

Code of Practice on  
Disinformation – Report of  
Resolver (formerly Crisp) for  
the period January –  
December 2024

## Table of Content

<b>Executive summary</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>Guidelines for filling out the report</b> .....	<b>5</b>
Commitment 29.....	7
Commitment 37.....	8

## Executive summary

In early 2024, Crisp rebranded to Resolver. Our commitment to our mission of making the internet a safer place remains unwavering throughout this change, and we remain dedicated to safeguarding online platforms and individuals. We look forward to continuing our work in the Trust & Safety space as we take this next step in our journey.

Resolver (formerly Crisp), a Kroll business, stands at the forefront of risk intelligence, safeguarding over \$6.5 trillion in market cap for more than 1,000 global companies. Leveraging AI with deep human expertise, our innovative Risk Intelligence Platform provides comprehensive visibility into enterprise-wide risks, enabling prioritised, timely, and agile responses. Trusted for our comprehensive solutions, we help organisations thrive in the face of adversity and safeguard operations, brand, and bottom line.

Backed by our expert team with nearly two decades of experience, we allow platforms to scale capacity and proactively safeguard online communities and reputations. We provide ongoing, comprehensive protection against online risks, tailored to meet current and evolving needs.

Through our Moderation for Platforms solution, Resolver secures platforms from harmful content, reduces unwanted behaviour and allows platform communities to thrive. Through our Platform Risk Intelligence solution, we provide actionable insights to proactively manage risks and address policy gaps while maintaining reputation.

Resolver remains committed to the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, which can be summarised as the following updates on specific commitments undertaken in 2024:

### **Commitment 29 (empowering the research community):**

2024 was forecast to be the most significant year for elections in history, with more than 4 billion people eligible to vote and as expected, Resolver observed significant volumes of politically motivated content being uploaded to social media, be that via user generated content (UGC) or ad placement on platforms. Our work in monitoring mis/disinformation as it relates to global events, notably elections, continues. The majority of work undertaken by Resolver at this time centred on election-related mis/disinformation; however, our research and reporting on the sphere of medical misinformation continued as well.

Generally the types of content Resolver observed were the types expected during election cycles, notable trends were; content aimed at undermining a politician's ability or eligibility to perform their role, content alleging political malpractice, content attempting to undermine political processes such as voting, content aiming to link politicians to historic crimes or content from hostile states which attempted to sow discord among third party populations.

In general, hostile state activity in 2024 was much more overt than that which had been observed in previous elections, with clear attempts to influence another country's elections via social media campaigns, often including manipulated content; such as GenAI content in France's EU campaigning period where individuals had been manufactured using AI and sophisticated voice manipulation. The most high profile example of hostile state involvement in third party elections was in Romania.

Despite a much more overt approach from hostile state groups to influence elections, the greatest risk remained that posed by misinformed and homegrown groups. In the US for example, groups attempted to seed the idea of election fraud in the weeks approaching November 5th, in what was almost certainly a campaign to justify post election violence in the event of a Trump loss, which ultimately did not transpire.

**Commitment 37 (permanent task-force):**

Resolver remains committed to the permanent task-force.

## Guidelines for filling out the report

Reports are detailing how signatories have implemented their Commitments under the Code and signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each signatory.

### Reporting period

The reporting period to be covered in the reports is 12 months for signatories who are not offering very large online platform services. Signatories shall submit reports outlining policy updates and actions taken to implement the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code. All data and policy updates should be reported for 12 months period from the submission of last reports.

### Adjusting the reporting template

Signatories who are not offering very large online platform services can adapt the template to specific commitments and measures they subscribed to. This may include adapted wording for commitments, measures, QREs and SLIs. Relevant signatories will report only on commitments and measures they subscribed to and provide Member State-level data only if feasible.

### Reporting per Service

When filling in a report for several services, use colour codes to clearly distinguish between services. At the beginning of the report, clarify what colour is used for which service.

