch history. For users with YouTube watch history off and

		<p>no significant prior watch history, the homepage will show the search bar and the left-hand Guide menu, with no feed of recommended videos.</p> <p>Users can also tell YouTube when it is recommending something a user is not interested in. For example, buttons on the homepage and in the 'Up next' section allow users to filter and choose recommendations by specific topics. Users can also click on 'not interested' to tell YouTube that a video or channel is not what a user wanted to see at that time, and YouTube will consider that when generating recommendations for that viewer in the future.</p> <p>Additional information about how a user can manage their recommendation settings are outlined here in YouTube's Help Centre.</p>
QRE 18.1.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<p>Recommendations play an important role in how YouTube maintains a responsible platform.</p> <p>Limiting low quality content</p> <p>With a rise in the spread of misinformation in recent years, YouTube has expanded the ways in which it ensures that its ranking and recommendations systems surface high quality content to curb the spread of harmful misinformation and 'borderline' content — content that comes close to, but does not quite violate YouTube's Community Guidelines. To determine borderline content, evaluators look at whether content is inaccurate, misleading or deceptive; insensitive or intolerant; or harmful or with the potential to cause harm. This input trains YouTube systems to automatically identify this type of content. Consistent with YouTube's efforts to connect users with high quality information, not all content is widely recommended on YouTube, which includes low quality content considered to be borderline.</p>

<p>SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies</p>	<p><i>Not subscribed</i></p>	<p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 18.1.1 for future reports.</p>
<p>Data</p>	<p><i>Not subscribed</i></p>	
<p>Measure 18.2</p>	<p>Google Search</p>	<p>YouTube</p>
<p>QRE 18.2.1</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search has the following policies which complement the Content Policies outlined in QRE 14.1.1:</p> <p>Medical Content Policy: This policy prohibits content that contradicts or runs contrary to scientific or medical consensus and evidence-based best practices.</p> <p>Misleading Content Policy: This policy states that Search features and News prohibits preview content that misleads users to engage with it by promising details which are not reflected in the underlying content.</p> <p>These policies also provide users with information on how to report specific types of content that violate those policies. Google Search removes content for policy violations based on user reports as well as through its internal content moderation</p>	<p>See response to QRE 14.1.1 to see how YouTube’s Community Guidelines map to the TTPs. These policies seek to, among other things, limit the spread of misleading or deceptive content that poses a serious risk of egregious harm.</p> <p>Community Guidelines Enforcement</p> <p>In addition, when content is removed from a creator’s channel for violating YouTube’s Community Guidelines, the creator may be issued a strike. If the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, their channel may be permanently removed from YouTube. In some cases, YouTube may terminate a channel for a single case of severe abuse, as explained in the Help Centre. YouTube may also remove content for reasons other than Community Guidelines violations, such as a first-party privacy complaint or a court order. In these cases, creators will not be issued with a strike.</p> <p>If a creator’s channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, notifications on mobile and desktop, and an alert in their channel settings the next time they sign in to YouTube. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain the action taken on their content and which of YouTube’s policies the content violated. More</p>

	<p>processes. More extensive policies are deployed for Search features, and can be found at the Content Policies Help Centre.</p> <p>In addition, Google Search removes content that has been determined to be unlawful under applicable law, in response to a notification from a third party, such as a user or an authority. Examples include material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid 'right to be forgotten request' or material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid court order. Google Search measures the number of court and government Legal Removal requests biannually (across all products), and publishes this information in transparency reports.</p>		<p>detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes here.</p> <p>YouTube also reserves the right to restrict a creator's ability to create content at its discretion. A channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, users are prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on the YouTube channel. A violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of Service, and may result in termination of all existing YouTube channels of the user, any new channels created or acquired, and channels in which the user is repeatedly or prominently featured.</p>				
SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	<p>See response to SLI 14.2.1.</p>		<p>(1) Number of videos removed for violations of YouTube's misinformation policies in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State;</p> <p>(2) Views threshold on videos removed for violations of YouTube's misinformation policies in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State</p>				
	YouTube only						
	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001-10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views
Level	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos

Member States							
Austria	279	16	116	75	48	19	5
Belgium	256	15	103	72	36	22	8
Bulgaria	143	18	62	31	20	8	4
Croatia	124	2	25	39	34	19	5
Cyprus	57	2	30	11	9	4	1
Czech Republic	207	14	66	52	44	22	9
Denmark	185	18	53	64	39	10	1
Estonia	56	9	19	13	8	5	2
Finland	174	10	58	48	37	17	4
France	1,472	66	597	418	271	82	38
Germany	2,708	200	1,036	692	518	190	72
Greece	378	13	139	92	74	43	17
Hungary	118	3	58	27	13	13	4
Ireland	729	67	353	150	108	40	11
Italy	2,684	197	1,091	614	479	203	100
Latvia	104	5	41	30	21	6	1
Lithuania	89	3	33	20	13	8	12
Luxembourg	11	0	5	4	1	1	0
Malta	42	4	20	8	5	3	2
Netherlands	949	77	408	233	140	67	24
Poland	1,451	128	435	328	291	178	91

Portugal	399	53	144	108	60	31	3
Romania	534	39	221	118	77	59	20
Slovakia	80	5	29	16	18	10	2
Slovenia	69	5	23	20	13	7	1
Spain	2,781	308	1,027	670	478	235	63
Sweden	340	21	118	86	65	33	17
Iceland	13	1	7	2	3	0	0
Liechtenstein	2	0	1	1	0	0	0
Norway	124	9	46	37	22	6	4
Total EU	16,419	1,298	6,310	4,039	2,920	1,335	517
Total EEA	16,558	1,308	6,364	4,079	2,945	1,341	521
Measure 18.3	Google Search			YouTube			
QRE 18.3.1	<p>Google, including YouTube, works with industry leaders across the technology sector, government, and civil society to set good policies, remain abreast of emerging challenges, and establish, share, and learn from industry best practices and research.</p> <p>Described below are recent examples that demonstrate Google’s, including YouTube, commitment to these actions:</p> <p>Jigsaw-led Research</p> <p>Jigsaw, a unit within Google that explores threats to open societies and builds technology that inspires scalable solutions, began conducting research on 'information interventions' more than 10 years ago. Information interventions are tools that provide helpful information to users at a critical moment in their online journey so that they can protect themselves online from a range of online harms such as harmful misinformation.</p> <p>Jigsaw has since contributed research and technology on ways to make people more resilient to disinformation. Their research efforts are based on behavioural science and ethnographic studies that examine when people might be vulnerable to specific messages and how to provide helpful information when people need it most. These interventions provide a methodology for proactively addressing a range of threats to people online, as a complement to approaches that focus on removing or downranking material online.</p>						

Notable research efforts by Jigsaw that they have run on and with YouTube include but are not limited to:

- [Accuracy Prompts \(APs\)](#): APs remind users to think about accuracy. The prompts work by serving users bite-sized digital literacy tips at a moment when it might matter. Lab studies conducted across 16 countries with over 30,000 participants, suggest that APs increase engagement with accurate information and decrease engagement with less accurate information. Small experiments on YouTube suggest users enjoy the experience and report that it makes them feel safer online.
- [Prebunking Messages](#): Preemptive messages using inoculation theory, or ‘prebunking’, can help individuals identify manipulative narratives and strategies. In partnership with several universities, including the University of Cambridge and the University of Bristol, Jigsaw developed prebunking videos to test the efficacy of prebunking messages concerning manipulation techniques commonly encountered online. These videos were then tested with over 1M YouTube users in the US and demonstrated that prebunking can be scaled effectively using ads. Jigsaw then partnered with misinformation experts in Central and Eastern Europe to develop videos prebunking anti-migrant narratives, which have helped tens of millions of EU citizens build resilience to targeted misinformation.
- In February 2023, Jigsaw published its findings of the largest prebunking experiment on social media to date which was launched in September 2022 and ran until January 2023, ultimately reaching almost a third of the Polish, Czech and Slovak populations, garnering over 38 million views. These videos help individuals better identify two rhetorical strategies commonly used to spread false claims online and thus defend themselves against manipulation. More information about the experiment’s findings are available [here](#). The initiative proved so effective that Google expanded it to Germany, in partnership with [Moonshot](#) and six local NGOs. More information about the German campaign aimed at helping people build resilience to manipulation tactics online is available [here](#) and [here](#).
- Additional information on these research efforts can be found on the [Info Interventions website](#).

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, Search has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but Search regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to its recommendation system.	No, YouTube has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but YouTube regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to its recommendation system.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 19 for future reports.

Measure 19.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 19.1.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.	See response to QRE 18.1.2.

Google Search's ranking systems sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user's query include:

- **Meaning of your query:** To return relevant results, Google Search first needs to establish the intent behind a user's query. Google Search builds language models to decipher how the words that a user enters into the search box match up to the most useful content available.
- **Relevance of content:** Next, Google Search systems analyse the content to assess whether it contains information that might be relevant to what the user is looking for. The most basic signal that information is relevant is when content contains the same keywords as the user's search query.
- **Quality of content:** Google Search systems prioritise content that seems most helpful by identifying signals that can help determine which content demonstrates expertise, authoritativeness, and trustworthiness. For example, one of several factors that Google Search uses to help determine this is by understanding if other prominent websites link or refer to the content. Aggregated feedback from the Google Search quality evaluation process is used to further refine how Google Search systems discern the quality of information.
- **Usability:** Google Search systems also consider the usability of content. When all things are relatively equal, content that people will find more accessible may perform better.

- **Context and settings:** Information such as user location, past Google Search history, and [Search settings](#) all help Google Search ensure user results are what is most useful and relevant at that moment. Google Search uses the user's country and location to deliver content relevant to their area. For instance, if a user in Chicago searches 'football', Google Search will likely show the user results about American football and the Chicago Bears first. Whereas if the user searches 'football' in London, Google will show results about soccer and the Premier League. Google Search settings are also an important indicator of which results a user is likely to find useful, such as if they set a preferred language or opted in to [SafeSearch](#) (a tool that helps filter out explicit results). Google Search also includes features that personalise results based on the activity in their Google account. The user can control what Google Search activity is used to improve their experience, including adjusting what data is saved to their Google account at [myaccount.google.com](#). To disable Google Search personalisation based on activity in a user's account, the user can turn off [personal results in Search](#). Users can also prevent activity being stored to the user's account or delete particular history items in [Web & App Activity](#). Google Search systems are designed to match a user's interests, but they are not designed to infer sensitive characteristics like race, religion or political party.

The [How Search Works website](#) explains the ins and outs of Google Search. The following links provide additional information

	about helping people and businesses learn how Search works and how results are automatically generated .	
Measure 19.2	Google Search	YouTube
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Number of impressions on the personal results control for logged in users in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State.	YouTube is sharing the percentage of Daily Active Users that are signed in to the platform (those not signed in are signed out). Signed in users are able to amend their settings in their YouTube or Google Accounts. The average percentage of signed in Daily Active Users over H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State.
	Number of impressions on the personal results control for logged in users	Percentage of daily active users that are signed in
Level	Impressions	Signed In Users
Member State		
Austria	39,387	65%
Belgium	43,718	67%
Bulgaria	18,037	68%
Croatia	15,885	71%
Cyprus	3,497	71%
Czech Republic	33,543	68%
Denmark	17,688	59%
Estonia	4,705	68%
Finland	33,632	68%
France	288,295	69%

Germany	411,264	65%
Greece	39,665	68%
Hungary	32,048	67%
Ireland	23,011	65%
Italy	297,649	74%
Latvia	7,315	69%
Lithuania	10,798	70%
Luxembourg	2,051	59%
Malta	1,347	70%
Netherlands	92,881	65%
Poland	174,454	71%
Portugal	29,157	75%
Romania	50,974	72%
Slovakia	15,782	69%
Slovenia	5,504	68%
Spain	249,213	75%
Sweden	41,811	61%
Iceland	704	65%
Liechtenstein	91	48%
Norway	15,367	61%
Total EU	1,983,311	69%
Total EEA	1,999,473	69%

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

	C.20	M 20.1	M 20.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	<i>Not subscribed</i>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Measure 20.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 20.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 20.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 20.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google has issued two grants to continue the work improving Claim Review: (1) Full Fact in the UK to explore a pilot around capturing new types of data in the Claim Review schema, and (2) Facts Matter to explore the publication and operationalisation of a 'harms-framework' around misinformation. • The Google Research team, alongside Google News Lab, invited 17 fact-checking organisations from around the world, five of which were from Europe (Maldita.es, Full Fact, 	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YouTube expanded the availability of information panels on topics prone to misinformation to additional EU markets. • YouTube sponsored the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) 'Global Fact 10' event in Seoul, an international gathering of fact-checkers who convened to discuss trends and technology. • YouTube has invested resources to aid Fact Check organisations to develop their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both

	<p>Correctiv, AFP, DPA), to take part in a user research session on the Fact Check Explorer and to beta test two new features. More information is available here.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google Search is providing an additional metric under SLI 21.1.1, namely the ‘Number of impressions on Fact Check Rich Snippets, by EEA Member State’. • In Q1 2023, Google Search expanded the availability of content advisory for searches where there is a high volume of misinformation on the Search results page for high-stakes, potentially harmful topics in French and German. 	<p>long- and short-form. In June 2023, YouTube hosted an open session at ‘Global Fact 10’ where content strategy and best practices were shared about how to leverage YouTube to create Fact Check videos in the Shorts format.</p>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YouTube will continue to provide training and support to fact-checkers and fact-checking organisations, so they can maximise their reach and presence on YouTube, bringing more native video Fact-Checking content to YouTube’s video-sharing platform. <p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to</p>

		exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 21 for future reports.
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Measure 21.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 21.1.1	<p>Fact-check articles in Google Search results help provide context and information to users. Google Search relies on machine-readable ClaimReview markup on websites to enhance search results for fact-check articles with 'rich snippets', to make it easy for users to understand at a glance what is being fact-checked and what the fact-checker's assessment is (if they meet Google Search's eligibility and technical criteria). Google also provides tools like Fact Check Explorer and the Google FactCheck Claim Search API. The 'Fact Check' label in Google Search applies to published stories with fact-checked content that is indicated by the schema.org ClaimReview markup, like round-up stories that contain multiple fact-check analyses within a single article.</p> <p>(1) schema.org ClaimReview mark up</p> <p>Google Search enables any fact-checker to signal their fact-checks for the purpose of being indexed free by implementing the schema.org ClaimReview markup on their content. Google provides training to fact-checking organisations on how to use the ClaimReview markup, as its success relies on publishers using the ClaimReview markup, reflected by the metrics outlined in SLI 21.1.1.</p> <p>The use of ClaimReview markup is not restricted to any set of organisations that partner with Google Search. As such, the</p>	<p>As a video-sharing platform, fact-checkers are able to post and share both short- and long-form video content on YouTube. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms.</p> <p>Users can subscribe to fact-checking channels to get notifications when new content has been uploaded, helping to build and engage audiences for fact-checking organisations. The content is also searchable on YouTube—e.g., users search for specific channels or content related to topics that fact-checkers may cover. As fact-checkers create and share more content on YouTube, users will have access and exposure to more fact-check content integrated into the YouTube corpus of content.</p> <p>YouTube Studio provides tools and information through which YouTube creators, including fact-checkers, can manage their presence, grow their channels, interact with their audiences, and make money—all in one place. Fact-checking organisations with YouTube channels can view data about their video performance through the Channel Analytics Dashboard in YouTube Studio. Available data includes views, watch time, traffic sources, and search queries that led viewers to their video content.</p>

remainder of QRE 21.1.1 (naming specific fact-checking organisations worked with) does not apply to Google Search.

