

Code of Conduct on
Disinformation – Report of
Meta for the period 01 July
to 31 December 2025

Executive summary

We are pleased to share our seventh report under the 2022 Code of Conduct on Disinformation, which also draws from our work with the Code's Taskforce. In accordance with the subscription form submitted by Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Meta) in January 2025, this report is being submitted by Meta in respect of the Facebook, Messenger, and Instagram services and on behalf of WhatsApp Ireland Limited in respect of the WhatsApp messaging service.

The aim of this report is to provide an update on how Meta approached misinformation and disinformation in the European Union (the EU) and, where relevant, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland (together, the EEA) between July and December 2025. We have additionally included any pertinent updates which occurred after the reporting period, where relevant in the report. Highlights include:

- **Elections:** The National Elections chapter provides an overview of our work on elections within the EEA, detailing our core policies, processes, and implementation strategies. It outlines our comprehensive approach to those elections, which continued for elections held in the second half of 2025. The election responses covered in this report include Norway, Czech Republic, Ireland and the Netherlands elections.
- **Expanding GenAI Transparency for Meta's Ads Products:** We began gradually rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative videos using a risk-based framework. When a video is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technology change.
- **Media literacy:** Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy in the EU and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram. It also provided details on specific media literacy initiatives run by Meta, including its work on digital citizenship, its media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital, and its election literacy programs.
- **Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour trends:** We are sharing insights into a covert influence operation that we disrupted in Poland and Belarus in the second half of 2025. We detected and removed these campaigns before they were able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

Here are a few of the figures which can be found throughout the report:

- From 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025, we removed over 11,000,000 ads from Facebook and Instagram, of which over 6,000,000 ads were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation policy.
- From 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025, we labelled over 810,000 ads on both Facebook and Instagram with "paid for by" disclaimers.
- We removed 1 network for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy which targeted one or more countries in the EEA (effectively or potentially). We also took steps to remove fake accounts, prioritising the removal of fake accounts that seek to cause harm. In Q3 2025, we took action against 692M fake accounts and in Q4 2025, we took action against 1.1B fake accounts on Facebook globally. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide daily active people (DAP) on Facebook during Q3 2025 and 5% during Q4 2025.

This report addresses the practices implemented for Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp within the EEA during the reporting period of H2 2025. In alignment with Meta's [public announcements on 7 January 2025](#), we continue to evaluate the applicability of these practices to Meta products. We also regularly review the appropriateness of making adjustments in response to changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Please note this report was updated in June 2026.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
1	<u>Measure 1.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 1.6</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<u>Measure 2.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 2.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 2.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 2.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<u>Measure 3.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 3.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 3.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
III. Political advertising					
4	<u>Measure 4.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 4.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	<u>Measure 5.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	<u>Measure 6.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 6.5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	<u>Measure 7.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 7.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 7.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	<u>Measure 8.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 8.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	<u>Measure 9.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 9.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	<u>Measure 10.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 10.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	<u>Measure 11.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 11.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	<u>Measure 12.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 12.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 12.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	<u>Measure 13.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 13.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 13.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IV. Integrity of services					
14	<u>Measure 14.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 14.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 14.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	<u>Measure 15.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 15.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	<u>Measure 16.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 16.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
V. Empowering users					
17	<u>Measure 17.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 17.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 17.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	<u>Measure 18.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 18.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 18.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	<u>Measure 19.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 19.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	<u>Measure 20.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 20.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	<u>Measure 21.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 21.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 21.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22	<u>Measure 22.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.6</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 22.7</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	<u>Measure 23.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 23.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	<u>Measure 24.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25	<u>Measure 25.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 25.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VI. Empowering the research community					
26	<u>Measure 26.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 26.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 26.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

27	<u>Measure 27.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 27.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	<u>Measure 28.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 28.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29	<u>Measure 29.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 29.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 29.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community						
30	<u>Measure 30.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 30.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31	<u>Measure 31.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 31.4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32	<u>Measure 32.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 32.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 32.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33	<u>Measure 33.1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
VIII. Transparency Centre						
34	<u>Measure 34.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 34.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 34.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
35	<u>Measure 35.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 35.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
36	<u>Measure 36.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 36.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 36.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IX. Permanent Taskforce					
37	<u>Measure 37.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 37.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	<u>Measure 38.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
39	-	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
40	<u>Measure 40.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 40.6</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
41	<u>Measure 41.1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<u>Measure 41.2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Measure 41.3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43	-	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
44	-	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 – 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	N/A

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We are in the process of expanding advertiser delivery reports to more Facebook ad placements. - We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We are in the process of expanding advertiser delivery reports to more Facebook ad placements. - We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.

Measure 1.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.1.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	N/A	N/A

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid¹ or impression²) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Taskforce of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

¹ Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

² Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

SLI 1.1.2 – Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	N/A	N/A
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Measure 1.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.2.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.2.1	N/A	N/A

Measure 1.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.3.1	<p>We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details].</p> <p>These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.</p>	<p>We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details].</p> <p>These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.</p>
Measure 1.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.4.1	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.
Measure 1.5	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.5.1	The Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG) audits Meta as part of its Certified Against Fraud and Brand Safety Certified accreditations. This audit supports the documentation of Meta's Content Monetization Policy and Advertising Standards Policy which both prohibit the monetization and advertisement of misinformation.	The Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG) audits Meta as part of its Certified Against Fraud and Brand Safety Certified accreditations. This audit supports the documentation of Meta's Content Monetization Policy and Advertising Standards Policy which both prohibit the monetization and advertisement of misinformation.
QRE 1.5.2	While Meta is not seeking further first-party Media Rating Council (MRC) accreditation, we remain committed to supporting the auditing efforts of our third-party partners.	While Meta is not seeking further first-party Media Rating Council (MRC) accreditation, we remain committed to supporting the auditing efforts of our third-party partners.

Measure 1.6	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.6.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.6.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.6.3	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.6.4	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.6.1	N/A	N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	N/A

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 2.1	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 2.1.1	Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of service, our <u>Community Standards</u> and our <u>Advertising Standards</u> . Meta's Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Misinformation Community Standard or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. See more here .	Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of service, our <u>Community Standards</u> and our <u>Advertising Standards</u> . Meta's Advertising Standards prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Misinformation Community Standard or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. See more here .	
SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. 	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census

	inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025		interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	
Country				
Austria	Over 7,000	Over 350,000	Over 7,000	Over 350,000
Belgium	Over 15,000	Over 200,000	Over 15,000	Over 200,000
Bulgaria	Over 4,600	Over 1,500,000	Over 4,600	Over 1,500,000
Croatia	Over 2,300	Over 580,000	Over 2,300	Over 580,000
Cyprus	Over 4,800	Over 250,000	Over 4,800	Over 250,000
Czech Republic	Over 10,000	Over 96,000	Over 10,000	Over 96,000
Denmark	Over 4,800	Over 180,000	Over 4,800	Over 180,000
Estonia	Over 2,700	Over 700	Over 2,700	Over 700
Finland	Over 3,200	Over 660,000	Over 3,200	Over 660,000
France	Over 17,000	Over 460,000	Over 17,000	Over 460,000
Germany	Over 23,000	Over 21,000	Over 23,000	Over 21,000
Greece	Over 5,000	Over 100,000	Over 5,000	Over 100,000
Hungary	Over 30,000	Over 220,000	Over 30,000	Over 220,000
Iceland	Over 4,800	Over 350,000	Over 4,800	Over 350,000
Ireland	Over 3,900	Over 1,100,000	Over 3,900	Over 1,100,000
Italy	Over 25,000	Over 210,000	Over 25,000	Over 210,000
Latvia	Over 2,200	Over 480,000	Over 2,200	Over 480,000
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Over 44,000	Less than 100	Over 44,000
Lithuania	Over 3,200	Over 340,000	Over 3,200	Over 340,000
Luxembourg	Over 680	Over 89,000	Over 680	Over 89,000

Malta	Over 870	Over 100,000	Over 870	Over 100,000
Netherlands	Over 7,500	Over 640,000	Over 7,500	Over 640,000
Norway	Over 3,200	Over 96,000	Over 3,200	Over 96,000
Poland	Over 15,000	Over 350,000	Over 15,000	Over 350,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 46,000	Over 2,500	Over 46,000
Romania	Over 28,000	Over 150,000	Over 28,000	Over 150,000
Slovakia	Over 7,600	Over 230,000	Over 7,600	Over 230,000
Slovenia	Over 980	Over 440,000	Over 980	Over 440,000
Spain	Over 9,900	Over 730,000	Over 9,900	Over 730,000
Sweden	Over 8,700	Over 1,000,000	Over 8,700	Over 1,000,000
Total	Over 250,000	Over 11,000,000	Over 250,000	Over 11,000,000

Measure 2.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.2.1	<p>Meta’s Advertising Standards, prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Misinformation Community Standard or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta technologies. See our Advertising Standards for more information.</p> <p>To identify ads and promoted content that may contravene policies and assess whether or not they are in fact violating before taking enforcement action, Meta uses the following tools, methods, and partnerships:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Automated tools and human review: Meta proactively reviews all advertisements before publication, implementing an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. This process uses automated detection systems combined with human review to identify policy-violating ads. The review covers ad components (images, video, text, targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations. 	<p>Meta’s Advertising Standards, prohibit any ad that is identified as violating our Misinformation Community Standard or any ad that includes content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers. Advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise across Meta technologies. See our Advertising Standards for more information.</p> <p>To identify ads and promoted content that may contravene policies and assess whether or not they are in fact violating before taking enforcement action, Meta uses the following tools, methods, and partnerships:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Automated tools and human review: Meta proactively reviews all advertisements before publication, implementing an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. This process uses automated detection systems combined with human review to identify policy-violating ads. The review covers ad components (images, video, text, targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations.

	<p>video, text, targeting information) as well as associated landing pages and other destinations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Fact-checker review</u>: In the EU, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations (3PFCs) certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). 3PFCs assess the accuracy of content and rate it as False, Partly False, Altered, or Missing Context. Any ad containing content rated as such by these fact-checkers is prohibited and advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may face restrictions on their ability to advertise, including reduced reach or loss of monetisation. - Influence Operations Research Archive: Meta shares information with qualified external researchers to enable research on influence operations. Data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy is made available through the IO Research Archive, housed in the <u>Meta Content Library</u>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Fact-checker review</u>: In the EU, Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations (3PFCs) certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). 3PFCs assess the accuracy of content and rate it as False, Partly False, Altered, or Missing Context. Any ad containing content rated as such by these fact-checkers is prohibited and advertisers that repeatedly post information deemed to be False or Altered may face restrictions on their ability to advertise, including reduced reach or loss of monetisation. - Influence Operations Research Archive: Meta shares information with qualified external researchers to enable research on influence operations. Data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy is made available through the IO Research Archive, housed in the <u>Meta Content Library</u>.
Measure 2.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.3.1	<p>Meta's ad review system is designed to ensure that ads on Facebook and Instagram comply with our Advertising Standards, Community Standards, and other Meta policies. The system operates through the following procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proactive and Reactive Review: All advertisements are proactively reviewed before publication, with an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. During this process, automated tools evaluate the ad's content – including images, text, titles, and landing pages – against our policies. We also monitor and investigate advertiser behaviour, reviewing Business Accounts and their assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts) for policy violations. Once an ad is live, it continues to be monitored and may be rejected for policy violations at any point. - Fact-checker review: Any ad containing content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by independent third-party fact-checkers is prohibited. Where fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, Meta uses technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook and Instagram. If ads are found to be identical or 	<p>Meta's ad review system is designed to ensure that ads on Facebook and Instagram comply with our Advertising Standards, Community Standards, and other Meta policies. The system operates through the following procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proactive and Reactive Review: All advertisements are proactively reviewed before publication, with an automatic 24-hour hold on distribution. During this process, automated tools evaluate the ad's content – including images, text, titles, and landing pages – against our policies. We also monitor and investigate advertiser behaviour, reviewing Business Accounts and their assets (ad accounts, Pages, and user accounts) for policy violations. Once an ad is live, it continues to be monitored and may be rejected for policy violations at any point. - Fact-checker review: Any ad containing content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by independent third-party fact-checkers is prohibited. Where fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, Meta uses technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook and Instagram. If ads are found to be identical or near-identical to content that fact-checkers have rated, they are rejected.

	near-identical to content that fact-checkers have rated, they are rejected.			
SLI 2.3.1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. 	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in the EEA from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EEA) from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Country				
Austria	Over 7,000	Over 350,000	Over 7,000	Over 350,000
Belgium	Over 15,000	Over 200,000	Over 15,000	Over 200,000
Bulgaria	Over 4,600	Over 1,500,000	Over 4,600	Over 1,500,000
Croatia	Over 2,300	Over 580,000	Over 2,300	Over 580,000
Cyprus	Over 4,800	Over 250,000	Over 4,800	Over 250,000
Czech Republic	Over 10,000	Over 96,000	Over 10,000	Over 96,000
Denmark	Over 4,800	Over 180,000	Over 4,800	Over 180,000
Estonia	Over 2,700	Over 700	Over 2,700	Over 700
Finland	Over 3,200	Over 660,000	Over 3,200	Over 660,000
France	Over 17,000	Over 460,000	Over 17,000	Over 460,000
Germany	Over 23,000	Over 21,000	Over 23,000	Over 21,000
Greece	Over 5,000	Over 100,000	Over 5,000	Over 100,000
Hungary	Over 30,000	Over 220,000	Over 30,000	Over 220,000
Iceland	Over 4,800	Over 350,000	Over 4,800	Over 350,000
Ireland	Over 3,900	Over 1,100,000	Over 3,900	Over 1,100,000
Italy	Over 25,000	Over 210,000	Over 25,000	Over 210,000

Latvia	Over 2,200	Over 480,000	Over 2,200	Over 480,000
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Over 44,000	Less than 100	Over 44,000
Lithuania	Over 3,200	Over 340,000	Over 3,200	Over 340,000
Luxembourg	Over 680	Over 89,000	Over 680	Over 89,000
Malta	Over 870	Over 100,000	Over 870	Over 100,000
Netherlands	Over 7,500	Over 640,000	Over 7,500	Over 640,000
Norway	Over 3,200	Over 96,000	Over 3,200	Over 96,000
Poland	Over 15,000	Over 350,000	Over 15,000	Over 350,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 46,000	Over 2,500	Over 46,000
Romania	Over 28,000	Over 150,000	Over 28,000	Over 150,000
Slovakia	Over 7,600	Over 230,000	Over 7,600	Over 230,000
Slovenia	Over 980	Over 440,000	Over 980	Over 440,000
Spain	Over 9,900	Over 730,000	Over 9,900	Over 730,000
Sweden	Over 8,700	Over 1,000,000	Over 8,700	Over 1,000,000
Total	Over 250,000	Over 11,000,000	Over 250,000	Over 11,000,000

Measure 2.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.4.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 2.4.1	N/A	N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

		C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
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We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:		Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram
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	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 3.1	Facebook	Instagram
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<p>QRE 3.1.1</p>	<p>Meta actively cooperates with partners to facilitate the integration and flow of information relevant to tackling harmful disinformation, via modes such as:</p> <p>Cooperation across industry and civil society: Meta works collaboratively across the broader information and monetization ecosystem to enable signal-sharing and partnerships that help identify and disrupt sources of harmful misinformation and disinformation.</p> <p>3PFC/EFCSN:In the EU, Meta integrates independent assessments of content quality through its cooperation with third party fact-checkers (3PFC) certified under the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to address misinformation on Facebook and Instagram. Fact-checkers will review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.</p> <p>Trusted Partners: In effort to remove misinformation or unverifiable rumours that contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm or violence, Meta works with Trusted Partners with experience in social media monitoring, an interest in learning about our Content Policies, and a commitment to keeping online communities safe</p> <p>Global security research community support: Meta shares threat indicators related to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) networks in our dedicated GitHub repository.</p> <p>EC: Meta collaborates with representatives of the European Commission (EC) as requested, to share disinformation threats. For example, we recently met with a working group, called the 'European Council's Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats', which recommends actions in response to shared disinformation threats, to discuss our work against CIB networks.</p>	<p>Meta actively cooperates with partners to facilitate the integration and flow of information relevant to tackling harmful disinformation, via modes such as:</p> <p>Cooperation across industry and civil society: Meta works collaboratively across the broader information and monetization ecosystem to enable signal-sharing and partnerships that help identify and disrupt sources of harmful misinformation and disinformation.</p> <p>3PFC/EFCSN:In the EU, Meta integrates independent assessments of content quality through its cooperation with third party fact-checkers (3PFC) certified under the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to address misinformation on Facebook and Instagram. Fact-checkers will review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.</p> <p>Trusted Partners: In effort to remove misinformation or unverifiable rumours that contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm or violence, Meta works with Trusted Partners with experience in social media monitoring, an interest in learning about our Content Policies, and a commitment to keeping online communities safe</p> <p>Global security research community support: Meta shares threat indicators related to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) networks in our dedicated GitHub repository.</p> <p>EC: Meta collaborates with representatives of the European Commission (EC) as requested, to share disinformation threats. For example, we recently met with a working group, called the 'European Council's Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats', which recommends actions in response to shared disinformation threats, to discuss our work against CIB networks.</p>
<p>Measure 3.2</p>	<p>Facebook</p>	<p>Instagram</p>
<p>QRE 3.2.1</p>	<p>Meta shares information on disinformation trends and TTPs with other CoCD Signatories and relevant fora via the CoCD Task-force.</p> <p>IO/CIB Bilateral Information Sharing with Industry Peers: Meta exchanges relevant information about influence operations, including foreign interference, with selected industry peers through established partnerships. Meta ensures that threat intelligence and technical</p>	<p>Information exchange: Meta shares information on disinformation trends and TTPs with other CoCD Signatories and relevant fora via the CoCD Task-force.</p> <p>IO/CIB Bilateral Information Sharing with Industry Peers: Meta exchanges relevant information about influence operations, including foreign interference, with selected industry peers through established partnerships.</p>

	<p>indicators are shared through secure channels and legal agreements with the partners.</p> <p>Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive is a secure repository established and operated by Meta’s Security Policy and Data Sharing Insights and Platform team. Its goal is to provide qualified external researchers with access to previously public content and data from networks that have been disrupted under Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy.</p> <p>CIB refers to networks managed by adversarial threat actors who engage in sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior, where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. Meta has publicly <u>reported</u> on adversarial threats since 2017.</p> <p>Ongoing Evaluation: Meta is evaluating further partnership opportunities and will provide updates as new collaborations are formalized.</p>	<p>Meta ensures that threat intelligence and technical indicators are shared through secure channels and legal agreements with the partners.</p> <p>The Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive is a secure repository established and operated by Meta’s Security Policy and Data Sharing Insights and Platform team. Its goal is to provide qualified external researchers with access to previously public content and data from networks that have been disrupted under Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy.</p> <p>CIB refers to networks managed by adversarial threat actors who engage in sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior, where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. Meta has publicly <u>reported</u> on adversarial threats since 2017.</p> <p>Ongoing Evaluation: Meta is evaluating further partnership opportunities and will provide updates as new collaborations are formalized.</p>
Measure 3.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.3.1	<p>Meta is working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.</p> <p>Meta collaborates with third parties creating a bidirectional flow of information and actions that help tackle purveyors of harmful disinformation. These collaborations support earlier detection, faster mitigation, and helps prevent the dissemination of advertising containing misinformation or disinformation. In line with <u>Meta’s Advertising Standards</u>, ads must not contain content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by third-party fact-checkers or otherwise violate Meta’s Community Standards. When such content is identified and flagged, Meta rejects these ads, thereby reducing the monetization of disinformation.</p> <p>Additionally, Meta shares information with qualified external researchers which enables them to conduct research on influence operations. The information is shared through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which provides data from networks disrupted under Meta’s <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy</u>. The IO Research Archive is housed in the <u>Meta Content Library (MCL)</u>.</p>	<p>Meta is working with fact-checkers to enforce the policies outlined under Commitments 1 and 2 above.</p> <p>Meta collaborates with third parties creating a bidirectional flow of information and actions that help tackle purveyors of harmful disinformation. These collaborations support earlier detection, faster mitigation, and helps prevent the dissemination of advertising containing misinformation or disinformation. In line with <u>Meta’s Advertising Standards</u>, ads must not contain content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, or Missing context by third-party fact-checkers or otherwise violate Meta’s Community Standards. When such content is identified and flagged, Meta rejects these ads, thereby reducing the monetization of disinformation.</p> <p>Meta shares information with qualified external researchers which enables them to conduct research on influence operations. The information is shared through the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which provides data from networks disrupted under Meta’s <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) policy</u>. The IO Research Archive is housed in the <u>Meta Content Library (MCL)</u>.</p>

III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of “political and issue advertising”.