### Reporting in text form

Reporting in the form of written text is required for several parts of the report. Most of them are accompanied by a target character limit. Please stick to the target character limit as much as possible. We encourage you to use bullet points and short sentences. When providing information to the QRE, please make sure that your answer covers all the elements of the associated commitment and measure. Links should only be used to provide examples or to illustrate the point. They should not be used to replace explanations or to provide data in the forms. All relevant explanations and data must be included in the report directly, in written form.

### Reporting SLIs and data

Reporting on SLIs requires quantitative information to be reported on in this harmonised reporting template.

- Where relevant and feasible, SLIs should be reported on per Member State.
- If no data is available on Member State level, SLIs might, instead, be exceptionally reported on per language. (NB that signatories agreed to revisit this issue after the first reporting, to ensure harmonised and meaningful reporting.)
- Please report data in the format provided by the harmonised reporting template, not through external links. Please use the Member State/language template provided in the harmonised reporting template. Where the table asks for "Other relevant metrics", please name the metric that you would like to report on in addition to the ones already provided. You may include more than the number of additional fields provided where necessary; in that case, please adjust the table as needed.
- Please contextualize all data as much as possible, i.e. include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualize the SLIs (e.g. number of pieces of content labelled out of what volume of content).
- If there are no relevant metrics to report on, please leave the respective columns blank.

### Reporting on TTPs

If subscribed to Commitment 14, Integrity of Services, we ask you to report on each identified TTP individually. The number of identified TTPs may vary per service. Where more than one TTP are reported under the same action, clarify the reasoning in the methodology. Where input is not provided, keep the placeholder for the relevant TTP and explain reasons and planned remedial action. Additionally, as with all other SLIs, data can be provided per Member State for each individual TTP.

### Missing Data

In case that at the time of reporting there is no data available yet, the data is insufficient, or the methodology is lacking, please outline in the dedicated field (i.e. in the field about further implementation measures planned) how this will be addressed over the upcoming six months, being as specific as possible.

Signatories are encouraged to provide insights about the data/numbers they provide by inserting possible explanations in the boxes of the template "*Methodology of data measurement & insights on data provided*". This should aim to explain the why of what is being reported, for instance – *Are there trends or curiosities that could*

*require or use contextual explanation? What may be driving the change or the difference in the number? Please also indicate inconsistencies or gaps regarding methodology in the dedicated box.*

## Attachments

We ask you not to enclose any additional attachments to the harmonised reporting template.

## Crisis and elections reporting template

Relevant signatories are asked to provide proportionate and appropriate information and data during a period of crisis and during an election. Reporting is a part of a special chapter at the end of the harmonised reporting template and should follow the guidelines:

- The reporting of signatories' actions should be as specific to the particular crisis or election reported on as possible. To this extent, the rows on "Specific Action[s]" should be filled in with actions that are either put in place specifically for a particular event (for example a media literacy campaign on disinformation related to the Ukraine war, an information panel for the European elections), or to explain in more detail how an action that forms part of the service's general approach to implementing the Code is implemented in the specific context of the crisis or election reported on (for example, what types of narratives in a particular election/crisis would fall into scope of a particular policy of the service, what forms of advertising are ineligible).
- Signatories who are not offering very large online platform services and who follow the invitation to report on their specific actions for a particular election or crisis may adapt the reporting template as follows:
  - They may remove the "Policies and Terms and Conditions" section of the template, or use it to report on any important changes in their internal rules applicable to a particular election or crisis (for example, a change in editorial guidelines for fact-checkers specific to the particular election or crisis)
  - They may remove any Chapter Section of the Reporting Template (Scrutiny of Ads Placement, Political Advertising, Integrity of Services etc.) that is not relevant to their activities
- The harmonised reporting template should be filled in by adding additional rows for each item reported on. This means that rather than combined/bulk reporting such as "Depending on severity of violation, we demote or remove content based on policies X, Y, Z", there should be individual rows stating for example "Under Policy X, content is demoted or removed based on severity", "Under Policy Y, content [...]" etc.
- The rows should be colour-coded to indicate which service is being reported on, using the same colour code as for the overall harmonised reporting template.