(2) Fact Check Explorer

The Google Research team, alongside Google News Lab, invited 17 fact-checking organisations from around the world, five of which were from Europe (Maldita.es, Full Fact, Correctiv, AFP, DPA), to take part in a user research session on the Fact Check Explorer and to beta test two new features.

The findings revealed that image verification, and images taken out of context were a particular concern. The new features allow a user (i) to search by image to see if a fact-check has been written on it already and (ii) to see a timeline of the context around an image; this will help aid expert users to better understand the lifecycle of an image to aid fact-checking efforts.

The beta launch was announced at '[Global Fact 10](#)' on 28 June 2023 and is currently being tested by fact-checkers around the world. More information is available [here](#).

Creators who participate in the YouTube Partner Program have access to YouTube's Creator Support teams, who can provide guidance on how channels use YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.

YouTube has also established regular meetings with several major EU-based fact-checking organisations to better support their needs on YouTube's platform.

Additionally, YouTube provides details on how text-based fact-checks on YouTube work and how to become an eligible fact-checker on YouTube through the [YouTube Help Centre](#), YouTube's fact-check information panels provide additional context by highlighting relevant, third-party fact-checked articles above search results for relevant queries.

There are many factors that determine whether a fact-check information panel will appear for any given search:

- If the search terms are clearly seeking information about the accuracy of a claim;
- The relevance and recency of the fact-check in relation to the search terms;
- If a relevant fact-check article is available from an eligible publisher.

YouTube's fact-check information panels rely on an open network of third-party publishers and leverage the [ClaimReview](#) tagging system. All publishers are welcome to participate provided they follow the publicly available ClaimReview [structured data](#)

		<p>guidelines, and are either part of the International Fact-Checking Network or are an authoritative publisher.</p> <p>If a publisher has fact-checked something specific to a user’s search, users may see an information panel marked as an ‘independent fact-check’ with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The name of the publisher doing the fact-check; • A link to the publisher’s article to learn more; • Information about the publication date of the fact-check article. <p>When there are related fact-checks from a few publishers, users may see several fact-check articles.</p> <p>YouTube continues to explore ways to support and integrate fact-checker content.</p>
<p>SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1</p>	<p>(1) Number of articles available with the Fact Check Rich Snippet in Google Search in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), globally;</p> <p>(2) Number of impressions on Fact Check Rich Snippets in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below);</p> <p>(3) Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the beginning and end of H1 2023, globally;</p> <p>(4) Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the beginning and end of H1 2023, broken down by EEA language (see table below).</p>	<p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 21.1.1 for future reports.</p>

	<p>(1) In H1 2023, 183,765 articles were available with the Fact Check Rich Snippet in Google Search, globally;</p> <p>(3) At the beginning of H1 2023, 204,730 articles were available in the Google Search Fact Check Explorer, globally. At the end of H1 2023, 211,154 articles were available, globally.</p>			
	<p>Number of impressions on Fact Check Rich Snippets, by EEA Member State</p>	<p>Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the beginning of H1 2023, broken down by EEA language</p>	<p>Number of articles available in Google Search Fact Check Explorer at the end of H1 2023, broken down by EEA language</p>	
	<p>Level</p> <p>Member State</p>	<p>Impressions</p>	<p>Articles</p>	<p>Articles</p>
Austria	2,141,947			
Belgium	1,920,944			
Bulgaria	700,905			
Croatia	979,725			
Cyprus	287,855			
Czech Republic	894,530			
Denmark	1,341,990			
Estonia	126,094			

Finland	971,316			
France	17,898,747			
Germany	20,255,232			
Greece	2,399,480			
Hungary	628,337			
Ireland	1,955,355			
Italy	7,666,142			
Latvia	164,429			
Lithuania	268,095			
Luxembourg	173,974			
Malta	140,633			
Netherlands	3,368,349			
Poland	11,102,645			
Portugal	9,769,818			
Romania	1,273,445			
Slovakia	437,168			
Slovenia	290,130			
Spain	15,635,176			
Sweden	1,878,083			
Iceland	108,805			
Liechtenstein	8,563			
Norway	1,873,683			

Total EU	104,670,544			
Total EEA	106,661,595			
Bulgarian		230	307	
Croatian		1,203	1,468	
Czech		298	336	
Danish		683	725	
Dutch		428	1,573	
English		73,093	71,891	
Estonian		0	0	
Finnish		146	182	
French		4,361	5,325	
German		3,741	5,708	
Greek		2,018	2,014	
Hungarian		158	201	
Irish		0	0	
Italian		3,901	4,389	
Latvian		0	0	
Lithuanian		0	0	
Maltese		0	0	
Polish		5,326	4,621	
Portuguese		22,166	20,428	
Romanian		232	26	

Slovak		301	0
Slovenian		0	0
Spanish		15,134	17,736
Swedish		0	10
Icelandic		0	0
Norwegian		456	481

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	SLI 21.1.2 does not apply to Google Search. Should Search's product features change, Search will reconsider a response at that time.	SLI 21.1.2 does not apply to YouTube. Should YouTube's product features change, YouTube will reconsider a response at that time.
Member States		

Measure 21.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 21.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<p>There are a variety of ways in which YouTube may undertake research or testing for updates to its policies, features and programs.</p> <p>For example, YouTube has a process for running experiments on new features, collecting feedback, and gradually rolling out the new features. An experiment is a test that YouTube uses to measure how users react to new and improved product features, including labelling.</p> <p>YouTube may consider rolling out features more broadly based on user feedback from experiments. If a user wants to share thoughts on any feature, they can send feedback. All users, including fact-checkers, can also report a video for misinformation or misleading content on YouTube, which helps</p>

		<p>identify narratives or content that may need additional products, such as labelling.</p> <p>In addition to in-product and experiment feedback, YouTube may also conduct user research on products to learn more about user and creator preferences. At times, YouTube may also commission research from third parties to get broader insights into market trends, perceptions, or product opportunities. All of these factors can help inform product development.</p> <p>YouTube also holds regular meetings with EU-based fact-checking organisations to ensure YouTube is working in partnership towards shared goals, and may incorporate findings into YouTube’s product.</p> <p>Once a feature is ready, it is typically deployed through a gradual launch of the new feature. Sometimes, YouTube may initially launch a feature to a small percentage of viewers and/or creators, and increase that percentage over time until the new feature is available to users globally.</p>
Measure 21.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 21.3.1	<p>Google Search’s content advisory notices help alert users to when they have encountered a query and results set that may not yet include high quality information from reliable sources or when the results retrieved are likely to be off-topic and therefore unhelpful. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic.</p>	<p>YouTube works with authoritative information providers around the world — like news organisations, health authorities, and learning institutions — to create information panels that provide additional context about the content they are searching for and watching on the platform. YouTube consulted published literature from third-party experts and conducted user experience research prior to launching its information panels.</p>

	<p>Google Search releases these content advisories, following both user research and multiple rounds of consultations with academic experts in mis- and disinformation. Content advisories include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (i) those when a topic is rapidly evolving, available to users globally (see more regarding this feature here); and • (ii) where Google Search systems do not have high confidence in the overall quality of search results in English (see blog for details) This content advisory was expanded to French and German during H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023) with expansion to include Italian and Spanish planned over the coming months (see blog for details). <p>Google Search consulted independent experts to consider their feedback on the effectiveness and possible risks of the content advisory feature ahead of its launch. Google generally conducts research with prospective and current users and where applicable, reviews published literature from third-party experts in developing its products and features.</p>	<p>For example, to identify authoritative health sources that users see across YouTube’s health product features, YouTube uses principles and definitions developed by an expert panel convened by the National Academy of Medicine (NAM) and verified by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for global application.</p> <p>To help identify high-quality, authoritative news sources to raise in YouTube’s news features, YouTube’s systems use various signals that may include channel quality and channel coverage of recent and relevant news events. Channels must also follow Google Search features policies and Google News’ content policies.</p> <p>Further, eligible fact-check publishers must be either a verified signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network’s Code of Principles or an authoritative publisher.</p> <p>In June 2023, YouTube sponsored the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) ‘Global Fact 10’ event in Seoul, an international gathering of fact-checkers who discussed trends and technology. During this conference, Google and YouTube representatives provided additional sessions to listen, learn and discuss emerging trends with fact-checkers. YouTube provided tools and techniques to help fact-checking organisations have a greater presence on YouTube. YouTube also holds regular meetings with EU-based fact-checking organisations to ensure YouTube is working in partnership towards shared goals, and may incorporate findings into YouTube’s product.</p>
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V. Empowering Users

Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

	C.22	M 22.1	M 22.2	M 22.3	M 22.4	M 22.5	M 22.6	M 22.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google Search and YouTube prioritise providing users with tools to help them make informed decisions. Google Search and YouTube look forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Measure 22.7 for future reports.	

Measure 22.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 22.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>

SLI 22.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Member States	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Measure 22.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 22.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 22.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 22.3.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 22.4	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 22.4.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 22.4.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 22.5	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 22.5.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 22.5.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Member States	<i>Not subscribed</i>

SLI 22.5.2 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 22.6	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 22.6.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 22.6.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Measure 22.7	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 22.7.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search deploys the following features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ‘SOS Alerts’: Structured content that appears on a Google Search page, including authoritative help links and local relevant information when a crisis strikes. The alerts aim to make emergency information more accessible during a crisis. Google brings together relevant and authoritative content from the web, media, and Google products, and then highlights that information across Google products such as Google Search and Google Maps. See Help Centre for more information. ● Special features created to provide information about COVID-19: Structured features which provide structured, authoritative information about the COVID-19 pandemic including information on COVID-19 vaccines. The features organise the search result pages to help users easily navigate to trusted COVID resources. 	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>YouTube highlights information from authoritative third-party sources using information panels. As users navigate YouTube, they might see a variety of different information panels, including fact-check panels. These panels provide additional context, with each designed to help users make their own decisions about the content they find.</p> <p>These information panels will show regardless of what opinions or perspectives are expressed in a video. If users want to learn more, most panels also link to the third-party partner’s website.</p> <p>Information panels may not be available in all countries/regions and languages. YouTube is working to bring more information panels to more countries/regions and languages.</p> <p>Information panels on YouTube include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● COVID-19 information panels: In response to COVID-19, YouTube launched information panels with links to learn more about COVID-19 or COVID-19 vaccine information. ● Crisis resource panels: These panels let users connect with live support, 24/7 from recognised service partners. The panels may surface on the Watch page, when a user watches videos on topics related to suicide or self-harm,

		or in search results, when a user searches for topics related to certain health crises or emotional distress.
SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above	<p>Number of views/impressions on the following Google Search features in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), for EEA Member States:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crisis Response (e.g. ‘SOS Alerts’, ‘Public Alerts’); • Structured features for COVID-19. 	<p>Impressions of information panels (excluding fact-check panels, crisis resource panels and non-covid medical panels) in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State.</p> <p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 22.7.1 for future reports.</p>
	<p>In H1 2023, the following number of views/impressions were made on the Google Search features below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 52,420,298 views/impressions on Crisis Response alerts (e.g. ‘SOS Alerts’, ‘Public Alerts’); • 84,210,900 views/impressions on COVID-19 Structured Features. 	
Level		Impressions
Member States		
Austria		20,247,284
Belgium		100,974,654
Bulgaria		19,319,781
Croatia		38,136,263
Cyprus		1,242,349
Czech Republic		62,727,930
Denmark		4,564,299

Estonia		12,976,919
Finland		4,679,470
France		716,555,464
Germany		1,513,401,484
Greece		12,079,641
Hungary		48,257,787
Ireland		42,894,776
Italy		457,695,279
Latvia		36,584,534
Lithuania		37,359,304
Luxembourg		1,015,524
Malta		1,020,762
Netherlands		244,690,832
Poland		150,405,170
Portugal		8,716,631
Romania		73,492,851
Slovakia		18,061,861
Slovenia		11,801,990
Spain		317,436,505
Sweden		61,749,357
Iceland		878,332
Liechtenstein		75,647
Norway		4,216,279
Total EU		4,018,088,701
Total EEA		4,023,258,959

V. Empowering users

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YouTube has long made a flagging feature available to users across all EU Member States. • In 2023, YouTube made it easier for creators to understand Community Guidelines issues by introducing a new guided policy experience. Specifically, creators can now see where the Community Guidelines violation occurs, including the specific policy that was violated, alongside helpful educational resources about YouTube’s Community Guidelines. More information can be found here.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	No	No

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 23 for future reports.

Measure 23.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 23.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search aims to make the process of submitting removal requests as easy as possible, and has built reporting tools, which allow users in all EU Member States to report potentially violative content for review under Search Content Policies. The Report Content On Google tool, for example, guides users to the right reporting form to provide the necessary information for the legal or policy issue they seek to flag.</p> <p>Google Search has reporting tools for Search features, such as knowledge panels and featured snippets. For overall Search Results, users can flag content via the three dots in Search features and 10 blue links. Using the Send Feedback option in 'About this Result', users can then send feedback about the result, describing the issue and attaching a screenshot.</p>	<p>Flagging inappropriate or harmful content on YouTube</p> <p>YouTube offers YouTube community members an opportunity to report or flag content that they believe violates YouTube's Community Guidelines or other policies. Users can report content using YouTube's flagging feature, which is available to users in all EU Member States via computer (desktop or laptop), mobile devices, and other surfaces. Details on how to report different types of content using YouTube's flagging feature is outlined in YouTube's Help Centre.</p> <p>YouTube also has a Priority Flagger program through which NGOs and government agencies who are particularly effective at identifying certain types of harmful content have access to more sophisticated reporting processes and prioritised review of flags.</p> <p>In addition to user flagging, YouTube uses smart detection technology to flag videos for review. YouTube developed powerful machine learning that detects content that may violate YouTube's</p>

policies and sends it for human review. In some cases, that same machine learning automatically takes an action.

Once models are trained to identify potentially violative content, the role of content moderators remains essential throughout the enforcement process. Machine learning identifies potentially violative content at scale and nominates for review content that may be against YouTube Community Guidelines. Content moderators then help confirm or deny whether the content should be removed. This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of these models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. It also means that the enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube (over 500 hours of content every minute), while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

YouTube's content moderators support 22 of the 24 EU Official Languages including: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonia, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swedish. While Irish and Maltese are not covered, English provides substantive coverage as one of the official languages in both Ireland and Malta.