	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	N/A

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 4.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 4.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	N/A	N/A
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 5

Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.

	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	N/A	N/A

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A
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Measure 5.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 5.1.1	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising						
Commitment 6						
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising						
This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.						
	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Messenger

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Do you plan to put further implementation	N/A	N/A	N/A

measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]			
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A	N/A

Measure 6.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 6.1.1	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Measure 6.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 6.2.1	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
QRE 6.2.2	Examples of political ad labeling may be found in the Ad Library. The Ad Library is Meta's most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.	Examples of political ad labeling may be found in the Ad Library. The Ad Library is Meta's most comprehensive ads transparency surface, providing a searchable view of ads across Meta technologies. It helps make advertising transparent by giving people more information about the ads they see. All ads about social issues, elections or politics, both active and inactive, are stored for seven years.

SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying “paid for by” disclaimers from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying “paid for by” disclaimers from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.
	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined
Country		
Austria	Over 15,000	Over 15,000
Belgium	Over 66,000	Over 66,000
Bulgaria	Over 2,200	Over 2,200
Croatia	Over 10,000	Over 10,000
Cyprus	Over 2,000	Over 2,000
Czech Republic	Over 24,000	Over 24,000
Denmark	Over 22,000	Over 22,000
Estonia	Over 5,600	Over 5,600
Finland	Over 5,800	Over 5,800
France	Over 17,000	Over 17,000
Germany	Over 47,000	Over 47,000
Greece	Over 13,000	Over 13,000
Hungary	Over 47,000	Over 47,000
Iceland	Over 870	Over 870
Ireland	Over 6,700	Over 6,700
Italy	Over 42,000	Over 42,000
Latvia	Over 3,000	Over 3,000
Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Less than 100
Lithuania	Over 3,200	Over 3,200
Luxembourg	Over 460	Over 460
Malta	Over 1,300	Over 1,300

Netherlands	Over 350,000	Over 350,000
Norway	Over 20,000	Over 20,000
Poland	Over 21,000	Over 21,000
Portugal	Over 14,000	Over 14,000
Romania	Over 10,000	Over 10,000
Slovakia	Over 19,000	Over 19,000
Slovenia	Over 1,600	Over 1,600
Spain	Over 13,000	Over 13,000
Sweden	Over 17,000	Over 17,000
Total	Over 810,000	Over 810,000

Measure 6.3	Facebook	Instagram	N/A
QRE 6.3.1	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	N/A
Measure 6.4	Facebook	Instagram	Messenger
QRE 6.4.1	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	N/A
Measure 6.5	N/A	N/A	Messenger
QRE 6.5.1	N/A	N/A	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 7.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.1.1	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.
	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 in EEA Member States.
Country		
Austria	Over 290,000	Over 290,000
Belgium	Over 260,000	Over 260,000
Bulgaria	Over 63,000	Over 63,000
Croatia	Over 79,000	Over 79,000
Cyprus	Over 44,000	Over 44,000
Czech Republic	Over 220,000	Over 220,000
Denmark	Over 230,000	Over 230,000
Estonia	Over 42,000	Over 42,000
Finland	Over 160,000	Over 160,000
France	Over 260,000	Over 260,000
Germany	Over 770,000	Over 770,000
Greece	Over 190,000	Over 190,000
Hungary	Over 480,000	Over 480,000
Iceland	Over 1,800	Over 1,800
Ireland	Over 68,000	Over 68,000

Italy	Over 800,000	Over 800,000
Latvia	Over 32,000	Over 32,000
Liechtenstein	Over 330	Over 330
Lithuania	Over 47,000	Over 47,000
Luxembourg	Over 15,000	Over 15,000
Malta	Over 25,000	Over 25,000
Netherlands	Over 270,000	Over 270,000
Norway	Over 12,000	Over 12,000
Poland	Over 340,000	Over 340,000
Portugal	Over 72,000	Over 72,000
Romania	Over 370,000	Over 370,000
Slovakia	Over 180,000	Over 180,000
Slovenia	Over 33,000	Over 33,000
Spain	Over 260,000	Over 260,000
Sweden	Over 330,000	Over 330,000
Total	Over 6,000,000	Over 6,000,000

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As mentioned in our Advertising standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. - As announced in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As mentioned in our Advertising standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. - As announced in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
QRE 7.2.2	<p>Details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our Business Help Centre.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page using a valid disclaimer to complete authorization. The review</p>	<p>Details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our Business Help Centre.</p> <p>An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page using a valid disclaimer to complete authorization. The review process is</p>

	process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.	usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections or politics can be up to 72 hours.
Measure 7.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.3.1	<p>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our <u>Advertising Standards</u>. In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</p> <p>The <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.</p> <p>We require advertisers to know how we define social issues and review text examples. Ads where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.</p> <p>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook, which relies primarily on automated review (artificial intelligence) to check ads against our Advertising Policies. Ad review can take up to 72 hours to determine if an ad falls under our ads about social issues, elections or politics policy or if the ad is primarily focused on selling a product or promoting a service.</p> <p>Advertisers can request another review if they believe the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service and doesn't require a disclaimer. Upon review, if we determine the ads aren't in scope of our social issues, elections, or politics policy, then the ad will be permitted to run without a disclaimer. However, if ads are determined to fall under this policy, advertisers won't be able to run these ads unless they include a disclaimer on them.</p> <p>In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</p> <p>Facebook's Community Standards prohibit ads that promote voter</p>	<p>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our <u>Advertising Standards</u>. In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</p> <p>The <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.</p> <p>We require advertisers to know how we define social issues and review text examples. Ads where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency.</p> <p>All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook, which relies primarily on automated review (artificial intelligence) to check ads against our Advertising Policies. Ad review can take up to 72 hours to determine if an ad falls under our ads about social issues, elections or politics policy or if the ad is primarily focused on selling a product or promoting a service.</p> <p>Advertisers can request another review if they believe the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service and doesn't require a disclaimer. Upon review, if we determine the ads aren't in scope of our social issues, elections, or politics policy, then the ad will be permitted to run without a disclaimer. However, if ads are determined to fall under this policy, advertisers won't be able to run these ads unless they include a disclaimer on them.</p> <p>In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it.</p> <p>Facebook's Community Standards prohibit ads that promote voter interference:</p>

	<p>interference:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences - Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials' activity using militaristic language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Content, including ads, stating that census or voting participation may or will result in law enforcement consequences - Statements of intent, support or advocacy to go to an election site, voting location, or vote counting location when the purpose of going to the site is to monitor or watch voters or election officials' activity using militaristic language or an expressed goal to intimidate, exert control or display power.
QRE 7.3.2	<p>Our <u>Advertising Standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.</p> <p>Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads without being authorized will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.</p> <p>As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.</p>	<p>Our <u>Advertising Standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions.</p> <p>Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across our technologies, and must not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behavior similar to business assets that we've already taken down.</p> <p>Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads without being authorized will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise</p> <p>As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.</p>
Measure 7.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.4.1	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 8

Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
Please note: Meta has made additions and revisions to this commitment.			
	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 8.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 8.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 8.1.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
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III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.			
	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan	N/A	N/A

to put in place in the next 6 months?		
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Measure 9.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 9.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 9.1.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	<p>Meta’s <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.</p> <p>Further:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To better match people’s evolving expectations of how advertisers may reach them on our platform, we removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. - Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the “Paid for by” political disclaimer on them. We also allow Facebook users to see <u>how we decide which ads to show</u> and how users can adjust their preferences to determine the ads users are shown. - Our FAQs section in the <u>Ad Library</u> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads. 	<p>Meta’s <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u> feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds.</p> <p>Further:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To better match people’s evolving expectations of how advertisers may reach them on our platform, we removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. - Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the “Paid for by” political disclaimer on them. We also allow Instagram users <u>control to see fewer ads about social issues, elections or politics</u>. - Our FAQs section in the <u>Ad Library</u> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 10			
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.			
This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.			
	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	As <u>announced</u> in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 10.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 10.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the <u>Ad Library</u> provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We currently store these ads in the library for 7 years.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the <u>Ad Library</u> provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We currently store these ads in the library for 7 years.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.”

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta’s Ad Library application programming interface (“ API ”) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report .	Meta’s Ad Library application programming interface (“ API ”) allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report .
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 11.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.3	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	<p>The Ad Library API provides access data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ad creatives - Ad performance data including total amount spent (range) - Total impressions an ad received (range) - Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%) - Dates the ad ran <p>The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete these steps to access the API.</p> <p>Anyone can explore the ad library, with or without a Facebook account. However, reporting ads and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.</p>	<p>The Ad Library API provides access data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The results returned from the API include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ad creatives - Ad performance data including total amount spent (range) - Total impressions an ad received (range) - Demographics: age, gender, and location of people reached (%) - Dates the ad ran <p>The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. You can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete these steps to access the API.</p> <p>Anyone can explore the ad library, with or without a Facebook account. However, reporting ads and viewing adult content both require the user to have an account and to be logged in.</p>
QRE 11.4.1	<p>Meta engages with researchers to understand their experience with the functionalities of its ads transparency and research tools – including the Ad Library API and related datasets – through several channels:</p> <p>Research Partnerships Team: Meta maintains a dedicated team that serves as the primary point of contact for qualified academic researchers, supporting partner onboarding, data access setup, and product training. The team provides Office Hours for live technical support and promotes product updates through newsletters and educational materials. Through these activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs.</p> <p>Stakeholder Engagement: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research. On June 26, 2025, Meta hosted a data dialogue in Berlin to gather feedback on Meta's research tools and discuss barriers encountered. Meta further engaged with researchers during the</p>	<p>Meta engages with researchers to understand their experience with the functionalities of its ads transparency and research tools – including the Ad Library API and related datasets – through several channels:</p> <p>Research Partnerships Team: Meta maintains a dedicated team that serves as the primary point of contact for qualified academic researchers, supporting partner onboarding, data access setup, and product training. The team provides Office Hours for live technical support and promotes product updates through newsletters and educational materials. Through these activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs.</p> <p>Stakeholder Engagement: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research. On June 26, 2025, Meta hosted a data dialogue in Berlin to gather feedback on Meta's research tools and discuss barriers encountered. Meta further engaged with researchers during the DSA Access Days conference in September 2025, where researcher experiences with platform access were</p>

	<p>DSA Access Days conference in September 2025, where researcher experiences with platform access were discussed. No reports of adversarial actions against researchers were identified during these engagements.</p> <p>Expanded Data Access: As of December 2025, targeting information for over 49 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads has been made available globally to academic researchers – an expansion informed by researcher demand for more comprehensive geographic coverage.</p> <p>Task-force Collaboration: Dependent on the Task-force priorities during each period, Meta works with the Task-force on essential tasks including considering research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments.</p>	<p>discussed. No reports of adversarial actions against researchers were identified during these engagements.</p> <p>Expanded Data Access: As of December 2025, targeting information for over 49 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads has been made available globally to academic researchers – an expansion informed by researcher demand for more comprehensive geographic coverage.</p> <p>Task-force Collaboration: Dependent on the Task-force priorities during each period, Meta works with the Task-force on essential tasks including considering research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments.</p>
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III. Political Advertising	
Commitment 12	
<p>Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.</p>	
<p>This commitment applies to civil society organisations.</p>	

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 13				
<p>Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.</p>				
<p>This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.</p>				
	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
<p>We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:</p>	<p>Facebook Instagram</p>	<p>Facebook Instagram</p>	<p>Facebook Instagram</p>	<p>Facebook Instagram</p>

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
<p>In line with this commitment, did you</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>

deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 13.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3)	<p>As announced in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.</p> <p>Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Task-force, participating in weekly Task-force plenary sessions and working groups where applicable SIEP-related topics are discussed as applicable.</p>	<p>As announced in July 2025, since October 6, 2025, Meta no longer allows political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.</p> <p>Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Task-force, participating in weekly Task-force plenary sessions and working groups where applicable SIEP-related topics are discussed as applicable.</p>

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new	Yes	Yes

tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	<p>We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. Our approach to Inauthentic Behavior, and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behavior- and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech).</p> <p>Fake accounts: In order to maintain a safe environment, we restrict or remove fake accounts that violate our Terms of Service. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We prioritize enforcement against fake accounts that seek to cause harm. Many of these accounts are used in spam campaigns and are financially motivated. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 692M accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q3 2025 and 1.1B fake accounts in Q4 2025 on Facebook globally.</p> <p>Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that attempt to deceive Meta or our community or to evade enforcement under the Community Standards. In 2025. We updated our inauthentic behavior policy to simplify and refine our policy language and to help uninvolved authentic communities, Pages and Groups that are targeted, managed, or co-opted by CIB operations to remain on our services. . We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.</p> <p>In July 2024, we stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.</p> <p>We also continue to update our inauthentic behavior policy to improve our ability to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p>	<p>We continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. Our approach to Inauthentic Behavior, and covert Influence Operations (IO) more broadly, is grounded in behavior- and actor-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviors exhibited by violating actors, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech).</p> <p>Fake accounts: In order to maintain a safe environment, we restrict or remove fake accounts that violate our Terms of Service. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We prioritize enforcement against fake accounts that seek to cause harm. Many of these accounts are used in spam campaigns and are financially motivated. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 692M accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q3 2025 and 1.1B fake accounts in Q4 2025 on Facebook globally.</p> <p>Inauthentic behaviour: We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that attempt to deceive Meta or our community or to evade enforcement under the Community Standards. In 2025. We updated our inauthentic behavior policy to simplify and refine our policy language and to help uninvolved authentic communities, Pages and Groups that are targeted, managed, or co-opted by CIB operations to remain on our services. . We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.</p> <p>In July 2024, we stopped removing content solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.</p> <p>We also continue to update our inauthentic behavior policy to improve our ability to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.</p> <p><u>Cybersecurity:</u></p>
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	<p><u>Cybersecurity:</u> We know that bad actors often target people's accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures.</p> <p>We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people's accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. As a result, we've helped eight times more people a day on average get back into their Facebook account than last year when they didn't have access to their listed contact points. We're also running global in-app prompts across Facebook reminding people to confirm their contact points.</p>	<p>We know that bad actors often target people's accounts to compromise them, including as part of covert influence operations. To build the most efficient security tools, we apply adversarial design to how we build account security measures.</p> <p>We continue to work on and roll out new security features to help keep people's accounts safe and build out our support to help if they lose access. As a result, we've helped eight times more people a day on average get back into their Facebook account than last year when they didn't have access to their listed contact points. We're also running global in-app prompts across Facebook reminding people to confirm their contact points.</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 14.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.1.1	<p>Depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:</p> <p>Inauthentic Behaviour - Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts.</p> <p>CIB Policy - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior where inauthentic accounts are</p>	<p>Depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below:</p> <p>Inauthentic Behaviour - Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram.</p> <p>CIB Policy - Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior where inauthentic accounts are</p>

	<p>central to the operation,” the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> <p>CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on fake accounts. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behavior policies, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.</p> <p>We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviors, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviors. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defenses.</p> <p>CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments); (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers; (4) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, and domains; (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (6) account hijacking or impersonation; and (7) inauthentic coordination.</p> <p>We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on Account Integrity and Authentic Identity. However, no enforcement framework can guarantee complete elimination of inauthentic behaviour in real time, precisely because adversarial actors are incentivised to find and exploit gaps in any system. This necessitates continuous investment in both proactive and reactive enforcement capabilities.</p> <p>Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or engage in unauthorised access by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p>Spam - We work hard to limit the spread of spam because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or</p>	<p>central to the operation,” the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms.</p> <p>CIB refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal that centrally relies on fake accounts. This is distinctly different from misinformation, which is content that is false or misleading. When we remove networks for violating CIB or other inauthentic behavior policies, it is based on their behavior, not the content they posted. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.</p> <p>We rely on both expert investigators to find and take down more sophisticated and emerging adversarial behaviors, as well as on scaled solutions to help detect and remove networks engaged in inauthentic behaviors. As part of this effort and because we know that these bad actors rarely target only one single platform, we have partnered with civil society, our industry partners, researchers, and governments to strengthen our collective defenses.</p> <p>CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments); (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers; (4) the creation of inauthentic groups, and domains; (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (6) account hijacking or impersonation; and (7) inauthentic coordination.</p> <p>We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on Account Integrity and Authentic Identity. However, no enforcement framework can guarantee complete elimination of inauthentic behaviour in real time, precisely because adversarial actors are incentivised to find and exploit gaps in any system. This necessitates continuous investment in both proactive and reactive enforcement capabilities.</p> <p>Cybersecurity - Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or engage in unauthorised access by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.</p> <p>Spam - We work hard to limit the spread of spam because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or</p>
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	<p>distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic Pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices.</p> <p>Branded Content Policies - <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages.</p> <p>Privacy - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>	<p>distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices.</p> <p>Branded Content Policies - <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages.</p> <p>Privacy - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.</p>
<p>QRE 14.1.2</p>	<p>Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.</p> <p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can't access our systems and thus can't create accounts. - Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behavior through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we've removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm. - Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defenses and still make it onto the platform. Often, this 	<p>Our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted.</p> <p>In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. We work to stop fake accounts abusing our platforms in three distinct ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Blocking accounts from being created. Our systems look for a number of different signals that indicate if accounts are created en masse from one location. A simple example is blocking certain IP addresses altogether so that they can't access our systems and thus can't create accounts. - Removing accounts when they sign-up. We try to spot signs of malicious behavior through a combination of signals such as patterns of using suspicious email addresses, suspicious actions, or other signals previously associated with other fake accounts we've removed. Most of the accounts we currently remove are blocked within minutes of their creation before they can do any harm. - Removing existing accounts. Some accounts may get past the above two defenses and still make it onto the platform. Often, this

