Code of Practice on Disinformation – Report of Meta for the period 01 July 2024 to 31 December 2024

Executive summary

We are pleased to share our fifth report under the 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, which also draws from our work with the Code's Taskforce.

The aim of this report is to provide the latest updates, for July to December 2024, on how Meta approaches misinformation and disinformation in the European Union. We have additionally included any pertinent updates which occurred after the reporting period, where relevant in the report. Highlights include:

- **Elections:** We have aligned this report with Meta's <u>post-elections report</u> which covers the Legislative Elections in France . We also included information about the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Romania in the National Elections chapter, which provides an overview of our work, including information on our core policies, processes, and implementation.

- **Media literacy**:

  - **National Elections**: In preparation for the French legislative elections, Meta invested in media literacy by launching a campaign on its platforms, Facebook and Instagram. This initiative aimed to raise awareness among French users about the tools and processes Meta employs to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference, and protect electoral candidates. Running from 20 June to 4 July 2024, just before the second round of elections, the campaign reached 2.1 million users in France and generated 10.6 million impressions. Additionally, Meta collaborated with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) and the European Disability Forum (EDF) to educate users on identifying AI-generated and digitally altered media.

  - **Fraud and Scams:** Meta launched a campaign to raise awareness of fraud and scams. The campaign ran in several EU markets, including France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Belgium, and Spain and used a range of relevant mediums including Meta's platforms (Facebook and Instagram), and other third-party platforms. The campaign featured ads from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, emphasizing our commitment to user safety.

- **CIB trends and Doppelganger:** As a result of our ongoing aggressive enforcement against recidivist efforts by Doppelganger, its operators have been forced to keep adapting and making tactical changes in an attempt to evade takedowns, as indicated in our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report for <u>Q3 2024</u>. These changes have led to the degradation of the quality of the operation's efforts.

- **Researcher data access:** As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, and researchers can now share editable content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Facebook and Instagram.

- **Labelling AI generated images for increased transparency:** In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent is to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we continue to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations.

Here are a few of the figures which can be found throughout the report:

- From 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024, we removed over 5.1 million ads from Facebook and Instagram in EU member states, of which over 87,000 ads were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation policy.

- From 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024, we labelled over 810,000 ads on both Facebook and Instagram with "paid for by" disclaimers in the EU.

- **We removed** 2 **networks in Q3 2024 and** 1 **network in Q4 2024** for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy which targeted one or more European countries (effectively or potentially). We also took steps to remove fake accounts, prioritising the removal of fake accounts that seek to cause harm. In Q3, we took action against 1.1 billion **fake accounts** and in Q4 2024, we took action against 1.4 billion **fake accounts** on Facebook globally**. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 3% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q3 2024 and 3% during Q4 2024.**

- In July–December 2024, we worked through our global fact-checking programme, so that our independent fact-checking partners could continue to quickly review and rate false content on our apps. We've partnered with **29 fact-checking organisations** covering **23 different languages** in the EU. **On average 46% of people on Instagram and 47% of people on Facebook in the EU who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning that the content has been fact-checked.**

- Between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024, **over 150,000 distinct fact-checking articles on Facebook in the EU** were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 27 million pieces of content in the EU.** As for Instagram, **over 43,000 distinct articles in the EU** were used to both label and reduce the virality of **over 1 million pieces of content in the EU.**

As currently drafted, this report addresses the practices implemented for Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp within the EU during the reporting period of H2 2024. In alignment with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to evaluate the applicability of these practices to Meta products. We will also regularly review the appropriateness of making adjustments in response to changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram	Service C – Messenger	Service D – WhatsApp
		II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
1	Measure 1.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 1.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 1.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.5	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	☑	☑	☐	☐
2	Measure 2.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 2.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 2.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
3	Measure 3.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 3.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 3.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
		III. Political advertising			
4	Measure 4.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 4.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
5	Measure 5.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
6	Measure 6.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.5	☐	☐	☑	☐
7	Measure 7.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 7.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 7.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 7.4	☑	☑	☐	☐

8	Measure 8.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 8.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
9	Measure 9.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 9.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
10	Measure 10.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 10.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
11	Measure 11.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 11.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 11.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 11.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
12	Measure 12.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 12.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 12.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
13	Measure 13.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 13.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 13.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
IV. Integrity of services					
14	Measure 14.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 14.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 14.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
15	Measure 15.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 15.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
16	Measure 16.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 16.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
V. Empowering users					
17	Measure 17.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 17.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 17.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
18	Measure 18.1	☑	☑	☐	☐

	Measure 18.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 18.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 19.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
20	Measure 20.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 20.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
21	Measure 21.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 21.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 21.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
22	Measure 22.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.5	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.6	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.7	☐	☐	☐	☐
23	Measure 23.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 23.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
25	Measure 25.1	☐	☐	☑	☑
	Measure 25.2	☐	☐	☑	☑
VI. Empowering the research community					
26	Measure 26.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 26.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 26.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
27	Measure 27.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 27.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 27.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 27.4	☑	☑	☐	☐

28	Measure 28.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 28.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 28.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 28.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
29	Measure 29.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 29.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 29.3	☑	☑	☐	☐

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

30	Measure 30.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 30.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 30.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 30.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
31	Measure 31.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 31.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 31.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 31.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
32	Measure 32.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 32.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 32.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
33	Measure 33.1	☐	☐	☐	☐

VIII. Transparency Centre

34	Measure 34.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
35	Measure 35.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.3	☑	☑	☑	☑

	Measure 35.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.6	☑	☑	☑	☑
36	Measure 36.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 36.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 36.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
IX. Permanent Taskforce					
37	Measure 37.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.6	☑	☑	☑	☑
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	Measure 38.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
39	–	☑	☑	☑	☑
40	Measure 40.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.6	☑	☑	☑	☑
41	Measure 41.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 41.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 41.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
42		☐	☐	☐	☐
43	–	☐	☐	☐	☐
44	–	☐	☐	☐	☐

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements
Commitments 1 – 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements							
Commitment 1							
Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements							
	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	**Improvements to Inventory Filter for Facebook Feed and Reels:** Inventory Filter for Facebook Feed and Reels gives advertisers the ability to adjust their preferences for adjacency to different content types. Within this control, advertisers can choose between expanded, moderate, and limited inventory settings based on the suitability level that's right for their brand. We've rolled out the following improvements to this control: ● **Language Expansion:** Inventory Filter now supports a total of 34 languages on Facebook Feed and Reels. We're further working to expand the number of languages supported by Inventory Filter this year. ○ Please note that this language expansion refers to Inventory Filter for Feed and Reels. The Inventory Filter for in-content ads, currently supports 37 languages and	**Improvements to Inventory Filter for Instagram Feed and Reels:** Inventory Filter for Instagram Feed and Reels gives advertisers the ability to adjust their preferences for adjacency to different content types. Within this control, advertisers can choose between expanded, moderate, and limited inventory settings based on the suitability level that's right for their brand. We've rolled out the following improvements to this control: ● **Language Expansion:** Inventory Filter now supports a total of 34 languages on Instagram Feed and Reels. We're further working to expand the number of languages supported by Inventory Filter this year. ○ Please note that this language expansion refers to Inventory Filter for Feed and Reels. The Inventory Filter for in-content ads, currently supports 37 languages and this work will bring

	this work will bring the language support closer to parity between the two controls. **Additional Brand Safety & Suitability Meta Business Partners have onboarded to the third-party brand suitability verification solution** for Facebook Feed and Reels, such as Adloox. *(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)*	the language support closer to parity between the two controls. **Additional Brand Safety & Suitability Meta Business Partners have onboarded to the third-party brand suitability verification solution** for Instagram Feed and Reels, such as Adloox. *(For advertising policies, see Commitment 2)*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	• Meta will continue to invest resources in the ongoing development and enhancement of the inventory filter. • We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.	• Meta will continue to invest resources in the ongoing development and enhancement of the inventory filter. • We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.

Measure 1.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.1.1	We continue to require compliance from our users with the policies defined in our baseline report regarding monetisation of their content. No additional new policies to report on in this instance.	We continue to require compliance from our users with the policies defined in our baseline report regarding monetisation of their content. No additional new policies to report on in this instance.
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)		

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid[1] or impression[2]) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Taskforce of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).		
SLI 1.1.2 – Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

Measure 1.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.2.1	We continue to discuss potential changes to our Community Standards, Advertising Standards or Product Policies in our Policy Forum meeting. In the second half of 2024, three Policy Forum meetings were conducted that included some discussions on Community Standards, including advertising elements. The topics covered were: Removing Self-Reported Imagery, Disordered Eating, and DOI Condolence Content.	We continue to discuss potential changes to our Community Standards, Advertising Standards or Product Policies in our Policy forum meeting. In the second half of 2024, three Policy Forum meetings were conducted that included some discussions on Community Standards, including advertising elements. The topics covered were: Removing Self-Reported Imagery, Disordered Eating, and DOI Condolence Content.
SLI 1.2.1	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

Measure 1.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.3.1	We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details].	We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details]. These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.

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[1] Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.
[2] Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

	These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.	
Measure 1.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.4.1	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.
Measure 1.5	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.5.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook received accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) for content-level Brand Safety on Facebook covering Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app. There are no further areas of accreditation for the moment. We are continuing to work on this audit and will issue updates as new information becomes available.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram is in scope for accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) in the next audit period. We are continuing to work on this audit and will issue updates as new information becomes available.
QRE 1.5.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, the areas covered by the MRC accreditation are Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile, web and mobile in-app. This is a recurring audit where we will expand the scope to areas meeting the most demand where we have generally available controls. For the next round, we are still determining the final scope but plan to include Facebook Feed placements into the scope as we have suitability controls available on those placements (e.g., Inventory Filter for FB Feed). We do not have any updates on this process at this time.	Meta will expand the scope of the recurring MRC audit to Instagram in the future. At present Meta is still determining the scope of this audit. We do not have any updates on this process at this time.
Measure 1.6	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.6.1	As mentioned in the baseline report, we continue to offer several brand safety controls for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details] Users can find details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.	As mentioned in the baseline report, we continue to offer several brand safety controls for preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details] Users can find details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.
QRE 1.6.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, when advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.	As mentioned in our baseline report, when advertising on our platforms, we respect our policies and principles and are able to use the brand safety tools outlined above.

QRE 1.6.3	As mentioned in our baseline report, we provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Facebook, and provide resources to use appropriately. The brand suitability inventory filter control for Facebook Feed and Reels has been expanded to support additional languages including Dutch, Hebrew, Indonesian, Korean, Romanian and Ukrainian. In addition, third-party brand safety and suitability verification for Facebook Feed and Reels is now available through our Meta Business Partner, Adloox, in addition to our other partners previously announced.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we provide brand safety tools across Audience Network and Instagram, and provide resources to use appropriately. The brand suitability inventory filter control for Instagram Feed and Reels has been expanded to support additional languages including Dutch, Hebrew, Indonesian, Korean, Romanian and Ukrainian. In addition, third-party brand safety and suitability verification for Instagram Feed and Reels is now available through our Meta Business Partner, Adloox, in addition to our other partners previously announced.
QRE 1.6.4	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.6.1	N/A	N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
Commitment 2					
Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.					
	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we enforce Advertising Standards on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our Community Standards. *(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)*	As mentioned in our baseline report, we enforce Advertising Standards on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our Community Standards. *(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising Standards, policies, tools, and processes.	As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising Standards, policies, tools, and processes.

Measure 2.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.1.1	As noted in our baseline report, advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Service, our Community Standards and our Advertising Standards. As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards. See more here.	As noted in our baseline report, advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Use, our Community Standards and our Advertising Standards. As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards. See more here.
SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. **Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent*

	Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*		Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online**	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States				
Austria	Over 660	Over 56,000	Over 660	Over 56,000
Belgium	Over 1,200	Over 89,000	Over 1,200	Over 89,000
Bulgaria	Over 1,100	Over 73,000	Over 1,100	Over 73,000
Croatia	Less than 500	Over 23,000	Less than 500	Over 23,000
Cyprus	Less than 500	Over 37,000	Less than 500	Over 37,000
Czech Republic	Over 1,300	Over 92,000	Over 1,300	Over 92,000
Denmark	Over 1,000	Over 58,000	Over 1,000	Over 58,000
Estonia	Over 2,400	Over 240,000	Over 2,400	Over 240,000
Finland	Over 730	Over 24,000	Over 730	Over 24,000
France	Over 5,600	Over 400,000	Over 5,600	Over 400,000
Germany	Over 9,100	Over 780,000	Over 9,100	Over 780,000
Greece	Over 700	Over 44,000	Over 700	Over 44,000
Hungary	Over 810	Over 63,000	Over 810	Over 63,000
Ireland	Over 800	Over 41,000	Over 800	Over 41,000
Italy	Over 14,000	Over 660,000	Over 14,000	Over 660,000
Latvia	Over 2,200	Over 73,000	Over 2,200	Over 73,000
Lithuania	Over 3,400	Over 97,000	Over 3,400	Over 97,000
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Over 5,100	Less than 500	Over 5,100

Malta	Less than 500	Over 16,000	Less than 500	Over 16,000
Netherlands	Over 3,700	Over 270,000	Over 3,700	Over 270,000
Poland	Over 12,000	Over 790,000	Over 12,000	Over 790,000
Portugal	Over 6,100	Over 270,000	Over 6,100	Over 270,000
Romania	Over 6,300	Over 210,000	Over 6,300	Over 210,000
Slovakia	Over 680	Over 38,000	Over 680	Over 38,000
Slovenia	Less than 500	Over 35,000	Less than 500	Over 35,000
Spain	Over 8,500	Over 530,000	Over 8,500	Over 530,000
Sweden	Over 1,900	Over 76,000	Over 1,900	Over 76,000
Total EU	Over 87,000	Over 5,100,000	Over 87,000	Over 5,100,000

Measure 2.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.2.1	As noted in our baseline report, misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our Advertising Standards for more information. In the EU, Meta's third party fact-checkers may review ads posted on Facebook, labelling them where a falsity assessment has concluded that they are false.	As noted in our baseline report, misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards, and as such those types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our Advertising Standards for more information. In the EU, Meta's third party fact-checkers may review ads posted on Instagram, labelling them where a falsity assessment has concluded that they are false.
Measure 2.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, the ad review system checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we use technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook. If we find ads that are identical or near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the ad review system checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we can use technology to identify near-identical versions across Instagram. If we find ads that are near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.
SLI 2.3.1	1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.

	Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online		*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States				
Austria	Over 660	Over 56,000	Over 660	Over 56,000
Belgium	Over 1,200	Over 89,000	Over 1,200	Over 89,000
Bulgaria	Over 1,100	Over 73,000	Over 1,100	Over 73,000
Croatia	Less than 500	Over 23,000	Less than 500	Over 23,000
Cyprus	Less than 500	Over 37,000	Less than 500	Over 37,000
Czech Republic	Over 1,300	Over 92,000	Over 1,300	Over 92,000
Denmark	Over 1,000	Over 58,000	Over 1,000	Over 58,000
Estonia	Over 2,400	Over 240,000	Over 2,400	Over 240,000
Finland	Over 730	Over 24,000	Over 730	Over 24,000
France	Over 5,600	Over 400,000	Over 5,600	Over 400,000
Germany	Over 9,100	Over 780,000	Over 9,100	Over 780,000
Greece	Over 700	Over 44,000	Over 700	Over 44,000
Hungary	Over 810	Over 63,000	Over 810	Over 63,000
Ireland	Over 800	Over 41,000	Over 800	Over 41,000
Italy	Over 14,000	Over 660,000	Over 14,000	Over 660,000
Latvia	Over 2,200	Over 73,000	Over 2,200	Over 73,000
Lithuania	Over 3,400	Over 97,000	Over 3,400	Over 97,000

Luxembourg	Less than 500	Over 5,100	Less than 500	Over 5,100
Malta	Less than 500	Over 16,000	Less than 500	Over 16,000
Netherlands	Over 3,700	Over 270,000	Over 3,700	Over 270,000
Poland	Over 12,000	Over 790,000	Over 12,000	Over 790,000
Portugal	Over 6,100	Over 270,000	Over 6,100	Over 270,000
Romania	Over 6,300	Over 210,000	Over 6,300	Over 210,000
Slovakia	Over 680	Over 38,000	Over 680	Over 38,000
Slovenia	Less than 500	Over 35,000	Less than 500	Over 35,000
Spain	Over 8,500	Over 530,000	Over 8,500	Over 530,000
Sweden	Over 1,900	Over 76,000	Over 1,900	Over 76,000
Total EU	Over 87,000	Over 5,100,000	Over 87,000	Over 5,100,000

Measure 2.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, our ad review system relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running. More information can be found in our Business Help Centre. Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time. In case of violations, advertisers will be notified directly if the Page or profile is facing restricted or disabled access to monetisation tools. Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our ad review system relies primarily on automated tools to check ads and business assets against our policies. Our ad review process starts automatically before ads begin running. More information can be found in our Business Help Centre. Ads remain subject to review and re-review at all times, and may be rejected or restricted for violation of our policies at any time. In case of violations advertisers will be notified directly if the account is restricted or disabled access to monetisation tools. Advertisers will always have the option to appeal this review.
SLI 2.4.1	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements
Commitment 3

		C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.					
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:		Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	- The brand suitability inventory filter control for Facebook Feed and Reels has been expanded to support additional languages including Dutch, Hebrew, Indonesian, Korean, Romanian and Ukrainian. - In addition, third-party brand safety and suitability verification for Facebook Feed and Reels is now available through our Meta Business Partner, Adloox, in addition to our other partners previously announced.	- The brand suitability inventory filter control for Instagram Feed and Reels has been expanded to support additional languages including Dutch, Hebrew, Indonesian, Korean, Romanian and Ukrainian. - In addition, third-party brand safety and suitability verification forInstagram Feed and Reels is now available through our Meta Business Partner, Adloox, in addition to our other partners previously announced.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you		

plan to put in place in the next 6 months?		

	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 3.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.1.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Measure 3.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.2.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Measure 3.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.3.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

III. Political Advertising
Commitments 4 – 13

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 4 Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".			
	C.4	M 4.1	M 4.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As noted in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for Ads about social issues, elections or politics ("SIEP ads").	As noted in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for Ads about social issues, elections or politics ("SIEP ads").
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta's products and or/policies.	As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta's products and/or policies.

Measure 4.1	Facebook	Instagram

Measure 4.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), which covers advertising that: ● Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office ● Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns. ● Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run (we define social issues as sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result in/relate to existing or proposed legislation. In the EU, those social issues include civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy). ● Is regulated by law as political advertising. Further details of our policies can be found online: ● <u>Advertising Standards</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics ● <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined</u> ● <u>About social issues</u> ● <u>Examples</u> of ads about social issues, elections or politics	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads"), which covers advertising that: ● Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office ● Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns. ● Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run (we define social issues as sensitive topics that are heavily debated, may influence the outcome of an election or result in/relate to existing or proposed legislation. In the EU, those social issues include civil and social rights, crime, economy, environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and governance, and security and foreign policy). ● Is regulated by law as political advertising. Further details of our policies can be found online: ● <u>Advertising Standards</u> for ads about social issues, elections or politics ● <u>How ads about social issues, elections or politics are defined</u> ● <u>About social issues</u>
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	*The Taskforce working group on the definition of political ads has not begun.*	*The Taskforce working group on the definition of political ads has not begun.*

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5		
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	**M 5.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook's policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer. In addition to this, we've established measures where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram's policy requires that any advertiser who wants to run ads that discuss, debate, or advocate for/or against social issues, elections or politics must go through the authorization process and have a "Paid for by" disclaimer run alongside such ads indicating the payor. It is our intention to detect and enforce consistently on these ads to the extent a political advertiser runs an ad without a disclaimer. In addition to this, we've established measures where ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and could be rejected if in violation of our policies.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta's products and or/policies.	As the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising become applicable, we will update measures under this Chapter as appropriate and to the extent they are not already addressed by Meta's products and or/policies.

Measure 5.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 5.1.1	As mentioned and explained in our baseline report, any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the authorization process required by Meta.	As mentioned and explained in our baseline report, any advertiser running ads about social issues, elections or politics who is located in or targeting people in designated countries must complete the authorization process required by Meta.

This applies to any ad that: ● Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office ● Is about any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns ● Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run ● Is regulated as political advertising Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving; disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits and reporting requirements. If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library. From April 2024 the Ad Library in the EU now contains more information about the Advertising or Community Standard that an ad violated (if applicable). We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics. Advertisers also have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered (more detail about this policy is outlined at the start of this commitment). We publicly share resources on our advertising standards covering the topics described above, such as a<u>ds about social issues, elections or politics</u> in our Transparency Centre.	This applies to any ad that: ● Is made by, on behalf of or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office ● Is about any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns ● Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run ● Is regulated as political advertising Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to <u>restrictions</u>. Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving; disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits and reporting requirements. If ads do not include a disclaimer and we determine that the ad content includes content about social issues, elections or politics, it will be disapproved during ad review. If an ad is already running, it can be flagged by automated systems or reported by our community and, if found to be violating our policy by missing a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library. From April 2024 the Ad Library in the EU now contains more information about the Advertising or Community Standards that an ad violated (if applicable). We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics. Advertisers also have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered (more detail about this policy is outlined at the start of this commitment). We publicly share resources on our advertising standards covering the topics described above, such as a<u>ds about social issues, elections or politics</u> in our Transparency Centre.

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 6 Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising					
	C.6	**M 6.1**	**M 6.2**	**M 6.3**	**M 6.4**	**M 6.5**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Messenger

	Service A – Facebook	**Service B – Instagram**	**Service C – Messenger**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As noted in our previous report, Meta launched an AI disclosure policy in 2024 to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. Advertisers will have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to: - Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or - Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or - Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not	As noted in our previous report, Meta launched an AI disclosure policy in 2024 to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. Advertisers will have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to: - Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or - Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or - Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is	

	a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.	not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.

Measure 6.1	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.1.1	As noted in our baseline report, Meta uses disclaimers for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Not all placement nor formats can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such placements or formats. While some placements are not available at this time, we are working to increase availability.	As noted in our baseline report, Meta uses disclaimers for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Not all placement nor formats can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such placements or formats. While some placements are not available at this time, we are working to increase availability.	N/A
Measure 6.2	Facebook	Instagram	N/A
QRE 6.2.1	As noted in our baseline report, Ads about social issues, elections or politics require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.	As noted in our baseline report, Ads about social issues, elections or politics require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.	N/A
QRE 6.2.2	As noted in our baseline report, examples of political ad labelling may be found in the Ad Library.	As noted in our baseline report, examples of political ad labelling may be found in the Ad Library.	N/A

SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 in EU member states. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 in EU member states. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	N/A
	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	N/A
Member States			
Austria	Over 40,000	Over 40,000	
Belgium	Over 72,000	Over 72,000	
Bulgaria	Over 7,600	Over 7,600	
Croatia	Over 13,000	Over 13,000	
Cyprus	Over 3,700	Over 3,700	
Czech Republic	Over 35,000	Over 35,000	
Denmark	Over 24,000	Over 24,000	
Estonia	Over 2,700	Over 2,700	
Finland	Over 13,000	Over 13,000	
France	Over 47,000	Over 47,000	
Germany	Over 71,000	Over 71,000	
Greece	Over 19,000	Over 19,000	
Hungary	Over 37,000	Over 37,000	
Ireland	Over 22,000	Over 22,000	
Italy	Over 76,000	Over 76,000	
Latvia	Over 18,000	Over 18,000	
Lithuania	Over 11,000	Over 11,000	
Luxembourg	Over 760	Over 760	
Malta	Over 1,900	Over 1,900	

Netherlands	Over 61,000	Over 61,000	
Poland	Over 33,000	Over 33,000	
Portugal	Over 31,000	Over 31,000	
Romania	Over 80,000	Over 80,000	
Slovakia	Over 21,000	Over 21,000	
Slovenia	Over 2,000	Over 2,000	
Spain	Over 28,000	Over 28,000	
Sweden	Over 34,000	Over 34,000	
Total EU	Over 810,000	Over 810,000	N/A

Measure 6.3	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Facebook so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Instagram so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time.	N/A
Measure 6.4	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	N/A
Measure 6.5	N/A	N/A	Messenger
QRE 6.5.1	N/A	N/A	As noted in our baseline report, when an ad, labelled as SIEP on the Facebook app, is shared via Messenger, the link redirects the user to the ad where the label is visible.

				Our teams will continue to consider potential solutions to meaningfully enhance the visibility of the SIEP label further in the Messenger conversation.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 7
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

	C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a policy that applies to all "ads about social issues, elections or politics" Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties, elections or social issues will be required to confirm their identity.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have taken a broad definition for political advertising and adopted a policy that applies to all "ads about social issues, elections or politics". Any advertiser—both political and non-political—who wants to run ads targeting countries in the EU that are about a candidate for public office, a political figure, political parties, elections or social issues will be required to confirm their identity.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.

Measure 7.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report: Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the authorisation process and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads, about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management. Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of: ● Turning on two-factor authentication ● Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity: – Valid photo ID – Two official documents – A notarized form that you download from facebook.com/id To help guard against foreign interference, advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting. European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualify to run ads about social issues, elections, and politics in Member States unless otherwise prohibited.	As mentioned in our baseline report: Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the authorisation process and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads, about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management. Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of: ● Turning on two-factor authentication ● Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity: – Valid photo ID – Two official documents – A notarized form that you download from facebook.com/id To help guard against foreign interference, advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting. European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualify to run ads about social issues, elections, and politics in Member States unless otherwise prohibited.

	Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions. To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.	Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions. To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above **(comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)**	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 in EU member states.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 in EU member states in EU member states.
	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 in EU member states.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 in EU member states.
Member States		
Austria	Over 7,300	Over 7,300
Belgium	Over 19,000	Over 19,000
Bulgaria	Over 3,700	Over 3,700
Croatia	Over 1,900	Over 1,900
Cyprus	Over 2,800	Over 2,800
Czech Republic	Over 9,700	Over 9,700
Denmark	Over 6,800	Over 6,800
Estonia	Over 3,200	Over 3,200
Finland	Over 8,000	Over 8,000
France	Over 36,000	Over 36,000
Germany	Over 40,000	Over 40,000
Greece	Over 7,000	Over 7,000
Hungary	Over 6,900	Over 6,900
Ireland	Over 5,200	Over 5,200
Italy	Over 45,000	Over 45,000
Latvia	Over 5,800	Over 5,800
Lithuania	Over 5,600	Over 5,600

Luxembourg	Over 810	Over 810
Malta	Over 1,100	Over 1,100
Netherlands	Over 12,000	Over 12,000
Poland	Over 32,000	Over 32,000
Portugal	Over 15,000	Over 15,000
Romania	Over 17,000	Over 17,000
Slovakia	Over 5,700	Over 5,700
Slovenia	Over 2,400	Over 2,400
Spain	Over 25,000	Over 25,000
Sweden	Over 7,300	Over 7,300
Total EU	Over 330,000	Over 330,000

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>. ● As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. ● Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements <u>vary by country</u>. ● As mentioned in our <u>Advertising standards</u>, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. ● Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.
QRE 7.2.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <u>Business Help Centre</u>. An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page <u>using a valid disclaimer</u> to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to	As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our <u>Business Help Centre</u>. An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account <u>using a valid disclaimer</u> to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections, social issues or politics can be up to 72 hours.

Measure 7.3	Facebook	Instagram
	review ads about elections, social issues or politics can be up to 72 hours.	
QRE 7.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● We require advertisers to acknowledge how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples before they can post SIEP ads. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency. ● All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our <u>Advertising Standards</u>. ● In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it. The <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● We require advertisers to acknowledge how we define <u>social issues</u> and review text examples before they can post SIEP ads. <u>Ads</u> where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency. ● All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Instagram against our <u>Advertising Standards</u>. ● In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it. The <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.
QRE 7.3.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, our <u>Advertising Standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise. From 2024 Meta launched a new AI Disclosure policy which helps people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook has been digitally created or altered (including through the use of AI) – as a result, advertisers may also incur penalties for advertisements that demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our <u>Advertising Standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise. From 2024 Meta launched a new AI Disclosure policy which helps people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Instagram has been digitally created or altered (including through the use of AI) – as a result, advertisers may also incur penalties for advertisements that demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements.