Reporting illegal content

While YouTube's Community Guidelines are policies that apply globally, YouTube is available in more than 100 different countries; therefore, processes are in place to review and appropriately act on requests from users, courts, and governments about content that violates local laws. Users can report illegal content using

		<p>webforms dedicated to specific legal issues such as trademark, copyright, counterfeit and defamation. Webforms may also be accessed via the flagging feature after selecting Infringes my Rights as the report reason. To expedite the review, users should report content that violates the legal policies outlined here in YouTube’s Help Centre.</p>
Measure 23.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 23.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search carefully scrutinises most removal complaints that arrive in Google Search systems. Removal requests are handled according to the product area, issue type, and region, by a global team of front-line reviewers and Policy Leads who have expertise in a range of product areas, issue types (such as defamation or copyright infringement), local laws, and languages. Removal requests are processed in accordance with the mission of complying with the law and Google’s policies while maximising access to information and preserving user expression.</p> <p>For most classes of requests, trained reviewers manually assess the removals. In some cases, such as copyright takedowns, Google Search deploys automation to speed the processing of high-volume complaints. To avoid abuse in this process, Google Search relies upon:</p> <p>1) Limitations on who may submit high volumes of requests through flows like the Trusted Copyright Removals Program,</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Ensuring integrity of reporting policy violative content and appeals</p> <p>Reporting content is anonymous, so other creators cannot tell who made the report. YouTube offers creators the opportunity to appeal certain content removals, channel terminations, and age-restrictions. Once an appeal decision has been made, creators receive a response that informs them whether the decision was reversed or the original decision was upheld.</p> <p>YouTube also introduced a new guided policy experience to help support creators when working through a Community Guidelines issue. Specifically, creators can now see where the Community Guidelines violation occurs, including the specific policy that was violated, alongside helpful educational resources about YouTube’s Community Guidelines. More information can be found here.</p> <p>Ensuring integrity of reporting and evaluating illegal content</p>

	<p>ensuring that participants in this program are organisations with bona fide copyright interests unlikely to abuse their rights to suppress unrelated content;</p> <p>2) Legal protections, such as those found in the E-Commerce Directive. Google or webmasters can file suit against submitters of bad-faith copyright complaints;</p> <p>3) Handling counter-notifications from affected webmasters;</p> <p>4) Tracking patterns of abusive behaviour and adjusting Google Search automation to avoid automatically honouring abusive takedowns of a kind Google Search has become aware of.</p>	<p>YouTube only considers legal complaints when the party in question or their authorised legal representative contacts YouTube.</p> <p>Once a legal complaint from an authorised legal representative is received, the YouTube Legal Support Team will review the request and take appropriate action.</p> <p>When YouTube receives a request to remove content, whether through formal webforms or informally through other channels (e.g. public policy team), the person reporting generally specifies a reason for their complaint. When YouTube receives complaints regarding content on YouTube's platforms, YouTube carefully evaluates them to ensure they are categorised correctly.</p>
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V. Empowering users

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube

	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	<i>Not subscribed</i>	No

of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<i>Not subscribed</i>	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 24 for future reports.

Measure 24.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube
QRE 24.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<p>When content is removed from a creator’s channel for violating YouTube’s Community Guidelines, the creator may be issued a strike. YouTube may also remove content for reasons other than Community Guidelines violations, such as a first-party privacy complaint or a court order. In these cases, creators will not be issued with a strike.</p> <p>If a creator’s channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, notifications on mobile and desktop, and an alert in their channel settings the next time they sign in to YouTube. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain the action taken on their content and which of YouTube’s policies the content violated.</p>

The below appeals processes are available in all Member States:

Appeal a Community Guidelines strike

Users can appeal a Community Guidelines Strike by signing into their Dashboard in YouTube Studio, selecting the Channel Violations card, and selecting Appeal to initiate the appeals process. Users may appeal each strike received only once.

Appeal a Community Guidelines video removal

Users can appeal a Community Guidelines video removal by signing into YouTube Studio. Once signed in, users must select Content from the left menu and select the video removal they would like to appeal. After selecting which video removal to appeal, under the Restrictions column, users can hover their cursor over the restriction type and click Appeal. After entering the reason for their appeal in the space provided, the user has to click Submit to initiate the appeals process.

Appeal the age restriction of a video

Users can appeal an age restriction on their [Videos page](#) by clicking Appeals Link next to their age-restricted video. The YouTube team will review their request and take further action if appropriate. Note that users may only appeal the age restriction on their video once.

Appeal playlist or thumbnail removals

Users receive an email if their playlist or thumbnail was removed for violating YouTube's Community Guidelines. If a user thinks that their content does not violate the Community Guidelines and was removed in error, they can use the form provided in the email to appeal.

Appeal a channel termination

When a channel is terminated, the channel owner gets an email explaining the reason for the termination. If a user believes that channel/account was terminated by mistake, they can appeal using a [web form](#), which is accessible via YouTube's [Help Centre](#).

After a creator submits an appeal

After a creator submits an appeal, they will get an email from YouTube letting them know the appeal outcome. One of the following will happen:

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, YouTube will reinstate it and remove the strike from their channel. If a user appeals a warning and the appeal is granted, the next offence will be a warning.
- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, but is not appropriate for all audiences, YouTube will apply an age-restriction. If it is a video, it will not be visible to users who are signed out, are under 18 years of age, or have [Restricted Mode](#) turned on. If it is a custom thumbnail, it will be removed.
- If YouTube finds that a user's content was in violation of YouTube's Community Guidelines, the strike will stay and the video will remain down from the site. There is no additional penalty for appeals that are rejected.

For a more granular Member State level breakdown, refer to SLI 24.1.1.

SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<p>Correction as of 26 March 2024: the values for videos removed that were then reinstated following a creator’s appeal were updated to account for a technical issue affecting data on reinstatement.</p> <p>(1) Appeals following video removal for violations of YouTube’s misinformation policies in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State;</p> <p>(2) Video reinstatements following a successful appeal against content removals for violations of YouTube’s misinformation policies in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State.</p>	
	<i>Not subscribed</i>	Number of videos removed that were subsequently appealed	Number of videos removed that were then reinstated following a creator’s appeal
Member States	<i>Not subscribed</i>		
Austria		66	6
Belgium		40	8
Bulgaria		22	3
Croatia		28	4
Cyprus		3	1
Czech Republic		32	5
Denmark		27	1
Estonia		12	0
Finland		38	2

France		237	31
Germany		663	111
Greece		83	5
Hungary		26	3
Ireland		134	11
Italy		418	31
Latvia		16	1
Lithuania		22	6
Luxembourg		1	0
Malta		6	0
Netherlands		189	12
Poland		316	15
Portugal		58	4
Romania		101	9
Slovakia		16	4
Slovenia		23	2
Spain		422	32
Sweden		60	5
Iceland		2	1
Liechtenstein		1	0
Norway		15	0
Total EU		3,059	312

Total EEA		3,077	313
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V. Empowering users

Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	<i>Not subscribed</i>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<i>Not subscribed</i>
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Measure 25.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 25.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 25.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 25.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 25.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools	<i>Not subscribed</i>
	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	YouTube is exploring ways that it can continue to expand the YouTube Researcher Program, based in part on feedback from researchers.

Measure 26.1	Google Search	YouTube
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<p>QRE 26.1.1</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Trends</p> <p>Google Search and YouTube provide publicly available data via Google Trends, which provides access to a largely unfiltered sample of actual search requests made to Google Search and YouTube’s search function. It is anonymised (no one is personally identified), categorised (determined by the topic for a search query) and aggregated (grouped together). This allows Google Trends to display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography. See Trends Help Centre for details.</p> <p>Google Fact Check Explorer</p> <p>Google Search also provides tools like Fact Check Explorer and the Google FactCheck Claim Search API. Google Search Fact Check Explorer allows anyone to explore the Fact Check articles that are using the ClaimReview markup. See QRE 31.4.1 for more details on ClaimReview markup; additional information about the Fact Check Markup Tool can be found here, and in Search’s response to QRE 21.1.1.</p> <p>Using the Google FactCheck Claim Search API, users can query the same set of Fact Check results available via the Fact Check Explorer or a developer could continuously get the latest updates on a particular query. Use of the FactCheck Claim Search API is subject to Google’s API Terms of Service. To learn more, check the detailed API documentation.</p>
<p>QRE 26.1.2</p>	<p>Google Trends</p> <p>The information provided via Google Trends is a sample of all of Google Search and YouTube’s search activity. The 2 different samples of Google Trends data that can be accessed are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Real-time data - a sample covering the last seven days; ● Non-realtime data - a separate sample from real-time data that goes as far back as 2004 and up to 72 hours before one’s search. <p>Only a sample of Google Search and YouTube searches are used in Google Trends (a publicly available research tool), because Google, including YouTube, handles billions of searches per day. Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, Google can look at a dataset representative of all searches on Google, which includes YouTube, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world. See Trends Help Centre for details.</p>

	<p>Google Fact Check Explorer</p> <p>The Fact Check Explorer includes the following information, from fact-check articles using the ClaimReview markup:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Claim made by: Name of the publisher making the claim; ● Rating text: True or False; ● Fact Check article: The fact-checking article on the publisher's site; ● Claim reviewed: A short summary of the claim being evaluated; ● Tags: The tags that show up next to the claim. <p>For additional details on fields included on Google Fact Check API, see API documentation.</p>		
<p>SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1</p>	<p>(1) Number of Fact Check API tool requests from users in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), globally;</p> <p>(2) Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below);</p> <p>(3) Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to Google Search in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).</p>		<p>Correction as of 26 March 2024: the values for the following countries have been updated due to a transposition error – Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia.</p> <p>Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to YouTube in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).</p>
	<p>(1) In H1 2023, the Fact Check Search API received approximately 277,466 requests from Google Search users, globally.</p>		
	<p>Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users</p>	<p>Number of Google Trends users researching Google Search</p>	<p>Number of Google Trends users researching YouTube</p>
	<p>Level</p>	<p>Users</p>	<p>Users</p>
<p>Member State</p>			
<p>Austria</p>	<p>185</p>	<p>151,859</p>	<p>2,061</p>

Belgium	567	75,324	2,420
Bulgaria	189	30,556	1,241
Croatia	167	22,617	948
Cyprus	48	10,709	793
Czech Republic	48	47,995	2,062
Denmark	268	58,742	1,937
Estonia	46	14,822	588
Finland	140	46,072	1,501
France	2,079	967,888	13,494
Germany	1,746	949,922	20,438
Greece	321	38,788	1,887
Hungary	197	52,153	2,125
Ireland	340	47,016	2,341
Italy	1,630	363,861	13,233
Latvia	60	15,453	1,218
Lithuania	86	24,429	1,235
Luxembourg	59	101,647	252
Malta	47	5,590	306
Netherlands	1,098	382,038	9,448
Poland	696	418,138	10,395
Portugal	375	90,239	4,684
Romania	350	211,237	4,359

Slovakia	143	18,149	928
Slovenia	70	12,009	602
Spain	2,361	367,995	15,973
Sweden	410	146,001	3,600
Iceland	<25	10,059	148
Liechtenstein	<25	321	10
Norway	242	98,199	2,168
Total EU	13,726	4,671,249	120,069
Total EEA	14,001	4,779,828	122,395
Measure 26.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>		YouTube
QRE 26.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>		<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for academic researchers affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution. Learn more about the data available in the YouTube API reference.</p>
QRE 26.2.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>		<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p>

		<p>The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. The program allows researchers to independently analyse the data they collect, including generating new/derived metrics for their research. Information available via the Data API includes video and channel title and description, views, likes, keyword searches, and other data.</p>
<p>QRE 26.2.3</p>	<p><i>Not subscribed</i></p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>The YouTube Researcher Program has a 3-step application process:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. YouTube verifies the applicant is an academic researcher affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution; 2. The Researcher creates an API project in the Google Cloud Console and enables the relevant YouTube APIs. They can learn more by visiting the enabled APIs page; 3. The Researcher applies with their institutional email (e.g. with a .edu suffix), includes as much detail as possible, and confirms that all of their information is accurate. <p>Once an application has been submitted, YouTube’s operations team will conduct a review and let applicants know if they are accepted into the program.</p>
<p>SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the</p>	<p><i>Not subscribed</i></p>	<p>(1-4) Applications received, approved, rejected or under review for the YouTube Researcher Program in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), broken down by EEA Member States (* indicates</p>

uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2

applications that were rejected on the basis of incorrect/incomplete application);

(5) Total number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher Program API in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member States;

(6) Median application resolution time in days in H1 2023, reported at the EU and EEA level.

Please note the following:

- Cells with '0' under applications received signify that there were no applications submitted by a researcher from that country. Similarly, cells with '0' signify that there were no applications approved, rejected, or under review for that country.
- Applications under review reflect those applications still being processed at the end of the reporting period. The outcomes of these applications will be included in the next reporting period.
- Researchers accessing the Researcher Program API from 1 January - 30 June 2023 may have been approved before H1 2023. There can be more than one researcher per application.
- Median Application Resolution time is the median number of days from application creation to application resolution. Applications may go back and forth between the applicant and API Ops Agents throughout the approval process. This metric does not reflect YouTube's first response back to the

	<i>Not subscribed</i>	applicant.					
		Applications Received	Applications Approved	Applications Rejected	Applications under Review	Number of unique researchers accessing the API	Median application resolution time
Member States	<i>Not subscribed</i>						
Austria		1	1	0	0	1	-
Belgium		2	1	1	0	1	-
Bulgaria		1	0	1	0	0	-
Croatia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Cyprus		1	1	0	0	0	-
Czech Republic		2	1	1	0	1	-
Denmark		0	0	0	0	0	-
Estonia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Finland		0	0	0	0	0	-
France		1	0	1	0	3	-
Germany		13	10	2	1	16	-
Greece		0	0	0	0	0	-
Hungary		0	0	0	0	0	-
Ireland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Italy		8	3	5	0	4	-

Latvia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Lithuania		0	0	0	0	0	-
Luxembourg		0	0	0	0	0	-
Malta		0	0	0	0	0	-
Netherlands		4	3	1	0	3	-
Poland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Portugal		0	0	0	0	0	-
Romania		1	0	1	0	0	-
Slovakia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Slovenia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Spain		6	5	1	0	4	-
Sweden		0	0	0	0	0	-
Iceland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	0	-
Norway		1	1	0	0	0	-
Total EU		40	25	14	1	33	10 days
Total EEA		41	26	14	1	33	7.5 days
Measure 26.3	Google Search	YouTube					
QRE 26.3.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.						
	Google Trends For Google Trends, users have an option to report an issue by taking a screenshot of the malfunction area and then submitting it for feedback via the Send Feedback option on the Google Trends page. Additionally, users can access the Trends Help Centre to						

troubleshoot any issues they may be experiencing.

Google Fact Check Explorer

Within Google Search’s [Fact Check Explorer](#), the Report Issue option provides users the ability to report issues to Google.

YouTube Researcher Program

For the YouTube Researcher Program, there is support available via email. Researchers can contact YouTube, with questions and to report technical issues or other suspected faults, via a unique email alias, provided upon acceptance into the program. Questions are answered by YouTube’s Developer Support team and by other relevant internal parties as needed.

Google is not aware of any malfunctions during the reporting period that would have prevented access to these reporting systems.