	<p>is because they don't readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behavior or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are.</p> <p>Pages and Groups that violate our CIB policy are removed. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behavior-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block the network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts, Pages and Groups connected to networks we took down in the past.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see Meta's threat disruptions.</p>	<p>is because they don't readily show signals of being fake or malicious at first. We find these accounts when our detection systems identify inauthentic behavior or if users report them to us. We use a number of signals about how the account was created and is being used to determine whether it has a high probability of being fake and disable those that are.</p> <p>Pages and Groups that violate our CIB policy are removed. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behavior-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source.</p> <p>We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed. After each takedown, we feed the data about the network into our automated detection systems to block the network from operating on our platforms again, as well as explore ways to make our platforms more resilient and difficult to exploit. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts, Pages and Groups connected to networks we took down in the past.</p> <p>For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see Meta's threat disruptions.</p>
Measure 14.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.2.1	<p>We report on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fake Accounts Policy: In Q3 2025, we took action against 692M fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide daily active people (DAP) on Facebook during Q3 2025. In Q4 2025, we took action against 1.1B fake accounts, representing approximately 5% of worldwide DAP during Q4 2025. These enforcement actions address TTPs related to the creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets, and the use of fake/inauthentic reactions, followers, and subscribers. - Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) Policy: In the <u>second half of 2025</u>, we disrupted the following CIB networks targeting EEA Member States: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Poland-based network targeting Poland:</i> We removed 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups, and 1 Instagram account. This domestic operation used fake accounts with crafted political identities and organic amplification to infiltrate civic groups across the political spectrum – corresponding to TTPs including creation of 	<p>We report on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fake Accounts Policy: In Q3 2025, we took action against 692M fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide daily active people (DAP) on Facebook during Q3 2025. In Q4 2025, we took action against 1.1B fake accounts, representing approximately 5% of worldwide DAP during Q4 2025. These enforcement actions address TTPs related to the creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets, and the use of fake/inauthentic reactions, followers, and subscribers. - Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) Policy: In the <u>second half of 2025</u>, we disrupted the following CIB networks targeting EEA Member States: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Poland-based network targeting Poland:</i> We removed 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups, and 1 Instagram account. This domestic operation used fake accounts with crafted political identities and organic amplification to infiltrate civic groups across the political spectrum – corresponding to TTPs including creation of

	<p>inauthentic accounts and inauthentic coordination of content amplification.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Belarus/Russia-based network targeting Poland: We removed 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages, and 21 Instagram accounts. This foreign influence campaign employed impersonation of a Polish political party, targeted advertising under false identities, and amplification of hack-and-leak campaign materials – corresponding to TTPs including account impersonation, deliberately targeting recipients, and use of hack-and-leak operations.</i> - <i>Iran-based network ("Endless Mayfly") targeting France (among others): In our Adversarial Threat Report, we published an updated attribution of a persistent Iranian influence operation targeting France, the US, Israel, and the UK. TTPs employed include creation of inauthentic domains, impersonation of journalists, and coordinated cross-platform content amplification using proxy infrastructure.</i> <p>Full details, including threat indicators for each network, are published on Meta's dedicated GitHub repository.</p>	<p>inauthentic accounts and inauthentic coordination of content amplification.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Belarus/Russia-based network targeting Poland: We removed 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages, and 21 Instagram accounts. This foreign influence campaign employed impersonation of a Polish political party, targeted advertising under false identities, and amplification of hack-and-leak campaign materials – corresponding to TTPs including account impersonation, deliberately targeting recipients, and use of hack-and-leak operations.</i> - <i>Iran-based network ("Endless Mayfly") targeting France (among others): In our Adversarial Threat Report, we published an updated attribution of a persistent Iranian influence operation targeting France, the US, Israel, and the UK. TTPs employed include creation of inauthentic domains, impersonation of journalists, and coordinated cross-platform content amplification using proxy infrastructure.</i> <p>Full details, including threat indicators for each network, are published on Meta's dedicated GitHub repository.</p>
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FACEBOOK	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	
<p>TTP OR ACTION 1: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR</p>	<p>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments) Use of fake followers or subscribers Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification Account hijacking or impersonation <p>Methodology of data measurement: coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behaviour where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content – no matter who's behind them, what they post or whether they're foreign or domestic. <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.</u> We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</p>

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Poland	55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups	Removal of 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, 23 Groups		About 49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 1,100 accounts followed one or more of these Groups.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		We observed that network operators consistently amplified narratives critical of Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski and the current Polish government while promoting content favorable to the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) Party. The network employed sophisticated persona development tactics, creating fake accounts with carefully crafted political identities spanning the ideological spectrum, including both left-wing and right-wing personas as well as accounts focused on historical interests.				
Belarus	4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages	Removal of 4 Facebook accounts, 12 Pages		About 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		We observed that network operators strategically disseminated messaging focused on Poland's immigration policies and the country's relationships with the European Union and Ukraine.				

TTP OR ACTION 2	<p>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts) - Use of fake followers or subscribers - Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains <p>Methodology of data measurement: Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information here.</p>											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
GLOBAL Q3 2025	692M accounts	Removal of 692M accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)						
GLOBAL Q4 2025	1.1B accounts	Removal of 1.1B accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)						

INSTAGRAM												
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4												
TTP OR ACTION 1	<p>TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter: This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour</u>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments) - Use of fake followers or subscribers - Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains - Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification 											

Methodology of data measurement: <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European countries (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</u>												
SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4			
Origin of network	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)
Poland	1 Instagram account	Removed 1 Instagram account		About 2,900 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		We observed that network operators consistently amplified narratives critical of Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski and the current Polish government while promoting content favorable to the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) Party. The network employed sophisticated persona development tactics, creating fake accounts with carefully crafted political identities spanning the ideological spectrum, including both left-wing and right-wing personas as well as accounts focused on historical interests.				
Belarus	21 Instagram accounts	Removed 21 Instagram accounts		About 3,300 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		We observed that network operators strategically disseminated messaging focused on Poland's immigration policies and the country's relationships with				

								the European Union and Ukraine.				
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Measure 14.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.3.1	<p>The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs did so during Q4 2022.</p> <p>Ongoing TTP Identification and Public Disclosure: Independent of the collective Task-force process, Meta continuously identifies, analyses, and publicly discloses emerging TTPs through its Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), published on a regular basis. The ATR details the disruption of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, including narrative deep-dives on specific TTPs employed by threat actors. For every CIB network taken down, Meta publishes threat indicators (including domains, behavioural signatures, and associated TTPs) through its dedicated GitHub repository, enabling external research communities to investigate and build upon these findings.</p>	<p>The Taskforce working group in charge of developing a list of TTPs did so during Q4 2022.</p> <p>Ongoing TTP Identification and Public Disclosure: Independent of the collective Task-force process, Meta continuously identifies, analyses, and publicly discloses emerging TTPs through its Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), published on a regular basis. The ATR details the disruption of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, including narrative deep-dives on specific TTPs employed by threat actors. For every CIB network taken down, Meta publishes threat indicators (including domains, behavioural signatures, and associated TTPs) through its dedicated GitHub repository, enabling external research communities to investigate and build upon these findings.</p>

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 15.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.1.1	We acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely	We acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely

	<p>to cause significant harm. Meta’s Community Standards and enforcement actions are designed to counter prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content. Our approach includes proactive detection and labeling of AI-generated content, warning users through visible labels, and removing or restricting content that violates our policies. These measures are regularly reviewed and updated to ensure continued compliance with evolving regulatory requirements and best practices.</p> <p>Labeling content that has been created using generative AI creative features is one part of Meta’s efforts to provide transparency about the use of AI in content creation, particularly in advertisements and organic content across Facebook and Instagram. The rollout of AI labeling began in 2024, with updates and expansions planned as new generative AI features are introduced, and as technology continues to evolve.</p> <p>Meta has processes/technology in place to help automatic detection of AI-generated content. Once content is generated via Meta AI and it is uploaded or shared across the relevant, in-scope posting surfaces, that Meta AI generated content is labelled. Upon successful attribution, for fully Meta AI-generated content, the label appears directly on the content and is visible to all users.</p>	<p>to cause significant harm. Meta’s Community Standards and enforcement actions are designed to counter prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content. Our approach includes proactive detection and labeling of AI-generated content, warning users through visible labels, and removing or restricting content that violates our policies. These measures are regularly reviewed and updated to ensure continued compliance with evolving regulatory requirements and best practices.</p> <p>Labeling content that has been created using generative AI creative features is one part of Meta’s efforts to provide transparency about the use of AI in content creation, particularly in advertisements and organic content across Facebook and Instagram. The rollout of AI labeling began in 2024, with updates and expansions planned as new generative AI features are introduced, and as technology continues to evolve.</p> <p>Meta has processes/technology in place to help automatic detection of AI-generated content. Once content is generated via Meta AI and it is uploaded or shared across the relevant, in-scope posting surfaces, that Meta AI generated content is labelled. Upon successful attribution, for fully Meta AI-generated content, the label appears directly on the content and is visible to all users.</p>
Measure 15.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.2.1	<p>Meta applies established governance frameworks and oversight—including regular cross-functional reviews and alignment with industry standards such as C2PA and IPTC metadata protocols—to ensure that algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content are trustworthy, respect end-user rights, and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices.</p> <p>Detection and moderation systems are periodically assessed for effectiveness, fairness, and compliance with applicable laws. AI-generated content is labeled to inform users, not restrict access, and labeling is based on objective signals (e.g., metadata, self-disclosure) rather than subjective or manipulative criteria. Meta is committed to transparency and will continue to update disclosures as practices and regulatory expectations evolve. For more information, see Meta’s Responsible AI Principles and the Meta Transparency Center.</p>	<p>Meta applies established governance frameworks and oversight—including regular cross-functional reviews and alignment with industry standards such as C2PA and IPTC metadata protocols—to ensure that algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content are trustworthy, respect end-user rights, and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices.</p> <p>Detection and moderation systems are periodically assessed for effectiveness, fairness, and compliance with applicable laws. AI-generated content is labeled to inform users, not restrict access, and labeling is based on objective signals (e.g., metadata, self-disclosure) rather than subjective or manipulative criteria. Meta is committed to transparency and will continue to update disclosures as practices and regulatory expectations evolve. For more information, see Meta’s Responsible AI Principles and the Meta Transparency Center.</p>

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A
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Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.1.1	<p>Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action to stop emerging threats [Meta Newsroom].</p> <p>Meta publishes Adversarial Threat Reports (ATRs) to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. As of 2025, researchers have produced over 100 independent reports using this archive (ATR, p. 10). In support of the global security research community, Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.</p> <p>Collaboration and Disruption</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta works closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. Many of our coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) takedowns are the result of information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement. - For example, in the December 2025 Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), Meta details how information sharing led to the early detection and removal of covert influence operations before they could build authentic audiences (see ATR, p. 3-5). <p>Examples of Case Studies <u>Poland:</u> In H2 2025, Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in and targeting Poland, actioning 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, and 23 Groups. About</p>	<p>Meta’s strategy to prevent interference and counter cross-platform influence operations is built on proactive collaboration with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society, and other technology companies. We establish direct lines of communication, share knowledge, and identify opportunities for joint action to stop emerging threats [Meta Newsroom].</p> <p>Meta publishes Adversarial Threat Reports (ATRs) to share information on threat research, case studies, and new covert influence operations. Additionally, the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive provides qualified researchers with access to data on disrupted networks for independent analysis. As of 2025, researchers have produced over 100 independent reports using this archive (ATR, p. 10). In support of the global security research community, Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.</p> <p>Collaboration and Disruption</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta works closely with industry peers and researchers to study and disrupt cross-platform influence operations. Many of our coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) takedowns are the result of information sharing with technology companies, security researchers, investigative journalists, and law enforcement. - For example, in the December 2025 Adversarial Threat Report (ATR), Meta details how information sharing led to the early detection and removal of covert influence operations before they could build authentic audiences (see ATR, p. 3-5). <p>Examples of Case Studies <u>Poland:</u> In H2 2025, Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in and targeting Poland, actioning 55 Facebook accounts, 36 Pages, and 23 Groups. About 49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and about 1,100</p>

	<p>49,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and about 1,100 accounts followed one or more of these Groups. The network relied on organic amplification, not paid ads. The investigation found direct links to an individual in Poland, indicating a domestic operation seeking to influence local political conversations. <i>Reference: ATR, p. 6-7</i></p> <p><u>Belarus:</u> Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in Belarus and targeting Polish audiences, with links to Belarus and Russia. 4 Facebook accounts and 12 Pages were removed; about 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages. Network operators spent about \$1,800 in ads to amplify content. <i>Reference: ATR, p. 7</i></p>	<p>accounts followed one or more of these Groups. The network relied on organic amplification, not paid ads. The investigation found direct links to an individual in Poland, indicating a domestic operation seeking to influence local political conversations. <i>Reference: ATR, p. 6-7</i></p> <p><u>Belarus:</u> Meta disrupted a CIB network originating in Belarus and targeting Polish audiences, with links to Belarus and Russia. 4 Facebook accounts and 12 Pages were removed; about 200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages. Network operators spent about \$1,800 in ads to amplify content. <i>Reference: ATR, p. 7</i></p>
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	
Measure 16.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.2.1	<p>Meta is committed to sharing qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed by disinformation actors, as observed by our moderation teams and external partners.</p> <p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta regularly publishes <u>Adversarial Threat Reports</u> (see Dec 2025 ATR, p. 8-11) to share notable trends, case studies, and investigations on evolving security threats, including the migration of disinformation actors across platforms. - Meta collaborates with partners such as Microsoft (Global Signal Exchange), Google, and the Global Anti-Scam Alliance (GASA) to exchange early signals of account compromise and scam infrastructure, enabling earlier detection and removal of fraudulent accounts and infrastructure. In 2025, we worked with the Global Signal Exchange to identify and remove about 29,000 scam accounts in Australian Facebook groups and 1,850 scam enablers (websites, job ads) (ATR, p. 9-10). - Meta provides qualified researchers with access to the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which contains public information on disrupted networks, supporting independent analysis of migration tactics and cross-platform activity. Over 100 independent reports have been produced by researchers using the IO Research Archive, analyzing migration tactics and the evolution of disinformation networks (ATR, p. 10). 	<p>Meta is committed to sharing qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed by disinformation actors, as observed by our moderation teams and external partners.</p> <p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta regularly publishes <u>Adversarial Threat Reports</u> (see Dec 2025 ATR, p. 8-11) to share notable trends, case studies, and investigations on evolving security threats, including the migration of disinformation actors across platforms. - Meta collaborates with partners such as Microsoft (Global Signal Exchange), Google, and the Global Anti-Scam Alliance (GASA) to exchange early signals of account compromise and scam infrastructure, enabling earlier detection and removal of fraudulent accounts and infrastructure. In 2025, we worked with the Global Signal Exchange to identify and remove about 29,000 scam accounts in Australian Facebook groups and 1,850 scam enablers (websites, job ads) (ATR, p. 9-10). - Meta provides qualified researchers with access to the Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive, which contains public information on disrupted networks, supporting independent analysis of migration tactics and cross-platform activity. Over 100 independent reports have been produced by researchers using the IO Research Archive, analyzing migration tactics and the evolution of disinformation networks (ATR, p. 10).