Measure 7.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.4.1	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 8			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.			
	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Facebook with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.	As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Instagram with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan		

to put in place in the next 6 months?		

	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 8.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 8.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 8.1.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 9			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.			
	C.9	**M 9.1**	**M 9.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Facebook with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.	As mentioned in our previous report, we continue to provide transparency on Instagram with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	No	No

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes.

Measure 9.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 9.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 9.1.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	Meta's <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u>" feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. In our baseline report, we also discussed how: ● We removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. ● Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them. We also allow Facebook users to see <u>how we decide which ads to show</u> and how users can adjust their preferences to determine the ads users are shown. ● Our FAQs section in the <u>Ad Library</u> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.	Meta's <u>Why am I seeing this ad?</u>" feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. In our baseline report, we also discussed how: ● We removed <u>Detailed Targeting</u> options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. ● Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them. We also allow Instagram users <u>control to see fewer ads about social issues, elections or politics</u>. ● Our FAQs section in the <u>Ad Library</u> also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 10
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous report, starting in April 2024, the Ad Library in the EU contains more information about the Advertising or Community Standard that an ad violated (if applicable). We display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics. For disapproved ads that received delivery in the EU, images will be blurred and there will be messaging saying that the ad was removed. The user can click to see more ad details and see more detailed reasoning on why the ad was disapproved, including the specific Advertising or Community Standard it violated. This change is applicable only to ads that were added to the Ad Library on or after 17 August 2023.	As mentioned in our previous report, starting in April 2024, the Ad Library in the EU contains more information about the Advertising Standards or Community Standards that an ad violated (if applicable). We display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics. For disapproved ads that received delivery in the EU, images will be blurred and there will be messaging saying that the ad was removed. The user can click to see more ad details and see more detailed reasoning on why the ad was disapproved, including the specific Advertising Standard or Community Standard it violated. This change is applicable only to ads that were added to the Ad Library on or after 17 August 2023.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising policies, tools, and processes. |

Measure 10.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 10.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We store these ads in the library for 7 years.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces."

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation	As mentioned in our baseline report, our Ad Library application programming interface ("API") allows users to perform custom	As mentioned in our baseline report, our Ad Library application programming interface ("API") allows users to perform custom keyword

measures here [short bullet points].	keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.	searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising repositories.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Political Advertising repositories.

Measure 11.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.3	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1–11.4)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library API provides access to data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term, name or Page in the Ad Library. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete these steps to access the API.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library API provides access to data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term or name in the Ad Library. For Instagram accounts that don't have a linked Facebook Page, people will be able to search for an advertiser's ad using their Instagram handle name.
QRE 11.4.1	As of December 2024, we've made targeting information for 35.31 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads	As of December 2024, we've made targeting information for 35.31 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads globally

	globally available to academic researchers. More details on the original launch of this initiative are available in the baseline report.	available to academic researchers. More details on the original launch of this initiative are available in the baseline report.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 12
Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.
This commitment applies to civil society organisations.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 13			
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.			
	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?		

Measure 13.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1–13.3)	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitments 14 – 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:
- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:
- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"…)
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new	Yes	Yes

tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. - **Fake accounts:** Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 1.1 billion accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q3 2024 and 1.4 billion fake accounts in Q4 2024 on Facebook globally. - **Inauthentic behaviour:** We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down. We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state. In July 2024, we <u>stopped removing content </u>solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour. - **Inauthentic behaviour:** We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts on Instagram that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally to help us automatically detect bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including the networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down. We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state. In July 2024, we <u>stopped removing content</u> solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from

measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Measure 14.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.1.1	To clarify what we've included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below: **Inauthentic Behaviour** – Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts. **CIB Policies** – Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behaviour (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation", the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms. CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification and (6) account hijacking or impersonation and (7) inauthentic coordination. We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on <u>Account Integrity and Authentic Identity</u>. Our goal is to remove as many fake accounts on Facebook as we can to minimise opportunities for IO threat actors to operate on our platforms. **Cybersecurity** – Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services.	To clarify what we've included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below: **Inauthentic Behaviour** – Our Inauthentic Behaviour policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram. **CIB Policies** – Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behaviour (as defined by our policy), where the use of fake accounts is central to the operation", the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms. CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification and (6) account hijacking or impersonation and (7) inauthentic coordination. **Cybersecurity** – Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services. **Spam** – We work hard to <u>limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic

	Spam – We work hard to <u>limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic Pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices. **Branded Content Policies** – <u>Branded content </u>may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages. **Privacy** – <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.	accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices. **Branded Content Policies** – <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages. **Privacy** - <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.
QRE 14.1.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. Besides, Pages and Groups directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source. We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly, is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours exhibited, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. Besides, accounts directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source. We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed.

	For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.	For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see here.
Measure 14.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment: Our fake accounts policies: ● In Q3 2024, we took action against 1.1 billion fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 3% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q3 2024. ● In Q4 2024, we took action against 1.4 billion fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 3% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q4 2024. Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies: ● In Q3 2024, we took down 7 Facebook accounts, 23 Pages, and one group while removing a network which originated in Moldova. We removed 48 Facebook accounts while removing a network that originated in Iran. ● In Q4 2024, we removed 16 Facebook accounts and six Pages in Benin for violating our coordinated inauthentic behavior policy.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the policy most relevant to this Commitment: Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies: ● In Q3 2024, we took down 20 Instagram accounts while removing a network which originated in Moldova. We also removed 2 Instagram accounts while removing a network which originated in Iran (more detail provided in Commitment 16) .

FACEBOOK	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	
TTP OR ACTION 1: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter**: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour: Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments) Use of fake followers or subscribers Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification Account hijacking or impersonation

	Methodology of data measurement: coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal, in which fake accounts are central to the operation. In each case, people coordinate with one another and use fake accounts to mislead others about who they are and what they are doing. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content — no matter who's behind them, what they post or whether they're foreign or domestic. <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024</u>. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2					SLI 14.2.3				SLI 14.2.4
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction /engagement on the service)
Moldova	Removal of 7 Facebook accounts, 23 pages, and one group	Removal of 7 Facebook accounts, 23 pages, and one group		About 4,200 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, no accounts joined this group	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		This operation centered around about a dozen fictitious, Russian-language news brands posing as independent entities with presence on multiple internet services. The individuals behind this activity used fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled prior to our investigation – to manage Pages posing as independent news entities, post content, and to drive people to this operation's off-platform channel. They posted original content, including cartoons, about news and geopolitical events concerning Moldova. They also posted supportive commentary about pro-Russia parties in Moldova, including a small fraction referencing exiled oligarch Shor and his party. The operators also posted about offering money and giveaways, including food and concert tickets, if people in Moldova would follow them on				

							social media or make graffiti with the campaign's brand names.			
Iran	Removal of 48 Facebook accounts	Removal of 48 Facebook accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)	The operation ran five fictitious brands – Zeus, Cyber Court, Net Hunter, Regiment Groupe Union Defense (RGUD), and WeRedEvils0g – posing as anti-West activist or hacktivist collectives. They had unique visual branding, slogans and presence across the internet, including on our apps, YouTube, Telegram, X, and their own websites. One brand called for banning Israeli athletes from participating in the Paris Olympics, attracting the attention of French authorities. Two others appeared to have appropriated the branding of previously existing entities but with slight modifications. One of these brands also ran a website mimicking the Jerusalem Post where they published their content.			
Benin	Removal of 16 Facebook accounts and six Pages	Removal of 16 Facebook accounts and six Pages		About 18,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)	This effort targeted primarily France with posts in French about news and politics, including criticism of President Macron and NATO; supportive commentary about Marine Le Pen and her party; and calls for reduced support for Ukraine.			

TTP OR ACTION 2	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:** This action covers the following TTPs:
	  – Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
	  – Use of fake followers or subscribers
	  – Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

<table>
<tr><td colspan="13">Methodology of data measurement: Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information <u>here</u>.</td></tr>
</table>

	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2					SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
GLOBAL Q3 2024	1.1 bn accounts	Removal of 1.1 bn accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)						
GLOBAL Q4 2024	1.4 bn accounts	Removal of 1.4 bn accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)						

INSTAGRAM	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	

TTP OR ACTION 1	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:** This action covers the following TTPs <u>in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour</u>: – Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments) – Use of fake followers or subscribers – Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains – Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification Methodology of data measurement: <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European countries (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.</u>
	SLI 14.2.1 SLI 14.2.2 SLI 14.2.3 SLI 14.2.4

Origin of network	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/ engagement on the service)
Moldova	20 Instagram accounts	Removed 20 Instagram accounts		Around 355,000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		This operation centered around about a dozen fictitious, Russian-language news brands posing as independent entities with presence on multiple internet services. The individuals behind this activity used fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled prior to our investigation – to manage Pages posing as independent news entities, post content, and to drive people to this operation's off-platform channel. They posted original content, including cartoons, about news and geopolitical events concerning Moldova. They also posted supportive commentary about pro-Russia parties in Moldova, including a small fraction referencing exiled oligarch Shor and his party. The operators also posted about offering money and giveaways, including food and concert tickets, if people in Moldova would follow them on social media or make graffiti with the campaign's brand names.				

Iran				Around 10 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		The operation ran five fictitious brands – Zeus, Cyber Court, Net Hunter, Regiment Groupe Union Defense (RGUD), and WeRedEvils0g – posing as anti-West activist or hacktivist collectives. They had unique visual branding, slogans and presence across the internet, including on our apps, YouTube, Telegram, X, and their own websites. One brand called for banning Israeli athletes from participating in the Paris Olympics, attracting the attention of French authorities. Two others appeared to have appropriated the branding of previously existing entities but with slight modifications. One of these brands also ran a website mimicking the Jerusalem Post where they published their content.				
	2 Instagram accounts	Removed 2 Instagram accounts										
Benin					0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		This effort targeted primarily France with posts in French about news and politics, including criticism of President Macron and NATO; supportive commentary about Marine Le Pen and her party; and calls for reduced support for Ukraine.				
	16 Facebook accounts and six Pages	Removed 16 Facebook accounts and six Pages		About 18,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages.								

Measure 14.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.3.1	We continue to engage with this working group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1–14.2.4 above.	We continue to engage with this working group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1–14.2.4 above.

IV. Integrity of Services			
Commitment 15 Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.			
	C.15	**M 15.1**	**M 15.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. We recognize that the widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify and address disinformation on our platforms. We also acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely to cause significant harm. We want people to know when they see posts that have been made with AI. In early 2024, we <u>announced</u> a new approach for labeling AI-generated organic content. An important part of this approach relies on industry standard indicators that other companies include in content created using their tools, which help us assess whether something is created using AI. In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations. For organic content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we moved the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed. In September 2024, we also began rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative images using a risk-based framework. When an image is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu).	We recognise that widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify, and address disinformation on our platforms. We recognize that the widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify and address disinformation on our platforms. We also acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely to cause significant harm. We want people to know when they see posts that have been made with AI. In early 2024, we <u>announced</u> a new approach for labeling organic AI-generated content. An important part of this approach relies on industry standard indicators that other companies include in content created using their tools, which help us assess whether something is created using AI. In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations. For organic content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we moved the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed. In September 2024, we also began rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative images using a risk-based framework. When an image is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	Yes	Yes

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In January 2025, we began gradually rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative videos using a risk-based framework. When a video is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu).	In January 2025, we began gradually rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative videos using a risk-based framework. When a video is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu).

Measure 15.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.1.1	We address potential abuses from AI-generated content in two primary ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; and (2) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated. In February 2024 Meta's Oversight Board provided <u>feedback</u> regarding our approach to manipulated media, arguing that we unnecessarily risk restricting freedom of expression when we remove manipulated media that does not otherwise violate our Community Standards. It recommended a "less restrictive" approach to manipulated media, such as labels with context. We agree that providing transparency and additional context is now the better way to address this content. In <u>May 2024 we began labelling AI generated or edited content</u> (based on industry aligned standards on identifying AI as well as through users self declaring AI influenced content) with the label 'Made with AI'. While we work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI info" across our apps, which people can click for more information. These labels cover a broader range of content in addition to the manipulated content that the Oversight Board also recommended labelling in their feedback. If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a	We address potential abuses from AI-generated content in two primary ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; and (2) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated. In February 2024 Meta's Oversight Board provided <u>feedback</u> regarding our approach to manipulated media, arguing that we unnecessarily risk restricting freedom of expression when we remove manipulated media that does not otherwise violate our Community Standards. It recommended a "less restrictive" approach to manipulated media, such as labels with context. We agree that providing transparency and additional context is now the better way to address this content. In <u>May 2024 we began labelling AI generated or edited content</u> (based on industry aligned standards on identifying AI as well as through users self declaring AI influenced content) with the label 'Made with AI'. While we work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI info" across our apps, which people can click for more information. These labels cover a broader range of content in addition to the manipulated content that the Oversight Board also recommended labelling in their feedback. If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a

	matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations. For content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we are moving the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We will still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.	matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations. For content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we are moving the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We will still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.
Measure 15.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.2.1	Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency. • We display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.	Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency. • We display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.

IV. Integrity of Services			
Commitment 16 Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.			
	C.16	**M 16.1**	**M 16.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation.

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to stop emerging threats by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration. In December 2024 and February 2025, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat reports (Q3 2024 and Q4 2024) with information on threat research into new covert influence operations that we took down.	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to stop emerging threats by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration. In December 2024 and February 2025, we shared our Quarterly Adversarial Threat reports (Q3 2024 and Q4 2024) with information on threat research into new covert influence operations that we took down.

We detected and removed these campaigns before they were able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

Global enforcements: Russia remains the number one source of global CIB networks we've disrupted to date since 2017, with 39 covert influence operations. The next most frequent sources of foreign interference are Iran, with 31 CIB networks, and China, with 12. This year, our teams have taken down around 20 new covert influence operations around the world, including in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and the US.