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	For example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Google is part of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body, a group of industry representatives, academia, and civil society who 	

	<p>have begun work to develop an organisational model for a new independent intermediary body that will facilitate data sharing between digital platforms, including search engines, and independent, external researchers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The new working group was launched in May 2023 following the recommendation of a previous EDMO-led multistakeholder working group that explored how platforms can provide data and the steps researchers themselves must take to protect that data, under the GDPR. The group is intended to play an advisory role for the Code and the researcher access provision under Art. 40 DSA. 	
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Google Search and YouTube will continue to engage in discussions with other Signatories, the EU Commission, European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and civil society, as part of the Permanent Task-force, in order to help set up workstreams related to Commitment 27 and to meaningfully engage with those.</p> <p>Over the next six months, the members of the working group plan to (a) identify appropriate governing principles for the new intermediary body, (b) lay out its core functions, (c) outline an organisational structure, staffing, and budgetary needs, (d) identify an appropriate form and place of establishment, and (e) provide a timeline for the body's initial phases of work.</p> <p>YouTube is exploring ways that it can continue to expand the YouTube Researcher Program, based in part on feedback from researchers.</p>	

Measure 27.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.1.1	<p>Google, including YouTube, participates in the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body, engaging with industry representatives, academia, and civil society to develop an organisational model for a new independent intermediary body that will facilitate data sharing between digital platforms, including search engines, and</p>	

	<p>independent, external researchers. The working group follows commitments made as part of the EU's Code of Practice on Disinformation.</p> <p>Over the next months the members of the working group plan to (a) identify appropriate governing principles for the new intermediary body, (b) lay out its core functions, (c) outline an organisational structure, staffing, and budgetary needs, (d) identify an appropriate form and place of establishment, and (e) provide a timeline for the body's initial phases of work.</p> <p>More information is available here.</p>	
Measure 27.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.2.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with other Signatories, the European Commission, EDMO, and civil society, as part of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, in order to satisfy Commitment 27. As of the filing of this report, there is no agreed-upon funding plan to report on.</p>	
Measure 27.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.3.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with other Signatories, the European Commission, EDMO, and civil society, as part of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, in order to satisfy Commitment 27. As no third-party body has yet been established, Google Search and YouTube are unable to report on the cooperation with it at this time.</p>	
SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent	<p>Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with other Signatories, the European Commission, EDMO, and civil society, as part of the Code of Practice's Permanent Task-force, in order to satisfy Commitment 27. As no third-party body has yet been established, Google Search and YouTube are unable to report on the cooperation with it at this time.</p>	

third-party body		
Data		
Measure 27.4	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 27.4.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google Search continues to explore options to engage in pilot programs towards sharing data with vetted researchers for the purpose of investigating mis-/disinformation.</p>	<p>YouTube has a program for academic researchers interested in using YouTube’s global Data API for their next research project. The program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Learn more about what data is available in the YouTube API reference. There is an application process with detailed policies, eligibility criteria, and guidance that can be found on the YouTube Research Policies page.</p> <p>In H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), 25 researchers from the EU were approved to use the YouTube Research API. Based on self-declarations, these researchers are exploring the topic of misinformation in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social Sciences; • Computer Information Sciences; • Behavioral Cognitive Sciences; • Environmental Biology.

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28					
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube
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	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google will publish a Researcher Program which equips qualified researchers with resources to advance the public's understanding of certain Google services and their impact.	YouTube is exploring ways that it can continue to expand the YouTube Researcher Program, based in part on feedback from researchers.

Measure 28.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google has a longstanding commitment to transparency, and has led the way in transparency reporting of content removals and</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>YouTube has teams that operate the YouTube Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and provide</p>

	<p>government requests for user data over the past decade plus.</p> <p>Google’s products, processes, and practices via the Lumen Database, Google Trends, and Fact Check Explorer show some of the ways that Google provides tools to support not only researchers but journalists and others to understand more about Google Search.</p> <p>Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2 for further information about Google Fact Check Tool APIs and Google Trends.</p> <p>Google’s partnership with Lumen is an independent research project managed by the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. The Lumen database houses millions of content takedown requests that have been voluntarily shared by various companies, including Google. Its purpose is to facilitate academic and industry research concerning the availability of online content. As part of Google’s partnership with Lumen, information about the legal notices Google receives may be sent to the Lumen project for publication. Google informs users about its Lumen practices under the ‘Transparency at our core’ section of the Legal Removals Help Centre. Additional information on Lumen can be found here.</p> <p>In addition, Google Search’s Product and Policy teams regularly exchange with researchers who reach out with questions about the functioning of Google Search or seek to receive feedback on past or future research projects.</p>	<p>technical support throughout the research project. They also evaluate potential updates and developments for the YouTube Researcher Program. Researchers can use any of the options below to obtain support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue Tracker; • YouTube API Code Samples at GitHub; • YouTube provides a contact email alias to researchers who have been granted access to the program. <p>In addition, YouTube’s Product and Policy teams regularly communicate with researchers who reach out with questions about the functioning of YouTube or seek to receive feedback on past or future research projects.</p>
Measure 28.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.2.1		Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some

	See response to QRE 28.1.1.	<p>instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Information available via the Data API includes video and channel title and description, views, likes, keyword searches, and other data (see YouTube API reference for more information).</p>
Measure 28.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.3.1	<p>Google Search and YouTube continue to engage constructively with the Code of Practice’s Permanent Task-force and with EDMO. As of the time of this report, no annual consultation has yet taken place, but Google Search and YouTube stand ready to collaborate with EDMO to that end in 2023.</p> <p>In 2021, Google contributed €25M EUR to help launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) to 'strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-26).</p> <p>The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund’s support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications. At the time of submitting this report, 47 projects were granted €6.4M EUR, with the list of selected grantees here. The list of funded projects includes €1.93M EUR for 8 specific efforts in research and investigations into misinformation.</p>	
Measure 28.4	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.4.1	Refer to QRE 30.1.1, QRE 30.1.3, and QRE 30.2.1 to learn more about how Google, including YouTube, structured agreements with partners such that the resources provided are independently managed.	

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

	C.29	M 29.1	M 29.2	M 29.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	<i>Not subscribed</i>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Measure 29.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 29.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 29.1.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>

QRE 29.1.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 29.1.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects	<i>Not subscribed</i>
	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 29.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 29.2.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 29.2.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 29.2.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 29.2.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (of various resilience-fostering measures)	<i>Not subscribed</i>
	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Measure 29.3	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 29.3.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 29.3.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects (effective repositories of advertising)	<i>Not subscribed</i>
	<i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On 14 April 2023, the International Fact-Checking Network's (IFCN) Global Fact Check Fund opened its Phase 1 (Build) application process for grants, through its \$13.2M partnership with Google, including YouTube. In June 2023, IFCN announced the recipients of its Phase 1 (Build) application process. IFCN began to make initial payments to these organisations in July 2023. Google facilitated deep user research sessions on the Fact Check Explorer in Q2 2023, inviting fact-checking organisations from around the world, including five from Europe, to beta test new features and receive feedback. The beta launch was announced at 'Global Fact 10' on 28 June 2023 and is currently being tested by fact-checkers around the world. More information is available here. In H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), additional partnerships commenced with deCheckers, German Press Agency DPA, CTK (Czech Press Agency), University of Westminster, and Demagog Poland. Google funded 'BuloBús: Route against misinformation' by Maldita.es where a minibus travelled to 20 towns across Spain between April and May 2023 to improve media literacy. YouTube has invested resources to aid Fact Check organisations to develop their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form. In June 2023, YouTube hosted an open session 	

	at ‘Global Fact 10’ where 30+ fact-checkers from around the world learned about various topics, including how to leverage YouTube to create Fact Check videos in the Shorts format, with an emphasis on content strategy and creation best practices.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In H2 2023 (Jul. - Dec. 2023), IFCN will invite applications for Phase 2 (Grow) and Phase 3 (Engage) grant opportunities, with payments to successful Phase 2 (Grow) applicants by the end of the year. • YouTube will continue to provide training and support to fact-checkers and fact-checking organisations, so they can maximise their reach and presence on YouTube, bringing more native video Fact Checking content to YouTube’s video-sharing platform. <p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 30 for future reports.</p>	

Measure 30.1	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 30.1.1	<p>Globally, Google, including YouTube, works with publishers and journalists to support quality journalism and global media literacy. Google’s digital tools, training and resources are helping newsrooms to find, verify and tell stories. Google News Initiative has provided training, including digital verification techniques, to over 124,000 European journalists since 2015, and Google’s free online curriculum has been visited over 400,000 times.</p> <p>As mentioned in response to QRE 21.1.1, Google Search and YouTube enable any fact-checkers to mark up their content for the purpose of indexation in Google’s and others’ services for free using the publicly available schema.org ClaimReview mark-up. Fact-checkers must also be either a verified signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network’s Code of Principles or an</p>	

authoritative publisher to be eligible on YouTube. Accordingly, Google and YouTube agreements and partnerships with fact-checking organisations differ from those of services that would rely upon proprietary tools or closed partnerships.

European Media and Information Fund

In 2021, Google contributed €25M EUR to help launch the [European Media and Information Fund](#) (EMIF) 'to strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-26).

The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund's support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications. To date, at least 47 projects in 15 EU Member States have been granted €6.4M EUR with the list of selected grantees from this fund available [here](#).

International Fact-Checking Network

Additionally, on 29 November 2022, Google, including YouTube, announced they will work with the [International Fact-Checking Network](#) (IFCN), to [provide \\$13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations](#) via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, \$1.2M USD will be used by IFCN to operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach. The goal is to reach fact-checking organisations of differing maturity:

- **Build:** fact-checkers with little or no online presence;
- **Grow:** fact-checkers with a basic digital presence looking to expand reach;
- **Engage:** digitally mature fact-checkers, looking to invest in new technologies.

Please refer to this [blog](#) for more information.

IFCN [received Phase 1 \(Build\) applications](#) from 14 April 2023 to 15 May 2023. In June 2023, IFCN independently selected 35 organisations covering 45 countries to receive Phase 1 (Build) funding. This included an organisation from Ukraine and six organisations from the following EEA Member States: Belgium, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal. For this initial phase of funding, each organisation will receive \$25K USD totalling \$150K USD for the EEA Member States. The full list of independently selected fact-checking grantees from this fund can be found [here](#).

Additional Partnerships

In addition to the indirect funding via organisations such as IFCN and the EMIF, Google funds the following projects:

- Google issued a grant to Demagog Poland, the largest Polish fact-checking organisation, to train 500 journalists, editors and fact-checkers, with a focus on local journalists, improving their skills and boosting their awareness of fact-checking techniques in the runup to Polish parliamentary election 2023.
- Google issued a grant to CTK (Czech Press Agency) who trained over 120 journalists in Czechia on fact-checking and verification skills. CTK will now provide training to journalists and fact-checkers in the local language in Slovakia before the election in September 2023.
- Google issued a grant to the German Press Agency DPA for the 3rd consecutive year to train 800 journalists from Germany, Switzerland and Austria. The program [Faktencheck23](#) is based on 3 pillars: training, fact-checking challenge and a factify summit scheduled for November 2023. To expand opportunities, APA (Austria) and SDA Keystone (Switzerland) are the local partners. To date, over 1300 journalists from more than 130 newsrooms from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland have taken part in the training.
- Google, including YouTube, issued a grant to the University of Westminster to explore the creation and operationalisation of a harms framework in the Claim Review schema. It seeks to investigate the following question: 'If fact-checkers identify the harms of mis/disinformation at the time of publication, how can the community use those insights more meaningfully?'
- Google issued a grant to deCheckers to train 100 journalists and fact-checkers in Belgium, initiate collaboration with other newsrooms, and develop a chatbot to scrape social media for misinformation and respond to it in a semi-automated way on social media.
- Google issued funding for Austria Presse Agentur (APA) to provide digital growth program trainings for DACH publishers, develop two products, a central API hub for fact-checked data and data driven content, and to host the inaugural 'The Future of Fact Checking' summit in Austria.

YouTube

As a video-sharing platform, YouTube allows fact-checkers to post and share both short- and long-form video content. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from

	<p>other websites and online platforms. Every fact-checking creator on YouTube agrees to follow the YouTube Community Guidelines and Terms of Service. As YouTube is available in all EU Member States, fact-checking organisations from all Member States are welcome to share content on YouTube’s platform.</p> <p>Fact-checking organisations who meet certain eligibility criteria may also participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP), a monetisation program. Creators who are accepted into YPP agree to additional terms that govern monetization, including YouTube’s Advertising-Friendly Guidelines.</p> <p>Currently, there are 10 EU-based fact-checking organisations participating in the YPP - one from each of Spain, Portugal and Germany and seven from France.</p> <p>YouTube continues to partner with fact-checking organisations to support their efforts to create video content and share it on YouTube.</p>
<p>QRE 30.1.2</p>	<p>Google’s main partnerships are with the European Media and Information Fund and the International Fact-Checking Network. Both organisations provide indirect payments to fact-checking members.</p> <p>Additional partnerships include deCheckers, German Press Agency DPA, CTK (Czech Press Agency), and Demagog Poland. These organisations were either provided direct grants, or will provide indirect payments to fact-checking members.</p> <p>YouTube</p> <p>The following EU based fact-checking organisations participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP) YouTube’s monetisation program: Observador, AFP Sprawdzam, Perikasa Fakta, Fact Check Myanmar, Faktantarkistus, AFP Checamos, Bayerischer Rundfunk, France Info, EFE Verifica, The France 24 Observers.</p>
<p>QRE 30.1.3</p>	<p>Google contributed €25M EUR to help launch the European Media and Information Fund 'to strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-26). To date, 47 projects have been granted €6.4M EUR with the list of selected grantees from this fund available here.</p> <p>Additionally, Google, including YouTube, is working with the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), to provide \$13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, \$1.2M USD will be used by IFCN to operate</p>

the fund, manage the application process and outreach. In June 2023, IFCN independently selected 35 organisations covering 45 countries to receive Phase 1 (Build) funding. This included an organisation from Ukraine and 6 organisations from the following EEA Member States: Belgium, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal. For this initial phase of funding, each organisation will receive \$25K USD totalling \$150K USD for the EEA Member States. The full list of independently selected fact-checking grantees from this fund can be found [here](#).

In response to the events in Ukraine, Google is protecting users from harmful disinformation about the realities of the invasion. Google is continuing to fund this effort, which includes partnerships with think tanks and civil society organisations to conduct region-specific research on misinformation and cash grants to support fact-checking networks and nonprofits. Additional information on how Google is supporting the refugee crisis can be found [here](#).

Google has also made the following financial grants with partners in specific EU Member States, including:

- Demagog Poland (Poland) - Grant for the largest Polish fact-checking organisation to train 500 journalists, editors and fact-checkers, with a focus on local journalists, improving their skills and boosting their awareness of fact-checking techniques in the runup to Polish parliamentary election 2023.
- DPA Faktencheck23 (Germany) - Grant to German Press Agency DPA for the 3rd consecutive year to train 800 journalists from Germany, Switzerland and Austria.
- deCheckers (Belgium) - Grant to deCheckers to train 100 journalists and fact-checkers in Belgium, initiate collaboration with other newsrooms, and develop a chatbot to scrape social media for misinformation and respond to it in a semi-automated way on social media.
- APA (Austria) - Funding for Austria Presse Agentur (APA) to provide digital growth program trainings for DACH publishers, develop two products, a central API hub for fact-checked data and data driven content, and to host the inaugural 'The Future of Fact Checking' summit in Austria.