	<p>Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.</p>	<p>Meta also shares threat indicators related to covert influence operations via a dedicated GitHub repository (ATR, p. 11). This enables industry partners and researchers to enhance detection and mitigation of similar adversarial activities across platforms.</p>
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V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission’s initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>The key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram. - In 2025, Meta launched a campaign that ran in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of new tools available on Instagram to protect Youth well-being. These tools included private accounts, additional messaging and sensitive content restrictions, time limit reminders and sleep mode. 	<p>The key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Our strategy focuses on providing people with additional context and information on posts they see and connecting them with authoritative information. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram. - In 2025, Meta launched a campaign that ran in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of new tools available on Instagram to protect Youth well-being. These tools included private accounts, additional messaging and sensitive content restrictions, time limit reminders and sleep mode.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As part of our global anti-scam awareness campaign to protect people online, we share <u>relevant product tools</u> across Facebook. Additionally, we released new research on romance scams occurring across the internet, along with updates on our enforcement actions targeting scammers who impersonate military personnel and other individuals. - In 2025, Meta rolled out a youth-focused campaign across eight EU countries—France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Ireland, and Greece—running from late September through late November, to highlight support for parental approval for teens accessing online services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As part of our global anti-scam awareness campaign to protect people online, we share <u>relevant product tools</u> across Instagram. Additionally, we released new research on romance scams occurring across the internet, along with updates on our enforcement actions targeting scammers who impersonate military personnel and other individuals. • In 2025, Meta rolled out a youth-focused campaign across eight EU countries—France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Ireland, and Greece—running from late September through late November, to highlight support for parental approval for teens accessing online services.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 17.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.1.1	<p>Meta has developed a series of tools over the years to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.</p> <p>A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:</p> <p><u>Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook:</u></p>	<p>Meta has developed a series of tools over the years to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world.</p> <p>A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:</p> <p><u>Warning screens on sensitive content on Instagram:</u></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent or graphic imagery. - Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness. - Some forms of nudity. - Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts. <p><u>Fact-checking notices:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When content has been rated by fact-checkers as False, Altered, Partly False, or Missing Context, we add a notice to it so that people can read additional context. - Meta also notifies users before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. - Meta uses its technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact checkers, and add notices to that content as well. <p>Links: Warning screens on sensitive content: https://transparency.meta.com/enforcement/taking-action/context-on-sensitive-misleading-content/</p> <p>Fact-checking notices: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works/</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To help people avoid coming across content that they'd rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile. <p><u>Fact-checking notices:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When content has been rated by fact-checkers as False, Altered, Partly False, or Missing Context, we add a notice to it so that people can read additional context. - Meta also notifies users before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. - Meta uses its technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact checkers, and add notices to that content as well. <p>Links: Warning screens on sensitive content: https://transparency.meta.com/enforcement/taking-action/context-on-sensitive-misleading-content/</p> <p>Fact-checking notices: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works/</p>
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SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above		Content on Facebook treated with a warning screen for sensitive content between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.		Content on Instagram treated with a warning screen for sensitive content between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
	Country				Country			
	Austria	13,368	Over 490,000	51.00%	Austria	10,232	Over 22,000	61.40%
	Belgium	28,509	Over 730,000	50.60%	Belgium	23,469	Over 26,000	63.90%
	Bulgaria	11,439	Over 570,000	56.70%	Bulgaria	3,119	Over 9,500	63.70%

Croatia	6,641	Over 370,000	56.10%	Croatia	2,246	Over 10,000	63.70%
Cyprus	4,734	Over 150,000	61.10%	Cyprus	3,149	Over 9,800	69.00%
Czech Republic	19,447	Over 460,000	38.20%	Czech Republic	5,537	Over 13,000	58.30%
Denmark	14,273	Over 370,000	52.70%	Denmark	13,181	Over 14,000	61.80%
Estonia	1,578	Over 76,000	44.40%	Estonia	469	Over 3,900	51.20%
Finland	8,015	Over 170,000	43.90%	Finland	4,141	Over 12,000	61.30%
France	108,617	Over 3,200,000	57.80%	France	97,743	Over 60,000	67.10%
Germany	120,394	Over 2,700,000	49.50%	Germany	112,568	Over 92,000	60.90%
Greece	25,395	Over 760,000	58.00%	Greece	8,138	Over 19,000	67.90%
Hungary	29,595	Over 320,000	53.30%	Hungary	2,324	Over 9,500	62.50%
Iceland	1,249	Over 450,000	55.90%	Iceland	912	Over 20,000	64.50%
Ireland	12,559	Over 37,000	51.20%	Ireland	14,107	Over 2,600	60.80%
Italy	123,761	Over 2,900,000	55.20%	Italy	94,899	Over 73,000	63.90%
Latvia	1,832	Over 2,900	43.30%	Latvia	602	Over 310	62.50%
Liechtenstein	39	Over 130,000	100.00%	Liechtenstein	24	Over 4,400	80.00%
Lithuania	3,353	Over 190,000	49.10%	Lithuania	1,573	Over 5,500	59.70%
Luxembourg	1,674	Over 75,000	50.00%	Luxembourg	1,271	Over 4,700	66.50%
Malta	1,454	Over 68,000	61.10%	Malta	612	Over 4,300	74.80%
Netherlands	36,834	Over 780,000	44.20%	Netherlands	31,161	Over 35,000	58.00%
Norway	13,055	Over 295,000	45.00%	Norway	11,303	Over 13,000	58.20%
Poland	38,439	Over 1,400,000	49.00%	Poland	15,815	Over 24,000	65.00%
Portugal	45,433	Over 920,000	62.40%	Portugal	19,652	Over 34,000	65.50%
Romania	26,379	Over 820,000	28.70%	Romania	9,816	Over 15,000	59.40%
Slovakia	7,029	Over 280,000	38.80%	Slovakia	2,795	Over 9,000	51.70%

	Slovenia	3,358	Over 180,000	47.90%	Slovenia	1,258	Over 5,900	58.80%
	Spain	84,328	Over 2,500,000	60.30%	Spain	90,856	Over 69,000	67.40%
	Sweden	29,365	Over 530,000	53.20%	Sweden	25,936	Over 25,000	59.00%
	Total	822,146	Over 17,000,000		Total	608,908	Over 280,000	

Measure 17.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.2.1	<p>Meta invests in user education programs and resources to improve media literacy and critical thinking skills. Below are examples of Media Literacy activities Meta has undertaken in the European Union in 2025:</p> <p><u>National Elections:</u> We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. For more information, please refer to the Elections chapter.</p> <p><u>Media Literacy Annual Plan:</u> This plan establishes Meta's strategic framework for media literacy, outlining how its products, features, and initiatives help users build the skills to critically assess the credibility and context of content they encounter online. Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025 in compliance with the Irish Online Safety Code, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features it makes available to Facebook and Instagram users. See the publicly available report here.</p> <p><u>Meta Safety Center:</u> The Safety Center provides a variety of resources for educators, parents, and community leaders to promote digital literacy, which are updated as needed to reflect new developments and initiatives. The Digital Literacy section of the Safety Center features resources designed to help people develop practical skills for navigating the digital world safely.</p> <p><u>Global awareness campaigns:</u></p>	<p>Meta invests in user education programs and resources to improve media literacy and critical thinking skills. Below are examples of Media Literacy activities Meta has undertaken in the European Union in 2025:</p> <p><u>National Elections:</u> We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. For more information, please refer to the Elections chapter.</p> <p><u>Media Literacy Annual Plan:</u> This plan establishes Meta's strategic framework for media literacy, outlining how its products, features, and initiatives help users build the skills to critically assess the credibility and context of content they encounter online. Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025 in compliance with the Irish Online Safety Code, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features it makes available to Facebook and Instagram users. See the publicly available report here.</p> <p><u>Meta Safety Center:</u> The Safety Center provides a variety of resources for educators, parents, and community leaders to promote digital literacy, which are updated as needed to reflect new developments and initiatives. The Digital Literacy section of the Safety Center features resources designed to help people develop practical skills for navigating the digital world safely.</p> <p><u>Global awareness campaigns:</u></p>

	<p>These campaigns equip users with the knowledge to help identify misleading or manipulative content, which is a core component of media literacy. For example during Cybersecurity Awareness Month (October 2025), Meta published guidance on helping older adults avoid online scams and shared updates on its global anti-scam efforts. See the campaign blog post here.</p> <p>Links: Media Literacy Annual Plan: https://transparency.meta.com/reports/regulatory-transparency-reports/#:-:text=Online%20Safety%20Code,Facebook%20and%20Instagram</p> <p>Meta Safety Center – Digital Literacy section: https://www.meta.com/en-gb/safety/topics/digital-literacy/?srsId=AfmBOooOlpprLLtqxUPGf-fJmijzXkD1T2qiNbkJK3-EEnd8jd22hr7p</p> <p>Campaign blog for the Cybersecurity Awareness Month: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/10/cybersecurity-awareness-month-helping-older-adults-avoid-online-scams/</p>			<p>These campaigns equip users with the knowledge to help identify misleading or manipulative content, which is a core component of media literacy. For example during Cybersecurity Awareness Month (October 2025), Meta published guidance on helping older adults avoid online scams and shared updates on its global anti-scam efforts. See the campaign blog post here.</p> <p>Links: Media Literacy Annual Plan: https://transparency.meta.com/reports/regulatory-transparency-reports/#:-:text=Online%20Safety%20Code,Facebook%20and%20Instagram</p> <p>Meta Safety Center – Digital Literacy section: https://www.meta.com/en-gb/safety/topics/digital-literacy/?srsId=AfmBOooOlpprLLtqxUPGf-fJmijzXkD1T2qiNbkJK3-EEnd8jd22hr7p</p> <p>Campaign blog for the Cybersecurity Awareness Month: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/10/cybersecurity-awareness-month-helping-older-adults-avoid-online-scams/</p>		
SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above		Number of distinct sessions on the transparency reporting page hosting the Media Literacy Annual Plan between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Number of distinct sessions on pages within the Meta Safety Center between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025		Number of distinct sessions on the transparency reporting page hosting the Media Literacy Annual Plan between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Number of distinct sessions on pages within the Meta Safety Center between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025
	Country			Country		
	Austria	143	3,548	Austria	143	3,548
	Belgium	279	4,664	Belgium	279	4,664
	Bulgaria	155	1,616	Bulgaria	155	1,616
	Croatia	21	1,130	Croatia	21	1,130
	Cyprus	39	885	Cyprus	39	885
	Czech Republic	503	2,991	Czech Republic	503	2,991
	Denmark	83	1,602	Denmark	83	1,602
	Estonia	12	333	Estonia	12	333

	Finland	63	1,842	Finland	63	1,842
	France	841	36,838	France	841	36,838
	Germany	976	33,419	Germany	976	33,419
	Greece	273	2,971	Greece	273	2,971
	Hungary	363	2,108	Hungary	363	2,108
	Iceland	4	182	Iceland	4	182
	Ireland	277	2,897	Ireland	277	2,897
	Italy	471	21,431	Italy	471	21,431
	Latvia	14	535	Latvia	14	535
	Liechtenstein	0	23	Liechtenstein	0	23
	Lithuania	46	653	Lithuania	46	653
	Luxembourg	15	301	Luxembourg	15	301
	Malta	12	226	Malta	12	226
	Netherlands	522	7,331	Netherlands	522	7,331
	Norway	76	2,481	Norway	76	2,481
	Poland	288	8,621	Poland	288	8,621
	Portugal	173	7,316	Portugal	173	7,316
	Romania	360	4,010	Romania	360	4,010
	Slovakia	141	1,109	Slovakia	141	1,109
	Slovenia	20	401	Slovenia	20	401
	Spain	403	18,669	Spain	403	18,669
	Sweden	123	3,943	Sweden	123	3,943
	Total	6,696	174,076	Total	6,696	174,076

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
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<p>QRE 17.3.1</p>	<p>Meta cooperates with media literacy experts to improve media literacy and critical thinking across its platforms, engaging through direct partnerships, institutional frameworks, and research infrastructure collaboration.</p> <p>Fact-Checking and Media Literacy Expertise: Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the program, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.</p> <p>EDMO and the Research Community: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting research on Meta's platforms. Meta also started collaboration with GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their research proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data.</p>	<p>Meta cooperates with media literacy experts to improve media literacy and critical thinking across its platforms, engaging through direct partnerships, institutional frameworks, and research infrastructure collaboration.</p> <p>Fact-Checking and Media Literacy Expertise: Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the program, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.</p> <p>EDMO and the Research Community: Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting research on Meta's platforms. Meta also started collaboration with GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their research proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data.</p>
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V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	N/A	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of	No	Yes

service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 18.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.1.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 18.1.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 18.1.3	N/A	N/A
SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	N/A	N/A
Country		
Austria	N/A	N/A
Belgium	N/A	N/A
Bulgaria	N/A	N/A
Croatia	N/A	N/A
Cyprus	N/A	N/A

Czech Republic	N/A	N/A
Denmark	N/A	N/A
Estonia	N/A	N/A
Finland	N/A	N/A
France	N/A	N/A
Germany	N/A	N/A
Greece	N/A	N/A
Hungary	N/A	N/A
Ireland	N/A	N/A
Italy	N/A	N/A
Latvia	N/A	N/A
Lithuania	N/A	N/A
Luxembourg	N/A	N/A
Malta	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	N/A	N/A
Poland	N/A	N/A
Portugal	N/A	N/A
Romania	N/A	N/A
Slovakia	N/A	N/A
Slovenia	N/A	N/A
Spain	N/A	N/A
Sweden	N/A	N/A
Total EU	N/A	N/A
Measure 18.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.2.1	Our policies and approach to tackle harmful false or misleading information, which Meta interprets as misinformation, are published in our Transparency Centre: - Meta Community Standards - Misinformation	Our policies and approach to tackle harmful false or misleading information, which Meta interprets as misinformation, are published in our Transparency Centre: - Meta Community Standards - Misinformation

	<p>- Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') - <u>Misinformation</u></p> <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly</u> share misinformation. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have rated as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.</p> <p>Our penalty system to restrict accounts that violate our Community Standards on the platform can be found <u>here</u>. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.</p> <p>These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, <u>these restrictions</u> only apply to Facebook accounts).</p> <p>If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.</p> <p>For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.</p>	<p>- Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') - <u>Misinformation</u></p> <p>These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly violate our policies</u>. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have rated as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.</p> <p>For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.</p> <p>If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.</p> <p>For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.</p>
<p>SLI 18.2.1 - removal actions taken in response to policy violations</p>	<p>Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.</p> <p>Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.</p>	<p>Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.</p> <p>Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.</p>
<p>Country</p>	<p>This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.</p>	<p>This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.</p>
<p>Austria</p>		
<p>Belgium</p>		

Bulgaria		
Croatia		
Cyprus		
Czech Republic		
Denmark		
Estonia		
Finland		
France		
Germany		
Greece		
Hungary		
Iceland		
Ireland		
Italy		
Latvia		
Liechtenstein		
Lithuania		
Luxembourg		
Malta		
Netherlands		
Norway		
Poland		
Portugal		
Romania		
Slovakia		
Slovenia		
Spain		
Sweden		

Total		
SLI 18.2.1 - demotion actions taken in response to likely misinformation	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Instagram for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.
Country	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.	This metric is not reported in the current period due to technical limitations in attribution and aggregation. Meta will assess feasibility for inclusion in future reporting cycles.
Austria		
Belgium		
Bulgaria		
Croatia		
Cyprus		
Czech Republic		
Denmark		
Estonia		
Finland		
France		
Germany		
Greece		
Hungary		
Iceland		
Ireland		
Italy		
Latvia		
Liechtenstein		
Lithuania		
Luxembourg		
Malta		

Netherlands		
Norway		
Poland		
Portugal		
Romania		
Slovakia		
Slovenia		
Spain		
Sweden		
Total		
Measure 18.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.3.1	<p>Meta supports a number of initiatives to empower the independent research community, including the Influence Operations Research Archive.</p> <p>Meta's cross-functional teams also conduct regular in-house research and analysis of adversarial threats and Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks. The identification and disruption of CIB networks, which underpin the Influence Operations Research Archive, are the product of internal investigations conducted by highly specialized experts. This in-house research helps mitigate disinformation risk by informing improvements to Meta's detection systems and enforcement policies. Some of these findings are shared publicly via Meta's Adversarial Threat Reports on the Transparency Center.</p> <p>Meta's approach to translating research into platform actions is holistic with findings integrated into Meta's broader integrity and product development ecosystem, informing ongoing improvements to policies, systems, and features across Facebook and Instagram. For example, insights from CIB network disruptions continuously refine Meta's CIB detection and enforcement capabilities.</p>	<p>Meta supports a number of initiatives to empower the independent research community, including the Influence Operations Research Archive.</p> <p>Meta's cross-functional teams also conduct regular in-house research and analysis of adversarial threats and Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks. The identification and disruption of CIB networks, which underpin the Influence Operations Research Archive, are the product of internal investigations conducted by highly specialized experts. This in-house research helps mitigate disinformation risk by informing improvements to Meta's detection systems and enforcement policies. Some of these findings are shared publicly via Meta's Adversarial Threat Reports on the Transparency Center.</p> <p>Meta's approach to translating research into platform actions is holistic with findings integrated into Meta's broader integrity and product development ecosystem, informing ongoing improvements to policies, systems, and features across Facebook and Instagram. For example, insights from CIB network disruptions continuously refine Meta's CIB detection and enforcement capabilities.</p>

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

Please note: Meta has made additions and revisions to this commitment.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 19.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.1.1	<p>Meta publishes AI System Cards on the Transparency Center (https://transparency.meta.com/features/explaining-ranking/), providing an in-depth view into how AI systems in Meta's products work – including prediction models, input signals, and how they evolve over time. System Cards are written for both expert and non-expert audiences.</p> <p>Meta provides users with the following tools to understand and control their Facebook experience:</p> <p>Transparency tools:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "Why Am I Seeing This Ad?" – shows how demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to ads shown in Feed <p>Feed control tools:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Show More / Show Less – users give feedback on post types they want to see more or less of, temporarily adjusting ranking scores - Favourites Feed – users select up to 30 friends/Pages whose posts appear higher in Feed and in a dedicated Favourites feed - Most Recent Feed – content sorted in chronological order - Feed Filter Bar – users alternate between Top Posts, Most Recent, or Favourites feeds - Feed Preferences (https://www.facebook.com/help/964154640320617) – suite of tools to manage Feed: unfollow, snooze accounts, or prioritise Favourites <p>Content controls:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comment permissions – users decide who can comment on public posts - Profanity and keyword filters <p>Meta continuously analyses integrity risks on its platforms and adjusts transparency and recommender tools as part of an ongoing improvement process.</p>	<p>Meta publishes Instagram System Cards on the Transparency Center (https://transparency.meta.com/features/explaining-ranking/instagram-feed/), explaining how the Feed ranking system dynamically delivers a personalised experience. Users can interact with a simulation tool to test how ranking predictions work for hypothetical users.</p> <p>Meta provides users with the following tools to control their Instagram experience:</p> <p>Content controls:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitive Content Control (https://help.instagram.com/2731122607168995) – users adjust how much sensitive content they see across Feed, Explore, Search, Reels, Accounts You Might Follow, and Hashtag Pages. The "More" option is unavailable for users under 18. - "Not Interested" – removes a post immediately and reduces similar suggestions across Reels, Search, and other recommendation surfaces - Snooze Recommendations – pauses suggested posts in Feed for 30 days - Hidden Words (https://help.instagram.com/700284123459336) – hides content with specified words, phrases, emojis, or hashtags from recommendations in captions and hashtags - Mute – stops seeing an account's content without unfollowing <p>Feed controls:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Following & Favorites Feeds – users add up to 50 accounts to Favorites; posts appear higher and can be viewed in a dedicated feed with no suggested posts <p>Meta continuously analyses integrity risks on its platforms and adjusts transparency and recommender tools as part of an ongoing improvement process.</p>
Measure 19.2	Facebook	Instagram

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 21.1	Facebook	Facebook
QRE 21.1.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1	N/A	N/A
	N/A	N/A

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	
Country	
Austria	

Belgium	
Bulgaria	
Croatia	
Cyprus	
Czech Republic	
Denmark	
Estonia	
Finland	
France	
Germany	
Greece	
Hungary	
Ireland	
Italy	
Latvia	
Lithuania	
Luxembourg	
Malta	
Netherlands	
Poland	
Portugal	
Romania	
Slovakia	
Slovenia	
Spain	
Sweden	
Total EU	