Moldova:
We removed 7 Facebook accounts, 23 Pages, one Group and 20 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated primarily in the Transnistria region of Moldova, and targeted Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova. They posted original content, including cartoons, about news and geopolitical events concerning Moldova. It included criticism of President Sandu, pro-EU politicians, and close ties between Moldova and Romania.
We removed this campaign before they were able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

Benin:
We removed 16 Facebook accounts and 6 Pages for violating our coordinated inauthentic behavior policy. This network originated in Benin, and targeted primarily France.
First, the people behind this operation created Pages which posed as French and posted about politics in France, but were run by authentic users in Benin. We quickly took down this activity on our apps. In response to enforcement, they changed tactics. Instead of using authentic accounts, the operators created a network of fake and compromised accounts, and used TOR and proxy IP infrastructure to conceal their origin and appear to be in France. Our automated systems and expert investigators continued to detect and take them down on a rolling basis.
This effort targeted primarily France with posts in French about news and politics, including criticism of President Macron and NATO; supportive commentary about Marine Le Pen and her party; and calls for reduced support for Ukraine.

Our quarterly reports also included further updates and analysis on Doppelganger.

SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	We found a CIB network as a result of our internal investigation and linked it to an Iranian threat actor, Cotton Sandstorm, which Microsoft previously connected to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC.	
Measure 16.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.2.1	We publish quarterly our Adversarial Treat reports, to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see. In our Q3 and Q4 2024 reports, in addition to sharing our threat research, we also included updates on the most persistent Russian covert influence operation known as Doppelganger.	We publish quarterly our Adversarial Treat reports, to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see. In our Q3 and Q4 2024 reports, in addition to sharing our threat research, we also included updates on the most persistent Russian covert influence operation known as Doppelganger.

V. Empowering Users
Commitments 17 – 25

	V. Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union. During the reporting period Meta ran a range of media literacy topics, focusing on a range of areas, including Youth, EU Elections, Gen AI, as well as EU national elections. These campaigns are outlined in more detail in QRE 17.2.1 with reach metrics outlined in SLI 17.2.1. In the second half of 2024, Meta undertook several initiatives aimed at promoting digital literacy and combating misinformation in the EU. As part of these efforts, in November 2024, Meta launched a global Fraud and Scams campaign including several EU markets, such as France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Belgium, and Spain. The campaign featured	As mentioned in our baseline report, the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union. During the reporting period Meta ran a range of media literacy topics, focusing on a range of areas, including Youth, EU Elections, Gen AI, as well as EU national elections. These campaigns are outlined in more detail in QRE 17.2.1 with reach metrics outlined in SLI 17.2.1. In the second half of 2024, Meta undertook several initiatives aimed at promoting digital literacy and combating misinformation in the EU. As part of these efforts, in November 2024, Meta launched a global Fraud and Scams campaign including several EU markets, such as France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Belgium, and Spain. The campaign featured ads

	ads from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, emphasizing our commitment to user safety. It educates users on how to identify, avoid, and report scams while highlighting our ongoing efforts to protect them on our platforms. In addition to these campaigns, we continued our collaboration with the European Disability Forum (EDF) by launching a media literacy initiative focused on accessible elections. This program aimed to promote inclusive and accessible electoral processes for all citizens, including those with disabilities.	from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, emphasizing our commitment to user safety. It educates users on how to identify, avoid, and report scams while highlighting our ongoing efforts to protect them on our platforms. In addition to these campaigns, we continued our collaboration with the European Disability Forum (EDF) by launching a media literacy initiative focused on accessible elections. This program aimed to promote inclusive and accessible electoral processes for all citizens, including those with disabilities.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In January 2025, Meta launched a Youth campaign running in France, Ireland, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.	In January 2025, Meta launched a Youth campaign running in France, Ireland, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.

Measure 17.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some

	some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:
	• Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook:
	    • People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as:
	       • Violent or graphic imagery.
	       • Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness.
	       • Some forms of nudity.
	       • Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts.
	• Verified badges on Facebook:
	    • Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with.
	    • To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents.
	• Notification screens on outdated articles on the Facebook app:
	    • Our goal is to make it easier for people to identify content that's timely, reliable and most valuable to them.
	    • To give people more context about a news article before they share it on Facebook, Meta includes a notification screen if the article is more than 90 days old. After which, we allow people to continue sharing it if they desire. This notification helps people understand how old a given news article is and its source.
	    • To ensure that we don't slow the spread of credible information, especially in the health space, content posted by government health authorities and recognised global health organisations does not have this notification screen.
		ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading:
		• Warning screens on sensitive content on Instagram:
		    • To help people avoid coming across content that they'd rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile.
		• Verified badges on Instagram:
		    • Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with.
		    • To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents.

SLI 17.1.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

Measure 17.2	Facebook	Instagram

| QRE 17.2.1 | National Elections:
We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote.

For instance, for the <u>legislative elections in France</u>, the 'Election Day Information' feature ran between June 29 - 30, and July 6 - 7, 2024 and directed users to a voting information page on the Ministry of the Interior's <u>website</u>.

Also, Meta launched a campaign aimed to increase awareness of the tools and processes that Meta deploys on its own platforms (Facebook and Instagram) in advance of an election, to help inform French users how Meta works to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference and protect electoral candidates. The campaign ran from the 20th of June until the second round election on the 4th of July 2024.

For the **Irish General Election** on 29 November 2024, Meta successfully launched its Voter Information Unit (VIU) and Election Day Reminder (EDR) campaigns on Facebook, reaching a significant number of users in support of the recent elections.

Meta also launched a campaign on external platforms ahead of the general election in Ireland. This campaign aimed to increase awareness of the tools and processes that Meta deploys on Facebook in advance of an election, to help inform Irish users how Meta works to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference and protect electoral candidates. The campaign ran from the 22nd November until 28th November 2024.

Fraud and Scams: Meta launched a campaign to raise awareness of fraud and scams. The campaign ran in several EU markets, including France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Belgium, and Spain and used a range of relevant mediums including Meta's platforms (Facebook and Instagram) and other external platforms. The campaign featured ads from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, emphasizing our commitment to user safety. It educates users on how to identify, avoid, and report scams while highlighting our ongoing efforts to protect them on our platforms. The campaign ran from 11 November–31 December 2024. | National Elections:
We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on Instagram, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote.

For instance, for the <u>legislative elections in France</u>, the 'Election Day Information' feature ran between June 29 - 30, and July 6 - 7, 2024 and directed users to a voting information page on the Ministry of the Interior's <u>website</u>.

Also, Meta launched a campaign aimed to increase awareness of the tools and processes that Meta deploys on its own platforms (Facebook and Instagram) in advance of an election, to help inform French users how Meta works to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference and protect electoral candidates. The campaign ran from the 20th of June until the second round election on the 4th of July 2024.

For the **Irish General Election** on 29 November 2024, Meta successfully launched its Voter Information Unit (VIU) and Election Day Reminder (EDR) campaigns on Instagram, reaching a significant number of users in support of the recent elections.

Fraud and Scams: Meta launched a campaign to raise awareness of fraud and scams. The campaign ran in several EU markets, including France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Belgium, and Spain and used a range of relevant mediums including Meta's platforms (Facebook and Instagram) and other external platforms. The campaign featured ads from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, emphasizing our commitment to user safety. It educates users on how to identify, avoid, and report scams while highlighting our ongoing efforts to protect them on our platforms. The campaign ran from 11 November–31 December 2024. |
| **SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above** | Below we have provided some engagement statistics for the above described media literacy campaigns:
   ● French Elections 'Election Day Information' feature: Users in metropolitan France and overseas territories clicked on these in-app notifications more than 599K times on Facebook. | Below we have provided some engagement statistics for the above described media literacy campaigns:
   ● French Elections 'Election Day Information' feature: Users in metropolitan France and overseas territories clicked on these in-app notifications more than 496K times on Instagram. |

	• French Elections campaign: Reached 2.1 million users in France, generating 10.6 million impressions. This ran on Meta owned platforms only. • Irish Elections: On channels outside of Meta owned platforms, the campaign reached 436.5K users. • Fraud & Scams: On Meta-owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 23.8 users, generating 460 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 12.1 million users, generating 165.3 million impressions.	• French Elections campaign: Reached 2.1 million users in France, generating 10.6 million impressions. This ran on Meta owned platforms only.

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party fact-checkers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more. Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the <u>EU Digital Citizenship working group</u>, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party factcheckers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, the Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more. Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the <u>EU Digital Citizenship working group</u>, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of misinformation. In December 2024, we globally deprecated the feature on Instagram that displayed a pop-up when an account attempted to tag or mention another account that had been repeatedly fact-checked.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 18 covers the current practices for Facebook in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 18 covers the current practices for Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 18.1	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 18.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through: Meta's technologies, as well as through human review teams. In our baseline report we mentioned our Content Distribution Guidelines outline some of the most significant reasons why content receives reduced distribution in Feed. In 2023 we summarised the changes that we've made to the Content Distribution Guidelines and detailed any specific adjustments to the types of content we demote. For example by removing the guideline for posts from broadly untrusted news publishers, because we no longer use it as a ranking signal.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to prevent the spread of harmful content, including misinformation, through: Meta's technologies as well as through human review teams . In our January to June 2023 report, we mentioned the publication of our Content Distribution Guidelines for Instagram. It lays down our guidelines for content lowered in feed and stories, which outline types of content that may be shown lower in feed and stories.
QRE 18.1.2	As mentioned in previous reports, Facebook system cards help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provides insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Facebook. These cards provide detail on how our systems work in a way that is accessible for those who don't have deep technical knowledge. In June 2023, we released 14 system cards for Facebook. There are 15 system cards for Facebook which are periodically updated. They give information about how our AI systems rank content, some of the predictions each system makes to determine what content might be most relevant, as well as the controls users can use to help customise users' experience. They cover Feed, Stories, Reels and other surfaces where people go to find content from the accounts or people they follow. The system cards also cover AI systems that recommend "unconnected" content from people, groups, or accounts they don't follow. A more detailed explanation of the AI behind content recommendations is available here. To give a further level of detail beyond what's published in the system cards, we have shared the types of inputs – known as signals – as well as the predictive models these signals inform that help determine what content users may find most relevant from their network on Facebook. Users can find these signals and predictions in the Transparency Centre, along with how frequently they tend to be used in the overall ranking process. We also use signals to help identify harmful content, which we remove as we become aware of it, as well as to help reduce the distribution of	As mentioned in previous reports, Instagram System Cards help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences and provide insights into how the Feed ranking system dynamically works to deliver a personalised experience on Instagram. These cards provide detail on how our systems work in a way that is accessible for those who don't have deep technical knowledge. In June 2023, we released 8 system cards for Instagram. There are 10 system cards for Instagram which are periodically updated. They give information about how our AI systems rank content, some of the predictions each system makes to determine what content might be most relevant, as well as the controls users can use to help customise users' experience. They cover Feed, Stories, Reels and other surfaces where people go to find content from the accounts or people they follow. The system cards also cover AI systems that recommend "unconnected" content from people, groups, or accounts they don't follow. A more detailed explanation of the AI behind content recommendations is available here. To give a further level of detail beyond what's published in the system cards, we have shared the types of inputs – known as signals – as well as the predictive models these signals inform that help determine what content users may find most relevant from their network on Instagram. Users can find these signals and predictions in the Transparency Centre, along with how frequently they tend to be used in the overall ranking process. We also use signals to help identify harmful content, which we remove as we become aware of it, as well as to help reduce the distribution of other

	other types of problematic or low-quality content in line with our Content Distribution Guidelines.	types of problematic or low-quality content in line with our Content Distribution Guidelines.
QRE 18.1.3	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it: ● We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes. For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organisations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves. Regarding the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content: on average 47% of people on Facebook in the EU do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies articulate different categories of misinformation and try to provide clear guidance about how we treat that speech when we see it: ● We remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. We also remove content that is likely to directly contribute to interference with the functioning of political processes. ● For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. As part of that effort, we partner with third-party fact-checking organisations to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. We also provide resources to increase media and digital literacy so people can decide what to read, trust and share themselves. Regarding the impact of our fact-checking labels, focused specifically on people who have already demonstrated an intent to share the fact-checked content: on average 46% of people on Instagram in the EU who start to share fact-checked content do not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked.
SLI 18.1.1 – actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content on Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States		
Austria	41%	45%
Belgium	46%	44%
Bulgaria	51%	46%
Croatia	46%	41%
Cyprus	56%	50%
Czech Republic	35%	44%
Denmark	40%	49%
Estonia	35%	44%

Finland	39%	41%
France	54%	48%
Germany	42%	45%
Greece	51%	48%
Hungary	54%	46%
Ireland	44%	43%
Italy	54%	48%
Latvia	39%	43%
Lithuania	47%	47%
Luxembourg	43%	48%
Malta	58%	48%
Netherlands	41%	42%
Poland	43%	45%
Portugal	58%	45%
Romania	35%	44%
Slovakia	39%	45%
Slovenia	37%	46%
Spain	56%	48%
Sweden	45%	46%
Total EU	47%	46%
Measure 18.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies and approach to tackle misinformation – which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 – are published in our Transparency Centre: ● Meta Community Standards – <u>Misinformation</u> ● Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') – <u>Misinformation</u> These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly</u> share misinformation. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies and approach to tackle misinformation – which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 – are published in our Transparency Centre: ● Meta Community Standards – <u>Misinformation</u> ● Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') – <u>Misinformation</u> These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly violate our policies</u>. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what

	Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced. In 2023, we updated our penalty system to restrict accounts that violate our Community Standards on the platform. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time. These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, these restrictions only apply to Facebook accounts). If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features. For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account. These policies apply across all EU Member States.	fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time. If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features. For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account. These policies apply across all EU Member States.
SLI 18.2.1 – actions taken in response to policy violations	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location. *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location. *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*

Member States		
Austria	48	3
Belgium	40	1
Bulgaria	18	1
Croatia	12	1
Cyprus	2	0
Czech Republic	11	0
Denmark	11	0
Estonia	1	1
Finland	3	1
France	147	13
Germany	296	5
Greece	7	1
Hungary	6	1
Ireland	13	3
Italy	82	11
Latvia	4	0
Lithuania	3	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	1	0
Netherlands	99	5
Poland	26	3
Portugal	37	12
Romania	93	7
Slovakia	6	1
Slovenia	1	0
Spain	57	7
Sweden	75	0
Total EU	1,099	77
Measure 18.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.3.1	As noted in our baseline report, the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community	As noted in our baseline report, the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to

and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as **Social Science Research, Data for Good, the Research Platform for** coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) **Network Disruptions** **Research Grants & Awards.** In our baseline report, we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. Details of our most recent awards can be found here.	help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as **Social Science Research, Data for Good, the Research Platform for** coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) **Network Disruptions** **Research Grants & Awards.** In our baseline report, we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. Details of our most recent awards can be found here.