In June 2023, Google, including YouTube, hosted 3 training sessions at '[Global Fact 10](#)' that covered topics including Account Security for Fact Checkers/Journalists, How YouTube Fights Misinformation, Demystifying YouTube's Algorithm, and Scaling Audiences on YouTube. During this conference, Google and YouTube representatives also met with fact-checking organisations to listen, learn, and discuss emerging trends. Google, including YouTube, plans to meet regularly with fact-checking organisations to better understand what fact-checkers need to better leverage YouTube and Google. Additional interactions included:

- Meeting with 8 of the EU-based fact-checking organisations who are members of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN);

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leading training sessions for 30+ EU-based fact-checking organisations. <p>YouTube</p> <p>In addition to the grant programs mentioned above, fact-checking organisations may also be eligible to generate revenue through YouTube’s monetisation program, the YouTube Partner Program (YPP). Fact-checking creators who participate in YPP also have access to Creator Support teams, who provide guidance to channels on how to maximise their presence and engagement on YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube. Ten EU-based fact-checking organisations currently participate in YPP.</p> <p>The Member State breakdown of these EU-based fact-checking organisations participating in YPP are as follows: one from each of Spain, Portugal and Germany and seven from France.</p> <p>As a video-sharing platform, YouTube allows fact-checkers to post and share both short- and long-form video content. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms. Twenty-four EU-based IFCN and EFCSN member organisations have made content available on YouTube and 20 EU-based endorsers of the EFCSN Code have YouTube channels.</p> <p>YouTube continues to partner with fact-checking organisations to support their efforts to create video content and share it on YouTube.</p>
SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	As per QRE 30.1.1, the funded organisations, European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) and International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), will evaluate and select projects for funding. As such, EMIF and IFCN will determine Member State and language coverage.
Member States	

Measure 30.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 30.2.1	European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) Partnership	

The [EMIF's Key funding principles](#) are explained on their website and were previously published in the Baseline report.

The [governance process](#) is explained transparently in detail. Additionally, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) has agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of EMIF's projects that will receive the fund's support, and they do not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the selection process.

International Fact-Checking Network Partnership

Google, including YouTube, is working with the [International Fact-Checking Network](#) (IFCN), to [provide \\$13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations](#) via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, \$1.2M USD will be used by IFCN to operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach.

In June 2023, IFCN independently selected 35 organisations covering 45 countries to receive Phase 1 (Build) funding. This included an organisation from Ukraine and six organisations from the following EEA Member States: Belgium, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal. The list of independently selected fact-checking grantees from this fund can be found [here](#).

International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)'s Code of Principles are a set of five commitments around fairness, transparency, standards, and honesty. Google, including YouTube, previously published them in the Baseline report and they are explained in detail on the IFCN website [here](#).

Additional Partnerships

The methodologies and principles of [deCheckers](#), [Demagog Poland](#), and [DPA Faktencheck23](#) can be found on their respective websites, as well.

YouTube

The eligibility criteria and participation requirements for YouTube's Partner Program (YPP) can be found [here](#). Additional information about getting paid on YouTube can be found [here](#).

YouTube's automated systems and human reviewers assess each channel as a whole to make sure the channel follows all of the policies and guidelines. To focus YouTube's support for creators who are active and engaged with the community, YouTube may turn off monetization on channels that have not uploaded a video or posted to the Community tab for 6 months or more.

QRE 30.2.2

European Media and Information Fund (EMIF)

EMIF will issue reports on a yearly basis regarding the distribution of the Fund. Within the progress updates, there will be a public impact assessment. The impact assessment will outline:

- Measures taken to ensure that the Fund is being managed in good faith and in compliance with applicable laws;
- Update to assess the transparent process by which applications to the Fund for financial support are considered to ensure that all applicants are treated fairly and reasonably;
- An assessment of the decision making of the Management Committee (and its delegates) presenting how decisions are made independently, without any conflict of interest, and according to the charter;
- An assessment of how funds have been distributed across the entire EEA region, including the United Kingdom, and to a diverse range of projects.

Additionally, EMIF refers to [funding](#) ‘a wide geographic coverage (minimum 12 Member States each year), while supporting projects that foster diversity and help building networks of specialists at national and EU levels. Given the diversity and specific vulnerabilities of national information environments, EMIF shall fund a wide and well-balanced portfolio of projects.’

The [first EMIF annual progress report](#) was published in November 2022.

International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)

IFCN has [a public webpage](#) dedicated to the Global Fact Check Fund to outline full details of governance and application process. IFCN will issue progress reports on a quarterly basis regarding the distribution of the Fund, these will outline the following:

- Measures taken to ensure the Fund is being managed in good faith and in compliance with applicable laws;
- An assessment of how funds have been distributed across the entire world to a diverse range of organisations, including a breakdown of how support has been provided among organisations within the 27 EU Member States;
- Specific details on the decision making process and relevant information on overall progress.

YouTube

Fact-checking creators who participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP) have access to Creator Support teams, who can provide guidance on how channels use YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.

	<p>YouTube has also established regular meetings with several major EU-based Fact-checking organisations to better support their needs on the platform. Some of these touchpoints include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular meetings with 11 EU-based fact-checking organisations who are members of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN): Maldita.es, Les Surligneurs, Faktograf, CORRECTIV, Teyit, Demagog, Full Fact, AFP, dpa, TjekDet, Pagella Politica/Facta News; • Meeting at ‘Global Fact 10’ with eight of the EU-based fact-checking organisations who are members of EFCSN; • YouTube led training sessions at ‘Global Fact 10’ for 30+ EU-based fact-checking organisations covering the following topics: Account Security for Fact Checkers/Journalists, How YouTube Fights Misinformation, Demystifying YouTube’s Algorithm, and Scaling Audiences on YouTube. 	
<p>QRE 30.2.3</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>This QRE focuses on Signatories that are European fact-checking organisations - as such, there is nothing for Google Search or YouTube to report.</p>	
<p>Measure 30.3</p>	<p>Google Search</p>	<p>YouTube</p>
<p>QRE 30.3.1</p>	<p>Central partners, such as the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), help bring together fact-checkers from around the globe. Google also leads efforts to facilitate cross-border collaboration through research sessions.</p> <p>International Fact-Checking Network On IFCN’s website, they state that their organisation ‘enable[s] fact-checkers through networking, capacity building and collaboration. IFCN promotes the excellence of fact-checking to more than 100 organisations worldwide through advocacy, training and global events.’</p> <p>In June 2023, Google, including YouTube, hosted three training sessions at ‘Global Fact 10’ that covered topics including Account Security for Fact Checkers/Journalists, How YouTube Fights Misinformation, Demystifying YouTube’s Algorithm, and Scaling Audiences on YouTube. During this conference, Google and YouTube representatives also met with fact-checking organisations to listen, learn, and discuss emerging trends. Google, including YouTube, plans to meet regularly with fact-checking organisations to better understand what fact-checkers need to better leverage YouTube and Google.</p>	

European Media and Information Fund (EMIF)

The EMIF 'ensures a wide geographic coverage (minimum 12 Member States each year), while supporting projects that foster diversity and help building networks of specialists at national and EU levels. Given the diversity and specific vulnerabilities of national information environments, EMIF shall fund a wide and well-balanced portfolio of projects' (excerpt from [EMIF Funding Principles](#)).

In addition, the very design of Google's approach towards fact-checking facilitates cross-border cooperation among fact-checkers, in that Google does not index fact-checks submitted via a private repository but rather those made available on the open web, and Google makes those easily searchable via Fact-Check Explorer.

Google

Google facilitated deep user research sessions on the [Fact Check Explorer](#) in Q2 2023, inviting 17 fact-checking organisations from around the world, five of which were from Europe (Maldita, Full Fact, Correctiv, AFP, DPA), to beta test new features and receive feedback on additional features to support fact-checkers around the world.

Google News Initiative extended the long-term partnership with German Press Agency DPA to expand the Faktencheck23 initiative based on three pillars: verification and fact-checking training for journalists, a new fact-checking challenge and a fact-checking summit to convene practitioners, academics and KOFs from the DACH region. To expand opportunities, Austrian Press Agency APA (Austria) and Swiss Press Agency SDA Keystone (Switzerland) are the local partners to offer verification and fact-checking training to journalists in the respective markets. The goal of Faktencheck23 is to advance verification and fact-checking skills while fostering cross-border collaboration. Separately, Google is funding APA among other things to develop two products, a central API hub for fact-checked data and data driven content, and to host the inaugural 'The Future of Fact Checking' summit in Austria.

YouTube

As an open platform operating in all EU Member States, YouTube enables fact-checking content posted by an organisation in one Member State to be viewed by any YouTube user anywhere in the EU or around the world. This access enables cross-border collaboration between fact-checking organisations who may view other fact-check content and recognize similar patterns or narratives. YouTube's search functionality further enables cross-border discovery (e.g., a search for a particular fact-check organisation with a YouTube channel will return a link to that channel at or near the top of results).

Measure 30.4

Google Search

YouTube

QRE 30.4.1	As the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN)'s governance body and adhesion procedure launched in November 2022 and December 2022 (respectively), Google Search and YouTube do not have, by the time of this report, updates to share on this QRE. Google Search and YouTube expect this to change with future reports.
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VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No, Google Search has not recently introduced new implementation measures related to this Commitment, but Google Search regularly, and on an ongoing basis, updates its internal systems and processes related to surfacing information panels and authoritative information.	Yes. Additionally, to integrate fact-checking content in a manner fit for YouTube's video-sharing platform, YouTube needs to have more video fact-checking content on the platform. Thus, investments in training how to leverage YouTube, and support for fact-checking creators, are a critical piece of the product integration commitment.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	For Example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YouTube has invested resources to aid Fact Check organisations to develop their presence on YouTube by leveraging video formats, both long- and short-form. In June 2023, YouTube hosted an open session at 'Global Fact 10'

		where content strategy and best practices were shared about how to leverage YouTube to create Fact Check videos in the Shorts format.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YouTube will continue to invest and support fact-checkers' creation of short- and long-form video content through trainings and additional resources. YouTube will continue to ensure that authoritative content is surfaced to users through search and recommendations on the platform. <p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding Commitment 31 for future reports.</p>

Measure 31.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube
Measure 31.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 31.1.1	See response to QRE 21.1.1.	See response to QRE 21.1.1.

SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	See response to SLI 21.1.1.	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 31.1.1 for future reports.
Member States		

SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	Google Search’s use of fact-checks does not involve taking specific actions with regards to content that is fact-checked (e.g. marking it as false or removing it), which in turn does not make it possible to report on the impact of such actions.	YouTube’s use of fact-checks does not involve taking specific actions with regards to content that is fact-checked (e.g. marking it as false or removing it), which in turn does not make it possible to report on the impact of such actions.
Member States		

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Discussions around relevant baseline information have been initiated within the Permanent Task-force, and will continue through the next reporting period.	
Member States		

Measure 31.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 31.3.1	YouTube and Google Search are members of the Fact Checking working group, set up as part of the Task-force. The group has held bi-weekly meetings since 3 April 2023. At the time of this report, the working group has not yet finalised the roadmap for the repository, but expect to have more to share in future reports.	
Measure 31.4	Google Search	YouTube

QRE 31.4.1

Google, including YouTube, has helped develop the ['ClaimReview' HTML mark-up](#), an open standard that lets any fact-checker mark up their content so it can be identified and used by any online service. This standard is [not proprietary](#) to Google or YouTube and is designed to be interoperable across the web.

In order to make it easier for fact-checkers to leverage the ClaimReview mark-up, Google has developed a [free tool](#) that simplifies the process of marking up webpages using this standard.

YouTube

Given concerns about resources to produce long-form video content, YouTube believes that the Shorts format on the platform is a possible technical solution for fact-checkers to create video content while minimising production resources. YouTube emphasised Shorts in its 'Global Fact 10' workshop and will continue to provide support for Fact Check organisations seeking to leverage video formats on its video-sharing platform.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google Search YouTube	Google Search YouTube	YouTube	Google Search YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

<p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p>	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Google facilitated deep user research sessions on the Fact Check Explorer in Q2 2023, inviting fact-checking organisations from around the world, five of which were from Europe, to beta test new features and receive feedback. Find more information here. 	<p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In June 2023, YouTube sponsored the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) ‘Global Fact 10’ event in Seoul, an international gathering of fact-checkers who convened to discuss trends and technology. ● Google facilitated deep user research sessions on the Fact Check Explorer in Q2 2023, inviting fact-checking organisations from around the world, five of which were from Europe, to beta test new features and receive feedback. Find more information here. ● YouTube engaged in regular discussions with members of industry bodies including the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and European Fact Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). YouTube also provides global fact training to support Fact-checking organisations as YouTube creators.
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p>If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?</p>	<p>Google Search plans to engage in regular discussion with the European Fact Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) (see QRE 32.3.1 for more details).</p>	<p>YouTube plans to engage in regular discussions with the newly formed European Fact Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) (see QRE 32.3.1 for more details).</p>

		YouTube also plans to expand training to support Fact Checking organisations as YouTube creators, including supporting organisations that may be eligible for YouTube’s monetization program. YouTube will continue to ensure that fact-checkers on the platform are aware of the creator analytics available to users.
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Measure 32.1	Google Search	YouTube
Measure 32.2	<i>Not subscribed</i>	YouTube
QRE 32.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Search Console is a free service offered by Google that includes various tools and reports to help webmasters, including fact-checking organisations, to monitor, maintain, and troubleshoot their site's presence in Google Search.</p> <p>The Search Performance report shows important metrics about how a site performs in Google Search results including how often the site appears in Google Search, what search queries are most likely to show on the site, how often searchers click through for those queries, and site views from all EU countries. This can help fact-checkers assess how their content is performing on Google Search. Further information on the Search Performance report can be found here.</p>	<p>As a video-sharing platform, fact-checkers are able to post and share both short- and long-form video content on YouTube. Fact-check content made available on YouTube can be surfaced through relevant search results, via recommendations, or linked directly from other websites and online platforms.</p> <p>YouTube Studio provides tools and information through which YouTube creators can manage their presence, grow their channels, interact with their audiences, and make money—all in one place. Fact-checking organisations with YouTube channels can view data about their video performance through the Channel Analytics Dashboard in YouTube Studio. Available data includes views, watch time, traffic sources, and search queries that led viewers to their video content.</p> <p>In addition, YouTube provides details on how text-based fact-checks on YouTube work and how to become an eligible fact-checker on YouTube through the YouTube Help Centre.</p>

SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	Fact-checkers are not required to identify themselves as such in order to use the Search console. Accordingly, Google Search is unable to report on usage of the Search console among fact-checkers.	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding SLI 32.1.1 for future reports.
Data		
Measure 32.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 32.3.1	<p>International Fact-Checking Network</p> <p>Google, including YouTube, has been in regular discussions with industry bodies, such as the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), to discuss collaborations and efforts to build and support the work of fact-checkers. Some of these conversations have been about:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving support and funding to Fact Checking initiatives and technical capabilities; • Opening additional channels of communication from the Fact Checking community to YouTube; • Scaled trainings on platform best practices to help Fact Checkers increase engagement on YouTube and manage their channel strategy. <p>In June 2023, Google, including YouTube, hosted three training sessions at ‘Global Fact 10’ that covered topics including Account Security for Fact Checkers/Journalists, How YouTube Fights Misinformation, Demystifying YouTube’s Algorithm, and Scaling Audiences on YouTube. During this conference, Google and YouTube representatives also met with fact-checking organisations to listen, learn, and discuss emerging trends. Google, including YouTube, plans to meet regularly with fact-checking organisations to better understand what fact-checkers need to better leverage YouTube and Google.</p> <p>Google, including YouTube, is working with the IFCN, to provide \$13.2M USD over 2.5 years to 135+ organisations via in-direct payments. Within the funding provided, \$1.23M USD will be used by IFCN to operate the fund, manage the application process and outreach.</p> <p>In the future, Google, including YouTube, plan to also engage in regular discussions on similar and other topics with the newly formed European Fact Checking Standards Network (EFCSN).</p>	

	<p>Google</p> <p>Google facilitated deep user research sessions on the Fact Check Explorer in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), inviting 17 fact-checking organisations from around the world, five of which were from Europe (Maldita, Full Fact, Correctiv, AFP, DPA), to beta test new features and receive feedback on additional features to support fact-checkers around the world.</p> <p>YouTube</p> <p>Creators who participate in the YouTube Partner Program (YPP) have access to Creator Support teams, who can provide guidance on how channels use YouTube, including tips on technical or service aspects of YouTube.</p> <p>YouTube has also established regular meetings with several major EU-based fact-checking organisations to gather feedback and to better support their needs on YouTube’s platform.</p>
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VII. Empowering the fact-checking community		
Commitment 33		
Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.		
	C.33	M 33.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	<i>Not subscribed</i>	<i>Not subscribed</i>

	<i>Not subscribed</i>
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	<i>Not subscribed</i>
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<i>Not subscribed</i>

Measure 33.1	<i>Not subscribed</i>
QRE 33.1.1	<i>Not subscribed</i> <i>Not subscribed</i>
SLI 33.1.1 - number of European fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified	<i>Not subscribed</i> <i>Not subscribed</i> <i>Not subscribed</i>
Data	<i>Not subscribed</i>

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website

	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments and alongside other Signatories, Google assisted in the setup of an EU CoP Transparency Centre, located at https://disinfocode.eu in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 34.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.3	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.4	Google, on behalf of related services

Measure 34.5	Google, on behalf of related services
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VIII. Transparency Centre							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, and alongside other Signatories, Google populated the EU CoP Transparency Centre with related relevant information in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 35.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.3	Google, on behalf of related services

Measure 35.4	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.5	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.6	Google, on behalf of related services

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36				
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, Google uploaded its report to the newly launched Transparency Centre in February 2023.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In line with Code commitments, Google plans to upload reports and pertinent updates to the Transparency Centre located at https://disinfocode.eu .