Measure 21.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.2.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 21.3	Facebook	Instagram

<p>QRE 21.3.1</p>	<p>Development and Stakeholder Engagement Meta's fact-checking programme's rating types and labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts, and may be refined through ongoing engagement with these stakeholders. Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations, certified through the IFCN or EFCSN, who review and rate content based on their independent research and reporting. Meta provides guidance to partners through dedicated Partner Managers who regularly communicate product and policy changes and share related training resources. Partners may communicate feedback or raise questions about the program to Meta's Partner Managers.</p> <p>Evidence-Based Monitoring and Improvement Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also gives Partners the ability to report any issues they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta's teams.</p> <p>User Needs and Effectiveness By engaging with fact-checkers, content moderation experts, and independent organizations, Meta ensures its labelling and warning systems are responsive to evolving user needs and informed by evidence on label effectiveness.</p>	<p>Development and Stakeholder Engagement Meta's fact-checking programme's rating types and labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts, and may be refined through ongoing engagement with these stakeholders. Meta partners with independent third-party fact-checking organisations, certified through the IFCN or EFCSN, who review and rate content based on their independent research and reporting. Meta provides guidance to partners through dedicated Partner Managers who regularly communicate product and policy changes and share related training resources. Partners may communicate feedback or raise questions about the program to Meta's Partner Managers.</p> <p>Evidence-Based Monitoring and Improvement Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also gives Partners the ability to report any issues they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta's teams.</p> <p>User Needs and Effectiveness By engaging with fact-checkers, content moderation experts, and independent organizations, Meta ensures its labelling and warning systems are responsive to evolving user needs and informed by evidence on label effectiveness.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center;">V. Empowering Users</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Commitment 22</p> <p>Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, trustworthiness indicators are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. This is acknowledged by the Commission's 2021 Guidance, which describes them as a tool signatories "could" explore, and negotiations of the updated Code which confirmed this to be a direction signatories are encouraged but not expected to follow. Other tools to achieve this objective covered elsewhere in this section - Commitment 21 in particular - are relevant and pertinent for our subscribed products at this time.</p> <p>We note however that we use several of the products and features listed under Measure 22.7 (in particular information panels, banners, pop-ups, and prompts) as already outlined under Commitment 21 above, as well as in our crisis monitoring reports below.</p>

V. Empowering users

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 23.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.1.1	<p>We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Standards when we're made aware, including fake accounts and accounts engaged in inauthentic behavior and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm.</p> <p>We use a combination of automated and human review for enforcement actions taken on the platform and invest in technology and people resources to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behavior.</p> <p>As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.</p> <p>Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on the Help Center:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Click Options next to the post that you'd like to mark as false. - Click Report post. - Click Scam, fraud or false information. - Click Sharing false information, then select the kind of false information. - Click Done. 	<p>We remove content and accounts that violate our Community Standards when we're made aware, including fake accounts and accounts engaged in inauthentic behavior and misinformation likely to contribute to imminent physical harm.</p> <p>We use a combination of automated and human review for enforcement actions taken on the platform and invest in technology and people resources to detect and identify violating content, accounts or suspicious behavior.</p> <p>As we improve our AI capabilities to proactively detect and take action on violating content, our reliance on user reports have significantly decreased. However, every week, people around the world report millions of pieces of content to us that they believe violate our policies.</p> <p>Users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on the Help Center:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Click Options next to the post that you'd like to mark as false. - Click Report post. - Click Scam, fraud or false information. - Click Sharing false information, then select the kind of false information. - Click Done
Measure 23.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.2.1	<p>Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.</p> <p>Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high.</p> <p>Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.</p>	<p>Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems.</p> <p>Mass reporting: We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high.</p> <p>Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.</p>

	<p>Protection against misuse: We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.</p> <p>Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.</p>	<p>Protection against misuse: We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.</p> <p>Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Instagram, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.</p>
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V. Empowering users		
Commitment 24		
<p>Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.</p>		
<p>This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.</p>		
	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 24.1	Facebook				Instagram			
QRE 24.1.1	<p><u>When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.</p> <p>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.</p>				<p><u>When we remove a piece of content, we let the user know</u> that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker.</p> <p>Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.</p>			
SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents that were	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents that were

	violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were later appealed.	violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were restored after appeal	removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were later appealed.	violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were restored after appeal.	removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation, inauthentic behavior or voter or census interference policies in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Country								
Austria	Over 41,000	Less than 100	49	0.03	Over 2,900	Over 290	291	4.32
Belgium	Over 60,000	Less than 100	52	0.06	Over 4,700	Over 140	135	1.01
Bulgaria	Over 170,000	Less than 100	50	0.06	Over 1,300	Less than 100	12	0.22
Croatia	Over 36,000	Less than 100	16	0.12	Over 2,900	Less than 100	31	0.21
Cyprus	Over 11,000	Less than 100	6	0.2	Over 2,000	Less than 100	53	0.19
Czech Republic	Over 100,000	Less than 100	35	0.1	Over 2,100	Over 180	157	3.34
Denmark	Over 20,000	Less than 100	47	0.07	Over 2,500	Less than 100	62	1.5
Estonia	Over 7,000	Less than 100	9	0.15	Over 290	Less than 100	2	0.03
Finland	Over 8,900	Less than 100	19	1.68	Over 1,300	Less than 100	90	1.08
France	Over 420,000	Over 330	248	0.03	Over 18,000	Over 2,200	2,143	0.44
Germany	Over 320,000	Over 710	500	0.06	Over 30,000	Over 1,100	1,074	0.69
Greece	Over 160,000	Less than 100	38	0.07	Over 5,000	Over 130	99	6.55
Hungary	Over 26,000	Less than 100	38	0.02	Over 740	Less than 100	18	5.59
Iceland	Over 1,500	Less than 100	0	0	Over 120	Less than 100	2	0.16
Ireland	Over 26,000	Less than 100	38	0.02	Over 2,400	Less than 100	66	0.37
Italy	Over 680,000	Over 370	257	0.07	Over 23,000	Over 950	899	0.81
Latvia	Over 24,000	Less than 100	4	0.01	Over 250	Less than 100	7	0.03

Liechtenstein	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	0	Less than 100	Less than 100	1	0.01
Lithuania	Over 22,000	Less than 100	6	0.01	Over 2,000	Less than 100	4	1.27
Luxembourg	Over 4,600	Less than 100	3	0.19	Over 1,000	Over 420	422	6.81
Malta	Over 3,300	Less than 100	6	0.01	Over 160	Less than 100	6	0.13
Netherlands	Over 59,000	Over 220	134	0.11	Over 8,300	Over 990	990	3.42
Norway	Over 18,000	Less than 100	17	0.15	Over 1,500	Less than 100	54	1.57
Poland	Over 260,000	Over 180	121	0.08	Over 6,600	Over 490	450	1.26
Portugal	Over 75,000	Less than 100	39	0.1	Over 6,400	Over 260	240	1.04
Romania	Over 380,000	Less than 100	68	0.06	Over 4,000	Over 230	218	0.25
Slovakia	Over 83,000	Less than 100	14	0.02	Over 1,100	Over 120	121	1.55
Slovenia	Over 13,000	Less than 100	1	26.08	Over 350	Less than 100	11	3.96
Spain	Over 380,000	Over 180	136	0.06	Over 24,000	Over 1,000	957	0.73
Sweden	Over 37,000	Over 170	130	0.13	Over 6,100	Over 130	129	0.6
Total	Over 3,400,000	Over 3,000	2,081		Over 160,000	Over 9,300	8,744	
SLI 18.2.1 - demotion actions taken in response to likely misinformation	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were later appealed.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were restored after appeal	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents that were demoted from Facebook for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Instagram for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Instagram for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were later appealed.	Number of unique contents that were demoted from Instagram for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025 that were restored after appeal	Median time to address appeals (in hours) on unique contents that were demoted from Instagram for likely misinformation in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025
	Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location.							
Country								
Austria	Over 82,000	Over 1,800	122	133.3	Over 510	Less than 100	3	135.15
Belgium	Over 110,000	Over 2,300	226	56.76	Over 780	Less than 100	6	138.35

Bulgaria	Over 440,000	Over 3,400	315	129.65	Over 280	Less than 100	0	152.58
Croatia	Over 120,000	Over 1,500	151	119.11	Over 290	Less than 100	4	141.92
Cyprus	Over 28,000	Over 450	44	130.49	Over 210	Less than 100	2	144.81
Czech Republic	Over 230,000	Over 3,000	355	129.75	Over 390	Less than 100	1	155.36
Denmark	Over 40,000	Over 1,100	162	131.01	Over 440	Less than 100	4	145.1
Estonia	Over 24,000	Over 360	44	133.03	Less than 100	Less than 100	1	233.59
Finland	Over 17,000	Over 920	101	131.39	Over 260	Less than 100	0	137.59
France	Over 1,000,000	Over 13,000	1,479	228.88	Over 3,600	Over 260	19	132
Germany	Over 700,000	Over 16,000	1,121	667.84	Over 5,500	Over 500	41	131.61
Greece	Over 350,000	Over 6,000	620	130.79	Over 1,100	Less than 100	8	134.16
Hungary	Over 61,000	Over 1,200	99	131.21	Over 230	Less than 100	1	140.98
Iceland	Over 3,100	Less than 100	6	134.82	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	156.23
Ireland	Over 61,000	Over 1,400	181	130.38	Over 490	Less than 100	5	133.77
Italy	Over 1,000,000	Over 26,000	2,408	1551.32	Over 10,000	Over 770	70	131.48
Latvia	Over 58,000	Over 430	33	131.81	Over 100	Less than 100	1	244.67
Liechtenstein	Over 170	Less than 100	0	490.99	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	0
Lithuania	Over 61,000	Over 690	56	132.54	Less than 100	Less than 100	1	166.46
Luxembourg	Over 8,700	Over 170	17	134.19	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	159.38
Malta	Over 5,500	Over 160	14	132.61	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	144.87
Netherlands	Over 97,000	Over 3,200	316	58.34	Over 1,500	Over 140	15	135.3
Norway	Over 26,000	Over 990	107	130.04	Over 340	Less than 100	2	155.02
Poland	Over 600,000	Over 7,900	778	129.6	Over 1,200	Over 100	12	136.38
Portugal	Over 210,000	Over 4,400	559	128.9	Over 1,700	Over 120	19	142.36
Romania	Over 610,000	Over 4,300	483	130.35	Over 640	Less than 100	1	133.5
Slovakia	Over 160,000	Over 1,600	189	130.96	Over 220	Less than 100	3	136.25

Slovenia	Over 32,000	Over 670	50	130.06	Less than 100	Less than 100	0	176.24
Spain	Over 840,000	Over 14,000	1,494	1,342.39	Over 6,500	Over 460	49	37.31
Sweden	Over 78,000	Over 2,600	293	129.78	Over 1,100	Less than 100	7	135.59
Total	Over 7,200,000	Over 120,000	11,823		Over 38,000	Over 2,900	275	

V. Empowering users

Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram	Service C - Messenger	Service D - WhatsApp
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	N/A	N/A	No	No

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]				
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Measure 25.1			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.1.1			<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false by our fact-checkers are prominently labelled when re-shared in Messenger, this includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Misinformation labels (clear, visual labels to content that has been rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by fact-checkers, and surfaces their fact-checking articles for additional context) - Warning screens (when someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share). 	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with accurate information. To this purpose, WhatsApp partners with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organisations certified by the IFCN around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Because personal messages and calls on WhatsApp are secured with end-to-end encryption, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated reporting. Users can flag potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organisations by sending them a message, and fact-checking organisations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article. - Government agencies and nonprofit organisations to help make authoritative information available to users on WhatsApp.
SLI 25.1.1			Please see section 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers.	Partnerships with fact-checkers: 13 fact-checking organisations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business App and/or the WhatsApp Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information.

				<p>The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. A reduction in the number of partners using the tool does not necessarily reflect a change in the number of fact-checking partners WhatsApp has in its WhatsApp fact-checking programme.</p> <p>WhatsApp has a formal fact-checking programme which utilises the WhatsApp Business Platform and has not seen a reduction during this reporting period in the number of partners.</p>
Member States				
List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)				<p>The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not.</p> <p><u>Directory</u> of fact-checking organisations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) during the period of this report]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - France: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 20 Minutes (French) - AFP France (French) - AFP Africa (English) - France24 (French) - Germany <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CORRECTIV (German) - AFP Faktencheck (German) - dpa Faktencheck (German) - Greece <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ellinika Hoaxes (Greek) - Italy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pagella Politica / Facta (Italian) - Portugal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Polígrafo (Portuguese) - Spain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EFE Verifica (Spanish) - Maldita (Spanish) - Newtral (Spanish)
Measure 25.2			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.2.1			As mentioned in our baseline report, to <u>help</u> reduce the spread of viral misinformation and	As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default for all

			<p>harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger. For example, when a user shares content from their feed into a private chat, and that content has been rated by a 3pfc, we continue to show the label on the content.</p>	<p>personal messages and calls. In this context, we work to counter misinformation both by limiting virality on our platform, and by encouraging users to think about the messages that are forwarded to them. We do this by using:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forwarding labels - Limits to messaging forwarding <p>WhatsApp provides a simple way to double check messages that have been forwarded many times: using the "Search on web" tool. This tool helps our users find news results or other sources of information about content they have received. This feature works by allowing users to tap a link that enables them to upload the message via their browser.</p> <p>We continue to evolve our efforts and approaches to tackling misinformation on WhatsApp. This ongoing work is focused on making sure we have the most efficient surface impact and consistently improving reach of our partners.</p>
<p>SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools</p>				<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the introduction of the additional forwarding limits in April 2020 reduced virality immediately by 70%. When we introduced the new group chat forwarding limit in 2022, we saw a reduction of approximately 20% in the number of forwarded messages sent to groups on WhatsApp globally.</p>
			<p><i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i></p>	<p><i>Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.</i></p>

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p><u>Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content on Facebook. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p>Individuals, including journalists, affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university</p>	<p><u>Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p>Individuals, including journalists, affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university</p>

	<p>Consortium for Political and Social Research. This was a first-of-its-kind partnership that enabled researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Furthermore, in December 2025, Meta <u>launched</u> a partnership with the Secure Data Access Center (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), an organization renowned for facilitating responsible data access for researchers worldwide. As part of our collaboration, CASD independently reviews research proposals to access Meta Content Library. We also launched a new Meta-hosted application portal, <u>Research Tools Manager</u>, to enhance the onboarding and support experience for both new applicants and existing researchers.</p> <p>In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform).</p> <p>Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications as of December 2025, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Additionally, we made updates to the <u>Meta Research Tools Terms and Conditions</u>.</p> <p>Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Facebook via its <u>Transparency Centre</u>. We've shared our 2025 reports there:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>The Community Standards Enforcement Report</u> - <u>The Adversarial Threat Report</u> 	<p>Consortium for Political and Social Research. This was a first-of-its-kind partnership that enabled researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Furthermore, in December 2025, Meta <u>launched</u> a partnership with the Secure Data Access Center (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), an organization renowned for facilitating responsible data access for researchers worldwide. As part of our collaboration, CASD independently reviews research proposals to access Meta Content Library. We also launched a new Meta-hosted application portal, <u>Research Tools Manager</u> to enhance the onboarding and support experience for both new applicants and existing researchers.</p> <p>In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform).</p> <p>Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta Content Library applications as of December 2025, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>Additionally, we made updates to the <u>Meta Research Tools Terms and Conditions</u>.</p> <p>Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Instagram via its <u>Transparency Centre</u>. We've shared our 2025 reports there:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>The Community Standards Enforcement Report</u> - <u>The Adversarial Threat Report</u>
<p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>

commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.

Measure 26.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.1.1	<p>Meta provides public access to public data that can support research through several tools and processes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualified researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment. - Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API – publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies. - Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports (https://transparency.fb.com/data/). <p>Safeguards to address risks of abuse: The Meta Content Library and API implement multiple, layered safeguards, such as controlled access, prohibition of misuse, privacy protection and ongoing oversight.</p> <p>The Ad Library is a public transparency tool. The Ad Library API implements safeguards including verified access, policy-based restrictions, and technical abuse prevention.</p>	<p>Meta provides public access to public data that can support research through several tools and processes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta Content Library and API: Meta maintains the Meta Content Library User Interface (UI) and the Meta Content Library API, research tools that allow qualified researchers to explore and analyse publicly accessible data across Facebook and Instagram. The Meta Content Library UI provides a comprehensive, visual, searchable collection of publicly accessible content, while the Meta Content Library API enables programmatic queries of the data and deeper analysis in a secure cleanroom environment. - Ad Library and API: Meta maintains the Ad Library and the Ad Library API – publicly available tools that allow for multi-criteria search of ads delivered across Meta technologies. - Additionally, Meta publishes aggregated data on content enforcement in its publicly available Transparency Centre reports (https://transparency.fb.com/data/). <p>Safeguards to address risks of abuse: The Meta Content Library and API implement multiple, layered safeguards, such as controlled access, prohibition of misuse, privacy protection and ongoing oversight.</p> <p>The Ad Library is a public transparency tool. The Ad Library API implements safeguards including verified access, policy-based restrictions, and technical abuse prevention.</p>
QRE 26.1.2	Meta Content Library and API: Meta publishes comprehensive documentation about the data available through the Meta Content Library and API on Meta's Developer Documentation portal, which is reachable from the Meta Transparency Centre. This documentation includes definitions of available data points, the scope of the data (including eligibility criteria for	Meta Content Library and API: Meta publishes comprehensive documentation about the data available through the Meta Content Library and API on Meta's Developer Documentation portal, which is reachable from the Meta Transparency Centre. This documentation includes definitions of available data points, the scope of the data (including eligibility criteria for content