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 19
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools.

Measure 19.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.1.1	The range of measures and policies put in place in relation to this measure have been described in previous reports and are explained in greater detail on Meta's Transparency Centre. For example, there it is possible to find detailed explanations relating to <u>Facebook System Cards that help</u> people understand <u>how AI shapes</u> their product experiences. The policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.	The range of measures and policies put in place in relation to this measure have been described in previous reports and are explained in greater detail on Meta's Transparency Centre. For example, there it is possible to find detailed explanations relating to <u>Instagram System Cards</u> that help people <u>understand how AI shapes</u> their product experiences. The policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.
Measure 19.2	Facebook	Instagram
SLI 19.2.1 – User Settings	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 20
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

As mentioned in our baseline report, the tools assessing provenance and edit history of digital content are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. Other tools to achieve this objective, including as set forth in Commitment 21 are relevant and pertinent to our subscribed products at this time.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous report, we updated our fact-checking program guidelines to clarify that our existing policies allow fact-checkers to rate digitally created or edited content – including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) – when content risks misleading people about something consequential that has no basis in fact. We also employed measures to improve fact-checkers ability to apply their ratings to fake or manipulated audio content.	As mentioned in our previous report, we updated our fact-checking program guidelines to clarify that our existing policies allow fact-checkers to rate digitally created or edited content – including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) – when content risks misleading people about something consequential that has no basis in fact. We also employed measures to improve fact-checkers ability to apply their ratings to fake or manipulated audio content.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 21 covers the current practices for Facebook in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 21 covers the current practices for Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 21.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta partners with over 45 Independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) in Europe. In the EU specifically we work with over 29 partners, covering 23 languages, and 26 countries. The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2. Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. Further details are shared on our Transparency Centre on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta partners with over 45 Independent third-party fact-checkers certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) in Europe. In the EU specifically we work with over 29 partners, covering 23 languages, and 26 countries. The list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2. Fact-checkers review a piece of content and rate its accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta. The ratings fact-checkers can use are False, Altered, Partly false, Missing context, Satire and True. Further details are shared on our Transparency Centre on these ratings. While we are responsible for setting these guidelines, fact-checkers review and rate content independently – we do not make changes to ratings. When content has been rated by fact-checkers, we take action to (1) label it, (2) ensure less people see it, and (3) sanction repeat offenders.

	There is more detail on all the actions taken under QRE 31.1 as well as in our baseline report.			There is more detail on all the actions taken under QRE 31.1.1 as well as in our baseline report.		
SLI 21.1.1 – actions taken under measure 21.1	*See SLI 21.1.2 below*					

	1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used to apply a fact-checking label to content on Facebook from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU member state. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all member states exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (150,000). This is expected.			1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used to apply a fact-checking label to content on Instagram from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU member state. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all member states exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (43,000). This is expected.		
SLI 21.1.2 – actions taken under measure 21.1	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States						
Austria	Over 45,000	Over 850,000	41%	Over 13,000	Over 72,000	45%
Belgium	Over 55,000	Over 1,200,000	46%	Over 14,000	Over 83,000	44%
Bulgaria	Over 34,000	Over 720,000	51%	Over 8,300	Over 32,000	46%
Croatia	Over 33,000	Over 510,000	46%	Over 8,800	Over 35,000	41%
Cyprus	Over 28,000	Over 260,000	56%	Over 8,200	Over 32,000	50%
Czech Republic	Over 36,000	Over 770,000	35%	Over 10,000	Over 46,000	44%

Denmark	Over 38,000	Over 620,000	40%	Over 11,000	Over 53,000	49%
Estonia	Over 17,000	Over 110,000	35%	Over 5,000	Over 14,000	44%
Finland	Over 32,000	Over 290,000	39%	Over 10,000	Over 47,000	41%
France	Over 78,000	Over 5,000,000	54%	Over 21,000	Over 200,000	48%
Germany	Over 89,000	Over 4,800,000	42%	Over 26,000	Over 310,000	45%
Greece	Over 45,000	Over 1,100,000	51%	Over 12,000	Over 69,000	48%
Hungary	Over 34,000	Over 590,000	54%	Over 8,500	Over 33,000	46%
Ireland	Over 48,000	Over 790,000	44%	Over 14,000	Over 89,000	43%
Italy	Over 80,000	Over 5,000,000	54%	Over 23,000	Over 220,000	48%
Latvia	Over 18,000	Over 210,000	39%	Over 5,400	Over 15,000	43%
Lithuania	Over 24,000	Over 280,000	47%	Over 5,900	Over 18,000	47%
Luxembourg	Over 21,000	Over 120,000	43%	Over 5,400	Over 15,000	48%
Malta	Over 21,000	Over 120,000	58%	Over 4,900	Over 14,000	48%
Netherlands	Over 60,000	Over 1,300,000	41%	Over 18,000	Over 130,000	42%
Poland	Over 53,000	Over 2,000,000	43%	Over 14,000	Over 84,000	45%
Portugal	Over 52,000	Over 1,400,000	58%	Over 17,000	Over 120,000	45%
Romania	Over 45,000	Over 1,500,000	35%	Over 11,000	Over 57,000	44%
Slovakia	Over 28,000	Over 470,000	39%	Over 7,900	Over 29,000	45%
Slovenia	Over 24,000	Over 280,000	37%	Over 6,200	Over 21,000	46%
Spain	Over 74,000	Over 4,000,000	56%	Over 23,000	Over 260,000	48%
Sweden	Over 51,000	Over 850,000	45%	Over 15,000	Over 100,000	46%
Total EU	*Over 150,000*	Over 27,000,000	47%	*Over 43,000*	Over 1,000,000	46%

Measure 21.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.2.1	Between July and December 2024, we displayed warnings on over 27 million distinct pieces of content on Facebook (including re-shares) in the EU based on over 150,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners in the EU.	Between July and December 2024, we displayed warnings on over 1 million distinct pieces of content on Instagram (including re-shares) in the EU based on over 43,000 debunking articles written by our fact-checking partners in the EU.

	The impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024, meant that 47% of reshares attempted on Fact-Checked content on Facebook in EU Member States were not completed.	The impact of actions taken under Measure 21.1.1 between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024, meant that 46% of reshares attempted on Fact-Checked content on Instagram in EU Member States were not completed.
Measure 21.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, the fact-checking programme's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the fact-checking programme's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 22
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.
As mentioned in our baseline report, trustworthiness indicators are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. This is acknowledged by the Commission's 2021 Guidance, which describes them as a tool signatories "could" explore, and negotiations of the updated Code which confirmed this to be a direction signatories are encouraged but not expected to follow. Other tools to achieve this objective covered elsewhere in this section – Commitment 21 in particular - are relevant and pertinent for our subscribed products at this time. We note however that we use several of the products and features listed under Measure 22.7 (in particular information panels, banners, pop-ups, and prompts) as already outlined under Commitment 21 above, as well as in our crisis monitoring reports below.

V. Empowering users
Commitment 23
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we maintain a specific report category for users to flag to us what they believe is false information (in addition to content that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards).	As mentioned in our baseline report, we maintain a specific report category for users to flag to us what they believe is false information (in addition to content that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes.

Measure 23.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on our website. We also provide an appeal system. More details about these systems can be found in our baseline and January to June 2023 report.	As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process outlined on our website. We also provide an appeal system. More details about these systems can be found in our baseline and January to June 2023 report.

Measure 23.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.2.1	Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems. **Mass reporting:** We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions. **Protection against misuse:** We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded. **Anonymous reporting:** When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.	Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems. **Mass reporting:** We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions. **Protection against misuse:** We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded. **Anonymous reporting:** When something gets reported to Instagram, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.

V. Empowering users
Commitment 24
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content. In June 2023, we also took steps to <u>improve our penalty system</u> to make it fairer and more effective. Relevant updates to user notice and appeal processes were also made in 2023, in line with DSA requirements.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content. In June 2023, we also took steps to <u>improve our penalty system</u> to make it fairer and more effective. Relevant updates to user notice and appeal processes were also made in 2023, in line with DSA requirements.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our processes.

Measure 24.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 24.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker. Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.	As mentioned in our baseline report, when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker. Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.
SLI 24.1.1 – enforcement actions	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*
Member States		
Austria	48	3
Belgium	40	1
Bulgaria	18	1
Croatia	12	1
Cyprus	2	0
Czech Republic	11	0
Denmark	11	0
Estonia	1	1
Finland	3	1
France	147	13
Germany	296	5
Greece	7	1
Hungary	6	1

Ireland	13	3
Italy	82	11
Latvia	4	0
Lithuania	3	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	1	0
Netherlands	99	5
Poland	26	3
Portugal	37	12
Romania	93	7
Slovakia	6	1
Slovenia	1	0
Spain	57	7
Sweden	75	0
Total EU	1,099	77

V. Empowering users		
Commitment 25		
In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.		
	C.25	**M 25.1**	**M 25.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram	Service C – Messenger	Service D – WhatsApp

			Messenger	WhatsApp
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to regularly review the measures we have in place in Messenger, in conjunction with the measures on the linked social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram). We will continue to actively review measures, including as we launch new products and disinformation trends change.	As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp is deeply committed to addressing misinformation while protecting people's privacy – without weakening encryption. Our approach is centred around limiting virality, preventing coordinated misuse, and empowering users. In October 2024, WhatsApp, in partnership with Google, expanded current search capabilities for "Highly Forwarded Messages," enabling users to search images and URLs for private messaging and Channels updates. This feature is currently available in some EU countries, including Ireland, Italy and Spain.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A	As mentioned in our baseline report, misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation.

Measure 25.1			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.1.1			As mentioned in our baseline report, content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false by our fact-checkers are	As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with

			prominently labelled when re-shared in Messenger, this includes: • Misinformation labels (clear, visual labels to content that has been debunked by fact-checkers, and surfaces their fact-checking articles for additional context) • Warning screens (when someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share).	accurate information. To this purpose, WhatsApp partners with: • **Organisations certified by the IFCN** around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Because private messages and calls on WhatsApp are secured with end-to-end encryption, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated reporting. Users can flag potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organisations by sending them a message, and fact-checking organisations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article. • **Government agencies and nonprofit organisations** to help make authoritative information available to users on WhatsApp **WhatsApp also works to empower users by supporting fact-checking through grants**. In August 2024, the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) at the Poynter Institute, in partnership with Meta, awarded $300,000 in "Spread the Facts" grants to 10 organizations worldwide, including two European recipients. These grants aim to combat AI-generated misinformation on WhatsApp by leveraging generative AI to optimize fact-checker workflows. The winner projects focus on developing AI-powered solutions to tackle climate-related misinformation and disinformation narratives, providing valuable lessons for the fact-checking community.
SLI 25.1.1			Please see section 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers.	**Partnerships with fact-checkers**: 13 fact-checking organisations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business App and/or the WhatsApp

				Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information. The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. A reduction in the number of partners using the tool does not necessarily reflect a change in the number of fact-checking partners WhatsApp has in its WhatsApp fact-checking programme. WhatsApp has a formal fact-checking programme which utilises the WhatsApp Business Platform and has not seen a reduction during this reporting period of its partner numbers.
Member States				

List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)				The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not.
				
				Directory of fact-checking organisations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) during the period of this report]:
				
				● France:
				   ○ 20 Minutes (French)
				   ○ AFP France (French)
				   ○ AFP Africa (English)
				   ○ France24 (French)
				● Germany
				   ○ CORRECTIV (German)
				   ○ AFP Faktencheck (German)
				   ○ dpa Faktencheck (German)
				● Greece
				   ○ Ellinika Hoaxes (Greek)
				● Italy
				   ○ Pagella Politica / Facta (Italian)
				● Portugal
				   ○ Polígrafo (Portuguese)
				● Spain
				   ○ EFE Verifica (Spanish)
				   ○ Maldita (Spanish)

				○ Newtral (Spanish)
Measure 25.2			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.2.1			As mentioned in our baseline report, to <u>help</u> reduce the spread of viral misinformation and harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger. For example, when a user shares content from their feed into a private chat, and that content has been rated by a 3pfc, we continue to show the label on the content.	As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default for all private messages and calls. In this context, we work to counter misinformation both by limiting virality on our platform, and by encouraging users to think about the messages that are forwarded to them. We do this by using: ● Forwarding labels ● Limits to messaging forwarding WhatsApp provides a simple way to double check messages that have been forwarded many times: using the "Search on web" tool. This tool helps our users find news results or other sources of information about content they have received. This feature works by allowing users to tap a link that enables them to upload the message via their browser. We continue to evolve our efforts and approaches to tackling misinformation on WhatsApp. This ongoing work is focused on making sure we have the most efficient surface impact and consistently improving reach of our partners.
SLI 25.2.1 – use of select tools				As mentioned in our baseline report, the introduction of the additional forwarding limits in April 2020 reduced virality immediately by 70%. When we introduced the new group chat forwarding limit in 2022, we saw a reduction of approximately 20% in the number of forwarded messages sent to groups on WhatsApp globally.
			Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.	*Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.*

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitments 26 – 29

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26
Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous reports, Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools to provide access to near real-time public content on Facebook. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram. Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for	As mentioned in our previous reports, Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools to provide access to near real-time public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram. Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for

	research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave. Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Facebook via its Transparency Centre. We've shared our quarterly reports throughout 2024 there: • The Community Standards Enforcement Report • The Adversarial Threat Report	research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave. Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Instagram via its Transparency Centre. We've shared our quarterly reports throughout 2024 there: • The Community Standards Enforcement Report • The Adversarial Threat Report
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.