Reporting should be brief and to the point, with a suggested character limit entry of 2000 characters.

## Uploading data to the Transparency Centre

The reports should be submitted to the Commission in the form of the pdf via e-mail to the address CNECT COP TASK FORCE [CNECT-COP-TASK-FORCE@ec.europa.eu](mailto:CNECT-COP-TASK-FORCE@ec.europa.eu) within the agreed deadline. Signatories will upload all data from the harmonised reporting template to the Transparency Centre, allowing easy data access and filtering within the agreed deadline. It is the responsibility of the signatories to ensure that the uploading takes place and is executed on time. Signatories are also responsible to ensure that the Transparency Centre is operational and functional by the time of the reports' submission that the data from the reports are uploaded and made accessible in the Transparency Centre within the above deadline, and that users are able to read, search, filter and download data as needed in a user-friendly way and format.

## VI. Empowering the research community

### Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences. [change wording if adapted]

Measure 29.1	
<b>QRE 29.1.1</b>	<p>2024 was forecast to be the most significant year for elections in history, with more than 4 billion people eligible to vote and as expected, Resolver observed significant volumes of politically motivated content being uploaded to social media, be that via user generated content (UGC) or ad placement on platforms. Our work in monitoring mis/disinformation as it relates to global events, notably elections, continues. The majority of work undertaken by Resolver at this time centred on election-related mis/disinformation; however, our research and reporting on the sphere of medical misinformation continued as well.</p> <p>Generally the types of content Resolver observed were the types expected during election cycles, notable trends were; content aimed at undermining a politician's ability or eligibility to perform their role, content alleging political malpractice, content attempting to undermine political processes such as voting, content aiming to link politicians to historic crimes or content from hostile states which attempted to sow discord among third party populations.</p> <p>In general, hostile state activity in 2024 was much more overt than that which had been observed in previous elections, with clear attempts to influence another country's elections via social media campaigns, often including manipulated content; such as GenAI content in France's EU campaigning period where individuals had been manufactured using AI and sophisticated voice manipulation. The most high profile example of hostile state involvement in third party elections was in Romania.</p> <p>Despite a much more overt approach from hostile state groups to influence elections, the greatest risk remained that posed by misinformed and homegrown groups. In the US for example, groups attempted to seed the idea of election fraud in the weeks approaching November 5th, in what was almost certainly a campaign to justify post election violence in the event of a Trump loss, which ultimately did not transpire.</p>
<b>SLI 29.1.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects</b>	<p>No mis/disinformation research projects made public in 2024</p> <p>See above</p>
<b>Data</b>	
Measure 29.2	
<b>QRE 29.2.1</b>	Not measurable during 2024
<b>QRE 29.2.2</b>	Not measurable during 2024
<b>QRE 29.2.3</b>	Not measurable during 2024
<b>SLI 29.2.1</b>	n/a

	No mis/disinformation research projects made public in 2024
<b>Data</b>	
Measure 29.3	
<b>QRE 29.3.1</b>	Not applicable in 2024 work
<b>SLI 29.3.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects</b> [change wording if adapted]	No mis/disinformation research projects made public in 2024 n/a
<b>Data</b>	

<b>IX. Permanent Task-Force</b>	
<b>Commitment 37</b>	
Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus. [change wording if adapted]	
Measure 37.1	See QRE 37.6.1
Measure 37.2	See QRE 37.6.1
Measure 37.3	See QRE 37.6.1
Measure 37.4	See QRE 37.6.1
Measure 37.5	See QRE 37.6.1
Measure 37.6	See QRE 37.6.1
<b>QRE 37.6.1</b>	Resolver remains committed to the permanent task-force.