	<p>content inclusion), technical protocols for accessing the data (including API documentation), and a changelog documenting product and data changes per release.</p> <p>Ad Library and API: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. Meta publishes information about ways-of-access and the data points available in the Ad Library and Ad Library API on Meta’s Transparency Center, the Ad Library Overview and FAQ page and the Ad Library API page.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Links: - Developer Documentation portal: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/content-library-and-api - Meta Transparency Centre: https://transparency.meta.com/researchtools/meta-content-library?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZWQCMTAAC3l0YwZhcHBfaWOOmjllyMDM5MTc4ODlwMDg5MgABHhLD5E16yNDV4SvBa9FOW6WoNMd_-4rF1tBPwkpimBUpxdmd6aMxu1KaU58_aem_KblzSA4h05TBOVvwyvALw - Ad Library Overview and FAQ page: https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=active&ad_type=all&country=NL&is_targeted_country=false&media_type=all&sort_data[model]=total_impressions&sort_data[direction]=desc - Ad Library API page: https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/api/?source=nav-header</p>	<p>inclusion), technical protocols for accessing the data (including API documentation), and a changelog documenting product and data changes per release.</p> <p>Ad Library and API: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. Meta publishes information about ways-of-access and the data points available in the Ad Library and Ad Library API on Meta’s Transparency Center, the Ad Library Overview and FAQ page and the Ad Library API page.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Links: - Developer Documentation portal: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/content-library-and-api - Meta Transparency Centre: https://transparency.meta.com/researchtools/meta-content-library?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZWQCMTAAC3l0YwZhcHBfaWOOmjllyMDM5MTc4ODlwMDg5MgABHhLD5E16yNDV4SvBa9FOW6WoNMd_-4rF1tBPwkpimBUpxdmd6aMxu1KaU58_aem_KblzSA4h05TBOVvwyvALw - Ad Library Overview and FAQ page: https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=active&ad_type=all&country=NL&is_targeted_country=false&media_type=all&sort_data[model]=total_impressions&sort_data[direction]=desc - Ad Library API page: https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/api/?source=nav-header</p>
SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	As of 31 December 2025, over 1,200 researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.	As of 31 December 2025, over 1,200 researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.
Measure 26.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.2.1	<p>Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. 	<p>Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Instagram. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API.</p> <p>Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. - Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. <p>Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Facebook Pages, posts, , groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. <p>For more details - see here.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. - Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. <p>Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Instagram posts, including a subset of personal Instagram accounts. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. <p>For more details - see here.</p>
<p>QRE 26.2.2</p>	<p>Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts. - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen <p>For more details - see here.</p>	<p>Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Posts shared by and information about Instagram business and creator accounts including from a subset of personal accounts. - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen <p>For more details - see here.</p>
<p>QRE 26.2.3</p>	<p>Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).</p> <p>Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Center (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to review Meta Content Library applications. Note that ICPSR no longer</p>	<p>Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).</p> <p>Starting in December 2025, Meta launched a partnership with the Secure Data Access Center (CASD, Le Centre d'Accès Sécurisé aux Données), to review Meta Content Library applications. Note that ICPSR no longer reviews Meta</p>

	<p>reviews Meta Content Library applications, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform).</p> <p>For more details on the application process - see here.</p>	<p>Content Library applications, but they continue to host the Meta Content Library API in the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave.</p> <p>In addition, researchers also now are able to choose between accessing the Meta Content Library API on the SOMAR Virtual Data Enclave or on the Meta Secure Research Environment (formerly known as Researcher Platform).</p> <p>For more details on the application process - see here.</p>
<p>SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2</p>	<p>Please refer to the tables below</p>	

TIMEFRAME	GLOBAL	EUROPEAN UNION (EU)	NON-EU
July 2025 - December 2025	Applications Received		
	375	91	284
	Access Granted (Approved)		
	289 of 375	71 of 91	218 of 284
	Under Review		
	76 of 375	18 of 91	58 of 284
	Withdrawn		
	10 of 375	2 of 91	8 of 284
	Rejected		

TIMEFRAME	GLOBAL	EUROPEAN UNION (EU)	NON-EU
	37	3	34

TIMEFRAME	GLOBAL
	Median Response Time (Days): Submission to SOMAR Approval
July 2025 - December 2025	31
	Median Response Time (Days): SOMAR Approval to Access
	9

Measure 26.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.3.1	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our <u>website</u> , which also include a dedicated <u>help centre</u> .	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our <u>website</u> , which also include a dedicated <u>help centre</u> .

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	N/A	N/A

implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 27.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.1.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 27.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.2.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 27.3	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.3.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	N/A	N/A
Measure 27.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.4.1	N/A	N/A

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 28

Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports.</p> <p>As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Facebook.</p> <p>Throughout the second half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comments filtering, and new tools in the API such as snapshots and collections. In addition, data coverage has expanded to include public profiles with 100 followers or more. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in independent research.</p> <p>We made changes to the Meta Research Tools Terms and Conditions which include granting researchers ownership of their research outputs</p>	<p>Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Adversarial Threat Reports.</p> <p>As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Instagram.</p> <p>Throughout the second half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comments filtering, filtering by account verified status, and new tools in the API such as snapshots and collections. In addition, data coverage has expanded to include public profiles with 100 followers or more. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in independent research. .</p>

	(Section 2(q)), subject to compliance with the terms and applicable law.	We made changes to the Meta Research Tools Terms and Conditions which include granting researchers ownership of their research outputs (Section 2(q)), subject to compliance with the terms and applicable law.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including streamlining application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including streamlining application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.

Measure 28.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.1.1	<p>Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world.</p> <p>The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for academic researchers, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners.</p> <p>Current models to support independent external research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Onboarding Support - Training and Education for researcher products and datasets - Office Hour to receive live technical support - Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials <p>Through these engagement activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs and help researchers identify the appropriate tools and contact points within Meta's research ecosystem.</p>	<p>Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world.</p> <p>The Research Partnerships team serves the academic community by being a primary point of contact for academic researchers, by supporting partner onboarding and data access setup as well as conducting product training for our ecosystem of partners.</p> <p>Current models to support independent external research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Onboarding Support - Training and Education for researcher products and datasets - Office Hour to receive live technical support - Promotion of research opportunities and product updates through newsletters and educational materials <p>Through these engagement activities, Meta maintains an open dialogue with the research community to understand evolving data needs and help researchers identify the appropriate tools and contact points within Meta's research ecosystem.</p>

	<p>Relevant details about research tools are available on our Transparency Centre.</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/researchtools/</p>	<p>Relevant details about research tools are available on our Transparency Centre.</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/researchtools/</p>
Measure 28.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.2.1	<p>Meta provides data sets and tools for researchers and publicly discloses all data types currently available in the Meta Content Library and API. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged on Research tools and datasets.</p> <p>The main data available to researchers are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram. • Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta's CIB policy. <p>-----</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/en-gb/researchtools/</p>	<p>Meta provides data sets and tools for researchers and publicly discloses all data types currently available in the Meta Content Library and API. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged on Research tools and datasets.</p> <p>The main data available to researchers are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meta Content Library and API: The Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access tool that allows approved researchers to explore and understand near real-time, publicly accessible data across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API available in cleanroom environments. The data covers public posts and comments from Pages, Groups, Events, and qualifying Profiles on Facebook, as well as public posts from Business, Creator, and qualifying Personal accounts on Instagram. • Influence Operations (IO) Research Archive: The IO Research Archive, housed within the Meta Content Library, provides data from networks disrupted under Meta's Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy. On Facebook, available data includes posts from public Pages, public groups, and public profiles that were removed for violating Meta's CIB policy. <p>-----</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/en-gb/researchtools/</p>
Measure 28.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.3.1	<p>Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research on Meta's platforms. This engagement included two main events in Berlin.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First, on June 26, 2025, Meta hosted a data dialogue where we invited several EDMO stakeholders to provide feedback on the MCL + API and discuss their experience conducting research, including any barriers or adversarial actions encountered. • Second, Meta further engaged with researchers and EDMO stakeholders during the DSA Access Days conference 	<p>Meta collaborated with EDMO stakeholders to engage with European researchers on their experience using Meta's research tools and any challenges encountered in conducting disinformation research on Meta's platforms. This engagement included two main events in Berlin.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First, on June 26, 2025, Meta hosted a data dialogue where we invited several EDMO stakeholders to provide feedback on the MCL + API and discuss their experience conducting research, including any barriers or adversarial actions encountered. • Second, Meta further engaged with researchers and EDMO stakeholders during the DSA Access Days conference in

	<p>(https://dsa40collaboratory.eu/data-access-days/) in September 2025, where researcher experiences with platform access and research conditions were discussed.</p> <p>No reports of adversarial actions against researchers conducting good-faith disinformation research were identified during these engagements.</p>	<p>September 2025 (https://dsa40collaboratory.eu/data-access-days/), where researcher experiences with platform access and research conditions were discussed.</p> <p>No reports of adversarial actions against researchers conducting good-faith disinformation research were identified during these engagements.</p>
Measure 28.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.4.1	<p>The specific provisions under Measure 28.4.1 are still in the process of being developed.</p> <p>Up until September 2025, Meta has coordinated with other platforms through EDMO working groups with the goal of establishing an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) intended to serve as an intermediary between researchers, platforms, search engines, and Digital Service Coordinators in order to facilitate data sharing and mitigate disputes among other things. Meta set aside \$100,000 to support this effort.</p> <p>Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative - a decision made in September 2025 for reasons outside Meta's control - Meta began collaboration with GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Meta has collaborated with GESIS to support their funding application for RIDLOP, which is intended to serve as an industry-wide initiative enabling structured data sharing between platforms and the European research community.</p>	<p>The specific provisions under Measure 28.4.1 are still in the process of being developed.</p> <p>Up until September 2025, Meta has coordinated with other platforms through EDMO working groups with the goal of establishing an Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) intended to serve as an intermediary between researchers, platforms, search engines, and Digital Service Coordinators in order to facilitate data sharing and mitigate disputes among other things. Meta set aside \$100,000 to support this effort.</p> <p>Following EDMO's decision to pause its funding initiative - a decision made in September 2025 for reasons outside Meta's control - Meta began collaboration with GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences on their RIDLOP proposal, which aims to establish a research infrastructure to facilitate researcher access to platform data. Meta has collaborated with GESIS to support their funding application for RIDLOP, which is intended to serve as an industry-wide initiative enabling structured data sharing between platforms and the European research community.</p>

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

Commitment 29 applies to research organisations.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<p>Meta continued providing all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset.</p> <p>Throughout the second half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including new collaborative tools in the API such as snapshots and collections. In addition, data coverage has expanded to include public profiles with 100 followers or more. collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact checking.</p>	<p>Meta continued providing all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset.</p> <p>Throughout the second half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including new collaborative tools in the API such as snapshots and collections. In addition, data coverage has expanded to include public profiles with 100 followers or more. collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact checking..</p>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	No	No

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's <u>public announcements on 7 January 2025</u> , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's <u>public announcements on 7 January 2025</u> , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 30.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.1.1	<p>Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognized industry standards.</p> <p>Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.</p> <p>Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.</p> <p>Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed.</p> <p>Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at Meta's Transparency Center: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works</p>	<p>Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognized industry standards.</p> <p>Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.</p> <p>Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.</p> <p>Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed.</p> <p>Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at Meta's Transparency Center: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works</p>

QRE 30.1.2	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack
	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg
	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP
	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP
	Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz	Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz
	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet
	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M
	Finland (Finnish)	AFP	Finland (Finnish)	AFP
	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs
	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck
	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes
	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP
	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie
	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica
	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min
	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck
	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog
Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo	

		<u>Observador</u>		<u>Observador</u>
	Romania (Romanian)	<u>AFP</u> <u>Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro</u>	Romania (Romanian)	<u>AFP</u> <u>Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro</u>
	Slovakia (Slovak)	<u>AFP</u> <u>Demagog.cz</u> <u>Demagog.sk</u>	Slovakia (Slovak)	<u>AFP</u> <u>Demagog.cz</u> <u>Demagog.sk</u>
	Slovenia (Slovene)	<u>Oštro</u>	Slovenia (Slovene)	<u>Oštro</u>
	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	<u>AFP</u> <u>EFE Verifica</u> <u>Maldito Buló</u> <u>Newtral</u>	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	<u>AFP España</u> <u>EFE Verifica</u> <u>Maldito Buló</u> <u>Newtral</u>
	Sweden (Swedish, English)	<u>Kallkritikbyran</u> AFP	Sweden (Swedish, English)	<u>Kallkritikbyran</u> AFP
QRE 30.1.3	<p>Meta allocates resources to achieve fact-checking coverage and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat disinformation. For example:</p> <p>Financial Resources: Meta has established an agreement framework that provides fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.</p> <p>Tools and Technology: Meta provides fact-checking partners with access to the Meta Content Library, which grants comprehensive access to public content across Facebook and Instagram to support their investigative capabilities. Partners also have access to Meta's fact-checking tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Training and Capacity Building: Meta provides partners with comprehensive training materials and training sessions on any significant policy or product updates.</p> <p>Dedicated Relationship Management: Meta supports cooperation through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support that helps improve the fact-checking programme.</p>		<p>Meta allocates resources to achieve fact-checking coverage and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat disinformation. For example:</p> <p>Financial Resources: Meta has established an agreement framework that provides fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.</p> <p>Tools and Technology: Meta provides fact-checking partners with access to the Meta Content Library, which grants comprehensive access to public content across Facebook and Instagram to support their investigative capabilities. Partners also have access to Meta's fact-checking tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Training and Capacity Building: Meta provides partners with comprehensive training materials and training sessions on any significant policy or product updates.</p> <p>Dedicated Relationship Management: Meta supports cooperation through dedicated Partner Managers who engage with partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support that helps improve the fact-checking programme.</p>	
SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.		Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.	
	See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2		See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2	

Measure 30.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.2.1	<p>Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognized industry standards.</p> <p>Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.</p> <p>Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.</p> <p>Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed.</p> <p>Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at Meta's Transparency Center: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works</p>	<p>Meta's agreements with fact-checking organisations are structured to ensure transparency, measurable outcomes, and adherence to recognized industry standards.</p> <p>Certifications & Standards: All Meta fact-checking partners are certified by either the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) or, in Europe, the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). Certification requires adherence to the IFCN/EFCSN Code of Principles, which are publicly available and enforce non-partisan, professional standards. Meta's agreements mandate ongoing compliance with these codes.</p> <p>Agreement Structure & Financial Terms: Meta's agreements provide fair financial contributions to independent fact-checking organisations based on measurable outcomes.</p> <p>Coverage & Partner Engagement: Meta has agreements with fact-checking partners covering all EU Member States where there are certified partners. Meta establishes clear rating guidelines and frameworks to promote consistency in how content is addressed.</p> <p>Quantitative Reporting & Impact Measurement: As part of the agreement, Meta provides reviewers with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Further details and evidence of Meta's partnership framework and processes are available in public documentation at Meta's Transparency Center: Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking: How It Works.</p> <p>Link: https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works</p>
QRE 30.2.2	<p>Meta has dedicated Partner Managers who engage with fact-checking partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support to improve the fact-checking programme. As part of this work, Partner Managers collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools.</p> <p>Meta also provides fact-checking partners with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also provides fact-checking partners the ability to</p>	<p>Meta has dedicated Partner Managers who engage with fact-checking partners across the region, communicate new product and policy changes, and manage day-to-day support to improve the fact-checking programme. As part of this work, Partner Managers collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools.</p> <p>Meta also provides fact-checking partners with access to a tool where they can see quantitative information on their fact-checking output and activity.</p> <p>Meta periodically monitors the performance of its fact-checking systems to inform ongoing improvements to the programme's design and deployment. Meta also provides fact-checking partners the ability to</p>

	report any issues they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta.	report any issues they're encountering with the fact-checking systems through a dedicated support form, which kicks off a review by Meta.
QRE 30.2.3	QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations	QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations
Measure 30.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.3.1	<p>As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.</p> <p>Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the program, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).</p> <p>Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.</p> <p>Also, given the cross-border nature of content flows, Meta's fact-checking systems allow multiple partners - including from different countries - to rate the same content. Users, regardless of location within the region, are then able to see the articles of multiple fact-checking partners.</p>	<p>As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.</p> <p>Meta cooperates with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) to help uphold industry standards across the region. As a prerequisite to participating in the program, Meta requires that all of its European partners maintain an active accreditation with either the EFCSN or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).</p> <p>Through its fact-checking policies and related training materials, Meta promotes common standards for how partners address content on its platforms.</p> <p>Also, given the cross-border nature of content flows, Meta's fact-checking systems allow multiple partners - including from different countries - to rate the same content. Users, regardless of location within the region, are then able to see the articles of multiple fact-checking partners.</p>
Measure 30.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.4.1	<p>The European Commission, ERGA and EDMO are standing members of the CoCD's Task-force, which is chaired by the European Commission. The Task-force meets in plenary sessions and through dedicated working groups (subgroups) on specific workstreams.</p> <p>Meta is an active participant in the Task-force, attending EC-organized working group meetings across multiple workstreams. Through this participation, Meta collaborates directly with the European Commission, ERGA and EDMO.</p> <p>Additionally, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab through its collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission within the Monitoring Working Group.</p> <p>Meta stands ready to cooperate in accordance with this QRE.</p>	<p>The European Commission, ERGA and EDMO are standing members of the CoCD's Task-force, which is chaired by the European Commission. The Task-force meets in plenary sessions and through dedicated working groups (subgroups) on specific workstreams.</p> <p>Meta is an active participant in the Task-force, attending EC-organized working group meetings across multiple workstreams. Through this participation, Meta collaborates directly with the European Commission, ERGA and EDMO.</p> <p>Additionally, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab through its collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission within the Monitoring Working Group.</p> <p>Meta stands ready to cooperate in accordance with this QRE.</p>

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	N/A	N/A

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025 , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 31.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 31.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.1.1	<p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure fewer people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders. Specifically, Meta's technology is designed to detect content that is the same or nearly identical to content rated by fact-checkers, applying notices and reduced distribution automatically. This integration operates across all content formats relevant to the service, including public posts, ads, articles, photos, videos, Reels, and text-only posts on both Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p>Labeling. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. Content rated Satire or True won't be labeled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Facebook. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well.</p> <p>Ensuring fewer people see misinformation. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly false, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent.</p> <p>Repeat offenders. Pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetize and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news Page.</p> <p>Detection. Meta's systems support fact-checkers' work through a signals-based detection approach, which uses various inputs - including user flags reporting "false information" - to identify and enqueue content for fact-checker review. Fact-checkers ultimately decide what to review and rate. Once content is rated, Meta applies automated enforcement actions (labeling, reduced distribution, ad rejection) and extends these actions to near-identical content detected through matching technology.</p>	<p>When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure fewer people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders. Specifically, Meta's technology is designed to detect content that is the same or nearly identical to content rated by fact-checkers, applying notices and reduced distribution automatically. This integration operates across all content formats relevant to the service, including public posts, ads, articles, photos, videos, Reels, and text-only posts on both Facebook and Instagram.</p> <p>Labeling. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we add a notice to it so people can read additional context. Content rated Satire or True won't be labeled but a fact-check article will be appended to the post on Facebook. We also notify people before they try to share this content or if they shared it in the past. We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by fact-checkers, and add notices to that content as well.</p> <p>Ensuring fewer people see misinformation. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly false, or we detect it as near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly false to a lesser extent.</p> <p>Repeat offenders. Pages, groups, profiles, and websites that repeatedly share content rated False or Altered will be put under some restrictions for a given time period. This includes removing them from the recommendations we show people, reducing their distribution, removing their ability to monetize and advertise, and removing their ability to register as a news Page.</p> <p>Detection. Meta's systems support fact-checkers' work through a signals-based detection approach, which uses various inputs - including user flags reporting "false information" - to identify and enqueue content for fact-checker review. Fact-checkers ultimately decide what to review and rate. Once content is rated, Meta applies automated enforcement actions (labeling, reduced distribution, ad rejection) and extends these actions to near-identical content detected through matching technology.</p>