Measure 26.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Centre including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: https://transparency.fb.com/data/. We also publish extensive reports on our	As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Centre including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: https://transparency.fb.com/data/. We also publish extensive reports on our

	findings about coordinated behaviour in our newsroom and we have a dedicated public website hosting our Ad Library tools.	findings about coordinated behaviour in our newsroom and we have a dedicated public website hosting our Ad Library tools.
QRE 26.1.2	Ad Library Tools: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities. As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Centre numerous reports : ● Community Standards Enforcement Report: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Centre on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 14 policies on Facebook). ● Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report: We share publicly our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we will publish information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.	Ad Library Tools: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities. As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Centre numerous reports : ● Community Standards Enforcement Report: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Centre on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 12 policies on Instagram). ● Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report: We share publicly our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our quarterly adversarial threat reports, we will publish information about the networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.
SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	Over 600 researchers globally had access to the Meta Content Library User Interface, and more than 160 had access to the Meta Content Library API.	Over 600 researchers globally had access to the Meta Content Library User Interface, and more than 160 had access to the Meta Content Library API.
Measure 26.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.2.1	Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API. Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:	Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Instagram. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API. Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment:

	- Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. - Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. - Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform: - Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Facebook Pages, posts, , groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. For more details – see here.	- Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. - Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. - Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform: - Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Instagram posts, including a subset of personal Instagram accounts. - Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. - Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. For more details – see here.
QRE 26.2.2	Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available: - Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts. - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen For more details – see here.	Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available: - Posts shared by and information about Instagram business and creator accounts including from a subset of personal accounts. - Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements - The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen For more details – see here.

QRE 26.2.3	Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For more details on the application process – see here.	Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For more details on the application process – see here.
SLI 26.2.1 – meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	On 31 December 2024, there were over 600 users globally with access to the Meta Content Library User Interface, and more than 160 with access to the Meta Content Library API.	
Measure 26.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.3.1	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website, which also include a dedicated help centre.	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website, which also include a dedicated help centre.

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 27					
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.					
	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your	No	No

terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We will continue to participate in the EDMO working group to further support the development of an independent intermediary body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing. This will include feeding learnings from the EDMO pilot described above into the EDMO working group. We continue to provide access to new and existing researchers on Meta Content Library, while also evaluating and working towards any improvements to access methods and application processes.	We will continue to participate in the EDMO working group to further support the development of an independent intermediary body to enable GDPR-compliant data sharing. This will include feeding learnings from the EDMO pilot described above into the EDMO working group. We continue to provide access to new and existing researchers on Meta Content Library, while also evaluating and working towards any improvements to access methods and application processes.

Measure 27.1	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 27.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we've been actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we shared extensive comments in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research. We are participating in the <u>EDMO working group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms</u>. In May 2022, EDMO published a report on the progress of the working group which contains an incomplete draft of an Art. 40 Code. The draft reflects significant input from both industry and academic partners. In 2025 we continue our involvement in the EDMO working group.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we've been actively engaged in the EDMO working group on Platform to Researcher data sharing to develop standardised processes for sharing data with researchers since 2019, and in 2020, we shared extensive comments in response to EDMO call for comment on the GDPR and sharing data for independent social scientific research. We are participating in the <u>EDMO working group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms</u>. In 2025 we continue our involvement in the EDMO working group.
Measure 27.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 27.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, while the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills-based sponsorship and participation in the EDMO pilot. Separately, we have funded a third party (CASD) to act as a third-party data sharing intermediary as part of the pilot.	As mentioned in our baseline report, while the EDMO process has been initially funded by the European Commission, we've actively supported it by skills-based sponsorship and participation in the EDMO pilot. Separately, we have funded a third party (CASD) to act as a third-party data sharing intermediary as part of the pilot.
Measure 27.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 27.3.1	N/A at this stage	N/A at this stage
SLI 27.3.1 – research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another highly experienced third-party, ICPSR, who is vetting researchers and hosting access to datasets about the US 2020 election, and the Meta Content Library and API.	At this time, the EDMO process has not yet vetted research proposals. We are engaging with another highly experienced third-party, ICPSR, who is vetting researchers and hosting access to datasets about the US 2020 election, and the Meta Content Library and API.
Measure 27.4	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 27.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). Since 2021, we have been expanding our Influence Operations (IO) Archive dataset — which provides information on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and contains more than 100 removed networks to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide. This dataset provides access to raw data where researchers can visualise and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis.	As mentioned in our baseline report, since 2018, we have been sharing information with independent researchers about our network disruptions relating to coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). Since 2021, we have been expanding our Influence Operations (IO) Archive dataset— which provides information on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and contains more than 100 removed networks — to more researchers studying influence operations worldwide. This dataset provides access to raw data where researchers can visualise and assess these network operations both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, we share our own internal research and analysis.

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 28				
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.				
	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports. As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Facebook.	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports. As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Instagram.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including enhancing application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including enhancing application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.

Measure 28.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. Relevant details about research tools are available on our <u>Transparency Centre</u>.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. Relevant details about research tools are available on our <u>Transparency Centre</u>.
Measure 28.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 28.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta provides a variety of data sets and tools for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <u>one place</u>. The main data available only to researchers are: - **Meta Content Library and API.** The Library includes data from certain public profiles, public posts, pages, groups, and events on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. 700+ researchers globally now have access to Meta Content Library. - **Ad Targeting Data Set**, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. **150+ researchers globally have accessed Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.** - URL Shares Data Set, which includes differentially private individual-level counts of the number of people who viewed, clicked, liked, commented, shared, or reacted to any URL on Facebook between January 2017 and September 2022. Counts are aggregated at the level of country, year-month, age bracket, gender. Access to the URL Shares is granted by <u>Social Science One</u>, and new researchers are onboarded once per quarter. 200+ researchers globally have accessed the URL Shares dataset since its release in February 2020. - **Influence Operations Research Archive for** coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) Network Disruptions, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1. - **Data for Good.** Provides a range of dashboards that make our data easier to understand.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta provides a variety of data sets and tools for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <u>one place</u>. The main data available only to researchers are: - **Meta Content Library and API.** For Instagram, it will include public posts and data. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. 700+ researchers globally now have access to Meta Content Library. - **Ad Targeting Data Set**, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. **150+ researchers globally have accessed Ads Targeting API since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.** - **Influence Operations Research Archive for** coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) **Network Disruptions,** as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.
Measure 28.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.3.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage
Measure 28.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.4.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 29
Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.
Commitment 29 applies to research organisations.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitments 30 – 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 30
Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In the first half of 2024, Meta provided all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset. Throughout the second half of 2024, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboards, text-in-image search, and expanded data scope. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact-checking. To facilitate a seamless transition of our 3PFCs to the MCL, we initiated a proactive outreach and education program. This comprehensive program included a targeted e-Newsletter series, training calls, and live tutorials. The education program has yielded encouraging results, with notable increases in usage by 3PFCs. We will continue to monitor the impact of our initiatives and make adjustments as needed to ensure that our users	In the first half of 2024, Meta provided all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset. Throughout the second half of 2024, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboards, text-in-image search, and expanded data scope. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact-checking. To facilitate a seamless transition of our 3PFCs to the MCL, we initiated a proactive outreach and education program. This comprehensive program included a targeted e-Newsletter series, training calls, and live tutorials. The education program has yielded encouraging results, with notable increases in usage by 3PFCs. We will continue to monitor the impact of our initiatives and make adjustments as needed to ensure that our users

	have the support and resources they need to effectively utilize our tools and contribute to a safer and more informed online community.

As a part of stakeholder engagement initiatives, Meta participated in the EFCSN Conference in Brussels, where we were joined by over 40 of our third-party fact-checking (3PFC) partners from the European Fact-Checking Program. During the conference, we also conducted 20 strategic partner meetings to further strengthen our collaborations and advance our shared goals. | have the support and resources they need to effectively utilize our tools and contribute to a safer and more informed online community.

As a part of stakeholder engagement initiatives, Meta participated in the EFCSN Conference in Brussels, where we were joined by over 40 of our third-party fact-checking (3PFC) partners from the European Fact-Checking Program. During the conference, we also conducted 20 strategic partner meetings to further strengthen our collaborations and advance our shared goals. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes. | As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes. |

Measure 30.1	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 30.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.
All fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.

The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e., how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and here. | | As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide.
All fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking.

The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e., how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and here. | |
| QRE 30.1.2 | Austria | AFP | Austria | AFP |

		(German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck	(German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck
		Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck Knack
		Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	AFP FactCheck.bg
		Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP	Croatia (Croatian)	Faktograf.hr AFP
		Cyprus (Greek)	AFP	Cyprus (Greek)	AFP
		Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz	Czech Republic (Czech)	AFP Demagog.cz
		Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet	Denmark (Danish)	TjekDet
		Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Estonia/Ekspress M
		Finland (Finnish)	AFP	Finland (Finnish)	AFP
		France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs	France (French, English)	20 Minutes AFP Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs
		Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck
		Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes
		Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP
		Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie
		Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica
		Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
		Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min
		Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck
		Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
		Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog
		Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador

	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro
	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk
	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro
	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP España EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral
	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran AFP	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran AFP
QRE 30.1.3	As mentioned in our baseline report, the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.		As mentioned in our baseline report, the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.	
SLI 30.1.1 – Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.		Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.	
	See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2		*See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2*	

Measure 30.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking. From 2024, third-party fact-checkers may also be onboarded to Meta if they are certified with the European Fact-Checking Standards Networks (EFCSN).	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking. From 2024, third-party fact-checkers may also be onboarded to Meta if they are certified with the European Fact-Checking Standards Networks (EFCSN).
QRE 30.2.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular initiatives to collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools. Meta has also dedicated the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. Meta has also dedicated the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.

QRE 30.2.3	*QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations*	*QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations*
Measure 30.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.3.1	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.
Measure 30.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 31					
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.					
	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 31.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 31.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. The current warning in place says that accounts that repeatedly share false information may experience temporary restrictions, including having their posts reduced. **Regarding rating AI-generated content.** Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.	As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. The current warning in place says that accounts that repeatedly share false information may experience temporary restrictions, including having their posts reduced. **Regarding rating AI-generated content.** Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.
SLI 31.1.1 – use of fact-checks	Filtered to content created on Facebook in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024: 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Filtered to content created on Instagram in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024: 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.

	2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (150,000). This is expected.		2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (43,000). This is expected.	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States				
Austria	Over 850,000	Over 45,000	Over 72,000	Over 13,000
Belgium	Over 1,200,000	Over 55,000	Over 83,000	Over 14,000
Bulgaria	Over 720,000	Over 34,000	Over 32,000	Over 8,300
Croatia	Over 510,000	Over 33,000	Over 35,000	Over 8,800
Cyprus	Over 260,000	Over 28,000	Over 32,000	Over 8,200
Czech Republic	Over 770,000	Over 36,000	Over 46,000	Over 10,000
Denmark	Over 620,000	Over 38,000	Over 53,000	Over 11,000
Estonia	Over 110,000	Over 17,000	Over 14,000	Over 5,000
Finland	Over 290,000	Over 32,000	Over 47,000	Over 10,000
France	Over 5,000,000	Over 78,000	Over 200,000	Over 21,000
Germany	Over 4,800,000	Over 89,000	Over 310,000	Over 26,000
Greece	Over 1,100,000	Over 45,000	Over 69,000	Over 12,000
Hungary	Over 590,000	Over 34,000	Over 33,000	Over 8,500
Ireland	Over 790,000	Over 48,000	Over 89,000	Over 14,000
Italy	Over 5,000,000	Over 80,000	Over 220,000	Over 23,000
Latvia	Over 210,000	Over 18,000	Over 15,000	Over 5,400
Lithuania	Over 280,000	Over 24,000	Over 18,000	Over 5,900

Luxembourg	Over 120,000	Over 21,000	Over 15,000	Over 5,400
Malta	Over 120,000	Over 21,000	Over 14,000	Over 4,900
Netherlands	Over 1,300,000	Over 60,000	Over 130,000	Over 18,000
Poland	Over 2,000,000	Over 53,000	Over 84,000	Over 14,000
Portugal	Over 1,400,000	Over 52,000	Over 120,000	Over 17,000
Romania	Over 1,500,000	Over 45,000	Over 57,000	Over 11,000
Slovakia	Over 470,000	Over 28,000	Over 29,000	Over 7,900
Slovenia	Over 280,000	Over 24,000	Over 21,000	Over 6,200
Spain	Over 4,000,000	Over 74,000	Over 260,000	Over 23,000
Sweden	Over 850,000	Over 51,000	Over 100,000	Over 15,000
Total EU	Over 27,000,000	*Over 150,000*	Over 1,000,000	*Over 43,000*

SLI 31.1.2 – impact of actions taken	1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.		1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States				
Austria	Over 850,000	41%	Over 72,000	45%
Belgium	Over 1,200,000	46%	Over 83,000	44%
Bulgaria	Over 720,000	51%	Over 32,000	46%
Croatia	Over 510,000	46%	Over 35,000	41%
Cyprus	Over 260,000	56%	Over 32,000	50%
Czech Republic	Over 770,000	35%	Over 46,000	44%

Denmark	Over 620,000	40%	Over 53,000	49%
Estonia	Over 110,000	35%	Over 14,000	44%
Finland	Over 290,000	39%	Over 47,000	41%
France	Over 5,000,000	54%	Over 200,000	48%
Germany	Over 4,800,000	42%	Over 310,000	45%
Greece	Over 1,100,000	51%	Over 69,000	48%
Hungary	Over 590,000	54%	Over 33,000	46%
Ireland	Over 790,000	44%	Over 89,000	43%
Italy	Over 5,000,000	54%	Over 220,000	48%
Latvia	Over 210,000	39%	Over 15,000	43%
Lithuania	Over 280,000	47%	Over 18,000	47%
Luxembourg	Over 120,000	43%	Over 15,000	48%
Malta	Over 120,000	58%	Over 14,000	48%
Netherlands	Over 1,300,000	41%	Over 130,000	42%
Poland	Over 2,000,000	43%	Over 84,000	45%
Portugal	Over 1,400,000	58%	Over 120,000	45%
Romania	Over 1,500,000	35%	Over 57,000	44%
Slovakia	Over 470,000	39%	Over 29,000	45%
Slovenia	Over 280,000	37%	Over 21,000	46%
Spain	Over 4,000,000	56%	Over 260,000	48%
Sweden	Over 850,000	45%	Over 100,000	46%
Total EU	Over 27,000,000	47%	Over 1,000,000	46%

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Average of monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Monthly Active Users	Over a 6-month period, ending 30 September 2024 (i.e., 1 April 2024 – 30 September 2024), there were a total of approximately 260.6 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report.	Over a 6-month period, ending 30 September 2024 (i.e., 1 April 2024 – 30 September 2024), there were a total of approximately 269.1 million average monthly active users on Instagram in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Instagram DSA transparency report.