Measure 36.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 36.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 36.3	Google, on behalf of related services

<p>QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)</p>	<p>Google is pleased to confirm that it has been an active participant in the working group that has successfully launched the common Transparency Centre this year. Google has assisted with establishing the website's requirements, selecting a vendor to build the website and overseeing the development of the website's key functionalities and interface. Google has ensured that the Centre will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Centre to be navigated both by commitment and signatory). Each signatory will be responsible for ensuring that the information they upload to the website is correct and accurate. Entities interested in joining the Code's Task-force will be able to sign up through a dedicated online application form on the website. Google has supported the working group in collecting feedback on the user experience of the website and will continue to seek such feedback from relevant stakeholders to better maintain and update the website.</p>
<p>QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)</p>	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>No changes to report other than those outlined in response to QRE 36.1.1.</p>
<p>SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.</p>	<p>The common Transparency Center has been visited by around 8,300 users globally between January 30th 2023 and June 30th 2023. The average engagement time on the website is 1m 22s.</p>
<p>Data</p>	

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6	M 37.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 37.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 37.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 37.3	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 37.4	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 37.5	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 37.6	Google, on behalf of related services
QRE 37.6.1	Google has meaningfully engaged in all Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to

participation and/or co-steering of meetings, producing documents, and providing feedback.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 38.1	Google, on behalf of related services
QRE 38.1.1	<p>Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit, or links updated) from the January 2023 Baseline Report as there is no new information to share now.</p> <p>Google has several teams across the company that work on the challenges of misinformation and disinformation, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments per this Code. This is core to Google’s mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful content. To enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google relies both on specially-trained experts and</p>

machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

C.39

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:

Google, on behalf of related services

Google, on behalf of related services

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].

In line with Code commitments in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), Google provided a baseline report to the European Commission.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), Google provided a baseline report which included reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness

of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google has been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators. • Google supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through its collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Google will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

C.42

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services
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	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 43

Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.

	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A
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X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

	C.44
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Covid-19 pandemic

Overview

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, teams across Google have launched over 200 new products, features and initiatives. Google is also contributing over \$1 billion in resources to help users, clients, partners, and governments through this unprecedented time. Google's major efforts are focused around: providing trusted information to users, helping people adapt to a changing world, and contributing to recovery efforts across the globe. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during the COVID-19 pandemic:

1. Spread of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation;
2. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations;
3. Advertising linked to COVID-19 disinformation.

The following sections summarise Google's main policies, strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the COVID-19 pandemic.

1. Spread of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation

As interest in COVID-19 has grown in Europe and across the world, Google has worked to help people find the information they need on its products – including by partnering with health organisations and governments to bring users authoritative information in a rapidly changing environment.

In addition to elevating authoritative information, Google takes active steps to detect and remove COVID-19 related misinformation that contradicts guidance from health authorities and may result in real-world harm.

Google has also participated in initiatives to support user awareness beyond direct interactions with services (e.g. via partnerships with or support for relevant third party organisations).

2. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations

When Google finds attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on its products anywhere around the world, swift action is taken by removing content from these services and terminating these actors' accounts, in accordance with Google's policies. In addition, steps are taken to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and Google routinely exchanges information and shares findings with others in

the industry.

In May 2020, Google introduced a quarterly [bulletin](#) published by Google's Threat Analysis Group, to share information about actions that Google takes against accounts attributed to coordinated influence operations (foreign and domestic), some of which relate to COVID-19.

3. Advertising linked to COVID-19 disinformation

Preserving the integrity of advertising products during the COVID-19 pandemic was a continuation of the work that Google does to minimise content that violates policies and to stop malicious actors.

- In order to ensure users have access to essential information while navigating COVID-19, Google Ads created a certification process allowing some entities to run coronavirus disease (COVID-19) related ads. Google Ads allowed ads from government organisations, healthcare providers, non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations, verified election ads advertisers and managed private sector accounts with a history of policy compliance who wanted to get relevant information out to the public. As of 15 June 2023, Google Ads [eased these limitations](#). Ads that contain COVID-19 related terms are no longer restricted, including ads for certain types of face masks, vaccines, and other COVID-19 related products and services. Content related to COVID-19 continues to be subject to all other Google Ads policies prohibiting content that is harmful to users and the overall advertising ecosystem.
- The [Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy](#) prohibits promoting or advocating for harmful health or medical claims or practices.
- Google Ads does not allow ads or destinations that deceive users by excluding relevant product information or providing misleading information about products, services, or businesses. The [Missing Information Policy](#) requires the disclosure of material information (that is, important and relevant information) when soliciting a charitable or political donation (e.g. Google Ads disapproves ads that fail to display a charity or tax exemption number for charitable donations, or that fail to disclose whether political donations are tax exempt).

Google aims to follow the following principles when responding to future crisis situations:

1. Provide trusted information to users;
2. Help people adapt to a changing world; and
3. Contribute to recovery efforts across the globe.

Future measures

On 4 May 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an end to the Public Health Emergency of International Concern in response to the outbreak of COVID-19. Billions of people accessed COVID-19 information through Google from over 200 countries and territories and in dozens of languages, as highlighted in this [case study](#). These panels surfaced information from public health organisations like WHO, including the COVID-19 vaccine information panels that launched in 2020. The impact made by this work between WHO and Google has made one thing clear: the work is not yet done.

Finding new opportunities to use Google’s expertise is critical to public health, specifically in three areas of focus: highlighting accurate health information, supporting digital transformation in low-resource settings, and preparing communities for future public health threats. WHO has shifted how it uses Google.org’s Ad Grants to public health topics beyond COVID-19, such as mental health, Mpox, flu, Ebola, and natural disasters. The organisation served over 28 million public service announcements in six languages, resulting in over 2.7 million visits to their website to learn more. Google.org is also providing another \$50M in Ad Grants to support WHO in continuing their impactful work in public health throughout 2023.

Finally, in May 2023, Google [announced](#) a multi-year Collaboration Agreement with the WHO to continue providing credible health-related information to help billions of people around the world respond to emerging and future public health issues.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s)].

Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	Google Advertising	
	N/A	N/A
	Google Search	
	N/A	N/A
	YouTube	
	N/A	YouTube continues to regularly review its policies to make sure that they reflect the changes that occur both on and off the platform, including crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. YouTube’s guiding focus is around one major

		<p>goal: preventing egregious real-world harm. YouTube is careful to draw the line around content that may cause egregious harm to its users or the platform.</p> <p>This article also captures the latest updates to all YouTube policies.</p>
	Google, on behalf of related services	
	N/A	N/A
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	Google Advertising	
	N/A	N/A
	Google Search	
	N/A	N/A
	YouTube	
	N/A	YouTube regularly reviews and updates its policies, where relevant, based on updated guidance from Local Health Authorities (LHAs) and the World Health Organization (WHO) as it pertains to COVID-19 or approved vaccines.
	Google, on behalf of related services	
	See above for service-specific information.	See above for service-specific information.
Policies regarding the crisis repealed/removed	Google Advertising	
	<p>In June 2023, Google Ads removed restrictions on COVID-19 content under the Sensitive Events Policy. Ads, Shopping ads, and Free Listings that contain COVID-19 related terms are no longer restricted, including ads and Shopping ads for certain types of face masks, vaccines, and other COVID-19 related products and services.</p> <p>Content related to COVID-19 will continue to be subject to all other Google Ads and Google Shopping policies prohibiting content that is harmful to users and the overall Google Ads</p>	<p>With the gradual easing of societal restrictions and coverage of other Ads & Shopping policies to prevent policy violating ads from showing on Google’s network, Google Ads has decided that it is now safe to exit the Sensitive Event Policy for COVID-19. Google Ads’ decision to exit the policy is also in alignment with other products and their approach towards the event.</p>

	and Shopping ecosystem, including the Misrepresentation Policy.	
	Google Search	
	N/A	N/A
	YouTube	
	N/A	N/A
	Google, on behalf of related services	
	N/A	N/A

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Overview

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a humanitarian disaster, damaged critical infrastructure, and upended energy markets and supply chains. Since the first days of the invasion, Google has been helping the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian government, and others affected by Russia's invasion, sharing its first commitments in [March 2022](#). Over a year later, Ukrainians are still facing deadly attacks and the realities of life under an active invasion — and Google remains focused on [helping](#) by providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, fighting disinformation, and providing authoritative information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during the invasion of Ukraine:

1. Continued online services manipulation and malign influence operations;
2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.

The following sections summarise Google's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the invasion of Ukraine.

1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations

Ukraine — and the broader Central and Eastern European region — is facing a disinformation crisis. Google's [Threat Analysis Group \(TAG\)](#) is helping Ukraine by [monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe](#) and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors. Google has also [announced new long-term partnerships](#) across Central and Eastern Europe. In February 2023, Google TAG, with additional research from Mandiant and Google Trust & Safety, published '[Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape](#)' which included how Moscow leverages the full spectrum of information operations, including disinformation, to shape public perception of war.

In the Baltics, Google entered into long-term partnerships with the [Civic Resilience Initiative](#) and the [Baltic Center for Media Excellence](#). These two organisations will receive €1.3 million in funding from Google to build on their impactful work towards increasing media literacy, building further resilience and actively tackling disinformation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Furthermore, Google is partnering with the Charles University in Prague, the main research centre of the [Central European Digital Media Observatory](#) (CEDMO) project, and providing €1 million in funding for CEDMO to further expand its research into information disorders (such as misinformation, disinformation or clickbait), and work to increase the level of media and digital literacy in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia.

2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation

Google has paused the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia, ads on Google’s properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, new Cloud sign ups, the payments functionality for most of Google’s services, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Due to the war in Ukraine, Google paused ads containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, ads are not available to any entities or individuals that are restricted under applicable trade sanctions and export compliance laws. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure

As the Ukrainian government is under near-constant digital attack, Google expanded eligibility for [Project Shield](#), Google’s free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the invasion. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats.

TAG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the invasion, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. TAG’s [findings](#) have shown that government-backed actors from [Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea](#) have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, NGOs, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the invasion as a lure for malicious campaigns.

Google is continuing to provide critical cybersecurity and technical infrastructure support by donating 50,000 new [Google Workspace](#) licences to the Ukrainian government. By providing these licences and a year of free access to Google Workspace solutions, including Google’s cloud-first, zero-trust security model, Google can help provide Ukrainian public institutions with the security and protection they need to deal with constant threats to their digital systems. In February 2023, Google also announced an extension of the free access to premium Google Workspace for Education features for 250 universities and colleges until the end of August 2023.

Google aims to continue to follow the following approach when responding to future crisis situations:

1. Elevate access to authoritative information across Google services;
2. Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
3. Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
4. Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

Future measures

Google is continually making investments in products, programs and partnerships to help fight disinformation, both in Ukraine and globally. Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.

Google joins the international community in expressing sincere hope for a return to a peaceful and sovereign Ukraine — and will continue to look for new ways to help those whose lives have been so deeply and tragically affected.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	Google Advertising	
	N/A	N/A
	Google Search	
	N/A	N/A
	YouTube	
	N/A	N/A
	Google, on behalf of related services	
	N/A	N/A
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	Google Advertising	
	N/A	N/A
	Google Search	
	N/A	N/A
	YouTube	
	N/A	N/A
	Google, on behalf of related services	
	N/A	N/A

Actions to mitigate the crisis impact on the service			
Type of mitigation	Intervention or action (short summary)	Intervention or action (explanation and implementation)	Impact metrics
Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.)	Google Advertising		
	Enforces the Google Ads Misrepresentative Content Policy which does not allow ads or destinations that deceive users by excluding relevant product information or providing misleading information about products, services, or businesses.	Specifically for the invasion of Ukraine, Google Ads focused on the Manipulated Media sub-category in the Misrepresentative Content Policy which disallows the practice of deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues or matters of public concern. Google Ads also enforced the Clickbait Ads Policy which is a sub-category under the Misrepresentative Content Policy. This policy prohibits ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic.	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
	As noted above, Google Ads enforces the Sensitive Events Policy which does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.	Due to the invasion of Ukraine, Google Ads enforced the Sensitive Events Policy and paused ads on pages containing content that is exploitative, dismissive, or condones the invasion in March 2022. This is in addition to the pausing of ads from and on Russian Federation state-funded media in February 2022.	Since 2022, Google Ads has remained vigilant on enforcing these policies and blocked more than 17 million ads related to the war in Ukraine under the Sensitive Event Policy. This effort is ongoing in 2023.