	In terms of AI-generated content, fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts and visual techniques to aid in the detection of this content.		In terms of AI-generated content, fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts and visual techniques to aid in the detection of this content.	
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	Filtered to content created on Facebook in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:		Filtered to content created on Instagram in EEA Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:	
	<p>1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:.</p> <p>2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:*</p> <p>These two metrics together show both the scale and impact of fact-checking.</p> <p>*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EEA Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EEA (120,000). This is expected.</p>		<p>1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:.</p> <p>2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:*</p> <p>These two metrics together show both the scale and impact of fact-checking.</p> <p>*This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EEA Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EEA (120,000). This is expected.</p>	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025:	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Country				
Austria	Over 490,000	Over 33,000	Over 22,000	61.40%
Belgium	Over 730,000	Over 40,000	Over 26,000	63.90%
Bulgaria	Over 570,000	Over 23,000	Over 9,500	63.70%
Croatia	Over 370,000	Over 23,000	Over 10,000	63.70%
Cyprus	Over 150,000	Over 18,000	Over 9,800	69.00%
Czech Republic	Over 460,000	Over 24,000	Over 13,000	58.30%
Denmark	Over 370,000	Over 25,000	Over 14,000	61.80%
Estonia	Over 76,000	Over 10,000	Over 3,900	51.20%

Finland	Over 170,000	Over 20,000	Over 12,000	61.30%
France	Over 3,200,000	Over 60,000	Over 60,000	67.10%
Germany	Over 2,700,000	Over 68,000	Over 92,000	60.90%
Greece	Over 760,000	Over 32,000	Over 19,000	67.90%
Hungary	Over 320,000	Over 22,000	Over 9,500	62.50%
Ireland	Over 450,000	Over 32,000	Over 2,600	64.50%
Iceland	Over 37,000	Over 8,400	Over 20,000	60.80%
Italy	Over 2,900,000	Over 62,000	Over 73,000	63.90%
Liechtenstein	Over 2,900	Over 1,600	Over 4,400	62.50%
Latvia	Over 130,000	Over 12,000	Over 300	80.00%
Lithuania	Over 190,000	Over 16,000	Over 5,500	59.70%
Luxembourg	Over 75,000	Over 15,000	Over 4,700	66.50%
Malta	Over 68,000	Over 13,000	Over 4,300	74.80%
Netherlands	Over 780,000	Over 43,000	Over 35,000	58.00%
Norway	Over 295,000	Over 27,000	Over 13,000	58.20%
Poland	Over 1,400,000	Over 38,000	Over 24,000	65.00%
Portugal	Over 920,000	Over 38,000	Over 34,000	65.50%
Romania	Over 820,000	Over 30,000	Over 15,000	59.40%
Slovakia	Over 280,000	Over 19,000	Over 9,000	51.70%
Slovenia	Over 180,000	Over 16,000	Over 5,900	58.80%
Spain	Over 2,500,000	Over 58,000	Over 69,000	67.40%
Sweden	Over 530,000	Over 35,000	Over 25,000	59.00%
Total EU	Over 17,000,000	Over 120,000	Over 280,000	

SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
	2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.

	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Facebook between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Instagram between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
Country				
Austria	Over 490,000	51.00%	Over 22,000	61.40%
Belgium	Over 730,000	50.60%	Over 26,000	63.90%
Bulgaria	Over 570,000	56.70%	Over 9,500	63.70%
Croatia	Over 370,000	56.10%	Over 10,000	63.70%
Cyprus	Over 150,000	61.10%	Over 9,800	69.00%
Czech Republic	Over 460,000	38.20%	Over 13,000	58.30%
Denmark	Over 370,000	52.70%	Over 14,000	61.80%
Estonia	Over 76,000	44.40%	Over 3,900	51.20%
Finland	Over 170,000	43.90%	Over 12,000	61.30%
France	Over 3,200,000	57.80%	Over 60,000	67.10%
Germany	Over 2,700,000	49.50%	Over 92,000	60.90%
Greece	Over 760,000	58.00%	Over 19,000	67.90%
Hungary	Over 320,000	53.30%	Over 9,500	62.50%
Iceland	Over 37,000	55.90%	Over 2,600	64.50%
Ireland	Over 450,000	51.20%	Over 20,000	60.80%
Italy	Over 2,900,000	55.20%	Over 73,000	63.90%
Latvia	Over 130,000	43.30%	Over 4,400	62.50%
Liechtenstein	Over 2,900	100.00%	Over 300	80.00%
Lithuania	Over 190,000	49.10%	Over 5,500	59.70%
Luxembourg	Over 75,000	50.00%	Over 4,700	66.50%
Malta	Over 68,000	61.10%	Over 4,300	74.80%
Netherlands	Over 780,000	44.20%	Over 35,000	58.00%
Norway	Over 295,000	45.00%	Over 13,000	58.20%
Poland	Over 1,400,000	49.00%	Over 24,000	65.00%

Portugal	Over 920,000	62.40%	Over 34,000	65.50%
Romania	Over 820,000	28.70%	Over 15,000	59.40%
Slovakia	Over 280,000	38.80%	Over 9,000	51.70%
Slovenia	Over 180,000	47.90%	Over 5,900	58.80%
Spain	Over 2,500,000	60.30%	Over 69,000	67.40%
Sweden	Over 530,000	53.20%	Over 25,000	59.00%
Total	Over 17,000,000		Over 280,000	

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.	Average of monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025.
	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Monthly Active Users	Over a 6-month period, ending 31 December 2025 (i.e., 1 July 2025 – 31 December 2025), there were a total of approximately 263 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report .	Over a 6-month period, ending 31 December 2025 (i.e., 1 July 2025 – 31 December 2025), there were a total of approximately 289 million average monthly active users on Instagram in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Instagram DSA transparency report .

Measure 31.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.3.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 31.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.4.1	N/A	N/A

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community				
Commitment 32				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.				
This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.				
	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram
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	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting "false information" and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.	Fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting "false information" and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's <u>public announcements on 7 January 2025</u> , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's <u>public announcements on 7 January 2025</u> , we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 32.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 32.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 32.1.1	<p>All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting "false information". Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review and rate themselves. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find. For example, we've used this feature to group content about global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.</p>	<p>All of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including user flags reporting "false information". Fact-checkers can also proactively identify the content they would like to review and rate themselves. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more. Once a fact-checker has rated a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, or we detect it as a near identical, it will appear lower in Feed on Facebook. We dramatically reduce the distribution of False and Altered posts, and reduce the distribution of Partly False to a lesser extent. During major news events or for trending topics when speed is especially important, we also use keyword detection to gather related content in one place, making it easier for fact-checkers to find. For example, we've used this feature to group content about global elections, natural disasters, conflicts and other events.</p>
SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	See list in QRE 30.1.2 - all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.	
Measure 32.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.3.1	<p>As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. Meta's cooperation with fact-checking partners is primarily conducted through bilateral channels, including dedicated Partner Managers who regularly engage with partners to communicate product and policy changes and manage day-to-day support.</p> <p>Meta is an active participant in the CoCD Permanent Task-force, attending EC-organized plenary sessions and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. During this period, fact-checking has not been a dedicated working group focus within the Task-force; however, Meta continues to engage with the Task-force on other workstreams relevant to fact-checking, and maintains its direct cooperation with fact-checking partners through the channels described above.</p>	<p>As outlined under QRE 30.2.2, Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with our fact-checking partners, working to understand their feedback and improve our fact-checking program together. Meta's cooperation with fact-checking partners is primarily conducted through bilateral channels, including dedicated Partner Managers who regularly engage with partners to communicate product and policy changes and manage day-to-day support.</p> <p>Meta is an active participant in the CoCD Permanent Task-force, attending EC-organized plenary sessions and working group meetings across multiple workstreams. During this period, fact-checking has not been a dedicated working group focus within the Task-force; however, Meta continues to engage with the Task-force on other workstreams relevant to fact-checking, and maintains its direct cooperation with fact-checking partners through the channels described above.</p>

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

Commitment 33 applies to fact-checking organisations.

VIII. Transparency Centre Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A
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Measure 34.1	Meta supported the establishment and maintenance of the Transparency Centre website, making it operational and available to the public as of 2023, within 6 months from the signature of the Code. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 34.2	Meta equally co-funds the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website alongside other signatories, providing funding sufficient for the website's maintenance, daily operation, management, and regular updating. The website is managed by VOST Europe in the role of developer. Meta's funding contribution is commensurate with its activity as a signatory to the Code and proportional to its risk profile and economic capacity.
Measure 34.3	Meta continuously contributes to the Transparency Centre's information through the bi-annual submission of its Transparency Reports. These reports are uploaded to the Transparency Centre and made available to the public. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 34.4	Meta participates in EC CoCD Task-force discussions regarding the functioning and financing of the Transparency Centre. The financing arrangement is agreed upon within the Task-force and reviewed on an annual basis in accordance with the Code's requirements. Meta engages in these periodic reviews to ensure the arrangement remains appropriate and sufficient for the TC's continued operation.
Measure 34.5	<p>Meta is a regular and active participant in the EC CoCD Task-force, which regularly discusses the Transparency Centre and assesses whether adjustments or actions are necessary. During the reporting period, Meta participated in weekly Task-force plenary sessions and working groups where applicable TC topics were discussed as applicable.</p> <p>Meta remains committed to implementing any actions or adjustments decided within the Task-force within a reasonable timeline, consistent with the Code's requirements.</p>

VIII. Transparency Centre							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy	No
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new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 35.1	Meta publishes its Transparency Reports on a bi-annual basis in the EC's Transparency Centre. The Transparency Reports list all the relevant information, including the terms of service and policies applicable to Facebook and Instagram, per commitment and measure. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 35.2	Meta provides information on the implementation and enforcement of its policies, which is available in the published Transparency Reports. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 35.3	Meta's Transparency Reports, which assess the implementation of the Code's commitments, are maintained in the Transparency Centre repository. See the Transparency Centre reports here .
Measure 35.4	No formal crisis situation, as defined under Article 36 of the DSA or as declared by the European Commission, occurred during the current reporting period that would trigger the application of Measure 35.4. Meta maintains documented Crisis Response Protocols and Assessments that would be activated in the event a crisis is declared. These protocols enable Meta to identify and assess whether external events impacting the functioning and use of its services are significantly contributing to a serious threat, and to publish information regarding specific mitigation actions taken on the Transparency Centre (https://disinfocode.eu) as required.
Measure 35.5	Meta and other signatories equally co-fund the ongoing operation of the Transparency Centre website, which is managed by VOST Europe in the role of a developer, ensuring the Centre is built with state-of-the-art technology and user friendliness. The layout designed by the developer allows for easy searchability, as well as straightforward tracking of changes.
Measure 35.6	Meta's bi-annual Transparency Reports, published on the Transparency Centre (https://disinfocode.eu/reports?signatory=meta), list Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) tied to each commitment and measure for Facebook and Instagram, including Member State breakdowns in a standardised and searchable format.

	In addition, Meta supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, produced in collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz, and the European Commission as part of the Rapid Response System (RRS). These Structural Indicators are accessible via the Transparency Centre, enabling users to understand compliance patterns across signatories. Meta continues to update Structural Indicator measurements aligned with its bi-annual reporting periods.
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VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36				
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will upload this report in a timely and complete manner.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures	Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will continue to upload this report in a timely and complete manner.

do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	
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Measure 36.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.2	Meta regularly updates Service Level Indicators, reporting elements, and Structural Indicators which are published by TrustLab on the EC's Transparency Centre. Additionally, Meta participates in EC CoCD Task-force discussions regarding the operation of the Transparency Centre, which includes maintenance and regular updating of the Transparency Centre website.
Measure 36.3	Meta is involved in discussions with the EC Taskforce regarding the Code and monitoring framework. Consequently, any relevant decisions of the Task-force are updated in the Transparency Centre through the bi-annual cadence of the publishing of Meta's Transparency Report.
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	In the period between 01/07/2025 to 31/12/2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,580 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 9,941 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.

IX. Permanent Taskforce

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Taskforce

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Taskforce. The Taskforce includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Taskforce can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Taskforce are made by consensus.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6	M 37.7
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A
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Measure 37.1	Meta actively participates in and contributes to the work of the Task-force, attending plenary sessions and engaging in relevant subgroups dedicated to specific topics or workstreams.
Measure 37.2	Meta agrees to and actively works with the Task-force on all essential tasks if and as required, including but not limited to developing and refining harmonised reporting templates, Service Level and Structural Indicators, and TTP benchmarks; coordinating rapid response efforts during elections or crises; reviewing research and evidence relevant to the Code's commitments; providing guidance on fact-checking reporting obligations; assessing whether the Code's commitments and measures require updates in light of evolving developments; and promoting the Code's adoption among new signatories.
Measure 37.3	Meta works with the EC and other signatories to define operating rules for the EC Task-force, including third-party expert involvement, and supports the drafting and consensus agreement of the Vademecum with the EC.
Measure 37.4	Meta participates in the following working groups, contributing specialized knowledge and operational support to the implementation and revision of the Code: Elections Working Group, AI Working Group, Critics Protocol Working Group, Integrity of Services Working Group, and Ads Scrutiny Working Group. These working groups are updated if and as needed to address any specific issues.
Measure 37.5	Meta participates in annual and ad hoc EC Task-force meetings with stakeholders and experts, providing updates via bi-annual Transparency Reports and discussing research outcomes. Meta's collaborative efforts include supporting independent research initiatives and engaging with EDMO, ERGA, and the EC.
Measure 37.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 37.6.1	<p>Meta maintains its subscription document and actively participates in the EC CoCD Taskforce, through which any changes to commitments or measures are identified and discussed. Meta's subscription document remains unchanged from the prior reporting period.</p> <p>During the reporting period, the European Commission proposed a revised working group structure for the Task-force, reflecting the evolving priorities of the Code's implementation. On 12 December 2025, the CoCD Taskforce Plenary with the European Commission (EC) mapped European Democracy Shield priorities into the existing CoCD Working Groups. This resulted in an expanded scope, and the original Taskforce Working Group was expanded into additional working groups. Meta's participation in Task-force working groups during this period was as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Elections Working Group – The most active WG during the reporting period; focused on novel threats including AI-generated content and rapid response mechanisms. Meta participated in meetings and contributed to the development of the Rapid Response System (RRS) Framework. - AI Working Group – Focused on detection and labelling of AI-generated/manipulated content. The EC is pushing guidelines for Gen AI labelling; industry participants (including Meta) are engaging on the intersection with Art 50 AI Act Code of Practice work. - Crisis Protocol Working Group – Focused on the <u>Rapid Response System</u> for crisis situations. The EC is developing a Code-specific crisis protocol; industry signatories are engaging on alignment with existing DSA obligations. - Integrity of Services Working Group – Focused on voluntary user verification and recommender transparency. The platform coordinator position remains vacant; Meta continues to monitor developments.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Ads Scrutiny Working Group – Focused on demonetisation of ads. This group has not been active during the reporting period, though the EC expects all platforms with relevant commitments to participate once convened. <p>Meta remains an active participant in the Task-force plenary sessions and responds to meeting invitations as they are scheduled by the EC. Meta's engagement is aligned with the current Task-force priorities of election integrity and AI-related disinformation challenges.</p>
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X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

C.38

M 38.1

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintained and enhanced dedicated cross-functional team structure to support CoCD implementation, including Meta's Public Policy & Global Affairs team), Regulatory Information Response team, and Global Response Operations team. - Continued investment in teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development – all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation. - Active and ongoing participation in EC COCD Task-force plenary sessions and working groups, with current engagement focused on the Elections/AI Working Group and the Rapid Response System (RRS) to ensure alignment with Code requirements and adaptation of internal processes as needed. - Maintained the Regulatory Information Response (RIR) process to proactively manage compliance deliverables and audit readiness across all signed-up commitments, including bi-annual Transparency Report production and submission within required deadlines.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	No

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 38.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 38.1.1	<p>Meta dedicated adequate financial and human resources and maintained appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of its commitments under the Code, including but not limited to the following:</p> <p>Dedicated Teams Supporting CoCD Implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public Policy & Global Affairs Team: Alongside the Content Policy team responsible for maintaining Meta’s Misinformation Policy, and EMEA Integrity Legal, it serves as the primary liaison with the European Commission (EC) COCD Task-force. This team regularly participates in EC Task-force meetings and working groups, ensuring Meta’s internal processes remain aligned with Code requirements. - Regulatory Information Response (RIR) Team: Maintains a regulatory information response process to proactively produce regulatory reports, including the COCD bi-annual Transparency Report submissions. Following a 2025 organisational redesign, RIR operates under a regional model for response execution, with dedicated Response Managers organised regionally to deepen jurisdictional context and in-region expertise. - The Regulatory Risk Management & Insights team (aka Global Response): This team coordinates the effective implementation of the Rapid Alert System ahead of each EU national election, which operates under the Rapid Response System (RRS) framework, supporting Meta’s commitment to timely action on disinformation threats. The team is also responsible for coordinating the internal elections preparation work and ensures we have robust systems to respond to election specific risks, including misinformation and disinformation. - Meta also maintains specialized teams who manage the relationship with third party fact-checkers and the overall Fact checking program in Europe <p>Cross-Functional Resource Allocation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meta maintains teams with expertise across content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity, and product development – all contributing to combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation in support of the Code. - We have expert investigation teams to take down manipulation campaigns and identify emerging threats. - These teams are distributed globally and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners, including content moderators located in the EU with specialist expertise in EU languages. <p>Internal Processes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A dedicated cross-functional team manages the day-to-day processes relating to the CoCD, including regulatory reporting, EC engagement, and coordination of compliance deliverables across all signed-up commitments.