Measure 31.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.3.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Measure 31.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 31.4.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community				
Commitment 32				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.				
	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A - Facebook	Service B - Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 32.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 32.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.	As mentioned in our baseline report, all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Instagram, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.

SLI 32.1.1 – use of the interfaces and other tools	See list in QRE 30.1.2 – all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.	
Measure 32.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.3.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitment 33
Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.
Commitment 33 applies to fact-checking organisations.

VIII. Transparency Centre
Commitments 34 – 36

	VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website

	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) co-funded the Transparency Centre website's development, to ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	
If yes, which further implementation		

measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	

Measure 34.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

VIII. Transparency Centre							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Centre in due course.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Centre in due course.

Measure 35.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36 Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	**M 36.1**	**M 36.2**	**M 36.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	Yes

of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload this report in due course and support other signatories in their efforts to upload their own reports.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload all future reports in due course.

Measure 36.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34–36)	We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34–36)	The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.
SLI 36.1.1 – (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	The common Transparency Centre was visited by 20,255 unique users between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024, and 1,275 users downloaded reports 5,626 times during this period. For Meta specifically, 776 downloads (combined) occurred of our most recent and previous reports by 373 unique users.

IX. Permanent Taskforce
Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Taskforce								
Commitment 37								
Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Taskforce. The Taskforce includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Taskforce can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Taskforce are made by consensus.								
	C.37	**M 37.1**	**M 37.2**	**M 37.3**	**M 37.4**	**M 37.5**	**M 37.6**	**M 37.7**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	

Measure 37.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 37.6.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 38 – 44

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 38	
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.	
C.38	**M 38.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Globally we have around 40,000 people working on safety and security.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies benefit from our experience and expertise.

Measure 38.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 38.1.1	Globally we have around 40,000 people working on safety and security including around 15,000 content reviewers. All of these investments work to combat the spread of harmful content, including disinformation and misinformation, and thereby contribute to our implementation of the Code. Teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity and product development all work on these challenges. These teams are distributed globally, and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 39
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	This report was submitted within the required timeline.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve	No

the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	This report was submitted within the required timeline.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 40
Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	For this report, Facebook. Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	Yes

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide relevant QREs and SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

X. Monitoring of the Code				
Commitment 41				
Signatories commit to work within the Taskforce towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.				
	C.41	**M 41.1**	**M 41.2**	**M 41.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage with the Taskforce Monitoring Working Group.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the	Yes

next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage with the Taskforce monitoring working group.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 42
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the	Yes

next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.

X. Monitoring of the Code	
Commitment 43	
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Taskforce.	
	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the	Yes

next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger continue to engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

	C.44
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, following conversion of the Code into a Code of Conduct under the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits under the DSA.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, following conversion of the Code into a Code of Conduct under the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
As outlined in our benchmark report, we took a variety of actions with the objectives of: – Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: We've added several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted. – Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared. – Reducing the spread of misinformation: We took steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and consulted with outside experts. – Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetizing and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites. – In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today, Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others. – On 15 June 2024, we added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included: Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta. – On 17 September 2024, we expanded our ongoing enforcement against Russian state media outlets. Rossiya Segodnya, RT, and other related entities were banned from our apps globally due to foreign interference activities.
Our main strategies are in line with what we outlined in our benchmark report, with a focus on safety features in Ukraine and Russia, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation (including through media literacy campaigns), tools to help our community access crucial resources, transparency around state controlled media and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This means (as outlined in previous reports) we will continue to: – Monitor for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other adversarial networks (See commitment 16 for more information on behaviour we saw from Doppelganger during the reporting period). – Enforce our Community Standards – Work with fact-checkers – Strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the Central and Eastern Europe region
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].
Policies and Terms and Conditions
Outline any changes to your policies

Policy	Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)	Rationale
No further policy updates since our benchmark report	N/A	We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people's safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta's technologies, tools and processes. There are no substantial changes to report on for this period.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.		
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)	As mentioned in our baseline report, our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies. For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetisation Policies, any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our Partner Monetisation Policies.	
	As mentioned in our baseline report, we prohibited ads or monetisation from all Russian state-controlled media. Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.	

Political Advertising		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.		

Integrity of Services		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.		

Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs (Commitment 14)	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.
	Since the invasion began, we shared what measures we've taken to help keep Ukrainians and Russians safe, our approach to misinformation, state-controlled media and ensuring reliable access to trusted information. As mentioned in our baseline report, our security teams took down three distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war (announced here, here, and here) and have continued to monitor and enforce against Russian threat actors engaged in coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). We also took action to secure accounts that we believe were targeted by Ghostwriter, a threat actor that has been tracked for some time by the security community. In August 2023, we provided updated analysis on the work we've done to remove efforts by a Russian CIB network, known in the security field as "Doppelganger," to return to our platforms. We also published recommendations on how to improve cross-Internet responses to the domain name abuse we've observed in this case. Similarly, our Q4 2023 adversarial threats report detailed how we removed 1,020 Facebook accounts, five Pages, two Groups and 711 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Ukraine and targeted audiences in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The people behind this activity posted primarily in Russian about political events in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The Q3 2024 adversarial threats report shared a detailed assessment and breakdown of Doppelganger's behaviour: As a result of our ongoing aggressive enforcement against recidivist efforts by Doppelganger, its operators have been forced to keep adapting and make tactical changes in an attempt to evade takedowns. These changes have led to degrading the quality of the operation's efforts, rendering these attempts impossible to comprehend by an average online user. In addition, many of the adversarial shifts that appear primarily on our platforms do not show up elsewhere on the internet where the operators continue using some of their older known tactics. This suggests agility in response to detection by various services and we expect to see more changes over time.
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitment 14 –16)	As mentioned in the baseline report, throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.
	We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the platform around the clock, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.

Empowering Users

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.

Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)	**State controlled media:** We continue to take the actions we outlined in our benchmark report. We have taken further action to limit the impact of state controlled media, described above.
	Escalation channel: This channel continues to operate as outlined in our benchmark report.
	Covert influence campaigns: We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. Specifically, while we originally removed two Russian covert influence campaigns, we've seen thousands of recidivist attempts to create fake accounts. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.
Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)	As mentioned in our baseline report, we provided tools to help our community access crucial resources and take action to support people in need.
	We continued supporting the Halo Trust and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to spread authoritative factual information about the risks in contaminated areas, risks related to unexploded ordinances and life-saving information around shelters. Notably we sponsored the targeted ads campaigns of Halo Trust and improved the WhatsApp chat bot run by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to ensure a safe and secure infoline.
	In addition, we provided an ad credits budget to 'Ty Yak?', a national mental health awareness campaign, to promote mental health resources for people affected by the war.
	We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine.
	We continue to work through our Data for Good program, which empowers <u>humanitarian organizations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers</u> to make more informed decisions on how to support the people of Ukraine.
Empowering the Research Community	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.	
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 17-25)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Data for Good program shares privacy-protected data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty and climate change. In support of the Ukraine humanitarian response, the program's maps have been utilized to provide valuable assistance.
	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continued providing baseline population density maps (the high resolution settlement layer) of Ukraine and surrounding countries to humanitarian organisations for supply-chain planning and to aid demining efforts. These are the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e., no Facebook user data).

	Our Social Connectedness Index has been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission - Joint Research Centre unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to quantify the rate at which Ukrainian refugees seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU (Commitment 30-33)	As mentioned in our baseline report, for misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we work with our network of independent third-party fact-checking partners. The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above. As mentioned in our baseline report, our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.
	In Europe, we partner with 46 fact-checking organisations, covering 36 languages. This includes 29 partners covering 26 countries and 23 different languages in the EU.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis
Israel – Hamas War
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]:   In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the Israel – Hamas War.
Mitigations in place or planned - at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]:   In the wake of the 07/10/2023 terrorist attacks in Israel and Israel's response in Gaza, expert teams from across Meta took immediate crisis response measures, while protecting people's ability to use our apps to shed light on important developments happening on the ground. As we did so, we were guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, the protection of the dignity of victims, and the right to non-discrimination - as well as balancing those with the right to freedom of expression. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to prioritise and mitigate the most salient human rights risks: in this case, that people may use Meta platforms to further inflame an already violent conflict. We also looked to international humanitarian law (IHL) as an important source of reference for assessing online conduct. We have provided a public overview of our efforts related to the war in our Newsroom. The following are some examples of the specific steps we have taken:

Taking Action on Violating Content:

- We quickly established a dedicated crisis response staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. This allows us to remove content that violates our Community Standards faster, and serves as another line of defence against misinformation.
- We continue to enforce our policies around <u>Dangerous Organisations and Individuals</u>, <u>Violent and Graphic Content</u>, <u>Hate Speech</u>, <u>Violence and Incitement</u>, <u>Bullying and Harassment</u>, and <u>Coordinating Harm</u>.

Safety and Security:

- In addition to this, our teams have detected and taken down a cluster of activity linked to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) and <u>attributed</u> to Hamas in 2021. These fake accounts attempted to re-establish their presence on our platforms.
- In <u>Q3 2024</u>, we also removed 15 Facebook accounts, 15 Pages, and 6 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in Lebanon and targeted primarily Israel. This network posted original content in Hebrew about news and geopolitical events in Israel with generic hashtags like #Israel, #Jerusalem, #Netanyahu, among others. It included posts about Israel's dependence on US support, claims that Israeli people are leaving the country, claims of food shortages in Israel, and criticism of the Israeli government and its military strikes in the Middle East.
- We <u>memorialise accounts</u> when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

Reducing the Spread of Misinformation:

- We're working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, Reuters and Fatabyyano. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
- We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
- We're also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers.
- We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

User Controls:
We continue to provide <u>tools</u> to help people control their experience on our apps and protect themselves from content they don't want to see. These include but aren't limited to:

- Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
- Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
- Comment controls: You can <u>control</u> who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
- Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook.
- Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed.
- Sensitive Content Control: Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations.

More detail on these tools can be found in the chapter sections below.

Oversight Board cases:
The Oversight Board remains another avenue for review of Meta's crisis response, and during the reporting period the Board has reviewed and decided on 2 cases relating to the Hamas-Israel war. Details of these cases can be found here:

- https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/bun-kobfl44h/
- https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/bun-86tj0rk5/

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

For the duration of the ongoing crisis, Meta has taken various actions to mitigate the possible content risks emerging from the crisis. This includes, inter alia, under the Dangerous Organisations and Individuals Policy, removes imagery depicting the moment an identifiable individual is abducted, unless such imagery is shared in the context of condemnation or a call to release, in which case we allow with a Mark as Disturbing (MAD) interstitial; and, remove Hamas-produced imagery for hostages in captivity in all contexts. Meta has some further discretion policies which may be applied when content is escalated to us.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Political Advertising

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

AI Generated or altered SIEP ads disclosure (Commitment 3)	Meta announced in November 2023 an AI Disclosure policy to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. This policy went into effect in early 2024 and is required globally.

	Advertisers now have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to: ● Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or ● Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or ● Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video or audio recording of the event.
	Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the Ad Library. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser. The AI Disclosure policy helps inform people about digitally altered or created Ads. This way, people will be more aware about the authenticity of messaging, which will help combat Disinformation.

Integrity of Services

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.	
Removing a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour Network (Commitment 14, Commitment 16)	In Q3, 2024, we removed 15 Facebook accounts, 15 Pages, and 6 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in Lebanon and targeted primarily Israel. This network posted original content in Hebrew about news and geopolitical events in Israel with generic hashtags like #Israel, #Jerusalem, #Netanyahu, among others. It included posts about Israel's dependence on US support, claims that Israeli people are leaving the country, claims of food shortages in Israel, and criticism of the Israeli government and its military strikes in the Middle East.
	We removed this network before it was able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

Empowering Users

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Warning Screens on sensitive content, Sensitive Content Control	The 07/10/2023 attack by Hamas was designated as a Terrorist Attack under Meta's Dangerous Organisation and Individuals policy. Consistent with that designation, we removed all content showing identifiable victims at the moment of the attack. Following that, people began sharing this type of footage in order to raise awareness and condemn the attacks. Meta's goal is to allow people to express themselves while still removing harmful content. In turn, we began allowing people to post this type of footage within that context only, with the addition of a warning screen to inform users that it may be disturbing. If the user's intent in sharing the content is unclear, we err on the side of safety and remove it.

and Facebook Reduce: (Commitment 17)	However, there are additional protections in place to ensure people have choices when it comes to this content. Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. We try not to recommend sensitive content in these places by default, but people can also choose to see less, to further reduce the possibility of seeing this content from accounts they don't follow. Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed. Or if preferred, they can turn many of these demotions off entirely. They can also choose to maintain Meta's current demotions.
	These actions ensure that we balance the protection of voice with removing harmful content. In this context, it has allowed for important discussion and condemnation of violence, while also empowering people to make choices in reaction to the content they see on Facebook and Instagram.
Hidden words Filter (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	When turned on, Hidden Words filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments, so people never have to see them. People can customise this list, to make sure the terms they find offensive are hidden.
	Hidden Words help people choose offensive terms and phrases to hide, so they are protected from seeing them.
Limits (Commitment 18, Commitment 19,)	When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
	This tool gives people choice about DM and requests they receive, which may be important when engaging online around sensitive topics.
Comment Controls (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	People can control who can comment on their posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
	This tool gives people control over engagement with what they post on Facebook and Instagram.
Show more Show less: (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	Show More, Show Less gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. Selecting "Show more" will temporarily increase the amount of content that is like the post a user gave feedback on, while selecting "Show Less" means a user will temporarily see fewer posts like the one that feedback was given on. This tool provides people with more direct control over what they see, which is important for protecting people's well-being during high profile crisis events.