	<p>Enforces the Inappropriate Content Policy which does not allow ads or destinations that display shocking content or that promote hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.</p>	<p>Due to the invasion of Ukraine, Google Ads focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory and Shocking Content sub-categories of the Inappropriate Content Policy. The Dangerous or Derogatory sub-category does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, nationality, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or any other characteristic that is associated with systemic discrimination or marginalisation. The Shocking Content sub-category does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.</p>	<p>Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.</p>
	<p>Enforces Other Restricted Businesses which restrict certain kinds of businesses from advertising with Google Ads to prevent users from being exploited, even if individual businesses appear to comply with other policies.</p>	<p>In order to protect users, Google Ads specifically focused on enforcing the Government Documents and Official Services Policy which disallows the promotion of documents and/or services that facilitate the acquisition, renewal, replacement or lookup of official documents or information that are available directly from a government or government delegated provider.</p>	<p>Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.</p>

	<p>Enforces the Google AdSense Misrepresentative Content Policy. Which does not allow Google AdSense Ads to run against content that has misleading representation, unreliable and harmful claims, deceptive practices, or manipulated media. Google AdSense also does not allow AdSense Ads against content that is deemed Dangerous or Derogatory.</p>	<p>In light of the invasion of Ukraine, Google AdSense paused the monetisation of Russian Federation state-funded media, the creation of new Russian accounts on Google AdSense, AdMob and Google Ad Manager, as well as all AdSense Ads on Google properties and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia. Content that has been found to exploit, dismiss or condone the invasion of Ukraine has also had AdSense monetisation paused.</p>	<p>Since 2022, Google has removed ads from more than 275 Russian state-funded media sites across Google platforms. This effort is ongoing in 2023.</p>
Google Search			
	<p>Limited recommendations globally for a number of Russian state-funded media outlets.</p> <p>Enforced its Content Policies, including Misinformation Policies, which establish what types of content is not allowed on Google Search.</p>	<p>As stipulated by the EU's Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350, Search removed RT and Sputnik from Google's Search results in the EU.</p>	<p>Google removed two URLs and seven websites that were delisted under the EU sanctions on Russian state media.</p>
YouTube			
	<p>YouTube continues to enforce its Community Guidelines, including but not limited to misinformation policies, which establish what type of content and behaviour is not allowed on the platform.</p>	<p>YouTube's teams continue to work quickly to remove content that violates its policies. These policies apply to all types of content on YouTube's platform, including videos, comments, links, and thumbnails. YouTube's Community Guidelines are a key part of YouTube's broader suite of policies and are regularly updated in consultation with</p>	<p>Correction as of 26 March 2024: The value for videos removed has been corrected due to a transposition error.</p> <p>Since 24 February 2022, YouTube has removed over 12,000 channels and over 130,000 videos related to the</p>

		<p>outside experts and YouTube creators to keep pace with emerging challenges or crises.</p> <p>YouTube enforces its Community Guidelines using a combination of human reviewers and machine learning, and applies them to everyone equally—regardless of the subject or the creator’s background, political viewpoint, position, or affiliation.</p> <p>Our policies aim to make YouTube a safer community while still giving creators the freedom to share a broad range of experiences and perspectives.</p>	<p>ongoing war in Ukraine for violating its content policies, including those pertaining to misinformation, hate speech, and graphic violence.</p>
	<p>YouTube continues to block channels in certain countries and globally for a number of Russian state-funded news media outlets.</p>	<p>YouTube continues to block YouTube channels associated with Russian state-funded news channels in certain countries and globally, including ones tied to RT and Sputnik.</p>	<p>YouTube has blocked over 950 channels and over 4 million videos related to the Russia/Ukraine war since 24 February 2022.</p> <p>YouTube has restricted more than 40,000 videos related to the ongoing war in Ukraine.</p>
	<p>YouTube expanded ‘Hit Pause’, a global media literacy campaign, to teach viewers critical skills and to improve users’ experiences on YouTube.</p>	<p>Branded ‘Hit Pause,’ the campaign seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs)</p>	<p>Preliminary impressions from YouTube’s current European launch of ‘Hit Pause’, indicate 334,192,820 impressions in the</p>

		<p>via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated YouTube channel. The YouTube channels hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content, as well as additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation—from using emotional language to cherry picking information. YouTube’s ‘Hit Pause’ videos are available in multiple languages in order to make the information accessible and relevant for YouTube’s users, empowering the audience to spot, evaluate, and prevent the spread of misinformation.</p> <p>As of 2023, the campaign was live in all EEA Member States.</p>	<p>EEA in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 - 30 June 2023).</p>
Google, on behalf of related services			
	<p>Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that</p>	<p>Throughout 2023, TAG has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. Examples</p>	<p>TAG took the following actions on the highlighted examples:</p>

	<p>they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to UA/RU crisis response. TAG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.</p>	<p>related to campaigns identified by TAG as linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA) are highlighted below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In January 2023, TAG identified a campaign linked to the IRA that was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of the Wagner Group and Russia’s performance in the war in Ukraine. ● In February 2023, TAG identified a campaign linked to the IRA that was sharing content in Russian and English that was supportive of Russia and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. ● In March 2023, TAG identified a campaign linked to the IRA that was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine. ● In April 2023, TAG identified a campaign linked to the IRA that was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin and critical of Ukraine. <p>For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q1 2023 and Q2 2023 TAG Bulletins.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Terminated 87 IRA-linked YouTube channels in January 2023; ● Terminated 207 IRA-linked YouTube channels and 10 IRA-linked Blogger blogs in February 2023; ● Terminated 112 IRA-linked YouTube channels in March 2023; ● Terminated 5 IRA-linked YouTube channels in April 2023. <p>For additional examples, see the Q1 2023 and Q2 2023 TAG Bulletins.</p>
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	<p>Announced plans at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) to expand Jigsaw's 'prebunking' campaign to Germany.</p>	<p>In the fall and winter of 2022, Google piloted Jigsaw's 'prebunking' campaign in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia, to preemptively fight against narratives scapegoating Ukrainian refugees. Jigsaw developed a series of six short videos prebunking then emerging disinformation narratives and the rhetorical tactics used to press them. These narratives were identified through interviews conducted with experts in Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, including Demagog, the Polish National Research Institute NASK, and One World in Schools. One video focused on narratives scapegoating Ukrainian refugees for the escalating cost of living while the other highlighted fearmongering over Ukrainian refugees' purported violent and dangerous nature.</p> <p>The initiative proved so effective that Google just launched a new prebunking campaign in Germany, in partnership with Moonshot and local experts with expertise in the content safety, media literacy, and misinformation in the German context: Correctiv, Alfred Landecker Foundation, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Das NETZ, klicksafe, and Neue Deutsche Medienmacher*innen.</p>	<p>The pilot campaign was launched in September 2022 and ran until January 2023, reaching almost a third of the Polish, Czech and Slovak populations, garnering over 38 million views. The share of viewers who could correctly identify the misinformation tactics (fearmongering or scapegoating) increased by as much as 8 percentage points after viewing one of these videos.</p>
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		The campaign focuses on commonly used disinformation techniques such as fearmongering and decontextualization.	
Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels	Google Advertising		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Google Search		
	Deploys features that enhance access to trusted information on Search.	Globally, Google has surfaced features on Search to provide quick access to authoritative information, including highlighting news coverage from trusted sources and other helpful context about the invasion. See below for details on features in Ukraine.	N/A
Displays an 'SOS Alert' on Google Search in Ukraine and Eastern Europe and works with expert organisations to source helpful humanitarian information.	Google Search features an 'SOS Alert' in Ukraine that provides refugees with information in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. This includes links to UNHCR's Ukraine Help pages and hotline, safety tips from the ICRC, and a link to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Foreign student emergency info hotline. Google Search also launched an 'SOS Alert' in Poland that provides refugees with information in English, Polish, and Ukrainian, including links to the 'I Help Ukrainians Hub' created by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland and the 'Information for Ukrainian	See overall metrics in SLI 22.7.1. Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.	

		citizens' page hosted by the Polish Office for Foreigners.	
	Displayed content advisories when results for a query are rapidly evolving, providing a message that lets users know the topic may still be developing.	This notice is particularly important during the crisis, given how quickly new search terms are developing. In such cases, it is helpful to alert users to the fact that a new search term or query is so new that authoritative information has not been published yet on the open web. Among other languages, these notices are launched in Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.	See SLI 17.1.1 for metrics on the impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results. Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
	To help the increasing number of refugees in the region, Google developed ways for businesses to flag if they are providing services to refugees.	Hotel owners in countries neighbouring Ukraine can indicate on their Business Profile whether they are offering free or discounted accommodations for refugees. Local businesses can post to their Business Profile on Search and Maps to offer various services and aid to refugees from Ukraine.	Google Search will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
YouTube			
	YouTube continues to surface videos from authoritative sources in search results and recommendations.	Following a major news event, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the 'Breaking News' panel may continue to appear in YouTube search results for relevant queries, showing users developing stories from news sources	Between 21 February 2022 and 30 September 2022, videos on YouTube's breaking news and top news shelves on its homepage have received more than 100 million views in Ukraine.

		<p>that follow Google News Content Policies.</p> <p>In March 2022, YouTube launched a crisis resource panel in Ukraine (English, Russian, and Ukrainian languages) that appears in search results for queries related to displacement or refugees. As of the submission of this report, the panel continues to link to an emergency phone number and timely displacement information from the United Nations Agency for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide information for ‘people on the move’ (i.e. ‘displaced people’).</p>	
	<p>YouTube continues to provide features to enhance access to trusted information, including Information Panels in local languages on YouTube.</p>	<p>Information panels giving topical context may be displayed when searching for or watching videos related to topics prone to misinformation, such as the invasion of Ukraine; panels may appear at the top of search results or under a video being watched. The panels provide basic background information, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more context on a topic and link to the third-party partner’s website.</p> <p>Specifically, when one searches for a displacement or refugee-related query on YouTube, they may see emergency information and resources from the</p>	<p>Impressions of YouTube information panels were shown to users in EEA Member States, in Q3 2022 over 1.5 billion times.</p>

		<p>United Nations. The information is available across Ukraine, in English, Ukrainian and Russian; in Romania in Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, English; in Poland in English, Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish. In Ukraine, YouTube surfaces information from the United Nations Agency for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide information for 'people on the move' ('displaced people'). In Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Czechia, and Slovakia, YouTube surfaces timely displacement information from the respective country's government and NGOs.</p> <p>Information panels providing publisher context may be displayed if a channel is owned by a news publisher that is funded by a government or publicly funded. The information panel explains how the publisher is funded and provides a link to the publisher's Wikipedia page; it will appear directly under the video next to the information icon and is meant to give users additional information to help better understand the sources of news content on YouTube.</p>	
Google, on behalf of related services			

	Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts.	Access to authoritative information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google worked closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas, and to feature information on Search and Maps about shelter, humanitarian services, and aid points. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU	Google Advertising		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Google Search		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	YouTube		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Google, on behalf of related services		
Hosted Fighting Misinformation Online (FMO) and Google Safety Engineering Center (GSEC) events to discuss commitments to tackling Russian disinformation in and outside the CEE region.	Google hosted several FMO events in H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023) to discuss commitments to tackling Russian disinformation. Events were held with civil society, academic, media and policy groups in Helsinki, Finland in February 2023, Vilnius, Lithuania in April 2023, and Bratislava, Slovakia, Vilnius, Lithuania, and Brussels, Belgium in June 2023.	In H1 2023, several events were held across and outside the CEE region. Additional online content was also made available to extend the reach.	

		<p>Google also launched a newsletter to those signed up to attend the FMO events with a spotlight on Filter, a Ukrainian Media Literacy organisation.</p> <p>Similarly, CEE countries covered by the GSEC in H1 2023 include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Outside of the CEE, the GSEC hosted in-person misinformation sessions in Belgium, Germany and Ireland and hosted virtual sessions for Montenegro and Northern Europe Key Opinion Formers (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands). Google also presented to the French Ministry of Interior in Dublin.</p>	
	<p>Partnered with the Lviv Media Forum and the Thomson Foundation to provide training for Ukrainian news organisations.</p>	<p>Access to authoritative content and news is especially critical during times of crisis and war. Google partnered with the Lviv Media Forum and the Thomson Foundation in December 2022 and January 2023 to provide a four-part training program for Ukrainian news organisations on engaging diaspora audiences and combating misinformation, among other topics. The findings were published in a handbook and distributed for free across the Ukrainian news industry network.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	<p>Partners with organisations focused on media literacy through the Google News Initiative, including support of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).</p>	<p>On 29 November 2022, Google announced \$13.2 million to the IFCN at the nonprofit Poynter Institute to launch a new Global Fact Check Fund to support their network of 135 fact-checking organisations from 65 countries covering over 80 languages. Building on previous work to address misinformation, this is Google’s single largest financial contribution to fact-checking. In June 2023, IFCN independently selected 35 organisations covering 45 countries to receive (Build) funding, including an organisation from Ukraine.</p>	<p>Since 2018, the Google News Initiative has invested nearly \$75 million in projects and partnerships working to strengthen media literacy and combat misinformation around the world. The \$13.2 million grant to the IFCN builds on that commitment.</p>
	<p>Helped launch the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) to 'strengthen media literacy skills, fight misinformation and support fact-checking' over 5 years (2021-2026).</p>	<p>The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund’s support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications.</p>	<p>In 2021, Google contributed €25M EUR to help launch the EMIF. By the end of May 2023, 47 projects were granted €6.4M EUR, with the list of selected grantees here. The list of funded projects includes €1.93M EUR for 8 specific efforts in research and investigations into misinformation. The list also includes 13 funded projects which include a focus on misinformation specifically connected to the war in Ukraine.</p>

	<p>Protecting users from harmful disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine.</p>	<p>In March 2022, Sundar Pichai visited Warsaw and committed an additional \$10 million to this effort, including new partnerships with think tanks and civil society organisations to conduct region-specific research on misinformation and cash grants to support fact-checking networks and nonprofits. Additional information on how Google is supporting the refugee crisis can be found here.</p> <p>In March 2023, Google committed 5 million euros in funding to specialised NGOs using the Be Internet Awesome curriculum to advance media literacy and expand online safety training across Northern, Central and Eastern Europe. €3.5 million of this investment is funding the School with Class for kids initiative.</p>	<p>Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.</p>
<p>Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis</p>	<p>Google Advertising</p>		
	<p>Paused Google AdSenses' monetisation of Russian Federation state-funded media.</p>	<p>Beginning in February 2022, Google AdSense prohibited the monetisation of any Russian Federation state-funded media (i.e. sites, apps, YouTube channels). It is important to note that Google's current Publisher Policies and advertiser-friendly guidelines already prohibited many forms of content related to the invasion of Ukraine from monetising. In addition, Google</p>	<p>Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.</p>

		Advertising paused the monetisation of content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the invasion across services.	
Google Search			
	N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube			
	In 2022, YouTube indefinitely paused access to monetization privileges for Russian state-funded news media channels, in addition to continuing to review eligibility to the YouTube Partner Program for existing partners.	In light of the war in Ukraine, YouTube indefinitely paused access to monetization privileges for Russian state-funded media channels globally, in addition to continuing to review eligibility to the YouTube Partner Program for existing partners, including those in Russia. YouTube continues to actively monitor the situation and make adjustments as necessary.	In light of the ongoing war in Ukraine, YouTube suspended monetization privileges for over 300 channels, including those with ties to Russia.
	In 2022, YouTube temporarily paused ads from serving users based in Russia.	As part of Google’s recent suspension of ads in Russia, it also paused ads on Google properties, including YouTube, and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia. In addition, creators in Russia will not be able to complete new YouTube Partner Program (YPP) sign-ups at this time. These updates are meant to clarify, and in some cases expand, YouTube’s guidance as it relates to the invasion.	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information for future reports.
	In March 2022, YouTube paused access to all monetisation features for users in Russia, including users’ ability to	Enforcement of this policy aims to help stop the spread of misinformation and disrupt disinformation campaigns online.	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation.

	complete new sign-ups for the YouTube Partner Program. This policy was enforced under YouTube's Channel Monetisation Policies .	As a result, viewers in Russia cannot see ads or monetisation features like Channel Memberships, SuperChat, Super Stickers, or Merch. This also means YouTube creators temporarily stop earning revenue from users. These updates are meant to clarify, and in some cases expand, YouTube's guidance as it relates to the invasion.	YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information for future reports.
Google, on behalf of related services			
	Paused the vast majority of commercial activity in Russia.	Google has paused activities including serving Google ads in Russia; advertising globally for advertisers based in Russia; Play's billing system (users cannot purchase apps or make in-app purchases); payment-related services including via Google Pay; Premium/paid YouTube features, and new Cloud sign ups. In 2023, in compliance with EU sanctions, Google stopped monetization for Russia based creators, including views outside of Russia.	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in the future.
Measures taken to prevent malicious advertising	Google Advertising		
	Paused ads serving in Russia and ads that exploit the war since March 2022.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google paused ads containing content that exploits , dismisses, or condones the war.	N/A

		As part of Google Advertising’s suspension of ads in Russia , Google paused all ads on Google properties and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia.	
	Paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media since February 2022 and added new regions and individuals to the list of entities or individuals that are restricted under applicable trade sanctions and export compliance laws.	Google also paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media . In addition, Ads are not available to any entities or individuals that are restricted under applicable trade sanctions and export compliance laws . Currently, there are embargoes on Crimea, Cuba, so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), Iran, North Korea and Syria.	N/A
Google Search			
	N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube			
	In 2022, YouTube temporarily paused ads from serving users based in Russia.	As part of Google’s recent suspension of ads in Russia, it also paused ads on Google properties, including YouTube, and networks globally for advertisers based in Russia. In addition, creators in Russia will not be able to complete new YouTube Partner Program (YPP) sign-ups at this time. These updates are meant to clarify, and in some cases expand,	YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information for future reports.