	- Meta's DSA Head of Compliance (HoC) communicates and shares relevant information with the EC in relation to Meta Platforms Ireland Limited's compliance with the DSA, which now includes the CoCD, engaging with the EC periodically and taking any necessary actions arising from those engagements.
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X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 39	
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.	
	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	This report was submitted within the required timeline.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to	This report was submitted within the required timeline.

put in place in the next 6 months?	
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X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

This section was updated to provide additional information in June 2026.

	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	For this report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide relevant QREs and SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	
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X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Taskforce towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage with the Taskforce Monitoring Working Group.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage with the Taskforce monitoring working group.
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X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 42	
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.	
	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.
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X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 43	
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Taskforce.	
	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger continue to engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.
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Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

As outlined in our benchmark report, we took a variety of actions with the objectives of:

- Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: since the beginning of the full-scale invasions we have introduced several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted.
- Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared.
- Reducing the spread of misinformation: We took steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and consulted with outside experts.
- Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetizing and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites.
- In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today (globally), Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others.
- We added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included: Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, EADaily / Eurasia Daily, Fondsk, Lenta, NewsFront, RuBaltic, SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation, and Krasnaya Zvezda / Tvzvezda.
- We also expanded our ongoing enforcement against Russian state media outlets. Rossiya Segodnya, RT, and other related entities were banned from our apps globally due to foreign interference activities.

Our main strategies are in line with what we outlined in our benchmark report, with a focus on safety features in Ukraine and Russia, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation (including through media literacy campaigns), transparency around state controlled media and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

This means (as outlined in previous reports) we continue to:

- Monitor for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other adversarial networks (see commitment 16 for more information on behaviour we saw from Doppelganger during the reporting period).
- Enforce our Community Standards
- Work with fact-checkers
- Strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the Central and Eastern Europe region

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Outline any changes to your policies		
Policy	Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)	Rationale
Inauthentic Behavior Community Standards	We updated our Inauthentic Behavior Community Standards to simplify and refine our IB and CIB policies and help uninvolved authentic communities, Pages, and Groups that are targeted, managed, or co-opted by CIB operations remain on our services.	We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people's safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta's technologies, tools and processes.
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.		
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content rated as False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire or True by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.</p> <p>For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetisation Policies, any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our Partner Monetisation Policies.</p>	

	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we prohibited ads or monetisation from Russian state-controlled media. Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.</p>
<p>Political Advertising</p>	
<p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p>	
<p>Integrity of Services</p>	
<p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p>	
<p>Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs (Commitment 14)</p>	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, we have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.</p> <p>Since the invasion began, we shared what measures we've taken to help keep Ukrainians and Russians safe, our approach to misinformation, state-controlled media and ensuring reliable access to trusted information.</p> <p>As mentioned in our baseline report, our security teams took down three distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war (announced here, here, and here) and have continued to monitor and enforce against Russian threat actors engaged in coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). The Q4 2024 Adversarial Threat Report shared information on the continued low efficacy of the Doppelganger operation's efforts on our apps, with most attempts to acquire fake accounts or run ads being quickly detected and blocked.</p> <p>In 2025, we disrupted a coordinated inauthentic behavior network originating in Belarus and targeting Polish audiences. Our internal investigation revealed links to Belarus and Russia, indicating a coordinated foreign influence campaign. We observed that network operators strategically disseminated messaging focused on Poland's immigration policies and the country's relationships with the European Union and Ukraine.</p>
<p>Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitment 14 -16)</p>	<p>As mentioned in the baseline report, throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.</p> <p>We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the situation, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.</p>

Empowering Users	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.	
Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)	<p>State controlled media: We continue to take the actions we outlined in our benchmark report. We have taken further action to limit the impact of state controlled media, described above.</p> <p>Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate as outlined in our benchmark report.</p> <p>Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.</p>
Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)	<p>We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine.</p> <p>We continue to work through our AI for Good program, which empowers <u>humanitarian organizations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers</u> to make more informed decisions on how to support the people of Ukraine.</p>
Empowering the Research Community	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.	
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 17-25)	<p>As mentioned in our baseline report, the AI for Good program shares privacy-protected data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty and climate change. In support of the Ukraine humanitarian response, the program's maps have been utilized to provide valuable assistance.</p> <p>We make baseline population density maps (the high resolution settlement layer) of countries surrounding Ukraine publicly available. These are among the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e., no Facebook user data).</p> <p>Our Social Connectedness Index has also been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission - Joint Research Centre unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to estimate the rate at which Ukrainian refugees might seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.</p>

Working with the Fact-Checking Community	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU (Commitment 30-33)	As mentioned in our baseline report, for misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we work with our network of independent third-party fact-checking partners. The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above. As mentioned in our baseline report, our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.
	In Europe, we partner with 46 fact-checking organisations, covering 36 languages. This includes 29 partners covering 26 countries and 23 different languages in the EU.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis
Israel - Hamas War
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]: In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the Israel - Hamas War.
Mitigations in place or planned - at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]: In the wake of the 07/10/2023 terrorist attacks in Israel and Israel's response in Gaza, expert teams from across Meta took immediate crisis response measures, while protecting people's ability to use our apps to shed light on important developments happening on the ground. As we did so, we were guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, the protection of the dignity of victims, and the right to non-discrimination - as well as balancing those with the right to freedom of expression. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to prioritise and mitigate the most salient human rights risks: in this case, that people may use Meta platforms to further inflame an already violent conflict. We also looked to international humanitarian law (IHL) as an important source of reference for assessing online conduct. We have provided a public overview of our efforts related to the war in our Newsroom, as well as in our 2023 Annual Human Rights report . We provided an update on our actions in our 2024 annual human rights report . The following are some examples of the specific steps we have taken:
Taking Action on Violating Content: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We quickly established a dedicated crisis response staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. We explain how we deploy our Crisis Policy Protocol and manage crises in a new infographic in our 2024 annual human rights report (page 38).

- We continue to enforce our policies around Dangerous Organisations and Individuals, Violent and Graphic Content, Hateful Conduct, Violence and Incitement, Bullying and Harassment, and Coordinating Harm.

Safety and Security:

- In addition to this, our teams detected and removed a cluster of Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) activity attributed to Hamas in 2021. These fake accounts attempted to re-establish their presence on our platforms.
- In early 2025, we removed 17 accounts on Facebook, 22 FB Pages and 21 accounts on Instagram for violating our CIB policy. This network originated in Iran and targeted Azeri-speaking audiences in Azerbaijan and Turkey. Fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems prior to our investigation – were used to post content, including in Groups, manage Pages, and to comment on the network’s own content – likely to make it appear more popular than it was. Many of these accounts posed as female journalists and pro-Palestine activists. The operation also used popular hashtags like #palestine, #gaza, #starbucks, #instagram in their posts, as part of its spammy tactics in an attempt to insert themselves in the existing public discourse.
- We memorialise accounts when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

Reducing the Spread of Misinformation:

- We’re working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta’s third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP and Reuters. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
- We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we’ve made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
- We’re also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers.
- We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven’t originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

User Controls:

We continue to provide tools to help people control their experience on our apps and protect themselves from content they don’t want to see. These include but aren’t limited to:

- Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
- Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don’t follow you, or who only recently followed you.
- Comment controls: You can control who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
- Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook.
- Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed.
- Sensitive Content Control: Instagram’s Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

For the duration of the ongoing crisis, Meta has taken various actions to mitigate the possible content risks emerging from the crisis. This includes, inter alia, under the Dangerous Organisations and Individuals Policy, removes imagery depicting the moment an identifiable individual is abducted, unless such imagery is shared in the context of condemnation or a call to release, in which case we allow with a Mark as Disturbing (MAD) interstitial; and, remove Hamas-produced imagery for hostages in captivity in all contexts. Meta has some further discretion policies which may be applied when content is escalated to us.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Political Advertising

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

AI Generated or altered SIEP ads disclosure (Commitment 3)

The social issues, elections, and politics (SIEP) self-disclosure label will soon change from "digitally created" to "AI Info." This update more clearly indicates when AI is involved in creating or editing content, helping users better understand the type of content they're seeing.

Advertisers must still disclose when ads about social issues, elections, or politics use AI to create or edit photorealistic images, videos, or realistic audio that depicts:

- A real person saying or doing something they didn't.
- A realistic-looking non-existent person.
- A realistic event that didn't happen.
- Altered footage of a real event.
- A realistic, alleged event that isn't a true recording.

Disclosure is not required for immaterial AI uses (e.g., resizing, color correction). Meta will continue to enforce disclosure for AI-created or edited SIEP ads; failure to disclose the scenarios above may result in ad removal and account penalties for repeated violations.

We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technology change.

	<p>Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the Ad Library. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser.</p> <p>The AI Disclosure policy helps inform people about digitally altered or created Ads. This way, people will be more aware about the authenticity of messaging, which will help combat Disinformation.</p>
<p>Integrity of Services</p>	
<p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.</p>	
<p>Empowering Users</p>	
<p>As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.</p>	
<p>Warning Screens on sensitive content, Sensitive Content Control and Facebook Reduce: (Commitment 17)</p>	<p>The 07/10/2023 attack by Hamas was designated as a Terrorist Attack under Meta’s Dangerous Organisation and Individuals policy. Consistent with that designation, we removed all content showing identifiable victims at the moment of the attack. Following that, people began sharing this type of footage in order to raise awareness and condemn the attacks. Meta’s goal is to allow people to express themselves while still removing harmful content. In turn, we began allowing people to post this type of footage within that context only, with the addition of a warning screen to inform users that it may be disturbing. If the user’s intent in sharing the content is unclear, we err on the side of safety and remove it.</p> <p>However, there are additional protections in place to ensure people have choices when it comes to this content.</p> <p>Instagram’s Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. We try not to recommend sensitive content in these places by default, but people can also choose to see less, to further reduce the possibility of seeing this content from accounts they don’t follow.</p> <p>We’re continually testing how we deliver personalized experiences and have recently conducted testing around civic content. As a result, we started treating civic content from people and Pages users follow on Facebook more like any other content in their feed, and we started ranking and showing users that content based on explicit signals (for example, liking a piece of content) and implicit signals (like viewing posts) that help us predict what’s meaningful to people. We also started recommending more political content based on these personalized signals and are expanding the options people have to control how much of this content they see.</p> <p>These actions ensure that we balance the protection of voice with removing harmful content. In this context, it has allowed for important discussion and condemnation of violence, while also empowering people to make choices in reaction to the content they see on Facebook and Instagram.</p>

Hidden words Filter (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	When turned on, Hidden Words filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments, so people never have to see them. People can customise this list, to make sure the terms they find offensive are hidden.
	Hidden Words help people choose offensive terms and phrases to hide, so they are protected from seeing them.
Limits (Commitment 18, Commitment 19,)	When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
	This tool gives people choice about DM and requests they receive, which may be important when engaging online around sensitive topics.
Comment Controls (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	People can <u>control</u> who can comment on their posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
	This tool gives people control over engagement with what they post on Facebook and Instagram.
Show more Show less: (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	Show More, Show Less gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. Selecting "Show more" will temporarily increase the amount of content that is like the post a user gave feedback on, while selecting "Show Less" means a user will temporarily see fewer posts like the one that feedback was given on.
	This tool provides people with more direct control over what they see, which is important for protecting people's well-being during high profile crisis events.
Empowering the Research Community	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Content Library and API tools (Commitment 26)	As we previously reported, Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and API tools to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date.

	Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.
	Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements.
Empowering the Fact-Checking Community	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection (Commitment 30)	Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, and Reuters. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
	When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
Content Warning Labels (Commitment 31)	Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.
	Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election

National Elections

Meta's Approach to Elections

Meta is committed to providing reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages on our platforms. Our [policies and safeguards for elections](#) have been developed over many years and informed by our experiences of working on more than 200 elections around the world. Those experiences have resulted in the development of a robust election program, which uses mature policies, processes, and tools to both protect speech on our platform and safeguard the integrity of the elections. We continuously improve these measures to ensure they remain appropriate and responsive to emerging risks, and we have reinforced these efforts in light of the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act, the Election Guidelines, and our commitments under this Code.

1. Community Standards and Guidelines Relevant to Elections:

Our [Community Standards](#) set out strict rules for content that can and cannot be posted to our platforms. These policies cover voter interference, voter fraud, electoral violence, and misinformation, among other categories, such as, hateful conduct, coordinating harm and promoting crime, bullying and harassment. Our policies have been refined over many years, by partnering with academics, civil society, and third-party fact-checkers to find the appropriate balance between protecting people and protecting freedom of expression and information. These policies are regularly reviewed, and they are made available to the public through our [Transparency Centre](#).

Our comprehensive approach to elections continued for European elections held between [1 July - 31 December 2025](#). The election responses covered in this report include:

1. Norway (Parliamentary) election, **9 September 2025**
2. Czech Republic (Legislative) election, **3 - 4 October 2025**
3. Ireland (Presidential) election, **24 October 2025**
4. Netherlands, General election for the House of Representatives, **29 October 2025**

2. Our Election Risk Management Processes

We have a dedicated team responsible for driving Meta's cross-company election integrity efforts, leveraging experts from a full range of business functions to foster a holistic approach to tackling election-related risks. Those functions include colleagues in Meta's intelligence, data science, product and engineering, research, operations, content and public policy, and legal teams.

Over the years, Meta has developed a comprehensive approach to mitigate relevant user risks and respect the integrity of elections during an election period. This approach has been iterated and has matured over the course of hundreds of elections over the past years. We have processes, tools and policies in place all year round to address harmful or illegal content while protecting legitimate speech on our platforms, which have been further reinforced in light of the regulatory framework under the DSA including the Communication from the Commission (C/2024/3014) on Commission Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes (the "Election Guidelines").

During the reporting period for this report, we continued to work closely with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures ahead of elections. This included collaboration with Member State Digital Service Coordinators (DSCs), national authorities, electoral bodies, as well as taking part in the EU Code of Practice ("CoP") [Rapid Response System](#). As part of the rapid response system framework, we onboarded designated civil society organisations and fact checkers to our direct escalation channels to report time sensitive content, accounts or trends that could threaten the integrity of the electoral process.

Overview of Cooperation with External Stakeholders and Election Integrity Efforts

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of our day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation and integrity efforts for Norway, Czech Republic, Ireland and the Netherlands. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

Norway Parliamentary Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, including engagements with the national security authority (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance. We also conducted training in the Norwegian Parliament for political parties in May 2025 to provide further information on our policies and reporting channels.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

We remain focused on providing users with reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages. That is why we continue to connect people with details about the election for their Member State through in-app notifications, where legally permitted. We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app ‘Voter Information Units (VIU)’ and ‘Election Day Information’ reminders (EDR).

Facebook <ul style="list-style-type: none">- VIU Reach: Over 2.8 million- EDR Reach: Over 2.0 million	Instagram <ul style="list-style-type: none">- VIU Reach: Over 1.9 million- EDR Reach: Over 1.4 million
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Czech Republic - Legislative Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, including participating in several engagements with stakeholders across government, including: the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meta also participated in roundtables organised by the Digital Service Coordinator (DSC), with representatives of the European Commission, Czech government, civil society organizations and law enforcement agencies. We also onboarded the Czech Telecommunication Office to our direct regulatory reporting channel and provided on-the-ground training to Czech authorities on our policies and reporting channels.

As an active member of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Taskforce’s Working Group on Elections, we took part in its Rapid Response System (RRS). Through this, we were regularly in touch with civil society organisations and partners including: Central European Digital Media Observatory, Globsec, Demagog.cz and Alliance4Europe.

Meta also conducted comprehensive outreach to all political Parties ahead of the election in advance to ensure all candidates’ teams were aware of critical resources, policies and escalation channels on how to contact Meta in case of an escalation.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (8 September to 13 October 2025):

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 4.

- Number of reports received during the election period: 6.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

<p>Facebook</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - VIU Reach: Over 3.3 million - EDR Reach: Over 3.1 million 	<p>Instagram</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - VIU Reach: Over 2.8 million - EDR Reach: Over 2.6 million
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Ireland Presidential Election

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, including a roundtable hosted by CnaM in September 2025. This included a range of partners, such as representatives from the European Commission, European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and An Garda Síochána. We were also regularly in touch with civil society organisations and partners, including: Democracy Reporting International and Ireland’s Electoral Commission (An Coimisiún Toghcháin) who we onboarded to our direct regulatory reporting channel.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (29 September – 3 November 2025):

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 2.
- Number of reports received during the election period: 59.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

<p>Facebook</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - VIU Reach: Over 2.0 million - EDR Reach: Over 1.5 million 	<p>Instagram</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - VIU Reach: Over 2.2 million - EDR Reach: Over 1.5 million
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Netherlands – General election for the House of Representatives

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (1 October to 5 November 2025):

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 4.
- Number of reports received during the election period: 1.

External engagement and election preparation efforts began early, including meetings with the Rijksvoorlichtingsdiens and roundtables with the Authority for Consumers and Markets. We also continued our collaboration with the local, independent fact-checking organisations: dpa-Faktencheck and AFP as part of our election integrity efforts.

As an active member of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Taskforce’s Working Group on Elections, we took part in its Rapid Response System (RRS). Through this, we onboarded the Authority for Consumers and Markets (designated Digital Service Coordinator) to our direct regulatory reporting channel. We also worked closely with the European Commission and non-platform signatories (civil society organisations and fact checkers) to share elections related trends and onboard them to a direct escalation channel to report content which poses serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process and support its prompt review.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

Facebook <ul style="list-style-type: none">- VIU Reach: Over 5.2 million- EDR Reach: Over 4.4 million	Instagram <ul style="list-style-type: none">- VIU Reach: Over 6.9 million- EDR Reach: Over 5.9 million
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Responsible Approach to Gen AI

Meta’s approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for the EU national elections.

Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling:

Meta’s Community Standards and Advertising Standards apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by Meta’s third-party fact-checking partners, whose rating options allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is created or edited by AI.

Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from certain content creation tools.

Meta has begun labelling a wider range of video, audio, and image content when we detect industry-standard AI image indicators or when users disclose that they are uploading AI-generated content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context.

Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration:

Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the Partnership on AI, for example, and signed onto the tech accord designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2024 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

The measures outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 of this report were in place for the elections covered in this report. They were complemented by the prohibited ads policy outlined above. Most pertinently, under these policies, content that is fact-checked cannot be used for an ad under our [Advertising Standards](#).

Political Advertising

As outlined in Section 6, Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

Integrity of Services

All the measures outlined in Chapters 14 to 16 of this report were in place ahead of the European national elections.

Empowering the Research Community

Since 2023, researchers in Europe have had access to the Meta Content Library, enabling them to study various topics, including disinformation.