	Empowering the Research Community
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Content Library and API tools (Commitment 26)	As we previously reported, Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and API tools to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date. Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.
	Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements.

	Empowering the Fact-Checking Community
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection (Commitment 30)	Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, Reuters and Fatabyyano. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
	When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
Content Warning Labels Commitment 31)	Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.
	Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election
National Elections

Over many years, Meta has developed a comprehensive approach for elections on its platforms. While each election is unique, we have used our experience working on more than 200 elections around the world to build a robust election program that includes mature processes, tools, and policies to protect speech on our platform and safeguard the integrity of the elections. We continuously improve these measures to make sure they remain responsive to risks as they emerge, and we have reinforced these efforts in light of the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act, the Election Guidelines, and our commitments under this Code.

We outlined our comprehensive approach for elections, and its particular relevance to the 2024 European Parliament ("EP") elections, in our public post-elections report for the EP elections available on our Transparency Center. This work continued in earnest for the snap legislative elections in France, which were called on 9 June 2024 following the results of the EP elections, and which occurred shortly thereafter. Additionally, similar efforts were made for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Romania, held on 24 November 2024, and 1 December 2024, respectively.

Our comprehensive approach for elections was outlined in our public post-elections report for the EP elections available on our Transparency Center. Meta's approach to elections is outlined in full across the following pillars:

1. Utilising and deploying our policies, and our overall content moderation efforts, to remove policy-violating content and help keep people safe on our platforms
2. Our election risk management processes
3. Cooperation with external stakeholders
4. Tools to support civic engagement
5. Preventing interference and disinformation
6. Reducing the spread of misinformation
7. Safeguards and transparency efforts related to political advertising
8. Responsible approach to Generative AI

This work continued in earnest for the European National elections, including snap legislative elections in France. Below we provide a summarised overview of support for the legislative elections in France and the impact of our efforts during this period, with the focus on 2 key aspects, which are:

- Cooperation with external stakeholders in advance of the elections:
    - Working Group on Elections & Rapid Response System
    - Engagement with national authorities
- Our work in the Generative AI space

Cooperation with External Stakeholders

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

France: Pre-Election Engagements with National Authorities and Civil Society:
As part of the Working Group, Meta participated in the various sessions organised ahead of the legislative elections in France to discuss election readiness with the signatories of the EU CoP on Disinformation, including fact checkers and civil society organisations. In these engagements, along with other signatory platforms, we presented the efforts

and tools we were deploying to fight against misinformation and foreign interference, and to provide more transparency on political ads. In addition, we shared information on our civic products aimed at informing users. Meta also responded to questions from the different participants on escalation channels and approaches.

Digital Service Coordinator ("DSC") – Arcom:
Meta conducted outreach and delivered comprehensive training to Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique (Arcom), as France's appointed DSC. Arcom, as well as other onboarded DSCs, have access to Meta's government reporting channels.

We provided step-by-step guidance to help Arcom navigate the "Single Point of Contact" (SPOC) Form for EU Member States' authorities, the EU Commission, and the EU Board for Digital Services, as well as the onboarding process, where required, in order to access the relevant contact forms. During the electoral period, we received no reports from Arcom through this dedicated reporting channel.

We have a long-standing relationship with Arcom and are in regular touch on various topics. We maintained continuous communication and engagement ahead of the EP elections through regular check-ins on election preparedness. In addition, we joined the industry roundtable hosted by Arcom on 2 May 2024 in their headquarters, along with VIGINUM (France's agency in charge of tackling online foreign interference) and other tech platforms to present our work on election integrity, with a particular focus on misinformation and foreign interference.

Meta also participated in a roundtable co-organised by Arcom, the European Commission, and VIGINUM on 24 June 2024 ahead of the election, bringing together industry partners to discuss elections preparations and mitigations to address systemic risks around the French snap elections. Meta continued direct engagements with Arcom throughout the electoral period.

VIGINUM:
In addition to our engagements with VIGINUM at the roundtables discussed above, we held an engagement with them on 21 May 2024 to discuss our investments to prevent foreign interference, protect the elections, and establish the appropriate communication channels between our teams to ensure we could identify and tackle potential operations efficiently.

Political Parties:
Ahead of the EP elections, Meta organised training sessions and office hours on our policies and products with French government organisations, political parties, and civil society organisations. Political parties were provided an email alias to contact for any urgent escalations around the election. We additionally launched an EU Election Center (https://www.facebook.com/government-nonprofits/eu) in all 24 EU official languages, including French, to support our government partners. For the legislative elections in France, these same resources were available and further office hours were offered to ensure provision of best practices and support.

Romania
As part of the elections preparations efforts, Meta has engaged with a full range of Romanian stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures and hear their concerns. Engagements with government and non government partners started ahead of the 2024 EP Elections, and continue at this point in time.

- **Romanian government stakeholders:** We are in regular contact with the AnCOM (Romanian Digital Service Coordinator), the Ministry of Digitalisation, the Electoral Body and the Romanian Cybersecurity agency on elections related topics . All of them are onboarded to our direct escalation channels, where they have been reporting content to us.

- **Election Engagements with the European Commission, National Authorities and Civil Society:** Similar to what we did in France, Meta participated in the various sessions organised ahead and after the 2024 elections to discuss election readiness with the signatories of the EU CoP on Disinformation, including fact checkers and civil society organisations. In these engagements, along with other signatory platforms, we presented the efforts and tools we were deploying to fight against

misinformation and foreign interference, and to provide more transparency on political ads. In addition, we shared information on our civic products aimed at informing users. Meta also responded to questions from the different participants on escalation channels and approaches.

Working Group on Elections & Rapid Response System:

Meta is also an active member of the EU Code of Practice ("CoP") on Disinformation Taskforce's Working Group on Elections and took part in its <u>Rapid Response System</u>. This was first piloted for the European Parliamentary elections and the CoP Taskforce decided to have it in place for the legislative elections in France as well.

France
As part of the Working Group, Meta participated in the various sessions organised ahead of the legislative elections in France to discuss election readiness with the signatories of the EU CoP on Disinformation, including fact checkers and civil society organisations. In these engagements, along with other signatory platforms, we presented the efforts and tools we were deploying to fight against misinformation and foreign interference, and to provide more transparency on political ads. Meta also responded to questions from the different participants on escalation channels and approaches.

Romania
Rapid Alert System: Meta participated in the Rapid Alert system and has been in regular touch with civil society organisations from Romania, through various meetings and roundtables organised by the Disinfo working group. Meta created a direct escalation channel for five Romanian partners to report Community Standards violations, and unlawful content.

Political parties: Meta started engaging with Romanian Political Parties already in advance to the European Parliamentary Elections. Ahead of the 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, Meta organised online training sessions on our policies and products and provided, and on how to contact Meta in case of an escalation.

Responsible Approach to Gen AI

Meta's approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for the EU national elections.

Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling:

Meta's Community Standards and <u>Advertising Standards</u> apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by Meta's third-party fact-checking partners, whose <u>rating options</u> allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is created or edited by AI.

Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney, and Shutterstock that users post to Facebook and Instagram.

Meta has begun labelling a wider range of video, audio, and image content when we detect industry-standard AI image indicators or when users disclose that they're uploading AI-generated content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context.

Political Ads and Meta's AI Disclosure Policy:

Meta announced in <u>November 2023</u> a disclosure policy to help people understand when a SIEP ad (as described in Section 6) on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. This policy went into effect in January 2024 and was active during the legislative elections in France.

Advertisers have to disclose whenever a SIEP ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:

- Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or

- Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or

- Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video or audio recording of the event.

If advertisers do not disclose these specified scenarios, the ad may be disapproved. Repeated failure to disclose may result in further penalties to the account.

AI Content Around the French Elections:
As a result of our policies and measures relating to AI-generated content, between 1 June - 21 July 2024, over 50 SIEP ads created by users in France across Facebook and Instagram were labelled with the "digitally created" AI disclaimer as a result of self-disclosure, providing enhanced transparency to users.

SIEP Ads and Enforcement Around the French Elections:
The below table shows information on the number of ads accepted and run with SIEP disclaimers as well as the number of ads removed for non-compliance with Meta's SIEP policy between 1 June - 21 July 2024, where the inferred advertiser location at the time of enforcement was France. This reflects application of the above mentioned policies and measures.

Number of SIEP ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Over 10,000
Number of SIEP ads removed for not complying with our SIEP ads policy on Facebook and Instagram combined	Over 20,000

Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration:

Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the <u>Partnership on AI</u>, for example, and signed onto <u>the tech accord</u> designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2024 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions		
All the measures outlined in this report are in place ahead of the European Parliament elections, as well as national elections. In addition, we have the policy change outlined below.		
Policy	**Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)**	**Rationale**
Prohibited Ads Policy	We've established <u>measures</u> in which ads related to voting around elections (this includes primary, general, special, and run-off elections) are subject to additional prohibitions and will be rejected if in violation of our policies. This policy applies to the Member States of the EU.	Ads targeting the EU with the following content aren't allowed: - Ads that discourage people from voting in an election. This includes ads that portray voting as useless/meaningless and/or advise people not to vote. - Ads that call into question the legitimacy of an upcoming or ongoing election. - Ads with premature claims of election victory. This prohibition includes ads that call into question the legitimacy of the methods and processes of elections, as well as their outcomes.
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
The measures outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 of this report were in place for the European national elections. They were complemented by the prohibited ads policy outlined above. Most pertinently, under these policies, content that is fact-checked cannot be used for an ad under our <u>Advertising Standards</u>.		
Political Advertising		
We continue to enforce our policy for <u>Ads about social issues, elections or politics</u> ("SIEP ads") as outlined in chapters 4 to 13 of this report. As a result of those policies and measures, we removed over 20,000 SIEP ads in France around the time of the French elections for non-compliance with Meta's SIEP policy.		
Policy updates regarding digitally altered content	Meta helps users understand when a social issue, election or political advertisement on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. Advertisers must disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to: ● Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or ● Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or	

	● Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event.

Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the Ad Library. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser. |
| | The expected impact of this policy is to increase users' awareness of when they are viewing advertisements related to social issues, elections or politics that are digitally altered. It will also increase the transparency of these ads by requiring that advertisers disclose this information. |

Integrity of Services

All the measures outlined in Chapters 14 to 16 of this report were in place ahead of the European national elections.

Empowering Users

All the measures outlined in Chapters 17 to 25 of this report to combat disinformation and misinformation were in place ahead of the European national elections. In addition, we had the measures outlined below.

Reminders	We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on both Facebook and Instagram, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote.
	For the legislative elections in France, the 'Election Day Information' feature ran between 29 - 30 June, and 6 - 7 July 2024 and directed users to a voting information page on the Ministry of the Interior's website. Users in metropolitan France and overseas territories clicked on these in-app notifications more than 599K times on Facebook and more than 496K times on Instagram, as shown in the table below:

	Facebook Clicks	Instagram Clicks
Election Day Information	Over 599,000	Over 496,000

Media Literacy Partnerships	Around the EP elections, Meta engaged in several media literacy efforts. This included two campaigns in France to combat misinformation and prevent electoral interference: A collaboration with the local fact-checking partner AFP Fact Check, producing a Reel video featuring popular French astronaut Thomas Pesquet reviewing a series of pictures and videos that had been shared online as hoaxes. He explains best practices and tools people should leverage when faced with a piece of news that seems unlikely. According to AFP, the videos resulted in nearly 2.5 million views on Instagram and Facebook. Participation in a multi-platform campaign operated by the French partner NGO Génération Numérique, consisting of a series of educational short videos gathering tips and recommendations on avoiding becoming a victim of misinformation. According to Génération Numérique, the videos reached over 200k users and generated nearly 300k impressions on Instagram and Facebook alone.
	Additional efforts included wider campaigns with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) on how to spot AI-generated and digitally altered media, with the European Disability Forum (EDF). We refer readers to our EP post-elections report for further detail on these and other initiatives. Ahead of the French legislative elections, Meta continued this investment in media literacy by launching a campaign on Meta owned channels (Facebook and Instagram). This campaign aimed to increase awareness of the tools and processes that Meta deploys on its own platforms (Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) in advance of an election, to help inform French users how Meta works to combat misinformation, prevent electoral interference, and protect electoral candidates. The campaign ran from 20 June until 4 July 2024, a few days before the second round of the election. It reached 2.1 million users in France, generating 10.6 million impressions.
Training political candidates	Ahead of the EP elections, Meta organised training sessions and office hours on our policies and products with French government organisations, political parties, and civil society organisations. Political parties were provided an email alias to contact for any urgent escalations around the election. We additionally launched an EU Election Center (https://www.facebook.com/government-nonprofits/eu) in all 24 EU official languages, including French, to support our government partners. For the legislative elections in France, these same resources were available and further office hours were offered to ensure provision of best practices and support.

Empowering the Research Community

Since 2023, researchers in Europe have had access to the Meta Content Library, enabling them to study various topics, including disinformation.

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

In France, as a result of our misinformation policies and measures, we labelled over 1.8 million pieces of content on Facebook, and over 65K pieces of content on Instagram, with fact checks in the month leading up to and including the electoral period.

Content Treated with Misinformation Labels Around the French Elections

The below table shows information on content viewed by users in France which was treated with misinformation labels on Facebook and Instagram between 1 June – 21 July, 2024, as well as attempted reshares.

	Facebook	Instagram
Content treated with fact checks after being rated by 3PFCs	Over 1,800,000	Over 65,000
% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content	55.9%	46.6%

In addition, we had the measures outlined below.

Policy expansion to EFCSN	Additional efforts included wider campaigns with the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) on how to spot AI-generated and digitally altered media, with the European Disability Forum (EDF).