		YouTube's guidance as it relates to the invasion.	
	Google, on behalf of related services		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTPs	Google Advertising		
	Enforced the Coordinated Deceptive Practices Policy which prohibits advertisers from promoting content related to public concerns while misrepresenting or concealing their identity or country or origin. Enforced Google's Clickbait Ads Policy which prohibits ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action.	Accounts found to be engaging in Coordinated Deceptive Practices are suspended immediately and without prior warning. Clickbait ads are disapproved upon detection. Repeated violations of this policy can lead to an account suspension.	Google Advertising will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
	Google Search		
	Continued to enforce spam and webmaster policies.	See more details about Google Search's implementation of its spam and webmaster policies in the response to QRE 14.1.2.	See overall spam metrics in SLI 14.2.1. Google Search is unable to provide Spam metrics specific to this crisis event.
	YouTube		
Since March 2022, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the invasion of Ukraine, focusing on the	Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Bulletin is released each quarter and includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, including YouTube. It	TAG provides updates about these operations in the quarterly TAG Bulletin .	

	<p>safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.</p>	<p>is YouTube’s primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues. The TAG Bulletin is global in scope, and will include action taken that’s related to a European Union Member State. In February 2023, TAG published ‘The Fog of War’ providing insights into changes in the cyber threat landscape triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), TAG published its quarterly reports (Q1 2023, Q2 2023) as well as additional updates on cyber on the threat landscape from the war in Ukraine.’</p>	<p>YouTube prioritises the identification and removal of harmful misinformation. YouTube looks forward to exploring opportunities to provide more granular information regarding enforcement of certain YouTube policies in future reports.</p>
Google, on behalf of related services			
	<p>Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative — including compromise assessments, incident response services, shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.</p>	<p>This level of collective defence – between governments, companies and security stakeholders across the world – was unprecedented in scope. In February 2023, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG), with additional research from Mandiant and Google Trust & Safety, published a report reflecting on this work, sharing Google’s learnings with the global security community to help prepare better defences for the future. It outlines Google’s analysis of these issues and includes observations informed by over two decades of</p>	<p>N/A</p>

		<p>experience managing complex global security events, as well as several broader forward looking assessments for the security community for 2023.</p> <p>The report details how Moscow leverages the full spectrum of information operations, including disinformation, to shape public perception of war and can be seen here: 'Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape'.</p>	
	<p>Announced a new Online Safety and Security Partnership with the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) to provide free security training and tools to high-risk users. Google's new partnership with IFES combines Google's account security tools, like the Advanced Protection Program (APP), and IFES's history in supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections management bodies.</p>	<p>IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across the world, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Security training: In collaboration with Google's Safety Engineering Center, IFES will expand its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices and create content for specialised audiences. ● Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries: Google's tools and resources for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES's international networks, helping more people use things like 	<p>In February 2023, Google committed to providing 100,000 Titan Security Keys to high-risk individuals at no cost.</p>

		<p>Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google’s strongest form of account security for high-risk users, Google Titan Security Keys, Project Shield, a free tool to help protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Industry thought leadership and case studies: IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES’s partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its Threat Analysis Group (TAG) to help IFES further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process. 	
	<p>Expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google’s free protection against DDoS attack, so that Ukrainian government websites, embassies worldwide and other governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves and continue to offer their crucial services.</p>	<p>Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks. In H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023), Project Shield expanded eligibility to</p>	<p>As of 16 February 2023, over 200 websites in Ukraine, including Ukrainian government and embassy websites, are using Project Shield’s service for protection against DDoS attacks.</p>

		select government entities under exigent circumstances.	
	Added websites and domains identified as threats to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.	Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the invasion of Ukraine. Google sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
	Automatically increased Google account security protections (including more frequent authentication challenges) for people in Ukraine and the surrounding region.	Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection Program — which delivers Google’s highest level of security — is currently protecting the accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine.	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
	Monitor safety and security of users in Ukraine and the surrounding region to help users access and share important information and take action against threat actors in this region.	Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) continues to disrupt campaigns from multiple sets of Russian government-backed attackers focused on the war in Ukraine. FROZENBARENTS (aka Sandworm), a group attributed to Russian Armed Forces’ Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) Unit 74455, continues to focus heavily on the war in Ukraine with campaigns spanning intelligence collection, information operations (IO), and leaking hacked data	In the first quarter of 2023, Russian government-backed phishing campaigns targeted users in Ukraine the most, with the country accounting for over 60% of observed Russian targeting. TAG’s takedowns reflect a steady pattern of Russian attempts to circumvent Google’s policies, details of which are reported in the Q1 2023 TAG Bulletin .

		<p>through Telegram. Throughout Q1 2023, FROZENBARENTS conducted multiple campaigns against energy sector organisations in Eastern Europe, delivering links to fake Windows update packages hosted on a domain spoofing the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). If executed, the fake update would run a variant of the Rhadamanthys stealer to exfiltrate stored credentials. In February and March 2023, another Russian GRU actor TAG tracks as FROZENLAKE (aka APT28) sent multiple large waves of phishing emails to hundreds of users in Ukraine. Starting in early February 2023, TAG saw FROZENLAKE using reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) on multiple Ukrainian government websites to redirect users to phishing pages - a new TTP for the group. TAG also observed PUSHCHA, a Belarusian threat actor, consistently targeting users in Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Their phishing campaigns typically target regional webmail providers such as i.ua, meta.ua and similar services and are targeted, focused on small numbers of users in Ukraine. Further insights on attacker trends from primarily January - March 2023 are available here.</p>	
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		<p>Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation. TAG also sends affected targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity and encourages anyone who might be a potential target to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated. TAG remains committed to identifying bad actors, disrupting their campaigns, and sharing relevant information with others across industry and governments to raise awareness, protect users and prevent future attacks.</p>	
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation	Google Advertising		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Google Search		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	YouTube		
<p>YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.</p>	<p>Google, including YouTube, continues to provide publicly available data via Google Trends, which provides access to a largely unfiltered sample of actual search requests made to Google Search and YouTube’s search function. Sharing Google Trends Data allows YouTube to display interest in a particular topic from</p>	<p>The following metrics are not specific to the Russia/Ukraine crisis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The number of users who initiated research about YouTube on the Google Trends platform from within EEA Member States 	

		<p>around the globe or down to city-level geography.</p> <p>In 2022, YouTube established the YouTube Researcher Program which equips researchers from around the world with data, tools, and support to advance the public's understanding of the YouTube platform and its impact. The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for academic researchers affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution.</p>	<p>during Q3 2022 was over 75,000.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The YouTube Research Program had 41 applicants from EEA Member States during H1 2023 (1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023). • Median application resolution time was 7.5 days for the YouTube Research Program for applicants from EEA Member States during H1 2023. • SLI 26.2.1 contains more information on applications received, approved, rejected or under review by the YouTube Researcher Program in H1 2023, broken down by EEA Member States.
Google, on behalf of related services			
	<p>Announced new long-term partnerships across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), a region considered highly vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda due to its geographic proximity to the war in Ukraine.</p>	<p>In the Baltics, Google entered into long-term partnership with the Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Center for Media Excellence, two established and well-respected organisations, to provide funding to build on their impactful work towards increasing</p>	<p>The Civic Resilience Initiative and the Baltic Center for Media Excellence will receive €1.3 million in funding from Google as part of Google's commitment to invest \$10M to address misinformation and</p>

		<p>media literacy, building further resilience and actively tackling disinformation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.</p> <p>Furthermore, Google partnered with the Charles University in Prague, the main research centre of the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO) project, to further expand its research into information disorders (such as misinformation, disinformation or clickbait), and work to increase the level of media and digital literacy in Poland, Czechia and Slovakia.</p>	<p>disinformation surrounding the invasion of Ukraine</p> <p>As part of that commitment, Google is also providing €1 million in funding for CEDMO.</p>
	<p>Forged partnerships with think tanks and civil society organisations to conduct region-specific research into misinformation and disinformation and rolled out cash grants to support fact-checking networks and nonprofits.</p>	<p>As an information company, Google takes its responsibility seriously to provide reliable, trustworthy information to people when they need it. A big part of the challenge is addressing misinformation spreading about the realities and facts of the invasion of Ukraine. Google committed funding to this effort, including new partnerships with think tanks and civil society organisations to conduct region-specific research into misinformation and disinformation, as well as cash grants to support fact-checking networks and nonprofits.</p>	<p>Techsoup Europe received a \$2.5 million Google.org grant to help civil society organisations across Central and Eastern Europe leverage technology to fight disinformation at scale. This grant is part of Google’s commitment to invest \$10M to address misinformation and disinformation surrounding the invasion of Ukraine.</p>

	Expanded the Google Priority Flagger Program to countries across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).	As part of Google’s commitment to fight misinformation in the context of the Ukraine / Russia war, Google expanded the Priority Flagger Program to now be available in 10 countries across CEE (EE, LV, LT, PL, SK, HU, RO, MD, UA, BG). The program provides channels for participating organisations to notify Google of content on its products and services that may violate Google policies and Community Guidelines. 20+ local organisations are now actively contributing to the program, ranging from both government and civil society sectors, among them Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation .	Onboarded 20+ entities in CEE, including Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation .
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis	Google Advertising		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Google Search		
	N/A	N/A	N/A
	YouTube		
	See response for ‘Google, on behalf of related services’ below.	See response for ‘Google, on behalf of related services’ below.	See response for ‘Google, on behalf of related services’ below.
	Google, on behalf of related services		
Adapted to ensure the well-being of employees and extended workforce and enlisted existing practices and policies to apply to the crisis.	Since the start of the invasion, Google teams set to work around the clock to support people in Ukraine through Google products, defend against cybersecurity threats, surface	Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.	

		<p>high-quality, reliable information and ensure the safety and security of colleagues and their families in the region. Google coordinated a response internally including employees and extended workforce, and enlisted existing practices and policies to apply to the crisis.</p>	
	<p>Committed funding and continued in-kind support, including Google.org Fellowships, office space, and education resources, to help the humanitarian aid efforts on the ground in Central and Eastern Europe.</p>	<p>As part of Google’s funding for humanitarian aid, as well as longer-term refugee support and recovery efforts, Google donated \$1 million to Vostok, an organisation in Ukraine that is helping respond to urgent needs including supplying food and hygiene products and assisting with the evacuation of immobile people. Google also provided Google.org Fellowships to four organisations, which are already delivering critical support in the region: International Rescue Committee, Tech to the Rescue, NeedsList and East Europe Foundation. For example, a team of Google.org Fellows worked with the International Rescue Committee to expand the Googler-co-founded United for Ukraine platform, which has already reached 5 million people, as well as helping nearly 300,000 refugees access information to cross the border and</p>	<p>Through Google.org and Google employees, Google provided over \$50 million in cash funding to nonprofits responding to the war in Ukraine. In addition, Google provided \$8.2 million in donated Search advertising, over \$12M in in-kind giving and four Google.org Fellowships for humanitarian relief efforts amounting to over 36,000 pro-bono hours.</p>

		<p>matching 15,000 refugees with temporary accommodation.</p> <p>At Google’s office in Warsaw, one of the nonprofits Google is supporting — Our Choice Foundation, which operates Ukrainian House — continues to work from one floor in Google’s building. About 60 representatives from the organisation use the space as a regular office where the team organises all kinds of assistance for Ukrainian refugees arriving in Poland, including finding a place to stay, helping enrol kids in school, searching for a job, and registering for language courses. Finally, all of Google’s 50,000 donated Chromebooks for schools have been delivered throughout Ukraine and an estimated 1.5 million students are using the devices for continuity of education (both online and offline). Google also extended free access to premium Google Workspace for Education features for 250 universities and colleges until the end of August 2023.</p>	
	<p>Offer assistance to Google colleagues in Ukraine.</p>	<p>Since January 2022, Google’s local Security and People Operations teams have been working to provide assistance to Ukrainian team members and their families. Help provided includes physical</p>	<p>Google will explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.</p>

		security support, paid leave, assistance options and reimbursement for housing, travel and food for anyone forced to leave their homes.	
	Invested in the Central and Eastern Europe region to support people and businesses affected by the invasion.	<p>In March 2022, Google announced the purchase and development of The Warsaw HUB, a modern office complex in the heart of Poland’s capital city. This investment followed the 2021 opening of Google’s new office in Warsaw, hiring of over 250 people, and launch of a Google Cloud region in Poland.</p> <p>Additionally, Google provides safe accommodation for Googlers and their families (upon request) and ad hoc support together with POps such as winter and energy crisis preparation</p> <p>Google believes in the strength and future of Central and Eastern Europe, and when the invasion ends, will be here for Ukraine and the region for the long haul.</p>	Google will invest nearly \$700 million in the purchase and further development of The Warsaw HUB, resulting in a capacity for 2500 employees, with potential for future growth.
	Help support Ukrainians to maintain their livelihoods given the war’s significant impact on the Ukrainian economy.	The Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund helps entrepreneurs across Ukraine working in extraordinary circumstances to ensure that their businesses maintain liquidity, continue operations and incentivize further investment. Since launching the fund,	Since March 2022, Google for Startups has funded and coached three cohorts of the \$5 million Ukraine Support Fund . From March 2022 to March 2023, the 58 Ukraine Support Fund recipients have

		<p>many of the startups Google supported have been able to expand to new markets, have raised follow-on funding, and have been recognized as creating the world's top inventions, like Esper Bionics. More than 60 representatives from Ukrainian startups continue to work from the Google for Startups Campus in Warsaw, Poland. Google gathered with many founders at the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund Summit in Warsaw on 30 March 2023, helping them to build critical connections with international investors.</p>	<p>gone on to raise \$10.2 million in funding, grow revenues by an average of 106%, employ more than 800 tech workers - 46% women - and hire 216 people.</p>
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